| e30aa03d | 09-Apr-2026 |
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> |
x86/virt: Treat SVM as unsupported when running as an SEV+ guest
When running as an SEV+ guest, treat SVM as unsupported even if CPUID (and
other reporting, e.g. MSRs) enumerate support for SVM, as
x86/virt: Treat SVM as unsupported when running as an SEV+ guest
When running as an SEV+ guest, treat SVM as unsupported even if CPUID (and
other reporting, e.g. MSRs) enumerate support for SVM, as KVM doesn't
support nested virtualization within an SEV VM (KVM would need to
explicitly share all VMCBs and other assets with the untrusted host), let
alone running nested VMs within SEV-ES+ guests (e.g. emulating VMLOAD,
VMSAVE, and VMRUN all require access to guest register state). And outside
of KVM, there is no in-tree user of SVM enabling.
Arguably, the hypervisor/VMM (e.g. QEMU) should clear SVM from guest CPUID
for SEV VMs, especially for SEV-ES+, but super duper technically, it's
feasible to run nested VMs in SEV+ guests (with many caveats). More
importantly, Linux-as-a-guest has played nice with SVM being advertised to
SEV+ guests for a long time.
Treating SVM as unsupported fixes a regression where a clean shutdown of
an SEV-ES+ guest degrades into an abrupt termination. Due to a gnarly
virtualization hole in SEV-ES (the architecture), where EFER must NOT be
intercepted by the hypervisor (because the untrusted hypervisor can't set
e.g. EFER.LME on behalf o the guest), the _host's_ EFER.SVME is visible to
the guest. Because EFER.SVME must be always '1' while in guest mode,
Linux-the-guest sees EFER.SVME=1 even when _its_ EFER.SVME is '0', thinks
it has enabled virtualization, and ultimately can cause
x86_svm_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu() to execute STGI to ensure
GIF is enabled. Executing STGI _should_ be fine, except Linux is a also
wee bit paranoid when running as an SEV-ES guest.
Because L0 sees EFER.SVME=0 for the guest, a well-behaved L0 hypervisor
will intercept STGI (to inject #UD), and thus generate a #VC on the STGI.
Which, again, should be fine. Unfortunately, vc_check_opcode_bytes() fails
to account for STGI and other SVM instructions, throws a fatal error, and
triggers a termination request. In a perfect world, the #VC handler would
be more forgiving of unknown intercepts, especially when the #VC happened
on an instruction with exception fixup. For now, just fix the immediate
regression.
Fixes: 428afac5a8ea ("KVM: x86: Move bulk of emergency virtualizaton logic to virt subsystem")
Reported-by: Srikanth Aithal <sraithal@amd.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/c820e242-9f3a-4210-b414-19d11b022404@amd.com
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260409191341.1932853-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
show more ...
|
| 7b2bc5f0 | 24-Mar-2026 |
Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org> |
x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move HSAVE_PA setup to arch/x86/
Now that there is snp_prepare() that indicates when the CCP driver wants to
prepare the architecture for SNP_INIT(_EX), move this architecture-s
x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move HSAVE_PA setup to arch/x86/
Now that there is snp_prepare() that indicates when the CCP driver wants to
prepare the architecture for SNP_INIT(_EX), move this architecture-specific
bit of code to a more sensible place.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324161301.1353976-6-tycho@kernel.org
show more ...
|
| 299933b1 | 24-Mar-2026 |
Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org> |
x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move SNP init to ccp driver
Use the new snp_prepare() to initialize SNP from the ccp driver instead of at
boot time. This means that SNP is not enabled unless it is really going
x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move SNP init to ccp driver
Use the new snp_prepare() to initialize SNP from the ccp driver instead of at
boot time. This means that SNP is not enabled unless it is really going to be
used (i.e. kvm_amd loads the ccp driver automatically).
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324161301.1353976-5-tycho@kernel.org
show more ...
|
| b65546b1 | 24-Mar-2026 |
Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org> |
x86/sev: Create snp_shutdown()
After SNP_SHUTDOWN, two things should be done:
1. clear the RMP table
2. disable MFDM to prevent the FW_WARN in k8_check_syscfg_dram_mod_en() in
the event of a kex
x86/sev: Create snp_shutdown()
After SNP_SHUTDOWN, two things should be done:
1. clear the RMP table
2. disable MFDM to prevent the FW_WARN in k8_check_syscfg_dram_mod_en() in
the event of a kexec
Create and export to the CCP driver a function that does them.
Also change the MFDM helper to allow for disabling the bit, since the SNP x86
shutdown path needs to disable MFDM.
