1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* 3 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc. 4 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> 5 * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH 6 * Copyright (C) 2020-2021 Intel Corporation 7 */ 8 9 #include <linux/netdevice.h> 10 #include <linux/types.h> 11 #include <linux/skbuff.h> 12 #include <linux/compiler.h> 13 #include <linux/ieee80211.h> 14 #include <linux/gfp.h> 15 #include <asm/unaligned.h> 16 #include <net/mac80211.h> 17 #include <crypto/aes.h> 18 #include <crypto/algapi.h> 19 20 #include "ieee80211_i.h" 21 #include "michael.h" 22 #include "tkip.h" 23 #include "aes_ccm.h" 24 #include "aes_cmac.h" 25 #include "aes_gmac.h" 26 #include "aes_gcm.h" 27 #include "wpa.h" 28 29 ieee80211_tx_result 30 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) 31 { 32 u8 *data, *key, *mic; 33 size_t data_len; 34 unsigned int hdrlen; 35 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; 36 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; 37 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); 38 int tail; 39 40 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; 41 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP || 42 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control)) 43 return TX_CONTINUE; 44 45 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); 46 if (skb->len < hdrlen) 47 return TX_DROP; 48 49 data = skb->data + hdrlen; 50 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen; 51 52 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) { 53 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */ 54 info->control.hw_key = NULL; 55 } 56 57 if (info->control.hw_key && 58 (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG || 59 ieee80211_hw_check(&tx->local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_FRAG)) && 60 !(tx->key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | 61 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE))) { 62 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC or MIC space */ 63 return TX_CONTINUE; 64 } 65 66 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; 67 if (!info->control.hw_key) 68 tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN; 69 70 if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || 71 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, 72 "mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n", 73 skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, 74 skb_tailroom(skb), tail)) 75 return TX_DROP; 76 77 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); 78 79 if (tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) { 80 /* Zeroed MIC can help with debug */ 81 memset(mic, 0, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); 82 return TX_CONTINUE; 83 } 84 85 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY]; 86 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic); 87 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) 88 mic[0]++; 89 90 return TX_CONTINUE; 91 } 92 93 94 ieee80211_rx_result 95 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 96 { 97 u8 *data, *key = NULL; 98 size_t data_len; 99 unsigned int hdrlen; 100 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN]; 101 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; 102 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); 103 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; 104 105 /* 106 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other 107 * than data frames. 108 */ 109 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control)) 110 return RX_CONTINUE; 111 112 /* 113 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or 114 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely 115 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a 116 * MIC failure report. 117 */ 118 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) { 119 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR) 120 goto mic_fail_no_key; 121 122 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key && 123 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) 124 goto update_iv; 125 126 return RX_CONTINUE; 127 } 128 129 /* 130 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even 131 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no 132 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures. 133 */ 134 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP || 135 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) 136 return RX_CONTINUE; 137 138 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) { 139 /* 140 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC 141 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for 142 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast 143 * frames in the BSS. 144 */ 145 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 146 } 147 148 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR) 149 goto mic_fail; 150 151 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); 152 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) 153 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 154 155 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) 156 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 157 hdr = (void *)skb->data; 158 159 data = skb->data + hdrlen; 160 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; 161 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY]; 162 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic); 163 if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)) 164 goto mic_fail; 165 166 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */ 167 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); 168 169 update_iv: 170 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */ 171 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32; 172 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16; 173 174 return RX_CONTINUE; 175 176 mic_fail: 177 rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++; 178 179 mic_fail_no_key: 180 /* 181 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in 182 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if 183 * the key is set. 184 */ 185 cfg80211_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata->dev, hdr->addr2, 186 is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) ? 187 NL80211_KEYTYPE_GROUP : 188 NL80211_KEYTYPE_PAIRWISE, 189 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1, 190 NULL, GFP_ATOMIC); 191 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 192 } 193 194 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) 195 { 196 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; 197 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; 198 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); 199 unsigned int hdrlen; 200 int len, tail; 201 u64 pn; 202 u8 *pos; 203 204 if (info->control.hw_key && 205 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && 206 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) { 207 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */ 208 return 0; 209 } 210 211 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); 212 len = skb->len - hdrlen; 213 214 if (info->control.hw_key) 215 tail = 0; 216 else 217 tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN; 218 219 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || 220 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN)) 221 return -1; 222 223 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN); 224 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen); 225 pos += hdrlen; 226 227 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ 228 if (info->control.hw_key && 229 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) 230 return 0; 231 232 /* Increase IV for the frame */ 233 pn = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); 234 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, &key->conf, pn); 235 236 /* hwaccel - with software IV */ 237 if (info->control.hw_key) 238 return 0; 239 240 /* Add room for ICV */ 241 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN); 242 243 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(&tx->local->wep_tx_ctx, 244 key, skb, pos, len); 245 } 246 247 248 ieee80211_tx_result 249 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) 250 { 251 struct sk_buff *skb; 252 253 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); 254 255 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { 256 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) 257 return TX_DROP; 258 } 259 260 return TX_CONTINUE; 261 } 262 263 264 ieee80211_rx_result 265 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 266 { 267 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data; 268 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0; 269 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; 270 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; 271 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); 272 273 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); 274 275 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control)) 276 return RX_CONTINUE; 277 278 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12) 279 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 280 281 /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */ 282 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) 283 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 284 hdr = (void *)skb->data; 285 286 /* 287 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption. 