xref: /linux/security/apparmor/lsm.c (revision 49a695ba723224875df50e327bd7b0b65dd9a56b)
1 /*
2  * AppArmor security module
3  *
4  * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
5  *
6  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7  * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
8  *
9  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11  * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12  * License.
13  */
14 
15 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
16 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
17 #include <linux/mm.h>
18 #include <linux/mman.h>
19 #include <linux/mount.h>
20 #include <linux/namei.h>
21 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
22 #include <linux/ctype.h>
23 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
24 #include <linux/audit.h>
25 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
26 #include <net/sock.h>
27 
28 #include "include/apparmor.h"
29 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
30 #include "include/audit.h"
31 #include "include/capability.h"
32 #include "include/context.h"
33 #include "include/file.h"
34 #include "include/ipc.h"
35 #include "include/path.h"
36 #include "include/label.h"
37 #include "include/policy.h"
38 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
39 #include "include/procattr.h"
40 #include "include/mount.h"
41 
42 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
43 int apparmor_initialized;
44 
45 DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
46 
47 
48 /*
49  * LSM hook functions
50  */
51 
52 /*
53  * free the associated aa_task_ctx and put its labels
54  */
55 static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
56 {
57 	aa_free_task_context(cred_ctx(cred));
58 	cred_ctx(cred) = NULL;
59 }
60 
61 /*
62  * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
63  */
64 static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
65 {
66 	/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
67 	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
68 
69 	if (!ctx)
70 		return -ENOMEM;
71 
72 	cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
73 	return 0;
74 }
75 
76 /*
77  * prepare new aa_task_ctx for modification by prepare_cred block
78  */
79 static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
80 				 gfp_t gfp)
81 {
82 	/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
83 	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
84 
85 	if (!ctx)
86 		return -ENOMEM;
87 
88 	aa_dup_task_context(ctx, cred_ctx(old));
89 	cred_ctx(new) = ctx;
90 	return 0;
91 }
92 
93 /*
94  * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
95  */
96 static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
97 {
98 	const struct aa_task_ctx *old_ctx = cred_ctx(old);
99 	struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(new);
100 
101 	aa_dup_task_context(new_ctx, old_ctx);
102 }
103 
104 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
105 					unsigned int mode)
106 {
107 	struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
108 	int error;
109 
110 	tracer = begin_current_label_crit_section();
111 	tracee = aa_get_task_label(child);
112 	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee,
113 		  mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ ? AA_PTRACE_READ : AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
114 	aa_put_label(tracee);
115 	end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
116 
117 	return error;
118 }
119 
120 static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
121 {
122 	struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
123 	int error;
124 
125 	tracee = begin_current_label_crit_section();
126 	tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent);
127 	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
128 	aa_put_label(tracer);
129 	end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
130 
131 	return error;
132 }
133 
134 /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
135 static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
136 			   kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
137 {
138 	struct aa_label *label;
139 	const struct cred *cred;
140 
141 	rcu_read_lock();
142 	cred = __task_cred(target);
143 	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
144 
145 	/*
146 	 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
147 	 * initialize effective and permitted.
