1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 2 #include <linux/kernel.h> 3 #include <linux/syscalls.h> 4 #include <linux/fdtable.h> 5 #include <linux/string.h> 6 #include <linux/random.h> 7 #include <linux/module.h> 8 #include <linux/ptrace.h> 9 #include <linux/init.h> 10 #include <linux/errno.h> 11 #include <linux/cache.h> 12 #include <linux/bug.h> 13 #include <linux/err.h> 14 #include <linux/kcmp.h> 15 #include <linux/capability.h> 16 #include <linux/list.h> 17 #include <linux/eventpoll.h> 18 #include <linux/file.h> 19 20 #include <asm/unistd.h> 21 22 /* 23 * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons. 24 * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we 25 * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead. 26 * 27 * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with 28 * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space. 29 * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to 30 * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product 31 * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is 32 * relative prime to 2^n). 33 * 34 * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed 35 * it can be changed to an alternate scheme. 36 */ 37 static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly; 38 39 static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type) 40 { 41 return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1]; 42 } 43 44 /* 45 * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2 46 * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2 47 * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2 48 * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future) 49 */ 50 static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type) 51 { 52 long t1, t2; 53 54 t1 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type); 55 t2 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type); 56 57 return (t1 < t2) | ((t1 > t2) << 1); 58 } 59 60 /* The caller must have pinned the task */ 61 static struct file * 62 get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx) 63 { 64 struct file *file; 65 66 file = fget_task(task, idx); 67 if (file) 68 fput(file); 69 70 return file; 71 } 72 73 static void kcmp_unlock(struct rw_semaphore *l1, struct rw_semaphore *l2) 74 { 75 if (likely(l2 != l1)) 76 up_read(l2); 77 up_read(l1); 78 } 79 80 static int kcmp_lock(struct rw_semaphore *l1, struct rw_semaphore *l2) 81 { 82 int err; 83 84 if (l2 > l1) 85 swap(l1, l2); 86 87 err = down_read_killable(l1); 88 if (!err && likely(l1 != l2)) { 89 err = down_read_killable_nested(l2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); 90 if (err) 91 up_read(l1); 92 } 93 94 return err; 95 } 96 97 #ifdef CONFIG_EPOLL 98 static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1, 99 struct task_struct *task2, 100 unsigned long idx1, 101 struct kcmp_epoll_slot __user *uslot) 102 { 103 struct file *filp, *filp_epoll, *filp_tgt; 104 struct kcmp_epoll_slot slot; 105 106 if (copy_from_user(&slot, uslot, sizeof(slot))) 107 return -EFAULT; 108 109 filp = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1); 110 if (!filp) 111 return -EBADF; 112 113 filp_epoll = fget_task(task2, slot.efd); 114 if (!filp_epoll) 115 return -EBADF; 116 117 filp_tgt = get_epoll_tfile_raw_ptr(filp_epoll, slot.tfd, slot.toff); 118 fput(filp_epoll); 119 120 if (IS_ERR(filp_tgt)) 121 return PTR_ERR(filp_tgt); 122 123 return kcmp_ptr(filp, filp_tgt, KCMP_FILE); 124 } 125 #else 126 static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1, 127 struct task_struct *task2, 128 unsigned long idx1, 129 struct kcmp_epoll_slot __user *uslot) 130 { 131 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 132 } 133 #endif 134 135 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type, 136 unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2) 137 { 138 struct task_struct *task1, *task2; 139 int ret; 140 141 rcu_read_lock(); 142 143 /* 144 * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only. 145 */ 146 task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1); 147 task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2); 148 if (!task1 || !task2) 149 goto err_no_task; 150 151 get_task_struct(task1); 152 get_task_struct(task2); 153 154 rcu_read_unlock(); 155 156 /* 157 * One should have enough rights to inspect task details. 158 */ 159 ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->exec_update_lock, 160 &task2->signal->exec_update_lock); 161 if (ret) 162 goto err; 163 if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) || 164 !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) { 165 ret = -EPERM; 166 goto err_unlock; 167 } 168 169 switch (type) { 170 case KCMP_FILE: { 171 struct file *filp1, *filp2; 172 173 filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1); 174 filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2); 175 176 if (filp1 && filp2) 177 ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE); 178 else 179 ret = -EBADF; 180 break; 181 } 182 case KCMP_VM: 183 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM); 184 break; 185 case KCMP_FILES: 186 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES); 187 break; 188 case KCMP_FS: 189 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS); 190 break; 191 case KCMP_SIGHAND: 192 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND); 193 break; 194 case KCMP_IO: 195 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO); 196 break; 197 case KCMP_SYSVSEM: 198 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC 199 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list, 200 task2->sysvsem.undo_list, 201 KCMP_SYSVSEM); 202 #else 203 ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; 204 #endif 205 break; 206 case KCMP_EPOLL_TFD: 207 ret = kcmp_epoll_target(task1, task2, idx1, (void *)idx2); 208 break; 209 default: 210 ret = -EINVAL; 211 break; 212 } 213 214 err_unlock: 215 kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->exec_update_lock, 216 &task2->signal->exec_update_lock); 217 err: 218 put_task_struct(task1); 219 put_task_struct(task2); 220 221 return ret; 222 223 err_no_task: 224 rcu_read_unlock(); 225 return -ESRCH; 226 } 227 228 static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void) 229 { 230 int i; 231 232 get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies)); 233 234 for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++) 235 cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >> 1) | 1); 236 237 return 0; 238 } 239 arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init); 240