1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com 3 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook 4 * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io 5 */ 6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h> 7 #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h> 8 #include <linux/kernel.h> 9 #include <linux/types.h> 10 #include <linux/slab.h> 11 #include <linux/bpf.h> 12 #include <linux/btf.h> 13 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> 14 #include <linux/filter.h> 15 #include <net/netlink.h> 16 #include <linux/file.h> 17 #include <linux/vmalloc.h> 18 #include <linux/stringify.h> 19 #include <linux/bsearch.h> 20 #include <linux/sort.h> 21 #include <linux/perf_event.h> 22 #include <linux/ctype.h> 23 #include <linux/error-injection.h> 24 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> 25 #include <linux/btf_ids.h> 26 #include <linux/poison.h> 27 #include <linux/module.h> 28 #include <linux/cpumask.h> 29 #include <linux/bpf_mem_alloc.h> 30 #include <net/xdp.h> 31 #include <linux/trace_events.h> 32 #include <linux/kallsyms.h> 33 34 #include "disasm.h" 35 36 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { 37 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \ 38 [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, 39 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) 40 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name) 41 #include <linux/bpf_types.h> 42 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE 43 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE 44 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE 45 }; 46 47 enum bpf_features { 48 BPF_FEAT_RDONLY_CAST_TO_VOID = 0, 49 BPF_FEAT_STREAMS = 1, 50 __MAX_BPF_FEAT, 51 }; 52 53 struct bpf_mem_alloc bpf_global_percpu_ma; 54 static bool bpf_global_percpu_ma_set; 55 56 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program 57 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. 58 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. 59 * 60 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. 61 * It rejects the following programs: 62 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns 63 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) 64 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) 65 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps 66 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. 67 * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the 68 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of 69 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. 70 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k 71 * 72 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction 73 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. 74 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is 75 * copied to R1. 76 * 77 * All registers are 64-bit. 78 * R0 - return register 79 * R1-R5 argument passing registers 80 * R6-R9 callee saved registers 81 * R10 - frame pointer read-only 82 * 83 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context 84 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. 85 * 86 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: 87 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), 88 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), 89 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 90 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize 91 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. 92 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK 93 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). 94 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. 95 * 96 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which 97 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. 98 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) 99 * 100 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register 101 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are 102 * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function. 103 * 104 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' 105 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. 106 * 107 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against 108 * function argument constraints. 109 * 110 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. 111 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be 112 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as 113 * 'pointer to map element key' 114 * 115 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): 116 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, 117 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, 118 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 119 * 120 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' 121 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and 122 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside 123 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. 124 * 125 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: 126 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) 127 * { 128 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; 129 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; 130 * void *value; 131 * 132 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that 133 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on 134 * the stack of eBPF program. 135 * } 136 * 137 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: 138 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR 139 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK 140 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP 141 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), 142 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: 143 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, 144 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes 145 * 146 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, 147 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits 148 * and were initialized prior to this call. 149 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at 150 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets 151 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function 152 * returns either pointer to map value or NULL. 153 * 154 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' 155 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to 156 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false 157 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). 158 * 159 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 160 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. 161 * 162 * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel 163 * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by 164 * the BPF program: 165 * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET 166 * 167 * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a 168 * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state. 169 * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into 170 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type 171 * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is 172 * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference. 173 * 174 * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as 175 * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as 176 * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function, 177 * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased 178 * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it. 179 */ 180 181 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ 182 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { 183 /* verifier state is 'st' 184 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' 185 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' 186 */ 187 struct bpf_verifier_state st; 188 int insn_idx; 189 int prev_insn_idx; 190 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; 191 /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */ 192 u32 log_pos; 193 }; 194 195 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192 196 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64 197 198 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON (1ULL << 63) 199 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN (1ULL << 62) 200 201 #define BPF_GLOBAL_PERCPU_MA_MAX_SIZE 512 202 203 #define BPF_PRIV_STACK_MIN_SIZE 64 204 205 static int acquire_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); 206 static int release_reference_nomark(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int ref_obj_id); 207 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id); 208 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 209 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 210 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 211 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 212 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 213 214 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 215 { 216 return aux->map_ptr_state.poison; 217 } 218 219 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 220 { 221 return aux->map_ptr_state.unpriv; 222 } 223 224 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 225 struct bpf_map *map, 226 bool unpriv, bool poison) 227 { 228 unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux); 229 aux->map_ptr_state.unpriv = unpriv; 230 aux->map_ptr_state.poison = poison; 231 aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr = map; 232 } 233 234 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 235 { 236 return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON; 237 } 238 239 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 240 { 241 return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN); 242 } 243 244 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 245 { 246 return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 247 } 248 249 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state) 250 { 251 bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux); 252 253 aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | 254 (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL); 255 } 256 257 static bool bpf_helper_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 258 { 259 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 260 insn->src_reg == 0; 261 } 262 263 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 264 { 265 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 266 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; 267 } 268 269 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 270 { 271 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 272 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL; 273 } 274 275 struct bpf_call_arg_meta { 276 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 277 bool raw_mode; 278 bool pkt_access; 279 u8 release_regno; 280 int regno; 281 int access_size; 282 int mem_size; 283 u64 msize_max_value; 284 int ref_obj_id; 285 int dynptr_id; 286 int map_uid; 287 int func_id; 288 struct btf *btf; 289 u32 btf_id; 290 struct btf *ret_btf; 291 u32 ret_btf_id; 292 u32 subprogno; 293 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 294 s64 const_map_key; 295 }; 296 297 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta { 298 /* In parameters */ 299 struct btf *btf; 300 u32 func_id; 301 u32 kfunc_flags; 302 const struct btf_type *func_proto; 303 const char *func_name; 304 /* Out parameters */ 305 u32 ref_obj_id; 306 u8 release_regno; 307 bool r0_rdonly; 308 u32 ret_btf_id; 309 u64 r0_size; 310 u32 subprogno; 311 struct { 312 u64 value; 313 bool found; 314 } arg_constant; 315 316 /* arg_{btf,btf_id,owning_ref} are used by kfunc-specific handling, 317 * generally to pass info about user-defined local kptr types to later 318 * verification logic 319 * bpf_obj_drop/bpf_percpu_obj_drop 320 * Record the local kptr type to be drop'd 321 * bpf_refcount_acquire (via KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR arg type) 322 * Record the local kptr type to be refcount_incr'd and use 323 * arg_owning_ref to determine whether refcount_acquire should be 324 * fallible 325 */ 326 struct btf *arg_btf; 327 u32 arg_btf_id; 328 bool arg_owning_ref; 329 bool arg_prog; 330 331 struct { 332 struct btf_field *field; 333 } arg_list_head; 334 struct { 335 struct btf_field *field; 336 } arg_rbtree_root; 337 struct { 338 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 339 u32 id; 340 u32 ref_obj_id; 341 } initialized_dynptr; 342 struct { 343 u8 spi; 344 u8 frameno; 345 } iter; 346 struct { 347 struct bpf_map *ptr; 348 int uid; 349 } map; 350 u64 mem_size; 351 }; 352 353 struct btf *btf_vmlinux; 354 355 static const char *btf_type_name(const struct btf *btf, u32 id) 356 { 357 return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off); 358 } 359 360 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); 361 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_percpu_ma_lock); 362 363 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...) 364 { 365 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data; 366 va_list args; 367 368 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 369 return; 370 371 va_start(args, fmt); 372 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 373 va_end(args); 374 } 375 376 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 377 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 378 struct bpf_retval_range range, const char *ctx, 379 const char *reg_name) 380 { 381 bool unknown = true; 382 383 verbose(env, "%s the register %s has", ctx, reg_name); 384 if (reg->smin_value > S64_MIN) { 385 verbose(env, " smin=%lld", reg->smin_value); 386 unknown = false; 387 } 388 if (reg->smax_value < S64_MAX) { 389 verbose(env, " smax=%lld", reg->smax_value); 390 unknown = false; 391 } 392 if (unknown) 393 verbose(env, " unknown scalar value"); 394 verbose(env, " should have been in [%d, %d]\n", range.minval, range.maxval); 395 } 396 397 static bool reg_not_null(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 398 { 399 enum bpf_reg_type type; 400 401 type = reg->type; 402 if (type_may_be_null(type)) 403 return false; 404 405 type = base_type(type); 406 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 407 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 408 type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 409 type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 410 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 411 (type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && is_trusted_reg(reg)) || 412 (type == PTR_TO_MEM && !(reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) || 413 type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 414 } 415 416 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 417 { 418 struct btf_record *rec = NULL; 419 struct btf_struct_meta *meta; 420 421 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 422 rec = reg->map_ptr->record; 423 } else if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 424 meta = btf_find_struct_meta(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 425 if (meta) 426 rec = meta->record; 427 } 428 return rec; 429 } 430 431 static bool subprog_is_global(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 432 { 433 struct bpf_func_info_aux *aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux; 434 435 return aux && aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL; 436 } 437 438 static const char *subprog_name(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 439 { 440 struct bpf_func_info *info; 441 442 if (!env->prog->aux->func_info) 443 return ""; 444 445 info = &env->prog->aux->func_info[subprog]; 446 return btf_type_name(env->prog->aux->btf, info->type_id); 447 } 448 449 static void mark_subprog_exc_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 450 { 451 struct bpf_subprog_info *info = subprog_info(env, subprog); 452 453 info->is_cb = true; 454 info->is_async_cb = true; 455 info->is_exception_cb = true; 456 } 457 458 static bool subprog_is_exc_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 459 { 460 return subprog_info(env, subprog)->is_exception_cb; 461 } 462 463 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 464 { 465 return btf_record_has_field(reg_btf_record(reg), BPF_SPIN_LOCK | BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK); 466 } 467 468 static bool type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type) 469 { 470 return type & MEM_RDONLY; 471 } 472 473 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 474 const struct bpf_map *map) 475 { 476 enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC; 477 478 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || 479 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || 480 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || 481 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve || 482 func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 483 return true; 484 485 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 486 (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 487 map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)) 488 return true; 489 490 return false; 491 } 492 493 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 494 { 495 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock || 496 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock || 497 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock || 498 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock || 499 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock || 500 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_mptcp_sock || 501 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock || 502 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock; 503 } 504 505 static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 506 { 507 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data; 508 } 509 510 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 511 static bool is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 512 static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 513 static bool is_bpf_throw_kfunc(struct bpf_insn *insn); 514 515 static bool is_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 516 static bool is_task_work_add_kfunc(u32 func_id); 517 518 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 519 { 520 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 521 func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma || 522 func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop || 523 func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain; 524 } 525 526 static bool is_async_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 527 { 528 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback; 529 } 530 531 static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 532 { 533 return is_sync_callback_calling_function(func_id) || 534 is_async_callback_calling_function(func_id); 535 } 536 537 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn) 538 { 539 return (bpf_helper_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) || 540 (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)); 541 } 542 543 static bool is_async_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn) 544 { 545 return (bpf_helper_call(insn) && is_async_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) || 546 (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)); 547 } 548 549 static bool is_async_cb_sleepable(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 550 { 551 /* bpf_timer callbacks are never sleepable. */ 552 if (bpf_helper_call(insn) && insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) 553 return false; 554 555 /* bpf_wq and bpf_task_work callbacks are always sleepable. */ 556 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && insn->off == 0 && 557 (is_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl_kfunc(insn->imm) || is_task_work_add_kfunc(insn->imm))) 558 return true; 559 560 verifier_bug(env, "unhandled async callback in is_async_cb_sleepable"); 561 return false; 562 } 563 564 static bool is_may_goto_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn) 565 { 566 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND) && insn->src_reg == BPF_MAY_GOTO; 567 } 568 569 static bool is_may_goto_insn_at(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 570 { 571 return is_may_goto_insn(&env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]); 572 } 573 574 static bool is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 575 { 576 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get || 577 func_id == BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get || 578 func_id == BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get || 579 func_id == BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get; 580 } 581 582 static bool helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 583 const struct bpf_map *map) 584 { 585 int ref_obj_uses = 0; 586 587 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) 588 ref_obj_uses++; 589 if (is_acquire_function(func_id, map)) 590 ref_obj_uses++; 591 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 592 ref_obj_uses++; 593 594 return ref_obj_uses > 1; 595 } 596 597 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 598 { 599 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 600 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 601 insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG; 602 } 603 604 static bool is_atomic_load_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 605 { 606 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 607 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 608 insn->imm == BPF_LOAD_ACQ; 609 } 610 611 static int __get_spi(s32 off) 612 { 613 return (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 614 } 615 616 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 617 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 618 { 619 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 620 621 return cur->frame[reg->frameno]; 622 } 623 624 static bool is_spi_bounds_valid(struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi, int nr_slots) 625 { 626 int allocated_slots = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 627 628 /* We need to check that slots between [spi - nr_slots + 1, spi] are 629 * within [0, allocated_stack). 630 * 631 * Please note that the spi grows downwards. For example, a dynptr 632 * takes the size of two stack slots; the first slot will be at 633 * spi and the second slot will be at spi - 1. 634 */ 635 return spi - nr_slots + 1 >= 0 && spi < allocated_slots; 636 } 637 638 static int stack_slot_obj_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 639 const char *obj_kind, int nr_slots) 640 { 641 int off, spi; 642 643 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 644 verbose(env, "%s has to be at a constant offset\n", obj_kind); 645 return -EINVAL; 646 } 647 648 off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 649 if (off % BPF_REG_SIZE) { 650 verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off); 651 return -EINVAL; 652 } 653 654 spi = __get_spi(off); 655 if (spi + 1 < nr_slots) { 656 verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off); 657 return -EINVAL; 658 } 659 660 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(func(env, reg), spi, nr_slots)) 661 return -ERANGE; 662 return spi; 663 } 664 665 static int dynptr_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 666 { 667 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "dynptr", BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS); 668 } 669 670 static int iter_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 671 { 672 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "iter", nr_slots); 673 } 674 675 static int irq_flag_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 676 { 677 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "irq_flag", 1); 678 } 679 680 static enum bpf_dynptr_type arg_to_dynptr_type(enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 681 { 682 switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) { 683 case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 684 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 685 case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 686 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 687 case DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 688 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 689 case DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 690 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 691 case DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META: 692 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META; 693 case DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE: 694 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE; 695 default: 696 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 697 } 698 } 699 700 static enum bpf_type_flag get_dynptr_type_flag(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 701 { 702 switch (type) { 703 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 704 return DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 705 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 706 return DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 707 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 708 return DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 709 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 710 return DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 711 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META: 712 return DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META; 713 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE: 714 return DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE; 715 default: 716 return 0; 717 } 718 } 719 720 static bool dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 721 { 722 return type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF || type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE; 723 } 724 725 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 726 enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 727 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id); 728 729 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 730 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 731 732 static void mark_dynptr_stack_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 733 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg1, 734 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg2, 735 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 736 { 737 int id = ++env->id_gen; 738 739 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg1, type, true, id); 740 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg2, type, false, id); 741 } 742 743 static void mark_dynptr_cb_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 744 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 745 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 746 { 747 __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, type, true, ++env->id_gen); 748 } 749 750 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 751 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi); 752 753 static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 754 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx, int clone_ref_obj_id) 755 { 756 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 757 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 758 int spi, i, err; 759 760 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 761 if (spi < 0) 762 return spi; 763 764 /* We cannot assume both spi and spi - 1 belong to the same dynptr, 765 * hence we need to call destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot twice for both, 766 * to ensure that for the following example: 767 * [d1][d1][d2][d2] 768 * spi 3 2 1 0 769 * So marking spi = 2 should lead to destruction of both d1 and d2. In 770 * case they do belong to same dynptr, second call won't see slot_type 771 * as STACK_DYNPTR and will simply skip destruction. 