Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

Prepare input updates for 6.11 merge window.

Merge tag 'v6.9' into next

Sync up with the mainline to bring in the new cleanup API.

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

Some display refactoring patches are needed in order to allow conflict-
less merging.

Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@ursulin.net>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Sync to get the drm_printer changes to drm-intel-next.

Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>

Merge branch 'for-6.9/amd-sfh' into for-linus

- assorted fixes and optimizations for amd-sfh (Basavaraj Natikar)

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>

Merge tag 'drm-misc-next-2024-02-08' into msm-next

Merge the drm-misc tree to uprev MSM CI.

Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next

Kickstart 6.9 development cycle.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-xe-next

Sync to v6.8-rc1.

Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Backmerge to bring Xe driver to drm-intel-next.

Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>

Merge tag 'v6.8-rc4' into x86/percpu, to resolve conflicts and refresh the branch

Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/percpu.h
arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@k

Merge tag 'v6.8-rc4' into x86/percpu, to resolve conflicts and refresh the branch

Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/percpu.h
arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

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Merge branch 'linus' into x86/mm, to refresh the branch and pick up fixes

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Merge branch 'master' into mm-hotfixes-stable

Merge v6.8-rc1 into drm-misc-fixes

Let's kickstart the 6.8 fix cycle.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>

Merge remote-tracking branch 'torvalds/master' into perf-tools-next

To pick up fixes that went thru perf-tools for v6.7 and to get in sync
with upstream to check for drift in the copies of headers,

Merge remote-tracking branch 'torvalds/master' into perf-tools-next

To pick up fixes that went thru perf-tools for v6.7 and to get in sync
with upstream to check for drift in the copies of headers, etc.

Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

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Merge tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 TDX updates from Dave Hansen:
"This contains the initial support for host-side TDX support so that
KV

Merge tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 TDX updates from Dave Hansen:
"This contains the initial support for host-side TDX support so that
KVM can run TDX-protected guests. This does not include the actual
KVM-side support which will come from the KVM folks. The TDX host
interactions with kexec also needs to be ironed out before this is
ready for prime time, so this code is currently Kconfig'd off when
kexec is on.

The majority of the code here is the kernel telling the TDX module
which memory to protect and handing some additional memory over to it
to use to store TDX module metadata. That sounds pretty simple, but
the TDX architecture is rather flexible and it takes quite a bit of
back-and-forth to say, "just protect all memory, please."

There is also some code tacked on near the end of the series to handle
a hardware erratum. The erratum can make software bugs such as a
kernel write to TDX-protected memory cause a machine check and
masquerade as a real hardware failure. The erratum handling watches
out for these and tries to provide nicer user errors"

* tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (21 commits)
x86/virt/tdx: Make TDX host depend on X86_MCE
x86/virt/tdx: Disable TDX host support when kexec is enabled
Documentation/x86: Add documentation for TDX host support
x86/mce: Differentiate real hardware #MCs from TDX erratum ones
x86/cpu: Detect TDX partial write machine check erratum
x86/virt/tdx: Handle TDX interaction with sleep and hibernation
x86/virt/tdx: Initialize all TDMRs
x86/virt/tdx: Configure global KeyID on all packages
x86/virt/tdx: Configure TDX module with the TDMRs and global KeyID
x86/virt/tdx: Designate reserved areas for all TDMRs
x86/virt/tdx: Allocate and set up PAMTs for TDMRs
x86/virt/tdx: Fill out TDMRs to cover all TDX memory regions
x86/virt/tdx: Add placeholder to construct TDMRs to cover all TDX memory regions
x86/virt/tdx: Get module global metadata for module initialization
x86/virt/tdx: Use all system memory when initializing TDX module as TDX memory
x86/virt/tdx: Add skeleton to enable TDX on demand
x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL error printing for module initialization
x86/virt/tdx: Handle SEAMCALL no entropy error in common code
x86/virt/tdx: Make INTEL_TDX_HOST depend on X86_X2APIC
x86/virt/tdx: Define TDX supported page sizes as macros
...

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x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX during kernel boot

Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious
host and certain physical attacks. A CPU-attested software module
called 'the TDX m

x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX during kernel boot

Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious
host and certain physical attacks. A CPU-attested software module
called 'the TDX module' runs inside a new isolated memory range as a
trusted hypervisor to manage and run protected VMs.

Pre-TDX Intel hardware has support for a memory encryption architecture
called MKTME. The memory encryption hardware underpinning MKTME is also
used for Intel TDX. TDX ends up "stealing" some of the physical address
space from the MKTME architecture for crypto-protection to VMs. The
BIOS is responsible for partitioning the "KeyID" space between legacy
MKTME and TDX. The KeyIDs reserved for TDX are called 'TDX private
KeyIDs' or 'TDX KeyIDs' for short.