288 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well, 289 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt() 290 */ 291 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) 292 hwaccel = 1; 293 294 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(&rx->local->wep_rx_ctx, 295 key, skb->data + hdrlen, 296 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr, 297 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx, 298 &rx->tkip.iv32, 299 &rx->tkip.iv16); 300 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK) 301 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 302 303 /* Trim ICV */ 304 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED)) 305 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN); 306 307 /* Remove IV */ 308 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); 309 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN); 310 311 return RX_CONTINUE; 312 } 313 314 315 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad) 316 { 317 __le16 mask_fc; 318 int a4_included, mgmt; 319 u8 qos_tid; 320 u16 len_a; 321 unsigned int hdrlen; 322 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; 323 324 /* 325 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt) 326 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected 327 */ 328 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control); 329 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; 330 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | 331 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); 332 if (!mgmt) 333 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070); 334 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED); 335 336 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); 337 len_a = hdrlen - 2; 338 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control); 339 340 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) 341 qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); 342 else 343 qos_tid = 0; 344 345 /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC 346 * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived 347 * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the 348 * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take 349 * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting 350 * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. 351 */ 352 b_0[0] = 0x1; 353 354 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN 355 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7) 356 */ 357 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4); 358 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); 359 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); 360 361 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header 362 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */ 363 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]); 364 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]); 365 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN); 366 367 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */ 368 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f; 369 aad[23] = 0; 370 371 if (a4_included) { 372 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN); 373 aad[30] = qos_tid; 374 aad[31] = 0; 375 } else { 376 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN); 377 aad[24] = qos_tid; 378 } 379 } 380 381 382 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id) 383 { 384 hdr[0] = pn[5]; 385 hdr[1] = pn[4]; 386 hdr[2] = 0; 387 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6); 388 hdr[4] = pn[3]; 389 hdr[5] = pn[2]; 390 hdr[6] = pn[1]; 391 hdr[7] = pn[0]; 392 } 393 394 395 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr) 396 { 397 pn[0] = hdr[7]; 398 pn[1] = hdr[6]; 399 pn[2] = hdr[5]; 400 pn[3] = hdr[4]; 401 pn[4] = hdr[1]; 402 pn[5] = hdr[0]; 403 } 404 405 406 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb, 407 unsigned int mic_len) 408 { 409 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; 410 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; 411 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); 412 int hdrlen, len, tail; 413 u8 *pos; 414 u8 pn[6]; 415 u64 pn64; 416 u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN]; 417 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; 418 419 if (info->control.hw_key && 420 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && 421 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && 422 !((info->control.hw_key->flags & 423 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) && 424 ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) { 425 /* 426 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP 427 * header or MIC fields 428 */ 429 return 0; 430 } 431 432 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); 433 len = skb->len - hdrlen; 434 435 if (info->control.hw_key) 436 tail = 0; 437 else 438 tail = mic_len; 439 440 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || 441 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN)) 442 return -1; 443 444 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN); 445 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen); 446 447 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ 448 if (info->control.hw_key && 449 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) 450 return 0; 451 452 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos; 453 pos += hdrlen; 454 455 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); 456 457 pn[5] = pn64; 458 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8; 459 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16; 460 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24; 461 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32; 462 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40; 463 464 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx); 465 466 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */ 467 if (info->control.hw_key) 468 return 0; 469 470 pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; 471 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); 472 return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len, 473 skb_put(skb, mic_len)); 474 } 475 476 477 ieee80211_tx_result 478 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, 479 unsigned int mic_len) 480 { 481 struct sk_buff *skb; 482 483 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); 484 485 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { 486 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0) 487 return TX_DROP; 488 } 489 490 return TX_CONTINUE; 491 } 492 493 494 ieee80211_rx_result 495 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, 496 unsigned int mic_len) 497 { 498 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; 499 int hdrlen; 500 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; 501 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; 502 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); 503 u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN]; 504 int data_len; 505 int queue; 506 507 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); 508 509 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) && 510 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb)) 511 return RX_CONTINUE; 512 513 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { 514 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN)) 515 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 516 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED) 517 mic_len = 0; 518 } else { 519 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) 520 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 521 } 522 523 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len; 