1 /* 2 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Mellanox Technologies. All rights reserved. 3 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>. All rights reserved. 4 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Lance Chao <lancerchao@fb.com>. All rights reserved. 5 * Copyright (c) 2016, Fridolin Pokorny <fridolin.pokorny@gmail.com>. All rights reserved. 6 * Copyright (c) 2016, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>. All rights reserved. 7 * Copyright (c) 2018, Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io 8 * 9 * This software is available to you under a choice of one of two 10 * licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU 11 * General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file 12 * COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the 13 * OpenIB.org BSD license below: 14 * 15 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or 16 * without modification, are permitted provided that the following 17 * conditions are met: 18 * 19 * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above 20 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following 21 * disclaimer. 22 * 23 * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above 24 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following 25 * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials 26 * provided with the distribution. 27 * 28 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, 29 * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF 30 * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND 31 * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS 32 * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN 33 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN 34 * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE 35 * SOFTWARE. 36 */ 37 38 #include <linux/bug.h> 39 #include <linux/sched/signal.h> 40 #include <linux/module.h> 41 #include <linux/kernel.h> 42 #include <linux/splice.h> 43 #include <crypto/aead.h> 44 45 #include <net/strparser.h> 46 #include <net/tls.h> 47 #include <trace/events/sock.h> 48 49 #include "tls.h" 50 51 struct tls_decrypt_arg { 52 struct_group(inargs, 53 bool zc; 54 bool async; 55 bool async_done; 56 u8 tail; 57 ); 58 59 struct sk_buff *skb; 60 }; 61 62 struct tls_decrypt_ctx { 63 struct sock *sk; 64 u8 iv[TLS_MAX_IV_SIZE]; 65 u8 aad[TLS_MAX_AAD_SIZE]; 66 u8 tail; 67 bool free_sgout; 68 struct scatterlist sg[]; 69 }; 70 71 noinline void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err) 72 { 73 WARN_ON_ONCE(err >= 0); 74 /* sk->sk_err should contain a positive error code. */ 75 WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, -err); 76 /* Paired with smp_rmb() in tcp_poll() */ 77 smp_wmb(); 78 sk_error_report(sk); 79 } 80 81 static int __skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len, 82 unsigned int recursion_level) 83 { 84 int start = skb_headlen(skb); 85 int i, chunk = start - offset; 86 struct sk_buff *frag_iter; 87 int elt = 0; 88 89 if (unlikely(recursion_level >= 24)) 90 return -EMSGSIZE; 91 92 if (chunk > 0) { 93 if (chunk > len) 94 chunk = len; 95 elt++; 96 len -= chunk; 97 if (len == 0) 98 return elt; 99 offset += chunk; 100 } 101 102 for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) { 103 int end; 104 105 WARN_ON(start > offset + len); 106 107 end = start + skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]); 108 chunk = end - offset; 109 if (chunk > 0) { 110 if (chunk > len) 111 chunk = len; 112 elt++; 113 len -= chunk; 114 if (len == 0) 115 return elt; 116 offset += chunk; 117 } 118 start = end; 119 } 120 121 if (unlikely(skb_has_frag_list(skb))) { 122 skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) { 123 int end, ret; 124 125 WARN_ON(start > offset + len); 126 127 end = start + frag_iter->len; 128 chunk = end - offset; 129 if (chunk > 0) { 130 if (chunk > len) 131 chunk = len; 132 ret = __skb_nsg(frag_iter, offset - start, chunk, 133 recursion_level + 1); 134 if (unlikely(ret < 0)) 135 return ret; 136 elt += ret; 137 len -= chunk; 138 if (len == 0) 139 return elt; 140 offset += chunk; 141 } 142 start = end; 143 } 144 } 145 BUG_ON(len); 146 return elt; 147 } 148 149 /* Return the number of scatterlist elements required to completely map the 150 * skb, or -EMSGSIZE if the recursion depth is exceeded. 151 */ 152 static int skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len) 153 { 154 return __skb_nsg(skb, offset, len, 0); 155 } 156 157 static int tls_padding_length(struct tls_prot_info *prot, struct sk_buff *skb, 158 struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) 159 { 160 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); 161 struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb); 162 int sub = 0; 163 164 /* Determine zero-padding length */ 165 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) { 166 int offset = rxm->full_len - TLS_TAG_SIZE - 1; 167 char content_type = darg->zc ? darg->tail : 0; 168 int err; 169 170 while (content_type == 0) { 171 if (offset < prot->prepend_size) 172 return -EBADMSG; 173 err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + offset, 174 &content_type, 1); 175 if (err) 176 return err; 177 if (content_type) 178 break; 179 sub++; 180 offset--; 181 } 182 tlm->control = content_type; 183 } 184 return sub; 185 } 186 187 static void tls_decrypt_done(void *data, int err) 188 { 189 struct aead_request *aead_req = data; 190 struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(aead_req); 191 struct scatterlist *sgout = aead_req->dst; 192 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx; 193 struct tls_decrypt_ctx *dctx; 194 struct tls_context *tls_ctx; 195 struct scatterlist *sg; 196 unsigned int pages; 197 struct sock *sk; 198 int aead_size; 199 200 /* If requests get too backlogged crypto API returns -EBUSY and calls 201 * ->complete(-EINPROGRESS) immediately followed by ->complete(0) 202 * to make waiting for backlog to flush with crypto_wait_req() easier. 203 * First wait converts -EBUSY -> -EINPROGRESS, and the second one 204 * -EINPROGRESS -> 0. 205 * We have a single struct crypto_async_request per direction, this 206 * scheme doesn't help us, so just ignore the first ->complete(). 207 */ 208 if (err == -EINPROGRESS) 209 return; 210 211 aead_size = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(aead); 212 aead_size = ALIGN(aead_size, __alignof__(*dctx)); 213 dctx = (void *)((u8 *)aead_req + aead_size); 214 215 sk = dctx->sk; 216 tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 217 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 218 219 /* Propagate if there was an err */ 220 if (err) { 221 if (err == -EBADMSG) 222 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR); 223 ctx->async_wait.err = err; 224 tls_err_abort(sk, err); 225 } 226 227 /* Free the destination pages if skb was not decrypted inplace */ 228 if (dctx->free_sgout) { 229 /* Skip the first S/G entry as it points to AAD */ 230 for_each_sg(sg_next(sgout), sg, UINT_MAX, pages) { 231 if (!sg) 232 break; 233 put_page(sg_page(sg)); 234 } 235 } 236 237 kfree(aead_req); 238 239 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->decrypt_pending)) 240 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion); 241 } 242 243 static int tls_decrypt_async_wait(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx) 244 { 245 if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->decrypt_pending)) 246 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait); 247 atomic_inc(&ctx->decrypt_pending); 248 249 __skb_queue_purge(&ctx->async_hold); 250 return ctx->async_wait.err; 251 } 252 253 static int tls_do_decryption(struct sock *sk, 254 struct scatterlist *sgin, 255 struct scatterlist *sgout, 256 char *iv_recv, 257 size_t data_len, 258 struct aead_request *aead_req, 259 struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) 260 { 261 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 262 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 263 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 264 int ret; 265 266 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_recv); 267 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size); 268 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sgin, sgout, 269 data_len + prot->tag_size, 270 (u8 *)iv_recv); 271 272 if (darg->async) { 273 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, 274 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, 275 tls_decrypt_done, aead_req); 276 DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending) < 1); 277 atomic_inc(&ctx->decrypt_pending); 278 } else { 279 DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); 280 281 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, 282 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, 283 crypto_req_done, &wait); 284 ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); 285 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS || ret == -EBUSY) 286 ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &wait); 287 return ret; 288 } 289 290 ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); 291 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) 292 return 0; 293 294 if (ret == -EBUSY) { 295 ret = tls_decrypt_async_wait(ctx); 296 darg->async_done = true; 297 /* all completions have run, we're not doing async anymore */ 298 darg->async = false; 299 return ret; 300 } 301 302 atomic_dec(&ctx->decrypt_pending); 303 darg->async = false; 304 305 return ret; 306 } 307 308 static void tls_trim_both_msgs(struct sock *sk, int target_size) 309 { 310 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 311 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 312 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 313 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec; 314 315 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext, target_size); 316 if (target_size > 0) 317 target_size += prot->overhead_size; 318 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted, target_size); 319 } 320 321 static int tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(struct sock *sk, int len) 322 { 323 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 324 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 325 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec; 326 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 327 328 return sk_msg_alloc(sk, msg_en, len, 0); 329 } 330 331 static int tls_clone_plaintext_msg(struct sock *sk, int required) 332 { 333 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 334 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 335 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 336 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec; 337 struct sk_msg *msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 338 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 339 int skip, len; 340 341 /* We add page references worth len bytes from encrypted sg 342 * at the end of plaintext sg. It is guaranteed that msg_en 343 * has enough required room (ensured by caller). 