1 /* 2 * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation 3 * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> 4 * 5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. 8 * 9 * ima_policy.c 10 * - initialize default measure policy rules 11 * 12 */ 13 #include <linux/module.h> 14 #include <linux/list.h> 15 #include <linux/fs.h> 16 #include <linux/security.h> 17 #include <linux/magic.h> 18 #include <linux/parser.h> 19 #include <linux/slab.h> 20 #include <linux/rculist.h> 21 #include <linux/genhd.h> 22 #include <linux/seq_file.h> 23 24 #include "ima.h" 25 26 /* flags definitions */ 27 #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 28 #define IMA_MASK 0x0002 29 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004 30 #define IMA_UID 0x0008 31 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010 32 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020 33 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040 34 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080 35 #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 36 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 37 38 #define UNKNOWN 0 39 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ 40 #define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002 41 #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */ 42 #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008 43 #define AUDIT 0x0040 44 #define HASH 0x0100 45 #define DONT_HASH 0x0200 46 47 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \ 48 (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8)) 49 50 int ima_policy_flag; 51 static int temp_ima_appraise; 52 static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init; 53 54 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 55 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, 56 LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE 57 }; 58 59 enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB }; 60 61 struct ima_rule_entry { 62 struct list_head list; 63 int action; 64 unsigned int flags; 65 enum ima_hooks func; 66 int mask; 67 unsigned long fsmagic; 68 uuid_t fsuuid; 69 kuid_t uid; 70 kuid_t fowner; 71 bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* Handlers for operators */ 72 bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */ 73 int pcr; 74 struct { 75 void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */ 76 void *args_p; /* audit value */ 77 int type; /* audit type */ 78 } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; 79 char *fsname; 80 }; 81 82 /* 83 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be 84 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner 85 */ 86 87 /* 88 * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files 89 * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because 90 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building 91 * and running executables. 92 */ 93 static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] __ro_after_init = { 94 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 95 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 96 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 97 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 98 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 99 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 100 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 101 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 102 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SMACK_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 103 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, 104 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 105 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC, 106 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 107 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC} 108 }; 109 110 static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = { 111 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, 112 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, 113 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, 114 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, 115 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, 116 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq, 117 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, 118 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, 119 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, 120 }; 121 122 static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = { 123 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, 124 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, 125 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, 126 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, 127 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, 128 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq, 129 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID}, 130 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, 131 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq, 132 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID}, 133 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, 134 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, 135 {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, 136 }; 137 138 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { 139 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 140 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 141 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 142 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 143 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 144 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 145 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 146 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 147 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 148 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SMACK_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 149 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 150 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 151 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, 152 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY 153 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, 154 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, 155 #endif 156 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT 157 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &uid_eq, 158 .flags = IMA_FOWNER}, 159 #else 160 /* force signature */ 161 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &uid_eq, 162 .