148 	 */
149 	if (!unconfined(label)) {
150 		struct aa_profile *profile;
151 		struct label_it i;
152 
153 		label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
154 			if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
155 				continue;
156 			*effective = cap_intersect(*effective,
157 						   profile->caps.allow);
158 			*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted,
159 						   profile->caps.allow);
160 		}
161 	}
162 	rcu_read_unlock();
163 	aa_put_label(label);
164 
165 	return 0;
166 }
167 
168 static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
169 			    int cap, int audit)
170 {
171 	struct aa_label *label;
172 	int error = 0;
173 
174 	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
175 	if (!unconfined(label))
176 		error = aa_capable(label, cap, audit);
177 	aa_put_label(label);
178 
179 	return error;
180 }
181 
182 /**
183  * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
184  * @op: operation being checked
185  * @path: path to check permission of  (NOT NULL)
186  * @mask: requested permissions mask
187  * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
188  *
189  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
190  */
191 static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
192 		       struct path_cond *cond)
193 {
194 	struct aa_label *label;
195 	int error = 0;
196 
197 	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
198 	if (!unconfined(label))
199 		error = aa_path_perm(op, label, path, 0, mask, cond);
200 	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
201 
202 	return error;
203 }
204 
205 /**
206  * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond
207  * @op: operation being checked
208  * @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
209  * @mask: requested permissions mask
210  *
211  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
212  */
213 static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
214 {
215 	struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
216 				  d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
217 	};
218 
219 	if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry))
220 		return 0;
221 
222 	return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
223 }
224 
225 /**
226  * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
227  * @op: operation being checked
228  * @dir: directory of the dentry  (NOT NULL)
229  * @dentry: dentry to check  (NOT NULL)
230  * @mask: requested permissions mask
231  * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
232  *
233  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
234  */
235 static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
236 				  struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
237 				  struct path_cond *cond)
238 {
239 	struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
240 
241 	return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
242 }
243 
244 /**
245  * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
246  * @op: operation being checked
247  * @dir: directory that the dentry is in  (NOT NULL)
248  * @dentry: dentry being rm'd  (NOT NULL)
249  * @mask: requested permission mask
250  *
251  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
252  */
253 static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
254 			  struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
255 {
256 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
257 	struct path_cond cond = { };
258 
259 	if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
260 		return 0;
261 
262 	cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
263 	cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
264 
265 	return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
266 }
267 
268 /**
269  * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
270  * @op: operation being checked
271  * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in  (NOT NULL)
272  * @dentry: dentry to create   (NOT NULL)
273  * @mask: request permission mask
274  * @mode: created file mode
275  *
276  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
277  */
278 static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
279 			      struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
280 {
281 	struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
282 
283 	if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry))
284 		return 0;
285 
286 	return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
287 }
288 
289 static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
290 {
291 	return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
292 }
293 
294 static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
295 			       umode_t mode)
296 {
297 	return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
298 				  S_IFDIR);
299 }
300 
301 static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
302 {
303 	return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
304 }
305 
306 static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
307 			       umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
308 {
309 	return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
310 }
311 
312 static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
313 {
314 	return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR);
315 }
316 
317 static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
318 				 const char *old_name)
319 {
320 	return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
321 				  S_IFLNK);
322 }
323 
324 static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
325 			      struct dentry *new_dentry)
326 {
327 	struct aa_label *label;
328 	int error = 0;
329 
330 	if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
331 		return 0;
332 
333 	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
334 	if (!unconfined(label))
335 		error = aa_path_link(label, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
336 	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
337 
338 	return error;
339 }
340 
341 static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
342 				const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
343 {
344 	struct aa_label *label;
345 	int error = 0;
346 
347 	if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
348 		return 0;
349 
350 	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
351 	if (!unconfined(label)) {
352 		struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
353 					 .dentry = old_dentry };
354 		struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
355 					 .dentry = new_dentry };
356 		struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
357 					  d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
358 		};
359 
360 		error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0,
361 				     MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
362 				     AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
363 				     &cond);
364 		if (!error)
365 			error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &new_path,
366 					     0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
367 					     AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
368 
369 	}
370 	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
371 
372 	return error;
373 }
374 
375 static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
376 {
377 	return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
378 }
379 
380 static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
381 {
382 	return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
383 }
384 
385 static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
386 {
387 	return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR);
388 }
389 
390 static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
391 {
392 	struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file);
393 	struct aa_label *label;
394 	int error = 0;
395 
396 	if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
397 		return 0;
398 
399 	/* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
400 	 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
401 	 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
402 	 * actually execute the image.