344 */ 345 len = required - msg_pl->sg.size; 346 347 /* Skip initial bytes in msg_en's data to be able to use 348 * same offset of both plain and encrypted data. 349 */ 350 skip = prot->prepend_size + msg_pl->sg.size; 351 352 return sk_msg_clone(sk, msg_pl, msg_en, skip, len); 353 } 354 355 static struct tls_rec *tls_get_rec(struct sock *sk) 356 { 357 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 358 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 359 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 360 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en; 361 struct tls_rec *rec; 362 int mem_size; 363 364 mem_size = sizeof(struct tls_rec) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_send); 365 366 rec = kzalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation); 367 if (!rec) 368 return NULL; 369 370 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 371 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 372 373 sk_msg_init(msg_pl); 374 sk_msg_init(msg_en); 375 376 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_in, 2); 377 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_in[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size); 378 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_in[1]); 379 380 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_out, 2); 381 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_out[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size); 382 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_out[1]); 383 384 rec->sk = sk; 385 386 return rec; 387 } 388 389 static void tls_free_rec(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *rec) 390 { 391 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted); 392 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext); 393 kfree(rec); 394 } 395 396 static void tls_free_open_rec(struct sock *sk) 397 { 398 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 399 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 400 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec; 401 402 if (rec) { 403 tls_free_rec(sk, rec); 404 ctx->open_rec = NULL; 405 } 406 } 407 408 int tls_tx_records(struct sock *sk, int flags) 409 { 410 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 411 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 412 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp; 413 struct sk_msg *msg_en; 414 int tx_flags, rc = 0; 415 416 if (tls_is_partially_sent_record(tls_ctx)) { 417 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list, 418 struct tls_rec, list); 419 420 if (flags == -1) 421 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags; 422 else 423 tx_flags = flags; 424 425 rc = tls_push_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx, tx_flags); 426 if (rc) 427 goto tx_err; 428 429 /* Full record has been transmitted. 430 * Remove the head of tx_list 431 */ 432 list_del(&rec->list); 433 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext); 434 kfree(rec); 435 } 436 437 /* Tx all ready records */ 438 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) { 439 if (READ_ONCE(rec->tx_ready)) { 440 if (flags == -1) 441 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags; 442 else 443 tx_flags = flags; 444 445 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 446 rc = tls_push_sg(sk, tls_ctx, 447 &msg_en->sg.data[msg_en->sg.curr], 448 0, tx_flags); 449 if (rc) 450 goto tx_err; 451 452 list_del(&rec->list); 453 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext); 454 kfree(rec); 455 } else { 456 break; 457 } 458 } 459 460 tx_err: 461 if (rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN) 462 tls_err_abort(sk, rc); 463 464 return rc; 465 } 466 467 static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err) 468 { 469 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx; 470 struct tls_context *tls_ctx; 471 struct tls_prot_info *prot; 472 struct tls_rec *rec = data; 473 struct scatterlist *sge; 474 struct sk_msg *msg_en; 475 struct sock *sk; 476 477 if (err == -EINPROGRESS) /* see the comment in tls_decrypt_done() */ 478 return; 479 480 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 481 482 sk = rec->sk; 483 tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 484 prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 485 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 486 487 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, msg_en->sg.curr); 488 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size; 489 sge->length += prot->prepend_size; 490 491 /* Check if error is previously set on socket */ 492 if (err || sk->sk_err) { 493 rec = NULL; 494 495 /* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */ 496 if (sk->sk_err) { 497 ctx->async_wait.err = -sk->sk_err; 498 } else { 499 ctx->async_wait.err = err; 500 tls_err_abort(sk, err); 501 } 502 } 503 504 if (rec) { 505 struct tls_rec *first_rec; 506 507 /* Mark the record as ready for transmission */ 508 smp_store_mb(rec->tx_ready, true); 509 510 /* If received record is at head of tx_list, schedule tx */ 511 first_rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list, 512 struct tls_rec, list); 513 if (rec == first_rec) { 514 /* Schedule the transmission */ 515 if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, 516 &ctx->tx_bitmask)) 517 schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, 1); 518 } 519 } 520 521 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->encrypt_pending)) 522 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion); 523 } 524 525 static int tls_encrypt_async_wait(struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx) 526 { 527 if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->encrypt_pending)) 528 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait); 529 atomic_inc(&ctx->encrypt_pending); 530 531 return ctx->async_wait.err; 532 } 533 534 static int tls_do_encryption(struct sock *sk, 535 struct tls_context *tls_ctx, 536 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx, 537 struct aead_request *aead_req, 538 size_t data_len, u32 start) 539 { 540 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 541 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec; 542 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 543 struct scatterlist *sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, start); 544 int rc, iv_offset = 0; 545 546 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of IV is a constant */ 547 switch (prot->cipher_type) { 548 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128: 549 rec->iv_data[0] = TLS_AES_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE; 550 iv_offset = 1; 551 break; 552 case TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM: 553 rec->iv_data[0] = TLS_SM4_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE; 554 iv_offset = 1; 555 break; 556 } 557 558 memcpy(&rec->iv_data[iv_offset], tls_ctx->tx.iv, 559 prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size); 560 561 tls_xor_iv_with_seq(prot, rec->iv_data + iv_offset, 562 tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq); 563 564 sge->offset += prot->prepend_size; 565 sge->length -= prot->prepend_size; 566 567 msg_en->sg.curr = start; 568 569 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_send); 570 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size); 571 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, rec->sg_aead_in, 572 rec->sg_aead_out, 573 data_len, rec->iv_data); 574 575 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, 576 tls_encrypt_done, rec); 577 578 /* Add the record in tx_list */ 579 list_add_tail((struct list_head *)&rec->list, &ctx->tx_list); 580 DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending) < 1); 581 atomic_inc(&ctx->encrypt_pending); 582 583 rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); 584 if (rc == -EBUSY) { 585 rc = tls_encrypt_async_wait(ctx); 586 rc = rc ?: -EINPROGRESS; 587 /* 588 * The async callback tls_encrypt_done() has already 589 * decremented encrypt_pending and restored the sge on 590 * both success and error. Skip the synchronous cleanup 591 * below on error, just remove the record and return. 592 */ 593 if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) { 594 list_del(&rec->list); 595 return rc; 596 } 597 } 598 if (!rc || rc != -EINPROGRESS) { 599 atomic_dec(&ctx->encrypt_pending); 600 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size; 601 sge->length += prot->prepend_size; 602 } 603 604 if (!rc) { 605 WRITE_ONCE(rec->tx_ready, true); 606 } else if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) { 607 list_del(&rec->list); 608 return rc; 609 } 610 611 /* Unhook the record from context if encryption is not failure */ 612 ctx->open_rec = NULL; 613 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->tx); 614 return rc; 615 } 616 617 static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from, 618 struct tls_rec **to, struct sk_msg *msg_opl, 619 struct sk_msg *msg_oen, u32 split_point, 620 u32 tx_overhead_size, u32 *orig_end) 621 { 622 u32 i, j, bytes = 0, apply = msg_opl->apply_bytes; 623 struct scatterlist *sge, *osge, *nsge; 624 u32 orig_size = msg_opl->sg.size; 625 struct scatterlist tmp = { }; 626 struct sk_msg *msg_npl; 627 struct tls_rec *new; 628 int ret; 629 630 new = tls_get_rec(sk); 631 if (!new) 632 return -ENOMEM; 633 ret = sk_msg_alloc(sk, &new->msg_encrypted, msg_opl->sg.size + 634 tx_overhead_size, 0); 635 if (ret < 0) { 636 tls_free_rec(sk, new); 637 return ret; 638 } 639 640 *orig_end = msg_opl->sg.end; 641 i = msg_opl->sg.start; 642 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i); 643 while (apply && sge->length) { 644 if (sge->length > apply) { 645 u32 len = sge->length - apply; 646 647 get_page(sg_page(sge)); 648 sg_set_page(&tmp, sg_page(sge), len, 649 sge->offset + apply); 650 sge->length = apply; 651 bytes += apply; 652 apply = 0; 653 } else { 654 apply -= sge->length; 655 bytes += sge->length; 656 } 657 658 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); 659 if (i == msg_opl->sg.end) 660 break; 661 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i); 662 } 663 664 msg_opl->sg.end = i; 665 msg_opl->sg.curr = i; 666 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0; 667 msg_opl->apply_bytes = 0; 668 msg_opl->sg.size = bytes; 669 670 msg_npl = &new->msg_plaintext; 671 msg_npl->apply_bytes = apply; 672 msg_npl->sg.size = orig_size - bytes; 673 674 j = msg_npl->sg.start; 675 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j); 676 if (tmp.length) { 677 memcpy(nsge, &tmp, sizeof(*nsge)); 678 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j); 679 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j); 680 } 681 682 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i); 683 while (osge->length) { 684 memcpy(nsge, osge, sizeof(*nsge)); 685 sg_unmark_end(nsge); 686 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); 687 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j); 688 if (i == *orig_end) 689 break; 690 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i); 691 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j); 692 } 693 694 msg_npl->sg.end = j; 695 msg_npl->sg.curr = j; 696 msg_npl->sg.copybreak = 0; 697 698 *to = new; 699 return 0; 700 } 701 702 static void tls_merge_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *to, 703 struct tls_rec *from, u32 orig_end) 704 { 705 struct sk_msg *msg_npl = &from->msg_plaintext; 706 struct sk_msg *msg_opl = &to->msg_plaintext; 707 struct scatterlist *osge, *nsge; 708 u32 i, j; 709 710 i = msg_opl->sg.end; 711 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i); 712 j = msg_npl->sg.start; 713 714 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i); 715 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j); 716 717 if (sg_page(osge) == sg_page(nsge) && 718 osge->offset + osge->length == nsge->offset) { 719 osge->length += nsge->length; 720 put_page(sg_page(nsge)); 721 } 722 723 msg_opl->sg.end = orig_end; 724 msg_opl->sg.curr = orig_end; 725 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0; 726 msg_opl->apply_bytes = msg_opl->sg.size + msg_npl->sg.size; 727 msg_opl->sg.size += msg_npl->sg.size; 728 729 sk_msg_free(sk, &to->msg_encrypted); 730 sk_msg_xfer_full(&to->msg_encrypted, &from->msg_encrypted); 731 732 kfree(from); 733 } 734 735 static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags, 736 unsigned char record_type) 737 { 738 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 739 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 740 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 741 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec, *tmp = NULL; 742 u32 i, split_point, orig_end; 743 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en; 744 struct aead_request *req; 745 bool split; 746 int rc; 747 748 if (!rec) 749 return 0; 750 751 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 752 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 753 754 split_point = msg_pl->apply_bytes; 755 split = split_point && split_point < msg_pl->sg.size; 756 if (unlikely((!split && 757 msg_pl->sg.size + 758 prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size) || 759 (split && 760 split_point + 761 prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size))) { 762 split = true; 763 split_point = msg_en->sg.size; 764 } 765 if (split) { 766 rc = tls_split_open_record(sk, rec, &tmp, msg_pl, msg_en, 767 split_point, prot->overhead_size, 768 &orig_end); 769 if (rc < 0) 770 return rc; 771 /* This can happen if above tls_split_open_record allocates 772 * a single large encryption buffer instead of two smaller 773 * ones. In this case adjust pointers and continue without 774 * split. 