The comment for k8_check_syscfg_dram_mod_en() notes, the "BIOS" is supposed
clear it, or the kernel in the case of module unload and shutdown followed by
kexec.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324161301.1353976-4-tycho@kernel.org
show more ...
|
| ca2ca373 | 26-Mar-2026 |
Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org> |
x86/sev: Create snp_prepare()
In preparation for delayed SNP initialization, create a function snp_prepare()
that does the necessary architecture setup. Export this function for the ccp
module to a
x86/sev: Create snp_prepare()
In preparation for delayed SNP initialization, create a function snp_prepare()
that does the necessary architecture setup. Export this function for the ccp
module to allow it to do the setup as necessary.
Introduce a cpu_read_lock/unlock() wrapper around the MFDM and SNP enable.
While CPU hotplug is not supported, this makes sure that the bit setting
happens on the same set of CPUs in both cases.
This improvement was suggested by Sashiko:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho%40kernel.org
Also move {mfd,snp}_enable() out of the __init section, since these will be
called later.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326161110.1764303-3-tycho@kernel.org
show more ...
|
| 9c016c3f | 24-Mar-2026 |
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> |
x86/sev: Create a function to clear/zero the RMP
In preparation for delayed SNP initialization and disablement on shutdown,
create a function, clear_rmp(), that clears the RMP bookkeeping area and t
x86/sev: Create a function to clear/zero the RMP
In preparation for delayed SNP initialization and disablement on shutdown,
create a function, clear_rmp(), that clears the RMP bookkeeping area and the
RMP entries.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324161301.1353976-2-tycho@kernel.org
show more ...
|
| cca14942 | 09-Mar-2026 |
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> |
x86/virt/sev: Keep the RMP table bookkeeping area mapped
In preparation for delayed SNP initialization and disablement on shutdown, the
RMP will need to be cleared each time SNP is disabled. Maintai
x86/virt/sev: Keep the RMP table bookkeeping area mapped
In preparation for delayed SNP initialization and disablement on shutdown, the
RMP will need to be cleared each time SNP is disabled. Maintain the mapping to
the RMP bookkeeping area to avoid mapping and unmapping it each time and any
possible errors that may arise from that.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260309180053.2389118-4-tycho@kernel.org
show more ...
|
| 99cf1fb5 | 09-Mar-2026 |
Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org> |
x86/virt/sev: Drop WBINVD before setting MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN
WBINVD is required before SNP_INIT(_EX), but not before setting
MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN, since the ccp driver already does its own WB
x86/virt/sev: Drop WBINVD before setting MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN
WBINVD is required before SNP_INIT(_EX), but not before setting
MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN, since the ccp driver already does its own WBINVD
before SNP_INIT (and this one would be too early for that anyway...).
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260309180053.2389118-3-tycho@kernel.org
show more ...
|
| afe31de1 | 14-Feb-2026 |
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> |
x86/virt/tdx: Use ida_is_empty() to detect if any TDs may be running
Drop nr_configured_hkid and instead use ida_is_empty() to detect if any
HKIDs have been allocated/configured.
Suggested-by: Dan
x86/virt/tdx: Use ida_is_empty() to detect if any TDs may be running
Drop nr_configured_hkid and instead use ida_is_empty() to detect if any
HKIDs have been allocated/configured.
Suggested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260214012702.2368778-15-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
show more ...
|
| eac90a5b | 14-Feb-2026 |
Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> |
x86/virt/tdx: KVM: Consolidate TDX CPU hotplug handling
The core kernel registers a CPU hotplug callback to do VMX and TDX init
and deinit while KVM registers a separate CPU offline callback to bloc
x86/virt/tdx: KVM: Consolidate TDX CPU hotplug handling
The core kernel registers a CPU hotplug callback to do VMX and TDX init
and deinit while KVM registers a separate CPU offline callback to block
offlining the last online CPU in a socket.
Splitting TDX-related CPU hotplug handling across two components is odd
and adds unnecessary complexity.
Consolidate TDX-related CPU hotplug handling by integrating KVM's
tdx_offline_cpu() to the one in the core kernel.
Also move nr_configured_hkid to the core kernel because tdx_offline_cpu()
references it. Since HKID allocation and free are handled in the core
kernel, it's more natural to track used HKIDs there.
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260214012702.2368778-14-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
show more ...
|
| 9900400e | 14-Feb-2026 |
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> |
x86/virt/tdx: Tag a pile of functions as __init, and globals as __ro_after_init
Now that TDX-Module initialization is done during subsys init, tag all
related functions as __init, and relevant data
x86/virt/tdx: Tag a pile of functions as __init, and globals as __ro_after_init
Now that TDX-Module initialization is done during subsys init, tag all
related functions as __init, and relevant data as __ro_after_init.
