xref: /linux/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c (revision cea0f76a483d1270ac6f6513964e3e75193dda48)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /*
3  * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
4  *
5  * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
6  *
7  * File: ima_api.c
8  *	Implements must_appraise_or_measure, collect_measurement,
9  *	appraise_measurement, store_measurement and store_template.
10  */
11 #include <linux/slab.h>
12 #include <linux/file.h>
13 #include <linux/fs.h>
14 #include <linux/xattr.h>
15 #include <linux/evm.h>
16 #include <linux/iversion.h>
17 
18 #include "ima.h"
19 
20 /*
21  * ima_free_template_entry - free an existing template entry
22  */
23 void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
24 {
25 	int i;
26 
27 	for (i = 0; i < entry->template_desc->num_fields; i++)
28 		kfree(entry->template_data[i].data);
29 
30 	kfree(entry->digests);
31 	kfree(entry);
32 }
33 
34 /*
35  * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
36  */
37 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
38 			    struct ima_template_entry **entry,
39 			    struct ima_template_desc *desc)
40 {
41 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
42 	struct tpm_digest *digests;
43 	int i, result = 0;
44 
45 	if (desc)
46 		template_desc = desc;
47 	else
48 		template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
49 
50 	*entry = kzalloc(struct_size(*entry, template_data,
51 				     template_desc->num_fields), GFP_NOFS);
52 	if (!*entry)
53 		return -ENOMEM;
54 
55 	digests = kcalloc(NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip) + ima_extra_slots,
56 			  sizeof(*digests), GFP_NOFS);
57 	if (!digests) {
58 		kfree(*entry);
59 		*entry = NULL;
60 		return -ENOMEM;
61 	}
62 
63 	(*entry)->digests = digests;
64 	(*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
65 	for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
66 		const struct ima_template_field *field =
67 			template_desc->fields[i];
68 		u32 len;
69 
70 		result = field->field_init(event_data,
71 					   &((*entry)->template_data[i]));
72 		if (result != 0)
73 			goto out;
74 
75 		len = (*entry)->template_data[i].len;
76 		(*entry)->template_data_len += sizeof(len);
77 		(*entry)->template_data_len += len;
78 	}
79 	return 0;
80 out:
81 	ima_free_template_entry(*entry);
82 	*entry = NULL;
83 	return result;
84 }
85 
86 /*
87  * ima_store_template - store ima template measurements
88  *
89  * Calculate the hash of a template entry, add the template entry
90  * to an ordered list of measurement entries maintained inside the kernel,
91  * and also update the aggregate integrity value (maintained inside the
92  * configured TPM PCR) over the hashes of the current list of measurement
93  * entries.
94  *
95  * Applications retrieve the current kernel-held measurement list through
96  * the securityfs entries in /sys/kernel/security/ima. The signed aggregate
97  * TPM PCR (called quote) can be retrieved using a TPM user space library
98  * and is used to validate the measurement list.
99  *
100  * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise
101  */
102 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
103 		       int violation, struct inode *inode,
104 		       const unsigned char *filename, int pcr)
105 {
106 	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
107 	static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error";
108 	char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name;
109 	int result;
110 
111 	if (!violation) {
112 		result = ima_calc_field_array_hash(&entry->template_data[0],
113 						   entry);
114 		if (result < 0) {
115 			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
116 					    template_name, op,
117 					    audit_cause, result, 0);
118 			return result;
119 		}
120 	}
121 	entry->pcr = pcr;
122 	result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename);
123 	return result;
124 }
125 
126 /*
127  * ima_add_violation - add violation to measurement list.
128  *
129  * Violations are flagged in the measurement list with zero hash values.
130  * By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR
131  * value is invalidated.
132  */
133 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
134 		       struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
135 		       const char *op, const char *cause)
136 {
137 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
138 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
139 	struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
140 					     .file = file,
141 					     .filename = filename,
142 					     .violation = cause };
143 	int violation = 1;
144 	int result;
145 
146 	/* can overflow, only indicator */
147 	atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
148 
149 	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, NULL);
150 	if (result < 0) {
151 		result = -ENOMEM;
152 		goto err_out;
153 	}
154 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode,
155 				    filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
156 	if (result < 0)
157 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
158 err_out:
159 	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
160 			    op, cause, result, 0);
161 }
162 
163 /**
164  * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
165  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
166  * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
167  * @secid: secid of the task being validated
168  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
169  *        MAY_APPEND)
170  * @func: caller identifier
171  * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
172  * @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template=
173  * @keyring: keyring name used to determine the action
174  *
175  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
176  *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
177  *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
178  *	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
179  *	| KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK
180  *	mask: contains the permission mask
181  *	fsmagic: hex value
182  *
183  * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
184  *
185  */
186 int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
187 		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
188 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
189 		   const char *keyring)
190 {
191 	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
192 
193 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
194 
195 	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
196 				template_desc, keyring);
197 }
198 
199 /*
200  * ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement
201  *
202  * Calculate the file hash, if it doesn't already exist,
203  * storing the measurement and i_version in the iint.