775 */ 776 if (!msg_pl->sg.size) { 777 tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end); 778 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 779 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 780 split = false; 781 } 782 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size + 783 prot->overhead_size); 784 } 785 786 rec->tx_flags = flags; 787 req = &rec->aead_req; 788 789 i = msg_pl->sg.end; 790 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i); 791 792 /* msg_pl->sg.data is a ring; data[MAX+1] is reserved for the wrap 793 * link (frags won't use it). 'i' is now the last filled entry: 794 * 795 * i end start 796 * v v v [ rsv ] 797 * [ d ][ d ][ ][ ]...[ ][ d ][ d ][ d ][chain] 798 * ^ END v 799 * `-----------------------------------------' 800 * 801 * Note that SGL does not allow chain-after-chain, so for TLS 1.3, 802 * we must make sure we don't create the wrap entry and then chain 803 * link to content_type immediately at index 0. 804 */ 805 if (i < msg_pl->sg.start) 806 sg_chain(msg_pl->sg.data, ARRAY_SIZE(msg_pl->sg.data), 807 msg_pl->sg.data); 808 809 rec->content_type = record_type; 810 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) { 811 /* Add content type to end of message. No padding added */ 812 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_content_type, &rec->content_type, 1); 813 sg_mark_end(&rec->sg_content_type); 814 sg_chain(msg_pl->sg.data, i + 2, &rec->sg_content_type); 815 } else { 816 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_pl, i)); 817 } 818 819 i = msg_pl->sg.start; 820 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_in, 2, &msg_pl->sg.data[i]); 821 822 i = msg_en->sg.end; 823 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i); 824 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_en, i)); 825 826 i = msg_en->sg.start; 827 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_out, 2, &msg_en->sg.data[i]); 828 829 tls_make_aad(rec->aad_space, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, 830 tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq, record_type, prot); 831 832 tls_fill_prepend(tls_ctx, 833 page_address(sg_page(&msg_en->sg.data[i])) + 834 msg_en->sg.data[i].offset, 835 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, 836 record_type); 837 838 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = false; 839 840 rc = tls_do_encryption(sk, tls_ctx, ctx, req, 841 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, i); 842 if (rc < 0) { 843 if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) { 844 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); 845 if (split) { 846 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true; 847 tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end); 848 } 849 } 850 ctx->async_capable = 1; 851 return rc; 852 } else if (split) { 853 msg_pl = &tmp->msg_plaintext; 854 msg_en = &tmp->msg_encrypted; 855 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size); 856 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true; 857 ctx->open_rec = tmp; 858 } 859 860 return tls_tx_records(sk, flags); 861 } 862 863 static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk, 864 bool full_record, u8 record_type, 865 ssize_t *copied, int flags) 866 { 867 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 868 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 869 struct sk_msg msg_redir = { }; 870 struct sk_psock *psock; 871 struct sock *sk_redir; 872 struct tls_rec *rec; 873 bool enospc, policy, redir_ingress; 874 int err = 0, send; 875 u32 delta = 0; 876 877 policy = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY); 878 psock = sk_psock_get(sk); 879 if (!psock || !policy) { 880 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type); 881 if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) { 882 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg); 883 tls_free_open_rec(sk); 884 err = -sk->sk_err; 885 } 886 if (psock) 887 sk_psock_put(sk, psock); 888 return err; 889 } 890 more_data: 891 enospc = sk_msg_full(msg); 892 if (psock->eval == __SK_NONE) { 893 delta = msg->sg.size; 894 psock->eval = sk_psock_msg_verdict(sk, psock, msg); 895 delta -= msg->sg.size; 896 897 if ((s32)delta > 0) { 898 /* It indicates that we executed bpf_msg_pop_data(), 899 * causing the plaintext data size to decrease. 900 * Therefore the encrypted data size also needs to 901 * correspondingly decrease. We only need to subtract 902 * delta to calculate the new ciphertext length since 903 * ktls does not support block encryption. 904 */ 905 struct sk_msg *enc = &ctx->open_rec->msg_encrypted; 906 907 sk_msg_trim(sk, enc, enc->sg.size - delta); 908 } 909 } 910 if (msg->cork_bytes && msg->cork_bytes > msg->sg.size && 911 !enospc && !full_record) { 912 err = -ENOSPC; 913 goto out_err; 914 } 915 msg->cork_bytes = 0; 916 send = msg->sg.size; 917 if (msg->apply_bytes && msg->apply_bytes < send) 918 send = msg->apply_bytes; 919 920 switch (psock->eval) { 921 case __SK_PASS: 922 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type); 923 if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) { 924 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg); 925 tls_free_open_rec(sk); 926 err = -sk->sk_err; 927 goto out_err; 928 } 929 break; 930 case __SK_REDIRECT: 931 redir_ingress = psock->redir_ingress; 932 sk_redir = psock->sk_redir; 933 memcpy(&msg_redir, msg, sizeof(*msg)); 934 if (msg->apply_bytes < send) 935 msg->apply_bytes = 0; 936 else 937 msg->apply_bytes -= send; 938 sk_msg_return_zero(sk, msg, send); 939 msg->sg.size -= send; 940 release_sock(sk); 941 err = tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir, redir_ingress, 942 &msg_redir, send, flags); 943 lock_sock(sk); 944 if (err < 0) { 945 /* Regardless of whether the data represented by 946 * msg_redir is sent successfully, we have already 947 * uncharged it via sk_msg_return_zero(). The 948 * msg->sg.size represents the remaining unprocessed 949 * data, which needs to be uncharged here. 950 */ 951 sk_mem_uncharge(sk, msg->sg.size); 952 *copied -= sk_msg_free_nocharge(sk, &msg_redir); 953 msg->sg.size = 0; 954 } 955 if (msg->sg.size == 0) 956 tls_free_open_rec(sk); 957 break; 958 case __SK_DROP: 959 default: 960 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, send); 961 if (msg->apply_bytes < send) 962 msg->apply_bytes = 0; 963 else 964 msg->apply_bytes -= send; 965 if (msg->sg.size == 0) 966 tls_free_open_rec(sk); 967 *copied -= (send + delta); 968 err = -EACCES; 969 } 970 971 if (likely(!err)) { 972 bool reset_eval = !ctx->open_rec; 973 974 rec = ctx->open_rec; 975 if (rec) { 976 msg = &rec->msg_plaintext; 977 if (!msg->apply_bytes) 978 reset_eval = true; 979 } 980 if (reset_eval) { 981 psock->eval = __SK_NONE; 982 if (psock->sk_redir) { 983 sock_put(psock->sk_redir); 984 psock->sk_redir = NULL; 985 } 986 } 987 if (rec) 988 goto more_data; 989 } 990 out_err: 991 sk_psock_put(sk, psock); 992 return err; 993 } 994 995 static int tls_sw_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags) 996 { 997 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 998 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 999 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec; 1000 struct sk_msg *msg_pl; 1001 size_t copied; 1002 1003 if (!rec) 1004 return 0; 1005 1006 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 1007 copied = msg_pl->sg.size; 1008 if (!copied) 1009 return 0; 1010 1011 return bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, true, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA, 1012 &copied, flags); 1013 } 1014 1015 static int tls_sw_sendmsg_splice(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, 1016 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, size_t try_to_copy, 1017 ssize_t *copied) 1018 { 1019 struct page *page = NULL, **pages = &page; 1020 1021 do { 1022 ssize_t part; 1023 size_t off; 1024 1025 part = iov_iter_extract_pages(&msg->msg_iter, &pages, 1026 try_to_copy, 1, 0, &off); 1027 if (part <= 0) 1028 return part ?: -EIO; 1029 1030 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sendpage_ok(page))) { 1031 iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, part); 1032 return -EIO; 1033 } 1034 1035 sk_msg_page_add(msg_pl, page, part, off); 1036 msg_pl->sg.copybreak = 0; 1037 msg_pl->sg.curr = msg_pl->sg.end; 1038 sk_mem_charge(sk, part); 1039 *copied += part; 1040 try_to_copy -= part; 1041 } while (try_to_copy && !sk_msg_full(msg_pl)); 1042 1043 return 0; 1044 } 1045 1046 static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, 1047 size_t size) 1048 { 1049 long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT); 1050 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 1051 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 1052 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 1053 bool async_capable = ctx->async_capable; 1054 unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA; 1055 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter); 1056 bool eor = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE); 1057 size_t try_to_copy; 1058 ssize_t copied = 0; 1059 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en; 1060 struct tls_rec *rec; 1061 int required_size; 1062 int num_async = 0; 1063 bool full_record; 1064 int record_room; 1065 int num_zc = 0; 1066 int orig_size; 1067 int ret = 0; 1068 1069 if (!eor && (msg->msg_flags & MSG_EOR)) 1070 return -EINVAL; 1071 1072 if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen)) { 1073 ret = tls_process_cmsg(sk, msg, &record_type); 1074 if (ret) { 1075 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) 1076 num_async++; 1077 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) 1078 goto end; 1079 } 1080 } 1081 1082 while (msg_data_left(msg)) { 1083 if (sk->sk_err) { 1084 ret = -sk->sk_err; 1085 goto send_end; 1086 } 1087 1088 if (ctx->open_rec) 1089 rec = ctx->open_rec; 1090 else 1091 rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk); 1092 if (!rec) { 1093 ret = -ENOMEM; 1094 goto send_end; 1095 } 1096 1097 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 1098 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 1099 1100 orig_size = msg_pl->sg.size; 1101 full_record = false; 1102 