xref: /linux/kernel/cred.c (revision 9ffc93f203c18a70623f21950f1dd473c9ec48cd)
1 /* Task credentials management - see Documentation/security/credentials.txt
2  *
3  * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
4  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
5  *
6  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
7  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
8  * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
9  * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
10  */
11 #include <linux/export.h>
12 #include <linux/cred.h>
13 #include <linux/slab.h>
14 #include <linux/sched.h>
15 #include <linux/key.h>
16 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
17 #include <linux/init_task.h>
18 #include <linux/security.h>
19 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
20 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
21 
22 #if 0
23 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
24 	printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
25 #else
26 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
27 	no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
28 #endif
29 
30 static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
31 
32 /*
33  * The common credentials for the initial task's thread group
34  */
35 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
36 static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = {
37 	.usage	= ATOMIC_INIT(2),
38 	.tgid	= 0,
39 	.lock	= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_cred.tgcred.lock),
40 };
41 #endif
42 
43 /*
44  * The initial credentials for the initial task
45  */
46 struct cred init_cred = {
47 	.usage			= ATOMIC_INIT(4),
48 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
49 	.subscribers		= ATOMIC_INIT(2),
50 	.magic			= CRED_MAGIC,
51 #endif
52 	.securebits		= SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
53 	.cap_inheritable	= CAP_EMPTY_SET,
54 	.cap_permitted		= CAP_FULL_SET,
55 	.cap_effective		= CAP_FULL_SET,
56 	.cap_bset		= CAP_FULL_SET,
57 	.user			= INIT_USER,
58 	.user_ns		= &init_user_ns,
59 	.group_info		= &init_groups,
60 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
61 	.tgcred			= &init_tgcred,
62 #endif
63 };
64 
65 static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n)
66 {
67 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
68 	atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n);
69 #endif
70 }
71 
72 static inline int read_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *cred)
73 {
74 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
75 	return atomic_read(&cred->subscribers);
76 #else
77 	return 0;
78 #endif
79 }
80 
81 static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n)
82 {
83 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
84 	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
85 
86 	atomic_add(n, &cred->subscribers);
87 #endif
88 }
89 
90 /*
91  * Dispose of the shared task group credentials
92  */
93 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
94 static void release_tgcred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
95 {
96 	struct thread_group_cred *tgcred =
97 		container_of(rcu, struct thread_group_cred, rcu);
98 
99 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&tgcred->usage) != 0);
100 
101 	key_put(tgcred->session_keyring);
102 	key_put(tgcred->process_keyring);
103 	kfree(tgcred);
104 }
105 #endif
106 
107 /*
108  * Release a set of thread group credentials.
109  */
110 static void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred)
111 {
112 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
113 	struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = cred->tgcred;
114 
115 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&tgcred->usage))
116 		call_rcu(&tgcred->rcu, release_tgcred_rcu);
117 #endif
118 }
119 
120 /*
121  * The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials
122  */
123 static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
124 {
125 	struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);
126 
127 	kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred);
128 
129 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
130 	if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC_DEAD ||
131 	    atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0 ||
132 	    read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0)
133 		panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with"
134 		      " mag %x, put %p, usage %d, subscr %d\n",
135 		      cred, cred->magic, cred->put_addr,
136 		      atomic_read(&cred->usage),
137 		      read_cred_subscribers(cred));
138 #else
139 	if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
140 		panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
141 		      cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
142 #endif
143 
144 	security_cred_free(cred);
145 	key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
146 	key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
147 	release_tgcred(cred);
148 	if (cred->group_info)
149 		put_group_info(cred->group_info);
150 	free_uid(cred->user);
151 	kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred);
152 }
153 
154 /**
155  * __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials
156  * @cred: The record to release
157  *
158  * Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain.
