xref: /linux/kernel/cred.c (revision fd7d598270724cc787982ea48bbe17ad383a8b7f)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2 /* Task credentials management - see Documentation/security/credentials.rst
3  *
4  * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
5  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
6  */
7 
8 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "CRED: " fmt
9 
10 #include <linux/export.h>
11 #include <linux/cred.h>
12 #include <linux/slab.h>
13 #include <linux/sched.h>
14 #include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
15 #include <linux/key.h>
16 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
17 #include <linux/init_task.h>
18 #include <linux/security.h>
19 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
20 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
21 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
22 
23 #if 0
24 #define kdebug(FMT, ...)						\
25 	printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT "\n",					\
26 	       current->comm, current->pid, ##__VA_ARGS__)
27 #else
28 #define kdebug(FMT, ...)						\
29 do {									\
30 	if (0)								\
31 		no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT "\n",			\
32 			  current->comm, current->pid, ##__VA_ARGS__);	\
33 } while (0)
34 #endif
35 
36 static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
37 
38 /* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */
39 static struct group_info init_groups = { .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2) };
40 
41 /*
42  * The initial credentials for the initial task
43  */
44 struct cred init_cred = {
45 	.usage			= ATOMIC_INIT(4),
46 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
47 	.subscribers		= ATOMIC_INIT(2),
48 	.magic			= CRED_MAGIC,
49 #endif
50 	.uid			= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
51 	.gid			= GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
52 	.suid			= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
53 	.sgid			= GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
54 	.euid			= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
55 	.egid			= GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
56 	.fsuid			= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
57 	.fsgid			= GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
58 	.securebits		= SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
59 	.cap_inheritable	= CAP_EMPTY_SET,
60 	.cap_permitted		= CAP_FULL_SET,
61 	.cap_effective		= CAP_FULL_SET,
62 	.cap_bset		= CAP_FULL_SET,
63 	.user			= INIT_USER,
64 	.user_ns		= &init_user_ns,
65 	.group_info		= &init_groups,
66 	.ucounts		= &init_ucounts,
67 };
68 
69 static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n)
70 {
71 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
72 	atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n);
73 #endif
74 }
75 
76 static inline int read_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *cred)
77 {
78 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
79 	return atomic_read(&cred->subscribers);
80 #else
81 	return 0;
82 #endif
83 }
84 
85 static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n)
86 {
87 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
88 	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
89 
90 	atomic_add(n, &cred->subscribers);
91 #endif
92 }
93 
94 /*
95  * The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials
96  */
97 static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
98 {
99 	struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);
100 
101 	kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred);
102 
103 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
104 	if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC_DEAD ||
105 	    atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0 ||
106 	    read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0)
107 		panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with"
108 		      " mag %x, put %p, usage %d, subscr %d\n",
109 		      cred, cred->magic, cred->put_addr,
110 		      atomic_read(&cred->usage),
111 		      read_cred_subscribers(cred));
112 #else
113 	if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
114 		panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
115 		      cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
116 #endif
117 
118 	security_cred_free(cred);
119 	key_put(cred->session_keyring);
120 	key_put(cred->process_keyring);
121 	key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
122 	key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
123 	if (cred->group_info)
124 		put_group_info(cred->group_info);
125 	free_uid(cred->user);
126 	if (cred->ucounts)
127 		put_ucounts(cred->ucounts);
128 	put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
129 	kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred);
130 }
131 
132 /**
133  * __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials
134  * @cred: The record to release
135  *
136  * Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain.
137  */
138 void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
139 {
140 	kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred,
141 	       atomic_read(&cred->usage),
142 	       read_cred_subscribers(cred));
143 
144 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
145 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
146 	BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0);
147 	cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD;
148 	cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0);
149 #endif
150 	BUG_ON(cred == current->cred);
151 	BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred);
152 
153 	if (cred->non_rcu)
154 		put_cred_rcu(&cred->rcu);
155 	else
156 		call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
157 }
158 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
159 
160 /*
161  * Clean up a task's credentials when it exits
162  */
163 void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
164 {
165 	struct cred *cred;
166 
167 	kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
168 	       atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
169 	       read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
170 
171 	cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred;
172 	tsk->real_cred = NULL;
173 	validate_creds(cred);
174 	alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
175 	put_cred(cred);
176 
177 	cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
178 	tsk->cred = NULL;
179 	validate_creds(cred);
180 	alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
181 	put_cred(cred);
182 
183 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE
184 	key_put(tsk->cached_requested_key);
185 	tsk->cached_requested_key = NULL;
186 #endif
187 }
188 
189 /**
190  * get_task_cred - Get another task's objective credentials
191  * @task: The task to query
192  *
193  * Get the objective credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go
194  * away.  Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted.
