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Searched refs:MDS (Results 1 – 11 of 11) sorted by relevance

/linux/Documentation/arch/x86/
H A Dtsx_async_abort.rst12 Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS). In this
17 the same uarch data structures as in MDS, with same scope of exposure i.e.
29 b) Clear CPU buffers - similar to MDS, clearing the CPU buffers mitigates this
69 …0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
84 … 0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
87 … 0 1 1 Enabled Yes None Same as MDS
99 …0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
H A Dmds.rst1 Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) mitigation
9 Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a family of side channel attacks
52 needed for exploiting MDS requires:
182 and not by any other MDS variant. The other MDS variants cannot be
/linux/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/
H A Dprocessor_mmio_stale_data.rst16 are similar to those used to mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) or
131 enumerate MDS_NO (meaning they are affected by MDS) but that do
152 Like MDS, all variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities have the
162 On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on
166 For CPUs not affected by MDS or TAA, mitigation is needed only for the attacker
175 Same mitigation as MDS when affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise no mitigation
186 Same mitigation as MDS when processor is also affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise
188 MDS/TAA, guest without MMIO access cannot extract secrets using Processor MMIO
H A Dtsx_async_abort.rst16 (bit 5) is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR, the existing MDS mitigations
75 As for MDS, the attacker has no control over the memory addresses that can
158 systems which are MDS-affected and deploy MDS mitigation,
169 processors that are affected by both TAA and MDS, specifying just
184 not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1
232 0 1 0 MDS and TAA mitigated via VERW
233 1 1 0 MDS fixed, TAA vulnerable if TSX enabled
236 1 X 1 MDS fixed, TAA can be mitigated by
H A Dspecial-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst6 SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS
15 to MDS attacks.
59 executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
H A Dcore-scheduling.rst17 Threads of the same core. MDS and L1TF are examples of such attacks. The only
183 1. For MDS
185 Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings
199 For both MDS and L1TF, if the guest vCPU is configured to not trust each
H A Dattack_vector_controls.rst208 MDS X X X X * (Note 2)
/linux/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/
H A Dp1021mds.dts3 * P1021 MDS Device Tree Source
H A Dmpc8568mds.dts3 * MPC8568E MDS Device Tree Source
H A Dmpc8569mds.dts3 * MPC8569E MDS Device Tree Source
/linux/arch/powerpc/xmon/
H A Dppc-opc.c2486 #define MDS(op, xop, rc) (OP (op) | ((((unsigned long)(xop)) & 0xf) << 1) | ((rc) & 1)) macro
2487 #define MDS_MASK MDS (0x3f, 0xf, 1)
4647 {"rotld", MDS(30,8,0), MDSMB_MASK, PPC64, PPCVLE, {RA, RS, RB}},
4648 {"rldcl", MDS(30,8,0), MDS_MASK, PPC64, PPCVLE, {RA, RS, RB, MB6}},
4649 {"rotld.", MDS(30,8,1), MDSMB_MASK, PPC64, PPCVLE, {RA, RS, RB}},
4650 {"rldcl.", MDS(30,8,1), MDS_MASK, PPC64, PPCVLE, {RA, RS, RB, MB6}},
4652 {"rldcr", MDS(30,9,0), MDS_MASK, PPC64, PPCVLE, {RA, RS, RB, ME6}},
4653 {"rldcr.", MDS(30,9,1), MDS_MASK, PPC64, PPCVLE, {RA, RS, RB, ME6}},