1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 2 /* 3 * KFENCE guarded object allocator and fault handling. 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC. 6 */ 7 8 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "kfence: " fmt 9 10 #include <linux/atomic.h> 11 #include <linux/bug.h> 12 #include <linux/debugfs.h> 13 #include <linux/hash.h> 14 #include <linux/irq_work.h> 15 #include <linux/jhash.h> 16 #include <linux/kcsan-checks.h> 17 #include <linux/kfence.h> 18 #include <linux/kmemleak.h> 19 #include <linux/list.h> 20 #include <linux/lockdep.h> 21 #include <linux/log2.h> 22 #include <linux/memblock.h> 23 #include <linux/moduleparam.h> 24 #include <linux/nodemask.h> 25 #include <linux/notifier.h> 26 #include <linux/panic_notifier.h> 27 #include <linux/random.h> 28 #include <linux/rcupdate.h> 29 #include <linux/reboot.h> 30 #include <linux/sched/clock.h> 31 #include <linux/seq_file.h> 32 #include <linux/slab.h> 33 #include <linux/spinlock.h> 34 #include <linux/string.h> 35 36 #include <asm/kfence.h> 37 38 #include "kfence.h" 39 40 /* Disables KFENCE on the first warning assuming an irrecoverable error. */ 41 #define KFENCE_WARN_ON(cond) \ 42 ({ \ 43 const bool __cond = WARN_ON(cond); \ 44 if (unlikely(__cond)) { \ 45 WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false); \ 46 disabled_by_warn = true; \ 47 } \ 48 __cond; \ 49 }) 50 51 /* === Data ================================================================= */ 52 53 static bool kfence_enabled __read_mostly; 54 static bool disabled_by_warn __read_mostly; 55 56 unsigned long kfence_sample_interval __read_mostly = CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL; 57 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kfence_sample_interval); /* Export for test modules. */ 58 59 #ifdef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX 60 #undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX 61 #endif 62 #define MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX "kfence." 63 64 static int kfence_enable_late(void); 65 static int param_set_sample_interval(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 66 { 67 unsigned long num; 68 int ret = kstrtoul(val, 0, &num); 69 70 if (ret < 0) 71 return ret; 72 73 /* Using 0 to indicate KFENCE is disabled. */ 74 if (!num && READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) { 75 pr_info("disabled\n"); 76 WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false); 77 } 78 79 *((unsigned long *)kp->arg) = num; 80 81 if (num && !READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled) && system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING) 82 return disabled_by_warn ? -EINVAL : kfence_enable_late(); 83 return 0; 84 } 85 86 static int param_get_sample_interval(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 87 { 88 if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) 89 return sprintf(buffer, "0\n"); 90 91 return param_get_ulong(buffer, kp); 92 } 93 94 static const struct kernel_param_ops sample_interval_param_ops = { 95 .set = param_set_sample_interval, 96 .get = param_get_sample_interval, 97 }; 98 module_param_cb(sample_interval, &sample_interval_param_ops, &kfence_sample_interval, 0600); 99 100 /* Pool usage% threshold when currently covered allocations are skipped. */ 101 static unsigned long kfence_skip_covered_thresh __read_mostly = 75; 102 module_param_named(skip_covered_thresh, kfence_skip_covered_thresh, ulong, 0644); 103 104 /* Allocation burst count: number of excess KFENCE allocations per sample. */ 105 static unsigned int kfence_burst __read_mostly; 106 module_param_named(burst, kfence_burst, uint, 0644); 107 108 /* If true, use a deferrable timer. */ 109 static bool kfence_deferrable __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_DEFERRABLE); 110 module_param_named(deferrable, kfence_deferrable, bool, 0444); 111 112 /* If true, check all canary bytes on panic. */ 113 static bool kfence_check_on_panic __read_mostly; 114 module_param_named(check_on_panic, kfence_check_on_panic, bool, 0444); 115 116 /* The pool of pages used for guard pages and objects. */ 117 char *__kfence_pool __read_mostly; 118 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kfence_pool); /* Export for test modules. */ 119 120 /* 121 * Per-object metadata, with one-to-one mapping of object metadata to 122 * backing pages (in __kfence_pool). 123 */ 124 static_assert(CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS > 0); 125 struct kfence_metadata *kfence_metadata __read_mostly; 126 127 /* 128 * If kfence_metadata is not NULL, it may be accessed by kfence_shutdown_cache(). 129 * So introduce kfence_metadata_init to initialize metadata, and then make 130 * kfence_metadata visible after initialization is successful. This prevents 131 * potential UAF or access to uninitialized metadata. 132 */ 133 static struct kfence_metadata *kfence_metadata_init __read_mostly; 134 135 /* Freelist with available objects. */ 136 DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kfence_freelist_lock); /* Lock protecting freelist. */ 137 static struct list_head kfence_freelist __guarded_by(&kfence_freelist_lock) = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kfence_freelist); 138 139 /* 140 * The static key to set up a KFENCE allocation; or if static keys are not used 141 * to gate allocations, to avoid a load and compare if KFENCE is disabled. 