Revision tags: v6.12-rc5 |
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fc5ced75 |
| 25-Oct-2024 |
Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> |
Merge drm/drm-fixes into drm-misc-fixes
Backmerging to get the latest fixes from upstream.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
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86e6b154 |
| 24-Oct-2024 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue
It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical accesses in kernel space. And so using just the high bit to de
x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue
It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical accesses in kernel space. And so using just the high bit to decide whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the result:
CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“
Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures, which closes the speculation window.
But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1]. That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the speculation window is now open.
Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers.
It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/80d94591-1297-4afb-b510-c665efd37f10@citrix.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241023094448.GAZxjFkEOOF_DM83TQ@fat_crate.local/ [1] Link: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1010.html Link: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.10771 Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> # LAM case Fixes: 2865baf54077 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional") Fixes: 6014bc27561f ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM") Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()") Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Revision tags: v6.12-rc4 |
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ade8ff3b |
| 18-Oct-2024 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
Merge tag 'x86_bugs_post_ibpb' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 IBPB fixes from Borislav Petkov: "This fixes the IBPB implementation of older AMDs (< gen4) that do
Merge tag 'x86_bugs_post_ibpb' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 IBPB fixes from Borislav Petkov: "This fixes the IBPB implementation of older AMDs (< gen4) that do not flush the RSB (Return Address Stack) so you can still do some leaking when using a "=ibpb" mitigation for Retbleed or SRSO. Fix it by doing the flushing in software on those generations.
IBPB is not the default setting so this is not likely to affect anybody in practice"
* tag 'x86_bugs_post_ibpb' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/bugs: Do not use UNTRAIN_RET with IBPB on entry x86/bugs: Skip RSB fill at VMEXIT x86/entry: Have entry_ibpb() invalidate return predictions x86/cpufeatures: Add a IBPB_NO_RET BUG flag x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET
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Revision tags: v6.12-rc3, v6.12-rc2, v6.12-rc1 |
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3ea87dfa |
| 23-Sep-2024 |
Johannes Wikner <kwikner@ethz.ch> |
x86/cpufeatures: Add a IBPB_NO_RET BUG flag
Set this flag if the CPU has an IBPB implementation that does not invalidate return target predictions. Zen generations < 4 do not flush the RSB when exec
x86/cpufeatures: Add a IBPB_NO_RET BUG flag
Set this flag if the CPU has an IBPB implementation that does not invalidate return target predictions. Zen generations < 4 do not flush the RSB when executing an IBPB and this bug flag denotes that.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
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c8d430db |
| 06-Oct-2024 |
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> |
Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.12-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.12, take #1
- Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not chang
Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.12-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.12, take #1
- Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not change critical system registers as we're about to fail
- Make sure that the host's vector length is at capped by a value common to all CPUs
- Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of "negative" features, as the current code is pretty broken
- Promote Joey to the status of official reviewer, while James steps down -- hopefully only temporarly
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0c436dfe |
| 02-Oct-2024 |
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> |
Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v6.12-rc1' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus
ASoC: Fixes for v6.12
A bunch of fixes here that came in during the merge window and t
Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v6.12-rc1' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus
ASoC: Fixes for v6.12
A bunch of fixes here that came in during the merge window and the first week of release, plus some new quirks and device IDs. There's nothing major here, it's a bit bigger than it might've been due to there being no fixes sent during the merge window due to your vacation.
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2cd86f02 |
| 01-Oct-2024 |
Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-fixes' into drm-misc-fixes
Required for a panthor fix that broke when FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET was added in place of FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET.
Signed-off-by: Maarten L
Merge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-fixes' into drm-misc-fixes
Required for a panthor fix that broke when FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET was added in place of FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET.
Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
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3a39d672 |
| 27-Sep-2024 |
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
No conflicts and no adjacent changes.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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36ec807b |
| 20-Sep-2024 |
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> |
Merge branch 'next' into for-linus
Prepare input updates for 6.12 merge window.
