1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /*
3 * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation
4 * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation
5 */
6
7 #include <linux/asn1_encoder.h>
8 #include <linux/oid_registry.h>
9 #include <linux/string.h>
10 #include <linux/err.h>
11 #include <linux/tpm.h>
12 #include <linux/tpm_command.h>
13
14 #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
15 #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
16
17 #include <linux/unaligned.h>
18
19 #include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
20
21 static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 };
22
tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload * payload,struct trusted_key_options * options,u8 * src,u32 len)23 static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
24 struct trusted_key_options *options,
25 u8 *src, u32 len)
26 {
27 const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
28 u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
29 u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
30 u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE;
31 u8 *priv, *pub;
32 u16 priv_len, pub_len;
33 int ret;
34
35 priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
36 priv = src;
37
38 src += priv_len;
39
40 pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
41 pub = src;
42
43 if (!scratch)
44 return -ENOMEM;
45
46 work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
47 asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
48
49 if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
50 unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
51 /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
52 w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
53 if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) {
54 ret = PTR_ERR(w);
55 goto err;
56 }
57 work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool);
58 }
59
60 /*
61 * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length
62 *
63 * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never
64 * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on
65 */
66 if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE,
67 "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) {
68 ret = -EINVAL;
69 goto err;
70 }
71
72 work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
73 work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
74 work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
75
76 work1 = payload->blob;
77 work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob),
78 scratch, work - scratch);
79 if (IS_ERR(work1)) {
80 ret = PTR_ERR(work1);
81 pr_err("BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed with %d\n", ret);
82 goto err;
83 }
84
85 kfree(scratch);
86 return work1 - payload->blob;
87
88 err:
89 kfree(scratch);
90 return ret;
91 }
92
93 struct tpm2_key_context {
94 u32 parent;
95 const u8 *pub;
96 u32 pub_len;
97 const u8 *priv;
98 u32 priv_len;
99 };
100
tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload * payload,struct trusted_key_options * options,u8 ** buf)101 static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
102 struct trusted_key_options *options,
103 u8 **buf)
104 {
105 int ret;
106 struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
107 u8 *blob;
108
109 memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
110
111 ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob,
112 payload->blob_len);
113 if (ret < 0)
114 return ret;
115
116 if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
117 return -EINVAL;
118
119 blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
120 if (!blob)
121 return -ENOMEM;
122
123 *buf = blob;
124 options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
125
126 memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
127 blob += ctx.priv_len;
128
129 memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len);
130
131 return 0;
132 }
133
tpm2_key_parent(void * context,size_t hdrlen,unsigned char tag,const void * value,size_t vlen)134 int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
135 unsigned char tag,
136 const void *value, size_t vlen)
137 {
138 struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
139 const u8 *v = value;
140 int i;
141
142 ctx->parent = 0;
143 for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) {
144 ctx->parent <<= 8;
145 ctx->parent |= v[i];
146 }
147
148 return 0;
149 }
150
tpm2_key_type(void * context,size_t hdrlen,unsigned char tag,const void * value,size_t vlen)151 int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
152 unsigned char tag,
153 const void *value, size_t vlen)
154 {
155 enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
156
157 if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) {
158 char buffer[50];
159
160 sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
161 pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n",
162 buffer);
163 return -EINVAL;
164 }
165
166 return 0;
167 }
168
tpm2_key_pub(void * context,size_t hdrlen,unsigned char tag,const void * value,size_t vlen)169 int tpm2_key_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
170 unsigned char tag,
171 const void *value, size_t vlen)
172 {
173 struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
174
175 ctx->pub = value;
176 ctx->pub_len = vlen;
177
178 return 0;
179 }
180
tpm2_key_priv(void * context,size_t hdrlen,unsigned char tag,const void * value,size_t vlen)181 int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
182 unsigned char tag,
183 const void *value, size_t vlen)
184 {
185 struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
186
187 ctx->priv = value;
188 ctx->priv_len = vlen;
189
190 return 0;
191 }
192
193 /**
194 * tpm2_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer.