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, 163 #endif 164 }; 165 166 static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { 167 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS 168 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, 169 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, 170 #endif 171 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS 172 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, 173 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, 174 #endif 175 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS 176 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, 177 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, 178 #endif 179 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS 180 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, 181 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, 182 #endif 183 }; 184 185 static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { 186 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, 187 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, 188 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, 189 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, 190 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, 191 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, 192 {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, 193 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, 194 }; 195 196 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules); 197 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules); 198 static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules); 199 static struct list_head *ima_rules; 200 201 static int ima_policy __initdata; 202 203 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) 204 { 205 if (ima_policy) 206 return 1; 207 208 ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB; 209 return 1; 210 } 211 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); 212 213 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; 214 static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; 215 static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; 216 static int __init policy_setup(char *str) 217 { 218 char *p; 219 220 while ((p = strsep(&str, " |\n")) != NULL) { 221 if (*p == ' ') 222 continue; 223 if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) 224 ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB; 225 else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0) 226 ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; 227 else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) 228 ima_use_secure_boot = true; 229 else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) 230 ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; 231 } 232 233 return 1; 234 } 235 __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup); 236 237 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) 238 { 239 ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; 240 return 1; 241 } 242 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup); 243 244 /* 245 * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring 246 * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect 247 * the reloaded LSM policy. We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if 248 * they don't. 249 */ 250 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) 251 { 252 struct ima_rule_entry *entry; 253 int result; 254 int i; 255 256 list_for_each_entry(entry, &ima_policy_rules, list) { 257 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { 258 if (!entry->lsm[i].rule) 259 continue; 260 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type, 261 Audit_equal, 262 entry->lsm[i].args_p, 263 &entry->lsm[i].rule); 264 BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule); 265 } 266 } 267 } 268 269 /** 270 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule. 271 * @rule: a pointer to a rule 272 * @inode: a pointer to an inode 273 * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation 274 * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated 275 * @func: LIM hook identifier 276 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) 277 * 278 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. 279 */ 280 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, 281 const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, 282 enum ima_hooks func, int mask) 283 { 284 int i; 285 286 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && 287 (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) 288 return false; 289 if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && 290 (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR)) 291 return false; 292 if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) && 293 (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR)) 294 return false; 295 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) 296 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) 297 return false; 298 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSNAME) 299 && strcmp(rule->fsname, inode->i_sb->s_type->name)) 300 return false; 301 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) && 302 !uuid_equal(&rule->fsuuid, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid)) 303 return false; 304 if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid)) 305 return false; 306 if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) { 307 if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) { 308 if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid) 309 && !rule->uid_op(cred->suid, rule->uid) 310 && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid)) 311 return false; 312 } else if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid)) 313 return false; 314 } 315 316 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && 317 !rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner)) 318 return false; 319 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { 320 int rc = 0; 321 u32 osid; 322 int retried = 0; 323 324 if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) 325 continue; 326 retry: 327 switch (i) { 328 case LSM_OBJ_USER: 329 case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: 330 case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: 331 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); 332 rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, 333 rule->lsm[i].type, 334 Audit_equal, 335 rule->lsm[i].rule, 336 NULL); 337 break; 338 case LSM_SUBJ_USER: 339 case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: 340 case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: 341 rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid, 342 rule->lsm[i].type, 343 Audit_equal, 344 rule->lsm[i].rule, 345 NULL); 346 default: 347 break; 348 } 349 if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) { 350 retried = 1; 351 ima_lsm_update_rules(); 352 goto retry; 353 } 354 if (!rc) 355 return false; 356 } 357 return true; 358 } 359 360 /* 361 * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general, 362 * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules. 363 */ 364 static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) 365 { 366 if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC)) 367 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE; 368 369 switch (func) { 370 case MMAP_CHECK: 371 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE; 372 case BPRM_CHECK: 373 return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE; 374 case CREDS_CHECK: 375 return IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE; 376 case FILE_CHECK: 377 case POST_SETATTR: 378 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE; 379 case MODULE_CHECK ... MAX_CHECK - 1: 380 default: 381 return IMA_READ_APPRAISE; 382 } 383 } 384 385 /** 386 * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions 387 * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made 388 * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is 389 * being made 390 * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated 391 * @func: IMA hook identifier 392 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) 393 * @pcr: set the pcr to extend 394 * 395 * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type) 396 * conditions. 