Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

Prepare input updates for 6.11 merge window.

Merge tag 'v6.9' into next

Sync up with the mainline to bring in the new cleanup API.

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

Some display refactoring patches are needed in order to allow conflict-
less merging.

Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@ursulin.net>

Merge topic branches 'clkdev' and 'fixes' into for-linus

Merge branch 'master' into mm-stable

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-xe-next

Backmerging drm-next in order to get up-to-date and in particular
to access commit 9ca5facd0400f610f3f7f71aeb7fc0b949a48c67.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <tho

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-xe-next

Backmerging drm-next in order to get up-to-date and in particular
to access commit 9ca5facd0400f610f3f7f71aeb7fc0b949a48c67.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>

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Merge tag 'phy_dp_modes_6.10' into msm-next-lumag

Merge DisplayPort subnode API in order to allow DisplayPort driver to
configure the PHYs either to the DP or eDP mode, depending on hardware
configu

Merge tag 'phy_dp_modes_6.10' into msm-next-lumag

Merge DisplayPort subnode API in order to allow DisplayPort driver to
configure the PHYs either to the DP or eDP mode, depending on hardware
configuration.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>

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Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Catching up on 6.9-rc2

Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next

Backmerging to get v6.9-rc2 changes into drm-misc-next.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>

Merge branch 'topic/sound-devel-6.10' into for-next

Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v6.9-rc2' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus

ASoC: Fixes for v6.9

A relatively large set of fixes here, the biggest piece of it is a

Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v6.9-rc2' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus

ASoC: Fixes for v6.9

A relatively large set of fixes here, the biggest piece of it is a
series correcting some problems with the delay reporting for Intel SOF
cards but there's a bunch of other things. Everything here is driver
specific except for a fix in the core for an issue with sign extension
handling volume controls.

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Merge drm/drm-fixes into drm-misc-fixes

Backmerging to get drm-misc-fixes to the state of v6.9-rc1.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>

Merge branch 'x86/sev' into x86/boot, to resolve conflicts and to pick up dependent tree

We are going to queue up a number of patches that depend
on fresh changes in x86/sev - merge in that branch t

Merge branch 'x86/sev' into x86/boot, to resolve conflicts and to pick up dependent tree

We are going to queue up a number of patches that depend
on fresh changes in x86/sev - merge in that branch to
reduce the number of conflicts going forward.

Also resolve a current conflict with x86/sev.

Conflicts:
arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

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Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:

- Add the x86 part of the SEV-SNP host support.

This will a

Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:

- Add the x86 part of the SEV-SNP host support.

This will allow the kernel to be used as a KVM hypervisor capable of
running SNP (Secure Nested Paging) guests. Roughly speaking, SEV-SNP
is the ultimate goal of the AMD confidential computing side,
providing the most comprehensive confidential computing environment
up to date.

This is the x86 part and there is a KVM part which did not get ready
in time for the merge window so latter will be forthcoming in the
next cycle.

- Rework the early code's position-dependent SEV variable references in
order to allow building the kernel with clang and -fPIE/-fPIC and
-mcmodel=kernel

- The usual set of fixes, cleanups and improvements all over the place

* tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits)
x86/sev: Disable KMSAN for memory encryption TUs
x86/sev: Dump SEV_STATUS
crypto: ccp - Have it depend on AMD_IOMMU
iommu/amd: Fix failure return from snp_lookup_rmpentry()
x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup code
crypto: ccp: Make snp_range_list static
x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
Documentation: virt: Fix up pre-formatted text block for SEV ioctls
crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command
crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command
crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command
x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature
KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe
crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump
iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown
crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands when SNP is enabled
crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data when SNP is enabled
crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled
x86/sev: Introduce an SNP leaked pages list
crypto: ccp: Provide an API to issue SEV and SNP commands
...

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x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code

Bit 31 in the page fault-error bit will be set when processor encounters
an RMP violation.

While at it, use the BIT() macro.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh S

x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code

Bit 31 in the page fault-error bit will be set when processor encounters
an RMP violation.

While at it, use the BIT() macro.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-9-michael.roth@amd.com

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Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

Work that needs to land in drm-intel-gt-next depends on two patches only
present in drm-intel-next, absence of which is causing a merge conflict:

3b918f4

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

Work that needs to land in drm-intel-gt-next depends on two patches only
present in drm-intel-next, absence of which is causing a merge conflict:

3b918f4f0c8b ("drm/i915/pxp: Optimize GET_PARAM:PXP_STATUS")
ac765b7018f6 ("drm/i915/pxp/mtl: intel_pxp_init_hw needs runtime-pm inside pm-complete")

Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>

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Merge branch 'linus' into smp/core

Pull in upstream to get the fixes so depending changes can be applied.

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next

Updating drm-misc-next to the state of Linux v6.6-rc2.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>

Merge tag 'v6.6-rc4' into perf/core, to pick up fixes

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Merge tag 'v6.6-rc2' into locking/core, to pick up fixes

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Sync to v6.6-rc1.

Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>

Merge drm/drm-fixes into drm-misc-fixes

Forwarding to v6.6-rc1.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>

Merge tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen:
"This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part o

Merge tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen:
"This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and
indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack
part of this feature, and just for userspace.

The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against
return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a
secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has
protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction,
the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and
to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops
the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy.

For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier
versions of this patch set"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/

* tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits)
x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type
x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm
x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR
x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference
x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK
x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test
x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface
x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status
x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem
x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn
x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
...

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x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors

The CPU performs "shadow stack accesses" when it expects to encounter
shadow stack mappings. These accesses can be implicit (via CALL/RET
instructions) o

x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors

The CPU performs "shadow stack accesses" when it expects to encounter
shadow stack mappings. These accesses can be implicit (via CALL/RET
instructions) or explicit (instructions like WRSS).

Shadow stack accesses to shadow-stack mappings can result in faults in
normal, valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings.
Shadow stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap
and copy-on-write. The kernel needs to use faults to implement those
features.

The architecture has concepts of both shadow stack reads and shadow stack
writes. Any shadow stack access to non-shadow stack memory will generate
a fault with the shadow stack error code bit set.

This means that, unlike normal write protection, the fault handler needs
to create a type of memory that can be written to (with instructions that
generate shadow stack writes), even to fulfill a read access. So in the
case of COW memory, the COW needs to take place even with a shadow stack
read. Otherwise the page will be left (shadow stack) writable in
userspace. So to trigger the appropriate behavior, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE
for shadow stack accesses, even if the access was a shadow stack read.

For the purpose of making this clearer, consider the following example.
If a process has a shadow stack, and forks, the shadow stack PTEs will
become read-only due to COW. If the CPU in one process performs a shadow
stack read access to the shadow stack, for example executing a RET and
causing the CPU to read the shadow stack copy of the return address, then
in order for the fault to be resolved the PTE will need to be set with
shadow stack permissions. But then the memory would be changeable from
userspace (from CALL, RET, WRSS, etc). So this scenario needs to trigger
COW, otherwise the shared page would be changeable from both processes.

Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow
stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack
mapping. Also, generate the errors for invalid shadow stack accesses.

Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-16-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com

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Merge remote-tracking branch 'net/master'