159  */
160 void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
161 {
162 	kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred,
163 	       atomic_read(&cred->usage),
164 	       read_cred_subscribers(cred));
165 
166 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
167 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
168 	BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0);
169 	cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD;
170 	cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0);
171 #endif
172 	BUG_ON(cred == current->cred);
173 	BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred);
174 
175 	call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
176 }
177 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
178 
179 /*
180  * Clean up a task's credentials when it exits
181  */
182 void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
183 {
184 	struct cred *cred;
185 
186 	kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
187 	       atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
188 	       read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
189 
190 	cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred;
191 	tsk->real_cred = NULL;
192 	validate_creds(cred);
193 	alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
194 	put_cred(cred);
195 
196 	cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
197 	tsk->cred = NULL;
198 	validate_creds(cred);
199 	alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
200 	put_cred(cred);
201 
202 	cred = (struct cred *) tsk->replacement_session_keyring;
203 	if (cred) {
204 		tsk->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
205 		validate_creds(cred);
206 		put_cred(cred);
207 	}
208 }
209 
210 /**
211  * get_task_cred - Get another task's objective credentials
212  * @task: The task to query
213  *
214  * Get the objective credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go
215  * away.  Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted.
216  *
217  * The caller must also make sure task doesn't get deleted, either by holding a
218  * ref on task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked.
219  */
220 const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task)
221 {
222 	const struct cred *cred;
223 
224 	rcu_read_lock();
225 
226 	do {
227 		cred = __task_cred((task));
228 		BUG_ON(!cred);
229 	} while (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&((struct cred *)cred)->usage));
230 
231 	rcu_read_unlock();
232 	return cred;
233 }
234 
235 /*
236  * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a
237  * later date without risk of ENOMEM.
238  */
239 struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)
240 {
241 	struct cred *new;
242 
243 	new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
244 	if (!new)
245 		return NULL;
246 
247 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
248 	new->tgcred = kzalloc(sizeof(*new->tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
249 	if (!new->tgcred) {
250 		kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, new);
251 		return NULL;
252 	}
253 	atomic_set(&new->tgcred->usage, 1);
254 #endif
255 
256 	atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
257 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
258 	new->magic = CRED_MAGIC;
259 #endif
260 
261 	if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
262 		goto error;
263 
264 	return new;
265 
266 error:
267 	abort_creds(new);
268 	return NULL;
269 }
270 
271 /**
272  * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
273  *
274  * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification.  A task's creds
275  * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to
276  * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by
277  * calling commit_creds().
278  *
279  * Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification.
280  *
281  * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
282  *
283  * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
284  */
285 struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
286 {
287 	struct task_struct *task = current;
288 	const struct cred *old;
289 	struct cred *new;
290 
291 	validate_process_creds();
292 
293 	new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
294 	if (!new)
295 		return NULL;
296 
297 	kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
298 
299 	old = task->cred;
300 	memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));
301 
302 	atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
303 	set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
304 	get_group_info(new->group_info);
305 	get_uid(new->user);
306 
307 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
308 	key_get(new->thread_keyring);
309 	key_get(new->request_key_auth);
310 	atomic_inc(&new->tgcred->usage);
311 #endif
312 
313 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
314 	new->security = NULL;
315 #endif
316 
317 	if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
318 		goto error;
319 	validate_creds(new);
320 	return new;
321 
322 error:
323 	abort_creds(new);
324 	return NULL;
325 }
326 EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
327 
328 /*
329  * Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve()
330  * - The caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex
331  */
332 struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
333 {
334 	struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL;
335 	struct cred *new;
336 
337 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
338 	tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
339 	if (!tgcred)
340 		return NULL;
341 #endif
342 
343 	new = prepare_creds();
344 	if (!new) {
345 		kfree(tgcred);
346 		return new;
347 	}
348 
349 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
350 	/* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
351 	key_put(new->thread_keyring);
352 	new->thread_keyring = NULL;
353 
354 	/* create a new per-thread-group creds for all this set of threads to
355 	 * share */
356 	memcpy(tgcred, new->tgcred, sizeof(struct thread_group_cred));
357 
358 	atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
359 	spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
360 
361 	/* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */
362 	key_get(tgcred->session_keyring);
363 	tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
364 
365 	release_tgcred(new);
366 	new->tgcred = tgcred;
367 #endif
368 
369 	return new;
370 }
371 
372 /*
373  * Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
374  *
375  * We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
376  * set.