403 	 */
404 	if (current->in_execve) {
405 		fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
406 		return 0;
407 	}
408 
409 	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
410 	if (!unconfined(label)) {
411 		struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
412 		struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
413 
414 		error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0,
415 				     aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
416 		/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
417 		fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
418 	}
419 	aa_put_label(label);
420 
421 	return error;
422 }
423 
424 static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
425 {
426 	int error = 0;
427 
428 	/* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
429 	struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
430 	file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_ctx(label, GFP_KERNEL);
431 	if (!file_ctx(file))
432 		error = -ENOMEM;
433 	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
434 
435 	return error;
436 }
437 
438 static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
439 {
440 	aa_free_file_ctx(file_ctx(file));
441 }
442 
443 static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
444 {
445 	struct aa_label *label;
446 	int error = 0;
447 
448 	/* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */
449 	if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry)
450 		return -EACCES;
451 
452 	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
453 	error = aa_file_perm(op, label, file, mask);
454 	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
455 
456 	return error;
457 }
458 
459 static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file)
460 {
461 	return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file));
462 }
463 
464 static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
465 {
466 	return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
467 }
468 
469 static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
470 {
471 	u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
472 
473 	if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
474 		mask |= MAY_WRITE;
475 
476 	return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
477 }
478 
479 static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
480 		       unsigned long flags)
481 {
482 	int mask = 0;
483 
484 	if (!file || !file_ctx(file))
485 		return 0;
486 
487 	if (prot & PROT_READ)
488 		mask |= MAY_READ;
489 	/*
490 	 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
491 	 * write back to the files
492 	 */
493 	if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
494 		mask |= MAY_WRITE;
495 	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
496 		mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
497 
498 	return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
499 }
500 
501 static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
502 			      unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
503 {
504 	return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
505 }
506 
507 static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
508 				  unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
509 {
510 	return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
511 			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
512 }
513 
514 static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
515 			     const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
516 {
517 	struct aa_label *label;
518 	int error = 0;
519 
520 	/* Discard magic */
521 	if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
522 		flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
523 
524 	flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
525 
526 	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
527 	if (!unconfined(label)) {
528 		if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
529 			error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data);
530 		else if (flags & MS_BIND)
531 			error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags);
532 		else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
533 				  MS_UNBINDABLE))
534 			error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags);
535 		else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
536 			error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name);
537 		else
538 			error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type,
539 					     flags, data);
540 	}
541 	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
542 
543 	return error;
544 }
545 
546 static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
547 {
548 	struct aa_label *label;
549 	int error = 0;
550 
551 	label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
552 	if (!unconfined(label))
553 		error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags);
554 	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
555 
556 	return error;
557 }
558 
559 static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
560 				 const struct path *new_path)
561 {
562 	struct aa_label *label;
563 	int error = 0;
564 
565 	label = aa_get_current_label();
566 	if (!unconfined(label))
567 		error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path);
568 	aa_put_label(label);
569 
570 	return error;
571 }
572 
573 static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
574 				char **value)
575 {
576 	int error = -ENOENT;
577 	/* released below */
578 	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
579 	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
580 	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
581 
582 	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
583 		label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label);
584 	else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && ctx->previous)
585 		label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
586 	else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
587 		label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
588 	else
589 		error = -EINVAL;
590 
591 	if (label)
592 		error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
593 
594 	aa_put_label(label);
595 	put_cred(cred);
596 
597 	return error;
598 }
599 
600 static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
601 				size_t size)
602 {
603 	char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
604 	size_t arg_size;
605 	int error;
606 	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR);
607 
608 	if (size == 0)
609 		return -EINVAL;
610 
611 	/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
612 	if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
613 		/* null terminate */
614 		largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
615 		if (!args)
616 			return -ENOMEM;
617 		memcpy(args, value, size);
618 		args[size] = '\0';
619 	}
620 
621 	error = -EINVAL;
622 	args = strim(args);
623 	command = strsep(&args, " ");
624 	if (!args)
625 		goto out;
626 	args = skip_spaces(args);
627 	if (!*args)
628 		goto out;
629 
630 	arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
631 	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
632 		if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
633 			error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
634 							 AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
635 		} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
636 			error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
637 							 AA_CHANGE_TEST);
638 		} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
639 			error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
640 		} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
641 			error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST);
642 		} else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) {
643 			error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK);
644 		} else
645 			goto fail;
646 	} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
647 		if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
648 			error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC);
649 		else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0)
650 			error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC |
651 							 AA_CHANGE_STACK));
652 		else
653 			goto fail;
654 	} else
655 		/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
656 		goto fail;
657 
658 	if (!error)
659 		error = size;
660 out:
661 	kfree(largs);
662 	return error;
663 
664 fail:
665 	aad(&sa)->label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
666 	aad(&sa)->info = name;
667 	aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL;
668 	aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
669 	end_current_label_crit_section(aad(&sa)->label);
670 	goto out;
671 }
672 
673 /**
674  * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
675  * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
676  */
677 static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
678 {
679 	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
680 	struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred);
681 
682 	/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
683 	if ((new_ctx->label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
684 	    (unconfined(new_ctx->label)))
685 		return;
686 
687 	aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
688 
689 	current->pdeath_signal = 0;
690 
691 	/* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */
692 	__aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_ctx->label);
693 }
694 
695 /**
696  * apparmor_bprm_committed_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed
697  * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
698  */
699 static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
700 {
701 	/* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */
702 	return;
703 }
704 
705 static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
706 		unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
707 {
708 	struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
709 	int error = 0;
710 
711 	if (!unconfined(label))
712 		error = aa_task_setrlimit(label, task, resource, new_rlim);
713 	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
714 
715 	return error;
716 }
717 
718 static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
719 			      int sig, const struct cred *cred)