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260214012702.2368778-13-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
show more ...
|
| 165e7735 | 14-Feb-2026 |
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> |
KVM: x86/tdx: Do VMXON and TDX-Module initialization during subsys init
Now that VMXON can be done without bouncing through KVM, do TDX-Module
initialization during subsys init (specifically before
KVM: x86/tdx: Do VMXON and TDX-Module initialization during subsys init
Now that VMXON can be done without bouncing through KVM, do TDX-Module
initialization during subsys init (specifically before module_init() so
that it runs before KVM when both are built-in). Aside from the obvious
benefits of separating core TDX code from KVM, this will allow tagging a
pile of TDX functions and globals as being __init and __ro_after_init.
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260214012702.2368778-12-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
show more ...
|
| 0efe5dc1 | 14-Feb-2026 |
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> |
x86/virt/tdx: Drop the outdated requirement that TDX be enabled in IRQ context
Remove TDX's outdated requirement that per-CPU enabling be done via IPI
function call, which was a stale artifact lefto
x86/virt/tdx: Drop the outdated requirement that TDX be enabled in IRQ context
Remove TDX's outdated requirement that per-CPU enabling be done via IPI
function call, which was a stale artifact leftover from early versions of
the TDX enablement series. The requirement that IRQs be disabled should
have been dropped as part of the revamped series that relied on a the KVM
rework to enable VMX at module load.
In other words, the kernel's "requirement" was never a requirement at all,
but instead a reflection of how KVM enabled VMX (via IPI callback) when
the TDX subsystem code was merged.
Note, accessing per-CPU information is safe even without disabling IRQs,
as tdx_online_cpu() is invoked via a cpuhp callback, i.e. from a per-CPU
thread.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZyJOiPQnBz31qLZ7@google.com
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260214012702.2368778-11-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
show more ...
|
| 8528a7f9 | 14-Feb-2026 |
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> |
x86/virt: Add refcounting of VMX/SVM usage to support multiple in-kernel users
Implement a per-CPU refcounting scheme so that "users" of hardware
virtualization, e.g. KVM and the future TDX code, ca
x86/virt: Add refcounting of VMX/SVM usage to support multiple in-kernel users
Implement a per-CPU refcounting scheme so that "users" of hardware
virtualization, e.g. KVM and the future TDX code, can co-exist without
pulling the rug out from under each other. E.g. if KVM were to disable
VMX on module unload or when the last KVM VM was destroyed, SEAMCALLs from
the TDX subsystem would #UD and panic the kernel.
Disable preemption in the get/put APIs to ensure virtualization is fully
enabled/disabled before returning to the caller. E.g. if the task were
preempted after a 0=>1 transition, the new task would see a 1=>2 and thus
return without enabling virtualization. Explicitly disable preemption
instead of requiring the caller to do so, because the need to disable
preemption is an artifact of the implementation. E.g. from KVM's
perspective there is no _need_ to disable preemption as KVM guarantees the
pCPU on which it is running is stable (but preemption is enabled).
Opportunistically abstract away SVM vs. VMX in the public APIs by using
X86_FEATURE_{SVM,VMX} to communicate what technology the caller wants to
enable and use.
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260214012702.2368778-10-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
show more ...
|
| 428afac5 | 14-Feb-2026 |
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> |
KVM: x86: Move bulk of emergency virtualizaton logic to virt subsystem
Move the majority of the code related to disabling hardware virtualization
in emergency from KVM into the virt subsystem so tha
KVM: x86: Move bulk of emergency virtualizaton logic to virt subsystem
Move the majority of the code related to disabling hardware virtualization
in emergency from KVM into the virt subsystem so that virt can take full
ownership of the state of SVM/VMX. This will allow refcounting usage of
SVM/VMX so that KVM and the TDX subsystem can enable VMX without stomping
on each other.
To route the emergency callback to the "right" vendor code, add to avoid
mixing vendor and generic code, implement a x86_virt_ops structure to
track the emergency callback, along with the SVM vs. VMX (vs. "none")
feature that is active.
To avoid having to choose between SVM and VMX, simply refuse to enable
either if both are somehow supported. No known CPU supports both SVM and
VMX, and it's comically unlikely such a CPU will ever exist.
Leave KVM's clearing of loaded VMCSes and MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA in KVM, via a
callback explicitly scoped to KVM. Loading VMCSes and saving/restoring
host state are firmly tied to running VMs, and thus are (a) KVM's
responsibility and (b) operations that are still exclusively reserved for
KVM (as far as in-tree code is concerned). I.e. the contract being
established is that non-KVM subsystems can utilize virtualization, but for
all intents and purposes cannot act as full-blown hypervisors.
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260214012702.2368778-9-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
show more ...
|
| 32d76cdf | 14-Feb-2026 |
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> |
KVM: SVM: Move core EFER.SVME enablement to kernel
Move the innermost EFER.SVME logic out of KVM and into to core x86 to land
the SVM support alongside VMX support. This will allow providing a more
KVM: SVM: Move core EFER.SVME enablement to kernel
Move the innermost EFER.SVME logic out of KVM and into to core x86 to land
the SVM support alongside VMX support. This will allow providing a more
unified API from the kernel to KVM, and will allow moving the bulk of the
emergency disabling insanity out of KVM without having a weird split
between kernel and KVM for SVM vs. VMX.