try_to_copy = msg_data_left(msg); 1103 record_room = tls_ctx->tx_max_payload_len - msg_pl->sg.size; 1104 if (try_to_copy >= record_room) { 1105 try_to_copy = record_room; 1106 full_record = true; 1107 } 1108 1109 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy + 1110 prot->overhead_size; 1111 1112 if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk)) 1113 goto wait_for_sndbuf; 1114 1115 alloc_encrypted: 1116 ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size); 1117 if (ret) { 1118 if (ret != -ENOSPC) 1119 goto wait_for_memory; 1120 1121 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was 1122 * actually allocated. The difference is due 1123 * to max sg elements limit 1124 */ 1125 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_en->sg.size; 1126 full_record = true; 1127 } 1128 1129 if (try_to_copy && (msg->msg_flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES)) { 1130 ret = tls_sw_sendmsg_splice(sk, msg, msg_pl, 1131 try_to_copy, &copied); 1132 if (ret < 0) 1133 goto send_end; 1134 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true; 1135 1136 if (sk_msg_full(msg_pl)) { 1137 full_record = true; 1138 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, 1139 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size); 1140 } 1141 1142 if (full_record || eor) 1143 goto copied; 1144 continue; 1145 } 1146 1147 if (!is_kvec && (full_record || eor) && !async_capable) { 1148 u32 first = msg_pl->sg.end; 1149 1150 ret = sk_msg_zerocopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter, 1151 msg_pl, try_to_copy); 1152 if (ret) 1153 goto fallback_to_reg_send; 1154 1155 num_zc++; 1156 copied += try_to_copy; 1157 1158 sk_msg_sg_copy_set(msg_pl, first); 1159 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record, 1160 record_type, &copied, 1161 msg->msg_flags); 1162 if (ret) { 1163 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) 1164 num_async++; 1165 else if (ret == -ENOMEM) 1166 goto wait_for_memory; 1167 else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC) { 1168 if (msg_pl->cork_bytes) { 1169 ret = 0; 1170 goto send_end; 1171 } 1172 goto rollback_iter; 1173 } else if (ret != -EAGAIN) 1174 goto send_end; 1175 } 1176 1177 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */ 1178 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) { 1179 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work); 1180 tls_tx_records(sk, msg->msg_flags); 1181 } 1182 1183 continue; 1184 rollback_iter: 1185 copied -= try_to_copy; 1186 sk_msg_sg_copy_clear(msg_pl, first); 1187 iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, 1188 msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size); 1189 fallback_to_reg_send: 1190 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_pl, orig_size); 1191 } 1192 1193 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy; 1194 1195 ret = tls_clone_plaintext_msg(sk, required_size); 1196 if (ret) { 1197 if (ret != -ENOSPC) 1198 goto send_end; 1199 1200 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was 1201 * actually allocated. The difference is due 1202 * to max sg elements limit 1203 */ 1204 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size; 1205 full_record = true; 1206 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, 1207 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size); 1208 } 1209 1210 if (try_to_copy) { 1211 ret = sk_msg_memcopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter, 1212 msg_pl, try_to_copy); 1213 if (ret < 0) 1214 goto trim_sgl; 1215 } 1216 1217 /* Open records defined only if successfully copied, otherwise 1218 * we would trim the sg but not reset the open record frags. 1219 */ 1220 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true; 1221 copied += try_to_copy; 1222 copied: 1223 if (full_record || eor) { 1224 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record, 1225 record_type, &copied, 1226 msg->msg_flags); 1227 if (ret) { 1228 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) 1229 num_async++; 1230 else if (ret == -ENOMEM) 1231 goto wait_for_memory; 1232 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) { 1233 if (ret == -ENOSPC) 1234 ret = 0; 1235 goto send_end; 1236 } 1237 } 1238 1239 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */ 1240 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) { 1241 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work); 1242 tls_tx_records(sk, msg->msg_flags); 1243 } 1244 } 1245 1246 continue; 1247 1248 wait_for_sndbuf: 1249 set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); 1250 wait_for_memory: 1251 ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo); 1252 if (ret) { 1253 trim_sgl: 1254 if (ctx->open_rec) 1255 tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, orig_size); 1256 goto send_end; 1257 } 1258 1259 if (ctx->open_rec && msg_en->sg.size < required_size) 1260 goto alloc_encrypted; 1261 } 1262 1263 send_end: 1264 if (!num_async) { 1265 goto end; 1266 } else if (num_zc || eor) { 1267 int err; 1268 1269 /* Wait for pending encryptions to get completed */ 1270 err = tls_encrypt_async_wait(ctx); 1271 if (err) { 1272 ret = err; 1273 copied = 0; 1274 } 1275 } 1276 1277 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */ 1278 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) { 1279 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work); 1280 tls_tx_records(sk, msg->msg_flags); 1281 } 1282 1283 end: 1284 ret = sk_stream_error(sk, msg->msg_flags, ret); 1285 return copied > 0 ? copied : ret; 1286 } 1287 1288 int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) 1289 { 1290 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 1291 int ret; 1292 1293 if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL | 1294 MSG_CMSG_COMPAT | MSG_SPLICE_PAGES | MSG_EOR | 1295 MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY)) 1296 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 1297 1298 ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&tls_ctx->tx_lock); 1299 if (ret) 1300 return ret; 1301 lock_sock(sk); 1302 ret = tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(sk, msg, size); 1303 release_sock(sk); 1304 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock); 1305 return ret; 1306 } 1307 1308 /* 1309 * Handle unexpected EOF during splice without SPLICE_F_MORE set. 1310 */ 1311 void tls_sw_splice_eof(struct socket *sock) 1312 { 1313 struct sock *sk = sock->sk; 1314 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 1315 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 1316 struct tls_rec *rec; 1317 struct sk_msg *msg_pl; 1318 ssize_t copied = 0; 1319 bool retrying = false; 1320 int ret = 0; 1321 1322 if (!ctx->open_rec) 1323 return; 1324 1325 mutex_lock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock); 1326 lock_sock(sk); 1327 1328 retry: 1329 /* same checks as in tls_sw_push_pending_record() */ 1330 rec = ctx->open_rec; 1331 if (!rec) 1332 goto unlock; 1333 1334 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 1335 if (msg_pl->sg.size == 0) 1336 goto unlock; 1337 1338 /* Check the BPF advisor and perform transmission. */ 1339 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, false, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA, 1340 &copied, 0); 1341 switch (ret) { 1342 case 0: 1343 case -EAGAIN: 1344 if (retrying) 1345 goto unlock; 1346 retrying = true; 1347 goto retry; 1348 case -EINPROGRESS: 1349 break; 1350 default: 1351 goto unlock; 1352 } 1353 1354 /* Wait for pending encryptions to get completed */ 1355 if (tls_encrypt_async_wait(ctx)) 1356 goto unlock; 1357 1358 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */ 1359 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) { 1360 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work); 1361 tls_tx_records(sk, 0); 1362 } 1363 1364 unlock: 1365 release_sock(sk); 1366 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock); 1367 } 1368 1369 /* When has_copied is true the caller has already moved bytes to 1370 * userspace. Report sk_err but leave it set so the next read 1371 * surfaces it instead of a spurious EOF, otherwise sk_err is 1372 * consumed via sock_error(). 1373 */ 1374 static int 1375 tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock, 1376 bool released, bool has_copied) 1377 { 1378 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 1379 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 1380 DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function); 1381 int ret = 0; 1382 long timeo; 1383 1384 /* a rekey is pending, let userspace deal with it */ 1385 if (unlikely(ctx->key_update_pending)) 1386 return -EKEYEXPIRED; 1387 1388 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock); 1389 1390 while (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) { 1391 if (!sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) 1392 return 0; 1393 1394 if (sk->sk_err) { 1395 if (has_copied) 1396 return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err); 1397 return sock_error(sk); 1398 } 1399 1400 if (ret < 0) 1401 return ret; 1402 1403 if (sk_flush_backlog(sk)) 1404 released = true; 1405 if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) { 1406 /* Defer notification to the exit point; this thread 1407 * will consume the record directly. 1408 */ 1409 tls_strp_check_rcv(&ctx->strp, false); 1410 if (tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) 1411 break; 1412 } 1413 1414 /* sk_flush_backlog() can run tcp_reset(), which sets 1415 * sk_err and then sk_shutdown via tcp_done(). Recheck 1416 * sk_err here so a connection abort surfaces as the 1417 * actual error rather than a clean EOF. 1418 */ 1419 if (sk->sk_err) { 1420 if (has_copied) 1421 return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err); 1422 return sock_error(sk); 1423 } 1424 if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) 1425 return 0; 1426 1427 if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE)) 1428 return 0; 1429 1430 if (!timeo) 1431 return -EAGAIN; 1432 1433 released = true; 1434 add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); 1435 sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); 1436 ret = sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo, 1437 tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx) || 1438 !sk_psock_queue_empty(psock), 1439 &wait); 1440 sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); 1441 remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); 1442 1443 /* Handle signals */ 1444 if (signal_pending(current)) 1445 return sock_intr_errno(timeo); 1446 } 1447 1448 if (unlikely(!tls_strp_msg_load(&ctx->strp, released))) 1449 return tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, nonblock, false, has_copied); 1450 1451 return 1; 1452 } 1453 1454 static int tls_setup_from_iter(struct iov_iter *from, 1455 int length, int *pages_used, 1456 struct scatterlist *to, 1457 int to_max_pages) 1458 { 1459 int rc = 0, i = 0, num_elem = *pages_used, maxpages; 1460 struct page *pages[MAX_SKB_FRAGS]; 1461 unsigned int size = 0; 1462 ssize_t copied, use; 1463 size_t offset; 1464 1465 while (length > 0) { 1466 i = 0; 1467 maxpages = to_max_pages - num_elem; 1468 if (maxpages == 0) { 1469 rc = -EFAULT; 1470 goto out; 1471 } 1472 copied = iov_iter_get_pages2(from, pages, 1473 length, 1474 maxpages, &offset); 1475 if (copied <= 0) { 1476 rc = -EFAULT; 1477 goto out; 1478 } 1479 1480 length -= copied; 1481 size += copied; 1482 while (copied) { 1483 use = min_t(int, copied, PAGE_SIZE - offset); 1484 1485 sg_set_page(&to[num_elem], 1486 pages[i], use, offset); 1487 sg_unmark_end(&to[num_elem]); 1488 /* We do not uncharge memory from this API */ 1489 1490 offset = 0; 1491 copied -= use; 1492 1493 i++; 1494 num_elem++; 1495 } 1496 } 1497 /* Mark the end in the last sg entry if newly added */ 1498 if (num_elem > *pages_used) 1499 sg_mark_end(&to[num_elem - 1]); 1500 out: 1501 if (rc) 1502 iov_iter_revert(from, size); 1503 *pages_used = num_elem; 1504 1505 return rc; 1506 } 1507 1508 static struct sk_buff * 1509 tls_alloc_clrtxt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, 1510 unsigned int full_len) 1511 { 1512 struct strp_msg *clr_rxm; 1513 struct sk_buff *clr_skb; 1514 int err; 1515 1516 clr_skb = alloc_skb_with_frags(0, full_len, TLS_PAGE_ORDER, 1517 &err, sk->sk_allocation); 1518 if (!clr_skb) 1519 return NULL; 1520 1521 skb_copy_header(clr_skb, skb); 1522 clr_skb->len = full_len; 1523 clr_skb->data_len = full_len; 1524 1525 clr_rxm = strp_msg(clr_skb); 1526 clr_rxm->offset = 0; 1527 1528 return clr_skb; 1529 } 1530 1531 /* Decrypt handlers 1532 * 1533 * tls_decrypt_sw() and tls_decrypt_device() are decrypt handlers. 