772 */ 773 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 774 if (err) 775 return err; 776 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi - 1); 777 if (err) 778 return err; 779 780 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 781 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 782 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 783 } 784 785 type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 786 if (type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 787 return -EINVAL; 788 789 mark_dynptr_stack_regs(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 790 &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, type); 791 792 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(type)) { 793 /* The id is used to track proper releasing */ 794 int id; 795 796 if (clone_ref_obj_id) 797 id = clone_ref_obj_id; 798 else 799 id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx); 800 801 if (id < 0) 802 return id; 803 804 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 805 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 806 } 807 808 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - 1) | BIT(spi)); 809 810 return 0; 811 } 812 813 static void invalidate_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi) 814 { 815 int i; 816 817 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 818 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 819 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 820 } 821 822 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 823 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 824 825 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - 1) | BIT(spi)); 826 } 827 828 static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 829 { 830 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 831 int spi, ref_obj_id, i; 832 833 /* 834 * This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot 835 * be released by any dynptr helper. Hence, unmark_stack_slots_dynptr 836 * is safe to do directly. 837 */ 838 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 839 verifier_bug(env, "CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be released"); 840 return -EFAULT; 841 } 842 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 843 if (spi < 0) 844 return spi; 845 846 if (!dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) { 847 invalidate_dynptr(env, state, spi); 848 return 0; 849 } 850 851 ref_obj_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 852 853 /* If the dynptr has a ref_obj_id, then we need to invalidate 854 * two things: 855 * 856 * 1) Any dynptrs with a matching ref_obj_id (clones) 857 * 2) Any slices derived from this dynptr. 858 */ 859 860 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 861 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, ref_obj_id)); 862 863 /* Invalidate any dynptr clones */ 864 for (i = 1; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 865 if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id != ref_obj_id) 866 continue; 867 868 /* it should always be the case that if the ref obj id 869 * matches then the stack slot also belongs to a 870 * dynptr 871 */ 872 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) { 873 verifier_bug(env, "misconfigured ref_obj_id"); 874 return -EFAULT; 875 } 876 if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 877 invalidate_dynptr(env, state, i); 878 } 879 880 return 0; 881 } 882 883 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 884 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 885 886 static void mark_reg_invalid(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 887 { 888 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 889 __mark_reg_not_init(env, reg); 890 else 891 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 892 } 893 894 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 895 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi) 896 { 897 struct bpf_func_state *fstate; 898 struct bpf_reg_state *dreg; 899 int i, dynptr_id; 900 901 /* We always ensure that STACK_DYNPTR is never set partially, 902 * hence just checking for slot_type[0] is enough. This is 903 * different for STACK_SPILL, where it may be only set for 904 * 1 byte, so code has to use is_spilled_reg. 905 */ 906 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) 907 return 0; 908 909 /* Reposition spi to first slot */ 910 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 911 spi = spi + 1; 912 913 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) { 914 verbose(env, "cannot overwrite referenced dynptr\n"); 915 return -EINVAL; 916 } 917 918 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 919 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - 1); 920 921 /* Writing partially to one dynptr stack slot destroys both. */ 922 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 923 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 924 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 925 } 926 927 dynptr_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 928 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 929 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, fstate, dreg, ({ 930 /* Dynptr slices are only PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL and PTR_TO_MEM */ 931 if (dreg->type != (PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && dreg->type != PTR_TO_MEM) 932 continue; 933 if (dreg->dynptr_id == dynptr_id) 934 mark_reg_invalid(env, dreg); 935 })); 936 937 /* Do not release reference state, we are destroying dynptr on stack, 938 * not using some helper to release it. Just reset register. 939 */ 940 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 941 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 942 943 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - 1) | BIT(spi)); 944 945 return 0; 946 } 947 948 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 949 { 950 int spi; 951 952 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 953 return false; 954 955 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 956 957 /* -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots) isn't an 958 * error because this just means the stack state hasn't been updated yet. 959 * We will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later. 960 */ 961 if (spi < 0 && spi != -ERANGE) 962 return false; 963 964 /* We don't need to check if the stack slots are marked by previous 965 * dynptr initializations because we allow overwriting existing unreferenced 966 * STACK_DYNPTR slots, see mark_stack_slots_dynptr which calls 967 * destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot to ensure dynptr objects at the slots we are 968 * touching are completely destructed before we reinitialize them for a new 969 * one. For referenced ones, destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot returns an error early 970 * instead of delaying it until the end where the user will get "Unreleased 971 * reference" error. 972 */ 973 return true; 974 } 975 976 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 977 { 978 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 979 int i, spi; 980 981 /* This already represents first slot of initialized bpf_dynptr. 982 * 983 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR already has fixed and var_off as 0 due to 984 * check_func_arg_reg_off's logic, so we don't need to check its 985 * offset and alignment. 986 */ 987 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 988 return true; 989 990 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 991 if (spi < 0) 992 return false; 993 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 994 return false; 995 996 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 997 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR || 998 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR) 999 return false; 1000 } 1001 1002 return true; 1003 } 1004 1005 static bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1006 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 1007 { 1008 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1009 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 1010 int spi; 1011 1012 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR takes any type of dynptr */ 1013 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 1014 return true; 1015 1016 dynptr_type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 1017 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 1018 return reg->dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 1019 } else { 1020 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 1021 if (spi < 0) 1022 return false; 1023 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 1024 } 1025 } 1026 1027 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 1028 1029 static bool in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 1030 1031 static bool is_kfunc_rcu_protected(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta); 1032 1033 static int mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1034 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 1035 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int insn_idx, 1036 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots) 1037 { 1038 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1039 int spi, i, j, id; 1040 1041 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1042 if (spi < 0) 1043 return spi; 1044 1045 id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx); 1046 if (id < 0) 1047 return id; 1048 1049 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1050 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1051 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1052 1053 __mark_reg_known_zero(st); 1054 st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */ 1055 if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(meta)) { 1056 if (in_rcu_cs(env)) 1057 st->type |= MEM_RCU; 1058 else 1059 st->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 1060 } 1061 st->ref_obj_id = i == 0 ? id : 0; 1062 st->iter.btf = btf; 1063 st->iter.btf_id = btf_id; 1064 st->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE; 1065 st->iter.depth = 0; 1066 1067 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1068 slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_ITER; 1069 1070 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - i)); 1071 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 1072 } 1073 1074 return 0; 1075 } 1076 1077 static int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1078 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 1079 { 1080 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1081 int spi, i, j; 1082 1083 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1084 if (spi < 0) 1085 return spi; 1086 1087 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1088 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1089 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1090 1091 if (i == 0) 1092 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, st->ref_obj_id)); 1093 1094 __mark_reg_not_init(env, st); 1095 1096 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1097 slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 1098 1099 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - i)); 1100 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 1101 } 1102 1103 return 0; 1104 } 1105 1106 static bool is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1107 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 1108 { 1109 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1110 int spi, i, j; 1111 1112 /* For -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots), we 1113 * will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later, so 1114 * return true for that case. 1115 */ 1116 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1117 if (spi == -ERANGE) 1118 return true; 1119 if (spi < 0) 1120 return false; 1121 1122 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1123 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1124 1125 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1126 if (slot->slot_type[j] == STACK_ITER) 1127 return false; 1128 } 1129 1130 return true; 1131 } 1132 1133 static int is_iter_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1134 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots) 1135 { 1136 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1137 int spi, i, j; 1138 1139 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1140 if (spi < 0) 1141 return -EINVAL; 1142 1143 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1144 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1145 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1146 1147 if (st->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) 1148 return -EPROTO; 1149 /* only main (first) slot has ref_obj_id set */ 1150 if (i == 0 && !st->ref_obj_id) 1151 return -EINVAL; 1152 if (i != 0 && st->ref_obj_id) 1153 return -EINVAL; 1154 if (st->iter.btf != btf || st->iter.btf_id != btf_id) 1155 return -EINVAL; 1156 1157 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1158 if (slot->slot_type[j] != STACK_ITER) 1159 return -EINVAL; 1160 } 1161 1162 return 0; 1163 } 1164 1165 static int acquire_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); 1166 static int release_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int id); 1167 1168 static int mark_stack_slot_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1169 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 1170 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int insn_idx, 1171 int kfunc_class) 1172 { 1173 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1174 struct bpf_stack_state *slot; 1175 struct bpf_reg_state *st; 1176 int spi, i, id; 1177 1178 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg); 1179 if (spi < 0) 1180 return spi; 1181 1182 id = acquire_irq_state(env, insn_idx); 1183 if (id < 0) 1184 return id; 1185 1186 slot = &state->stack[spi]; 1187 st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1188 1189 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, reg->frameno, BIT(spi)); 1190 __mark_reg_known_zero(st); 1191 st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */ 1192 st->ref_obj_id = id; 1193 st->irq.kfunc_class = kfunc_class; 1194 1195 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 1196 slot->slot_type[i] = STACK_IRQ_FLAG; 1197 1198 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 1199 return 0; 1200 } 1201 1202 static int unmark_stack_slot_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1203 int kfunc_class) 1204 { 1205 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1206 struct bpf_stack_state *slot; 1207 struct bpf_reg_state *st; 1208 int spi, i, err; 1209 1210 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg); 1211 if (spi < 0) 1212 return spi; 1213 1214 slot = &state->stack[spi]; 1215 st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1216 1217 if (st->irq.kfunc_class != kfunc_class) { 1218 const char *flag_kfunc = st->irq.kfunc_class == IRQ_NATIVE_KFUNC ? "native" : "lock"; 1219 const char *used_kfunc = kfunc_class == IRQ_NATIVE_KFUNC ? "native" : "lock"; 1220 1221 verbose(env, "irq flag acquired by %s kfuncs cannot be restored with %s kfuncs\n", 1222 flag_kfunc, used_kfunc); 1223 return -EINVAL; 1224 } 1225 1226 err = release_irq_state(env->cur_state, st->ref_obj_id); 1227 WARN_ON_ONCE(err && err != -EACCES); 1228 if (err) { 1229 int insn_idx = 0; 1230 1231 for (int i = 0; i < env->cur_state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1232 if (env->cur_state->refs[i].id == env->cur_state->active_irq_id) { 1233 insn_idx = env->cur_state->refs[i].insn_idx; 1234 break; 1235 } 1236 } 1237 1238 verbose(env, "cannot restore irq state out of order, expected id=%d acquired at insn_idx=%d\n", 1239 env->cur_state->active_irq_id, insn_idx); 1240 return err; 1241 } 1242 1243 __mark_reg_not_init(env, st); 1244 1245 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, reg->frameno, BIT(spi)); 1246 1247 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 1248 slot->slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 1249 1250 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 1251 return 0; 1252 } 1253 1254 static bool is_irq_flag_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1255 { 1256 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1257 struct bpf_stack_state *slot; 1258 int spi, i; 1259 1260 /* For -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots), we 1261 * will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later, so 1262 * return true for that case. 1263 */ 1264 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg); 1265 if (spi == -ERANGE) 1266 return true; 1267 if (spi < 0) 1268 return false; 1269 1270 slot = &state->stack[spi]; 1271 1272 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 1273 if (slot->slot_type[i] == STACK_IRQ_FLAG) 1274 return false; 1275 return true; 1276 } 1277 1278 static int is_irq_flag_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1279 { 1280 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1281 struct bpf_stack_state *slot; 1282 struct bpf_reg_state *st; 1283 int spi, i; 1284 1285 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg); 1286 if (spi < 0) 1287 return -EINVAL; 1288 1289 slot = &state->stack[spi]; 1290 st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1291 1292 if (!st->ref_obj_id) 1293 return -EINVAL; 1294 1295 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 1296 if (slot->slot_type[i] != STACK_IRQ_FLAG) 1297 return -EINVAL; 1298 return 0; 1299 } 1300 1301 /* Check if given stack slot is "special": 1302 * - spilled register state (STACK_SPILL); 1303 * - dynptr state (STACK_DYNPTR); 1304 * - iter state (STACK_ITER). 1305 * - irq flag state (STACK_IRQ_FLAG) 1306 */ 1307 static bool is_stack_slot_special(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1308 { 1309 enum bpf_stack_slot_type type = stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]; 1310 1311 switch (type) { 1312 case STACK_SPILL: 1313 case STACK_DYNPTR: 1314 case STACK_ITER: 1315 case STACK_IRQ_FLAG: 1316 return true; 1317 case STACK_INVALID: 1318 case STACK_MISC: 1319 case STACK_ZERO: 1320 return false; 1321 default: 1322 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown stack slot type %d\n", type); 1323 return true; 1324 } 1325 } 1326 1327 /* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when 1328 * it was spilled to the stack. 1329 */ 1330 static bool is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1331 { 1332 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL; 1333 } 1334 1335 static bool is_spilled_scalar_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1336 { 1337 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL && 1338 stack->spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE; 1339 } 1340 1341 static bool is_spilled_scalar_reg64(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1342 { 1343 return stack->slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 1344 stack->spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE; 1345 } 1346 1347 /* Mark stack slot as STACK_MISC, unless it is already STACK_INVALID, in which 1348 * case they are equivalent, or it's STACK_ZERO, in which case we preserve 1349 * more precise STACK_ZERO. 1350 * Regardless of allow_ptr_leaks setting (i.e., privileged or unprivileged 1351 * mode), we won't promote STACK_INVALID to STACK_MISC. In privileged case it is 1352 * unnecessary as both are considered equivalent when loading data and pruning, 1353 * in case of unprivileged mode it will be incorrect to allow reads of invalid 1354 * slots. 1355 */ 1356 static void mark_stack_slot_misc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u8 *stype) 1357 { 1358 if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) 1359 return; 1360 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID) 1361 return; 1362 *stype = STACK_MISC; 1363 } 1364 1365 static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype) 1366 { 1367 if (*stype != STACK_INVALID) 1368 *stype = STACK_MISC; 1369 } 1370 1371 /* copy array src of length n * size bytes to dst. dst is reallocated if it's too 1372 * small to hold src. This is different from krealloc since we don't want to preserve 1373 * the contents of dst. 1374 * 1375 * Leaves dst untouched if src is NULL or length is zero. Returns NULL if memory could 1376 * not be allocated. 1377 */ 1378 static void *copy_array(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags) 1379 { 1380 size_t alloc_bytes; 1381 void *orig = dst; 1382 size_t bytes; 1383 1384 if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(src)) 1385 goto out; 1386 1387 if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes))) 1388 return NULL; 1389 1390 alloc_bytes = max(ksize(orig), kmalloc_size_roundup(bytes)); 1391 dst = krealloc(orig, alloc_bytes, flags); 1392 if (!dst) { 1393 kfree(orig); 1394 return NULL; 1395 } 1396 1397 memcpy(dst, src, bytes); 1398 out: 1399 return dst ? dst : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1400 } 1401 1402 /* resize an array from old_n items to new_n items. the array is reallocated if it's too 1403 * small to hold new_n items. new items are zeroed out if the array grows. 1404 * 1405 * Contrary to krealloc_array, does not free arr if new_n is zero. 1406 */ 1407 static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size) 1408 { 1409 size_t alloc_size; 1410 void *new_arr; 1411 1412 if (!new_n || old_n == new_n) 1413 goto out; 1414 1415 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(new_n, size)); 1416 new_arr = krealloc(arr, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 1417 if (!new_arr) { 1418 kfree(arr); 1419 return NULL; 1420 } 1421 arr = new_arr; 1422 1423 if (new_n > old_n) 1424 memset(arr + old_n * size, 0, (new_n - old_n) * size); 1425 1426 out: 1427 return arr ? arr : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1428 } 1429 1430 static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst, const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) 1431 { 1432 dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs, 1433 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 1434 if (!dst->refs) 1435 return -ENOMEM; 1436 1437 dst->acquired_refs = src->acquired_refs; 1438 dst->active_locks = src->active_locks; 1439 dst->active_preempt_locks = src->active_preempt_locks; 1440 dst->active_rcu_locks = src->active_rcu_locks; 1441 dst->active_irq_id = src->active_irq_id; 1442 dst->active_lock_id = src->active_lock_id; 1443 dst->active_lock_ptr = src->active_lock_ptr; 1444 return 0; 1445 } 1446 1447 static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1448 { 1449 size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1450 1451 dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state), 1452 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 1453 if (!dst->stack) 1454 return -ENOMEM; 1455 1456 dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack; 1457 return 0; 1458 } 1459 1460 static int resize_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, size_t n) 1461 { 1462 state->refs = realloc_array(state->refs, state->acquired_refs, n, 1463 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state)); 1464 if (!state->refs) 1465 return -ENOMEM; 1466 1467 state->acquired_refs = n; 1468 return 0; 1469 } 1470 1471 /* Possibly update state->allocated_stack to be at least size bytes. Also 1472 * possibly update the function's high-water mark in its bpf_subprog_info. 1473 */ 1474 static int grow_stack_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, int size) 1475 { 1476 size_t old_n = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, n; 1477 1478 /* The stack size is always a multiple of BPF_REG_SIZE. */ 1479 size = round_up(size, BPF_REG_SIZE); 1480 n = size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1481 1482 if (old_n >= n) 1483 return 0; 1484 1485 state->stack = realloc_array(state->stack, old_n, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state)); 1486 if (!state->stack) 1487 return -ENOMEM; 1488 1489 state->allocated_stack = size; 1490 1491 /* update known max for given subprogram */ 1492 if (env->subprog_info[state->subprogno].stack_depth < size) 1493 env->subprog_info[state->subprogno].stack_depth = size; 1494 1495 return 0; 1496 } 1497 1498 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include 1499 * this new pointer reference. 