142 */ 143 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kfence_allocation_key); 144 145 /* Gates the allocation, ensuring only one succeeds in a given period. */ 146 atomic_t kfence_allocation_gate = ATOMIC_INIT(1); 147 148 /* 149 * A Counting Bloom filter of allocation coverage: limits currently covered 150 * allocations of the same source filling up the pool. 151 * 152 * Assuming a range of 15%-85% unique allocations in the pool at any point in 153 * time, the below parameters provide a probablity of 0.02-0.33 for false 154 * positive hits respectively: 155 * 156 * P(alloc_traces) = (1 - e^(-HNUM * (alloc_traces / SIZE)) ^ HNUM 157 */ 158 #define ALLOC_COVERED_HNUM 2 159 #define ALLOC_COVERED_ORDER (const_ilog2(CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) + 2) 160 #define ALLOC_COVERED_SIZE (1 << ALLOC_COVERED_ORDER) 161 #define ALLOC_COVERED_HNEXT(h) hash_32(h, ALLOC_COVERED_ORDER) 162 #define ALLOC_COVERED_MASK (ALLOC_COVERED_SIZE - 1) 163 static atomic_t alloc_covered[ALLOC_COVERED_SIZE]; 164 165 /* Stack depth used to determine uniqueness of an allocation. */ 166 #define UNIQUE_ALLOC_STACK_DEPTH ((size_t)8) 167 168 /* 169 * Randomness for stack hashes, making the same collisions across reboots and 170 * different machines less likely. 171 */ 172 static u32 stack_hash_seed __ro_after_init; 173 174 /* Statistics counters for debugfs. */ 175 enum kfence_counter_id { 176 KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED, 177 KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS, 178 KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES, 179 KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES, 180 KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS, 181 KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT, 182 KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_CAPACITY, 183 KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_COVERED, 184 KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT, 185 }; 186 static atomic_long_t counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT]; 187 static const char *const counter_names[] = { 188 [KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED] = "currently allocated", 189 [KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS] = "total allocations", 190 [KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES] = "total frees", 191 [KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES] = "zombie allocations", 192 [KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS] = "total bugs", 193 [KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT] = "skipped allocations (incompatible)", 194 [KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_CAPACITY] = "skipped allocations (capacity)", 195 [KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_COVERED] = "skipped allocations (covered)", 196 }; 197 static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(counter_names) == KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT); 198 199 /* === Internals ============================================================ */ 200 201 static inline bool should_skip_covered(void) 202 { 203 unsigned long thresh = (CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS * kfence_skip_covered_thresh) / 100; 204 205 return atomic_long_read(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]) > thresh; 206 } 207 208 static u32 get_alloc_stack_hash(unsigned long *stack_entries, size_t num_entries) 209 { 210 num_entries = min(num_entries, UNIQUE_ALLOC_STACK_DEPTH); 211 num_entries = filter_irq_stacks(stack_entries, num_entries); 212 return jhash(stack_entries, num_entries * sizeof(stack_entries[0]), stack_hash_seed); 213 } 214 215 /* 216 * Adds (or subtracts) count @val for allocation stack trace hash 217 * @alloc_stack_hash from Counting Bloom filter. 218 */ 219 static void alloc_covered_add(u32 alloc_stack_hash, int val) 220 { 221 int i; 222 223 for (i = 0; i < ALLOC_COVERED_HNUM; i++) { 224 atomic_add(val, &alloc_covered[alloc_stack_hash & ALLOC_COVERED_MASK]); 225 alloc_stack_hash = ALLOC_COVERED_HNEXT(alloc_stack_hash); 226 } 227 } 228 229 /* 230 * Returns true if the allocation stack trace hash @alloc_stack_hash is 231 * currently contained (non-zero count) in Counting Bloom filter. 232 */ 233 static bool alloc_covered_contains(u32 alloc_stack_hash) 234 { 235 int i; 236 237 for (i = 0; i < ALLOC_COVERED_HNUM; i++) { 238 if (!atomic_read(&alloc_covered[alloc_stack_hash & ALLOC_COVERED_MASK])) 239 return false; 240 alloc_stack_hash = ALLOC_COVERED_HNEXT(alloc_stack_hash); 241 } 242 243 return true; 244 } 245 246 static bool kfence_protect(unsigned long addr) 247 { 248 return !KFENCE_WARN_ON(!kfence_protect_page(ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE), true)); 249 } 250 251 static bool kfence_unprotect(unsigned long addr) 252 { 253 return !KFENCE_WARN_ON(!kfence_protect_page(ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE), false)); 254 } 255 256 static inline unsigned long metadata_to_pageaddr(const struct kfence_metadata *meta) 257 __must_hold(&meta->lock) 258 { 259 unsigned long offset = (meta - kfence_metadata + 1) * PAGE_SIZE * 2; 260 unsigned long pageaddr = (unsigned long)&__kfence_pool[offset]; 261 262 /* The checks do not affect performance; only called from slow-paths. */ 263 264 /* Only call with a pointer into kfence_metadata. */ 265 if (KFENCE_WARN_ON(meta < kfence_metadata || 266 meta >= kfence_metadata + CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS)) 267 return 0; 268 269 /* 270 * This metadata object only ever maps to 1 page; verify that the stored 271 * address is in the expected range. 272 */ 273 if (KFENCE_WARN_ON(ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE) != pageaddr)) 274 return 0; 275 276 return pageaddr; 277 } 278 279 static inline bool kfence_obj_allocated(const struct kfence_metadata *meta) 280 { 281 enum kfence_object_state state = READ_ONCE(meta->state); 282 283 return state == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED || state == KFENCE_OBJECT_RCU_FREEING; 284 } 285 286 /* 287 * Update the object's metadata state, including updating the alloc/free stacks 288 * depending on the state transition. 