204  *
205  * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
206  *
207  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
208  */
209 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
210 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
211 			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig)
212 {
213 	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
214 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
215 	const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
216 	int result = 0;
217 	int length;
218 	void *tmpbuf;
219 	u64 i_version;
220 	struct {
221 		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
222 		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
223 	} hash;
224 
225 	/*
226 	 * Always collect the modsig, because IMA might have already collected
227 	 * the file digest without collecting the modsig in a previous
228 	 * measurement rule.
229 	 */
230 	if (modsig)
231 		ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
232 
233 	if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)
234 		goto out;
235 
236 	/*
237 	 * Dectecting file change is based on i_version. On filesystems
238 	 * which do not support i_version, support is limited to an initial
239 	 * measurement/appraisal/audit.
240 	 */
241 	i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
242 	hash.hdr.algo = algo;
243 
244 	/* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
245 	memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
246 
247 	if (buf)
248 		result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
249 	else
250 		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
251 
252 	if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
253 		goto out;
254 
255 	length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
256 	tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, GFP_NOFS);
257 	if (!tmpbuf) {
258 		result = -ENOMEM;
259 		goto out;
260 	}
261 
262 	iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
263 	memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
264 	iint->version = i_version;
265 
266 	/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
267 	if (!result)
268 		iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
269 out:
270 	if (result) {
271 		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
272 			audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
273 
274 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
275 				    filename, "collect_data", audit_cause,
276 				    result, 0);
277 	}
278 	return result;
279 }
280 
281 /*
282  * ima_store_measurement - store file measurement
283  *
284  * Create an "ima" template and then store the template by calling
285  * ima_store_template.
286  *
287  * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
288  * but the measurement could already exist:
289  *	- multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
290  *	  different filesystems.
291  *	- the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
292  *	  containing the hashing info.
293  *
294  * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
295  */
296 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
297 			   struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
298 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
299 			   int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
300 			   struct ima_template_desc *template_desc)
301 {
302 	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
303 	static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM";
304 	int result = -ENOMEM;
305 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
306 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
307 	struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
308 					     .file = file,
309 					     .filename = filename,
310 					     .xattr_value = xattr_value,
311 					     .xattr_len = xattr_len,
312 					     .modsig = modsig };
313 	int violation = 0;
314 
315 	/*
316 	 * We still need to store the measurement in the case of MODSIG because
317 	 * we only have its contents to put in the list at the time of
318 	 * appraisal, but a file measurement from earlier might already exist in
319 	 * the measurement list.
320 	 */
321 	if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr) && !modsig)
322 		return;
323 
324 	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc);
325 	if (result < 0) {
326 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
327 				    op, audit_cause, result, 0);
328 		return;
329 	}
330 
331 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr);
332 	if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) {
333 		iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
334 		iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr);
335 	}
336 	if (result < 0)
337 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
338 }
339 
340 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
341 			   const unsigned char *filename)
342 {
343 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
344 	char *hash;
345 	const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
346 	int i;
347 
348 	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
349 		return;
350 
351 	hash = kzalloc((iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
352 	if (!hash)
353 		return;
354 
355 	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash->length; i++)
356 		hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash->digest[i]);
357 	hash[i * 2] = '\0';
358 
359 	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
360 			     AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
361 	if (!ab)
362 		goto out;
363 
364 	audit_log_format(ab, "file=");
365 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename);
366 	audit_log_format(ab, " hash=\"%s:%s\"", algo_name, hash);
367 
368 	audit_log_task_info(ab);
369 	audit_log_end(ab);
370 
371 	iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
372 out:
373 	kfree(hash);
374 	return;
375 }
376 
377 /*
378  * ima_d_path - return a pointer to the full pathname
379  *
380  * Attempt to return a pointer to the full pathname for use in the
381  * IMA measurement list, IMA audit records, and auditing logs.
382  *
383  * On failure, return a pointer to a copy of the filename, not dname.
384  * Returning a pointer to dname, could result in using the pointer
385  * after the memory has been freed.
386  */
387 const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf)
388 {
389 	char *pathname = NULL;
390 
391 	*pathbuf = __getname();
392 	if (*pathbuf) {
393 		pathname = d_absolute_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
394 		if (IS_ERR(pathname)) {
395 			__putname(*pathbuf);
396 			*pathbuf = NULL;
397 			pathname = NULL;
398 		}
399 	}
400 
401 	if (!pathname) {
402 		strlcpy(namebuf, path->dentry->d_name.name, NAME_MAX);
403 		pathname = namebuf;
404 	}
405 
406 	return pathname;
407 }
408