History log of /linux/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c (Results 1 – 25 of 2967)
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Revision tags: v6.12-rc5
# fc5ced75 25-Oct-2024 Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>

Merge drm/drm-fixes into drm-misc-fixes

Backmerging to get the latest fixes from upstream.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>


# 86e6b154 24-Oct-2024 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue

It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space. And so using just the high bit to de

x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue

It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space. And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the
result:

CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“

Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.

But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1].
That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the
speculation window is now open.

Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the
regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm
version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers.

It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no
speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations.

Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/80d94591-1297-4afb-b510-c665efd37f10@citrix.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241023094448.GAZxjFkEOOF_DM83TQ@fat_crate.local/ [1]
Link: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1010.html
Link: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.10771
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> # LAM case
Fixes: 2865baf54077 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional")
Fixes: 6014bc27561f ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM")
Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

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Revision tags: v6.12-rc4
# ade8ff3b 18-Oct-2024 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge tag 'x86_bugs_post_ibpb' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 IBPB fixes from Borislav Petkov:
"This fixes the IBPB implementation of older AMDs (< gen4) that do

Merge tag 'x86_bugs_post_ibpb' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 IBPB fixes from Borislav Petkov:
"This fixes the IBPB implementation of older AMDs (< gen4) that do not
flush the RSB (Return Address Stack) so you can still do some leaking
when using a "=ibpb" mitigation for Retbleed or SRSO. Fix it by doing
the flushing in software on those generations.

IBPB is not the default setting so this is not likely to affect
anybody in practice"

* tag 'x86_bugs_post_ibpb' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/bugs: Do not use UNTRAIN_RET with IBPB on entry
x86/bugs: Skip RSB fill at VMEXIT
x86/entry: Have entry_ibpb() invalidate return predictions
x86/cpufeatures: Add a IBPB_NO_RET BUG flag
x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET

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Revision tags: v6.12-rc3, v6.12-rc2, v6.12-rc1
# 3ea87dfa 23-Sep-2024 Johannes Wikner <kwikner@ethz.ch>

x86/cpufeatures: Add a IBPB_NO_RET BUG flag

Set this flag if the CPU has an IBPB implementation that does not
invalidate return target predictions. Zen generations < 4 do not flush
the RSB when exec

x86/cpufeatures: Add a IBPB_NO_RET BUG flag

Set this flag if the CPU has an IBPB implementation that does not
invalidate return target predictions. Zen generations < 4 do not flush
the RSB when executing an IBPB and this bug flag denotes that.

[ bp: Massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Johannes Wikner <kwikner@ethz.ch>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>

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# c8d430db 06-Oct-2024 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.12-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.12, take #1

- Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not chang

Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.12-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.12, take #1

- Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not change critical
system registers as we're about to fail

- Make sure that the host's vector length is at capped by a value
common to all CPUs

- Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of "negative" features, as the current
code is pretty broken

- Promote Joey to the status of official reviewer, while James steps
down -- hopefully only temporarly

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# 0c436dfe 02-Oct-2024 Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v6.12-rc1' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus

ASoC: Fixes for v6.12

A bunch of fixes here that came in during the merge window and t

Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v6.12-rc1' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus

ASoC: Fixes for v6.12

A bunch of fixes here that came in during the merge window and the first
week of release, plus some new quirks and device IDs. There's nothing
major here, it's a bit bigger than it might've been due to there being
no fixes sent during the merge window due to your vacation.

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# 2cd86f02 01-Oct-2024 Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>

Merge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-fixes' into drm-misc-fixes

Required for a panthor fix that broke when
FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET was added in place of FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET.

Signed-off-by: Maarten L

Merge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-fixes' into drm-misc-fixes

Required for a panthor fix that broke when
FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET was added in place of FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET.

Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>

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# 3a39d672 27-Sep-2024 Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.

No conflicts and no adjacent changes.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>


# 36ec807b 20-Sep-2024 Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>

Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

Prepare input updates for 6.12 merge window.