289 */ 290 static noinline void 291 metadata_update_state(struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_object_state next, 292 unsigned long *stack_entries, size_t num_stack_entries) 293 __must_hold(&meta->lock) 294 { 295 struct kfence_track *track = 296 next == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED ? &meta->alloc_track : &meta->free_track; 297 298 lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock); 299 300 /* Stack has been saved when calling rcu, skip. */ 301 if (READ_ONCE(meta->state) == KFENCE_OBJECT_RCU_FREEING) 302 goto out; 303 304 if (stack_entries) { 305 memcpy(track->stack_entries, stack_entries, 306 num_stack_entries * sizeof(stack_entries[0])); 307 } else { 308 /* 309 * Skip over 1 (this) functions; noinline ensures we do not 310 * accidentally skip over the caller by never inlining. 311 */ 312 num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(track->stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 1); 313 } 314 track->num_stack_entries = num_stack_entries; 315 track->pid = task_pid_nr(current); 316 track->cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); 317 track->ts_nsec = local_clock(); /* Same source as printk timestamps. */ 318 319 out: 320 /* 321 * Pairs with READ_ONCE() in 322 * kfence_shutdown_cache(), 323 * kfence_handle_page_fault(). 324 */ 325 WRITE_ONCE(meta->state, next); 326 } 327 328 #ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN 329 #define check_canary_attributes noinline __no_kmsan_checks 330 #else 331 #define check_canary_attributes inline 332 #endif 333 334 /* Check canary byte at @addr. */ 335 static check_canary_attributes bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr) 336 { 337 struct kfence_metadata *meta; 338 unsigned long flags; 339 340 if (likely(*addr == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U8(addr))) 341 return true; 342 343 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]); 344 345 meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); 346 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); 347 kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, false, NULL, meta, KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION); 348 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 349 350 return false; 351 } 352 353 static inline void set_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta) 354 { 355 const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE); 356 unsigned long addr = pageaddr; 357 358 /* 359 * The canary may be written to part of the object memory, but it does 360 * not affect it. The user should initialize the object before using it. 361 */ 362 for (; addr < meta->addr; addr += sizeof(u64)) 363 *((u64 *)addr) = KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U64; 364 365 addr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr + meta->size, sizeof(u64)); 366 for (; addr - pageaddr < PAGE_SIZE; addr += sizeof(u64)) 367 *((u64 *)addr) = KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U64; 368 } 369 370 static check_canary_attributes void 371 check_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta) 372 { 373 const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE); 374 unsigned long addr = pageaddr; 375 376 /* 377 * We'll iterate over each canary byte per-side until a corrupted byte 378 * is found. However, we'll still iterate over the canary bytes to the 379 * right of the object even if there was an error in the canary bytes to 380 * the left of the object. Specifically, if check_canary_byte() 381 * generates an error, showing both sides might give more clues as to 382 * what the error is about when displaying which bytes were corrupted. 383 */ 384 385 /* Apply to left of object. */ 386 for (; meta->addr - addr >= sizeof(u64); addr += sizeof(u64)) { 387 if (unlikely(*((u64 *)addr) != KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U64)) 388 break; 389 } 390 391 /* 392 * If the canary is corrupted in a certain 64 bytes, or the canary 393 * memory cannot be completely covered by multiple consecutive 64 bytes, 394 * it needs to be checked one by one. 395 */ 396 for (; addr < meta->addr; addr++) { 397 if (unlikely(!check_canary_byte((u8 *)addr))) 398 break; 399 } 400 401 /* Apply to right of object. */ 402 for (addr = meta->addr + meta->size; addr % sizeof(u64) != 0; addr++) { 403 if (unlikely(!check_canary_byte((u8 *)addr))) 404 return; 405 } 406 for (; addr - pageaddr < PAGE_SIZE; addr += sizeof(u64)) { 407 if (unlikely(*((u64 *)addr) != KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U64)) { 408 409 for (; addr - pageaddr < PAGE_SIZE; addr++) { 410 if (!check_canary_byte((u8 *)addr)) 411 return; 412 } 413 } 414 } 415 } 416 417 static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t gfp, 418 unsigned long *stack_entries, size_t num_stack_entries, 419 u32 alloc_stack_hash) 420 { 421 struct kfence_metadata *meta = NULL; 422 unsigned long flags; 423 struct slab *slab; 424 void *addr; 425 const bool random_right_allocate = get_random_u32_below(2); 426 const bool random_fault = CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS && 427 !get_random_u32_below(CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS); 428 429 /* Try to obtain a free object. */ 430 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); 431 if (!list_empty(&kfence_freelist)) { 432 meta = list_entry(kfence_freelist.next, struct kfence_metadata, list); 433 list_del_init(&meta->list); 434 } 435 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); 436 if (!meta) { 437 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_CAPACITY]); 438 return NULL; 439 } 440 441 if (unlikely(!raw_spin_trylock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags))) { 442 /* 443 * This is extremely unlikely -- we are reporting on a 444 * use-after-free, which locked meta->lock, and the reporting 445 * code via printk calls kmalloc() which ends up in 446 * kfence_alloc() and tries to grab the same object that we're 447 * reporting on. While it has never been observed, lockdep does 448 * report that there is a possibility of deadlock. Fix it by 449 * using trylock and bailing out gracefully. 