xref: /linux/security/Kconfig (revision 599bbba5a36f6de57ab14c373c25881e2b5273f5)
1# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2#
3# Security configuration
4#
5
6menu "Security options"
7
8source "security/keys/Kconfig"
9
10config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
11	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
12	default n
13	help
14	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
15	  syslog via dmesg(8).
16
17	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
18	  unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
19
20	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
21
22choice
23	prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override"
24	default PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE
25	help
26	  Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory
27	  permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace
28	  capability.
29
30	  This allows people to limit that - either never override, or
31	  require actual active ptrace attachment (default).
32
33config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE
34	bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior"
35	help
36	  This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
37	  permissions if you have ptrace access rights.
38
39config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE
40	bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override"
41	help
42	  This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping
43	  permissions for active ptracers like gdb.
44
45config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
46	bool "Never"
47	help
48	  Never override memory mapping permissions
49
50endchoice
51
52config MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
53	bool "mseal system mappings"
54	depends on 64BIT
55	depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
56	depends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
57	help
58	  Apply mseal on system mappings.
59	  The system mappings includes vdso, vvar, vvar_vclock,
60	  vectors (arm compat-mode), sigpage (arm compat-mode), uprobes.
61
62	  A 64-bit kernel is required for the memory sealing feature.
63	  No specific hardware features from the CPU are needed.
64
65	  WARNING: This feature breaks programs which rely on relocating
66	  or unmapping system mappings. Known broken software at the time
67	  of writing includes CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, UML, gVisor, rr. Therefore
68	  this config can't be enabled universally.
69
70	  For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see
71	  Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
72
73config SECURITY
74	bool "Enable different security models"
75	depends on SYSFS
76	depends on MULTIUSER
77	help
78	  This allows you to choose different security modules to be
79	  configured into your kernel.
80
81	  If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
82	  model will be used.
83
84	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
85
86config HAS_SECURITY_AUDIT
87	def_bool y
88	depends on AUDIT
89	depends on SECURITY
90
91config SECURITYFS
92	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
93	help
94	  This will build the securityfs filesystem.  It is currently used by
95	  various security modules (AppArmor, IMA, SafeSetID, TOMOYO, TPM).
96
97	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
98
99config SECURITY_NETWORK
100	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
101	depends on SECURITY
102	help
103	  This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
104	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
105	  implement socket and networking access controls.
106	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
107
108config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
109	bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
110	depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
111	help
112	  This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
113	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
114	  implement Infiniband access controls.
115	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
116
117config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
118	bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
119	depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
120	help
121	  This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
122	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
123	  implement per-packet access controls based on labels
124	  derived from IPSec policy.  Non-IPSec communications are
125	  designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
126	  to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
127	  IPSec.
128	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
129
130config SECURITY_PATH
131	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
132	depends on SECURITY
133	help
134	  This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
135	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
136	  implement pathname based access controls.
137	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
138
139config INTEL_TXT
140	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
141	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
142	help
143	  This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
144	  Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
145	  Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
146	  of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
147	  will have no effect.
148
149	  Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
150	  initial state as well as data reset protection.  This is used to
151	  create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
152	  helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
153	  correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
154	  of the kernel itself.
155
156	  Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
157	  confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
158	  it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
159	  providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
160
161	  See <https://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
162	  about Intel(R) TXT.
163	  See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
164	  See Documentation/arch/x86/intel_txt.rst for a description of how to enable
165	  Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
166
167	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
168
169config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
170	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
171	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
172	default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
173	default 65536
174	help
175	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
176	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
177	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
178
179	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
180	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
181	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
182	  Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
183	  this low address space will need the permission specific to the
184	  systems running LSM.
185
186config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
187	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
188	help
189	  By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
190	  binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
191	  interface.  Some of these binaries are statically defined
192	  either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
193	  option.  However, some of these are dynamically created at
194	  runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
195	  To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
196	  calls through a single executable that can not have its name
197	  changed.
198
199	  Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
200	  "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
201	  passed to it.  If desired, this program can filter and pick
202	  and choose what real programs are called.
203
204	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
205	  disabled, choose this option and then set
206	  STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
207
208config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
209	string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
210	depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
211	default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
212	help
213	  The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
214	  program is wish to be run.  The "real" application's name will
215	  be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
216	  line.
217
218	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
219	  specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
220
221source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
222source "security/smack/Kconfig"
223source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
224source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"
225source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
226source "security/yama/Kconfig"
227source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
228source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
229source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
230source "security/ipe/Kconfig"
231
232source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
233
234choice
235	prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized"
236	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
237	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
238	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
239	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
240	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
241
242	help
243	  This choice is there only for converting CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY
244	  in old kernel configs to CONFIG_LSM in new kernel configs. Don't
245	  change this choice unless you are creating a fresh kernel config,
246	  for this choice will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM has been set.
247
248	  Selects the legacy "major security module" that will be
249	  initialized first. Overridden by non-default CONFIG_LSM.
250
251	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
252		bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
253
254	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
255		bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
256
257	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
258		bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
259
260	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
261		bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
262
263	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
264		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
265
266endchoice
267
268config LSM
269	string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
270	depends on SECURITY
271	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
272	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
273	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
274	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
275	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf"
276	help
277	  A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
278	  Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order
279	  LSM_ORDER_FIRST and LSM_ORDER_LAST, which are always enabled
280	  if selected in the kernel configuration, will be ignored.
281	  This can be controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.
282
283	  If unsure, leave this as the default.
284
285config SECURITY_COMMONCAP_KUNIT_TEST
286	bool "Build KUnit tests for commoncap" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
287	depends on KUNIT=y && USER_NS
288	default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
289	help
290	  This builds the commoncap KUnit tests.
291
292	  KUnit tests run during boot and output the results to the debug log
293	  in TAP format (https://testanything.org/). Only useful for kernel devs
294	  running KUnit test harness and are not for inclusion into a
295	  production build.
296
297	  For more information on KUnit and unit tests in general please refer
298	  to the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/.
299
300	  If unsure, say N.
301
302source "security/Kconfig.hardening"
303
304endmenu
305
306