During machine boot, TDX microcode verifies that the BIOS programmed TDX
private KeyIDs consistently and correctly programmed across all CPU
packages. The MSRs are locked in this state after verification. This
is why MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING gets used for TDX enumeration:
it indicates not just that the hardware supports TDX, but that all the
boot-time security checks passed.

The TDX module is expected to be loaded by the BIOS when it enables TDX,
but the kernel needs to properly initialize it before it can be used to
create and run any TDX guests. The TDX module will be initialized by
the KVM subsystem when KVM wants to use TDX.

Detect platform TDX support by detecting TDX private KeyIDs.

The TDX module itself requires one TDX KeyID as the 'TDX global KeyID'
to protect its metadata. Each TDX guest also needs a TDX KeyID for its
own protection. Just use the first TDX KeyID as the global KeyID and
leave the rest for TDX guests. If no TDX KeyID is left for TDX guests,
disable TDX as initializing the TDX module alone is useless.

[ dhansen: add X86_FEATURE, replace helper function ]

Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231208170740.53979-1-dave.hansen%40intel.com

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Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next

Let's kickstart the v6.8 release cycle.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>

Merge branch 'tip/perf/urgent'

Avoid conflicts, base on fixes.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

Merge tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 TDX updates from Dave Hansen:
"The majority of this is a rework of the assembly and C wrappers that
a

Merge tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 TDX updates from Dave Hansen:
"The majority of this is a rework of the assembly and C wrappers that
are used to talk to the TDX module and VMM. This is a nice cleanup in
general but is also clearing the way for using this code when Linux is
the TDX VMM.

There are also some tidbits to make TDX guests play nicer with Hyper-V
and to take advantage the hardware TSC.

Summary:

- Refactor and clean up TDX hypercall/module call infrastructure

- Handle retrying/resuming page conversion hypercalls

- Make sure to use the (shockingly) reliable TSC in TDX guests"

[ TLA reminder: TDX is "Trust Domain Extensions", Intel's guest VM
confidentiality technology ]

* tag 'x86_tdx_for_6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/tdx: Mark TSC reliable
x86/tdx: Fix __noreturn build warning around __tdx_hypercall_failed()
x86/virt/tdx: Make TDX_MODULE_CALL handle SEAMCALL #UD and #GP
x86/virt/tdx: Wire up basic SEAMCALL functions
x86/tdx: Remove 'struct tdx_hypercall_args'
x86/tdx: Reimplement __tdx_hypercall() using TDX_MODULE_CALL asm
x86/tdx: Make TDX_HYPERCALL asm similar to TDX_MODULE_CALL
x86/tdx: Extend TDX_MODULE_CALL to support more TDCALL/SEAMCALL leafs
x86/tdx: Pass TDCALL/SEAMCALL input/output registers via a structure
x86/tdx: Rename __tdx_module_call() to __tdcall()
x86/tdx: Make macros of TDCALLs consistent with the spec
x86/tdx: Skip saving output regs when SEAMCALL fails with VMFailInvalid
x86/tdx: Zero out the missing RSI in TDX_HYPERCALL macro
x86/tdx: Retry partially-completed page conversion hypercalls

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x86/virt/tdx: Wire up basic SEAMCALL functions

Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious
host and certain physical attacks. A CPU-attested software module
called 'the TD

x86/virt/tdx: Wire up basic SEAMCALL functions

Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious
host and certain physical attacks. A CPU-attested software module
called 'the TDX module' runs inside a new isolated memory range as a
trusted hypervisor to manage and run protected VMs.

TDX introduces a new CPU mode: Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM). This
mode runs only the TDX module itself or other code to load the TDX
module.

The host kernel communicates with SEAM software via a new SEAMCALL
instruction. This is conceptually similar to a guest->host hypercall,
except it is made from the host to SEAM software instead. The TDX
module establishes a new SEAMCALL ABI which allows the host to
initialize the module and to manage VMs.

The SEAMCALL ABI is very similar to the TDCALL ABI and leverages much
TDCALL infrastructure. Wire up basic functions to make SEAMCALLs for
the basic support of running TDX guests: __seamcall(), __seamcall_ret(),
and __seamcall_saved_ret() for TDH.VP.ENTER. All SEAMCALLs involved in
the basic TDX support don't use "callee-saved" registers as input and
output, except the TDH.VP.ENTER.

To start to support TDX, create a new arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c for
TDX host kernel support. Add a new Kconfig option CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST
to opt-in TDX host kernel support (to distinguish with TDX guest kernel
support). So far only KVM uses TDX. Make the new config option depend
on KVM_INTEL.

Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/4db7c3fc085e6af12acc2932294254ddb3d320b3.1692096753.git.kai.huang%40intel.com

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