195  *
196  * The caller must also make sure task doesn't get deleted, either by holding a
197  * ref on task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked.
198  */
199 const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task)
200 {
201 	const struct cred *cred;
202 
203 	rcu_read_lock();
204 
205 	do {
206 		cred = __task_cred((task));
207 		BUG_ON(!cred);
208 	} while (!get_cred_rcu(cred));
209 
210 	rcu_read_unlock();
211 	return cred;
212 }
213 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_task_cred);
214 
215 /*
216  * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a
217  * later date without risk of ENOMEM.
218  */
219 struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)
220 {
221 	struct cred *new;
222 
223 	new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
224 	if (!new)
225 		return NULL;
226 
227 	atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
228 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
229 	new->magic = CRED_MAGIC;
230 #endif
231 	if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0)
232 		goto error;
233 
234 	return new;
235 
236 error:
237 	abort_creds(new);
238 	return NULL;
239 }
240 
241 /**
242  * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
243  *
244  * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification.  A task's creds
245  * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to
246  * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by
247  * calling commit_creds().
248  *
249  * Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification.
250  *
251  * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
252  *
253  * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
254  */
255 struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
256 {
257 	struct task_struct *task = current;
258 	const struct cred *old;
259 	struct cred *new;
260 
261 	validate_process_creds();
262 
263 	new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
264 	if (!new)
265 		return NULL;
266 
267 	kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
268 
269 	old = task->cred;
270 	memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));
271 
272 	new->non_rcu = 0;
273 	atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
274 	set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
275 	get_group_info(new->group_info);
276 	get_uid(new->user);
277 	get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
278 
279 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
280 	key_get(new->session_keyring);
281 	key_get(new->process_keyring);
282 	key_get(new->thread_keyring);
283 	key_get(new->request_key_auth);
284 #endif
285 
286 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
287 	new->security = NULL;
288 #endif
289 
290 	new->ucounts = get_ucounts(new->ucounts);
291 	if (!new->ucounts)
292 		goto error;
293 
294 	if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0)
295 		goto error;
296 
297 	validate_creds(new);
298 	return new;
299 
300 error:
301 	abort_creds(new);
302 	return NULL;
303 }
304 EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
305 
306 /*
307  * Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve()
308  * - The caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex
309  */
310 struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
311 {
312 	struct cred *new;
313 
314 	new = prepare_creds();
315 	if (!new)
316 		return new;
317 
318 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
319 	/* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
320 	key_put(new->thread_keyring);
321 	new->thread_keyring = NULL;
322 
323 	/* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */
324 	key_put(new->process_keyring);
325 	new->process_keyring = NULL;
326 #endif
327 
328 	new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
329 	new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
330 
331 	return new;
332 }
333 
334 /*
335  * Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
336  *
337  * We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
338  * set.
339  *
340  * The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
341  * objective and subjective credentials
342  */
343 int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
344 {
345 	struct cred *new;
346 	int ret;
347 
348 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE
349 	p->cached_requested_key = NULL;
350 #endif
351 
352 	if (
353 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
354 		!p->cred->thread_keyring &&
355 #endif
356 		clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
357 	    ) {
358 		p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
359 		get_cred(p->cred);
360 		alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
361 		kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
362 		       p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
363 		       read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
364 		inc_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
365 		return 0;
366 	}
367 
368 	new = prepare_creds();
369 	if (!new)
370 		return -ENOMEM;
371 
372 	if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
373 		ret = create_user_ns(new);
374 		if (ret < 0)
375 			goto error_put;
376 		ret = set_cred_ucounts(new);
377 		if (ret < 0)
378 			goto error_put;
379 	}
380 
381 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
382 	/* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
383 	 * had one */
384 	if (new->thread_keyring) {
385 		key_put(new->thread_keyring);
386 		new->thread_keyring = NULL;
387 		if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
388 			install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
389 	}
390 
391 	/* The process keyring is only shared between the threads in a process;
392 	 * anything outside of those threads doesn't inherit.
393 	 */
394 	if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
395 		key_put(new->process_keyring);
396 		new->process_keyring = NULL;
397 	}
398 #endif
399 
400 	p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
401 	inc_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
402 	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
403 	validate_creds(new);
404 	return 0;
405 
406 error_put:
407 	put_cred(new);
408 	return ret;
409 }
410 
411 static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset)
412 {
413 	const struct user_namespace *set_ns = set->user_ns;
414 	const struct user_namespace *subset_ns = subset->user_ns;
415 
416 	/* If the two credentials are in the same user namespace see if
417 	 * the capabilities of subset are a subset of set.
