1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 2 /* 3 * This file contains common KASAN error reporting code. 4 * 5 * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. 6 * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> 7 * 8 * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by 9 * Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> 10 */ 11 12 #include <kunit/test.h> 13 #include <linux/bitops.h> 14 #include <linux/ftrace.h> 15 #include <linux/init.h> 16 #include <linux/kernel.h> 17 #include <linux/lockdep.h> 18 #include <linux/mm.h> 19 #include <linux/printk.h> 20 #include <linux/sched.h> 21 #include <linux/slab.h> 22 #include <linux/stackdepot.h> 23 #include <linux/stacktrace.h> 24 #include <linux/string.h> 25 #include <linux/types.h> 26 #include <linux/kasan.h> 27 #include <linux/module.h> 28 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> 29 #include <linux/uaccess.h> 30 #include <trace/events/error_report.h> 31 32 #include <asm/sections.h> 33 34 #include "kasan.h" 35 #include "../slab.h" 36 37 static unsigned long kasan_flags; 38 39 #define KASAN_BIT_REPORTED 0 40 #define KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT 1 41 42 enum kasan_arg_fault { 43 KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT, 44 KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT, 45 KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC, 46 }; 47 48 static enum kasan_arg_fault kasan_arg_fault __ro_after_init = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_DEFAULT; 49 50 /* kasan.fault=report/panic */ 51 static int __init early_kasan_fault(char *arg) 52 { 53 if (!arg) 54 return -EINVAL; 55 56 if (!strcmp(arg, "report")) 57 kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_REPORT; 58 else if (!strcmp(arg, "panic")) 59 kasan_arg_fault = KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC; 60 else 61 return -EINVAL; 62 63 return 0; 64 } 65 early_param("kasan.fault", early_kasan_fault); 66 67 static int __init kasan_set_multi_shot(char *str) 68 { 69 set_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags); 70 return 1; 71 } 72 __setup("kasan_multi_shot", kasan_set_multi_shot); 73 74 /* 75 * Used to suppress reports within kasan_disable/enable_current() critical 76 * sections, which are used for marking accesses to slab metadata. 77 */ 78 static bool report_suppressed(void) 79 { 80 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) 81 if (current->kasan_depth) 82 return true; 83 #endif 84 return false; 85 } 86 87 /* 88 * Used to avoid reporting more than one KASAN bug unless kasan_multi_shot 89 * is enabled. Note that KASAN tests effectively enable kasan_multi_shot 90 * for their duration. 91 */ 92 static bool report_enabled(void) 93 { 94 if (test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags)) 95 return true; 96 return !test_and_set_bit(KASAN_BIT_REPORTED, &kasan_flags); 97 } 98 99 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_MODULE_TEST) 100 101 bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void) 102 { 103 return test_and_set_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags); 104 } 105 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_save_enable_multi_shot); 106 107 void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled) 108 { 109 if (!enabled) 110 clear_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags); 111 } 112 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_restore_multi_shot); 113 114 #endif 115 116 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST) 117 118 /* 119 * Whether the KASAN KUnit test suite is currently being executed. 120 * Updated in kasan_test.c. 121 */ 122 static bool kasan_kunit_executing; 123 124 void kasan_kunit_test_suite_start(void) 125 { 126 WRITE_ONCE(kasan_kunit_executing, true); 127 } 128 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_kunit_test_suite_start); 129 130 void kasan_kunit_test_suite_end(void) 131 { 132 WRITE_ONCE(kasan_kunit_executing, false); 133 } 134 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_kunit_test_suite_end); 135 136 static bool kasan_kunit_test_suite_executing(void) 137 { 138 return READ_ONCE(kasan_kunit_executing); 139 } 140 141 #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST */ 142 143 static inline bool kasan_kunit_test_suite_executing(void) { return false; } 144 145 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_KUNIT_TEST */ 146 147 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT) 148 149 static void fail_non_kasan_kunit_test(void) 150 { 151 struct kunit *test; 152 153 if (kasan_kunit_test_suite_executing()) 154 return; 155 156 test = current->kunit_test; 157 if (test) 158 kunit_set_failure(test); 159 } 160 161 #else /* CONFIG_KUNIT */ 162 163 static inline void fail_non_kasan_kunit_test(void) { } 