| /linux/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/ |
| H A D | attack_vector_controls.rst | 3 Attack Vector Controls
6 Attack vector controls provide a simple method to configure only the mitigations
8 Administrators are encouraged to consider which attack vectors are relevant and
12 attack vector controls so administrators will likely not need to reconfigure
14 applied based on the chosen attack vector controls.
16 Attack Vectors
19 There are 5 sets of attack-vector mitigations currently supported by the kernel:
27 To control the enabled attack vectors, see :ref:`cmdline`.
34 The user-to-kernel attack vector involves a malicious userspace program
54 The user-to-user attack vector involves a malicious userspace program attempting
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| H A D | spectre.rst | 69 The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage
92 The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative
116 the attack revealing useful data.
118 One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
123 return instructions. This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return
134 Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
141 Previously the only known real-world BHB attack vector was via unprivileged
146 Attack scenarios
149 The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may
150 not cover all possible attack vectors.
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| H A D | l1tf.rst | 56 similar to the Meltdown attack.
59 allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
60 works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
65 Attack scenarios
73 application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
78 The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
92 PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
98 only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
99 on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
103 If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
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| H A D | gather_data_sampling.rst | 17 attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.
27 Attack scenarios
44 attack, and re-enable it.
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| H A D | rsb.rst | 22 the current kernel mitigations: what are the RSB-related attack vectors
36 considered individually for each attack vector (and microarchitecture
52 * All attack vectors can potentially be mitigated by flushing out any
178 attack demonstrated by the researchers. As previously documented,
208 intra-mode BTI attack. This is mitigated by clearing the BHB on
256 .. [#inception-paper] `Inception: Exposing New Attack Surfaces with Training in Transient Execution…
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| H A D | cross-thread-rsb.rst | 58 Attack scenarios
61 An attack can be mounted on affected processors by performing a series of CALL
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| /linux/Documentation/security/ |
| H A D | snp-tdx-threat-model.rst | 19 additional attack vectors that arise in the confidential computing space
91 | External attack | | Interfaces |
118 Regarding external attack vectors, it is interesting to note that in most
131 CoCo VM TCB due to its large SW attack surface. It is important to note
144 | External attack | | | Interfaces | |
161 leverage this access to attack the guest, the CoCo systems mitigate such
189 The **Linux CoCo VM attack surface** is any interface exposed from a CoCo
232 virtual devices. This allows any attack against confidentiality,
240 side-channel and/or transient execution attack vectors.
245 difference with the previous attack vector (malformed runtime input)
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| H A D | self-protection.rst | 9 and actively detecting attack attempts. Not all topics are explored in
20 attack surface. (Especially when they have the ability to load arbitrary
31 Attack Surface Reduction
114 bug to an attack.
127 unexpectedly extend the available attack surface. (The on-demand loading
146 to gain execution control during an attack, By far the most commonly
149 kind of attack exist, and protections exist to defend against them.
164 A less well understood attack is using a bug that triggers the
166 allocations. With this attack it is possible to write beyond the end of
200 defense, in that an attack must gather enough information about a
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| /linux/Documentation/tee/ |
| H A D | op-tee.rst | 111 There are additional attack vectors/mitigations for the kernel that should be
116 * Attack vector: Replace the OP-TEE OS image in the rootfs to gain control of
125 * Attack vector: Using an alternate boot mode (i.e. recovery mode), the
134 * Attack vector: Code that is executed prior to issuing the SMC call to load
137 * Mitigation: The OP-TEE driver must be loaded before any potential attack
144 * Attack vector: Prevent the driver from being probed, so the SMC call to
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| /linux/include/linux/mfd/ |
| H A D | ac100.h | 96 #define AC100_ADC_DAP_L_A_T 0x8b /* Left Attack Time */
98 #define AC100_ADC_DAP_R_A_T 0x8d /* Right Attack Time */
118 #define AC100_DAC_DAP_H_G_A_T_C 0xa9 /* High Gain Attack Time Coef */
119 #define AC100_DAC_DAP_L_G_A_T_C 0xaa /* Low Gain Attack Time Coef */
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| /linux/Documentation/input/devices/ |
| H A D | iforce-protocol.rst | 126 0a-0b Address of attack and fade parameters, or ffff if none.
139 Attack and fade
147 02-03 Duration of attack (little endian encoding, in ms)
148 04 Level at end of attack. Signed byte.