195 *
196 * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance
197 * @session_handle: session handle
198 * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used
199 * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used
200 * @attributes: the session attributes
201 * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used
202 * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used
203 */
tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf * buf,u32 session_handle,const u8 * nonce,u16 nonce_len,u8 attributes,const u8 * hmac,u16 hmac_len)204 static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle,
205 const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len,
206 u8 attributes,
207 const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len)
208 {
209 tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len);
210 tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle);
211 tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len);
212
213 if (nonce && nonce_len)
214 tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len);
215
216 tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes);
217 tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len);
218
219 if (hmac && hmac_len)
220 tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len);
221 }
222
223 /**
224 * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key
225 *
226 * @chip: TPM chip to use
227 * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
228 * @options: authentication values and other options
229 *
230 * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success.
231 */
tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip * chip,struct trusted_key_payload * payload,struct trusted_key_options * options)232 int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
233 struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
234 struct trusted_key_options *options)
235 {
236 off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
237 struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
238 int blob_len = 0;
239 int hash;
240 u32 flags;
241 int rc;
242
243 hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
244 if (hash < 0)
245 return hash;
246
247 if (!options->keyhandle)
248 return -EINVAL;
249
250 rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
251 if (rc)
252 return rc;
253
254 rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
255 if (rc)
256 goto out_put;
257
258 rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
259 if (rc) {
260 tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
261 goto out_put;
262 }
263
264 rc = tpm_buf_init_sized(&sized);
265 if (rc) {
266 tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
267 tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
268 goto out_put;
269 }
270
271 tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
272 tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
273 options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
274
275 /* sensitive */
276 tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len);
277
278 if (options->blobauth_len)
279 tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
280
281 tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len);
282 tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
283 tpm_buf_append(&buf, sized.data, sized.length);
284
285 /* public */
286 tpm_buf_reset_sized(&sized);
287 tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
288 tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, hash);
289
290 /* key properties */
291 flags = 0;
292 flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
293 flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
294 tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags);
295
296 /* policy */
297 tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len);
298 if (options->policydigest_len)
299 tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
300
301 /* public parameters */
302 tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
303 tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, 0);
304
305 tpm_buf_append(&buf, sized.data, sized.length);
306
307 /* outside info */
308 tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
309
310 /* creation PCR */
311 tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
312
313 if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
314 rc = -E2BIG;
315 tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
316 goto out;
317 }
318
319 tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
320 rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data");
321 rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
322 if (rc)
323 goto out;
324
325 blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset);
326 if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) {
327 rc = -E2BIG;
328 goto out;
329 }
330 if (buf.length - offset < blob_len) {
331 rc = -EFAULT;
332 goto out;
333 }
334
335 blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf.data[offset], blob_len);
336
337 out:
338 tpm_buf_destroy(&sized);
339 tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
340
341 if (rc > 0) {
342 if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH)
343 rc = -EINVAL;
344 else
345 rc = -EPERM;
346 }
347 if (blob_len < 0)
348 rc = blob_len;
349 else
350 payload->blob_len = blob_len;
351
352 out_put:
353 tpm_put_ops(chip);
354 return rc;
355 }
356
357 /**
358 * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command
359 *
360 * @chip: TPM chip to use
361 * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
362 * @options: authentication values and other options
363 * @blob_handle: returned blob handle
364 *
365 * Return: 0 on success.
366 * -E2BIG on wrong payload size.
367 * -EPERM on tpm error status.
368 * < 0 error from tpm_send.