418 	 */
419 	if (set_ns == subset_ns)
420 		return cap_issubset(subset->cap_permitted, set->cap_permitted);
421 
422 	/* The credentials are in a different user namespaces
423 	 * therefore one is a subset of the other only if a set is an
424 	 * ancestor of subset and set->euid is owner of subset or one
425 	 * of subsets ancestors.
426 	 */
427 	for (;subset_ns != &init_user_ns; subset_ns = subset_ns->parent) {
428 		if ((set_ns == subset_ns->parent)  &&
429 		    uid_eq(subset_ns->owner, set->euid))
430 			return true;
431 	}
432 
433 	return false;
434 }
435 
436 /**
437  * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
438  * @new: The credentials to be assigned
439  *
440  * Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace
441  * the old set.  Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are
442  * updated.  This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are
443  * in an overridden state.
444  *
445  * This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials.
446  *
447  * Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end
448  * of, say, sys_setgid().
449  */
450 int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
451 {
452 	struct task_struct *task = current;
453 	const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;
454 
455 	kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
456 	       atomic_read(&new->usage),
457 	       read_cred_subscribers(new));
458 
459 	BUG_ON(task->cred != old);
460 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
461 	BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2);
462 	validate_creds(old);
463 	validate_creds(new);
464 #endif
465 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
466 
467 	get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
468 
469 	/* dumpability changes */
470 	if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) ||
471 	    !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
472 	    !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
473 	    !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
474 	    !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
475 		if (task->mm)
476 			set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
477 		task->pdeath_signal = 0;
478 		/*
479 		 * If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable,
480 		 * the dumpability change must become visible before
481 		 * the credential change; otherwise, a __ptrace_may_access()
482 		 * racing with this change may be able to attach to a task it
483 		 * shouldn't be able to attach to (as if the task had dropped
484 		 * privileges without becoming nondumpable).
485 		 * Pairs with a read barrier in __ptrace_may_access().
486 		 */
487 		smp_wmb();
488 	}
489 
490 	/* alter the thread keyring */
491 	if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid))
492 		key_fsuid_changed(new);
493 	if (!gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid))
494 		key_fsgid_changed(new);
495 
496 	/* do it
497 	 * RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked
498 	 * in set_user().
499 	 */
500 	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
501 	if (new->user != old->user || new->user_ns != old->user_ns)
502 		inc_rlimit_ucounts(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
503 	rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
504 	rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
505 	if (new->user != old->user || new->user_ns != old->user_ns)
506 		dec_rlimit_ucounts(old->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
507 	alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);
508 
509 	/* send notifications */
510 	if (!uid_eq(new->uid,   old->uid)  ||
511 	    !uid_eq(new->euid,  old->euid) ||
512 	    !uid_eq(new->suid,  old->suid) ||
513 	    !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid))
514 		proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID);
515 
516 	if (!gid_eq(new->gid,   old->gid)  ||
517 	    !gid_eq(new->egid,  old->egid) ||
518 	    !gid_eq(new->sgid,  old->sgid) ||
519 	    !gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid))
520 		proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);
521 
522 	/* release the old obj and subj refs both */
523 	put_cred(old);
524 	put_cred(old);
525 	return 0;
526 }
527 EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
528 
529 /**
530  * abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task
531  * @new: The credentials that were going to be applied
532  *
533  * Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the
534  * current task.
535  */
536 void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
537 {
538 	kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
539 	       atomic_read(&new->usage),
540 	       read_cred_subscribers(new));
541 
542 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
543 	BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(new) != 0);
544 #endif
545 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
546 	put_cred(new);
547 }
548 EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds);
549 
550 /**
551  * override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials
552  * @new: The credentials to be assigned
553  *
554  * Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current
555  * process, returning the old set for later reversion.
556  */
557 const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
558 {
559 	const struct cred *old = current->cred;
560 
561 	kdebug("override_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
562 	       atomic_read(&new->usage),
563 	       read_cred_subscribers(new));
564 
565 	validate_creds(old);
566 	validate_creds(new);
567 
568 	/*
569 	 * NOTE! This uses 'get_new_cred()' rather than 'get_cred()'.
570 	 *
571 	 * That means that we do not clear the 'non_rcu' flag, since
572 	 * we are only installing the cred into the thread-synchronous
573 	 * '->cred' pointer, not the '->real_cred' pointer that is
574 	 * visible to other threads under RCU.