377  *
378  * The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
379  * objective and subjective credentials
380  */
381 int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
382 {
383 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
384 	struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
385 #endif
386 	struct cred *new;
387 	int ret;
388 
389 	if (
390 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
391 		!p->cred->thread_keyring &&
392 #endif
393 		clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
394 	    ) {
395 		p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
396 		get_cred(p->cred);
397 		alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
398 		kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
399 		       p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
400 		       read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
401 		atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
402 		return 0;
403 	}
404 
405 	new = prepare_creds();
406 	if (!new)
407 		return -ENOMEM;
408 
409 	if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
410 		ret = create_user_ns(new);
411 		if (ret < 0)
412 			goto error_put;
413 	}
414 
415 	/* cache user_ns in cred.  Doesn't need a refcount because it will
416 	 * stay pinned by cred->user
417 	 */
418 	new->user_ns = new->user->user_ns;
419 
420 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
421 	/* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
422 	 * had one */
423 	if (new->thread_keyring) {
424 		key_put(new->thread_keyring);
425 		new->thread_keyring = NULL;
426 		if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
427 			install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
428 	}
429 
430 	/* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in
431 	 * a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a
432 	 * bit */
433 	if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
434 		tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
435 		if (!tgcred) {
436 			ret = -ENOMEM;
437 			goto error_put;
438 		}
439 		atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
440 		spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
441 		tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
442 		tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring);
443 
444 		release_tgcred(new);
445 		new->tgcred = tgcred;
446 	}
447 #endif
448 
449 	atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
450 	p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
451 	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
452 	validate_creds(new);
453 	return 0;
454 
455 error_put:
456 	put_cred(new);
457 	return ret;
458 }
459 
460 /**
461  * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
462  * @new: The credentials to be assigned
463  *
464  * Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace
465  * the old set.  Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are
466  * updated.  This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are
467  * in an overridden state.
468  *
469  * This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials.
470  *
471  * Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end
472  * of, say, sys_setgid().
473  */
474 int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
475 {
476 	struct task_struct *task = current;
477 	const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;
478 
479 	kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
480 	       atomic_read(&new->usage),
481 	       read_cred_subscribers(new));
482 
483 	BUG_ON(task->cred != old);
484 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
485 	BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2);
486 	validate_creds(old);
487 	validate_creds(new);
488 #endif
489 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
490 
491 	get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
492 
493 	/* dumpability changes */
494 	if (old->euid != new->euid ||
495 	    old->egid != new->egid ||
496 	    old->fsuid != new->fsuid ||
497 	    old->fsgid != new->fsgid ||
498 	    !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) {
499 		if (task->mm)
500 			set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
501 		task->pdeath_signal = 0;
502 		smp_wmb();
503 	}
504 
505 	/* alter the thread keyring */
506 	if (new->fsuid != old->fsuid)
507 		key_fsuid_changed(task);
508 	if (new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
509 		key_fsgid_changed(task);
510 
511 	/* do it
512 	 * RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked
513 	 * in set_user().