369 */
tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip * chip,struct trusted_key_payload * payload,struct trusted_key_options * options,u32 * blob_handle)370 static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
371 struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
372 struct trusted_key_options *options,
373 u32 *blob_handle)
374 {
375 u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
376 struct tpm_buf buf;
377 unsigned int private_len;
378 unsigned int public_len;
379 unsigned int blob_len;
380 u8 *blob, *pub;
381 int rc;
382 u32 attrs;
383
384 rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
385 if (rc) {
386 /* old form */
387 blob = payload->blob;
388 payload->old_format = 1;
389 } else {
390 /* Bind for cleanup: */
391 blob_ref = blob;
392 }
393
394 /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
395 if (!options->keyhandle)
396 return -EINVAL;
397
398 /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
399 if (payload->blob_len < 4)
400 return -EINVAL;
401
402 private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob);
403
404 /* must be big enough for following public_len */
405 if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len))
406 return -E2BIG;
407
408 public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len);
409 if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len)
410 return -E2BIG;
411
412 pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2;
413 /* key attributes are always at offset 4 */
414 attrs = get_unaligned_be32(pub + 4);
415
416 if ((attrs & (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) ==
417 (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT))
418 payload->migratable = 0;
419 else
420 payload->migratable = 1;
421
422 blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4;
423 if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
424 return -E2BIG;
425
426 rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
427 if (rc)
428 return rc;
429
430 rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
431 if (rc) {
432 tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
433 return rc;
434 }
435
436 tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
437 tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth,
438 TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
439
440 tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
441
442 if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
443 rc = -E2BIG;
444 tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
445 goto out;
446 }
447
448 tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
449 rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob");
450 rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
451 if (!rc)
452 *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
453 (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
454
455 out:
456 tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
457
458 if (rc > 0)
459 rc = -EPERM;
460
461 return rc;
462 }
463
464 /**
465 * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command
466 *
467 * @chip: TPM chip to use
468 * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
469 * @options: authentication values and other options
470 * @blob_handle: blob handle
471 *
472 * Return: 0 on success
473 * -EPERM on tpm error status
474 * < 0 error from tpm_send
475 */
tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip * chip,struct trusted_key_payload * payload,struct trusted_key_options * options,u32 blob_handle)476 static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
477 struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
478 struct trusted_key_options *options,
479 u32 blob_handle)
480 {
481 struct tpm_buf buf;
482 u16 data_len;
483 u8 *data;
484 int rc;
485
486 rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
487 if (rc)
488 return rc;
489
490 rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL);
491 if (rc) {
492 tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
493 return rc;
494 }
495
496 tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL);
497
498 if (!options->policyhandle) {
499 tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
500 options->blobauth,
501 options->blobauth_len);
502 } else {
503 /*
504 * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
505 * kernel so we don't known the nonce and thus can't
506 * calculate a HMAC on it. Therefore, the user can
507 * only really use TPM2_PolicyPassword and we must
508 * send down the plain text password, which could be
509 * intercepted. We can still encrypt the returned
510 * key, but that's small comfort since the interposer
511 * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
512 * password.
513 */
514 tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
515 NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
516 options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
517 tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
518 NULL, 0);
519 }
520
521 tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
522 rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing");
523 rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
524 if (rc > 0)
525 rc = -EPERM;
526
527 if (!rc) {
528 data_len = be16_to_cpup(
529 (__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]);
530 if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
531 rc = -EFAULT;
532 goto out;
533 }
534
535 if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + data_len) {
536 rc = -EFAULT;
537 goto out;
538 }
539 data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6];
540
541 if (payload->old_format) {
542 /* migratable flag is at the end of the key */
543 memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1);
544 payload->key_len = data_len - 1;
545 payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1];
546 } else {
547 /*
548 * migratable flag already collected from key
549 * attributes
550 */
551 memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len);
552 payload->key_len = data_len;
553 }
554 }
555
556 out:
557 tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
558 return rc;
559 }
560
561 /**
562 * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key
563 *
564 * @chip: TPM chip to use
565 * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
566 * @options: authentication values and other options
567 *
568 * Return: Same as with tpm_send.
569 */
tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip * chip,struct trusted_key_payload * payload,struct trusted_key_options * options)570 int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
571 struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
572 struct trusted_key_options *options)
573 {
574 u32 blob_handle;
575 int rc;
576
577 rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
578 if (rc)
579 return rc;
580
581 rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
582 if (rc)
583 goto out;
584
585 rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
586 tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
587
588 out:
589 tpm_put_ops(chip);
590
591 return rc;
592 }
593