1500 * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register 1501 * On failure, returns a negative errno. 1502 */ 1503 static struct bpf_reference_state *acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 1504 { 1505 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 1506 int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs; 1507 int err; 1508 1509 err = resize_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1); 1510 if (err) 1511 return NULL; 1512 state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx; 1513 1514 return &state->refs[new_ofs]; 1515 } 1516 1517 static int acquire_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 1518 { 1519 struct bpf_reference_state *s; 1520 1521 s = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 1522 if (!s) 1523 return -ENOMEM; 1524 s->type = REF_TYPE_PTR; 1525 s->id = ++env->id_gen; 1526 return s->id; 1527 } 1528 1529 static int acquire_lock_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, enum ref_state_type type, 1530 int id, void *ptr) 1531 { 1532 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 1533 struct bpf_reference_state *s; 1534 1535 s = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 1536 if (!s) 1537 return -ENOMEM; 1538 s->type = type; 1539 s->id = id; 1540 s->ptr = ptr; 1541 1542 state->active_locks++; 1543 state->active_lock_id = id; 1544 state->active_lock_ptr = ptr; 1545 return 0; 1546 } 1547 1548 static int acquire_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 1549 { 1550 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 1551 struct bpf_reference_state *s; 1552 1553 s = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 1554 if (!s) 1555 return -ENOMEM; 1556 s->type = REF_TYPE_IRQ; 1557 s->id = ++env->id_gen; 1558 1559 state->active_irq_id = s->id; 1560 return s->id; 1561 } 1562 1563 static void release_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int idx) 1564 { 1565 int last_idx; 1566 size_t rem; 1567 1568 /* IRQ state requires the relative ordering of elements remaining the 1569 * same, since it relies on the refs array to behave as a stack, so that 1570 * it can detect out-of-order IRQ restore. Hence use memmove to shift 1571 * the array instead of swapping the final element into the deleted idx. 1572 */ 1573 last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1; 1574 rem = state->acquired_refs - idx - 1; 1575 if (last_idx && idx != last_idx) 1576 memmove(&state->refs[idx], &state->refs[idx + 1], sizeof(*state->refs) * rem); 1577 memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs)); 1578 state->acquired_refs--; 1579 return; 1580 } 1581 1582 static bool find_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int ptr_id) 1583 { 1584 int i; 1585 1586 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) 1587 if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) 1588 return true; 1589 1590 return false; 1591 } 1592 1593 static int release_lock_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int type, int id, void *ptr) 1594 { 1595 void *prev_ptr = NULL; 1596 u32 prev_id = 0; 1597 int i; 1598 1599 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1600 if (state->refs[i].type == type && state->refs[i].id == id && 1601 state->refs[i].ptr == ptr) { 1602 release_reference_state(state, i); 1603 state->active_locks--; 1604 /* Reassign active lock (id, ptr). */ 1605 state->active_lock_id = prev_id; 1606 state->active_lock_ptr = prev_ptr; 1607 return 0; 1608 } 1609 if (state->refs[i].type & REF_TYPE_LOCK_MASK) { 1610 prev_id = state->refs[i].id; 1611 prev_ptr = state->refs[i].ptr; 1612 } 1613 } 1614 return -EINVAL; 1615 } 1616 1617 static int release_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int id) 1618 { 1619 u32 prev_id = 0; 1620 int i; 1621 1622 if (id != state->active_irq_id) 1623 return -EACCES; 1624 1625 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1626 if (state->refs[i].type != REF_TYPE_IRQ) 1627 continue; 1628 if (state->refs[i].id == id) { 1629 release_reference_state(state, i); 1630 state->active_irq_id = prev_id; 1631 return 0; 1632 } else { 1633 prev_id = state->refs[i].id; 1634 } 1635 } 1636 return -EINVAL; 1637 } 1638 1639 static struct bpf_reference_state *find_lock_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, enum ref_state_type type, 1640 int id, void *ptr) 1641 { 1642 int i; 1643 1644 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1645 struct bpf_reference_state *s = &state->refs[i]; 1646 1647 if (!(s->type & type)) 1648 continue; 1649 1650 if (s->id == id && s->ptr == ptr) 1651 return s; 1652 } 1653 return NULL; 1654 } 1655 1656 static void update_peak_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 1657 { 1658 u32 cur_states; 1659 1660 cur_states = env->explored_states_size + env->free_list_size + env->num_backedges; 1661 env->peak_states = max(env->peak_states, cur_states); 1662 } 1663 1664 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) 1665 { 1666 if (!state) 1667 return; 1668 kfree(state->stack); 1669 kfree(state); 1670 } 1671 1672 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 1673 { 1674 kfree(state->jmp_history); 1675 state->jmp_history = NULL; 1676 state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; 1677 } 1678 1679 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 1680 bool free_self) 1681 { 1682 int i; 1683 1684 for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) { 1685 free_func_state(state->frame[i]); 1686 state->frame[i] = NULL; 1687 } 1688 kfree(state->refs); 1689 clear_jmp_history(state); 1690 if (free_self) 1691 kfree(state); 1692 } 1693 1694 /* struct bpf_verifier_state->parent refers to states 1695 * that are in either of env->{expored_states,free_list}. 1696 * In both cases the state is contained in struct bpf_verifier_state_list. 1697 */ 1698 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list *state_parent_as_list(struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1699 { 1700 if (st->parent) 1701 return container_of(st->parent, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, state); 1702 return NULL; 1703 } 1704 1705 static bool incomplete_read_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1706 struct bpf_verifier_state *st); 1707 1708 /* A state can be freed if it is no longer referenced: 1709 * - is in the env->free_list; 1710 * - has no children states; 1711 */ 1712 static void maybe_free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1713 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl) 1714 { 1715 if (!sl->in_free_list 1716 || sl->state.branches != 0 1717 || incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state)) 1718 return; 1719 list_del(&sl->node); 1720 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 1721 kfree(sl); 1722 env->free_list_size--; 1723 } 1724 1725 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space 1726 * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack 1727 */ 1728 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, 1729 const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1730 { 1731 memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, stack)); 1732 return copy_stack_state(dst, src); 1733 } 1734 1735 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, 1736 const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) 1737 { 1738 struct bpf_func_state *dst; 1739 int i, err; 1740 1741 dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, 1742 src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(*dst_state->jmp_history), 1743 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 1744 if (!dst_state->jmp_history) 1745 return -ENOMEM; 1746 dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; 1747 1748 /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them, this is also 1749 * necessary in case of exceptional exits using bpf_throw. 1750 */ 1751 for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { 1752 free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); 1753 dst_state->frame[i] = NULL; 1754 } 1755 err = copy_reference_state(dst_state, src); 1756 if (err) 1757 return err; 1758 dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; 1759 dst_state->in_sleepable = src->in_sleepable; 1760 dst_state->cleaned = src->cleaned; 1761 dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; 1762 dst_state->branches = src->branches; 1763 dst_state->parent = src->parent; 1764 dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; 1765 dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; 1766 dst_state->dfs_depth = src->dfs_depth; 1767 dst_state->callback_unroll_depth = src->callback_unroll_depth; 1768 dst_state->may_goto_depth = src->may_goto_depth; 1769 dst_state->equal_state = src->equal_state; 1770 for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { 1771 dst = dst_state->frame[i]; 1772 if (!dst) { 1773 dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 1774 if (!dst) 1775 return -ENOMEM; 1776 dst_state->frame[i] = dst; 1777 } 1778 err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]); 1779 if (err) 1780 return err; 1781 } 1782 return 0; 1783 } 1784 1785 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 1786 { 1787 return env->prog->len; 1788 } 1789 1790 static struct list_head *explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 1791 { 1792 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1793 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 1794 1795 return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)]; 1796 } 1797 1798 static bool same_callsites(struct bpf_verifier_state *a, struct bpf_verifier_state *b) 1799 { 1800 int fr; 1801 1802 if (a->curframe != b->curframe) 1803 return false; 1804 1805 for (fr = a->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) 1806 if (a->frame[fr]->callsite != b->frame[fr]->callsite) 1807 return false; 1808 1809 return true; 1810 } 1811 1812 /* Return IP for a given frame in a call stack */ 1813 static u32 frame_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, u32 frame) 1814 { 1815 return frame == st->curframe 1816 ? st->insn_idx 1817 : st->frame[frame + 1]->callsite; 1818 } 1819 1820 /* For state @st look for a topmost frame with frame_insn_idx() in some SCC, 1821 * if such frame exists form a corresponding @callchain as an array of 1822 * call sites leading to this frame and SCC id. 1823 * E.g.: 1824 * 1825 * void foo() { A: loop {... SCC#1 ...}; } 1826 * void bar() { B: loop { C: foo(); ... SCC#2 ... } 1827 * D: loop { E: foo(); ... SCC#3 ... } } 1828 * void main() { F: bar(); } 1829 * 1830 * @callchain at (A) would be either (F,SCC#2) or (F,SCC#3) depending 1831 * on @st frame call sites being (F,C,A) or (F,E,A). 1832 */ 1833 static bool compute_scc_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1834 struct bpf_verifier_state *st, 1835 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain) 1836 { 1837 u32 i, scc, insn_idx; 1838 1839 memset(callchain, 0, sizeof(*callchain)); 1840 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 1841 insn_idx = frame_insn_idx(st, i); 1842 scc = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].scc; 1843 if (scc) { 1844 callchain->scc = scc; 1845 break; 1846 } else if (i < st->curframe) { 1847 callchain->callsites[i] = insn_idx; 1848 } else { 1849 return false; 1850 } 1851 } 1852 return true; 1853 } 1854 1855 /* Check if bpf_scc_visit instance for @callchain exists. */ 1856 static struct bpf_scc_visit *scc_visit_lookup(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1857 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain) 1858 { 1859 struct bpf_scc_info *info = env->scc_info[callchain->scc]; 1860 struct bpf_scc_visit *visits = info->visits; 1861 u32 i; 1862 1863 if (!info) 1864 return NULL; 1865 for (i = 0; i < info->num_visits; i++) 1866 if (memcmp(callchain, &visits[i].callchain, sizeof(*callchain)) == 0) 1867 return &visits[i]; 1868 return NULL; 1869 } 1870 1871 /* Allocate a new bpf_scc_visit instance corresponding to @callchain. 1872 * Allocated instances are alive for a duration of the do_check_common() 1873 * call and are freed by free_states(). 1874 */ 1875 static struct bpf_scc_visit *scc_visit_alloc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1876 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain) 1877 { 1878 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; 1879 struct bpf_scc_info *info; 1880 u32 scc, num_visits; 1881 u64 new_sz; 1882 1883 scc = callchain->scc; 1884 info = env->scc_info[scc]; 1885 num_visits = info ? info->num_visits : 0; 1886 new_sz = sizeof(*info) + sizeof(struct bpf_scc_visit) * (num_visits + 1); 1887 info = kvrealloc(env->scc_info[scc], new_sz, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 1888 if (!info) 1889 return NULL; 1890 env->scc_info[scc] = info; 1891 info->num_visits = num_visits + 1; 1892 visit = &info->visits[num_visits]; 1893 memset(visit, 0, sizeof(*visit)); 1894 memcpy(&visit->callchain, callchain, sizeof(*callchain)); 1895 return visit; 1896 } 1897 1898 /* Form a string '(callsite#1,callsite#2,...,scc)' in env->tmp_str_buf */ 1899 static char *format_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain) 1900 { 1901 char *buf = env->tmp_str_buf; 1902 int i, delta = 0; 1903 1904 delta += snprintf(buf + delta, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN - delta, "("); 1905 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(callchain->callsites); i++) { 1906 if (!callchain->callsites[i]) 1907 break; 1908 delta += snprintf(buf + delta, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN - delta, "%u,", 1909 callchain->callsites[i]); 1910 } 1911 delta += snprintf(buf + delta, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN - delta, "%u)", callchain->scc); 1912 return env->tmp_str_buf; 1913 } 1914 1915 /* If callchain for @st exists (@st is in some SCC), ensure that 1916 * bpf_scc_visit instance for this callchain exists. 1917 * If instance does not exist or is empty, assign visit->entry_state to @st. 1918 */ 1919 static int maybe_enter_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1920 { 1921 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf; 1922 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; 1923 1924 if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) 1925 return 0; 1926 visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain); 1927 visit = visit ?: scc_visit_alloc(env, callchain); 1928 if (!visit) 1929 return -ENOMEM; 1930 if (!visit->entry_state) { 1931 visit->entry_state = st; 1932 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 1933 verbose(env, "SCC enter %s\n", format_callchain(env, callchain)); 1934 } 1935 return 0; 1936 } 1937 1938 static int propagate_backedges(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_scc_visit *visit); 1939 1940 /* If callchain for @st exists (@st is in some SCC), make it empty: 1941 * - set visit->entry_state to NULL; 1942 * - flush accumulated backedges. 1943 */ 1944 static int maybe_exit_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1945 { 1946 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf; 1947 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; 1948 1949 if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) 1950 return 0; 1951 visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain); 1952 if (!visit) { 1953 /* 1954 * If path traversal stops inside an SCC, corresponding bpf_scc_visit 1955 * must exist for non-speculative paths. For non-speculative paths 1956 * traversal stops when: 1957 * a. Verification error is found, maybe_exit_scc() is not called. 1958 * b. Top level BPF_EXIT is reached. Top level BPF_EXIT is not a member 1959 * of any SCC. 1960 * c. A checkpoint is reached and matched. Checkpoints are created by 1961 * is_state_visited(), which calls maybe_enter_scc(), which allocates 1962 * bpf_scc_visit instances for checkpoints within SCCs. 1963 * (c) is the only case that can reach this point. 1964 */ 1965 if (!st->speculative) { 1966 verifier_bug(env, "scc exit: no visit info for call chain %s", 1967 format_callchain(env, callchain)); 1968 return -EFAULT; 1969 } 1970 return 0; 1971 } 1972 if (visit->entry_state != st) 1973 return 0; 1974 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 1975 verbose(env, "SCC exit %s\n", format_callchain(env, callchain)); 1976 visit->entry_state = NULL; 1977 env->num_backedges -= visit->num_backedges; 1978 visit->num_backedges = 0; 1979 update_peak_states(env); 1980 return propagate_backedges(env, visit); 1981 } 1982 1983 /* Lookup an bpf_scc_visit instance corresponding to @st callchain 1984 * and add @backedge to visit->backedges. @st callchain must exist. 1985 */ 1986 static int add_scc_backedge(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1987 struct bpf_verifier_state *st, 1988 struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge) 1989 { 1990 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf; 1991 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; 1992 1993 if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) { 1994 verifier_bug(env, "add backedge: no SCC in verification path, insn_idx %d", 1995 st->insn_idx); 1996 return -EFAULT; 1997 } 1998 visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain); 1999 if (!visit) { 2000 verifier_bug(env, "add backedge: no visit info for call chain %s", 2001 format_callchain(env, callchain)); 2002 return -EFAULT; 2003 } 2004 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 2005 verbose(env, "SCC backedge %s\n", format_callchain(env, callchain)); 2006 backedge->next = visit->backedges; 2007 visit->backedges = backedge; 2008 visit->num_backedges++; 2009 env->num_backedges++; 2010 update_peak_states(env); 2011 return 0; 2012 } 2013 2014 /* bpf_reg_state->live marks for registers in a state @st are incomplete, 2015 * if state @st is in some SCC and not all execution paths starting at this 2016 * SCC are fully explored. 2017 */ 2018 static bool incomplete_read_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2019 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 2020 { 2021 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf; 2022 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; 2023 2024 if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) 2025 return false; 2026 visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain); 2027 if (!visit) 2028 return false; 2029 return !!visit->backedges; 2030 } 2031 2032 static void free_backedges(struct bpf_scc_visit *visit) 2033 { 2034 struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge, *next; 2035 2036 for (backedge = visit->backedges; backedge; backedge = next) { 2037 free_verifier_state(&backedge->state, false); 2038 next = backedge->next; 2039 kfree(backedge); 2040 } 2041 visit->backedges = NULL; 2042 } 2043 2044 static int update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 2045 { 2046 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl = NULL, *parent_sl; 2047 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent; 2048 int err; 2049 2050 while (st) { 2051 u32 br = --st->branches; 2052 2053 /* verifier_bug_if(br > 1, ...) technically makes sense here, 2054 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: 2055 */ 2056 verifier_bug_if((int)br < 0, env, "%s:branches_to_explore=%d", __func__, br); 2057 if (br) 2058 break; 2059 err = maybe_exit_scc(env, st); 2060 if (err) 2061 return err; 2062 parent = st->parent; 2063 parent_sl = state_parent_as_list(st); 2064 if (sl) 2065 maybe_free_verifier_state(env, sl); 2066 st = parent; 2067 sl = parent_sl; 2068 } 2069 return 0; 2070 } 2071 2072 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, 2073 int *insn_idx, bool pop_log) 2074 { 2075 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 2076 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; 2077 int err; 2078 2079 if (env->head == NULL) 2080 return -ENOENT; 2081 2082 if (cur) { 2083 err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st); 2084 if (err) 2085 return err; 2086 } 2087 if (pop_log) 2088 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos); 2089 if (insn_idx) 2090 *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; 2091 if (prev_insn_idx) 2092 *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx; 2093 elem = head->next; 2094 free_verifier_state(&head->st, false); 2095 kfree(head); 2096 env->head = elem; 2097 env->stack_size--; 2098 return 0; 2099 } 2100 2101 static bool error_recoverable_with_nospec(int err) 2102 { 2103 /* Should only return true for non-fatal errors that are allowed to 2104 * occur during speculative verification. For these we can insert a 2105 * nospec and the program might still be accepted. Do not include 2106 * something like ENOMEM because it is likely to re-occur for the next 2107 * architectural path once it has been recovered-from in all speculative 2108 * paths. 2109 */ 2110 return err == -EPERM || err == -EACCES || err == -EINVAL; 2111 } 2112 2113 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2114 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 2115 bool speculative) 2116 { 2117 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 2118 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 2119 int err; 2120 2121 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 2122 if (!elem) 2123 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 2124 2125 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 2126 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 2127 elem->next = env->head; 2128 elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 2129 env->head = elem; 2130 env->stack_size++; 2131 err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); 2132 if (err) 2133 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 2134 elem->st.speculative |= speculative; 2135 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 2136 verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n", 2137 env->stack_size); 2138 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); 2139 } 2140 if (elem->st.parent) { 2141 ++elem->st.parent->branches; 2142 /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here, 2143 * but 2144 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch 2145 * instructions 2146 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create 2147 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current 2148 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state 2149 * which might have large 'branches' count. 2150 */ 2151 } 2152 return &elem->st; 2153 } 2154 2155 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 2156 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { 2157 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 2158 }; 2159 2160 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */ 2161 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 2162 { 2163 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); 2164 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; 2165 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; 2166 reg->umin_value = imm; 2167 reg->umax_value = imm; 2168 2169 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 2170 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 2171 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 2172 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 2173 } 2174 2175 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as 2176 * known to have the value @imm. 2177 */ 2178 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 2179 { 2180 /* Clear off and union(map_ptr, range) */ 2181 memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0, 2182 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type)); 2183 reg->id = 0; 2184 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 2185 ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm); 2186 } 2187 2188 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 2189 { 2190 reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm); 2191 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 2192 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 2193 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 2194 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 2195 } 2196 2197 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be 2198 * used only on registers holding a pointer type. 2199 */ 2200 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2201 { 2202 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 2203 } 2204 2205 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2206 { 2207 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 2208 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2209 /* all scalars are assumed imprecise initially (unless unprivileged, 2210 * in which case everything is forced to be precise) 2211 */ 2212 reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; 2213 } 2214 2215 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2216 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2217 { 2218 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2219 verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2220 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 2221 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 2222 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2223 return; 2224 } 2225 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); 2226 } 2227 2228 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 2229 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id) 2230 { 2231 /* reg->type has no meaning for STACK_DYNPTR, but when we set reg for 2232 * callback arguments, it does need to be CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, so simply 2233 * set it unconditionally as it is ignored for STACK_DYNPTR anyway. 