397 * 398 * Since the IMA policy may be updated multiple times we need to lock the 399 * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous 400 * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. 401 */ 402 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, 403 enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr) 404 { 405 struct ima_rule_entry *entry; 406 int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1); 407 408 rcu_read_lock(); 409 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) { 410 411 if (!(entry->action & actmask)) 412 continue; 413 414 if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask)) 415 continue; 416 417 action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS; 418 419 action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK; 420 if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE) { 421 action |= get_subaction(entry, func); 422 action &= ~IMA_HASH; 423 if (ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs) 424 action |= IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS; 425 } 426 427 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK) 428 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1); 429 else 430 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1); 431 432 if ((pcr) && (entry->flags & IMA_PCR)) 433 *pcr = entry->pcr; 434 435 if (!actmask) 436 break; 437 } 438 rcu_read_unlock(); 439 440 return action; 441 } 442 443 /* 444 * Initialize the ima_policy_flag variable based on the currently 445 * loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit 446 * out of a function or not call the function in the first place 447 * can be made earlier. 448 */ 449 void ima_update_policy_flag(void) 450 { 451 struct ima_rule_entry *entry; 452 453 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) { 454 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK) 455 ima_policy_flag |= entry->action; 456 } 457 458 ima_appraise |= (build_ima_appraise | temp_ima_appraise); 459 if (!ima_appraise) 460 ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE; 461 } 462 463 static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) 464 { 465 if (func == MODULE_CHECK) 466 return IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES; 467 else if (func == FIRMWARE_CHECK) 468 return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; 469 else if (func == POLICY_CHECK) 470 return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; 471 else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) 472 return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC; 473 return 0; 474 } 475 476 /** 477 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules. 478 * 479 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the 480 * the new ima_policy_rules. 481 */ 482 void __init ima_init_policy(void) 483 { 484 int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries, secure_boot_entries; 485 486 /* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */ 487 measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0; 488 appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ? 489 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0; 490 secure_boot_entries = ima_use_secure_boot ? 491 ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules) : 0; 492 493 for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++) 494 list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules); 495 496 switch (ima_policy) { 497 case ORIGINAL_TCB: 498 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++) 499 list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list, 500 &ima_default_rules); 501 break; 502 case DEFAULT_TCB: 503 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++) 504 list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list, 505 &ima_default_rules); 506 default: 507 break; 508 } 509 510 /* 511 * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file 512 * signatures, prior to any other appraise rules. 513 */ 514 for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) { 515 list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules); 516 temp_ima_appraise |= 517 ima_appraise_flag(secure_boot_rules[i].func); 518 } 519 520 /* 521 * Insert the build time appraise rules requiring file signatures 522 * for both the initial and custom policies, prior to other appraise 523 * rules. 524 */ 525 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules); i++) { 526 struct ima_rule_entry *entry; 527 528 if (!secure_boot_entries) 529 list_add_tail(&build_appraise_rules[i].list, 530 &ima_default_rules); 531 532 entry = kmemdup(&build_appraise_rules[i], sizeof(*entry), 533 GFP_KERNEL); 534 if (entry) 535 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules); 536 build_ima_appraise |= 537 ima_appraise_flag(build_appraise_rules[i].func); 538 } 539 540 for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) { 541 list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list, 542 &ima_default_rules); 543 if (default_appraise_rules[i].func == POLICY_CHECK) 544 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; 545 } 546 547 ima_rules = &ima_default_rules; 548 ima_update_policy_flag(); 549 } 550 551 /* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */ 552 int ima_check_policy(void) 553 { 554 if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules)) 555 return -EINVAL; 556 return 0; 557 } 558 559 /** 560 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules 561 * 562 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new 563 * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so 564 * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the 565 * RCU updater. 566 * 567 * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when 568 * we switch from the default policy to user defined. 