450 */ 451 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); 452 /* Put the object back on the freelist. */ 453 list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist); 454 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); 455 456 return NULL; 457 } 458 459 meta->addr = metadata_to_pageaddr(meta); 460 /* Unprotect if we're reusing this page. */ 461 if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) 462 kfence_unprotect(meta->addr); 463 464 /* 465 * Note: for allocations made before RNG initialization, will always 466 * return zero. We still benefit from enabling KFENCE as early as 467 * possible, even when the RNG is not yet available, as this will allow 468 * KFENCE to detect bugs due to earlier allocations. The only downside 469 * is that the out-of-bounds accesses detected are deterministic for 470 * such allocations. 471 */ 472 if (random_right_allocate) { 473 /* Allocate on the "right" side, re-calculate address. */ 474 meta->addr += PAGE_SIZE - size; 475 meta->addr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, cache->align); 476 } 477 478 addr = (void *)meta->addr; 479 480 /* Update remaining metadata. */ 481 metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED, stack_entries, num_stack_entries); 482 /* Pairs with READ_ONCE() in kfence_shutdown_cache(). */ 483 WRITE_ONCE(meta->cache, cache); 484 meta->size = size; 485 meta->alloc_stack_hash = alloc_stack_hash; 486 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 487 488 alloc_covered_add(alloc_stack_hash, 1); 489 490 /* Set required slab fields. */ 491 slab = virt_to_slab(addr); 492 slab->slab_cache = cache; 493 slab->objects = 1; 494 495 /* Memory initialization. */ 496 set_canary(meta); 497 498 /* 499 * We check slab_want_init_on_alloc() ourselves, rather than letting 500 * SL*B do the initialization, as otherwise we might overwrite KFENCE's 501 * redzone. 502 */ 503 if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp, cache))) 504 memzero_explicit(addr, size); 505 if (cache->ctor) 506 cache->ctor(addr); 507 508 if (random_fault) 509 kfence_protect(meta->addr); /* Random "faults" by protecting the object. */ 510 511 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]); 512 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS]); 513 514 return addr; 515 } 516 517 static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool zombie) 518 { 519 struct kcsan_scoped_access assert_page_exclusive; 520 u32 alloc_stack_hash; 521 unsigned long flags; 522 bool init; 523 524 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); 525 526 if (!kfence_obj_allocated(meta) || meta->addr != (unsigned long)addr) { 527 /* Invalid or double-free, bail out. */ 528 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]); 529 kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, false, NULL, meta, 530 KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE); 531 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 532 return; 533 } 534 535 /* Detect racy use-after-free, or incorrect reallocation of this page by KFENCE. */ 536 kcsan_begin_scoped_access((void *)ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)addr, PAGE_SIZE), PAGE_SIZE, 537 KCSAN_ACCESS_SCOPED | KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT, 538 &assert_page_exclusive); 539 540 if (CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS) 541 kfence_unprotect((unsigned long)addr); /* To check canary bytes. */ 542 543 /* Restore page protection if there was an OOB access. */ 544 if (meta->unprotected_page) { 545 memzero_explicit((void *)ALIGN_DOWN(meta->unprotected_page, PAGE_SIZE), PAGE_SIZE); 546 kfence_protect(meta->unprotected_page); 547 meta->unprotected_page = 0; 548 } 549 550 /* Mark the object as freed. */ 551 metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED, NULL, 0); 552 init = slab_want_init_on_free(meta->cache); 553 alloc_stack_hash = meta->alloc_stack_hash; 554 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 555 556 alloc_covered_add(alloc_stack_hash, -1); 557 558 /* Check canary bytes for memory corruption. */ 559 check_canary(meta); 560 561 /* 562 * Clear memory if init-on-free is set. While we protect the page, the 563 * data is still there, and after a use-after-free is detected, we 564 * unprotect the page, so the data is still accessible. 565 */ 566 if (!zombie && unlikely(init)) 567 memzero_explicit(addr, meta->size); 568 569 /* Protect to detect use-after-frees. */ 570 kfence_protect((unsigned long)addr); 571 572 kcsan_end_scoped_access(&assert_page_exclusive); 573 if (!zombie) { 574 /* Add it to the tail of the freelist for reuse. */ 575 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); 576 KFENCE_WARN_ON(!list_empty(&meta->list)); 577 list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist); 578 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); 579 580 atomic_long_dec(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]); 581 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES]); 582 } else { 583 /* See kfence_shutdown_cache(). */ 584 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES]); 585 } 586 } 587 588 static void rcu_guarded_free(struct rcu_head *h) 589 { 590 struct kfence_metadata *meta = container_of(h, struct kfence_metadata, rcu_head); 591 592 kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, false); 593 } 594 595 /* 596 * Initialization of the KFENCE pool after its allocation. 597 * Returns 0 on success; otherwise returns the address up to 598 * which partial initialization succeeded. 599 */ 600 static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void) 601 __context_unsafe(/* constructor */) 602 { 603 unsigned long addr, start_pfn; 604 int i; 605 606 if (!arch_kfence_init_pool()) 607 return (unsigned long)__kfence_pool; 608 609 addr = (unsigned long)__kfence_pool; 610 start_pfn = PHYS_PFN(virt_to_phys(__kfence_pool)); 611 612 /* 613 * Set up object pages: they must have PGTY_slab set to avoid freeing 614 * them as real pages. 