| 44e69ea5 | 15-Aug-2023 |
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> |
integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys
On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are
needed during early boot to verify signed third party modu
integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys
On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are
needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These
third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform
KeyStore (PKS).
Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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| 7b9de406 | 15-Aug-2023 |
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> |
integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c
trust_mok variable is accessed within a single function locally.
Change trust_mok from global to local static variable.
Signed-off-by: Nayn
integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c
trust_mok variable is accessed within a single function locally.
Change trust_mok from global to local static variable.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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| bc026676 | 15-Aug-2023 |
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> |
integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform
On non-UEFI platforms, handle restrict_link_by_ca failures differently.
Certificates which do not satisfy CA restrictions on non-
integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform
On non-UEFI platforms, handle restrict_link_by_ca failures differently.
Certificates which do not satisfy CA restrictions on non-UEFI platforms
are ignored.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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| 4b3e71e9 | 10-Feb-2023 |
Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc> |
integrity/powerpc: Support loading keys from PLPKS
Add support for loading keys from the PLPKS on pseries machines, with the
"ibm,plpks-sb-v1" format.
The object format is expected to be the same,
integrity/powerpc: Support loading keys from PLPKS
Add support for loading keys from the PLPKS on pseries machines, with the
"ibm,plpks-sb-v1" format.
The object format is expected to be the same, so there shouldn't be any
functional differences between objects retrieved on powernv or pseries.
Unlike on powernv, on pseries the format string isn't contained in the
device tree. Use secvar_ops->format() to fetch the format string in a
generic manner, rather than searching the device tree ourselves.
(The current code searches the device tree for a node compatible with
"ibm,edk2-compat-v1". This patch switches to calling secvar_ops->format(),
which in the case of OPAL/powernv means opal_secvar_format(), which
searches the device tree for a node compatible with "ibm,secvar-backend"
and checks its "format" property. These are equivalent, as skiboot creates
a node with both "ibm,edk2-compat-v1" and "ibm,secvar-backend" as
compatible strings.)
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-27-ajd@linux.ibm.com
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| 3d6ae1a5 | 26-Jan-2022 |
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> |
integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
With the introduction of uefi_check_trust_mok_keys, it signifies the end-
user wants to trust the machine keyring as truste
integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
With the introduction of uefi_check_trust_mok_keys, it signifies the end-
user wants to trust the machine keyring as trusted keys. If they have
chosen to trust the machine keyring, load the qualifying keys into it
during boot, then link it to the secondary keyring . If the user has not
chosen to trust the machine keyring, it will be empty and not linked to
the secondary keyring.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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| 74f5e300 | 26-Jan-2022 |
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> |
integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found
A new Machine Owner Key (MOK) variable called MokListTrustedRT has been
introduced in shim. When this UEFI variable is set, it indicates the
end-u
integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found
A new Machine Owner Key (MOK) variable called MokListTrustedRT has been
introduced in shim. When this UEFI variable is set, it indicates the
end-user has made the decision themselves that they wish to trust MOK keys
within the Linux trust boundary. It is not an error if this variable
does not exist. If it does not exist, the MOK keys should not be trusted
within the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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| 45fcd5e5 | 26-Jan-2022 |
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> |
integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys
Currently both Secure Boot DB and Machine Owner Keys (MOK) go through
the same keyring handler (get_handler_for_db). With the addition of the
new mach
integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys
Currently both Secure Boot DB and Machine Owner Keys (MOK) go through
the same keyring handler (get_handler_for_db). With the addition of the
new machine keyring, the end-user may choose to trust MOK keys.
Introduce a new keyring handler specific for MOK keys. If MOK keys are
trusted by the end-user, use the new keyring handler instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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| d1996776 | 26-Jan-2022 |
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> |
integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
Many UEFI Linux distributions boot using shim. The UEFI shim provides
what is called Machine Owner Keys (MOK). Shim uses both the UEFI Secure
Boo
integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
Many UEFI Linux distributions boot using shim. The UEFI shim provides
what is called Machine Owner Keys (MOK). Shim uses both the UEFI Secure
Boot DB and MOK keys to validate the next step in the boot chain. The
MOK facility can be used to import user generated keys. These keys can
be used to sign an end-users development kernel build. When Linux
boots, both UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys get loaded in the Linux
.platform keyring.
Define a new Linux keyring called machine. This keyring shall contain just
MOK keys and not the remaining keys in the platform keyring. This new
machine keyring will be used in follow on patches. Unlike keys in the
platform keyring, keys contained in the machine keyring will be trusted
within the kernel if the end-user has chosen to do so.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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| ebd9c2ae | 22-Jan-2021 |
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> |
integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring
During boot the Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx,
is loaded into the blacklist keyring. Systems booted with shim
have an equiv
integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring
During boot the Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx,
is loaded into the blacklist keyring. Systems booted with shim
have an equivalent Forbidden Signature Database called mokx.
Currently mokx is only used by shim and grub, the contents are
ignored by the kernel.
Add the ability to load mokx into the blacklist keyring during boot.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c33c8e3839a41e9654f41cc92c7231104931b1d7.camel@HansenPartnership.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-5-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428674320.677100.12637282414018170743.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433313205.902181.2502803393898221637.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529607422.163428.13530426573612578854.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
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