569 */ 570 void ima_update_policy(void) 571 { 572 struct list_head *policy = &ima_policy_rules; 573 574 list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules, policy, synchronize_rcu); 575 576 if (ima_rules != policy) { 577 ima_policy_flag = 0; 578 ima_rules = policy; 579 } 580 ima_update_policy_flag(); 581 } 582 583 enum { 584 Opt_err = -1, 585 Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure, 586 Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise, 587 Opt_audit, Opt_hash, Opt_dont_hash, 588 Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, 589 Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, 590 Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_fsname, 591 Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid_eq, Opt_euid_eq, Opt_fowner_eq, 592 Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt, 593 Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, 594 Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio, 595 Opt_pcr 596 }; 597 598 static match_table_t policy_tokens = { 599 {Opt_measure, "measure"}, 600 {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"}, 601 {Opt_appraise, "appraise"}, 602 {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"}, 603 {Opt_audit, "audit"}, 604 {Opt_hash, "hash"}, 605 {Opt_dont_hash, "dont_hash"}, 606 {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"}, 607 {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"}, 608 {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"}, 609 {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"}, 610 {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"}, 611 {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"}, 612 {Opt_func, "func=%s"}, 613 {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"}, 614 {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"}, 615 {Opt_fsname, "fsname=%s"}, 616 {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"}, 617 {Opt_uid_eq, "uid=%s"}, 618 {Opt_euid_eq, "euid=%s"}, 619 {Opt_fowner_eq, "fowner=%s"}, 620 {Opt_uid_gt, "uid>%s"}, 621 {Opt_euid_gt, "euid>%s"}, 622 {Opt_fowner_gt, "fowner>%s"}, 623 {Opt_uid_lt, "uid<%s"}, 624 {Opt_euid_lt, "euid<%s"}, 625 {Opt_fowner_lt, "fowner<%s"}, 626 {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, 627 {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"}, 628 {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, 629 {Opt_err, NULL} 630 }; 631 632 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, 633 substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type) 634 { 635 int result; 636 637 if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) 638 return -EINVAL; 639 640 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args); 641 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p) 642 return -ENOMEM; 643 644 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; 645 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, 646 Audit_equal, 647 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, 648 &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); 649 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { 650 kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); 651 return -EINVAL; 652 } 653 654 return result; 655 } 656 657 static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value, 658 bool (*rule_operator)(kuid_t, kuid_t)) 659 { 660 if (!ab) 661 return; 662 663 if (rule_operator == &uid_gt) 664 audit_log_format(ab, "%s>", key); 665 else if (rule_operator == &uid_lt) 666 audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key); 667 else 668 audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key); 669 audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", value); 670 } 671 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value) 672 { 673 ima_log_string_op(ab, key, value, NULL); 674 } 675 676 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) 677 { 678 struct audit_buffer *ab; 679 char *from; 680 char *p; 681 bool uid_token; 682 int result = 0; 683 684 ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, 685 AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE); 686 687 entry->uid = INVALID_UID; 688 entry->fowner = INVALID_UID; 689 entry->uid_op = &uid_eq; 690 entry->fowner_op = &uid_eq; 691 entry->action = UNKNOWN; 692 while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) { 693 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; 694 int token; 695 unsigned long lnum; 696 697 if (result < 0) 698 break; 699 if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t')) 700 continue; 701 token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args); 702 switch (token) { 703 case Opt_measure: 704 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure"); 705 706 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) 707 result = -EINVAL; 708 709 entry->action = MEASURE; 710 break; 711 case Opt_dont_measure: 712 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure"); 713 714 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) 715 result = -EINVAL; 716 717 entry->action = DONT_MEASURE; 718 break; 719 case Opt_appraise: 720 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise"); 721 722 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) 723 result = -EINVAL; 724 725 entry->action = APPRAISE; 726 break; 727 case Opt_dont_appraise: 728 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise"); 729 730 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) 731 result = -EINVAL; 732 733 entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE; 734 break; 735 case Opt_audit: 736 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit"); 737 738 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) 739 result = -EINVAL; 740 741 entry->action = AUDIT; 742 break; 743 case Opt_hash: 744 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "hash"); 745 746 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) 747 result = -EINVAL; 748 749 entry->action = HASH; 750 break; 751 case Opt_dont_hash: 752 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_hash"); 753 754 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) 755 result = -EINVAL; 756 757 entry->action = DONT_HASH; 758 break; 759 case Opt_func: 760 ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from); 761 762 if (entry->func) 763 result = -EINVAL; 764 765 if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0) 766 entry->func = FILE_CHECK; 767 /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */ 768 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) 769 entry->func = FILE_CHECK; 770 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0) 771 entry->func = MODULE_CHECK; 772 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0) 773 entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK; 774 else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) 775 || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0)) 776 entry->func = MMAP_CHECK; 777 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0) 778 entry->func = BPRM_CHECK; 779 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CREDS_CHECK") == 0) 780 entry->func = CREDS_CHECK; 781 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") == 782 0) 783 entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK; 784 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK") 785 == 0) 786 entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK; 787 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0) 788 entry->func = POLICY_CHECK; 789 else 790 result = -EINVAL; 791 if (!result) 792 entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC; 793 break; 794 case Opt_mask: 795 ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from); 796 797 if (entry->mask) 798 result = -EINVAL; 799 800 from = args[0].from; 801 if (*from == '^') 802 from++; 803 804 if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0) 805 entry->mask = MAY_EXEC; 806 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0) 807 entry->mask = MAY_WRITE; 808 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0) 809 entry->mask = MAY_READ; 810 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0) 811 entry->mask = MAY_APPEND; 812 else 813 result = -EINVAL; 814 if (!result) 815 entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^') 816 ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK; 