615 * 616 * We also want to avoid inserting kfence_free() in the kfree() 617 * fast-path in SLUB, and therefore need to ensure kfree() correctly 618 * enters __slab_free() slow-path. 619 */ 620 for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) { 621 struct page *page; 622 623 if (!i || (i % 2)) 624 continue; 625 626 page = pfn_to_page(start_pfn + i); 627 __SetPageSlab(page); 628 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG 629 struct slab *slab = page_slab(page); 630 slab->obj_exts = (unsigned long)&kfence_metadata_init[i / 2 - 1].obj_exts | 631 MEMCG_DATA_OBJEXTS; 632 #endif 633 } 634 635 /* 636 * Protect the first 2 pages. The first page is mostly unnecessary, and 637 * merely serves as an extended guard page. However, adding one 638 * additional page in the beginning gives us an even number of pages, 639 * which simplifies the mapping of address to metadata index. 640 */ 641 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { 642 if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr))) 643 return addr; 644 645 addr += PAGE_SIZE; 646 } 647 648 for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { 649 struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata_init[i]; 650 651 /* Initialize metadata. */ 652 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&meta->list); 653 raw_spin_lock_init(&meta->lock); 654 meta->state = KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED; 655 meta->addr = addr; /* Initialize for validation in metadata_to_pageaddr(). */ 656 list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist); 657 658 /* Protect the right redzone. */ 659 if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr + PAGE_SIZE))) 660 goto reset_slab; 661 662 addr += 2 * PAGE_SIZE; 663 } 664 665 /* 666 * Make kfence_metadata visible only when initialization is successful. 667 * Otherwise, if the initialization fails and kfence_metadata is freed, 668 * it may cause UAF in kfence_shutdown_cache(). 669 */ 670 smp_store_release(&kfence_metadata, kfence_metadata_init); 671 return 0; 672 673 reset_slab: 674 for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) { 675 struct page *page; 676 677 if (!i || (i % 2)) 678 continue; 679 680 page = pfn_to_page(start_pfn + i); 681 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG 682 struct slab *slab = page_slab(page); 683 slab->obj_exts = 0; 684 #endif 685 __ClearPageSlab(page); 686 } 687 688 return addr; 689 } 690 691 static bool __init kfence_init_pool_early(void) 692 { 693 unsigned long addr; 694 695 if (!__kfence_pool) 696 return false; 697 698 addr = kfence_init_pool(); 699 700 if (!addr) { 701 /* 702 * The pool is live and will never be deallocated from this point on. 703 * Ignore the pool object from the kmemleak phys object tree, as it would 704 * otherwise overlap with allocations returned by kfence_alloc(), which 705 * are registered with kmemleak through the slab post-alloc hook. 706 */ 707 kmemleak_ignore_phys(__pa(__kfence_pool)); 708 return true; 709 } 710 711 /* 712 * Only release unprotected pages, and do not try to go back and change 713 * page attributes due to risk of failing to do so as well. If changing 714 * page attributes for some pages fails, it is very likely that it also 715 * fails for the first page, and therefore expect addr==__kfence_pool in 716 * most failure cases. 717 */ 718 memblock_free_late(__pa(addr), KFENCE_POOL_SIZE - (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool)); 719 __kfence_pool = NULL; 720 721 memblock_free_late(__pa(kfence_metadata_init), KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE); 722 kfence_metadata_init = NULL; 723 724 return false; 725 } 726 727 /* === DebugFS Interface ==================================================== */ 728 729 static int stats_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) 730 { 731 int i; 732 733 seq_printf(seq, "enabled: %i\n", READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)); 734 for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT; i++) 735 seq_printf(seq, "%s: %ld\n", counter_names[i], atomic_long_read(&counters[i])); 736 737 return 0; 738 } 739 DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(stats); 740 741 /* 742 * debugfs seq_file operations for /sys/kernel/debug/kfence/objects. 743 * start_object() and next_object() return the object index + 1, because NULL is used 744 * to stop iteration. 745 */ 746 static void *start_object(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) 747 { 748 if (*pos < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) 749 return (void *)((long)*pos + 1); 750 return NULL; 751 } 752 753 static void stop_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) 754 { 755 } 756 757 static void *next_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) 758 { 759 ++*pos; 760 if (*pos < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) 761 return (void *)((long)*pos + 1); 762 return NULL; 763 } 764 765 static int show_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) 766 { 767 struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[(long)v - 1]; 768 unsigned long flags; 769 770 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); 771 kfence_print_object(seq, meta); 772 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 773 seq_puts(seq, "---------------------------------\n"); 774 775 return 0; 776 } 777 778 static const struct seq_operations objects_sops = { 779 .start = start_object, 780 .next = next_object, 781 .stop = stop_object, 782 .show = show_object, 783 }; 784 DEFINE_SEQ_ATTRIBUTE(objects); 785 786 static int kfence_debugfs_init(void) 787 { 788 struct dentry *kfence_dir; 789 790 if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) 791 return 0; 