2234 */ 2235 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg); 2236 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 2237 /* Give each dynptr a unique id to uniquely associate slices to it. */ 2238 reg->id = dynptr_id; 2239 reg->dynptr.type = type; 2240 reg->dynptr.first_slot = first_slot; 2241 } 2242 2243 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2244 { 2245 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 2246 const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 2247 2248 if (map->inner_map_meta) { 2249 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 2250 reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta; 2251 /* transfer reg's id which is unique for every map_lookup_elem 2252 * as UID of the inner map. 2253 */ 2254 if (btf_record_has_field(map->inner_map_meta->record, 2255 BPF_TIMER | BPF_WORKQUEUE | BPF_TASK_WORK)) { 2256 reg->map_uid = reg->id; 2257 } 2258 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { 2259 reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 2260 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 2261 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) { 2262 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; 2263 } else { 2264 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 2265 } 2266 return; 2267 } 2268 2269 reg->type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 2270 } 2271 2272 static void mark_reg_graph_node(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 2273 struct btf_field_graph_root *ds_head) 2274 { 2275 __mark_reg_known_zero(®s[regno]); 2276 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 2277 regs[regno].btf = ds_head->btf; 2278 regs[regno].btf_id = ds_head->value_btf_id; 2279 regs[regno].off = ds_head->node_offset; 2280 } 2281 2282 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2283 { 2284 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 2285 } 2286 2287 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2288 { 2289 return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || 2290 reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; 2291 } 2292 2293 static bool reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2294 { 2295 return base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && 2296 (reg->type & 2297 (DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB | DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP | DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META)); 2298 } 2299 2300 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ 2301 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 2302 enum bpf_reg_type which) 2303 { 2304 /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. 2305 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its 2306 * origin. 2307 */ 2308 return reg->type == which && 2309 reg->id == 0 && 2310 reg->off == 0 && 2311 tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 2312 } 2313 2314 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ 2315 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2316 { 2317 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2318 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2319 reg->umin_value = 0; 2320 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2321 2322 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 2323 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 2324 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 2325 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 2326 } 2327 2328 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2329 { 2330 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2331 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2332 reg->umin_value = 0; 2333 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2334 } 2335 2336 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2337 { 2338 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 2339 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 2340 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 2341 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 2342 } 2343 2344 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2345 { 2346 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 2347 2348 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 2349 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, 2350 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN)); 2351 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 2352 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, 2353 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX)); 2354 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value); 2355 reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value, 2356 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask)); 2357 } 2358 2359 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2360 { 2361 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 2362 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, 2363 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); 2364 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 2365 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, 2366 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); 2367 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); 2368 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, 2369 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); 2370 } 2371 2372 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2373 { 2374 __update_reg32_bounds(reg); 2375 __update_reg64_bounds(reg); 2376 } 2377 2378 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ 2379 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2380 { 2381 /* If upper 32 bits of u64/s64 range don't change, we can use lower 32 2382 * bits to improve our u32/s32 boundaries. 2383 * 2384 * E.g., the case where we have upper 32 bits as zero ([10, 20] in 2385 * u64) is pretty trivial, it's obvious that in u32 we'll also have 2386 * [10, 20] range. But this property holds for any 64-bit range as 2387 * long as upper 32 bits in that entire range of values stay the same. 2388 * 2389 * E.g., u64 range [0x10000000A, 0x10000000F] ([4294967306, 4294967311] 2390 * in decimal) has the same upper 32 bits throughout all the values in 2391 * that range. As such, lower 32 bits form a valid [0xA, 0xF] ([10, 15]) 2392 * range. 2393 * 2394 * Note also, that [0xA, 0xF] is a valid range both in u32 and in s32, 2395 * following the rules outlined below about u64/s64 correspondence 2396 * (which equally applies to u32 vs s32 correspondence). In general it 2397 * depends on actual hexadecimal values of 32-bit range. They can form 2398 * only valid u32, or only valid s32 ranges in some cases. 2399 * 2400 * So we use all these insights to derive bounds for subregisters here. 2401 */ 2402 if ((reg->umin_value >> 32) == (reg->umax_value >> 32)) { 2403 /* u64 to u32 casting preserves validity of low 32 bits as 2404 * a range, if upper 32 bits are the same 2405 */ 2406 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)reg->umin_value); 2407 reg->u32_max_value = min_t(u32, reg->u32_max_value, (u32)reg->umax_value); 2408 2409 if ((s32)reg->umin_value <= (s32)reg->umax_value) { 2410 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, (s32)reg->umin_value); 2411 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, (s32)reg->umax_value); 2412 } 2413 } 2414 if ((reg->smin_value >> 32) == (reg->smax_value >> 32)) { 2415 /* low 32 bits should form a proper u32 range */ 2416 if ((u32)reg->smin_value <= (u32)reg->smax_value) { 2417 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)reg->smin_value); 2418 reg->u32_max_value = min_t(u32, reg->u32_max_value, (u32)reg->smax_value); 2419 } 2420 /* low 32 bits should form a proper s32 range */ 2421 if ((s32)reg->smin_value <= (s32)reg->smax_value) { 2422 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, (s32)reg->smin_value); 2423 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, (s32)reg->smax_value); 2424 } 2425 } 2426 /* Special case where upper bits form a small sequence of two 2427 * sequential numbers (in 32-bit unsigned space, so 0xffffffff to 2428 * 0x00000000 is also valid), while lower bits form a proper s32 range 2429 * going from negative numbers to positive numbers. E.g., let's say we 2430 * have s64 range [-1, 1] ([0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0000000000000001]). 2431 * Possible s64 values are {-1, 0, 1} ({0xffffffffffffffff, 2432 * 0x0000000000000000, 0x00000000000001}). Ignoring upper 32 bits, 2433 * we still get a valid s32 range [-1, 1] ([0xffffffff, 0x00000001]). 2434 * Note that it doesn't have to be 0xffffffff going to 0x00000000 in 2435 * upper 32 bits. As a random example, s64 range 2436 * [0xfffffff0fffffff0; 0xfffffff100000010], forms a valid s32 range 2437 * [-16, 16] ([0xfffffff0; 0x00000010]) in its 32 bit subregister. 2438 */ 2439 if ((u32)(reg->umin_value >> 32) + 1 == (u32)(reg->umax_value >> 32) && 2440 (s32)reg->umin_value < 0 && (s32)reg->umax_value >= 0) { 2441 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, (s32)reg->umin_value); 2442 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, (s32)reg->umax_value); 2443 } 2444 if ((u32)(reg->smin_value >> 32) + 1 == (u32)(reg->smax_value >> 32) && 2445 (s32)reg->smin_value < 0 && (s32)reg->smax_value >= 0) { 2446 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, (s32)reg->smin_value); 2447 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, (s32)reg->smax_value); 2448 } 2449 /* if u32 range forms a valid s32 range (due to matching sign bit), 2450 * try to learn from that 2451 */ 2452 if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value <= (s32)reg->u32_max_value) { 2453 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 2454 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 2455 } 2456 /* If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 2457 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 2458 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 2459 */ 2460 if ((u32)reg->s32_min_value <= (u32)reg->s32_max_value) { 2461 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 2462 reg->u32_max_value = min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 2463 } 2464 } 2465 2466 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2467 { 2468 /* If u64 range forms a valid s64 range (due to matching sign bit), 2469 * try to learn from that. Let's do a bit of ASCII art to see when 2470 * this is happening. Let's take u64 range first: 2471 * 2472 * 0 0x7fffffffffffffff 0x8000000000000000 U64_MAX 2473 * |-------------------------------|--------------------------------| 2474 * 2475 * Valid u64 range is formed when umin and umax are anywhere in the 2476 * range [0, U64_MAX], and umin <= umax. u64 case is simple and 2477 * straightforward. Let's see how s64 range maps onto the same range 2478 * of values, annotated below the line for comparison: 2479 * 2480 * 0 0x7fffffffffffffff 0x8000000000000000 U64_MAX 2481 * |-------------------------------|--------------------------------| 2482 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 2483 * 2484 * So s64 values basically start in the middle and they are logically 2485 * contiguous to the right of it, wrapping around from -1 to 0, and 2486 * then finishing as S64_MAX (0x7fffffffffffffff) right before 2487 * S64_MIN. We can try drawing the continuity of u64 vs s64 values 2488 * more visually as mapped to sign-agnostic range of hex values. 2489 * 2490 * u64 start u64 end 2491 * _______________________________________________________________ 2492 * / \ 2493 * 0 0x7fffffffffffffff 0x8000000000000000 U64_MAX 2494 * |-------------------------------|--------------------------------| 2495 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 2496 * / \ 2497 * >------------------------------ -------------------------------> 2498 * s64 continues... s64 end s64 start s64 "midpoint" 2499 * 2500 * What this means is that, in general, we can't always derive 2501 * something new about u64 from any random s64 range, and vice versa. 2502 * 2503 * But we can do that in two particular cases. One is when entire 2504 * u64/s64 range is *entirely* contained within left half of the above 2505 * diagram or when it is *entirely* contained in the right half. I.e.: 2506 * 2507 * |-------------------------------|--------------------------------| 2508 * ^ ^ ^ ^ 2509 * A B C D 2510 * 2511 * [A, B] and [C, D] are contained entirely in their respective halves 2512 * and form valid contiguous ranges as both u64 and s64 values. [A, B] 2513 * will be non-negative both as u64 and s64 (and in fact it will be 2514 * identical ranges no matter the signedness). [C, D] treated as s64 2515 * will be a range of negative values, while in u64 it will be 2516 * non-negative range of values larger than 0x8000000000000000. 2517 * 2518 * Now, any other range here can't be represented in both u64 and s64 2519 * simultaneously. E.g., [A, C], [A, D], [B, C], [B, D] are valid 2520 * contiguous u64 ranges, but they are discontinuous in s64. [B, C] 2521 * in s64 would be properly presented as [S64_MIN, C] and [B, S64_MAX], 2522 * for example. Similarly, valid s64 range [D, A] (going from negative 2523 * to positive values), would be two separate [D, U64_MAX] and [0, A] 2524 * ranges as u64. Currently reg_state can't represent two segments per 2525 * numeric domain, so in such situations we can only derive maximal 2526 * possible range ([0, U64_MAX] for u64, and [S64_MIN, S64_MAX] for s64). 2527 * 2528 * So we use these facts to derive umin/umax from smin/smax and vice 2529 * versa only if they stay within the same "half". This is equivalent 2530 * to checking sign bit: lower half will have sign bit as zero, upper 2531 * half have sign bit 1. Below in code we simplify this by just 2532 * casting umin/umax as smin/smax and checking if they form valid 2533 * range, and vice versa. Those are equivalent checks. 2534 */ 2535 if ((s64)reg->umin_value <= (s64)reg->umax_value) { 2536 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, reg->umin_value); 2537 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, reg->umax_value); 2538 } 2539 /* If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 2540 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 2541 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 2542 */ 2543 if ((u64)reg->smin_value <= (u64)reg->smax_value) { 2544 reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, reg->umin_value); 2545 reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, reg->umax_value); 2546 } else { 2547 /* If the s64 range crosses the sign boundary, then it's split 2548 * between the beginning and end of the U64 domain. In that 2549 * case, we can derive new bounds if the u64 range overlaps 2550 * with only one end of the s64 range. 2551 * 2552 * In the following example, the u64 range overlaps only with 2553 * positive portion of the s64 range. 2554 * 2555 * 0 U64_MAX 2556 * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] | 2557 * |----------------------------|----------------------------| 2558 * |xxxxx s64 range xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxx| 2559 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 2560 * 2561 * We can thus derive the following new s64 and u64 ranges. 2562 * 2563 * 0 U64_MAX 2564 * | [xxxxxx u64 range xxxxx] | 2565 * |----------------------------|----------------------------| 2566 * | [xxxxxx s64 range xxxxx] | 2567 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 2568 * 2569 * If they overlap in two places, we can't derive anything 2570 * because reg_state can't represent two ranges per numeric 2571 * domain. 2572 * 2573 * 0 U64_MAX 2574 * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] | 2575 * |----------------------------|----------------------------| 2576 * |xxxxx s64 range xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxxxxx| 2577 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 2578 * 2579 * The first condition below corresponds to the first diagram 2580 * above. 2581 */ 2582 if (reg->umax_value < (u64)reg->smin_value) { 2583 reg->smin_value = (s64)reg->umin_value; 2584 reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->umax_value, reg->smax_value); 2585 } else if ((u64)reg->smax_value < reg->umin_value) { 2586 /* This second condition considers the case where the u64 range 2587 * overlaps with the negative portion of the s64 range: 2588 * 2589 * 0 U64_MAX 2590 * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] | 2591 * |----------------------------|----------------------------| 2592 * |xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxxxxxxx s64 range | 2593 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 2594 */ 2595 reg->smax_value = (s64)reg->umax_value; 2596 reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->umin_value, reg->smin_value); 2597 } 2598 } 2599 } 2600 2601 static void __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2602 { 2603 /* Try to tighten 64-bit bounds from 32-bit knowledge, using 32-bit 2604 * values on both sides of 64-bit range in hope to have tighter range. 2605 * E.g., if r1 is [0x1'00000000, 0x3'80000000], and we learn from 2606 * 32-bit signed > 0 operation that s32 bounds are now [1; 0x7fffffff]. 2607 * With this, we can substitute 1 as low 32-bits of _low_ 64-bit bound 2608 * (0x100000000 -> 0x100000001) and 0x7fffffff as low 32-bits of 2609 * _high_ 64-bit bound (0x380000000 -> 0x37fffffff) and arrive at a 2610 * better overall bounds for r1 as [0x1'000000001; 0x3'7fffffff]. 2611 * We just need to make sure that derived bounds we are intersecting 2612 * with are well-formed ranges in respective s64 or u64 domain, just 2613 * like we do with similar kinds of 32-to-64 or 64-to-32 adjustments. 2614 */ 2615 __u64 new_umin, new_umax; 2616 __s64 new_smin, new_smax; 2617 2618 /* u32 -> u64 tightening, it's always well-formed */ 2619 new_umin = (reg->umin_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | reg->u32_min_value; 2620 new_umax = (reg->umax_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | reg->u32_max_value; 2621 reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->umin_value, new_umin); 2622 reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->umax_value, new_umax); 2623 /* u32 -> s64 tightening, u32 range embedded into s64 preserves range validity */ 2624 new_smin = (reg->smin_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | reg->u32_min_value; 2625 new_smax = (reg->smax_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | reg->u32_max_value; 2626 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, new_smin); 2627 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, new_smax); 2628 2629 /* Here we would like to handle a special case after sign extending load, 2630 * when upper bits for a 64-bit range are all 1s or all 0s. 2631 * 2632 * Upper bits are all 1s when register is in a range: 2633 * [0xffff_ffff_0000_0000, 0xffff_ffff_ffff_ffff] 2634 * Upper bits are all 0s when register is in a range: 2635 * [0x0000_0000_0000_0000, 0x0000_0000_ffff_ffff] 2636 * Together this forms are continuous range: 2637 * [0xffff_ffff_0000_0000, 0x0000_0000_ffff_ffff] 2638 * 2639 * Now, suppose that register range is in fact tighter: 2640 * [0xffff_ffff_8000_0000, 0x0000_0000_ffff_ffff] (R) 2641 * Also suppose that it's 32-bit range is positive, 2642 * meaning that lower 32-bits of the full 64-bit register 2643 * are in the range: 2644 * [0x0000_0000, 0x7fff_ffff] (W) 2645 * 2646 * If this happens, then any value in a range: 2647 * [0xffff_ffff_0000_0000, 0xffff_ffff_7fff_ffff] 2648 * is smaller than a lowest bound of the range (R): 2649 * 0xffff_ffff_8000_0000 2650 * which means that upper bits of the full 64-bit register 2651 * can't be all 1s, when lower bits are in range (W). 2652 * 2653 * Note that: 2654 * - 0xffff_ffff_8000_0000 == (s64)S32_MIN 2655 * - 0x0000_0000_7fff_ffff == (s64)S32_MAX 2656 * These relations are used in the conditions below. 2657 */ 2658 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && reg->smin_value >= S32_MIN && reg->smax_value <= S32_MAX) { 2659 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 2660 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 2661 reg->umin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 2662 reg->umax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 2663 reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 2664 tnum_range(reg->smin_value, reg->smax_value)); 2665 } 2666 } 2667 2668 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2669 { 2670 __reg32_deduce_bounds(reg); 2671 __reg64_deduce_bounds(reg); 2672 __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds(reg); 2673 } 2674 2675 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ 2676 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2677 { 2678 struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 2679 tnum_range(reg->umin_value, 2680 reg->umax_value)); 2681 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(var64_off), 2682 tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value, 2683 reg->u32_max_value)); 2684 2685 reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off); 2686 } 2687 2688 static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2689 { 2690 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ 2691 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 2692 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ 2693 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 2694 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 2695 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 2696 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 2697 __reg_bound_offset(reg); 2698 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 2699 * slightly, e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 2700 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 2701 */ 2702 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 2703 } 2704 2705 static int reg_bounds_sanity_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2706 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, const char *ctx) 2707 { 2708 const char *msg; 2709 2710 if (reg->umin_value > reg->umax_value || 2711 reg->smin_value > reg->smax_value || 2712 reg->u32_min_value > reg->u32_max_value || 2713 reg->s32_min_value > reg->s32_max_value) { 2714 msg = "range bounds violation"; 2715 goto out; 2716 } 2717 2718 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 2719 u64 uval = reg->var_off.value; 2720 s64 sval = (s64)uval; 2721 2722 if (reg->umin_value != uval || reg->umax_value != uval || 2723 reg->smin_value != sval || reg->smax_value != sval) { 2724 msg = "const tnum out of sync with range bounds"; 2725 goto out; 2726 } 2727 } 2728 2729 if (tnum_subreg_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 2730 u32 uval32 = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off).value; 2731 s32 sval32 = (s32)uval32; 2732 2733 if (reg->u32_min_value != uval32 || reg->u32_max_value != uval32 || 2734 reg->s32_min_value != sval32 || reg->s32_max_value != sval32) { 2735 msg = "const subreg tnum out of sync with range bounds"; 2736 goto out; 2737 } 2738 } 2739 2740 return 0; 2741 out: 2742 verifier_bug(env, "REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (%s): %s u64=[%#llx, %#llx] " 2743 "s64=[%#llx, %#llx] u32=[%#x, %#x] s32=[%#x, %#x] var_off=(%#llx, %#llx)", 2744 ctx, msg, reg->umin_value, reg->umax_value, 2745 reg->smin_value, reg->smax_value, 2746 reg->u32_min_value, reg->u32_max_value, 2747 reg->s32_min_value, reg->s32_max_value, 2748 reg->var_off.value, reg->var_off.mask); 2749 if (env->test_reg_invariants) 2750 return -EFAULT; 2751 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 2752 return 0; 2753 } 2754 2755 static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a) 2756 { 2757 return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX; 2758 } 2759 2760 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2761 { 2762 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value; 2763 reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value; 2764 2765 /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must 2766 * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later 2767 * from tnum. 2768 */ 2769 if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) && 2770 __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) { 2771 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 2772 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 2773 } else { 2774 reg->smin_value = 0; 2775 reg->smax_value = U32_MAX; 2776 } 2777 } 2778 2779 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ 2780 static void __mark_reg_unknown_imprecise(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2781 { 2782 /* 2783 * Clear type, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and 2784 * padding between 'type' and union 2785 */ 2786 memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)); 2787 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2788 reg->id = 0; 2789 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 2790 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 2791 reg->frameno = 0; 2792 reg->precise = false; 2793 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 2794 } 2795 2796 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value, 2797 * initialize .precise as true when not bpf capable. 