720 {
721 	struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
722 	int error;
723 
724 	if (cred) {
725 		/*
726 		 * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
727 		 */
728 		cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
729 		tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
730 		error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
731 		aa_put_label(cl);
732 		aa_put_label(tl);
733 		return error;
734 	}
735 
736 	cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
737 	tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
738 	error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
739 	aa_put_label(tl);
740 	__end_current_label_crit_section(cl);
741 
742 	return error;
743 }
744 
745 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
746 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
747 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
748 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
749 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
750 
751 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
752 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
753 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
754 
755 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
756 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
757 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
758 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
759 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
760 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
761 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
762 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
763 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
764 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
765 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
766 
767 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
768 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive),
769 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
770 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
771 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
772 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
773 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
774 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
775 
776 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
777 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
778 
779 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
780 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
781 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
782 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
783 
784 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
785 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
786 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
787 
788 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
789 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
790 };
791 
792 /*
793  * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
794  */
795 
796 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
797 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
798 #define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
799 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
800 	.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
801 	.set = param_set_aabool,
802 	.get = param_get_aabool
803 };
804 
805 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
806 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
807 #define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
808 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
809 	.set = param_set_aauint,
810 	.get = param_get_aauint
811 };
812 
813 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
814 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
815 #define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
816 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
817 	.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
818 	.set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
819 	.get = param_get_aalockpolicy
820 };
821 
822 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
823 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
824 
825 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
826 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
827 
828 /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
829  * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
830  */
831 
832 /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
833 enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
834 module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
835 		  &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
836 
837 /* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
838 bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
839 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
840 module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
841 #endif
842 
843 /* Debug mode */
844 bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
845 module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
846 
847 /* Audit mode */
848 enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
849 module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
850 		  &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
851 
852 /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages.  This
853  * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
854  */
855 bool aa_g_audit_header = true;
856 module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
857 		   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
858 
859 /* lock out loading/removal of policy
860  * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
861  *       load policy, if lock_policy is set
862  */
863 bool aa_g_lock_policy;
864 module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
865 		   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
866 
867 /* Syscall logging mode */
868 bool aa_g_logsyscall;
869 module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
870 
871 /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
872 unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
873 module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
874 
875 /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
876  * on the loaded policy is done.
877  * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
878  * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
879  */
880 bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true;
881 module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
882 
883 /* Boot time disable flag */
884 static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
885 module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
886 
887 static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
888 {
889 	unsigned long enabled;
890 	int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
891 	if (!error)
892 		apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
893 	return 1;
894 }
895 
896 __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
897 
898 /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
899 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
900 {
901 	if (!apparmor_enabled)
902 		return -EINVAL;
903 	if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
904 		return -EPERM;
905 	return param_set_bool(val, kp);
906 }
907 
908 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
909 {
910 	if (!apparmor_enabled)
911 		return -EINVAL;
912 	if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
913 		return -EPERM;
914 	return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
915 }
916 
917 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
918 {
919 	if (!apparmor_enabled)
920 		return -EINVAL;
921 	if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
922 		return -EPERM;
923 	return param_set_bool(val, kp);
924 }
925 
926 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
927 {
928 	if (!apparmor_enabled)
929 		return -EINVAL;
930 	if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
931 		return -EPERM;
932 	return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
933 }
934 
935 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
936 {
937 	int error;
938 
939 	if (!apparmor_enabled)
940 		return -EINVAL;
941 	/* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */
942 	if (apparmor_initialized)
943 		return -EPERM;
944 
945 	error = param_set_uint(val, kp);
946 	pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max);
947 
948 	return error;
949 }
950 
951 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
952 {
953 	if (!apparmor_enabled)
954 		return -EINVAL;
955 	if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
956 		return -EPERM;
957 	return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
958 }
959 
960 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
961 {
962 	if (!apparmor_enabled)
963 		return -EINVAL;
964 	if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
965 		return -EPERM;
966 	return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
967 }
968 
969 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
970 {
971 	int i;
972 
973 	if (!apparmor_enabled)
974 		return -EINVAL;
975 	if (!val)
976 		return -EINVAL;
977 	if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
978 		return -EPERM;
979 
980 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
981 		if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
982 			aa_g_audit = i;
983 			return 0;
984 		}
985 	}
986 
987 	return -EINVAL;
988 }
989 
990 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
991 {
992 	if (!apparmor_enabled)
993 		return -EINVAL;
994 	if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
995 		return -EPERM;
996 
997 	return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
998 }
999 
1000 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1001 {
1002 	int i;
1003 
1004 	if (!apparmor_enabled)
1005 		return -EINVAL;
1006 	if (!val)
1007 		return -EINVAL;
1008 	if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1009 		return -EPERM;
1010 
1011 	for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
1012 		if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
1013 			aa_g_profile_mode = i;
1014 			return 0;
1015 		}
1016 	}
1017 
1018 	return -EINVAL;
1019 }
1020 
1021 /*
1022  * AppArmor init functions
1023  */
1024 
1025 /**
1026  * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task.