817 break; 818 case Opt_fsmagic: 819 ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from); 820 821 if (entry->fsmagic) { 822 result = -EINVAL; 823 break; 824 } 825 826 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic); 827 if (!result) 828 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC; 829 break; 830 case Opt_fsname: 831 ima_log_string(ab, "fsname", args[0].from); 832 833 entry->fsname = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL); 834 if (!entry->fsname) { 835 result = -ENOMEM; 836 break; 837 } 838 result = 0; 839 entry->flags |= IMA_FSNAME; 840 break; 841 case Opt_fsuuid: 842 ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from); 843 844 if (!uuid_is_null(&entry->fsuuid)) { 845 result = -EINVAL; 846 break; 847 } 848 849 result = uuid_parse(args[0].from, &entry->fsuuid); 850 if (!result) 851 entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID; 852 break; 853 case Opt_uid_gt: 854 case Opt_euid_gt: 855 entry->uid_op = &uid_gt; 856 case Opt_uid_lt: 857 case Opt_euid_lt: 858 if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt)) 859 entry->uid_op = &uid_lt; 860 case Opt_uid_eq: 861 case Opt_euid_eq: 862 uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) || 863 (token == Opt_uid_gt) || 864 (token == Opt_uid_lt); 865 866 ima_log_string_op(ab, uid_token ? "uid" : "euid", 867 args[0].from, entry->uid_op); 868 869 if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) { 870 result = -EINVAL; 871 break; 872 } 873 874 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); 875 if (!result) { 876 entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), 877 (uid_t) lnum); 878 if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || 879 (uid_t)lnum != lnum) 880 result = -EINVAL; 881 else 882 entry->flags |= uid_token 883 ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID; 884 } 885 break; 886 case Opt_fowner_gt: 887 entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt; 888 case Opt_fowner_lt: 889 if (token == Opt_fowner_lt) 890 entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt; 891 case Opt_fowner_eq: 892 ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from, 893 entry->fowner_op); 894 895 if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) { 896 result = -EINVAL; 897 break; 898 } 899 900 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); 901 if (!result) { 902 entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum); 903 if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) 904 result = -EINVAL; 905 else 906 entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER; 907 } 908 break; 909 case Opt_obj_user: 910 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from); 911 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, 912 LSM_OBJ_USER, 913 AUDIT_OBJ_USER); 914 break; 915 case Opt_obj_role: 916 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from); 917 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, 918 LSM_OBJ_ROLE, 919 AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE); 920 break; 921 case Opt_obj_type: 922 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from); 923 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, 924 LSM_OBJ_TYPE, 925 AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE); 926 break; 927 case Opt_subj_user: 928 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from); 929 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, 930 LSM_SUBJ_USER, 931 AUDIT_SUBJ_USER); 932 break; 933 case Opt_subj_role: 934 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from); 935 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, 936 LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, 937 AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE); 938 break; 939 case Opt_subj_type: 940 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from); 941 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, 942 LSM_SUBJ_TYPE, 943 AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE); 944 break; 945 case Opt_appraise_type: 946 if (entry->action != APPRAISE) { 947 result = -EINVAL; 948 break; 949 } 950 951 ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from); 952 if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0) 953 entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED; 954 else 955 result = -EINVAL; 956 break; 957 case Opt_permit_directio: 958 entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO; 959 break; 960 case Opt_pcr: 961 if (entry->action != MEASURE) { 962 result = -EINVAL; 963 break; 964 } 965 ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from); 966 967 result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr); 968 if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr)) 969 result = -EINVAL; 970 else 971 entry->flags |= IMA_PCR; 972 973 break; 974 case Opt_err: 975 ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p); 976 result = -EINVAL; 977 break; 978 } 979 } 980 if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN)) 981 result = -EINVAL; 982 else if (entry->action == APPRAISE) 983 temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func); 984 985 audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result); 986 audit_log_end(ab); 987 return result; 988 } 989 990 /** 991 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules 992 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule 993 * 994 * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy() 995 * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure 996 */ 997 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) 998 { 999 static const char op[] = "update_policy"; 1000 char *p; 1001 struct ima_rule_entry *entry; 1002 ssize_t result, len; 1003 int audit_info = 0; 1004 1005 p = strsep(&rule, "\n"); 1006 len = strlen(p) + 1; 1007 p += strspn(p, " \t"); 1008 1009 if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0') 1010 return len; 1011 1012 entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); 1013 if (!entry) { 1014 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, 1015 NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info); 1016 return -ENOMEM; 1017 } 1018 1019 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list); 1020 1021 result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry); 1022 if (result) { 1023 kfree(entry); 1024 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, 1025 NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result, 1026 audit_info); 1027 return result; 1028 } 1029 1030 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules); 1031 1032 return len; 1033 } 1034 1035 /** 1036 * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy. 1037 * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is 1038 * different from the active one. There is also only one user of 1039 * ima_delete_rules() at a time. 1040 */ 1041 void ima_delete_rules(void) 1042 { 1043 struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; 1044 int i; 1045 1046 temp_ima_appraise = 0; 1047 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) { 1048 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) 1049 kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p); 1050 1051 list_del(&entry->list); 1052 kfree(entry); 1053 } 1054 } 1055 1056 