1534 * They must transform the darg in/out argument are as follows: 1535 * | Input | Output 1536 * ------------------------------------------------------------------- 1537 * zc | Zero-copy decrypt allowed | Zero-copy performed 1538 * async | Async decrypt allowed | Async crypto used / in progress 1539 * skb | * | Output skb 1540 * 1541 * If ZC decryption was performed darg.skb will point to the input skb. 1542 */ 1543 1544 /* This function decrypts the input skb into either out_iov or in out_sg 1545 * or in skb buffers itself. The input parameter 'darg->zc' indicates if 1546 * zero-copy mode needs to be tried or not. With zero-copy mode, either 1547 * out_iov or out_sg must be non-NULL. In case both out_iov and out_sg are 1548 * NULL, then the decryption happens inside skb buffers itself, i.e. 1549 * zero-copy gets disabled and 'darg->zc' is updated. 1550 */ 1551 static int tls_decrypt_sg(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *out_iov, 1552 struct scatterlist *out_sg, 1553 struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) 1554 { 1555 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 1556 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 1557 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 1558 int n_sgin, n_sgout, aead_size, err, pages = 0; 1559 struct sk_buff *skb = tls_strp_msg(ctx); 1560 const struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); 1561 const struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb); 1562 struct aead_request *aead_req; 1563 struct scatterlist *sgin = NULL; 1564 struct scatterlist *sgout = NULL; 1565 const int data_len = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size; 1566 int tail_pages = !!prot->tail_size; 1567 struct tls_decrypt_ctx *dctx; 1568 struct sk_buff *clear_skb; 1569 int iv_offset = 0; 1570 u8 *mem; 1571 1572 n_sgin = skb_nsg(skb, rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size, 1573 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size); 1574 if (n_sgin < 1) 1575 return n_sgin ?: -EBADMSG; 1576 1577 if (darg->zc && (out_iov || out_sg)) { 1578 clear_skb = NULL; 1579 1580 if (out_iov) 1581 n_sgout = 1 + tail_pages + 1582 iov_iter_npages_cap(out_iov, INT_MAX, data_len); 1583 else 1584 n_sgout = sg_nents(out_sg); 1585 } else { 1586 darg->zc = false; 1587 1588 clear_skb = tls_alloc_clrtxt_skb(sk, skb, rxm->full_len); 1589 if (!clear_skb) 1590 return -ENOMEM; 1591 1592 n_sgout = 1 + skb_shinfo(clear_skb)->nr_frags; 1593 } 1594 1595 /* Increment to accommodate AAD */ 1596 n_sgin = n_sgin + 1; 1597 1598 /* Allocate a single block of memory which contains 1599 * aead_req || tls_decrypt_ctx. 1600 * Both structs are variable length. 1601 */ 1602 aead_size = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_recv); 1603 aead_size = ALIGN(aead_size, __alignof__(*dctx)); 1604 mem = kmalloc(aead_size + struct_size(dctx, sg, size_add(n_sgin, n_sgout)), 1605 sk->sk_allocation); 1606 if (!mem) { 1607 err = -ENOMEM; 1608 goto exit_free_skb; 1609 } 1610 1611 /* Segment the allocated memory */ 1612 aead_req = (struct aead_request *)mem; 1613 dctx = (struct tls_decrypt_ctx *)(mem + aead_size); 1614 dctx->sk = sk; 1615 sgin = &dctx->sg[0]; 1616 sgout = &dctx->sg[n_sgin]; 1617 1618 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of nonce+iv is a constant */ 1619 switch (prot->cipher_type) { 1620 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128: 1621 dctx->iv[0] = TLS_AES_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE; 1622 iv_offset = 1; 1623 break; 1624 case TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM: 1625 dctx->iv[0] = TLS_SM4_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE; 1626 iv_offset = 1; 1627 break; 1628 } 1629 1630 /* Prepare IV */ 1631 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION || 1632 prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { 1633 memcpy(&dctx->iv[iv_offset], tls_ctx->rx.iv, 1634 prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size); 1635 } else { 1636 err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + TLS_HEADER_SIZE, 1637 &dctx->iv[iv_offset] + prot->salt_size, 1638 prot->iv_size); 1639 if (err < 0) 1640 goto exit_free; 1641 memcpy(&dctx->iv[iv_offset], tls_ctx->rx.iv, prot->salt_size); 1642 } 1643 tls_xor_iv_with_seq(prot, &dctx->iv[iv_offset], tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq); 1644 1645 /* Prepare AAD */ 1646 tls_make_aad(dctx->aad, rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size + 1647 prot->tail_size, 1648 tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, tlm->control, prot); 1649 1650 /* Prepare sgin */ 1651 sg_init_table(sgin, n_sgin); 1652 sg_set_buf(&sgin[0], dctx->aad, prot->aad_size); 1653 err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, &sgin[1], 1654 rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size, 1655 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size); 1656 if (err < 0) 1657 goto exit_free; 1658 1659 if (clear_skb) { 1660 sg_init_table(sgout, n_sgout); 1661 sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], dctx->aad, prot->aad_size); 1662 1663 err = skb_to_sgvec(clear_skb, &sgout[1], prot->prepend_size, 1664 data_len + prot->tail_size); 1665 if (err < 0) 1666 goto exit_free; 1667 } else if (out_iov) { 1668 sg_init_table(sgout, n_sgout); 1669 sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], dctx->aad, prot->aad_size); 1670 1671 err = tls_setup_from_iter(out_iov, data_len, &pages, &sgout[1], 1672 (n_sgout - 1 - tail_pages)); 1673 if (err < 0) 1674 goto exit_free_pages; 1675 1676 if (prot->tail_size) { 1677 sg_unmark_end(&sgout[pages]); 1678 sg_set_buf(&sgout[pages + 1], &dctx->tail, 1679 prot->tail_size); 1680 sg_mark_end(&sgout[pages + 1]); 1681 } 1682 } else if (out_sg) { 1683 memcpy(sgout, out_sg, n_sgout * sizeof(*sgout)); 1684 } 1685 dctx->free_sgout = !!pages; 1686 1687 /* Prepare and submit AEAD request */ 1688 err = tls_do_decryption(sk, sgin, sgout, dctx->iv, 1689 data_len + prot->tail_size, aead_req, darg); 1690 if (err) { 1691 if (darg->async_done) 1692 goto exit_free_skb; 1693 goto exit_free_pages; 1694 } 1695 1696 darg->skb = clear_skb ?: tls_strp_msg(ctx); 1697 clear_skb = NULL; 1698 1699 if (unlikely(darg->async)) { 1700 err = tls_strp_msg_hold(&ctx->strp, &ctx->async_hold); 1701 if (err) { 1702 err = tls_decrypt_async_wait(ctx); 1703 darg->async = false; 1704 } 1705 return err; 1706 } 1707 1708 if (unlikely(darg->async_done)) 1709 return 0; 1710 1711 if (prot->tail_size) 1712 darg->tail = dctx->tail; 1713 1714 exit_free_pages: 1715 /* Release the pages in case iov was mapped to pages */ 1716 for (; pages > 0; pages--) 1717 put_page(sg_page(&sgout[pages])); 1718 exit_free: 1719 kfree(mem); 1720 exit_free_skb: 1721 consume_skb(clear_skb); 1722 return err; 1723 } 1724 1725 static int 1726 tls_decrypt_sw(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx, 1727 struct msghdr *msg, struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) 1728 { 1729 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 1730 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 1731 struct strp_msg *rxm; 1732 int pad, err; 1733 1734 err = tls_decrypt_sg(sk, &msg->msg_iter, NULL, darg); 1735 if (err < 0) { 1736 if (err == -EBADMSG) 1737 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR); 1738 return err; 1739 } 1740 /* keep going even for ->async, the code below is TLS 1.3 */ 1741 1742 /* If opportunistic TLS 1.3 ZC failed retry without ZC */ 1743 if (unlikely(darg->zc && prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION && 1744 darg->tail != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)) { 1745 darg->zc = false; 1746 if (!darg->tail) 1747 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXNOPADVIOL); 1748 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTRETRY); 1749 return tls_decrypt_sw(sk, tls_ctx, msg, darg); 1750 } 1751 1752 pad = tls_padding_length(prot, darg->skb, darg); 1753 if (pad < 0) { 1754 if (darg->skb != tls_strp_msg(ctx)) 1755 consume_skb(darg->skb); 1756 return pad; 1757 } 1758 1759 rxm = strp_msg(darg->skb); 1760 rxm->full_len -= pad; 1761 1762 return 0; 1763 } 1764 1765 static int 1766 tls_decrypt_device(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, 1767 struct tls_context *tls_ctx, struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) 1768 { 1769 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 1770 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 1771 struct strp_msg *rxm; 1772 int pad, err; 1773 1774 if (tls_ctx->rx_conf != TLS_HW) 1775 return 0; 1776 1777 err = tls_device_decrypted(sk, tls_ctx); 1778 if (err <= 0) 1779 return err; 1780 1781 pad = tls_padding_length(prot, tls_strp_msg(ctx), darg); 1782 if (pad < 0) 1783 return pad; 1784 1785 darg->async = false; 1786 darg->skb = tls_strp_msg(ctx); 1787 /* ->zc downgrade check, in case TLS 1.3 gets here */ 1788 darg->zc &= !(prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION && 1789 tls_msg(darg->skb)->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA); 1790 1791 rxm = strp_msg(darg->skb); 1792 rxm->full_len -= pad; 1793 1794 if (!darg->zc) { 1795 /* Non-ZC case needs a real skb */ 1796 darg->skb = tls_strp_msg_detach(ctx); 1797 if (!darg->skb) 1798 return -ENOMEM; 1799 } else { 1800 unsigned int off, len; 1801 1802 /* In ZC case nobody cares about the output skb. 1803 * Just copy the data here. Note the skb is not fully trimmed. 1804 */ 1805 off = rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size; 1806 len = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size; 1807 1808 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(darg->skb, off, msg, len); 1809 if (err) 1810 return err; 1811 } 1812 return 1; 1813 } 1814 1815 static int tls_check_pending_rekey(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, 1816 struct sk_buff *skb) 1817 { 1818 const struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); 1819 const struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb); 1820 char hs_type; 1821 int err; 1822 1823 if (likely(tlm->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE)) 1824 return 0; 1825 1826 if (rxm->full_len < 1) 1827 return 0; 1828 1829 err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, &hs_type, 1); 1830 if (err < 0) { 1831 DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 1832 return err; 1833 } 1834 1835 if (hs_type == TLS_HANDSHAKE_KEYUPDATE) { 1836 struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = ctx->priv_ctx_rx; 1837 1838 WRITE_ONCE(rx_ctx->key_update_pending, true); 1839 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXREKEYRECEIVED); 1840 } 1841 1842 return 0; 1843 } 1844 1845 /* On decrypt failure the connection is aborted (sk_err set) before 1846 * returning a negative errno. 