2798 */ 2799 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2800 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2801 { 2802 __mark_reg_unknown_imprecise(reg); 2803 reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; 2804 } 2805 2806 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2807 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2808 { 2809 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2810 verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2811 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 2812 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 2813 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2814 return; 2815 } 2816 __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno); 2817 } 2818 2819 static int __mark_reg_s32_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2820 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 2821 u32 regno, 2822 s32 s32_min, 2823 s32 s32_max) 2824 { 2825 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 2826 2827 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, s32_min); 2828 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, s32_max); 2829 2830 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, s32_min); 2831 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, s32_max); 2832 2833 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 2834 2835 return reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, reg, "s32_range"); 2836 } 2837 2838 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2839 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2840 { 2841 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 2842 reg->type = NOT_INIT; 2843 } 2844 2845 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2846 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2847 { 2848 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2849 verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2850 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 2851 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 2852 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2853 return; 2854 } 2855 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2856 } 2857 2858 static int mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2859 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 2860 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, 2861 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, 2862 enum bpf_type_flag flag) 2863 { 2864 switch (reg_type) { 2865 case SCALAR_VALUE: 2866 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 2867 return 0; 2868 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 2869 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); 2870 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag; 2871 regs[regno].btf = btf; 2872 regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; 2873 if (type_may_be_null(flag)) 2874 regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 2875 return 0; 2876 case PTR_TO_MEM: 2877 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); 2878 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_MEM | flag; 2879 regs[regno].mem_size = 0; 2880 return 0; 2881 default: 2882 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected reg_type %d in %s\n", reg_type, __func__); 2883 return -EFAULT; 2884 } 2885 } 2886 2887 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) 2888 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2889 struct bpf_func_state *state) 2890 { 2891 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 2892 int i; 2893 2894 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 2895 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); 2896 regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 2897 } 2898 2899 /* frame pointer */ 2900 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; 2901 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); 2902 regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; 2903 } 2904 2905 static struct bpf_retval_range retval_range(s32 minval, s32 maxval) 2906 { 2907 return (struct bpf_retval_range){ minval, maxval }; 2908 } 2909 2910 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) 2911 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2912 struct bpf_func_state *state, 2913 int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno) 2914 { 2915 state->callsite = callsite; 2916 state->frameno = frameno; 2917 state->subprogno = subprogno; 2918 state->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 0); 2919 init_reg_state(env, state); 2920 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 2921 } 2922 2923 /* Similar to push_stack(), but for async callbacks */ 2924 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2925 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 2926 int subprog, bool is_sleepable) 2927 { 2928 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 2929 struct bpf_func_state *frame; 2930 2931 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 2932 if (!elem) 2933 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 2934 2935 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 2936 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 2937 elem->next = env->head; 2938 elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 2939 env->head = elem; 2940 env->stack_size++; 2941 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 2942 verbose(env, 2943 "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex for async cb.\n", 2944 env->stack_size); 2945 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); 2946 } 2947 /* Unlike push_stack() do not copy_verifier_state(). 2948 * The caller state doesn't matter. 2949 * This is async callback. It starts in a fresh stack. 2950 * Initialize it similar to do_check_common(). 2951 */ 2952 elem->st.branches = 1; 2953 elem->st.in_sleepable = is_sleepable; 2954 frame = kzalloc(sizeof(*frame), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 2955 if (!frame) 2956 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 2957 init_func_state(env, frame, 2958 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 2959 0 /* frameno within this callchain */, 2960 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 2961 elem->st.frame[0] = frame; 2962 return &elem->st; 2963 } 2964 2965 2966 enum reg_arg_type { 2967 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ 2968 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ 2969 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ 2970 }; 2971 2972 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b) 2973 { 2974 return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start - 2975 ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start; 2976 } 2977 2978 /* Find subprogram that contains instruction at 'off' */ 2979 struct bpf_subprog_info *bpf_find_containing_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 2980 { 2981 struct bpf_subprog_info *vals = env->subprog_info; 2982 int l, r, m; 2983 2984 if (off >= env->prog->len || off < 0 || env->subprog_cnt == 0) 2985 return NULL; 2986 2987 l = 0; 2988 r = env->subprog_cnt - 1; 2989 while (l < r) { 2990 m = l + (r - l + 1) / 2; 2991 if (vals[m].start <= off) 2992 l = m; 2993 else 2994 r = m - 1; 2995 } 2996 return &vals[l]; 2997 } 2998 2999 /* Find subprogram that starts exactly at 'off' */ 3000 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 3001 { 3002 struct bpf_subprog_info *p; 3003 3004 p = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, off); 3005 if (!p || p->start != off) 3006 return -ENOENT; 3007 return p - env->subprog_info; 3008 } 3009 3010 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 3011 { 3012 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 3013 int ret; 3014 3015 if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) { 3016 verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n"); 3017 return -EINVAL; 3018 } 3019 ret = find_subprog(env, off); 3020 if (ret >= 0) 3021 return ret; 3022 if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { 3023 verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); 3024 return -E2BIG; 3025 } 3026 /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ 3027 env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; 3028 sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 3029 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); 3030 return env->subprog_cnt - 1; 3031 } 3032 3033 static int bpf_find_exception_callback_insn_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3034 { 3035 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 3036 struct btf *btf = aux->btf; 3037 const struct btf_type *t; 3038 u32 main_btf_id, id; 3039 const char *name; 3040 int ret, i; 3041 3042 /* Non-zero func_info_cnt implies valid btf */ 3043 if (!aux->func_info_cnt) 3044 return 0; 3045 main_btf_id = aux->func_info[0].type_id; 3046 3047 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, main_btf_id); 3048 if (!t) { 3049 verbose(env, "invalid btf id for main subprog in func_info\n"); 3050 return -EINVAL; 3051 } 3052 3053 name = btf_find_decl_tag_value(btf, t, -1, "exception_callback:"); 3054 if (IS_ERR(name)) { 3055 ret = PTR_ERR(name); 3056 /* If there is no tag present, there is no exception callback */ 3057 if (ret == -ENOENT) 3058 ret = 0; 3059 else if (ret == -EEXIST) 3060 verbose(env, "multiple exception callback tags for main subprog\n"); 3061 return ret; 3062 } 3063 3064 ret = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, name, BTF_KIND_FUNC); 3065 if (ret < 0) { 3066 verbose(env, "exception callback '%s' could not be found in BTF\n", name); 3067 return ret; 3068 } 3069 id = ret; 3070 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id); 3071 if (btf_func_linkage(t) != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) { 3072 verbose(env, "exception callback '%s' must have global linkage\n", name); 3073 return -EINVAL; 3074 } 3075 ret = 0; 3076 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) { 3077 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id != id) 3078 continue; 3079 ret = aux->func_info[i].insn_off; 3080 /* Further func_info and subprog checks will also happen 3081 * later, so assume this is the right insn_off for now. 3082 */ 3083 if (!ret) { 3084 verbose(env, "invalid exception callback insn_off in func_info: 0\n"); 3085 ret = -EINVAL; 3086 } 3087 } 3088 if (!ret) { 3089 verbose(env, "exception callback type id not found in func_info\n"); 3090 ret = -EINVAL; 3091 } 3092 return ret; 3093 } 3094 3095 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256 3096 #define MAX_KFUNC_BTFS 256 3097 3098 struct bpf_kfunc_desc { 3099 struct btf_func_model func_model; 3100 u32 func_id; 3101 s32 imm; 3102 u16 offset; 3103 unsigned long addr; 3104 }; 3105 3106 struct bpf_kfunc_btf { 3107 struct btf *btf; 3108 struct module *module; 3109 u16 offset; 3110 }; 3111 3112 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab { 3113 /* Sorted by func_id (BTF ID) and offset (fd_array offset) during 3114 * verification. JITs do lookups by bpf_insn, where func_id may not be 3115 * available, therefore at the end of verification do_misc_fixups() 3116 * sorts this by imm and offset. 3117 */ 3118 struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS]; 3119 u32 nr_descs; 3120 }; 3121 3122 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab { 3123 struct bpf_kfunc_btf descs[MAX_KFUNC_BTFS]; 3124 u32 nr_descs; 3125 }; 3126 3127 static int specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc, 3128 int insn_idx); 3129 3130 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off(const void *a, const void *b) 3131 { 3132 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 3133 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 3134 3135 /* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */ 3136 return d0->func_id - d1->func_id ?: d0->offset - d1->offset; 3137 } 3138 3139 static int kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off(const void *a, const void *b) 3140 { 3141 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d0 = a; 3142 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d1 = b; 3143 3144 return d0->offset - d1->offset; 3145 } 3146 3147 static struct bpf_kfunc_desc * 3148 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, u16 offset) 3149 { 3150 struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 3151 .func_id = func_id, 3152 .offset = offset, 3153 }; 3154 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 3155 3156 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 3157 return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 3158 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off); 3159 } 3160 3161 int bpf_get_kfunc_addr(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, 3162 u16 btf_fd_idx, u8 **func_addr) 3163 { 3164 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 3165 3166 desc = find_kfunc_desc(prog, func_id, btf_fd_idx); 3167 if (!desc) 3168 return -EFAULT; 3169 3170 *func_addr = (u8 *)desc->addr; 3171 return 0; 3172 } 3173 3174 static struct btf *__find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3175 s16 offset) 3176 { 3177 struct bpf_kfunc_btf kf_btf = { .offset = offset }; 3178 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab; 3179 struct bpf_kfunc_btf *b; 3180 struct module *mod; 3181 struct btf *btf; 3182 int btf_fd; 3183 3184 tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 3185 b = bsearch(&kf_btf, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 3186 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off); 3187 if (!b) { 3188 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_BTFS) { 3189 verbose(env, "too many different module BTFs\n"); 3190 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); 3191 } 3192 3193 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 3194 verbose(env, "kfunc offset > 0 without fd_array is invalid\n"); 3195 return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO); 3196 } 3197 3198 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&btf_fd, env->fd_array, 3199 offset * sizeof(btf_fd), 3200 sizeof(btf_fd))) 3201 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); 3202 3203 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 3204 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 3205 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF fd specified\n"); 3206 return btf; 3207 } 3208 3209 if (!btf_is_module(btf)) { 3210 verbose(env, "BTF fd for kfunc is not a module BTF\n"); 3211 btf_put(btf); 3212 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 3213 } 3214 3215 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 3216 if (!mod) { 3217 btf_put(btf); 3218 return ERR_PTR(-ENXIO); 3219 } 3220 3221 b = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 3222 b->btf = btf; 3223 b->module = mod; 3224 b->offset = offset; 3225 3226 /* sort() reorders entries by value, so b may no longer point 3227 * to the right entry after this 3228 */ 3229 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 3230 kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off, NULL); 3231 } else { 3232 btf = b->btf; 3233 } 3234 3235 return btf; 3236 } 3237 3238 void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab) 3239 { 3240 if (!tab) 3241 return; 3242 3243 while (tab->nr_descs--) { 3244 module_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].module); 3245 btf_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].btf); 3246 } 3247 kfree(tab); 3248 } 3249 3250 static struct btf *find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s16 offset) 3251 { 3252 if (offset) { 3253 if (offset < 0) { 3254 /* In the future, this can be allowed to increase limit 3255 * of fd index into fd_array, interpreted as u16. 3256 */ 3257 verbose(env, "negative offset disallowed for kernel module function call\n"); 3258 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 3259 } 3260 3261 return __find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 3262 } 3263 return btf_vmlinux ?: ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); 3264 } 3265 3266 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset) 3267 { 3268 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 3269 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *btf_tab; 3270 struct btf_func_model func_model; 3271 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 3272 struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux; 3273 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 3274 const char *func_name; 3275 struct btf *desc_btf; 3276 unsigned long addr; 3277 int err; 3278 3279 prog_aux = env->prog->aux; 3280 tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab; 3281 btf_tab = prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 3282 if (!tab) { 3283 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 3284 verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 3285 return -ENOTSUPP; 3286 } 3287 3288 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) { 3289 verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n"); 3290 return -ENOTSUPP; 3291 } 3292 3293 if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) { 3294 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n"); 3295 return -ENOTSUPP; 3296 } 3297 3298 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) { 3299 verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 3300 return -EINVAL; 3301 } 3302 3303 tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 3304 if (!tab) 3305 return -ENOMEM; 3306 prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab; 3307 } 3308 3309 /* func_id == 0 is always invalid, but instead of returning an error, be 3310 * conservative and wait until the code elimination pass before returning 3311 * error, so that invalid calls that get pruned out can be in BPF programs 3312 * loaded from userspace. It is also required that offset be untouched 3313 * for such calls. 3314 */ 3315 if (!func_id && !offset) 3316 return 0; 3317 3318 if (!btf_tab && offset) { 3319 btf_tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*btf_tab), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 3320 if (!btf_tab) 3321 return -ENOMEM; 3322 prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab = btf_tab; 3323 } 3324 3325 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 3326 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) { 3327 verbose(env, "failed to find BTF for kernel function\n"); 3328 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 3329 } 3330 3331 if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id, offset)) 3332 return 0; 3333 3334 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) { 3335 verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n"); 3336 return -E2BIG; 3337 } 3338 3339 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 3340 if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) { 3341 verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n", 3342 func_id); 3343 return -EINVAL; 3344 } 3345 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 3346 if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) { 3347 verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n", 3348 func_id); 3349 return -EINVAL; 3350 } 3351 3352 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 3353 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name); 3354 if (!addr) { 3355 verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n", 3356 func_name); 3357 return -EINVAL; 3358 } 3359 3360 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) { 3361 err = bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_check(&env->log, prog_aux); 3362 if (err) 3363 return err; 3364 } 3365 3366 err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, desc_btf, 3367 func_proto, func_name, 3368 &func_model); 3369 if (err) 3370 return err; 3371 3372 desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 3373 desc->func_id = func_id; 3374 desc->offset = offset; 3375 desc->addr = addr; 3376 desc->func_model = func_model; 3377 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 3378 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off, NULL); 3379 return 0; 3380 } 3381 3382 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off(const void *a, const void *b) 3383 { 3384 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 3385 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 3386 3387 if (d0->imm != d1->imm) 3388 return d0->imm < d1->imm ? -1 : 1; 3389 if (d0->offset != d1->offset) 3390 return d0->offset < d1->offset ? -1 : 1; 3391 return 0; 3392 } 3393 3394 static int set_kfunc_desc_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc) 3395 { 3396 unsigned long call_imm; 3397 3398 if (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()) { 3399 call_imm = desc->func_id; 3400 } else { 3401 call_imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr); 3402 /* Check whether the relative offset overflows desc->imm */ 3403 if ((unsigned long)(s32)call_imm != call_imm) { 3404 verbose(env, "address of kernel func_id %u is out of range\n", 3405 desc->func_id); 3406 return -EINVAL; 3407 } 3408 } 3409 desc->imm = call_imm; 3410 return 0; 3411 } 3412 3413 static int sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3414 { 3415 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 3416 int i, err; 3417 3418 tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 3419 if (!tab) 3420 return 0; 3421 3422 for (i = 0; i < tab->nr_descs; i++) { 3423 err = set_kfunc_desc_imm(env, &tab->descs[i]); 3424 if (err) 3425 return err; 3426 } 3427 3428 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 3429 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off, NULL); 3430 return 0; 3431 } 3432 3433 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog) 3434 { 3435 return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 3436 } 3437 3438 const struct btf_func_model * 3439 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog, 3440 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 3441 { 3442 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 3443 .imm = insn->imm, 3444 .offset = insn->off, 3445 }; 3446 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res; 3447 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 3448 3449 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 3450 res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 3451 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off); 3452 3453 return res ? &res->func_model : NULL; 3454 } 3455 3456 static int add_kfunc_in_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3457 struct bpf_insn *insn, int cnt) 3458 { 3459 int i, ret; 3460 3461 for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, insn++) { 3462 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) { 3463 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off); 3464 if (ret < 0) 3465 return ret; 3466 } 3467 } 3468 return 0; 3469 } 3470 3471 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3472 { 3473 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 3474 int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len, ex_cb_insn; 3475 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 3476 3477 /* Add entry function. */ 3478 ret = add_subprog(env, 0); 3479 if (ret) 3480 return ret; 3481 3482 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 3483 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) && 3484 !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) 3485 continue; 3486 3487 if (!env->bpf_capable) { 3488 verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); 3489 return -EPERM; 3490 } 3491 3492 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn) || bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 3493 ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 3494 else 3495 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off); 3496 3497 if (ret < 0) 3498 return ret; 3499 } 3500 3501 ret = bpf_find_exception_callback_insn_off(env); 3502 if (ret < 0) 3503 return ret; 3504 ex_cb_insn = ret; 3505 3506 /* If ex_cb_insn > 0, this means that the main program has a subprog 3507 * marked using BTF decl tag to serve as the exception callback. 3508 */ 3509 if (ex_cb_insn) { 3510 ret = add_subprog(env, ex_cb_insn); 3511 if (ret < 0) 3512 return ret; 3513 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 3514 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != ex_cb_insn) 3515 continue; 3516 env->exception_callback_subprog = i; 3517 mark_subprog_exc_cb(env, i); 3518 break; 3519 } 3520 } 3521 3522 /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration 3523 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased. 3524 */ 3525 subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; 3526 3527 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 3528 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 3529 verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); 3530 3531 return 0; 3532 } 3533 3534 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3535 { 3536 int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0; 3537 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 3538 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 3539 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 3540 3541 /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */ 3542 subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start; 3543 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 3544 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 3545 u8 code = insn[i].code; 3546 3547 if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 3548 insn[i].src_reg == 0 && 3549 insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 3550 subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true; 3551 subprog[cur_subprog].tail_call_reachable = true; 3552 } 3553 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD && 3554 (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND)) 3555 subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true; 3556 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) 3557 goto next; 3558 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) 3559 goto next; 3560 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT) { 3561 subprog[cur_subprog].exit_idx = i; 3562 goto next; 3563 } 3564 off = i + bpf_jmp_offset(&insn[i]) + 1; 3565 if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) { 3566 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off); 3567 return -EINVAL; 3568 } 3569 next: 3570 if (i == subprog_end - 1) { 3571 /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another 3572 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit 3573 * or unconditional jump back or bpf_throw call 3574 */ 3575 if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && 3576 code != (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA) && 3577 code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { 3578 verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n"); 3579 return -EINVAL; 3580 } 3581 subprog_start = subprog_end; 3582 cur_subprog++; 3583 if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt) 3584 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 3585 } 3586 } 3587 return 0; 3588 } 3589 3590 static int mark_stack_slot_obj_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3591 int spi, int nr_slots) 3592 { 3593 int err, i; 3594 3595 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 3596 err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg->frameno, env->insn_idx, BIT(spi - i)); 3597 if (err) 3598 return err; 3599 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 3600 } 3601 return 0; 3602 } 3603 3604 static int mark_dynptr_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3605 { 3606 int spi; 3607 3608 /* For CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, it must have already been done by 3609 * check_reg_arg in check_helper_call and mark_btf_func_reg_size in 3610 * check_kfunc_call. 3611 */ 3612 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 3613 return 0; 3614 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 3615 if (spi < 0) 3616 return spi; 3617 /* Caller ensures dynptr is valid and initialized, which means spi is in 3618 * bounds and spi is the first dynptr slot. Simply mark stack slot as 3619 * read. 3620 */ 3621 return mark_stack_slot_obj_read(env, reg, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS); 3622 } 3623 3624 static int mark_iter_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3625 int spi, int nr_slots) 3626 { 3627 return mark_stack_slot_obj_read(env, reg, spi, nr_slots); 3628 } 3629 3630 static int mark_irq_flag_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3631 { 3632 int spi; 3633 3634 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg); 3635 if (spi < 0) 3636 return spi; 3637 return mark_stack_slot_obj_read(env, reg, spi, 1); 3638 } 3639 3640 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization 3641 * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates 3642 * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE. 3643 */ 3644 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_insn *insn, 3645 u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t) 3646 { 3647 u8 code, class, op; 3648 3649 code = insn->code; 3650 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 3651 op = BPF_OP(code); 3652 if (class == BPF_JMP) { 3653 /* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE 3654 * conservatively. 3655 */ 3656 if (op == BPF_EXIT) 3657 return true; 3658 if (op == BPF_CALL) { 3659 /* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking 3660 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we 3661 * don't care the register def because they are anyway 3662 * marked as NOT_INIT already. 3663 */ 3664 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 3665 return false; 3666 /* Helper call will reach here because of arg type 3667 * check, conservatively return TRUE. 3668 */ 3669 if (t == SRC_OP) 3670 return true; 3671 3672 return false; 3673 } 3674 } 3675 3676 if (class == BPF_ALU64 && op == BPF_END && (insn->imm == 16 || insn->imm == 32)) 3677 return false; 3678 3679 if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP || 3680 (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64)) 3681 return true; 3682 3683 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32) 3684 return false; 3685 3686 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 3687 if (t != SRC_OP) 3688 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_MEMSX; 3689 /* LDX source must be ptr. */ 3690 return true; 3691 } 3692 3693 if (class == BPF_STX) { 3694 /* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has one or more source 3695 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is 3696 * asking about it. 3697 */ 3698 if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 3699 return true; 3700 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 3701 } 3702 3703 if (class == BPF_LD) { 3704 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code); 3705 3706 /* LD_IMM64 */ 3707 if (mode == BPF_IMM) 3708 return true; 3709 3710 /* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */ 3711 if (t != SRC_OP) 3712 return false; 3713 3714 /* Implicit ctx ptr. */ 3715 if (regno == BPF_REG_6) 3716 return true; 3717 3718 /* Explicit source could be any width. */ 3719 return true; 3720 } 3721 3722 if (class == BPF_ST) 3723 /* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */ 3724 return true; 3725 3726 /* Conservatively return true at default. */ 3727 return true; 3728 } 3729 3730 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */ 3731 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 3732 { 3733 switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) { 3734 case BPF_JMP: 3735 case BPF_JMP32: 3736 case BPF_ST: 3737 return -1; 3738 case BPF_STX: 3739 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC || 3740 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC) { 3741 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 3742 return BPF_REG_0; 3743 else if (insn->imm == BPF_LOAD_ACQ) 3744 return insn->dst_reg; 3745 else if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) 3746 return insn->src_reg; 3747 } 3748 return -1; 3749 default: 3750 return insn->dst_reg; 3751 } 3752 } 3753 3754 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */ 3755 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_insn *insn) 3756 { 3757 int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn); 3758 3759 if (dst_reg == -1) 3760 return false; 3761 3762 return !is_reg64(insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP); 3763 } 3764 3765 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3766 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3767 { 3768 s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def; 3769 3770 if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG) 3771 return; 3772 3773 env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true; 3774 /* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */ 3775 reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 3776 } 3777 3778 static int __check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 3779 enum reg_arg_type t) 3780 { 3781 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx; 3782 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3783 bool rw64; 3784 3785 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { 3786 verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); 3787 return -EINVAL; 3788 } 3789 3790 mark_reg_scratched(env, regno); 3791 3792 reg = ®s[regno]; 3793 rw64 = is_reg64(insn, regno, reg, t); 3794 if (t == SRC_OP) { 3795 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ 3796 if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) { 3797 verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); 3798 return -EACCES; 3799 } 3800 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ 3801 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) 3802 return 0; 3803 3804 if (rw64) 3805 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 3806 3807 return 0; 3808 } else { 3809 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ 3810 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { 3811 verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); 3812 return -EACCES; 3813 } 3814 reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 3815 if (t == DST_OP) 3816 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 3817 } 3818 return 0; 3819 } 3820 3821 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3822 enum reg_arg_type t) 3823 { 3824 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3825 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3826 3827 return __check_reg_arg(env, state->regs, regno, t); 3828 } 3829 3830 static int insn_stack_access_flags(int frameno, int spi) 3831 { 3832 return INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS | (spi << INSN_F_SPI_SHIFT) | frameno; 3833 } 3834 3835 static int insn_stack_access_spi(int insn_flags) 3836 { 3837 return (insn_flags >> INSN_F_SPI_SHIFT) & INSN_F_SPI_MASK; 3838 } 3839 3840 static int insn_stack_access_frameno(int insn_flags) 3841 { 3842 return insn_flags & INSN_F_FRAMENO_MASK; 3843 } 3844 3845 static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 3846 { 3847 env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true; 3848 } 3849 3850 static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 3851 { 3852 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jmp_point; 3853 } 3854 3855 #define LR_FRAMENO_BITS 3 3856 #define LR_SPI_BITS 6 3857 #define LR_ENTRY_BITS (LR_SPI_BITS + LR_FRAMENO_BITS + 1) 3858 #define LR_SIZE_BITS 4 3859 #define LR_FRAMENO_MASK ((1ull << LR_FRAMENO_BITS) - 1) 3860 #define LR_SPI_MASK ((1ull << LR_SPI_BITS) - 1) 3861 #define LR_SIZE_MASK ((1ull << LR_SIZE_BITS) - 1) 3862 #define LR_SPI_OFF LR_FRAMENO_BITS 3863 #define LR_IS_REG_OFF (LR_SPI_BITS + LR_FRAMENO_BITS) 3864 #define LINKED_REGS_MAX 6 3865 3866 struct linked_reg { 3867 u8 frameno; 3868 union { 3869 u8 spi; 3870 u8 regno; 3871 }; 3872 bool is_reg; 3873 }; 3874 3875 struct linked_regs { 3876 int cnt; 3877 struct linked_reg entries[LINKED_REGS_MAX]; 3878 }; 3879 3880 static struct linked_reg *linked_regs_push(struct linked_regs *s) 3881 { 3882 if (s->cnt < LINKED_REGS_MAX) 3883 return &s->entries[s->cnt++]; 3884 3885 return NULL; 3886 } 3887 3888 /* Use u64 as a vector of 6 10-bit values, use first 4-bits to track 3889 * number of elements currently in stack. 3890 * Pack one history entry for linked registers as 10 bits in the following format: 3891 * - 3-bits frameno 3892 * - 6-bits spi_or_reg 3893 * - 1-bit is_reg 3894 */ 3895 static u64 linked_regs_pack(struct linked_regs *s) 3896 { 3897 u64 val = 0; 3898 int i; 3899 3900 for (i = 0; i < s->cnt; ++i) { 3901 struct linked_reg *e = &s->entries[i]; 3902 u64 tmp = 0; 3903 3904 tmp |= e->frameno; 3905 tmp |= e->spi << LR_SPI_OFF; 3906 tmp |= (e->is_reg ? 1 : 0) << LR_IS_REG_OFF; 3907 3908 val <<= LR_ENTRY_BITS; 3909 val |= tmp; 3910 } 3911 val <<= LR_SIZE_BITS; 3912 val |= s->cnt; 3913 return val; 3914 } 3915 3916 static void linked_regs_unpack(u64 val, struct linked_regs *s) 3917 { 3918 int i; 3919 3920 s->cnt = val & LR_SIZE_MASK; 3921 val >>= LR_SIZE_BITS; 3922 3923 for (i = 0; i < s->cnt; ++i) { 3924 struct linked_reg *e = &s->entries[i]; 3925 3926 e->frameno = val & LR_FRAMENO_MASK; 3927 e->spi = (val >> LR_SPI_OFF) & LR_SPI_MASK; 3928 e->is_reg = (val >> LR_IS_REG_OFF) & 0x1; 3929 val >>= LR_ENTRY_BITS; 3930 } 3931 } 3932 3933 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ 3934 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 3935 int insn_flags, u64 linked_regs) 3936 { 3937 u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; 3938 struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *p; 3939 size_t alloc_size; 3940 3941 /* combine instruction flags if we already recorded this instruction */ 3942 if (env->cur_hist_ent) { 3943 /* atomic instructions push insn_flags twice, for READ and 3944 * WRITE sides, but they should agree on stack slot 3945 */ 3946 verifier_bug_if((env->cur_hist_ent->flags & insn_flags) && 3947 (env->cur_hist_ent->flags & insn_flags) != insn_flags, 3948 env, "insn history: insn_idx %d cur flags %x new flags %x", 3949 env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->flags, insn_flags); 3950 env->cur_hist_ent->flags |= insn_flags; 3951 verifier_bug_if(env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs != 0, env, 3952 "insn history: insn_idx %d linked_regs: %#llx", 3953 env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs); 3954 env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs = linked_regs; 3955 return 0; 3956 } 3957 3958 cnt++; 3959 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(cnt, sizeof(*p))); 3960 p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 3961 if (!p) 3962 return -ENOMEM; 3963 cur->jmp_history = p; 3964 3965 p = &cur->jmp_history[cnt - 1]; 3966 p->idx = env->insn_idx; 3967 p->prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 3968 p->flags = insn_flags; 3969 p->linked_regs = linked_regs; 3970 cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; 3971 env->cur_hist_ent = p; 3972 3973 return 0; 3974 } 3975 3976 static struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *get_jmp_hist_entry(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, 3977 u32 hist_end, int insn_idx) 3978 { 3979 if (hist_end > 0 && st->jmp_history[hist_end - 1].idx == insn_idx) 3980 return &st->jmp_history[hist_end - 1]; 3981 return NULL; 3982 } 3983 3984 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded 3985 * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. 3986 * Return -ENOENT if we exhausted all instructions within given state. 3987 * 3988 * It's legal to have a bit of a looping with the same starting and ending 3989 * insn index within the same state, e.g.: 3->4->5->3, so just because current 3990 * instruction index is the same as state's first_idx doesn't mean we are 3991 * done. If there is still some jump history left, we should keep going. We 3992 * need to take into account that we might have a jump history between given 3993 * state's parent and itself, due to checkpointing. In this case, we'll have 3994 * history entry recording a jump from last instruction of parent state and 3995 * first instruction of given state. 3996 */ 3997 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, 3998 u32 *history) 3999 { 4000 u32 cnt = *history; 4001 4002 if (i == st->first_insn_idx) { 4003 if (cnt == 0) 4004 return -ENOENT; 4005 if (cnt == 1 && st->jmp_history[0].idx == i) 4006 return -ENOENT; 4007 } 4008 4009 if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { 4010 i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; 4011 (*history)--; 4012 } else { 4013 i--; 4014 } 4015 return i; 4016 } 4017 4018 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn) 4019 { 4020 const struct btf_type *func; 4021 struct btf *desc_btf; 4022 4023 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 4024 return NULL; 4025 4026 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(data, insn->off); 4027 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 4028 return "<error>"; 4029 4030 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, insn->imm); 4031 return btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 4032 } 4033 4034 static void verbose_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 4035 { 4036 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 4037 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 4038 .cb_print = verbose, 4039 .private_data = env, 4040 }; 4041 4042 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 4043 } 4044 4045 static inline void bt_init(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 4046 { 4047 bt->frame = frame; 4048 } 4049 4050 static inline void bt_reset(struct backtrack_state *bt) 4051 { 4052 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = bt->env; 4053 4054 memset(bt, 0, sizeof(*bt)); 4055 bt->env = env; 4056 } 4057 4058 static inline u32 bt_empty(struct backtrack_state *bt) 4059 { 4060 u64 mask = 0; 4061 int i; 4062 4063 for (i = 0; i <= bt->frame; i++) 4064 mask |= bt->reg_masks[i] | bt->stack_masks[i]; 4065 4066 return mask == 0; 4067 } 4068 4069 static inline int bt_subprog_enter(struct backtrack_state *bt) 4070 { 4071 if (bt->frame == MAX_CALL_FRAMES - 1) { 4072 verifier_bug(bt->env, "subprog enter from frame %d", bt->frame); 4073 return -EFAULT; 4074 } 4075 bt->frame++; 4076 return 0; 4077 } 4078 4079 static inline int bt_subprog_exit(struct backtrack_state *bt) 4080 { 4081 if (bt->frame == 0) { 4082 verifier_bug(bt->env, "subprog exit from frame 0"); 4083 return -EFAULT; 4084 } 4085 bt->frame--; 4086 return 0; 4087 } 4088 4089 static inline void bt_set_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg) 4090 { 4091 bt->reg_masks[frame] |= 1 << reg; 4092 } 4093 4094 static inline void bt_clear_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg) 4095 { 4096 bt->reg_masks[frame] &= ~(1 << reg); 4097 } 4098 4099 static inline void bt_set_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 4100 { 4101 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg); 4102 } 4103 4104 static inline void bt_clear_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 4105 { 4106 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg); 4107 } 4108 4109 static inline void bt_set_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) 4110 { 4111 bt->stack_masks[frame] |= 1ull << slot; 4112 } 4113 4114 static inline void bt_clear_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) 4115 { 4116 bt->stack_masks[frame] &= ~(1ull << slot); 4117 } 4118 4119 static inline u32 bt_frame_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 4120 { 4121 return bt->reg_masks[frame]; 4122 } 4123 4124 static inline u32 bt_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt) 4125 { 4126 return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame]; 4127 } 4128 4129 static inline u64 bt_frame_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 4130 { 4131 return bt->stack_masks[frame]; 4132 } 4133 4134 static inline u64 bt_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt) 4135 { 4136 return bt->stack_masks[bt->frame]; 4137 } 4138 4139 static inline bool bt_is_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 4140 { 4141 return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame] & (1 << reg); 4142 } 4143 4144 static inline bool bt_is_frame_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg) 4145 { 4146 return bt->reg_masks[frame] & (1 << reg); 4147 } 4148 4149 static inline bool bt_is_frame_slot_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) 4150 { 4151 return bt->stack_masks[frame] & (1ull << slot); 4152 } 4153 4154 /* format registers bitmask, e.g., "r0,r2,r4" for 0x15 mask */ 4155 static void fmt_reg_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u32 reg_mask) 4156 { 4157 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 4158 bool first = true; 4159 int i, n; 4160 4161 buf[0] = '\0'; 4162 4163 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 4164 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4165 n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%sr%d", first ? "" : ",", i); 4166 first = false; 4167 buf += n; 4168 buf_sz -= n; 4169 if (buf_sz < 0) 4170 break; 4171 } 4172 } 4173 /* format stack slots bitmask, e.g., "-8,-24,-40" for 0x15 mask */ 4174 void bpf_fmt_stack_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u64 stack_mask) 4175 { 4176 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 4177 bool first = true; 4178 int i, n; 4179 4180 buf[0] = '\0'; 4181 4182 bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); 4183 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 4184 n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%s%d", first ? "" : ",", -(i + 1) * 8); 4185 first = false; 4186 buf += n; 4187 buf_sz -= n; 4188 if (buf_sz < 0) 4189 break; 4190 } 4191 } 4192 4193 /* If any register R in hist->linked_regs is marked as precise in bt, 4194 * do bt_set_frame_{reg,slot}(bt, R) for all registers in hist->linked_regs. 4195 */ 4196 static void bt_sync_linked_regs(struct backtrack_state *bt, struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist) 4197 { 4198 struct linked_regs linked_regs; 4199 bool some_precise = false; 4200 int i; 4201 4202 if (!hist || hist->linked_regs == 0) 4203 return; 4204 4205 linked_regs_unpack(hist->linked_regs, &linked_regs); 4206 for (i = 0; i < linked_regs.cnt; ++i) { 4207 struct linked_reg *e = &linked_regs.entries[i]; 4208 4209 if ((e->is_reg && bt_is_frame_reg_set(bt, e->frameno, e->regno)) || 4210 (!e->is_reg && bt_is_frame_slot_set(bt, e->frameno, e->spi))) { 4211 some_precise = true; 4212 break; 4213 } 4214 } 4215 4216 if (!some_precise) 4217 return; 4218 4219 for (i = 0; i < linked_regs.cnt; ++i) { 4220 struct linked_reg *e = &linked_regs.entries[i]; 4221 4222 if (e->is_reg) 4223 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, e->frameno, e->regno); 4224 else 4225 bt_set_frame_slot(bt, e->frameno, e->spi); 4226 } 4227 } 4228 4229 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to 4230 * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and 4231 * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. 4232 * 4233 * @idx is an index of the instruction we are currently processing; 4234 * @subseq_idx is an index of the subsequent instruction that: 4235 * - *would be* executed next, if jump history is viewed in forward order; 4236 * - *was* processed previously during backtracking. 4237 */ 4238 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, 4239 struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist, struct backtrack_state *bt) 4240 { 4241 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; 4242 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 4243 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 4244 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 4245 u32 dreg = insn->dst_reg; 4246 u32 sreg = insn->src_reg; 4247 u32 spi, i, fr; 4248 4249 if (insn->code == 0) 4250 return 0; 4251 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4252 fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4253 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: regs=%s ", 4254 bt->frame, env->tmp_str_buf); 4255 bpf_fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_stack_mask(bt)); 4256 verbose(env, "stack=%s before ", env->tmp_str_buf); 4257 verbose(env, "%d: ", idx); 4258 verbose_insn(env, insn); 4259 } 4260 4261 /* If there is a history record that some registers gained range at this insn, 4262 * propagate precision marks to those registers, so that bt_is_reg_set() 4263 * accounts for these registers. 4264 */ 4265 bt_sync_linked_regs(bt, hist); 4266 4267 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 4268 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 4269 return 0; 4270 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 4271 /* sreg is reserved and unused 4272 * dreg still need precision before this insn 4273 */ 4274 return 0; 4275 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 4276 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 4277 /* dreg = sreg or dreg = (s8, s16, s32)sreg 4278 * dreg needs precision after this insn 4279 * sreg needs precision before this insn 4280 */ 4281 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 4282 if (sreg != BPF_REG_FP) 4283 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 4284 } else { 4285 /* dreg = K 4286 * dreg needs precision after this insn. 4287 * Corresponding register is already marked 4288 * as precise=true in this verifier state. 4289 * No further markings in parent are necessary 4290 */ 4291 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 4292 } 4293 } else { 4294 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 4295 /* dreg += sreg 4296 * both dreg and sreg need precision 4297 * before this insn 4298 */ 4299 if (sreg != BPF_REG_FP) 4300 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 4301 } /* else dreg += K 4302 * dreg still needs precision before this insn 4303 */ 4304 } 4305 } else if (class == BPF_LDX || is_atomic_load_insn(insn)) { 4306 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 4307 return 0; 4308 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 4309 4310 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision. 4311 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended. 4312 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated 4313 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. 4314 * No further tracking necessary. 4315 */ 4316 if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS)) 4317 return 0; 4318 /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. 4319 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be 4320 * tracked with precision 4321 */ 4322 spi = insn_stack_access_spi(hist->flags); 4323 fr = insn_stack_access_frameno(hist->flags); 4324 bt_set_frame_slot(bt, fr, spi); 4325 } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) { 4326 if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 4327 /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg 4328 * to access memory. It means backtracking 4329 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction. 