792 793 kfence_dir = debugfs_create_dir("kfence", NULL); 794 debugfs_create_file("stats", 0444, kfence_dir, NULL, &stats_fops); 795 debugfs_create_file("objects", 0400, kfence_dir, NULL, &objects_fops); 796 return 0; 797 } 798 799 late_initcall(kfence_debugfs_init); 800 801 /* === Panic Notifier ====================================================== */ 802 803 static void kfence_check_all_canary(void) 804 { 805 int i; 806 807 for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { 808 struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; 809 810 if (kfence_obj_allocated(meta)) 811 check_canary(meta); 812 } 813 } 814 815 static int kfence_check_canary_callback(struct notifier_block *nb, 816 unsigned long reason, void *arg) 817 { 818 kfence_check_all_canary(); 819 return NOTIFY_OK; 820 } 821 822 static struct notifier_block kfence_check_canary_notifier = { 823 .notifier_call = kfence_check_canary_callback, 824 }; 825 826 /* === Allocation Gate Timer ================================================ */ 827 828 static struct delayed_work kfence_timer; 829 830 #ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS 831 static int kfence_reboot_callback(struct notifier_block *nb, 832 unsigned long action, void *data) 833 { 834 /* 835 * Disable kfence to avoid static keys IPI synchronization during 836 * late shutdown/kexec 837 */ 838 WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false); 839 /* Cancel any pending timer work */ 840 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&kfence_timer); 841 842 return NOTIFY_OK; 843 } 844 845 static struct notifier_block kfence_reboot_notifier = { 846 .notifier_call = kfence_reboot_callback, 847 .priority = INT_MAX, /* Run early to stop timers ASAP */ 848 }; 849 850 /* Wait queue to wake up allocation-gate timer task. */ 851 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(allocation_wait); 852 853 static void wake_up_kfence_timer(struct irq_work *work) 854 { 855 wake_up(&allocation_wait); 856 } 857 static DEFINE_IRQ_WORK(wake_up_kfence_timer_work, wake_up_kfence_timer); 858 #endif 859 860 /* 861 * Set up delayed work, which will enable and disable the static key. We need to 862 * use a work queue (rather than a simple timer), since enabling and disabling a 863 * static key cannot be done from an interrupt. 864 * 865 * Note: Toggling a static branch currently causes IPIs, and here we'll end up 866 * with a total of 2 IPIs to all CPUs. If this ends up a problem in future (with 867 * more aggressive sampling intervals), we could get away with a variant that 868 * avoids IPIs, at the cost of not immediately capturing allocations if the 869 * instructions remain cached. 870 */ 871 static void toggle_allocation_gate(struct work_struct *work) 872 { 873 if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) 874 return; 875 876 atomic_set(&kfence_allocation_gate, -kfence_burst); 877 #ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS 878 /* Enable static key, and await allocation to happen. */ 879 static_branch_enable(&kfence_allocation_key); 880 881 wait_event_idle(allocation_wait, atomic_read(&kfence_allocation_gate) > 0); 882 883 /* Disable static key and reset timer. */ 884 static_branch_disable(&kfence_allocation_key); 885 #endif 886 queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, 887 msecs_to_jiffies(kfence_sample_interval)); 888 } 889 890 /* === Public interface ===================================================== */ 891 892 void __init kfence_alloc_pool_and_metadata(void) 893 { 894 if (!kfence_sample_interval) 895 return; 896 897 /* 898 * If the pool has already been initialized by arch, there is no need to 899 * re-allocate the memory pool. 900 */ 901 if (!__kfence_pool) 902 __kfence_pool = memblock_alloc(KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE); 903 904 if (!__kfence_pool) { 905 pr_err("failed to allocate pool\n"); 906 return; 907 } 908 909 /* The memory allocated by memblock has been zeroed out. */ 910 kfence_metadata_init = memblock_alloc(KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE); 911 if (!kfence_metadata_init) { 912 pr_err("failed to allocate metadata\n"); 913 memblock_free(__kfence_pool, KFENCE_POOL_SIZE); 914 __kfence_pool = NULL; 915 } 916 } 917 918 static void kfence_init_enable(void) 919 { 920 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS)) 921 static_branch_enable(&kfence_allocation_key); 922 923 if (kfence_deferrable) 924 INIT_DEFERRABLE_WORK(&kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate); 925 else 926 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate); 927 928 if (kfence_check_on_panic) 929 atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list, &kfence_check_canary_notifier); 930 931 #ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS 932 register_reboot_notifier(&kfence_reboot_notifier); 933 #endif 934 935 WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true); 936 queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, 0); 937 938 pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects at 0x%p-0x%p\n", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, 939 CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS, (void *)__kfence_pool, 940 (void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE)); 941 } 942 943 void __init kfence_init(void) 944 { 945 stack_hash_seed = get_random_u32(); 946 947 /* Setting kfence_sample_interval to 0 on boot disables KFENCE. */ 948 if (!kfence_sample_interval) 949 return; 950 951 if (!kfence_init_pool_early()) { 952 pr_err("%s failed\n", __func__); 953 return; 954 } 955 956 kfence_init_enable(); 957 } 958 959 static int kfence_init_late(void) 960 { 961 const unsigned long nr_pages_pool = KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; 962 const unsigned long nr_pages_meta = KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; 963 unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)__kfence_pool; 