1847 */ 1848 static int tls_rx_one_record(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, 1849 struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) 1850 { 1851 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 1852 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 1853 struct strp_msg *rxm; 1854 int err; 1855 1856 err = tls_decrypt_device(sk, msg, tls_ctx, darg); 1857 if (!err) 1858 err = tls_decrypt_sw(sk, tls_ctx, msg, darg); 1859 if (err < 0) { 1860 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); 1861 return err; 1862 } 1863 1864 rxm = strp_msg(darg->skb); 1865 rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size; 1866 rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size; 1867 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->rx); 1868 1869 return tls_check_pending_rekey(sk, tls_ctx, darg->skb); 1870 } 1871 1872 int decrypt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct scatterlist *sgout) 1873 { 1874 struct tls_decrypt_arg darg = { .zc = true, }; 1875 1876 return tls_decrypt_sg(sk, NULL, sgout, &darg); 1877 } 1878 1879 /* All records returned from a recvmsg() call must have the same type. 1880 * 0 is not a valid content type. Use it as "no type reported, yet". 1881 */ 1882 static int tls_record_content_type(struct msghdr *msg, struct tls_msg *tlm, 1883 u8 *control) 1884 { 1885 int err; 1886 1887 if (!*control) { 1888 *control = tlm->control; 1889 if (!*control) 1890 return -EBADMSG; 1891 1892 err = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE, 1893 sizeof(*control), control); 1894 if (*control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) { 1895 if (err || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) 1896 return -EIO; 1897 } 1898 } else if (*control != tlm->control) { 1899 return 0; 1900 } 1901 1902 return 1; 1903 } 1904 1905 /* The deferred announce is fired once on reader exit by 1906 * tls_rx_reader_release(). 1907 */ 1908 static void tls_rx_rec_done(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx) 1909 { 1910 tls_strp_msg_consume(&ctx->strp); 1911 tls_strp_check_rcv(&ctx->strp, false); 1912 } 1913 1914 /* This function traverses the rx_list in tls receive context to copies the 1915 * decrypted records into the buffer provided by caller zero copy is not 1916 * true. Further, the records are removed from the rx_list if it is not a peek 1917 * case and the record has been consumed completely. 1918 */ 1919 static int process_rx_list(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx, 1920 struct msghdr *msg, 1921 u8 *control, 1922 size_t skip, 1923 size_t len, 1924 bool is_peek, 1925 bool *more) 1926 { 1927 struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&ctx->rx_list); 1928 struct tls_msg *tlm; 1929 ssize_t copied = 0; 1930 int err; 1931 1932 while (skip && skb) { 1933 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); 1934 tlm = tls_msg(skb); 1935 1936 err = tls_record_content_type(msg, tlm, control); 1937 if (err <= 0) 1938 goto more; 1939 1940 if (skip < rxm->full_len) 1941 break; 1942 1943 skip = skip - rxm->full_len; 1944 skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list); 1945 } 1946 1947 while (len && skb) { 1948 struct sk_buff *next_skb; 1949 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); 1950 int chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len - skip, len); 1951 1952 tlm = tls_msg(skb); 1953 1954 err = tls_record_content_type(msg, tlm, control); 1955 if (err <= 0) 1956 goto more; 1957 1958 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset + skip, 1959 msg, chunk); 1960 if (err < 0) 1961 goto more; 1962 1963 len = len - chunk; 1964 copied = copied + chunk; 1965 1966 /* Consume the data from record if it is non-peek case*/ 1967 if (!is_peek) { 1968 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk; 1969 rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk; 1970 1971 /* Return if there is unconsumed data in the record */ 1972 if (rxm->full_len - skip) 1973 break; 1974 } 1975 1976 /* The remaining skip-bytes must lie in 1st record in rx_list. 1977 * So from the 2nd record, 'skip' should be 0. 1978 */ 1979 skip = 0; 1980 1981 if (msg) 1982 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR; 1983 1984 next_skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list); 1985 1986 if (!is_peek) { 1987 __skb_unlink(skb, &ctx->rx_list); 1988 consume_skb(skb); 1989 } 1990 1991 skb = next_skb; 1992 } 1993 err = 0; 1994 1995 out: 1996 return copied ? : err; 1997 more: 1998 if (more) 1999 *more = true; 2000 goto out; 2001 } 2002 2003 static bool 2004 tls_read_flush_backlog(struct sock *sk, struct tls_prot_info *prot, 2005 size_t len_left, size_t decrypted, ssize_t done, 2006 size_t *flushed_at) 2007 { 2008 size_t max_rec; 2009 2010 if (len_left <= decrypted) 2011 return false; 2012 2013 max_rec = prot->overhead_size - prot->tail_size + TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE; 2014 if (done - *flushed_at < SZ_128K && tcp_inq(sk) > max_rec) 2015 return false; 2016 2017 *flushed_at = done; 2018 return sk_flush_backlog(sk); 2019 } 2020 2021 static int tls_rx_reader_acquire(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx, 2022 bool nonblock) 2023 { 2024 long timeo; 2025 int ret; 2026 2027 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock); 2028 2029 while (unlikely(ctx->reader_present)) { 2030 DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function); 2031 2032 ctx->reader_contended = 1; 2033 2034 add_wait_queue(&ctx->wq, &wait); 2035 ret = sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo, 2036 !READ_ONCE(ctx->reader_present), &wait); 2037 remove_wait_queue(&ctx->wq, &wait); 2038 2039 if (timeo <= 0) 2040 return -EAGAIN; 2041 if (signal_pending(current)) 2042 return sock_intr_errno(timeo); 2043 if (ret < 0) 2044 return ret; 2045 } 2046 2047 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->reader_present, 1); 2048 2049 return 0; 2050 } 2051 2052 static int tls_rx_reader_lock(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx, 2053 bool nonblock) 2054 { 2055 int err; 2056 2057 lock_sock(sk); 2058 err = tls_rx_reader_acquire(sk, ctx, nonblock); 2059 if (err) 2060 release_sock(sk); 2061 return err; 2062 } 2063 2064 static void tls_rx_reader_release(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx) 2065 { 2066 /* Fire any deferred announce once per reader so that a record 2067 * parsed but not yet announced becomes visible to the next 2068 * reader. The call is idempotent through msg_announced. 2069 */ 2070 tls_rx_msg_maybe_announce(&ctx->strp); 2071 2072 if (unlikely(ctx->reader_contended)) { 2073 if (wq_has_sleeper(&ctx->wq)) 2074 wake_up(&ctx->wq); 2075 else 2076 ctx->reader_contended = 0; 2077 2078 WARN_ON_ONCE(!ctx->reader_present); 2079 } 2080 2081 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->reader_present, 0); 2082 } 2083 2084 static void tls_rx_reader_unlock(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx) 2085 { 2086 tls_rx_reader_release(sk, ctx); 2087 release_sock(sk); 2088 } 2089 2090 int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, 2091 struct msghdr *msg, 2092 size_t len, 2093 int flags) 2094 { 2095 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2096 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2097 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 2098 ssize_t decrypted = 0, async_copy_bytes = 0; 2099 struct sk_psock *psock; 2100 unsigned char control = 0; 2101 size_t flushed_at = 0; 2102 struct strp_msg *rxm; 2103 struct tls_msg *tlm; 2104 ssize_t copied = 0; 2105 ssize_t peeked = 0; 2106 bool async = false; 2107 int target, err; 2108 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter); 2109 bool is_peek = flags & MSG_PEEK; 2110 bool rx_more = false; 2111 bool released = true; 2112 bool bpf_strp_enabled; 2113 bool zc_capable; 2114 2115 if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)) 2116 return sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR); 2117 2118 err = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT); 2119 if (err < 0) 2120 return err; 2121 psock = sk_psock_get(sk); 2122 bpf_strp_enabled = sk_psock_strp_enabled(psock); 2123 2124 /* If crypto failed the connection is broken */ 2125 err = ctx->async_wait.err; 2126 if (err) 2127 goto end; 2128 2129 /* Process pending decrypted records. It must be non-zero-copy */ 2130 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, 0, len, is_peek, &rx_more); 2131 if (err < 0) 2132 goto end; 2133 2134 /* process_rx_list() will set @control if it processed any records */ 2135 copied = err; 2136 if (len <= copied || rx_more || 2137 (control && control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)) 2138 goto end; 2139 2140 target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len); 2141 len = len - copied; 2142 2143 zc_capable = !bpf_strp_enabled && !is_kvec && !is_peek && 2144 ctx->zc_capable; 2145 decrypted = 0; 2146 while (len && (decrypted + copied < target || tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx))) { 2147 struct tls_decrypt_arg darg; 2148 int to_decrypt, chunk; 2149 2150 err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, 2151 released, !!(decrypted + copied)); 2152 if (err <= 0) { 2153 if (psock) { 2154 chunk = sk_msg_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len, 2155 flags); 2156 if (chunk > 0) { 2157 decrypted += chunk; 2158 len -= chunk; 2159 continue; 2160 } 2161 } 2162 goto recv_end; 2163 } 2164 2165 memset(&darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs)); 2166 2167 rxm = strp_msg(tls_strp_msg(ctx)); 2168 tlm = tls_msg(tls_strp_msg(ctx)); 2169 2170 to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size; 2171 2172 if (zc_capable && to_decrypt <= len && 2173 tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) 2174 darg.zc = true; 2175 2176 /* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */ 2177 if (tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA && !bpf_strp_enabled) 2178 darg.async = ctx->async_capable; 2179 else 2180 darg.async = false; 2181 2182 err = tls_rx_one_record(sk, msg, &darg); 2183 if (err < 0) 2184 goto recv_end; 2185 2186 async |= darg.async; 2187 2188 /* If the type of records being processed is not known yet, 2189 * set it to record type just dequeued. If it is already known, 2190 * but does not match the record type just dequeued, go to end. 2191 * We always get record type here since for tls1.2, record type 2192 * is known just after record is dequeued from stream parser. 2193 * For tls1.3, we disable async. 