164 165 #endif /* CONFIG_KUNIT */ 166 167 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(report_lock); 168 169 static void start_report(unsigned long *flags, bool sync) 170 { 171 fail_non_kasan_kunit_test(); 172 /* Respect the /proc/sys/kernel/traceoff_on_warning interface. */ 173 disable_trace_on_warning(); 174 /* Do not allow LOCKDEP mangling KASAN reports. */ 175 lockdep_off(); 176 /* Make sure we don't end up in loop. */ 177 kasan_disable_current(); 178 spin_lock_irqsave(&report_lock, *flags); 179 pr_err("==================================================================\n"); 180 } 181 182 static void end_report(unsigned long *flags, void *addr) 183 { 184 if (addr) 185 trace_error_report_end(ERROR_DETECTOR_KASAN, 186 (unsigned long)addr); 187 pr_err("==================================================================\n"); 188 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags); 189 if (!test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags)) 190 check_panic_on_warn("KASAN"); 191 if (kasan_arg_fault == KASAN_ARG_FAULT_PANIC) 192 panic("kasan.fault=panic set ...\n"); 193 add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); 194 lockdep_on(); 195 kasan_enable_current(); 196 } 197 198 static void print_error_description(struct kasan_report_info *info) 199 { 200 pr_err("BUG: KASAN: %s in %pS\n", info->bug_type, (void *)info->ip); 201 202 if (info->type != KASAN_REPORT_ACCESS) { 203 pr_err("Free of addr %px by task %s/%d\n", 204 info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); 205 return; 206 } 207 208 if (info->access_size) 209 pr_err("%s of size %zu at addr %px by task %s/%d\n", 210 info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read", info->access_size, 211 info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); 212 else 213 pr_err("%s at addr %px by task %s/%d\n", 214 info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read", 215 info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); 216 } 217 218 static void print_track(struct kasan_track *track, const char *prefix) 219 { 220 pr_err("%s by task %u:\n", prefix, track->pid); 221 if (track->stack) 222 stack_depot_print(track->stack); 223 else 224 pr_err("(stack is not available)\n"); 225 } 226 227 static inline struct page *addr_to_page(const void *addr) 228 { 229 if (virt_addr_valid(addr)) 230 return virt_to_head_page(addr); 231 return NULL; 232 } 233 234 static void describe_object_addr(const void *addr, struct kasan_report_info *info) 235 { 236 unsigned long access_addr = (unsigned long)addr; 237 unsigned long object_addr = (unsigned long)info->object; 238 const char *rel_type, *region_state = ""; 239 int rel_bytes; 240 241 pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the object at %px\n" 242 " which belongs to the cache %s of size %d\n", 243 info->object, info->cache->name, info->cache->object_size); 244 245 if (access_addr < object_addr) { 246 rel_type = "to the left"; 247 rel_bytes = object_addr - access_addr; 248 } else if (access_addr >= object_addr + info->alloc_size) { 249 rel_type = "to the right"; 250 rel_bytes = access_addr - (object_addr + info->alloc_size); 251 } else { 252 rel_type = "inside"; 253 rel_bytes = access_addr - object_addr; 254 } 255 256 /* 257 * Tag-Based modes use the stack ring to infer the bug type, but the 258 * memory region state description is generated based on the metadata. 259 * Thus, defining the region state as below can contradict the metadata. 260 * Fixing this requires further improvements, so only infer the state 261 * for the Generic mode. 262 */ 263 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)) { 264 if (strcmp(info->bug_type, "slab-out-of-bounds") == 0) 265 region_state = "allocated "; 266 else if (strcmp(info->bug_type, "slab-use-after-free") == 0) 267 region_state = "freed "; 268 } 269 270 pr_err("The buggy address is located %d bytes %s of\n" 271 " %s%zu-byte region [%px, %px)\n", 272 rel_bytes, rel_type, region_state, info->alloc_size, 273 (void *)object_addr, (void *)(object_addr + info->alloc_size)); 274 } 275 276 static void describe_object_stacks(struct kasan_report_info *info) 277 { 278 if (info->alloc_track.stack) { 279 print_track(&info->alloc_track, "Allocated"); 280 pr_err("\n"); 281 } 282 283 if (info->free_track.stack) { 284 print_track(&info->free_track, "Freed"); 285 pr_err("\n"); 286 } 287 288 kasan_print_aux_stacks(info->cache, info->object); 289 } 290 291 static void describe_object(const void *addr, struct kasan_report_info *info) 292 { 293 if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled()) 294 describe_object_stacks(info); 295 describe_object_addr(addr, info); 296 } 297 298 static inline bool kernel_or_module_addr(const void *addr) 299 { 300 if (is_kernel((unsigned long)addr)) 301 return true; 