524 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) 525 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 526 527 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) { 528 int res; 529 530 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); 531 532 queue = rx->security_idx; 533 534 res = memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], 535 IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); 536 if (res < 0 || 537 (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) { 538 key->u.ccmp.replays++; 539 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 540 } 541 542 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { 543 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; 544 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; 545 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ 546 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); 547 548 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt( 549 key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, 550 skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, 551 data_len, 552 skb->data + skb->len - mic_len)) 553 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 554 } 555 556 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); 557 if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) 558 memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); 559 } 560 561 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */ 562 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len)) 563 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 564 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); 565 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN); 566 567 return RX_CONTINUE; 568 } 569 570 static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad) 571 { 572 __le16 mask_fc; 573 u8 qos_tid; 574 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; 575 576 memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); 577 memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); 578 j_0[13] = 0; 579 j_0[14] = 0; 580 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01; 581 582 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header 583 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] 584 */ 585 put_unaligned_be16(ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control) - 2, &aad[0]); 586 /* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt) 587 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected 588 */ 589 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; 590 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | 591 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); 592 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) 593 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070); 594 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED); 595 596 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]); 597 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN); 598 599 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */ 600 aad[22] = *((u8 *)&hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f; 601 aad[23] = 0; 602 603 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) 604 qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); 605 else 606 qos_tid = 0; 607 608 if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control)) { 609 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN); 610 aad[30] = qos_tid; 611 aad[31] = 0; 612 } else { 613 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN); 614 aad[24] = qos_tid; 615 } 616 } 617 618 static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id) 619 { 620 hdr[0] = pn[5]; 621 hdr[1] = pn[4]; 622 hdr[2] = 0; 623 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6); 624 hdr[4] = pn[3]; 625 hdr[5] = pn[2]; 626 hdr[6] = pn[1]; 627 hdr[7] = pn[0]; 628 } 629 630 static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr) 631 { 632 pn[0] = hdr[7]; 633 pn[1] = hdr[6]; 634 pn[2] = hdr[5]; 635 pn[3] = hdr[4]; 636 pn[4] = hdr[1]; 637 pn[5] = hdr[0]; 638 } 639 640 static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) 641 { 642 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; 643 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; 644 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); 645 int hdrlen, len, tail; 646 u8 *pos; 647 u8 pn[6]; 648 u64 pn64; 649 u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN]; 650 u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; 651 652 if (info->control.hw_key && 653 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && 654 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && 655 !((info->control.hw_key->flags & 656 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) && 657 ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) { 658 /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP 659 * header or MIC fields 660 */ 661 return 0; 662 } 663 664 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); 665 len = skb->len - hdrlen; 666 667 if (info->control.hw_key) 668 tail = 0; 669 else 670 tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN; 671 672 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || 673 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN)) 674 return -1; 675 676 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); 677 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen); 678 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + 679 IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); 680 681 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ 682 if (info->control.hw_key && 683 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) 684 return 0; 685 686 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)pos; 687 pos += hdrlen; 688 689 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); 690 691 pn[5] = pn64; 692 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8; 693 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16; 694 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24; 695 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32; 696 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40; 697 698 gcmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx); 699 700 /* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */ 701 if (info->control.hw_key) 702 return 0; 703 704 pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN; 705 gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad); 706 return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len, 707 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)); 708 } 709 710 ieee80211_tx_result 711 ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) 712 { 713 struct sk_buff *skb; 714 715 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); 716 717 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { 718 if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) 719 return TX_DROP; 720 } 721 722 return TX_CONTINUE; 723 } 724 725 ieee80211_rx_result 726 ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 727 { 728 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; 729 int hdrlen; 730 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; 731 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; 732 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); 733 u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN]; 734 int data_len, queue, mic_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN; 735 736 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); 737 738 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) && 739 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb)) 740 return RX_CONTINUE; 741 742 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { 743 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN)) 744 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 745 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED) 746 mic_len = 0; 747 } else { 748 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) 749 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 750 } 751 752 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len; 753 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) 754 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 755 756 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) { 757 int res; 758 759 gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); 760 761 queue = rx->security_idx; 762 763 res = memcmp(pn, key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], 764 IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); 765 if (res < 0 || 766 (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) { 767 key->u.gcmp.replays++; 