575 	 *
576 	 * Also note that we did validate_creds() manually, not depending
577 	 * on the validation in 'get_cred()'.
578 	 */
579 	get_new_cred((struct cred *)new);
580 	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1);
581 	rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
582 	alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1);
583 
584 	kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old,
585 	       atomic_read(&old->usage),
586 	       read_cred_subscribers(old));
587 	return old;
588 }
589 EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
590 
591 /**
592  * revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override
593  * @old: The credentials to be restored
594  *
595  * Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set,
596  * discarding the override set.
597  */
598 void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
599 {
600 	const struct cred *override = current->cred;
601 
602 	kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%d,%d})", old,
603 	       atomic_read(&old->usage),
604 	       read_cred_subscribers(old));
605 
606 	validate_creds(old);
607 	validate_creds(override);
608 	alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1);
609 	rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
610 	alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1);
611 	put_cred(override);
612 }
613 EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
614 
615 /**
616  * cred_fscmp - Compare two credentials with respect to filesystem access.
617  * @a: The first credential
618  * @b: The second credential
619  *
620  * cred_cmp() will return zero if both credentials have the same
621  * fsuid, fsgid, and supplementary groups.  That is, if they will both
622  * provide the same access to files based on mode/uid/gid.
623  * If the credentials are different, then either -1 or 1 will
624  * be returned depending on whether @a comes before or after @b
625  * respectively in an arbitrary, but stable, ordering of credentials.
626  *
627  * Return: -1, 0, or 1 depending on comparison
628  */
629 int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *a, const struct cred *b)
630 {
631 	struct group_info *ga, *gb;
632 	int g;
633 
634 	if (a == b)
635 		return 0;
636 	if (uid_lt(a->fsuid, b->fsuid))
637 		return -1;
638 	if (uid_gt(a->fsuid, b->fsuid))
639 		return 1;
640 
641 	if (gid_lt(a->fsgid, b->fsgid))
642 		return -1;
643 	if (gid_gt(a->fsgid, b->fsgid))
644 		return 1;
645 
646 	ga = a->group_info;
647 	gb = b->group_info;
648 	if (ga == gb)
649 		return 0;
650 	if (ga == NULL)
651 		return -1;
652 	if (gb == NULL)
653 		return 1;
654 	if (ga->ngroups < gb->ngroups)
655 		return -1;
656 	if (ga->ngroups > gb->ngroups)
657 		return 1;
658 
659 	for (g = 0; g < ga->ngroups; g++) {
660 		if (gid_lt(ga->gid[g], gb->gid[g]))
661 			return -1;
662 		if (gid_gt(ga->gid[g], gb->gid[g]))
663 			return 1;
664 	}
665 	return 0;
666 }
667 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cred_fscmp);
668 
669 int set_cred_ucounts(struct cred *new)
670 {
671 	struct ucounts *new_ucounts, *old_ucounts = new->ucounts;
672 
673 	/*
674 	 * This optimization is needed because alloc_ucounts() uses locks
675 	 * for table lookups.
676 	 */
677 	if (old_ucounts->ns == new->user_ns && uid_eq(old_ucounts->uid, new->uid))
678 		return 0;
679 
680 	if (!(new_ucounts = alloc_ucounts(new->user_ns, new->uid)))
681 		return -EAGAIN;
682 
683 	new->ucounts = new_ucounts;
684 	put_ucounts(old_ucounts);
685 
686 	return 0;
687 }
688 
689 /*
690  * initialise the credentials stuff
691  */
692 void __init cred_init(void)
693 {
694 	/* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */
695 	cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar", sizeof(struct cred), 0,
696 			SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
697 }
698 
699 /**
700  * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
701  * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
702  *
703  * Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service.  This can then be used to
704  * override a task's own credentials so that work can be done on behalf of that
705  * task that requires a different subjective context.
706  *
707  * @daemon is used to provide a base cred, with the security data derived from
708  * that; if this is "&init_task", they'll be set to 0, no groups, full
709  * capabilities, and no keys.
710  *
711  * The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired.
712  *
713  * Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory.