2194 */ 2195 err = tls_record_content_type(msg, tls_msg(darg.skb), &control); 2196 if (err <= 0) { 2197 DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(darg.zc); 2198 tls_rx_rec_done(ctx); 2199 put_on_rx_list_err: 2200 __skb_queue_tail(&ctx->rx_list, darg.skb); 2201 goto recv_end; 2202 } 2203 2204 /* periodically flush backlog, and feed strparser */ 2205 released = tls_read_flush_backlog(sk, prot, len, to_decrypt, 2206 decrypted + copied, 2207 &flushed_at); 2208 2209 /* TLS 1.3 may have updated the length by more than overhead */ 2210 rxm = strp_msg(darg.skb); 2211 chunk = rxm->full_len; 2212 tls_rx_rec_done(ctx); 2213 2214 if (!darg.zc) { 2215 bool partially_consumed = chunk > len; 2216 struct sk_buff *skb = darg.skb; 2217 2218 DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(darg.skb == ctx->strp.anchor); 2219 2220 if (async) { 2221 /* TLS 1.2-only, to_decrypt must be text len */ 2222 chunk = min_t(int, to_decrypt, len); 2223 async_copy_bytes += chunk; 2224 put_on_rx_list: 2225 decrypted += chunk; 2226 len -= chunk; 2227 __skb_queue_tail(&ctx->rx_list, skb); 2228 if (unlikely(control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)) 2229 break; 2230 continue; 2231 } 2232 2233 if (bpf_strp_enabled) { 2234 released = true; 2235 err = sk_psock_tls_strp_read(psock, skb); 2236 if (err != __SK_PASS) { 2237 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + rxm->full_len; 2238 rxm->full_len = 0; 2239 if (err == __SK_DROP) 2240 consume_skb(skb); 2241 continue; 2242 } 2243 } 2244 2245 if (partially_consumed) 2246 chunk = len; 2247 2248 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset, 2249 msg, chunk); 2250 if (err < 0) 2251 goto put_on_rx_list_err; 2252 2253 if (is_peek) { 2254 peeked += chunk; 2255 goto put_on_rx_list; 2256 } 2257 2258 if (partially_consumed) { 2259 rxm->offset += chunk; 2260 rxm->full_len -= chunk; 2261 goto put_on_rx_list; 2262 } 2263 2264 consume_skb(skb); 2265 } 2266 2267 decrypted += chunk; 2268 len -= chunk; 2269 2270 /* Return full control message to userspace before trying 2271 * to parse another message type 2272 */ 2273 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR; 2274 if (control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) 2275 break; 2276 } 2277 2278 recv_end: 2279 if (async) { 2280 int ret; 2281 2282 /* Wait for all previously submitted records to be decrypted */ 2283 ret = tls_decrypt_async_wait(ctx); 2284 2285 if (ret) { 2286 if (err >= 0 || err == -EINPROGRESS) 2287 err = ret; 2288 goto end; 2289 } 2290 2291 /* Drain records from the rx_list & copy if required */ 2292 if (is_peek) 2293 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, copied + peeked, 2294 decrypted - peeked, is_peek, NULL); 2295 else 2296 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, 0, 2297 async_copy_bytes, is_peek, NULL); 2298 2299 /* we could have copied less than we wanted, and possibly nothing */ 2300 decrypted += max(err, 0) - async_copy_bytes; 2301 } 2302 2303 copied += decrypted; 2304 2305 end: 2306 tls_rx_reader_unlock(sk, ctx); 2307 if (psock) 2308 sk_psock_put(sk, psock); 2309 return copied ? : err; 2310 } 2311 2312 ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos, 2313 struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, 2314 size_t len, unsigned int flags) 2315 { 2316 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sock->sk); 2317 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2318 struct strp_msg *rxm = NULL; 2319 struct sock *sk = sock->sk; 2320 struct tls_msg *tlm; 2321 struct sk_buff *skb; 2322 ssize_t copied = 0; 2323 int chunk; 2324 int err; 2325 2326 err = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK); 2327 if (err < 0) 2328 return err; 2329 2330 if (!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list)) { 2331 skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list); 2332 } else { 2333 struct tls_decrypt_arg darg; 2334 2335 err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK, 2336 true, false); 2337 if (err <= 0) 2338 goto splice_read_end; 2339 2340 memset(&darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs)); 2341 2342 err = tls_rx_one_record(sk, NULL, &darg); 2343 if (err < 0) 2344 goto splice_read_end; 2345 2346 tls_rx_rec_done(ctx); 2347 skb = darg.skb; 2348 } 2349 2350 rxm = strp_msg(skb); 2351 tlm = tls_msg(skb); 2352 2353 /* splice does not support reading control messages */ 2354 if (tlm->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) { 2355 err = -EINVAL; 2356 goto splice_requeue; 2357 } 2358 2359 chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len); 2360 copied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm->offset, pipe, chunk, flags); 2361 if (copied < 0) 2362 goto splice_requeue; 2363 2364 if (copied < rxm->full_len) { 2365 rxm->offset += copied; 2366 rxm->full_len -= copied; 2367 goto splice_requeue; 2368 } 2369 2370 consume_skb(skb); 2371 2372 splice_read_end: 2373 tls_rx_reader_unlock(sk, ctx); 2374 return copied ? : err; 2375 2376 splice_requeue: 2377 __skb_queue_head(&ctx->rx_list, skb); 2378 goto splice_read_end; 2379 } 2380 2381 int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc, 2382 sk_read_actor_t read_actor) 2383 { 2384 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2385 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2386 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 2387 struct strp_msg *rxm = NULL; 2388 struct sk_buff *skb = NULL; 2389 struct sk_psock *psock; 2390 size_t flushed_at = 0; 2391 bool released = true; 2392 struct tls_msg *tlm; 2393 ssize_t copied = 0; 2394 ssize_t decrypted; 2395 int err, used; 2396 2397 psock = sk_psock_get(sk); 2398 if (psock) { 2399 sk_psock_put(sk, psock); 2400 return -EINVAL; 2401 } 2402 err = tls_rx_reader_acquire(sk, ctx, true); 2403 if (err < 0) 2404 return err; 2405 2406 /* If crypto failed the connection is broken */ 2407 err = ctx->async_wait.err; 2408 if (err) 2409 goto read_sock_end; 2410 2411 decrypted = 0; 2412 while (desc->count) { 2413 if (!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list)) { 2414 skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list); 2415 rxm = strp_msg(skb); 2416 tlm = tls_msg(skb); 2417 } else { 2418 struct tls_decrypt_arg darg; 2419 2420 err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, true, released, !!copied); 2421 if (err <= 0) 2422 goto read_sock_end; 2423 2424 memset(&darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs)); 2425 2426 err = tls_rx_one_record(sk, NULL, &darg); 2427 if (err < 0) 2428 goto read_sock_end; 2429 2430 released = tls_read_flush_backlog(sk, prot, INT_MAX, 2431 0, decrypted, 2432 &flushed_at); 2433 skb = darg.skb; 2434 rxm = strp_msg(skb); 2435 tlm = tls_msg(skb); 2436 decrypted += rxm->full_len; 2437 2438 tls_rx_rec_done(ctx); 2439 } 2440 2441 /* read_sock does not support reading control messages */ 2442 if (tlm->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) { 2443 err = -EINVAL; 2444 goto read_sock_requeue; 2445 } 2446 2447 used = read_actor(desc, skb, rxm->offset, rxm->full_len); 2448 if (used <= 0) { 2449 if (!copied) 2450 err = used; 2451 goto read_sock_requeue; 2452 } 2453 copied += used; 2454 if (used < rxm->full_len) { 2455 rxm->offset += used; 2456 rxm->full_len -= used; 2457 __skb_queue_head(&ctx->rx_list, skb); 2458 } else { 2459 consume_skb(skb); 2460 } 2461 } 2462 2463 read_sock_end: 2464 tls_rx_reader_release(sk, ctx); 2465 return copied ? : err; 2466 2467 read_sock_requeue: 2468 __skb_queue_head(&ctx->rx_list, skb); 2469 goto read_sock_end; 2470 } 2471 2472 bool tls_sw_sock_is_readable(struct sock *sk) 2473 { 2474 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2475 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2476 bool ingress_empty = true; 2477 struct sk_psock *psock; 2478 2479 rcu_read_lock(); 2480 psock = sk_psock(sk); 2481 if (psock) 2482 ingress_empty = list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg); 2483 rcu_read_unlock(); 2484 2485 return !ingress_empty || tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx) || 2486 !skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list); 2487 } 2488 2489 int tls_rx_msg_size(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb) 2490 { 2491 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk); 2492 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 2493 char header[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + TLS_MAX_IV_SIZE]; 2494 size_t cipher_overhead; 2495 size_t data_len = 0; 2496 int ret; 2497 2498 /* Verify that we have a full TLS header, or wait for more data */ 2499 if (strp->stm.offset + prot->prepend_size > skb->len) 2500 return 0; 2501 2502 /* Sanity-check size of on-stack buffer. */ 2503 if (WARN_ON(prot->prepend_size > sizeof(header))) { 2504 ret = -EINVAL; 2505 goto read_failure; 2506 } 2507 2508 /* Linearize header to local buffer */ 2509 ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, strp->stm.offset, header, prot->prepend_size); 2510 if (ret < 0) 2511 goto read_failure; 2512 2513 strp->mark = header[0]; 2514 2515 data_len = ((header[4] & 0xFF) | (header[3] << 8)); 2516 2517 cipher_overhead = prot->tag_size; 2518 if (prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION && 2519 prot->cipher_type != TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) 2520 cipher_overhead += prot->iv_size; 2521 2522 if (data_len > TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE + cipher_overhead + 2523 prot->tail_size) { 2524 ret = -EMSGSIZE; 2525 goto read_failure; 2526 } 2527 if (data_len < cipher_overhead) { 2528 ret = -EBADMSG; 2529 goto read_failure; 2530 } 2531 2532 /* Note that both TLS1.3 and TLS1.2 use TLS_1_2 version here */ 2533 if (header[1] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MINOR || 2534 header[2] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MAJOR) { 2535 ret = -EINVAL; 2536 goto read_failure; 2537 } 2538 2539 tls_device_rx_resync_new_rec(strp->sk, data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE, 2540 TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + strp->stm.offset); 2541 return data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE; 2542 2543 read_failure: 2544 tls_strp_abort_strp(strp, ret); 2545 return ret; 2546 } 2547 2548 /* Fire saved_data_ready() at most once per parsed record. The 2549 * msg_announced bit is cleared by tls_strp_msg_consume() when the 2550 * record is consumed, arming the next announcement. 2551 */ 2552 void tls_rx_msg_maybe_announce(struct tls_strparser *strp) 2553 { 2554 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx; 2555 2556 if (!READ_ONCE(strp->msg_ready) || strp->msg_announced) 2557 return; 2558 strp->msg_announced = 1; 2559 2560 ctx = container_of(strp, struct tls_sw_context_rx, strp); 2561 ctx->saved_data_ready(strp->sk); 2562 } 2563 2564 static void tls_data_ready(struct sock *sk) 2565 { 2566 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2567 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2568 struct sk_psock *psock; 2569 gfp_t alloc_save; 2570 2571 trace_sk_data_ready(sk); 2572 2573 alloc_save = sk->sk_allocation; 2574 sk->sk_allocation = GFP_ATOMIC; 2575 tls_strp_data_ready(&ctx->strp); 2576 sk->sk_allocation = alloc_save; 2577 2578 psock = sk_psock_get(sk); 2579 if (psock) { 2580 if (!list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg)) 2581 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk); 2582 sk_psock_put(sk, psock); 2583 } 2584 } 2585 2586 void tls_sw_cancel_work_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2587 { 2588 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 2589 2590 set_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask); 2591 set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask); 2592 disable_delayed_work_sync(&ctx->tx_work.work); 2593 } 2594 2595 void tls_sw_release_resources_tx(struct sock *sk) 2596 { 2597 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2598 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 2599 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp; 2600 2601 /* Wait for any pending async encryptions to complete */ 2602 tls_encrypt_async_wait(ctx); 2603 2604 tls_tx_records(sk, -1); 2605 2606 /* Free up un-sent records in tx_list. First, free 2607 * the partially sent record if any at head of tx_list. 2608 */ 2609 if (tls_ctx->partially_sent_record) { 2610 tls_free_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx); 2611 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list, 2612 struct tls_rec, list); 2613 list_del(&rec->list); 2614 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext); 2615 kfree(rec); 2616 } 2617 2618 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) { 2619 list_del(&rec->list); 2620 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted); 2621 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext); 2622 kfree(rec); 2623 } 2624 2625 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_send); 2626 tls_free_open_rec(sk); 2627 } 2628 2629 void tls_sw_free_ctx_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2630 { 2631 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 2632 2633 kfree(ctx); 2634 } 2635 2636 void tls_sw_release_resources_rx(struct sock *sk) 2637 { 2638 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2639 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2640 2641 if (ctx->aead_recv) { 2642 __skb_queue_purge(&ctx->rx_list); 2643 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_recv); 2644 tls_strp_stop(&ctx->strp); 2645 /* If tls_sw_strparser_arm() was not called (cleanup paths) 2646 * we still want to tls_strp_stop(), but sk->sk_data_ready was 2647 * never swapped. 