Revision tags: v6.11, v6.11-rc7, v6.11-rc6, v6.11-rc5, v6.11-rc4, v6.11-rc3, v6.11-rc2, v6.11-rc1
# 3daee2e4 16-Jul-2024 Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>

Merge tag 'v6.10' into next

Sync up with mainline to bring in device_for_each_child_node_scoped()
and other newer APIs.


# 66e72a01 29-Jul-2024 Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>

Merge tag 'v6.11-rc1' into clk-meson-next

Linux 6.11-rc1


Revision tags: v6.10, v6.10-rc7, v6.10-rc6, v6.10-rc5
# 8cce4759 18-Jun-2024 Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

Merge branch 'bpf/for-next' into sched_ext-base


# 0e8655b4 29-Jul-2024 Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next

Backmerging to get a late RC of v6.10 before moving into v6.11.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>


# b1360211 17-Sep-2024 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge tag 'x86-fred-2024-09-17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 FRED updates from Thomas Gleixner:

- Enable FRED right after init_mem_mapping() because at that po

Merge tag 'x86-fred-2024-09-17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 FRED updates from Thomas Gleixner:

- Enable FRED right after init_mem_mapping() because at that point the
early IDT fault handler is replaced by the real fault handler. The
real fault handler retrieves the faulting address from the stack
frame and not from CR2 when the FRED feature is set. But that
obviously only works when FRED is enabled in the CPU as well.

- Set SS to __KERNEL_DS when enabling FRED to prevent a corner case
where ERETS can observe a SS mismatch and raises a #GP.

* tag 'x86-fred-2024-09-17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/entry: Set FRED RSP0 on return to userspace instead of context switch
x86/msr: Switch between WRMSRNS and WRMSR with the alternatives mechanism
x86/entry: Test ti_work for zero before processing individual bits
x86/fred: Set SS to __KERNEL_DS when enabling FRED
x86/fred: Enable FRED right after init_mem_mapping()
x86/fred: Move FRED RSP initialization into a separate function
x86/fred: Parse cmdline param "fred=" in cpu_parse_early_param()

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# a97756cb 09-Jul-2024 Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>

x86/fred: Enable FRED right after init_mem_mapping()

On 64-bit init_mem_mapping() relies on the minimal page fault handler
provided by the early IDT mechanism. The real page fault handler is
install

x86/fred: Enable FRED right after init_mem_mapping()

On 64-bit init_mem_mapping() relies on the minimal page fault handler
provided by the early IDT mechanism. The real page fault handler is
installed right afterwards into the IDT.

This is problematic on CPUs which have X86_FEATURE_FRED set because the
real page fault handler retrieves the faulting address from the FRED
exception stack frame and not from CR2, but that does obviously not work
when FRED is not yet enabled in the CPU.

To prevent this enable FRED right after init_mem_mapping() without
interrupt stacks. Those are enabled later in trap_init() after the CPU
entry area is set up.

[ tglx: Encapsulate the FRED details ]

Fixes: 14619d912b65 ("x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code")
Reported-by: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240709154048.3543361-4-xin@zytor.com

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# 73270c1f 09-Jul-2024 Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>

x86/fred: Move FRED RSP initialization into a separate function

To enable FRED earlier, move the RSP initialization out of
cpu_init_fred_exceptions() into cpu_init_fred_rsps().

This is required as

x86/fred: Move FRED RSP initialization into a separate function

To enable FRED earlier, move the RSP initialization out of
cpu_init_fred_exceptions() into cpu_init_fred_rsps().

This is required as the FRED RSP initialization depends on the availability
of the CPU entry areas which are set up late in trap_init(),

No functional change intended. Marked with Fixes as it's a depedency for
the real fix.

Fixes: 14619d912b65 ("x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code")
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240709154048.3543361-3-xin@zytor.com

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# 989b5cfa 09-Jul-2024 Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>

x86/fred: Parse cmdline param "fred=" in cpu_parse_early_param()

Depending on whether FRED is enabled, sysvec_install() installs a system
interrupt handler into either into FRED's system vector disp

x86/fred: Parse cmdline param "fred=" in cpu_parse_early_param()

Depending on whether FRED is enabled, sysvec_install() installs a system
interrupt handler into either into FRED's system vector dispatch table or
into the IDT.