No functional change intended.
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260214012702.2368778-8-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
show more ...
|
| 920da4f7 | 14-Feb-2026 |
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> |
KVM: VMX: Move core VMXON enablement to kernel
Move the innermost VMXON+VMXOFF logic out of KVM and into to core x86 so
that TDX can (eventually) force VMXON without having to rely on KVM being
load
KVM: VMX: Move core VMXON enablement to kernel
Move the innermost VMXON+VMXOFF logic out of KVM and into to core x86 so
that TDX can (eventually) force VMXON without having to rely on KVM being
loaded, e.g. to do SEAMCALLs during initialization.
Opportunistically update the comment regarding emergency disabling via NMI
to clarify that virt_rebooting will be set by _another_ emergency callback,
i.e. that virt_rebooting doesn't need to be set before VMCLEAR, only
before _this_ invocation does VMXOFF.
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260214012702.2368778-7-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
show more ...
|
| 95e4adb2 | 14-Feb-2026 |
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> |
x86/virt: Force-clear X86_FEATURE_VMX if configuring root VMCS fails
If allocating and configuring a root VMCS fails, clear X86_FEATURE_VMX in
all CPUs so that KVM doesn't need to manually check roo
x86/virt: Force-clear X86_FEATURE_VMX if configuring root VMCS fails
If allocating and configuring a root VMCS fails, clear X86_FEATURE_VMX in
all CPUs so that KVM doesn't need to manually check root_vmcs. As added
bonuses, clearing VMX will reflect that VMX is unusable in /proc/cpuinfo,
and will avoid a futile auto-probe of kvm-intel.ko.
WARN if allocating a root VMCS page fails, e.g. to help users figure out
why VMX is broken in the unlikely scenario something goes sideways during
boot (and because the allocation should succeed unless there's a kernel
bug). Tweak KVM's error message to suggest checking kernel logs if VMX is
unsupported (in addition to checking BIOS).
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260214012702.2368778-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
show more ...
|
| 405b7c27 | 14-Feb-2026 |
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> |
KVM: VMX: Unconditionally allocate root VMCSes during boot CPU bringup
Allocate the root VMCS (misleading called "vmxarea" and "kvm_area" in KVM)
for each possible CPU during early boot CPU bringup,
KVM: VMX: Unconditionally allocate root VMCSes during boot CPU bringup
Allocate the root VMCS (misleading called "vmxarea" and "kvm_area" in KVM)
for each possible CPU during early boot CPU bringup, before early TDX
initialization, so that TDX can eventually do VMXON on-demand (to make
SEAMCALLs) without needing to load kvm-intel.ko. Allocate the pages early
on, e.g. instead of trying to do so on-demand, to avoid having to juggle
allocation failures at runtime.
Opportunistically rename the per-CPU pointers to better reflect the role
of the VMCS. Use Intel's "root VMCS" terminology, e.g. from various VMCS
patents[1][2] and older SDMs, not the more opaque "VMXON region" used in
recent versions of the SDM. While it's possible the VMCS passed to VMXON
no longer serves as _the_ root VMCS on modern CPUs, it is still in effect
a "root mode VMCS", as described in the patents.
Link: https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/c7/e4/32/d7a7def5580667/WO2013101191A1.pdf [1]
Link: https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/13/f6/8d/1361fab8c33373/US20080163205A1.pdf [2]
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260214012702.2368778-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
show more ...
|
| b5425f54 | 09-Jan-2026 |
Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> |
x86/virt/tdx: Print TDX module version during init
It is useful to print the TDX module version in dmesg logs. This is
currently the only way to determine the module version from the host. It
also c
x86/virt/tdx: Print TDX module version during init
It is useful to print the TDX module version in dmesg logs. This is
currently the only way to determine the module version from the host. It
also creates a record for any future problems being investigated. This
was also requested in [1].
Include the version in the log messages during init, e.g.:
virt/tdx: TDX module version: 1.5.24
virt/tdx: 1034220 KB allocated for PAMT
virt/tdx: module initialized
Print the version in get_tdx_sys_info(), right after the version
metadata is read, which makes it available even if there are subsequent
initialization failures.
Based on a patch by Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> [2]
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony.lindgren@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAGtprH8eXwi-TcH2+-Fo5YdbEwGmgLBh9ggcDvd6N=bsKEJ_WQ@mail.gmail.com/ # [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6b5553756f56a8e3222bfc36d0bdb3e5192137b7.1731318868.git.kai.huang@intel.com # [2]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260109-tdx_print_module_version-v2-2-e10e4ca5b450@intel.com
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