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Revision tags: v6.11, v6.11-rc7, v6.11-rc6, v6.11-rc5, v6.11-rc4, v6.11-rc3, v6.11-rc2, v6.11-rc1 |
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3daee2e4 |
| 16-Jul-2024 |
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> |
Merge tag 'v6.10' into next
Sync up with mainline to bring in device_for_each_child_node_scoped() and other newer APIs.
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66e72a01 |
| 29-Jul-2024 |
Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com> |
Merge tag 'v6.11-rc1' into clk-meson-next
Linux 6.11-rc1
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Revision tags: v6.10, v6.10-rc7, v6.10-rc6, v6.10-rc5 |
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8cce4759 |
| 18-Jun-2024 |
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> |
Merge branch 'bpf/for-next' into sched_ext-base
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0e8655b4 |
| 29-Jul-2024 |
Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> |
Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next
Backmerging to get a late RC of v6.10 before moving into v6.11.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
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b1360211 |
| 17-Sep-2024 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
Merge tag 'x86-fred-2024-09-17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 FRED updates from Thomas Gleixner:
- Enable FRED right after init_mem_mapping() because at that po
Merge tag 'x86-fred-2024-09-17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 FRED updates from Thomas Gleixner:
- Enable FRED right after init_mem_mapping() because at that point the early IDT fault handler is replaced by the real fault handler. The real fault handler retrieves the faulting address from the stack frame and not from CR2 when the FRED feature is set. But that obviously only works when FRED is enabled in the CPU as well.
- Set SS to __KERNEL_DS when enabling FRED to prevent a corner case where ERETS can observe a SS mismatch and raises a #GP.
* tag 'x86-fred-2024-09-17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/entry: Set FRED RSP0 on return to userspace instead of context switch x86/msr: Switch between WRMSRNS and WRMSR with the alternatives mechanism x86/entry: Test ti_work for zero before processing individual bits x86/fred: Set SS to __KERNEL_DS when enabling FRED x86/fred: Enable FRED right after init_mem_mapping() x86/fred: Move FRED RSP initialization into a separate function x86/fred: Parse cmdline param "fred=" in cpu_parse_early_param()
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a97756cb |
| 09-Jul-2024 |
Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com> |
x86/fred: Enable FRED right after init_mem_mapping()
On 64-bit init_mem_mapping() relies on the minimal page fault handler provided by the early IDT mechanism. The real page fault handler is install
x86/fred: Enable FRED right after init_mem_mapping()
On 64-bit init_mem_mapping() relies on the minimal page fault handler provided by the early IDT mechanism. The real page fault handler is installed right afterwards into the IDT.
This is problematic on CPUs which have X86_FEATURE_FRED set because the real page fault handler retrieves the faulting address from the FRED exception stack frame and not from CR2, but that does obviously not work when FRED is not yet enabled in the CPU.
To prevent this enable FRED right after init_mem_mapping() without interrupt stacks. Those are enabled later in trap_init() after the CPU entry area is set up.
[ tglx: Encapsulate the FRED details ]
Fixes: 14619d912b65 ("x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code") Reported-by: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240709154048.3543361-4-xin@zytor.com
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73270c1f |
| 09-Jul-2024 |
Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com> |
x86/fred: Move FRED RSP initialization into a separate function
To enable FRED earlier, move the RSP initialization out of cpu_init_fred_exceptions() into cpu_init_fred_rsps().
This is required as
x86/fred: Move FRED RSP initialization into a separate function
To enable FRED earlier, move the RSP initialization out of cpu_init_fred_exceptions() into cpu_init_fred_rsps().
This is required as the FRED RSP initialization depends on the availability of the CPU entry areas which are set up late in trap_init(),
No functional change intended. Marked with Fixes as it's a depedency for the real fix.
Fixes: 14619d912b65 ("x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code") Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240709154048.3543361-3-xin@zytor.com
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989b5cfa |
| 09-Jul-2024 |
Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com> |
x86/fred: Parse cmdline param "fred=" in cpu_parse_early_param()
Depending on whether FRED is enabled, sysvec_install() installs a system interrupt handler into either into FRED's system vector disp
x86/fred: Parse cmdline param "fred=" in cpu_parse_early_param()
Depending on whether FRED is enabled, sysvec_install() installs a system interrupt handler into either into FRED's system vector dispatch table or into the IDT.