768 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 769 } 770 771 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { 772 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; 773 u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; 774 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ 775 gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad); 776 777 if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt( 778 key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, 779 skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, 780 data_len, 781 skb->data + skb->len - 782 IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)) 783 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 784 } 785 786 memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); 787 if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) 788 memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); 789 } 790 791 /* Remove GCMP header and MIC */ 792 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len)) 793 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 794 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); 795 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); 796 797 return RX_CONTINUE; 798 } 799 800 static ieee80211_tx_result 801 ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, 802 struct sk_buff *skb) 803 { 804 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; 805 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; 806 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); 807 int hdrlen; 808 u8 *pos, iv_len = key->conf.iv_len; 809 810 if (info->control.hw_key && 811 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) { 812 /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */ 813 return TX_CONTINUE; 814 } 815 816 if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < iv_len && 817 pskb_expand_head(skb, iv_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC))) 818 return TX_DROP; 819 820 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); 821 822 pos = skb_push(skb, iv_len); 823 memmove(pos, pos + iv_len, hdrlen); 824 825 return TX_CONTINUE; 826 } 827 828 static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len) 829 { 830 int i; 831 832 /* pn is little endian */ 833 for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 834 if (pn1[i] < pn2[i]) 835 return -1; 836 else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i]) 837 return 1; 838 } 839 840 return 0; 841 } 842 843 static ieee80211_rx_result 844 ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 845 { 846 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; 847 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; 848 const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL; 849 int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); 850 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb); 851 int data_len; 852 u8 *rx_pn; 853 u8 *skb_pn; 854 u8 qos_tid; 855 856 if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme || 857 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) 858 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 859 860 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control)) 861 return RX_CONTINUE; 862 863 cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme; 864 865 data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len; 866 867 if (data_len < 0) 868 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 869 870 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) 871 qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); 872 else 873 qos_tid = 0; 874 875 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) 876 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 877 878 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; 879 880 rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid]; 881 skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off; 882 883 if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0) 884 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 885 886 memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len); 887 888 /* remove security header and MIC */ 889 if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len)) 890 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 891 892 memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen); 893 skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len); 894 895 return RX_CONTINUE; 896 } 897 898 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad) 899 { 900 __le16 mask_fc; 901 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; 902 903 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */ 904 905 /* FC type/subtype */ 906 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */ 907 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; 908 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | 909 IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); 910 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]); 911 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */ 912 memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN); 913 } 914 915 916 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn) 917 { 918 *d++ = pn; 919 *d++ = pn >> 8; 920 *d++ = pn >> 16; 921 *d++ = pn >> 24; 922 *d++ = pn >> 32; 923 *d = pn >> 40; 924 } 925 926 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s) 927 { 928 *d++ = s[5]; 929 *d++ = s[4]; 930 *d++ = s[3]; 931 *d++ = s[2]; 932 *d++ = s[1]; 933 *d = s[0]; 934 } 935 936 937 ieee80211_tx_result 938 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) 939 { 940 struct sk_buff *skb; 941 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; 942 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; 943 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie; 944 u8 aad[20]; 945 u64 pn64; 946 947 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) 948 return TX_DROP; 949 950 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs); 951 952 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); 953 954 if (info->control.hw_key && 955 !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIE)) 956 return TX_CONTINUE; 957 958 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) 959 return TX_DROP; 960 961 mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie)); 962 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; 963 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; 964 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); 965 966 /* PN = PN + 1 */ 967 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); 968 969 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64); 970 971 if (info->control.hw_key) 972 return TX_CONTINUE; 973 974 bip_aad(skb, aad); 975 976 /* 977 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64) 978 */ 979 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, 980 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic); 981 982 return TX_CONTINUE; 983 } 984 985 ieee80211_tx_result 986 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) 987 { 988 struct sk_buff *skb; 989 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; 990 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; 991 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; 992 u8 aad[20]; 993 u64 pn64; 994 995 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) 996 return TX_DROP; 997 998 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs); 999 1000 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); 1001 1002 if (info->control.hw_key) 1003 return TX_CONTINUE; 1004 1005 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) 1006 return TX_DROP; 1007 1008 mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie)); 1009 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; 1010 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; 1011 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); 1012 1013 /* PN = PN + 1 */ 1014 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); 1015 1016 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64); 1017 1018 bip_aad(skb, aad); 1019 1020 /* MIC = AES-256-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) 1021 */ 1022 ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, 1023 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic); 1024 1025 return TX_CONTINUE; 1026 } 1027 1028 ieee80211_rx_result 1029 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 1030 { 1031 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; 1032 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); 1033 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; 1034 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie; 1035 