1027  *
1028  * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
1029  */
1030 static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
1031 {
1032 	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
1033 	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
1034 
1035 	ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
1036 	if (!ctx)
1037 		return -ENOMEM;
1038 
1039 	ctx->label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns));
1040 	cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
1041 
1042 	return 0;
1043 }
1044 
1045 static void destroy_buffers(void)
1046 {
1047 	u32 i, j;
1048 
1049 	for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
1050 		for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
1051 			kfree(per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j]);
1052 			per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = NULL;
1053 		}
1054 	}
1055 }
1056 
1057 static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
1058 {
1059 	u32 i, j;
1060 
1061 	for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
1062 		for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
1063 			char *buffer;
1064 
1065 			if (cpu_to_node(i) > num_online_nodes())
1066 				/* fallback to kmalloc for offline nodes */
1067 				buffer = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL);
1068 			else
1069 				buffer = kmalloc_node(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL,
1070 						      cpu_to_node(i));
1071 			if (!buffer) {
1072 				destroy_buffers();
1073 				return -ENOMEM;
1074 			}
1075 			per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = buffer;
1076 		}
1077 	}
1078 
1079 	return 0;
1080 }
1081 
1082 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
1083 static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
1084 			     void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
1085 {
1086 	if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1087 		return -EPERM;
1088 	if (!apparmor_enabled)
1089 		return -EINVAL;
1090 
1091 	return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
1092 }
1093 
1094 static struct ctl_path apparmor_sysctl_path[] = {
1095 	{ .procname = "kernel", },
1096 	{ }
1097 };
1098 
1099 static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
1100 	{
1101 		.procname       = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy",
1102 		.data           = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy,
1103 		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
1104 		.mode           = 0600,
1105 		.proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
1106 	},
1107 	{ }
1108 };
1109 
1110 static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
1111 {
1112 	return register_sysctl_paths(apparmor_sysctl_path,
1113 				     apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
1114 }
1115 #else
1116 static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
1117 {
1118 	return 0;
1119 }
1120 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
1121 
1122 static int __init apparmor_init(void)
1123 {
1124 	int error;
1125 
1126 	if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
1127 		aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
1128 		apparmor_enabled = false;
1129 		return 0;
1130 	}
1131 
1132 	error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
1133 	if (error) {
1134 		AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
1135 		goto alloc_out;
1136 	}
1137 
1138 	error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
1139 	if (error) {
1140 		AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
1141 		goto alloc_out;
1142 	}
1143 
1144 	error = apparmor_init_sysctl();
1145 	if (error) {
1146 		AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n");
1147 		goto alloc_out;
1148 
1149 	}
1150 
1151 	error = alloc_buffers();
1152 	if (error) {
1153 		AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n");
1154 		goto buffers_out;
1155 	}
1156 
1157 	error = set_init_ctx();
1158 	if (error) {
1159 		AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
1160 		aa_free_root_ns();
1161 		goto buffers_out;
1162 	}
1163 	security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
1164 				"apparmor");
1165 
1166 	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
1167 	apparmor_initialized = 1;
1168 	if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
1169 		aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
1170 	else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
1171 		aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
1172 	else
1173 		aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
1174 
1175 	return error;
1176 
1177 buffers_out:
1178 	destroy_buffers();
1179 
1180 alloc_out:
1181 	aa_destroy_aafs();
1182 	aa_teardown_dfa_engine();
1183 
1184 	apparmor_enabled = false;
1185 	return error;
1186 }
1187 
1188 security_initcall(apparmor_init);
1189