However FRED can be disabled later in trap_init(), after sysvec_install() has been invoked already; e.g., the HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR handler is registered with sysvec_install() in kvm_guest_init(), which is called in setup_arch() but way before trap_init().
IOW, there is a gap between FRED is available and available but disabled. As a result, when FRED is available but disabled, early sysvec_install() invocations fail to install the IDT handler resulting in spurious interrupts.
Fix it by parsing cmdline param "fred=" in cpu_parse_early_param() to ensure that FRED is disabled before the first sysvec_install() incovations.
Fixes: 3810da12710a ("x86/fred: Add a fred= cmdline param") Reported-by: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240709154048.3543361-2-xin@zytor.com
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963d0d60 |
| 16-Sep-2024 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.12_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 hw mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Add CONFIG_ option for every hw CPU mitigation. T
Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.12_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 hw mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Add CONFIG_ option for every hw CPU mitigation. The intent is to support configurations and scenarios where the mitigations code is irrelevant
- Other small fixlets and improvements
* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.12_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/bugs: Fix handling when SRSO mitigation is disabled x86/bugs: Add missing NO_SSB flag Documentation/srso: Document a method for checking safe RET operates properly x86/bugs: Add a separate config for GDS x86/bugs: Remove GDS Force Kconfig option x86/bugs: Add a separate config for SSB x86/bugs: Add a separate config for Spectre V2 x86/bugs: Add a separate config for SRBDS x86/bugs: Add a separate config for Spectre v1 x86/bugs: Add a separate config for RETBLEED x86/bugs: Add a separate config for L1TF x86/bugs: Add a separate config for MMIO Stable Data x86/bugs: Add a separate config for TAA x86/bugs: Add a separate config for MDS
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23e12b54 |
| 29-Aug-2024 |
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> |
x86/bugs: Add missing NO_SSB flag
The Moorefield and Lightning Mountain Atom processors are missing the NO_SSB flag in the vulnerabilities whitelist. This will cause unaffected parts to incorrectly
x86/bugs: Add missing NO_SSB flag
The Moorefield and Lightning Mountain Atom processors are missing the NO_SSB flag in the vulnerabilities whitelist. This will cause unaffected parts to incorrectly be reported as vulnerable. Add the missing flag.
These parts are currently out of service and were verified internally with archived documentation that they need the NO_SSB flag.
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAEJ9NQdhh+4GxrtG1DuYgqYhvc0hi-sKZh-2niukJ-MyFLntAA@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: Shanavas.K.S <shanavasks@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240829192437.4074196-1-daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com
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a23e1966 |
| 15-Jul-2024 |
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> |
Merge branch 'next' into for-linus
Prepare input updates for 6.11 merge window.
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be8f4de6 |
| 26-Jun-2024 |
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> |
Merge branch 'for-linus' into for-next
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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Revision tags: v6.10-rc4 |
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ef551352 |
| 16-Jun-2024 |
Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> |
Merge branch 'mana-shared' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma
Leon Romanovsky says:
==================== net: mana: Allow variable size indirection table
Like we talked, I
Merge branch 'mana-shared' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma
Leon Romanovsky says:
==================== net: mana: Allow variable size indirection table
Like we talked, I created new shared branch for this patch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma.git/log/?h=mana-shared
* 'mana-shared' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma: net: mana: Allow variable size indirection table ====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240612183051.GE4966@unreal Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
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Revision tags: v6.10-rc3 |
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4ac0f06c |
| 03-Jun-2024 |
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> |
ASoC: Merge up fixes
We need this to get the i.MX platforms working in CI again.
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Revision tags: v6.10-rc2 |
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6f47c7ae |
| 28-May-2024 |
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> |
Merge tag 'v6.9' into next
Sync up with the mainline to bring in the new cleanup API.
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afeea275 |
| 04-Jul-2024 |
Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org> |
Merge drm-misc-next-2024-07-04 into drm-misc-next-fixes
Let's start the drm-misc-next-fixes cycle.
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
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