| c68e418c | 28-Aug-2020 |
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> |
crypto: amlogic - Fix endianness marker
The endianness marking on the variable v in meson_cipher is wrong.
It is actually in CPU-order, not little-endian.
This patch fixes it.
Fixes: 3d04158814e7
crypto: amlogic - Fix endianness marker
The endianness marking on the variable v in meson_cipher is wrong.
It is actually in CPU-order, not little-endian.
This patch fixes it.
Fixes: 3d04158814e7 ("crypto: amlogic - enable working on big...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
show more ...
|
| 1d63e455 | 07-Jul-2020 |
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> |
crypto: amlogic-gxl - permit async skcipher as fallback
Even though the amlogic-gxl driver implements asynchronous versions of
ecb(aes) and cbc(aes), the fallbacks it allocates are required to be
sy
crypto: amlogic-gxl - permit async skcipher as fallback
Even though the amlogic-gxl driver implements asynchronous versions of
ecb(aes) and cbc(aes), the fallbacks it allocates are required to be
synchronous. Given that SIMD based software implementations are usually
asynchronous as well, even though they rarely complete asynchronously
(this typically only happens in cases where the request was made from
softirq context, while SIMD was already in use in the task context that
it interrupted), these implementations are disregarded, and either the
generic C version or another table based version implemented in assembler
is selected instead.
Since falling back to synchronous AES is not only a performance issue,
but potentially a security issue as well (due to the fact that table
based AES is not time invariant), let's fix this, by allocating an
ordinary skcipher as the fallback, and invoke it with the completion
routine that was given to the outer request.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
show more ...
|
| 674f368a | 31-Dec-2019 |
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> |
crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one a
crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
show more ...
|