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY 1057 enum { 1058 mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append 1059 }; 1060 1061 static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { 1062 "MAY_EXEC", 1063 "MAY_WRITE", 1064 "MAY_READ", 1065 "MAY_APPEND" 1066 }; 1067 1068 #define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str), 1069 1070 static const char *const func_tokens[] = { 1071 __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify) 1072 }; 1073 1074 void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) 1075 { 1076 loff_t l = *pos; 1077 struct ima_rule_entry *entry; 1078 1079 rcu_read_lock(); 1080 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) { 1081 if (!l--) { 1082 rcu_read_unlock(); 1083 return entry; 1084 } 1085 } 1086 rcu_read_unlock(); 1087 return NULL; 1088 } 1089 1090 void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) 1091 { 1092 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v; 1093 1094 rcu_read_lock(); 1095 entry = list_entry_rcu(entry->list.next, struct ima_rule_entry, list); 1096 rcu_read_unlock(); 1097 (*pos)++; 1098 1099 return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry; 1100 } 1101 1102 void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v) 1103 { 1104 } 1105 1106 #define pt(token) policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern 1107 #define mt(token) mask_tokens[token] 1108 1109 /* 1110 * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule 1111 */ 1112 static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func) 1113 { 1114 if (func > 0 && func < MAX_CHECK) 1115 seq_printf(m, "func=%s ", func_tokens[func]); 1116 else 1117 seq_printf(m, "func=%d ", func); 1118 } 1119 1120 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) 1121 { 1122 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v; 1123 int i; 1124 char tbuf[64] = {0,}; 1125 1126 rcu_read_lock(); 1127 1128 if (entry->action & MEASURE) 1129 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_measure)); 1130 if (entry->action & DONT_MEASURE) 1131 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_measure)); 1132 if (entry->action & APPRAISE) 1133 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_appraise)); 1134 if (entry->action & DONT_APPRAISE) 1135 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise)); 1136 if (entry->action & AUDIT) 1137 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit)); 1138 if (entry->action & HASH) 1139 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_hash)); 1140 if (entry->action & DONT_HASH) 1141 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_hash)); 1142 1143 seq_puts(m, " "); 1144 1145 if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) 1146 policy_func_show(m, entry->func); 1147 1148 if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) { 1149 if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC) 1150 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec)); 1151 if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE) 1152 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write)); 1153 if (entry->mask & MAY_READ) 1154 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read)); 1155 if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND) 1156 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append)); 1157 seq_puts(m, " "); 1158 } 1159 1160 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) { 1161 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "0x%lx", entry->fsmagic); 1162 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsmagic), tbuf); 1163 seq_puts(m, " "); 1164 } 1165 1166 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSNAME) { 1167 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", entry->fsname); 1168 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsname), tbuf); 1169 seq_puts(m, " "); 1170 } 1171 1172 if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) { 1173 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr); 1174 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf); 1175 seq_puts(m, " "); 1176 } 1177 1178 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) { 1179 seq_printf(m, "fsuuid=%pU", &entry->fsuuid); 1180 seq_puts(m, " "); 1181 } 1182 1183 if (entry->flags & IMA_UID) { 1184 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid)); 1185 if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt) 1186 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_gt), tbuf); 1187 else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt) 1188 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_lt), tbuf); 1189 else 1190 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_eq), tbuf); 1191 seq_puts(m, " "); 1192 } 1193 1194 if (entry->flags & IMA_EUID) { 1195 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid)); 1196 if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt) 1197 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_gt), tbuf); 1198 else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt) 1199 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_lt), tbuf); 1200 else 1201 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_eq), tbuf); 1202 seq_puts(m, " "); 1203 } 1204 1205 if (entry->flags & IMA_FOWNER) { 1206 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->fowner)); 1207 if (entry->fowner_op == &uid_gt) 1208 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_gt), tbuf); 1209 else if (entry->fowner_op == &uid_lt) 1210 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_lt), tbuf); 1211 else 1212 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_eq), tbuf); 1213 seq_puts(m, " "); 1214 } 1215 1216 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { 1217 if (entry->lsm[i].rule) { 1218 switch (i) { 1219 case LSM_OBJ_USER: 1220 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user), 1221 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); 1222 break; 1223 case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: 1224 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role), 1225 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); 1226 break; 1227 case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: 1228 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type), 1229 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); 1230 break; 1231 case LSM_SUBJ_USER: 1232 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user), 1233 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); 1234 break; 1235 case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: 1236 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role), 1237 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); 1238 break; 1239 case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: 1240 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type), 1241 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); 1242 break; 1243 } 1244 } 1245 } 1246 if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) 1247 seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig "); 1248 if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) 1249 seq_puts(m, "permit_directio "); 1250 rcu_read_unlock(); 1251 seq_puts(m, "\n"); 1252 return 0; 1253 } 1254 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */ 1255