514 	 */
515 	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
516 	if (new->user != old->user)
517 		atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
518 	rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
519 	rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
520 	if (new->user != old->user)
521 		atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
522 	alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);
523 
524 	/* send notifications */
525 	if (new->uid   != old->uid  ||
526 	    new->euid  != old->euid ||
527 	    new->suid  != old->suid ||
528 	    new->fsuid != old->fsuid)
529 		proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID);
530 
531 	if (new->gid   != old->gid  ||
532 	    new->egid  != old->egid ||
533 	    new->sgid  != old->sgid ||
534 	    new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
535 		proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);
536 
537 	/* release the old obj and subj refs both */
538 	put_cred(old);
539 	put_cred(old);
540 	return 0;
541 }
542 EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
543 
544 /**
545  * abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task
546  * @new: The credentials that were going to be applied
547  *
548  * Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the
549  * current task.
550  */
551 void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
552 {
553 	kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
554 	       atomic_read(&new->usage),
555 	       read_cred_subscribers(new));
556 
557 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
558 	BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(new) != 0);
559 #endif
560 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
561 	put_cred(new);
562 }
563 EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds);
564 
565 /**
566  * override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials
567  * @new: The credentials to be assigned
568  *
569  * Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current
570  * process, returning the old set for later reversion.
571  */
572 const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
573 {
574 	const struct cred *old = current->cred;
575 
576 	kdebug("override_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
577 	       atomic_read(&new->usage),
578 	       read_cred_subscribers(new));
579 
580 	validate_creds(old);
581 	validate_creds(new);
582 	get_cred(new);
583 	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1);
584 	rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
585 	alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1);
586 
587 	kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old,
588 	       atomic_read(&old->usage),
589 	       read_cred_subscribers(old));
590 	return old;
591 }
592 EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
593 
594 /**
595  * revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override
596  * @old: The credentials to be restored
597  *
598  * Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set,
599  * discarding the override set.
600  */
601 void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
602 {
603 	const struct cred *override = current->cred;
604 
605 	kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%d,%d})", old,
606 	       atomic_read(&old->usage),
607 	       read_cred_subscribers(old));
608 
609 	validate_creds(old);
610 	validate_creds(override);
611 	alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1);
612 	rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
613 	alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1);
614 	put_cred(override);
615 }
616 EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
617 
618 /*
619  * initialise the credentials stuff
620  */
621 void __init cred_init(void)
622 {
623 	/* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */
624 	cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar", sizeof(struct cred),
625 				     0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
626 }
627 
628 /**
629  * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
630  * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
631  *
632  * Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service.  This can then be used to
633  * override a task's own credentials so that work can be done on behalf of that
634  * task that requires a different subjective context.
635  *
636  * @daemon is used to provide a base for the security record, but can be NULL.
637  * If @daemon is supplied, then the security data will be derived from that;
638  * otherwise they'll be set to 0 and no groups, full capabilities and no keys.
639  *
640  * The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired.
641  *
642  * Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory.
643  *
644  * Does not take, and does not return holding current->cred_replace_mutex.
645  */
646 struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
647 {
648 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
649 	struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
650 #endif
651 	const struct cred *old;
652 	struct cred *new;
653 
654 	new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
655 	if (!new)
656 		return NULL;
657 
658 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
659 	tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
660 	if (!tgcred) {
661 		kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, new);
662 		return NULL;
663 	}
664 #endif
665 
666 	kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
667 
668 	if (daemon)
669 		old = get_task_cred(daemon);
670 	else
671 		old = get_cred(&init_cred);
672 
673 	validate_creds(old);
674 
675 	*new = *old;
676 	atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
677 	set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
678 	get_uid(new->user);
679 	get_group_info(new->group_info);
680 
681 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
682 	atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
683 	spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
684 	tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
685 	tgcred->session_keyring = NULL;
686 	new->tgcred = tgcred;
687 	new->request_key_auth = NULL;
688 	new->thread_keyring = NULL;
689 	new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
690 #endif
691 
692 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
693 	new->security = NULL;
694 #endif
695 	if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
696 		goto error;
697 
698 	put_cred(old);
699 	validate_creds(new);
700 	return new;
701 
702 error:
703 	put_cred(new);
704 	put_cred(old);
705 	return NULL;
706 }
707 EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
708 
709 /**
710  * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
711  * @new: The credentials to alter
712  * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
713  *
714  * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
715  * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
716  */
717 int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
718 {
719 	return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
720 }
721 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
722 
723 /**
724  * set_security_override_from_ctx - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
725  * @new: The credentials to alter
726  * @secctx: The LSM security context to generate the security ID from.