964 unsigned long free_size = KFENCE_POOL_SIZE; 965 int err = -ENOMEM; 966 967 #ifdef CONFIG_CONTIG_ALLOC 968 struct page *pages; 969 970 pages = alloc_contig_pages(nr_pages_pool, GFP_KERNEL, first_online_node, 971 NULL); 972 if (!pages) 973 return -ENOMEM; 974 975 __kfence_pool = page_to_virt(pages); 976 pages = alloc_contig_pages(nr_pages_meta, GFP_KERNEL, first_online_node, 977 NULL); 978 if (pages) 979 kfence_metadata_init = page_to_virt(pages); 980 #else 981 if (nr_pages_pool > MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES || 982 nr_pages_meta > MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES) { 983 pr_warn("KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS too large for buddy allocator\n"); 984 return -EINVAL; 985 } 986 987 __kfence_pool = alloc_pages_exact(KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); 988 if (!__kfence_pool) 989 return -ENOMEM; 990 991 kfence_metadata_init = alloc_pages_exact(KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); 992 #endif 993 994 if (!kfence_metadata_init) 995 goto free_pool; 996 997 memzero_explicit(kfence_metadata_init, KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE); 998 addr = kfence_init_pool(); 999 if (!addr) { 1000 kfence_init_enable(); 1001 kfence_debugfs_init(); 1002 return 0; 1003 } 1004 1005 pr_err("%s failed\n", __func__); 1006 free_size = KFENCE_POOL_SIZE - (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool); 1007 err = -EBUSY; 1008 1009 #ifdef CONFIG_CONTIG_ALLOC 1010 free_contig_range(page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)kfence_metadata_init)), 1011 nr_pages_meta); 1012 free_pool: 1013 free_contig_range(page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)addr)), 1014 free_size / PAGE_SIZE); 1015 #else 1016 free_pages_exact((void *)kfence_metadata_init, KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE); 1017 free_pool: 1018 free_pages_exact((void *)addr, free_size); 1019 #endif 1020 1021 kfence_metadata_init = NULL; 1022 __kfence_pool = NULL; 1023 return err; 1024 } 1025 1026 static int kfence_enable_late(void) 1027 { 1028 if (!__kfence_pool) 1029 return kfence_init_late(); 1030 1031 WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true); 1032 queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, 0); 1033 pr_info("re-enabled\n"); 1034 return 0; 1035 } 1036 1037 void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s) 1038 { 1039 unsigned long flags; 1040 struct kfence_metadata *meta; 1041 int i; 1042 1043 /* Pairs with release in kfence_init_pool(). */ 1044 if (!smp_load_acquire(&kfence_metadata)) 1045 return; 1046 1047 for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { 1048 bool in_use; 1049 1050 meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; 1051 1052 /* 1053 * If we observe some inconsistent cache and state pair where we 1054 * should have returned false here, cache destruction is racing 1055 * with either kmem_cache_alloc() or kmem_cache_free(). Taking 1056 * the lock will not help, as different critical section 1057 * serialization will have the same outcome. 1058 */ 1059 if (READ_ONCE(meta->cache) != s || !kfence_obj_allocated(meta)) 1060 continue; 1061 1062 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); 1063 in_use = meta->cache == s && kfence_obj_allocated(meta); 1064 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 1065 1066 if (in_use) { 1067 /* 1068 * This cache still has allocations, and we should not 1069 * release them back into the freelist so they can still 1070 * safely be used and retain the kernel's default 1071 * behaviour of keeping the allocations alive (leak the 1072 * cache); however, they effectively become "zombie 1073 * allocations" as the KFENCE objects are the only ones 1074 * still in use and the owning cache is being destroyed. 1075 * 1076 * We mark them freed, so that any subsequent use shows 1077 * more useful error messages that will include stack 1078 * traces of the user of the object, the original 1079 * allocation, and caller to shutdown_cache(). 1080 */ 1081 kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, /*zombie=*/true); 1082 } 1083 } 1084 1085 for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { 1086 meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; 1087 1088 /* See above. */ 1089 if (READ_ONCE(meta->cache) != s || READ_ONCE(meta->state) != KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) 1090 continue; 1091 1092 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); 1093 if (meta->cache == s && meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) 1094 meta->cache = NULL; 1095 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 1096 } 1097 } 1098 1099 void *__kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags) 1100 { 1101 unsigned long stack_entries[KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH]; 1102 size_t num_stack_entries; 1103 u32 alloc_stack_hash; 1104 int allocation_gate; 1105 1106 /* 1107 * Perform size check before switching kfence_allocation_gate, so that 1108 * we don't disable KFENCE without making an allocation. 1109 */ 1110 if (size > PAGE_SIZE) { 1111 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT]); 1112 return NULL; 1113 } 1114 1115 /* 1116 * Skip allocations from non-default zones, including DMA. We cannot 1117 * guarantee that pages in the KFENCE pool will have the requested 1118 * properties (e.g. reside in DMAable memory). 1119 */ 1120 if ((flags & GFP_ZONEMASK) || 1121 ((flags & __GFP_THISNODE) && num_online_nodes() > 1) || 1122 (s->flags & (SLAB_CACHE_DMA | SLAB_CACHE_DMA32))) { 1123 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT]); 1124 return NULL; 1125 } 1126 1127 /* 1128 * Skip allocations for this slab, if KFENCE has been disabled for 1129 * this slab. 1130 */ 1131 if (s->flags & SLAB_SKIP_KFENCE) 1132 return NULL; 1133 1134 allocation_gate = atomic_inc_return(&kfence_allocation_gate); 1135 if (allocation_gate > 1) 1136 return NULL; 1137 #ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS 1138 /* 1139 * waitqueue_active() is fully ordered after the update of 1140 * kfence_allocation_gate per atomic_inc_return(). 