However FRED can be disabled later in trap_init(), after sysvec_install()
has been invoked already; e.g., the HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR handler is
registered with sysvec_install() in kvm_guest_init(), which is called in
setup_arch() but way before trap_init().

IOW, there is a gap between FRED is available and available but disabled.
As a result, when FRED is available but disabled, early sysvec_install()
invocations fail to install the IDT handler resulting in spurious
interrupts.

Fix it by parsing cmdline param "fred=" in cpu_parse_early_param() to
ensure that FRED is disabled before the first sysvec_install() incovations.

Fixes: 3810da12710a ("x86/fred: Add a fred= cmdline param")
Reported-by: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240709154048.3543361-2-xin@zytor.com

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# 963d0d60 16-Sep-2024 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.12_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 hw mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov:

- Add CONFIG_ option for every hw CPU mitigation. T

Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.12_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 hw mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov:

- Add CONFIG_ option for every hw CPU mitigation. The intent is to
support configurations and scenarios where the mitigations code is
irrelevant

- Other small fixlets and improvements

* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.12_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/bugs: Fix handling when SRSO mitigation is disabled
x86/bugs: Add missing NO_SSB flag
Documentation/srso: Document a method for checking safe RET operates properly
x86/bugs: Add a separate config for GDS
x86/bugs: Remove GDS Force Kconfig option
x86/bugs: Add a separate config for SSB
x86/bugs: Add a separate config for Spectre V2
x86/bugs: Add a separate config for SRBDS
x86/bugs: Add a separate config for Spectre v1
x86/bugs: Add a separate config for RETBLEED
x86/bugs: Add a separate config for L1TF
x86/bugs: Add a separate config for MMIO Stable Data
x86/bugs: Add a separate config for TAA
x86/bugs: Add a separate config for MDS

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# 23e12b54 29-Aug-2024 Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>

x86/bugs: Add missing NO_SSB flag

The Moorefield and Lightning Mountain Atom processors are
missing the NO_SSB flag in the vulnerabilities whitelist.
This will cause unaffected parts to incorrectly

x86/bugs: Add missing NO_SSB flag

The Moorefield and Lightning Mountain Atom processors are
missing the NO_SSB flag in the vulnerabilities whitelist.
This will cause unaffected parts to incorrectly be reported
as vulnerable. Add the missing flag.

These parts are currently out of service and were verified
internally with archived documentation that they need the
NO_SSB flag.

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAEJ9NQdhh+4GxrtG1DuYgqYhvc0hi-sKZh-2niukJ-MyFLntAA@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Shanavas.K.S <shanavasks@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240829192437.4074196-1-daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com

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# a23e1966 15-Jul-2024 Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>

Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

Prepare input updates for 6.11 merge window.


# be8f4de6 26-Jun-2024 Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

Merge branch 'for-linus' into for-next

Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>


Revision tags: v6.10-rc4
# ef551352 16-Jun-2024 Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>

Merge branch 'mana-shared' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma

Leon Romanovsky says:

====================
net: mana: Allow variable size indirection table

Like we talked, I

Merge branch 'mana-shared' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma

Leon Romanovsky says:

====================
net: mana: Allow variable size indirection table

Like we talked, I created new shared branch for this patch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma.git/log/?h=mana-shared

* 'mana-shared' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma:
net: mana: Allow variable size indirection table
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240612183051.GE4966@unreal
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>

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Revision tags: v6.10-rc3
# 4ac0f06c 03-Jun-2024 Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>

ASoC: Merge up fixes

We need this to get the i.MX platforms working in CI again.


Revision tags: v6.10-rc2
# 6f47c7ae 28-May-2024 Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>

Merge tag 'v6.9' into next

Sync up with the mainline to bring in the new cleanup API.


# afeea275 04-Jul-2024 Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>

Merge drm-misc-next-2024-07-04 into drm-misc-next-fixes

Let's start the drm-misc-next-fixes cycle.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>


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