xref: /linux/kernel/stackleak.c (revision a4eb44a6435d6d8f9e642407a4a06f65eb90ca04)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 /*
3  * This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value
4  * before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature
5  * ported from grsecurity/PaX.
6  *
7  * Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
8  *
9  * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
10  * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
11  */
12 
13 #include <linux/stackleak.h>
14 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
15 
16 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
17 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
18 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
19 #include <linux/init.h>
20 
21 static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass);
22 
23 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
24 static int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
25 			void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
26 {
27 	int ret = 0;
28 	int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass);
29 	int prev_state = state;
30 
31 	table->data = &state;
32 	table->maxlen = sizeof(int);
33 	ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
34 	state = !!state;
35 	if (ret || !write || state == prev_state)
36 		return ret;
37 
38 	if (state)
39 		static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
40 	else
41 		static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
42 
43 	pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n",
44 					state ? "enabled" : "disabled");
45 	return ret;
46 }
47 static struct ctl_table stackleak_sysctls[] = {
48 	{
49 		.procname	= "stack_erasing",
50 		.data		= NULL,
51 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
52 		.mode		= 0600,
53 		.proc_handler	= stack_erasing_sysctl,
54 		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ZERO,
55 		.extra2		= SYSCTL_ONE,
56 	},
57 	{}
58 };
59 
60 static int __init stackleak_sysctls_init(void)
61 {
62 	register_sysctl_init("kernel", stackleak_sysctls);
63 	return 0;
64 }
65 late_initcall(stackleak_sysctls_init);
66 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
67 
68 #define skip_erasing()	static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass)
69 #else
70 #define skip_erasing()	false
71 #endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
72 
73 asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase(void)
74 {
75 	/* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
76 	unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack;
77 	unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
78 	unsigned int poison_count = 0;
79 	const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
80 
81 	if (skip_erasing())
82 		return;
83 
84 	/* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */
85 	if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE))
86 		kstack_ptr = boundary;
87 
88 	/* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */
89 	while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) {
90 		if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON)
91 			poison_count++;
92 		else
93 			poison_count = 0;
94 
95 		kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long);
96 	}
97 
98 	/*
99 	 * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and
100 	 * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y).
101 	 */
102 	if (kstack_ptr == boundary)
103 		kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
104 
105 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
106 	current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr;
107 #endif
108 
109 	/*
110 	 * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from
111 	 * 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that
112 	 * the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison.
113 	 */
114 	if (on_thread_stack())
115 		boundary = current_stack_pointer;
116 	else
117 		boundary = current_top_of_stack();
118 
119 	while (kstack_ptr < boundary) {
120 		*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON;
121 		kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
122 	}
123 
124 	/* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */
125 	current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64;
126 }
127 
128 void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void)
129 {
130 	unsigned long sp = current_stack_pointer;
131 
132 	/*
133 	 * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than
134 	 * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in
135 	 * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that.
136 	 */
137 	BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH);
138 
139 	/* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */
140 	sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long));
141 	if (sp < current->lowest_stack &&
142 	    sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
143 						sizeof(unsigned long)) {
144 		current->lowest_stack = sp;
145 	}
146 }
147 EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack);
148