1141 */ 1142 if (allocation_gate == 1 && waitqueue_active(&allocation_wait)) { 1143 /* 1144 * Calling wake_up() here may deadlock when allocations happen 1145 * from within timer code. Use an irq_work to defer it. 1146 */ 1147 irq_work_queue(&wake_up_kfence_timer_work); 1148 } 1149 #endif 1150 1151 if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) 1152 return NULL; 1153 1154 num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 0); 1155 1156 /* 1157 * Do expensive check for coverage of allocation in slow-path after 1158 * allocation_gate has already become non-zero, even though it might 1159 * mean not making any allocation within a given sample interval. 1160 * 1161 * This ensures reasonable allocation coverage when the pool is almost 1162 * full, including avoiding long-lived allocations of the same source 1163 * filling up the pool (e.g. pagecache allocations). 1164 */ 1165 alloc_stack_hash = get_alloc_stack_hash(stack_entries, num_stack_entries); 1166 if (should_skip_covered() && alloc_covered_contains(alloc_stack_hash)) { 1167 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_COVERED]); 1168 return NULL; 1169 } 1170 1171 return kfence_guarded_alloc(s, size, flags, stack_entries, num_stack_entries, 1172 alloc_stack_hash); 1173 } 1174 1175 size_t kfence_ksize(const void *addr) 1176 { 1177 const struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); 1178 1179 /* 1180 * Read locklessly -- if there is a race with __kfence_alloc(), this is 1181 * either a use-after-free or invalid access. 1182 */ 1183 return meta ? meta->size : 0; 1184 } 1185 1186 void *kfence_object_start(const void *addr) 1187 { 1188 const struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); 1189 1190 /* 1191 * Read locklessly -- if there is a race with __kfence_alloc(), this is 1192 * either a use-after-free or invalid access. 1193 */ 1194 return meta ? (void *)meta->addr : NULL; 1195 } 1196 1197 void __kfence_free(void *addr) 1198 { 1199 struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); 1200 1201 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG 1202 KFENCE_WARN_ON(meta->obj_exts.objcg); 1203 #endif 1204 /* 1205 * If the objects of the cache are SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, defer freeing 1206 * the object, as the object page may be recycled for other-typed 1207 * objects once it has been freed. meta->cache may be NULL if the cache 1208 * was destroyed. 1209 * Save the stack trace here so that reports show where the user freed 1210 * the object. 1211 */ 1212 if (unlikely(meta->cache && (meta->cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))) { 1213 unsigned long flags; 1214 1215 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); 1216 metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_RCU_FREEING, NULL, 0); 1217 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 1218 call_rcu(&meta->rcu_head, rcu_guarded_free); 1219 } else { 1220 kfence_guarded_free(addr, meta, false); 1221 } 1222 } 1223 1224 bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *regs) 1225 { 1226 const int page_index = (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool) / PAGE_SIZE; 1227 struct kfence_metadata *to_report = NULL; 1228 unsigned long unprotected_page = 0; 1229 enum kfence_error_type error_type; 1230 unsigned long flags; 1231 1232 if (!is_kfence_address((void *)addr)) 1233 return false; 1234 1235 if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) /* If disabled at runtime ... */ 1236 return kfence_unprotect(addr); /* ... unprotect and proceed. */ 1237 1238 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]); 1239 1240 if (page_index % 2) { 1241 /* This is a redzone, report a buffer overflow. */ 1242 struct kfence_metadata *meta; 1243 int distance = 0; 1244 1245 meta = addr_to_metadata(addr - PAGE_SIZE); 1246 if (meta && kfence_obj_allocated(meta)) { 1247 to_report = meta; 1248 /* Data race ok; distance calculation approximate. */ 1249 distance = addr - data_race(meta->addr + meta->size); 1250 } 1251 1252 meta = addr_to_metadata(addr + PAGE_SIZE); 1253 if (meta && kfence_obj_allocated(meta)) { 1254 /* Data race ok; distance calculation approximate. */ 1255 if (!to_report || distance > data_race(meta->addr) - addr) 1256 to_report = meta; 1257 } 1258 1259 if (!to_report) 1260 goto out; 1261 1262 error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB; 1263 unprotected_page = addr; 1264 1265 /* 1266 * If the object was freed before we took the look we can still 1267 * report this as an OOB -- the report will simply show the 1268 * stacktrace of the free as well. 1269 */ 1270 } else { 1271 to_report = addr_to_metadata(addr); 1272 if (!to_report) 1273 goto out; 1274 1275 error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF; 1276 /* 1277 * We may race with __kfence_alloc(), and it is possible that a 1278 * freed object may be reallocated. We simply report this as a 1279 * use-after-free, with the stack trace showing the place where 1280 * the object was re-allocated. 1281 */ 1282 } 1283 1284 out: 1285 if (to_report) { 1286 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags); 1287 to_report->unprotected_page = unprotected_page; 1288 kfence_report_error(addr, is_write, regs, to_report, error_type); 1289 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&to_report->lock, flags); 1290 } else { 1291 /* This may be a UAF or OOB access, but we can't be sure. */ 1292 kfence_report_error(addr, is_write, regs, NULL, KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID); 1293 } 1294 1295 return kfence_unprotect(addr); /* Unprotect and let access proceed. */ 1296 } 1297