356 - attack and fade : 0e
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| /linux/Documentation/security/tpm/ |
| H A D | tpm-security.rst | 8 packet alteration attacks (called passive and active interposer attack
28 Most recently the same `attack against TPM based Linux disk
34 try to insure that if we can't prevent the attack then at least we can
46 which would be an annoying denial of service attack. However, there
47 are two, more serious, classes of attack aimed at entities sealed to
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| /linux/sound/soc/codecs/ |
| H A D | cs42l73.h | 53 #define CS42L73_LIMARATEHL 0x26 /* Lmtr Attack Rate HP/Line. */
56 #define CS42L73_LIMARATESPK 0x29 /* Lmtr Attack Rate Spkphone [A]. */
59 #define CS42L73_LIMARATEESL 0x2C /* Lmtr Attack Rate */
62 #define CS42L73_ALCARATE 0x2F /* ALC Enable, Attack Rate AB. */
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| H A D | max98373.c | 237 SOC_SINGLE_TLV("DHT Attack Step Volume", MAX98373_R20D2_DHT_ATTACK_CFG,
241 SOC_ENUM("DHT Attack Rate", max98373_dht_attack_rate_enum),
273 SOC_SINGLE("BDE Attack Rate", MAX98373_R2091_BDE_GAIN_ATK_REL_RATE, 4, 0xF, 0),
306 SOC_ENUM("Limiter Attack Rate", max98373_limiter_attack_rate_enum),
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| H A D | sta32x.c | 471 SOC_ENUM("Limiter1 Attack Rate (dB/ms)", sta32x_limiter1_attack_rate_enum),
472 SOC_ENUM("Limiter2 Attack Rate (dB/ms)", sta32x_limiter2_attack_rate_enum),
476 /* depending on mode, the attack/release thresholds have
479 SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Limiter1 Attack Threshold (AC Mode)", STA32X_L1ATRT, STA32X_LxA_SHIFT,
481 SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Limiter2 Attack Threshold (AC Mode)", STA32X_L2ATRT, STA32X_LxA_SHIFT,
487 SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Limiter1 Attack Threshold (DRC Mode)", STA32X_L1ATRT, STA32X_LxA_SHIFT,
489 SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Limiter2 Attack Threshold (DRC Mode)", STA32X_L2ATRT, STA32X_LxA_SHIFT,
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| /linux/Documentation/process/ |
| H A D | threat-model.rst | 33 intended to reduce the attack surface or elevate the cost of an attack within
85 can constitute attack vectors when placed in wrong hands. While some of them
232 the use of specialized hardware (e.g., logic analyzers, DMA-attack tools over
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| /linux/include/uapi/sound/ |
| H A D | asound_fm.h | 39 unsigned char attack; /* 4 bits: attack rate */ member
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| H A D | sfnt_info.h | 77 unsigned short modatkhld; /* modulation attack & hold time (0x7f7f) */
82 unsigned short volatkhld; /* volume attack & hold time (0x7f7f) */
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| /linux/arch/arm/mm/ |
| H A D | copypage-v6.c | 28 * attack the kernel's existing mapping of these pages.
44 * attack the kernel's existing mapping of this page.
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| /linux/arch/powerpc/configs/ |
| H A D | hardening.config | 6 # Attack surface reduction.
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| /linux/arch/arm/configs/ |
| H A D | hardening.config | 6 # Dangerous; old interfaces and needless additional attack surface.
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| /linux/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/ |
| H A D | rename_attack_test.c | |
| /linux/drivers/firmware/efi/ |
| H A D | Kconfig | 171 bool "Reset memory attack mitigation"
175 using the TCG Platform Reset Attack Mitigation specification. This
203 PCI devices from being able to attack the OS via DMA. However, since
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| /linux/sound/pci/asihpi/ |
| H A D | hpifunc.c | 1886 u32 attack) in hpi_compander_set_attack_time_constant() argument
1888 return hpi_control_param_set(h_control, HPI_COMPANDER_ATTACK, attack, in hpi_compander_set_attack_time_constant()
1893 u32 *attack) in hpi_compander_get_attack_time_constant() argument
1896 index, attack, NULL); in hpi_compander_get_attack_time_constant()
2062 u16 hpi_meter_set_rms_ballistics(u32 h_control, u16 attack, u16 decay) in hpi_meter_set_rms_ballistics() argument
2065 attack, decay); in hpi_meter_set_rms_ballistics()
2070 u32 attack; in hpi_meter_get_rms_ballistics() local
2075 &attack, &decay); in hpi_meter_get_rms_ballistics()
2078 *pn_attack = (unsigned short)attack; in hpi_meter_get_rms_ballistics()
2085 u16 hpi_meter_set_peak_ballistics(u32 h_control, u16 attack, u16 decay) in hpi_meter_set_peak_ballistics() argument
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| /linux/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/filesystems/ |
| H A D | ubifs-authentication.rst | 27 进制文件使其执行时触发恶意行为 [DMC-CBC-ATTACK]。由于 UBIFS 大部分文件
345 [DMC-CBC-ATTACK] https://www.jakoblell.com/blog/2013/12/22/practical-malleability-attack-agains…
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