4330 */ 4331 return -ENOTSUPP; 4332 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ 4333 if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS)) 4334 return 0; 4335 spi = insn_stack_access_spi(hist->flags); 4336 fr = insn_stack_access_frameno(hist->flags); 4337 if (!bt_is_frame_slot_set(bt, fr, spi)) 4338 return 0; 4339 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, spi); 4340 if (class == BPF_STX) 4341 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 4342 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 4343 if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) { 4344 int subprog_insn_idx, subprog; 4345 4346 subprog_insn_idx = idx + insn->imm + 1; 4347 subprog = find_subprog(env, subprog_insn_idx); 4348 if (subprog < 0) 4349 return -EFAULT; 4350 4351 if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) { 4352 /* check that jump history doesn't have any 4353 * extra instructions from subprog; the next 4354 * instruction after call to global subprog 4355 * should be literally next instruction in 4356 * caller program 4357 */ 4358 verifier_bug_if(idx + 1 != subseq_idx, env, 4359 "extra insn from subprog"); 4360 /* r1-r5 are invalidated after subprog call, 4361 * so for global func call it shouldn't be set 4362 * anymore 4363 */ 4364 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 4365 verifier_bug(env, "global subprog unexpected regs %x", 4366 bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4367 return -EFAULT; 4368 } 4369 /* global subprog always sets R0 */ 4370 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 4371 return 0; 4372 } else { 4373 /* static subprog call instruction, which 4374 * means that we are exiting current subprog, 4375 * so only r1-r5 could be still requested as 4376 * precise, r0 and r6-r10 or any stack slot in 4377 * the current frame should be zero by now 4378 */ 4379 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 4380 verifier_bug(env, "static subprog unexpected regs %x", 4381 bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4382 return -EFAULT; 4383 } 4384 /* we are now tracking register spills correctly, 4385 * so any instance of leftover slots is a bug 4386 */ 4387 if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) { 4388 verifier_bug(env, 4389 "static subprog leftover stack slots %llx", 4390 bt_stack_mask(bt)); 4391 return -EFAULT; 4392 } 4393 /* propagate r1-r5 to the caller */ 4394 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 4395 if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, i)) { 4396 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 4397 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame - 1, i); 4398 } 4399 } 4400 if (bt_subprog_exit(bt)) 4401 return -EFAULT; 4402 return 0; 4403 } 4404 } else if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn) && idx != subseq_idx - 1) { 4405 /* exit from callback subprog to callback-calling helper or 4406 * kfunc call. Use idx/subseq_idx check to discern it from 4407 * straight line code backtracking. 4408 * Unlike the subprog call handling above, we shouldn't 4409 * propagate precision of r1-r5 (if any requested), as they are 4410 * not actually arguments passed directly to callback subprogs 4411 */ 4412 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 4413 verifier_bug(env, "callback unexpected regs %x", 4414 bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4415 return -EFAULT; 4416 } 4417 if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) { 4418 verifier_bug(env, "callback leftover stack slots %llx", 4419 bt_stack_mask(bt)); 4420 return -EFAULT; 4421 } 4422 /* clear r1-r5 in callback subprog's mask */ 4423 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 4424 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 4425 if (bt_subprog_exit(bt)) 4426 return -EFAULT; 4427 return 0; 4428 } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 4429 /* kfunc with imm==0 is invalid and fixup_kfunc_call will 4430 * catch this error later. Make backtracking conservative 4431 * with ENOTSUPP. 4432 */ 4433 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && insn->imm == 0) 4434 return -ENOTSUPP; 4435 /* regular helper call sets R0 */ 4436 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 4437 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 4438 /* if backtracking was looking for registers R1-R5 4439 * they should have been found already. 4440 */ 4441 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking call unexpected regs %x", 4442 bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4443 return -EFAULT; 4444 } 4445 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call 4446 && subseq_idx - idx != 1) { 4447 if (bt_subprog_enter(bt)) 4448 return -EFAULT; 4449 } 4450 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 4451 bool r0_precise; 4452 4453 /* Backtracking to a nested function call, 'idx' is a part of 4454 * the inner frame 'subseq_idx' is a part of the outer frame. 4455 * In case of a regular function call, instructions giving 4456 * precision to registers R1-R5 should have been found already. 4457 * In case of a callback, it is ok to have R1-R5 marked for 4458 * backtracking, as these registers are set by the function 4459 * invoking callback. 4460 */ 4461 if (subseq_idx >= 0 && bpf_calls_callback(env, subseq_idx)) 4462 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 4463 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 4464 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 4465 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking exit unexpected regs %x", 4466 bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4467 return -EFAULT; 4468 } 4469 4470 /* BPF_EXIT in subprog or callback always returns 4471 * right after the call instruction, so by checking 4472 * whether the instruction at subseq_idx-1 is subprog 4473 * call or not we can distinguish actual exit from 4474 * *subprog* from exit from *callback*. In the former 4475 * case, we need to propagate r0 precision, if 4476 * necessary. In the former we never do that. 4477 */ 4478 r0_precise = subseq_idx - 1 >= 0 && 4479 bpf_pseudo_call(&env->prog->insnsi[subseq_idx - 1]) && 4480 bt_is_reg_set(bt, BPF_REG_0); 4481 4482 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 4483 if (bt_subprog_enter(bt)) 4484 return -EFAULT; 4485 4486 if (r0_precise) 4487 bt_set_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 4488 /* r6-r9 and stack slots will stay set in caller frame 4489 * bitmasks until we return back from callee(s) 4490 */ 4491 return 0; 4492 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 4493 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg) && !bt_is_reg_set(bt, sreg)) 4494 return 0; 4495 /* dreg <cond> sreg 4496 * Both dreg and sreg need precision before 4497 * this insn. If only sreg was marked precise 4498 * before it would be equally necessary to 4499 * propagate it to dreg. 4500 */ 4501 if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_SRC_REG_STACK)) 4502 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 4503 if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_DST_REG_STACK)) 4504 bt_set_reg(bt, dreg); 4505 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 4506 /* dreg <cond> K 4507 * Only dreg still needs precision before 4508 * this insn, so for the K-based conditional 4509 * there is nothing new to be marked. 4510 */ 4511 } 4512 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 4513 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 4514 return 0; 4515 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 4516 /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind. 4517 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision 4518 * into parent is necessary 4519 */ 4520 if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS) 4521 /* to be analyzed */ 4522 return -ENOTSUPP; 4523 } 4524 /* Propagate precision marks to linked registers, to account for 4525 * registers marked as precise in this function. 4526 */ 4527 bt_sync_linked_regs(bt, hist); 4528 return 0; 4529 } 4530 4531 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm: 4532 * . at the start all registers have precise=false. 4533 * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns. 4534 * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in: 4535 * . ptr + scalar alu 4536 * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) 4537 * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected 4538 * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and 4539 * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar registers 4540 * should be precise. 4541 * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) 4542 * are equivalent if both are not precise. 4543 * 4544 * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain, 4545 * since many different registers and stack slots could have been 4546 * used to compute single precise scalar. 4547 * 4548 * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then 4549 * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects 4550 * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper 4551 * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe. 4552 * 4553 * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states. 4554 * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn. 4555 * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later. 4556 * 4557 * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like: 4558 * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) 4559 * r9 -= r8 4560 * r5 = r9 4561 * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7 4562 * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff)) 4563 * r5 += 1 4564 * ... 4565 * call bpf_perf_event_output#25 4566 * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO 4567 * 4568 * and this case: 4569 * r6 = 1 4570 * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0 4571 * r0 += r6 4572 * if r0 == 0 goto 4573 * 4574 * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame. 4575 * 4576 * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started, 4577 * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees 4578 * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to 4579 * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences") 4580 * 4581 * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. 4582 */ 4583 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4584 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 4585 { 4586 struct bpf_func_state *func; 4587 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4588 int i, j; 4589 4590 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4591 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: falling back to forcing all scalars precise\n", 4592 st->curframe); 4593 } 4594 4595 /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. 4596 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. 4597 * We also skip current state and go straight to first parent state, 4598 * because precision markings in current non-checkpointed state are 4599 * not needed. See why in the comment in __mark_chain_precision below. 4600 */ 4601 for (st = st->parent; st; st = st->parent) { 4602 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 4603 func = st->frame[i]; 4604 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 4605 reg = &func->regs[j]; 4606 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise) 4607 continue; 4608 reg->precise = true; 4609 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4610 verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing r%d to be precise\n", 4611 i, j); 4612 } 4613 } 4614 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 4615 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 4616 continue; 4617 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 4618 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise) 4619 continue; 4620 reg->precise = true; 4621 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4622 verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing fp%d to be precise\n", 4623 i, -(j + 1) * 8); 4624 } 4625 } 4626 } 4627 } 4628 } 4629 4630 static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 4631 { 4632 struct bpf_func_state *func; 4633 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4634 int i, j; 4635 4636 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 4637 func = st->frame[i]; 4638 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 4639 reg = &func->regs[j]; 4640 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 4641 continue; 4642 reg->precise = false; 4643 } 4644 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 4645 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 4646 continue; 4647 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 4648 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 4649 continue; 4650 reg->precise = false; 4651 } 4652 } 4653 } 4654 4655 /* 4656 * __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and 4657 * chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0) 4658 * and/or stack slot *spi* (if spi >= 0) are marked as precisely tracked 4659 * SCALARS, as well as any other registers and slots that contribute to 4660 * a tracked state of given registers/stack slots, depending on specific BPF 4661 * assembly instructions (see backtrack_insns() for exact instruction handling 4662 * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to 4663 * traverse entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the 4664 * necessary registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as 4665 * precise. 4666 * 4667 * One important and subtle aspect is that precise marks *do not matter* in 4668 * the currently verified state (current state). It is important to understand 4669 * why this is the case. 4670 * 4671 * First, note that current state is the state that is not yet "checkpointed", 4672 * i.e., it is not yet put into env->explored_states, and it has no children 4673 * states as well. It's ephemeral, and can end up either a) being discarded if 4674 * compatible explored state is found at some point or BPF_EXIT instruction is 4675 * reached or b) checkpointed and put into env->explored_states, branching out 4676 * into one or more children states. 4677 * 4678 * In the former case, precise markings in current state are completely 4679 * ignored by state comparison code (see regsafe() for details). Only 4680 * checkpointed ("old") state precise markings are important, and if old 4681 * state's register/slot is precise, regsafe() assumes current state's 4682 * register/slot as precise and checks value ranges exactly and precisely. If 4683 * states turn out to be compatible, current state's necessary precise 4684 * markings and any required parent states' precise markings are enforced 4685 * after the fact with propagate_precision() logic, after the fact. But it's 4686 * important to realize that in this case, even after marking current state 4687 * registers/slots as precise, we immediately discard current state. So what 4688 * actually matters is any of the precise markings propagated into current 4689 * state's parent states, which are always checkpointed (due to b) case above). 4690 * As such, for scenario a) it doesn't matter if current state has precise 4691 * markings set or not. 4692 * 4693 * Now, for the scenario b), checkpointing and forking into child(ren) 4694 * state(s). Note that before current state gets to checkpointing step, any 4695 * processed instruction always assumes precise SCALAR register/slot 4696 * knowledge: if precise value or range is useful to prune jump branch, BPF 4697 * verifier takes this opportunity enthusiastically. Similarly, when 4698 * register's value is used to calculate offset or memory address, exact 4699 * knowledge of SCALAR range is assumed, checked, and enforced. So, similar to 4700 * what we mentioned above about state comparison ignoring precise markings 4701 * during state comparison, BPF verifier ignores and also assumes precise 4702 * markings *at will* during instruction verification process. But as verifier 4703 * assumes precision, it also propagates any precision dependencies across 4704 * parent states, which are not yet finalized, so can be further restricted 4705 * based on new knowledge gained from restrictions enforced by their children 4706 * states. This is so that once those parent states are finalized, i.e., when 4707 * they have no more active children state, state comparison logic in 4708 * is_state_visited() would enforce strict and precise SCALAR ranges, if 4709 * required for correctness. 4710 * 4711 * To build a bit more intuition, note also that once a state is checkpointed, 4712 * the path we took to get to that state is not important. This is crucial 4713 * property for state pruning. When state is checkpointed and finalized at 4714 * some instruction index, it can be correctly and safely used to "short 4715 * circuit" any *compatible* state that reaches exactly the same instruction 4716 * index. I.e., if we jumped to that instruction from a completely different 4717 * code path than original finalized state was derived from, it doesn't 4718 * matter, current state can be discarded because from that instruction 4719 * forward having a compatible state will ensure we will safely reach the 4720 * exit. States describe preconditions for further exploration, but completely 4721 * forget the history of how we got here. 4722 * 4723 * This also means that even if we needed precise SCALAR range to get to 4724 * finalized state, but from that point forward *that same* SCALAR register is 4725 * never used in a precise context (i.e., it's precise value is not needed for 4726 * correctness), it's correct and safe to mark such register as "imprecise" 4727 * (i.e., precise marking set to false). This is what we rely on when we do 4728 * not set precise marking in current state. If no child state requires 4729 * precision for any given SCALAR register, it's safe to dictate that it can 4730 * be imprecise. If any child state does require this register to be precise, 4731 * we'll mark it precise later retroactively during precise markings 4732 * propagation from child state to parent states. 4733 * 4734 * Skipping precise marking setting in current state is a mild version of 4735 * relying on the above observation. But we can utilize this property even 4736 * more aggressively by proactively forgetting any precise marking in the 4737 * current state (which we inherited from the parent state), right before we 4738 * checkpoint it and branch off into new child state. This is done by 4739 * mark_all_scalars_imprecise() to hopefully get more permissive and generic 4740 * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states. 4741 */ 4742 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4743 struct bpf_verifier_state *starting_state, 4744 int regno, 4745 bool *changed) 4746 { 4747 struct bpf_verifier_state *st = starting_state; 4748 struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt; 4749 int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 4750 int last_idx = starting_state->insn_idx; 4751 int subseq_idx = -1; 4752 struct bpf_func_state *func; 4753 bool tmp, skip_first = true; 4754 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4755 int i, fr, err; 4756 4757 if (!env->bpf_capable) 4758 return 0; 4759 4760 changed = changed ?: &tmp; 4761 /* set frame number from which we are starting to backtrack */ 4762 bt_init(bt, starting_state->curframe); 4763 4764 /* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack 4765 * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision 4766 * tracking in the current state is unnecessary. 4767 */ 4768 func = st->frame[bt->frame]; 4769 if (regno >= 0) { 4770 reg = &func->regs[regno]; 4771 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4772 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking misuse"); 4773 return -EFAULT; 4774 } 4775 bt_set_reg(bt, regno); 4776 } 4777 4778 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4779 return 0; 4780 4781 for (;;) { 4782 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 4783 u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; 4784 struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist; 4785 4786 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4787 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: last_idx %d first_idx %d subseq_idx %d \n", 4788 bt->frame, last_idx, first_idx, subseq_idx); 4789 } 4790 4791 if (last_idx < 0) { 4792 /* we are at the entry into subprog, which 4793 * is expected for global funcs, but only if 4794 * requested precise registers are R1-R5 4795 * (which are global func's input arguments) 4796 */ 4797 if (st->curframe == 0 && 4798 st->frame[0]->subprogno > 0 && 4799 st->frame[0]->callsite == BPF_MAIN_FUNC && 4800 bt_stack_mask(bt) == 0 && 4801 (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) == 0) { 4802 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4803 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4804 reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i]; 4805 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 4806 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 4807 reg->precise = true; 4808 *changed = true; 4809 } 4810 } 4811 return 0; 4812 } 4813 4814 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking func entry subprog %d reg_mask %x stack_mask %llx", 4815 st->frame[0]->subprogno, bt_reg_mask(bt), bt_stack_mask(bt)); 4816 return -EFAULT; 4817 } 4818 4819 for (i = last_idx;;) { 4820 if (skip_first) { 4821 err = 0; 4822 skip_first = false; 4823 } else { 4824 hist = get_jmp_hist_entry(st, history, i); 4825 err = backtrack_insn(env, i, subseq_idx, hist, bt); 4826 } 4827 if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { 4828 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, starting_state); 4829 bt_reset(bt); 4830 return 0; 4831 } else if (err) { 4832 return err; 4833 } 4834 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4835 /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state. 4836 * Since this state is already marked, just return. 4837 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state. 4838 */ 4839 return 0; 4840 subseq_idx = i; 4841 i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); 4842 if (i == -ENOENT) 4843 break; 4844 if (i >= env->prog->len) { 4845 /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0 4846 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask 4847 * to backtrack. 4848 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where 4849 * particular register was initialized with a constant. 4850 */ 4851 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking idx %d", i); 4852 return -EFAULT; 4853 } 4854 } 4855 st = st->parent; 4856 if (!st) 4857 break; 4858 4859 for (fr = bt->frame; fr >= 0; fr--) { 4860 func = st->frame[fr]; 4861 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 4862 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4863 reg = &func->regs[i]; 4864 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4865 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 4866 continue; 4867 } 4868 if (reg->precise) { 4869 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 4870 } else { 4871 reg->precise = true; 4872 *changed = true; 4873 } 4874 } 4875 4876 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 4877 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 4878 if (verifier_bug_if(i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, 4879 env, "stack slot %d, total slots %d", 4880 i, func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE)) 4881 return -EFAULT; 4882 4883 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) { 4884 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 4885 continue; 4886 } 4887 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 4888 if (reg->precise) { 4889 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 4890 } else { 4891 reg->precise = true; 4892 *changed = true; 4893 } 4894 } 4895 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4896 fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, 4897 bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 4898 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: parent state regs=%s ", 4899 fr, env->tmp_str_buf); 4900 bpf_fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, 4901 bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 4902 verbose(env, "stack=%s: ", env->tmp_str_buf); 4903 print_verifier_state(env, st, fr, true); 4904 } 4905 } 4906 4907 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4908 return 0; 4909 4910 subseq_idx = first_idx; 4911 last_idx = st->last_insn_idx; 4912 first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 4913 } 4914 4915 /* if we still have requested precise regs or slots, we missed 4916 * something (e.g., stack access through non-r10 register), so 4917 * fallback to marking all precise 4918 */ 4919 if (!bt_empty(bt)) { 4920 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, starting_state); 4921 bt_reset(bt); 4922 } 4923 4924 return 0; 4925 } 4926 4927 int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4928 { 4929 return __mark_chain_precision(env, env->cur_state, regno, NULL); 4930 } 4931 4932 /* mark_chain_precision_batch() assumes that env->bt is set in the caller to 4933 * desired reg and stack masks across all relevant frames 4934 */ 4935 static int mark_chain_precision_batch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4936 struct bpf_verifier_state *starting_state) 4937 { 4938 return __mark_chain_precision(env, starting_state, -1, NULL); 4939 } 4940 4941 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) 4942 { 4943 switch (base_type(type)) { 4944 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 4945 case PTR_TO_STACK: 4946 case PTR_TO_CTX: 4947 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 4948 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 4949 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 4950 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 4951 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 4952 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 4953 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 4954 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 4955 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 4956 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 4957 case PTR_TO_BUF: 4958 case PTR_TO_MEM: 4959 case PTR_TO_FUNC: 4960 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 4961 case PTR_TO_ARENA: 4962 return true; 4963 default: 4964 return false; 4965 } 4966 } 4967 4968 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ 4969 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4970 { 4971 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 4972 } 4973 4974 /* check if register is a constant scalar value */ 4975 static bool is_reg_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, bool subreg32) 4976 { 4977 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 4978 tnum_is_const(subreg32 ? tnum_subreg(reg->var_off) : reg->var_off); 4979 } 4980 4981 /* assuming is_reg_const() is true, return constant value of a register */ 4982 static u64 reg_const_value(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, bool subreg32) 4983 { 4984 return subreg32 ? tnum_subreg(reg->var_off).value : reg->var_off.value; 4985 } 4986 4987 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, 4988 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4989 { 4990 if (allow_ptr_leaks) 4991 return false; 4992 4993 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; 4994 } 4995 4996 static void assign_scalar_id_before_mov(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4997 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 4998 { 4999 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 5000 return; 5001 5002 if (src_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) { 5003 /* 5004 * The verifier is processing rX = rY insn and 5005 * rY->id has special linked register already. 