714  */
715 struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
716 {
717 	const struct cred *old;
718 	struct cred *new;
719 
720 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!daemon))
721 		return NULL;
722 
723 	new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
724 	if (!new)
725 		return NULL;
726 
727 	kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
728 
729 	old = get_task_cred(daemon);
730 	validate_creds(old);
731 
732 	*new = *old;
733 	new->non_rcu = 0;
734 	atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
735 	set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
736 	get_uid(new->user);
737 	get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
738 	get_group_info(new->group_info);
739 
740 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
741 	new->session_keyring = NULL;
742 	new->process_keyring = NULL;
743 	new->thread_keyring = NULL;
744 	new->request_key_auth = NULL;
745 	new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
746 #endif
747 
748 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
749 	new->security = NULL;
750 #endif
751 	new->ucounts = get_ucounts(new->ucounts);
752 	if (!new->ucounts)
753 		goto error;
754 
755 	if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0)
756 		goto error;
757 
758 	put_cred(old);
759 	validate_creds(new);
760 	return new;
761 
762 error:
763 	put_cred(new);
764 	put_cred(old);
765 	return NULL;
766 }
767 EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
768 
769 /**
770  * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
771  * @new: The credentials to alter
772  * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
773  *
774  * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
775  * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
776  */
777 int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
778 {
779 	return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
780 }
781 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
782 
783 /**
784  * set_security_override_from_ctx - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
785  * @new: The credentials to alter
786  * @secctx: The LSM security context to generate the security ID from.
787  *
788  * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
789  * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.  The
790  * security ID is specified in string form as a security context to be
791  * interpreted by the LSM.
792  */
793 int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
794 {
795 	u32 secid;
796 	int ret;
797 
798 	ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
799 	if (ret < 0)
800 		return ret;
801 
802 	return set_security_override(new, secid);
803 }
804 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
805 
806 /**
807  * set_create_files_as - Set the LSM file create context in a set of credentials
808  * @new: The credentials to alter
809  * @inode: The inode to take the context from
810  *
811  * Change the LSM file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same
812  * as the object context of the specified inode, so that the new inodes have
813  * the same MAC context as that inode.
814  */
815 int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
816 {
817 	if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
818 		return -EINVAL;
819 	new->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
820 	new->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
821 	return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
822 }
823 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
824 
825 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
826 
827 bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
828 {
829 	if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
830 		return true;
831 	return false;
832 }
833 EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid);
834 
835 /*
836  * dump invalid credentials
837  */
838 static void dump_invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *label,
839 			       const struct task_struct *tsk)
840 {
841 	pr_err("%s credentials: %p %s%s%s\n",
842 	       label, cred,
843 	       cred == &init_cred ? "[init]" : "",
844 	       cred == tsk->real_cred ? "[real]" : "",
845 	       cred == tsk->cred ? "[eff]" : "");
846 	pr_err("->magic=%x, put_addr=%p\n",
847 	       cred->magic, cred->put_addr);
848 	pr_err("->usage=%d, subscr=%d\n",
849 	       atomic_read(&cred->usage),
850 	       read_cred_subscribers(cred));
851 	pr_err("->*uid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
852 		from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
853 		from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
854 		from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
855 		from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid));
856 	pr_err("->*gid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
857 		from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
858 		from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
859 		from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
860 		from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
861 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
862 	pr_err("->security is %p\n", cred->security);
863 	if ((unsigned long) cred->security >= PAGE_SIZE &&
864 	    (((unsigned long) cred->security & 0xffffff00) !=
865 	     (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)))
866 		pr_err("->security {%x, %x}\n",
867 		       ((u32*)cred->security)[0],
868 		       ((u32*)cred->security)[1]);
869 #endif
870 }
871 
872 /*
873  * report use of invalid credentials
874  */
875 void __noreturn __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line)
876 {
877 	pr_err("Invalid credentials\n");
878 	pr_err("At %s:%u\n", file, line);
879 	dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current);
880 	BUG();
881 }
882 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalid_creds);
883 
884 /*
885  * check the credentials on a process
886  */
887 void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk,
888 			      const char *file, unsigned line)
889 {
890 	if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) {
891 		if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 ||
892 			     creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
893 			goto invalid_creds;
894 	} else {
895 		if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 ||
896 			     read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 ||
897 			     creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) ||
898 			     creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
899 			goto invalid_creds;
900 	}
901 	return;
902 
903 invalid_creds:
904 	pr_err("Invalid process credentials\n");
905 	pr_err("At %s:%u\n", file, line);
906 
907 	dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk);
908 	if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred)
909 		dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk);
910 	else
911 		pr_err("Effective creds == Real creds\n");
912 	BUG();
913 }
914 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__validate_process_creds);
915 
916 /*
917  * check creds for do_exit()
918  */
919 void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
920 {
921 	kdebug("validate_creds_for_do_exit(%p,%p{%d,%d})",
922 	       tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
923 	       atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
924 	       read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
925 
926 	__validate_process_creds(tsk, __FILE__, __LINE__);
927 }
928 
929 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS */
930