302 if (is_module_address((unsigned long)addr)) 303 return true; 304 return false; 305 } 306 307 static inline bool init_task_stack_addr(const void *addr) 308 { 309 return addr >= (void *)&init_thread_union.stack && 310 (addr <= (void *)&init_thread_union.stack + 311 sizeof(init_thread_union.stack)); 312 } 313 314 static void print_address_description(void *addr, u8 tag, 315 struct kasan_report_info *info) 316 { 317 struct page *page = addr_to_page(addr); 318 319 dump_stack_lvl(KERN_ERR); 320 pr_err("\n"); 321 322 if (info->cache && info->object) { 323 describe_object(addr, info); 324 pr_err("\n"); 325 } 326 327 if (kernel_or_module_addr(addr) && !init_task_stack_addr(addr)) { 328 pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the variable:\n"); 329 pr_err(" %pS\n", addr); 330 pr_err("\n"); 331 } 332 333 if (object_is_on_stack(addr)) { 334 /* 335 * Currently, KASAN supports printing frame information only 336 * for accesses to the task's own stack. 337 */ 338 kasan_print_address_stack_frame(addr); 339 pr_err("\n"); 340 } 341 342 if (is_vmalloc_addr(addr)) { 343 struct vm_struct *va = find_vm_area(addr); 344 345 if (va) { 346 pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at\n" 347 " [%px, %px) created by:\n" 348 " %pS\n", 349 va->addr, va->addr + va->size, va->caller); 350 pr_err("\n"); 351 352 page = vmalloc_to_page(addr); 353 } 354 } 355 356 if (page) { 357 pr_err("The buggy address belongs to the physical page:\n"); 358 dump_page(page, "kasan: bad access detected"); 359 pr_err("\n"); 360 } 361 } 362 363 static bool meta_row_is_guilty(const void *row, const void *addr) 364 { 365 return (row <= addr) && (addr < row + META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW); 366 } 367 368 static int meta_pointer_offset(const void *row, const void *addr) 369 { 370 /* 371 * Memory state around the buggy address: 372 * ff00ff00ff00ff00: 00 00 00 05 fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe 373 * ... 374 * 375 * The length of ">ff00ff00ff00ff00: " is 376 * 3 + (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) * 2 chars. 377 * The length of each granule metadata is 2 bytes 378 * plus 1 byte for space. 379 */ 380 return 3 + (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) * 2 + 381 (addr - row) / KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * 3 + 1; 382 } 383 384 static void print_memory_metadata(const void *addr) 385 { 386 int i; 387 void *row; 388 389 row = (void *)round_down((unsigned long)addr, META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW) 390 - META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR * META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW; 391 392 pr_err("Memory state around the buggy address:\n"); 393 394 for (i = -META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR; i <= META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR; i++) { 395 char buffer[4 + (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) * 2]; 396 char metadata[META_BYTES_PER_ROW]; 397 398 snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), 399 (i == 0) ? ">%px: " : " %px: ", row); 400 401 /* 402 * We should not pass a shadow pointer to generic 403 * function, because generic functions may try to 404 * access kasan mapping for the passed address. 405 */ 406 kasan_metadata_fetch_row(&metadata[0], row); 407 408 print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, buffer, 409 DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, META_BYTES_PER_ROW, 1, 410 metadata, META_BYTES_PER_ROW, 0); 411 412 if (meta_row_is_guilty(row, addr)) 413 pr_err("%*c\n", meta_pointer_offset(row, addr), '^'); 414 415 row += META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW; 416 } 417 } 418 419 static void print_report(struct kasan_report_info *info) 420 { 421 void *addr = kasan_reset_tag(info->access_addr); 422 u8 tag = get_tag(info->access_addr); 423 424 print_error_description(info); 425 if (addr_has_metadata(addr)) 426 kasan_print_tags(tag, info->first_bad_addr); 427 pr_err("\n"); 428 429 if (addr_has_metadata(addr)) { 430 print_address_description(addr, tag, info); 431 print_memory_metadata(info->first_bad_addr); 432 } else { 433 dump_stack_lvl(KERN_ERR); 434 } 435 } 436 437 static void complete_report_info(struct kasan_report_info *info) 438 { 439 void *addr = kasan_reset_tag(info->access_addr); 440 struct slab *slab; 441 442 if (info->type == KASAN_REPORT_ACCESS) 443 info->first_bad_addr = kasan_find_first_bad_addr( 444 info->access_addr, info->access_size); 445 else 446 info->first_bad_addr = addr; 447 448 slab = kasan_addr_to_slab(addr); 449 if (slab) { 450 info->cache = slab->slab_cache; 451 info->object = nearest_obj(info->cache, slab, addr); 452 453 /* Try to determine allocation size based on the metadata. */ 454 info->alloc_size = kasan_get_alloc_size(info->object, info->cache); 455 /* Fallback to the object size if failed. */ 456 if (!info->alloc_size) 457 info->alloc_size = info->cache->object_size; 458 } else 459 info->cache = info->object = NULL; 460 461 switch (info->type) { 462 case KASAN_REPORT_INVALID_FREE: 463 info->bug_type = "invalid-free"; 464 break; 465 case KASAN_REPORT_DOUBLE_FREE: 466 info->bug_type = "double-free"; 467 break; 468 default: 469 /* bug_type filled in by kasan_complete_mode_report_info. */ 470 break; 471 } 472 473 /* Fill in mode-specific report info fields. */ 474 kasan_complete_mode_report_info(info); 475 } 476 477 void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *ptr, unsigned long ip, enum kasan_report_type type) 478 { 479 unsigned long flags; 480 struct kasan_report_info info; 481 482 /* 483 * Do not check report_suppressed(), as an invalid-free cannot be 484 * caused by accessing slab metadata and thus should not be 485 * suppressed by kasan_disable/enable_current() critical sections. 486 */ 487 if (unlikely(!report_enabled())) 488 return; 489 490 start_report(&flags, true); 491 492 memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); 493 info.type = type; 494 info.access_addr = ptr; 495 info.access_size = 0; 496 info.is_write = false; 497 info.ip = ip; 498 499 complete_report_info(&info); 500 501 print_report(&info); 502 503 end_report(&flags, ptr); 504 } 505 506 /* 507 * kasan_report() is the only reporting function that uses 508 * user_access_save/restore(): kasan_report_invalid_free() cannot be called 509 * from a UACCESS region, and kasan_report_async() is not used on x86. 510 */ 511 bool kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write, 512 unsigned long ip) 513 { 514 bool ret = true; 515 void *ptr = (void *)addr; 516 unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save(); 517 unsigned long irq_flags; 518 struct kasan_report_info info; 519 520 if (unlikely(report_suppressed()) || unlikely(!report_enabled())) { 521 ret = false; 522 goto out; 523 } 524 525 start_report(&irq_flags, true); 526 527 memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); 528 info.type = KASAN_REPORT_ACCESS; 529 info.access_addr = ptr; 530 info.access_size = size; 531 info.is_write = is_write; 532 info.ip = ip; 533 534 complete_report_info(&info); 535 536 print_report(&info); 537 538 end_report(&irq_flags, ptr); 539 540 out: 541 user_access_restore(ua_flags); 542 543 return ret; 544 } 545 546 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS 547 void kasan_report_async(void) 548 { 549 unsigned long flags; 550 551 /* 552 * Do not check report_suppressed(), as kasan_disable/enable_current() 553 * critical sections do not affect Hardware Tag-Based KASAN. 554 */ 555 if (unlikely(!report_enabled())) 556 return; 557 558 start_report(&flags, false); 559 pr_err("BUG: KASAN: invalid-access\n"); 560 pr_err("Asynchronous fault: no details available\n"); 561 pr_err("\n"); 562 dump_stack_lvl(KERN_ERR); 563 end_report(&flags, NULL); 564 } 565 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ 566 567 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE 568 /* 569 * With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high 570 * canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads 571 * before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the 572 * address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds 573 * shadow memory access lands in the non-canonical part of the address space. 574 * Help the user figure out what the original bogus pointer was. 575 */ 576 void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr) 577 { 578 unsigned long orig_addr; 579 const char *bug_type; 580 581 if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) 582 return; 583 584 orig_addr = (addr - KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT; 585 /* 586 * For faults near the shadow address for NULL, we can be fairly certain 587 * that this is a KASAN shadow memory access. 588 * For faults that correspond to shadow for low canonical addresses, we 589 * can still be pretty sure - that shadow region is a fairly narrow 590 * chunk of the non-canonical address space. 591 * But faults that look like shadow for non-canonical addresses are a 592 * really large chunk of the address space. In that case, we still 593 * print the decoded address, but make it clear that this is not 594 * necessarily what's actually going on. 595 */ 596 if (orig_addr < PAGE_SIZE) 597 bug_type = "null-ptr-deref"; 598 else if (orig_addr < TASK_SIZE) 599 bug_type = "probably user-memory-access"; 600 else 601 bug_type = "maybe wild-memory-access"; 602 pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type, 603 orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1); 604 } 605 #endif 606