2648 */ 2649 if (ctx->saved_data_ready) { 2650 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); 2651 sk->sk_data_ready = ctx->saved_data_ready; 2652 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); 2653 } 2654 } 2655 } 2656 2657 void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2658 { 2659 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2660 2661 tls_strp_done(&ctx->strp); 2662 } 2663 2664 void tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2665 { 2666 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2667 2668 kfree(ctx); 2669 } 2670 2671 void tls_sw_free_resources_rx(struct sock *sk) 2672 { 2673 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2674 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx; 2675 2676 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2677 2678 tls_sw_release_resources_rx(sk); 2679 __tls_strp_done(&ctx->strp); 2680 tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2681 } 2682 2683 /* The work handler to transmitt the encrypted records in tx_list */ 2684 static void tx_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) 2685 { 2686 struct delayed_work *delayed_work = to_delayed_work(work); 2687 struct tx_work *tx_work = container_of(delayed_work, 2688 struct tx_work, work); 2689 struct sock *sk = tx_work->sk; 2690 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2691 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx; 2692 2693 if (unlikely(!tls_ctx)) 2694 return; 2695 2696 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 2697 if (test_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) 2698 return; 2699 2700 if (!test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) 2701 return; 2702 2703 if (mutex_trylock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock)) { 2704 lock_sock(sk); 2705 tls_tx_records(sk, -1); 2706 release_sock(sk); 2707 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock); 2708 } else if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) { 2709 /* Someone is holding the tx_lock, they will likely run Tx 2710 * and cancel the work on their way out of the lock section. 2711 * Schedule a long delay just in case. 2712 */ 2713 schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, msecs_to_jiffies(10)); 2714 } 2715 } 2716 2717 static bool tls_is_tx_ready(struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx) 2718 { 2719 struct tls_rec *rec; 2720 2721 rec = list_first_entry_or_null(&ctx->tx_list, struct tls_rec, list); 2722 if (!rec) 2723 return false; 2724 2725 return READ_ONCE(rec->tx_ready); 2726 } 2727 2728 void tls_sw_write_space(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx) 2729 { 2730 struct tls_sw_context_tx *tx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx); 2731 2732 /* Schedule the transmission if tx list is ready */ 2733 if (tls_is_tx_ready(tx_ctx) && 2734 !test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &tx_ctx->tx_bitmask)) 2735 schedule_delayed_work(&tx_ctx->tx_work.work, 0); 2736 } 2737 2738 void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2739 { 2740 struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2741 2742 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); 2743 rx_ctx->saved_data_ready = sk->sk_data_ready; 2744 sk->sk_data_ready = tls_data_ready; 2745 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); 2746 } 2747 2748 void tls_update_rx_zc_capable(struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2749 { 2750 struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2751 2752 rx_ctx->zc_capable = tls_ctx->rx_no_pad || 2753 tls_ctx->prot_info.version != TLS_1_3_VERSION; 2754 } 2755 2756 static struct tls_sw_context_tx *init_ctx_tx(struct tls_context *ctx, struct sock *sk) 2757 { 2758 struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx_tx; 2759 2760 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_tx) { 2761 sw_ctx_tx = kzalloc_obj(*sw_ctx_tx); 2762 if (!sw_ctx_tx) 2763 return NULL; 2764 } else { 2765 sw_ctx_tx = ctx->priv_ctx_tx; 2766 } 2767 2768 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_tx->async_wait); 2769 atomic_set(&sw_ctx_tx->encrypt_pending, 1); 2770 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_list); 2771 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.work, tx_work_handler); 2772 sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.sk = sk; 2773 2774 return sw_ctx_tx; 2775 } 2776 2777 static struct tls_sw_context_rx *init_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *ctx) 2778 { 2779 struct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx_rx; 2780 2781 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_rx) { 2782 sw_ctx_rx = kzalloc_obj(*sw_ctx_rx); 2783 if (!sw_ctx_rx) 2784 return NULL; 2785 } else { 2786 sw_ctx_rx = ctx->priv_ctx_rx; 2787 } 2788 2789 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_rx->async_wait); 2790 atomic_set(&sw_ctx_rx->decrypt_pending, 1); 2791 init_waitqueue_head(&sw_ctx_rx->wq); 2792 skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->rx_list); 2793 skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->async_hold); 2794 2795 return sw_ctx_rx; 2796 } 2797 2798 int init_prot_info(struct tls_prot_info *prot, 2799 const struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info, 2800 const struct tls_cipher_desc *cipher_desc) 2801 { 2802 u16 nonce_size = cipher_desc->nonce; 2803 2804 if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) { 2805 nonce_size = 0; 2806 prot->aad_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE; 2807 prot->tail_size = 1; 2808 } else { 2809 prot->aad_size = TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE; 2810 prot->tail_size = 0; 2811 } 2812 2813 /* Sanity-check the sizes for stack allocations. */ 2814 if (nonce_size > TLS_MAX_IV_SIZE || prot->aad_size > TLS_MAX_AAD_SIZE) 2815 return -EINVAL; 2816 2817 prot->version = crypto_info->version; 2818 prot->cipher_type = crypto_info->cipher_type; 2819 prot->prepend_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + nonce_size; 2820 prot->tag_size = cipher_desc->tag; 2821 prot->overhead_size = prot->prepend_size + prot->tag_size + prot->tail_size; 2822 prot->iv_size = cipher_desc->iv; 2823 prot->salt_size = cipher_desc->salt; 2824 prot->rec_seq_size = cipher_desc->rec_seq; 2825 2826 return 0; 2827 } 2828 2829 static void tls_finish_key_update(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2830 { 2831 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_ctx->priv_ctx_rx; 2832 2833 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->key_update_pending, false); 2834 /* wake-up pre-existing poll() */ 2835 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk); 2836 } 2837 2838 int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx, 2839 struct tls_crypto_info *new_crypto_info) 2840 { 2841 struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info, *src_crypto_info; 2842 struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx_tx = NULL; 2843 struct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx_rx = NULL; 2844 const struct tls_cipher_desc *cipher_desc; 2845 char *iv, *rec_seq, *key, *salt; 2846 struct cipher_context *cctx; 2847 struct tls_prot_info *prot; 2848 struct crypto_aead **aead; 2849 struct tls_context *ctx; 2850 struct crypto_tfm *tfm; 2851 int rc = 0; 2852 2853 ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2854 prot = &ctx->prot_info; 2855 2856 /* new_crypto_info != NULL means rekey */ 2857 if (!new_crypto_info) { 2858 if (tx) { 2859 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = init_ctx_tx(ctx, sk); 2860 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_tx) 2861 return -ENOMEM; 2862 } else { 2863 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = init_ctx_rx(ctx); 2864 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_rx) 2865 return -ENOMEM; 2866 } 2867 } 2868 2869 if (tx) { 2870 sw_ctx_tx = ctx->priv_ctx_tx; 2871 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info; 2872 cctx = &ctx->tx; 2873 aead = &sw_ctx_tx->aead_send; 2874 } else { 2875 sw_ctx_rx = ctx->priv_ctx_rx; 2876 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_recv.info; 2877 cctx = &ctx->rx; 2878 aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv; 2879 } 2880 2881 src_crypto_info = new_crypto_info ?: crypto_info; 2882 2883 cipher_desc = get_cipher_desc(src_crypto_info->cipher_type); 2884 if (!cipher_desc) { 2885 rc = -EINVAL; 2886 goto free_priv; 2887 } 2888 2889 rc = init_prot_info(prot, src_crypto_info, cipher_desc); 2890 if (rc) 2891 goto free_priv; 2892 2893 iv = crypto_info_iv(src_crypto_info, cipher_desc); 2894 key = crypto_info_key(src_crypto_info, cipher_desc); 2895 salt = crypto_info_salt(src_crypto_info, cipher_desc); 2896 rec_seq = crypto_info_rec_seq(src_crypto_info, cipher_desc); 2897 2898 if (!*aead) { 2899 *aead = crypto_alloc_aead(cipher_desc->cipher_name, 0, 0); 2900 if (IS_ERR(*aead)) { 2901 rc = PTR_ERR(*aead); 2902 *aead = NULL; 2903 goto free_priv; 2904 } 2905 } 2906 2907 ctx->push_pending_record = tls_sw_push_pending_record; 2908 2909 /* setkey is the last operation that could fail during a 2910 * rekey. if it succeeds, we can start modifying the 2911 * context. 2912 */ 2913 rc = crypto_aead_setkey(*aead, key, cipher_desc->key); 2914 if (rc) { 2915 if (new_crypto_info) 2916 goto out; 2917 else 2918 goto free_aead; 2919 } 2920 2921 if (!new_crypto_info) { 2922 rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(*aead, prot->tag_size); 2923 if (rc) 2924 goto free_aead; 2925 } 2926 2927 if (!tx && !new_crypto_info) { 2928 tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv); 2929 2930 tls_update_rx_zc_capable(ctx); 2931 sw_ctx_rx->async_capable = 2932 src_crypto_info->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION && 2933 !!(tfm->__crt_alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); 2934 2935 rc = tls_strp_init(&sw_ctx_rx->strp, sk); 2936 if (rc) 2937 goto free_aead; 2938 } 2939 2940 memcpy(cctx->iv, salt, cipher_desc->salt); 2941 memcpy(cctx->iv + cipher_desc->salt, iv, cipher_desc->iv); 2942 memcpy(cctx->rec_seq, rec_seq, cipher_desc->rec_seq); 2943 2944 if (new_crypto_info) { 2945 unsafe_memcpy(crypto_info, new_crypto_info, 2946 cipher_desc->crypto_info, 2947 /* size was checked in do_tls_setsockopt_conf */); 2948 memzero_explicit(new_crypto_info, cipher_desc->crypto_info); 2949 if (!tx) 2950 tls_finish_key_update(sk, ctx); 2951 } 2952 2953 goto out; 2954 2955 free_aead: 2956 crypto_free_aead(*aead); 2957 *aead = NULL; 2958 free_priv: 2959 if (!new_crypto_info) { 2960 if (tx) { 2961 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_tx); 2962 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = NULL; 2963 } else { 2964 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_rx); 2965 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = NULL; 2966 } 2967 } 2968 out: 2969 return rc; 2970 } 2971