Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

Prepare input updates for 6.12 merge window.

Merge branch 'ib/6.11-rc6-matrix-keypad-spitz' into next

Bring in changes removing support for platform data from matrix-keypad
driver.

Merge tag 'v6.10' into next

Sync up with mainline to bring in device_for_each_child_node_scoped()
and other newer APIs.

Merge tag 'v6.11-rc1' into clk-meson-next

Linux 6.11-rc1

Merge tag 'v6.11-rc3' into trace/ring-buffer/core

The "reserve_mem" kernel command line parameter has been pulled into
v6.11. Merge the latest -rc3 to allow the persistent ring buffer memory to
be a

Merge tag 'v6.11-rc3' into trace/ring-buffer/core

The "reserve_mem" kernel command line parameter has been pulled into
v6.11. Merge the latest -rc3 to allow the persistent ring buffer memory to
be able to be mapped at the address specified by the "reserve_mem" command
line parameter.

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

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Merge tag 'v6.11-rc1' into for-6.12

Linux 6.11-rc1

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-xe-next

Get drm-xe-next on v6.11-rc2 and synchronized with drm-intel-next for
the display side. This resolves the current conflict for the
enable_display module parameter

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-xe-next

Get drm-xe-next on v6.11-rc2 and synchronized with drm-intel-next for
the display side. This resolves the current conflict for the
enable_display module parameter and allows further pending refactors.

Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>

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Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next

Get drm-misc-next to the state of v6.11-rc2.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Sync with v6.11-rc1 in general, and specifically get the new
BACKLIGHT_POWER_ constants for power states.

Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>

Merge branch 'linus' into x86/mm

Bring x86 and selftests up to date

Merge drm/drm-fixes into drm-misc-fixes

Let's start the new drm-misc-fixes cycle by bringing in 6.11-rc1.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>

Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

Prepare input updates for 6.11 merge window.

Merge tag 'v6.9' into next

Sync up with the mainline to bring in the new cleanup API.

Merge drm-misc-next-2024-07-04 into drm-misc-next-fixes

Let's start the drm-misc-next-fixes cycle.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next

Sync to v6.10-rc3.

Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-xe-next

Needed to get tracing cleanup and add mmio tracing series.

Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>

Merge remote-tracking branch 'drm-misc/drm-misc-next' into HEAD

Merge drm-misc-next tree into the msm-next tree in order to be able to
use HDMI connector framework for the MSM HDMI driver.

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next

Let's start the new release cycle.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>

Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-gt-next

Some display refactoring patches are needed in order to allow conflict-
less merging.

Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@ursulin.net>

Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.11_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:

- Add support for running the kernel in a SEV-SNP guest, over

Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.11_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:

- Add support for running the kernel in a SEV-SNP guest, over a Secure
VM Service Module (SVSM).

When running over a SVSM, different services can run at different
protection levels, apart from the guest OS but still within the
secure SNP environment. They can provide services to the guest, like
a vTPM, for example.

This series adds the required facilities to interface with such a
SVSM module.

- The usual fixlets, refactoring and cleanups

[ And as always: "SEV" is AMD's "Secure Encrypted Virtualization".

I can't be the only one who gets all the newer x86 TLA's confused,
can I?
- Linus ]

* tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.11_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
Documentation/ABI/configfs-tsm: Fix an unexpected indentation silly
x86/sev: Do RMP memory coverage check after max_pfn has been set
x86/sev: Move SEV compilation units
virt: sev-guest: Mark driver struct with __refdata to prevent section mismatch
x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present
x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM
x86/sev: Take advantage of configfs visibility support in TSM
fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility
sev-guest: configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated
virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL
x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace
x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support
x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0
x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0
x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas
x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP secrets page
x86/irqflags: Provide native versions of the local_irq_save()/restore()

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x86/sev: Move SEV compilation units

A long time ago it was agreed upon that the coco stuff needs to go where
it belongs:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/Yg5nh1RknPRwIrb8@zn.tnic

and not keep it in a

x86/sev: Move SEV compilation units

A long time ago it was agreed upon that the coco stuff needs to go where
it belongs:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/Yg5nh1RknPRwIrb8@zn.tnic

and not keep it in arch/x86/kernel. TDX did that and SEV can't find time
to do so. So lemme do it. If people have trouble converting their
ongoing featuritis patches, ask me for a sed script.

No functional changes.

Move the instrumentation exclusion bits too, as helpfully caught and
reported by the 0day folks.

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202406220748.hG3qlmDx-lkp@intel.com
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202407091342.46d7dbb-oliver.sang@intel.com
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Tested-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240619093014.17962-1-bp@kernel.org

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Merge branch 'tip/x86/cpu'

The Lunarlake patches rely on the new VFM stuff.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present

To allow execution at a level other than VMPL0, an SVSM must be present.
Allow the SEV-SNP guest to continue booting if an SVSM is detected

x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present

To allow execution at a level other than VMPL0, an SVSM must be present.
Allow the SEV-SNP guest to continue booting if an SVSM is detected and
the hypervisor supports the SVSM feature as indicated in the GHCB
hypervisor features bitmap.

[ bp: Massage a bit. ]

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2ce7cf281cce1d0cba88f3f576687ef75dc3c953.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com

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x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0

The PVALIDATE instruction can only be performed at VMPL0. If an SVSM is
present, it will be running at VMPL0 while the guest itself is the

x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0

The PVALIDATE instruction can only be performed at VMPL0. If an SVSM is
present, it will be running at VMPL0 while the guest itself is then
running at VMPL1 or a lower privilege level.

In that case, use the SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE call to perform memory
validation instead of issuing the PVALIDATE instruction directly.

The validation of a single 4K page is now explicitly identified as such
in the function name, pvalidate_4k_page(). The pvalidate_pages()
function is used for validating 1 or more pages at either 4K or 2M in
size. Each function, however, determines whether it can issue the
PVALIDATE directly or whether the SVSM needs to be invoked.

[ bp: Touchups. ]
[ Tom: fold in a fix for Coconut SVSM:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/234bb23c-d295-76e5-a690-7ea68dc1118b@amd.com ]

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4c4017d8b94512d565de9ccb555b1a9f8983c69c.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com

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x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP secrets page

During early boot phases, check for the presence of an SVSM when running
as an SEV-SNP guest.

An SVSM is present if not running at

x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP secrets page

During early boot phases, check for the presence of an SVSM when running
as an SEV-SNP guest.

An SVSM is present if not running at VMPL0 and the 64-bit value at offset
0x148 into the secrets page is non-zero. If an SVSM is present, save the
SVSM Calling Area address (CAA), located at offset 0x150 into the secrets
page, and set the VMPL level of the guest, which should be non-zero, to
indicate the presence of an SVSM.

[ bp: Touchups. ]

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9d3fe161be93d4ea60f43c2a3f2c311fe708b63b.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com

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