727  *
728  * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
729  * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.  The
730  * security ID is specified in string form as a security context to be
731  * interpreted by the LSM.
732  */
733 int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
734 {
735 	u32 secid;
736 	int ret;
737 
738 	ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
739 	if (ret < 0)
740 		return ret;
741 
742 	return set_security_override(new, secid);
743 }
744 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
745 
746 /**
747  * set_create_files_as - Set the LSM file create context in a set of credentials
748  * @new: The credentials to alter
749  * @inode: The inode to take the context from
750  *
751  * Change the LSM file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same
752  * as the object context of the specified inode, so that the new inodes have
753  * the same MAC context as that inode.
754  */
755 int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
756 {
757 	new->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
758 	new->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
759 	return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
760 }
761 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
762 
763 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
764 
765 bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
766 {
767 	if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
768 		return true;
769 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
770 	/*
771 	 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
772 	 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
773 	 */
774 	if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) {
775 		if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
776 			return true;
777 		if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
778 		    (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
779 			return true;
780 	}
781 #endif
782 	return false;
783 }
784 EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid);
785 
786 /*
787  * dump invalid credentials
788  */
789 static void dump_invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *label,
790 			       const struct task_struct *tsk)
791 {
792 	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: %s credentials: %p %s%s%s\n",
793 	       label, cred,
794 	       cred == &init_cred ? "[init]" : "",
795 	       cred == tsk->real_cred ? "[real]" : "",
796 	       cred == tsk->cred ? "[eff]" : "");
797 	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->magic=%x, put_addr=%p\n",
798 	       cred->magic, cred->put_addr);
799 	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->usage=%d, subscr=%d\n",
800 	       atomic_read(&cred->usage),
801 	       read_cred_subscribers(cred));
802 	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*uid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
803 	       cred->uid, cred->euid, cred->suid, cred->fsuid);
804 	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*gid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
805 	       cred->gid, cred->egid, cred->sgid, cred->fsgid);
806 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
807 	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security is %p\n", cred->security);
808 	if ((unsigned long) cred->security >= PAGE_SIZE &&
809 	    (((unsigned long) cred->security & 0xffffff00) !=
810 	     (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)))
811 		printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security {%x, %x}\n",
812 		       ((u32*)cred->security)[0],
813 		       ((u32*)cred->security)[1]);
814 #endif
815 }
816 
817 /*
818  * report use of invalid credentials
819  */
820 void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line)
821 {
822 	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials\n");
823 	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
824 	dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current);
825 	BUG();
826 }
827 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalid_creds);
828 
829 /*
830  * check the credentials on a process
831  */
832 void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk,
833 			      const char *file, unsigned line)
834 {
835 	if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) {
836 		if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 ||
837 			     creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
838 			goto invalid_creds;
839 	} else {
840 		if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 ||
841 			     read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 ||
842 			     creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) ||
843 			     creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
844 			goto invalid_creds;
845 	}
846 	return;
847 
848 invalid_creds:
849 	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid process credentials\n");
850 	printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
851 
852 	dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk);
853 	if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred)
854 		dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk);
855 	else
856 		printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Effective creds == Real creds\n");
857 	BUG();
858 }
859 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__validate_process_creds);
860 
861 /*
862  * check creds for do_exit()
863  */
864 void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
865 {
866 	kdebug("validate_creds_for_do_exit(%p,%p{%d,%d})",
867 	       tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
868 	       atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
869 	       read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
870 
871 	__validate_process_creds(tsk, __FILE__, __LINE__);
872 }
873 
874 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS */
875