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6]; 1036 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; 1037 1038 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) 1039 return RX_CONTINUE; 1040 1041 /* management frames are already linear */ 1042 1043 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) 1044 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 1045 1046 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) 1047 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); 1048 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || 1049 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) 1050 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */ 1051 1052 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number); 1053 1054 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) { 1055 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++; 1056 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 1057 } 1058 1059 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { 1060 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ 1061 bip_aad(skb, aad); 1062 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, 1063 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic); 1064 if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) { 1065 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; 1066 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 1067 } 1068 } 1069 1070 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); 1071 1072 /* Remove MMIE */ 1073 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); 1074 1075 return RX_CONTINUE; 1076 } 1077 1078 ieee80211_rx_result 1079 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 1080 { 1081 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; 1082 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); 1083 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; 1084 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; 1085 u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6]; 1086 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; 1087 1088 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) 1089 return RX_CONTINUE; 1090 1091 /* management frames are already linear */ 1092 1093 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) 1094 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 1095 1096 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *) 1097 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); 1098 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || 1099 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) 1100 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */ 1101 1102 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number); 1103 1104 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) { 1105 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++; 1106 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 1107 } 1108 1109 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { 1110 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ 1111 bip_aad(skb, aad); 1112 ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, 1113 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic); 1114 if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) { 1115 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; 1116 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 1117 } 1118 } 1119 1120 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); 1121 1122 /* Remove MMIE */ 1123 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); 1124 1125 return RX_CONTINUE; 1126 } 1127 1128 ieee80211_tx_result 1129 ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) 1130 { 1131 struct sk_buff *skb; 1132 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; 1133 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; 1134 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; 1135 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; 1136 u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN]; 1137 u64 pn64; 1138 u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN]; 1139 1140 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) 1141 return TX_DROP; 1142 1143 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs); 1144 1145 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); 1146 1147 if (info->control.hw_key) 1148 return TX_CONTINUE; 1149 1150 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) 1151 return TX_DROP; 1152 1153 mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie)); 1154 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; 1155 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; 1156 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); 1157 1158 /* PN = PN + 1 */ 1159 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); 1160 1161 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64); 1162 1163 bip_aad(skb, aad); 1164 1165 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; 1166 memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); 1167 bip_ipn_swap(nonce + ETH_ALEN, mmie->sequence_number); 1168 1169 /* MIC = AES-GMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) */ 1170 if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce, 1171 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic) < 0) 1172 return TX_DROP; 1173 1174 return TX_CONTINUE; 1175 } 1176 1177 ieee80211_rx_result 1178 ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 1179 { 1180 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; 1181 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); 1182 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; 1183 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; 1184 u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], *mic, ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN]; 1185 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; 1186 1187 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) 1188 return RX_CONTINUE; 1189 1190 /* management frames are already linear */ 1191 1192 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) 1193 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 1194 1195 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *) 1196 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); 1197 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || 1198 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) 1199 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */ 1200 1201 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number); 1202 1203 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) { 1204 key->u.aes_gmac.replays++; 1205 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 1206 } 1207 1208 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { 1209 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ 1210 bip_aad(skb, aad); 1211 1212 memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); 1213 memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6); 1214 1215 mic = kmalloc(GMAC_MIC_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); 1216 if (!mic) 1217 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 1218 if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce, 1219 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, 1220 mic) < 0 || 1221 crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) { 1222 key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++; 1223 kfree(mic); 1224 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 1225 } 1226 kfree(mic); 1227 } 1228 1229 memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); 1230 1231 /* Remove MMIE */ 1232 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); 1233 1234 return RX_CONTINUE; 1235 } 1236 1237 ieee80211_tx_result 1238 ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) 1239 { 1240 struct sk_buff *skb; 1241 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL; 1242 ieee80211_tx_result res; 1243 1244 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { 1245 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); 1246 1247 /* handle hw-only algorithm */ 1248 if (!info->control.hw_key) 1249 return TX_DROP; 1250 1251 if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME) { 1252 res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb); 1253 if (res != TX_CONTINUE) 1254 return res; 1255 } 1256 } 1257 1258 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); 1259 1260 return TX_CONTINUE; 1261 } 1262 1263 ieee80211_rx_result 1264 ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) 1265 { 1266 if (rx->sta && rx->sta->cipher_scheme) 1267 return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx); 1268 1269 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 1270 } 1271