5006 * Cleared it, since multiple rX += const are not supported. 5007 */ 5008 src_reg->id = 0; 5009 src_reg->off = 0; 5010 } 5011 5012 if (!src_reg->id && !tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) 5013 /* Ensure that src_reg has a valid ID that will be copied to 5014 * dst_reg and then will be used by sync_linked_regs() to 5015 * propagate min/max range. 5016 */ 5017 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 5018 } 5019 5020 /* Copy src state preserving dst->parent and dst->live fields */ 5021 static void copy_register_state(struct bpf_reg_state *dst, const struct bpf_reg_state *src) 5022 { 5023 *dst = *src; 5024 } 5025 5026 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5027 struct bpf_func_state *state, 5028 int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5029 int size) 5030 { 5031 int i; 5032 5033 copy_register_state(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, reg); 5034 5035 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > BPF_REG_SIZE - size; i--) 5036 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1] = STACK_SPILL; 5037 5038 /* size < 8 bytes spill */ 5039 for (; i; i--) 5040 mark_stack_slot_misc(env, &state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1]); 5041 } 5042 5043 static bool is_bpf_st_mem(struct bpf_insn *insn) 5044 { 5045 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ST && BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM; 5046 } 5047 5048 static int get_reg_width(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 5049 { 5050 return fls64(reg->umax_value); 5051 } 5052 5053 /* See comment for mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call() */ 5054 static void check_fastcall_stack_contract(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5055 struct bpf_func_state *state, int insn_idx, int off) 5056 { 5057 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = &env->subprog_info[state->subprogno]; 5058 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 5059 int i; 5060 5061 if (subprog->fastcall_stack_off <= off || aux[insn_idx].fastcall_pattern) 5062 return; 5063 /* access to the region [max_stack_depth .. fastcall_stack_off) 5064 * from something that is not a part of the fastcall pattern, 5065 * disable fastcall rewrites for current subprogram by setting 5066 * fastcall_stack_off to a value smaller than any possible offset. 5067 */ 5068 subprog->fastcall_stack_off = S16_MIN; 5069 /* reset fastcall aux flags within subprogram, 5070 * happens at most once per subprogram 5071 */ 5072 for (i = subprog->start; i < (subprog + 1)->start; ++i) { 5073 aux[i].fastcall_spills_num = 0; 5074 aux[i].fastcall_pattern = 0; 5075 } 5076 } 5077 5078 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers, 5079 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() 5080 */ 5081 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5082 /* stack frame we're writing to */ 5083 struct bpf_func_state *state, 5084 int off, int size, int value_regno, 5085 int insn_idx) 5086 { 5087 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 5088 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; 5089 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 5090 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; 5091 int insn_flags = insn_stack_access_flags(state->frameno, spi); 5092 5093 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, 5094 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits 5095 */ 5096 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && 5097 is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 5098 !is_spilled_scalar_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 5099 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 5100 verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); 5101 return -EACCES; 5102 } 5103 5104 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 5105 if (value_regno >= 0) 5106 reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 5107 if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) { 5108 bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type); 5109 5110 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 5111 u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]; 5112 5113 if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) { 5114 sanitize = true; 5115 break; 5116 } 5117 } 5118 5119 if (sanitize) 5120 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].nospec_result = true; 5121 } 5122 5123 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 5124 if (err) 5125 return err; 5126 5127 if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_REG_SIZE) { 5128 /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written 5129 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon 5130 * when stack slots are partially written. 5131 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be 5132 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks 5133 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs 5134 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes 5135 */ 5136 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi)); 5137 } 5138 5139 check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, insn_idx, off); 5140 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 5141 if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && env->bpf_capable) { 5142 bool reg_value_fits; 5143 5144 reg_value_fits = get_reg_width(reg) <= BITS_PER_BYTE * size; 5145 /* Make sure that reg had an ID to build a relation on spill. */ 5146 if (reg_value_fits) 5147 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, reg); 5148 save_register_state(env, state, spi, reg, size); 5149 /* Break the relation on a narrowing spill. */ 5150 if (!reg_value_fits) 5151 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = 0; 5152 } else if (!reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && 5153 env->bpf_capable) { 5154 struct bpf_reg_state *tmp_reg = &env->fake_reg[0]; 5155 5156 memset(tmp_reg, 0, sizeof(*tmp_reg)); 5157 __mark_reg_known(tmp_reg, insn->imm); 5158 tmp_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 5159 save_register_state(env, state, spi, tmp_reg, size); 5160 } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { 5161 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ 5162 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 5163 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 5164 verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); 5165 return -EACCES; 5166 } 5167 if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 5168 verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); 5169 return -EINVAL; 5170 } 5171 save_register_state(env, state, spi, reg, size); 5172 } else { 5173 u8 type = STACK_MISC; 5174 5175 /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ 5176 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 5177 /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr/dynptr/iter. */ 5178 if (is_stack_slot_special(&state->stack[spi])) 5179 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 5180 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]); 5181 5182 /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ 5183 if ((reg && register_is_null(reg)) || 5184 (!reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) { 5185 /* STACK_ZERO case happened because register spill 5186 * wasn't properly aligned at the stack slot boundary, 5187 * so it's not a register spill anymore; force 5188 * originating register to be precise to make 5189 * STACK_ZERO correct for subsequent states 5190 */ 5191 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 5192 if (err) 5193 return err; 5194 type = STACK_ZERO; 5195 } 5196 5197 /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ 5198 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 5199 state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = type; 5200 insn_flags = 0; /* not a register spill */ 5201 } 5202 5203 if (insn_flags) 5204 return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0); 5205 return 0; 5206 } 5207 5208 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is 5209 * known to contain a variable offset. 5210 * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively 5211 * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the 5212 * dynamic range is potentially written to. 5213 * 5214 * 'off' includes 'regno->off'. 5215 * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to 5216 * the stack. 5217 * 5218 * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know 5219 * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for 5220 * future reads cannot be terminated by this write. 5221 * 5222 * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered 5223 * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets 5224 * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to 5225 * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets. 5226 */ 5227 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5228 /* func where register points to */ 5229 struct bpf_func_state *state, 5230 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 5231 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 5232 { 5233 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 5234 int min_off, max_off; 5235 int i, err; 5236 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL; 5237 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 5238 bool writing_zero = false; 5239 /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any 5240 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO 5241 */ 5242 bool zero_used = false; 5243 5244 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 5245 ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno]; 5246 min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off; 5247 max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size; 5248 if (value_regno >= 0) 5249 value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 5250 if ((value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg)) || 5251 (!value_reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) 5252 writing_zero = true; 5253 5254 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 5255 int spi; 5256 5257 spi = __get_spi(i); 5258 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 5259 if (err) 5260 return err; 5261 } 5262 5263 check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, insn_idx, min_off); 5264 /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */ 5265 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 5266 u8 new_type, *stype; 5267 int slot, spi; 5268 5269 slot = -i - 1; 5270 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 5271 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 5272 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 5273 5274 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) { 5275 /* Reject the write if range we may write to has not 5276 * been initialized beforehand. If we didn't reject 5277 * here, the ptr status would be erased below (even 5278 * though not all slots are actually overwritten), 5279 * possibly opening the door to leaks. 5280 * 5281 * We do however catch STACK_INVALID case below, and 5282 * only allow reading possibly uninitialized memory 5283 * later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to 5284 * that slot. 5285 */ 5286 verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d", 5287 insn_idx, i); 5288 return -EINVAL; 5289 } 5290 5291 /* If writing_zero and the spi slot contains a spill of value 0, 5292 * maintain the spill type. 5293 */ 5294 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_SPILL && 5295 is_spilled_scalar_reg(&state->stack[spi])) { 5296 struct bpf_reg_state *spill_reg = &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 5297 5298 if (tnum_is_const(spill_reg->var_off) && spill_reg->var_off.value == 0) { 5299 zero_used = true; 5300 continue; 5301 } 5302 } 5303 5304 /* Erase all other spilled pointers. */ 5305 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 5306 5307 /* Update the slot type. */ 5308 new_type = STACK_MISC; 5309 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) { 5310 new_type = STACK_ZERO; 5311 zero_used = true; 5312 } 5313 /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to 5314 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot 5315 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as 5316 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory. 5317 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots 5318 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject 5319 * them, the error would be too confusing. 5320 */ 5321 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) { 5322 verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d", 5323 insn_idx, i); 5324 return -EINVAL; 5325 } 5326 *stype = new_type; 5327 } 5328 if (zero_used) { 5329 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 5330 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 5331 if (err) 5332 return err; 5333 } 5334 return 0; 5335 } 5336 5337 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, 5338 * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the 5339 * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then 5340 * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be 5341 * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must 5342 * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as 5343 * read. 5344 */ 5345 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5346 /* func where src register points to */ 5347 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state, 5348 int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno) 5349 { 5350 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5351 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5352 int i, slot, spi; 5353 u8 *stype; 5354 int zeros = 0; 5355 5356 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 5357 slot = -i - 1; 5358 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 5359 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 5360 stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 5361 if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO) 5362 break; 5363 zeros++; 5364 } 5365 if (zeros == max_off - min_off) { 5366 /* Any access_size read into register is zero extended, 5367 * so the whole register == const_zero. 5368 */ 5369 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, &state->regs[dst_regno]); 5370 } else { 5371 /* have read misc data from the stack */ 5372 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 5373 } 5374 } 5375 5376 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by 5377 * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a 5378 * spilled reg. 5379 * 5380 * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a 5381 * register. 5382 * 5383 * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds. 5384 */ 5385 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5386 /* func where src register points to */ 5387 struct bpf_func_state *reg_state, 5388 int off, int size, int dst_regno) 5389 { 5390 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5391 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5392 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 5393 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 5394 u8 *stype, type; 5395 int insn_flags = insn_stack_access_flags(reg_state->frameno, spi); 5396 int err; 5397 5398 stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 5399 reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 5400 5401 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 5402 check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, env->insn_idx, off); 5403 err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg_state->frameno, env->insn_idx, BIT(spi)); 5404 if (err) 5405 return err; 5406 5407 if (is_spilled_reg(®_state->stack[spi])) { 5408 u8 spill_size = 1; 5409 5410 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--) 5411 spill_size++; 5412 5413 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE || spill_size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 5414 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 5415 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 5416 verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); 5417 return -EACCES; 5418 } 5419 5420 if (dst_regno < 0) 5421 return 0; 5422 5423 if (size <= spill_size && 5424 bpf_stack_narrow_access_ok(off, size, spill_size)) { 5425 /* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the 5426 * subreg_def for this insn. Save it first. 5427 */ 5428 s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def; 5429 5430 copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg); 5431 state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def; 5432 5433 /* Break the relation on a narrowing fill. 5434 * coerce_reg_to_size will adjust the boundaries. 5435 */ 5436 if (get_reg_width(reg) > size * BITS_PER_BYTE) 5437 state->regs[dst_regno].id = 0; 5438 } else { 5439 int spill_cnt = 0, zero_cnt = 0; 5440 5441 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 5442 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 5443 if (type == STACK_SPILL) { 5444 spill_cnt++; 5445 continue; 5446 } 5447 if (type == STACK_MISC) 5448 continue; 5449 if (type == STACK_ZERO) { 5450 zero_cnt++; 5451 continue; 5452 } 5453 if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack) 5454 continue; 5455 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 5456 off, i, size); 5457 return -EACCES; 5458 } 5459 5460 if (spill_cnt == size && 5461 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && reg->var_off.value == 0) { 5462 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, &state->regs[dst_regno]); 5463 /* this IS register fill, so keep insn_flags */ 5464 } else if (zero_cnt == size) { 5465 /* similarly to mark_reg_stack_read(), preserve zeroes */ 5466 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, &state->regs[dst_regno]); 5467 insn_flags = 0; /* not restoring original register state */ 5468 } else { 5469 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 5470 insn_flags = 0; /* not restoring original register state */ 5471 } 5472 } 5473 } else if (dst_regno >= 0) { 5474 /* restore register state from stack */ 5475 copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg); 5476 /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely 5477 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() 5478 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions 5479 */ 5480 } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) { 5481 /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether 5482 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE 5483 * (e.g. for XADD). 5484 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that 5485 * with spilled pointers. 5486 */ 5487 verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n", 5488 off); 5489 return -EACCES; 5490 } 5491 } else { 5492 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 5493 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 5494 if (type == STACK_MISC) 5495 continue; 5496 if (type == STACK_ZERO) 5497 continue; 5498 if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack) 5499 continue; 5500 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 5501 off, i, size); 5502 return -EACCES; 5503 } 5504 if (dst_regno >= 0) 5505 mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno); 5506 insn_flags = 0; /* we are not restoring spilled register */ 5507 } 5508 if (insn_flags) 5509 return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0); 5510 return 0; 5511 } 5512 5513 enum bpf_access_src { 5514 ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */ 5515 ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */ 5516 }; 5517 5518 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5519 int regno, int off, int access_size, 5520 bool zero_size_allowed, 5521 enum bpf_access_type type, 5522 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta); 5523 5524 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5525 { 5526 return cur_regs(env) + regno; 5527 } 5528 5529 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register 5530 * 'dst_regno'. 5531 * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'), 5532 * but not its variable offset. 5533 * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned. 5534 * 5535 * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with 5536 * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when 5537 * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing 5538 * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable 5539 * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used 5540 * instead. 5541 */ 5542 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5543 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno) 5544 { 5545 /* The state of the source register. */ 5546 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 5547 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg); 5548 int err; 5549 int min_off, max_off; 5550 5551 /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted. 5552 */ 5553 err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 5554 false, BPF_READ, NULL); 5555 if (err) 5556 return err; 5557 5558 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 5559 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 5560 mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno); 5561 check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, ptr_state, env->insn_idx, min_off); 5562 return 0; 5563 } 5564 5565 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or 5566 * check_stack_read_var_off. 5567 * 5568 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack 5569 * bounds. 5570 * 5571 * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It 5572 * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register. 5573 */ 5574 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5575 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 5576 int dst_regno) 5577 { 5578 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 5579 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 5580 int err; 5581 /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */ 5582 bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 5583 5584 /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a 5585 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see 5586 * check_stack_read_fixed_off). 5587 */ 5588 if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) { 5589 char tn_buf[48]; 5590 5591 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5592 verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", 5593 tn_buf, off, size); 5594 return -EACCES; 5595 } 5596 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity 5597 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack 5598 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). The check in 5599 * check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic() called by 5600 * adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() prevents users from creating stack pointers 5601 * with variable offsets, therefore no check is required here. Further, 5602 * just checking it here would be insufficient as speculative stack 5603 * writes could still lead to unsafe speculative behaviour. 5604 */ 5605 if (!var_off) { 5606 off += reg->var_off.value; 5607 err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 5608 dst_regno); 5609 } else { 5610 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 5611 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this 5612 * branch. 5613 */ 5614 err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 5615 dst_regno); 5616 } 5617 return err; 5618 } 5619 5620 5621 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or 5622 * check_stack_write_var_off. 5623 * 5624 * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack. 5625 * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any). 5626 * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can 5627 * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register. 5628 * 5629 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size. 5630 */ 5631 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5632 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 5633 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 5634 { 5635 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 5636 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 5637 int err; 5638 5639 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5640 off += reg->var_off.value; 5641 err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 5642 value_regno, insn_idx); 5643 } else { 5644 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 5645 * than fixed offset ones. 5646 */ 5647 err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state, 5648 ptr_regno, off, size, 5649 value_regno, insn_idx); 5650 } 5651 return err; 5652 } 5653 5654 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5655 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) 5656 { 5657 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5658 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 5659 u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map); 5660 5661 if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) { 5662 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5663 map->value_size, off, size); 5664 return -EACCES; 5665 } 5666 5667 if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) { 5668 verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5669 map->value_size, off, size); 5670 return -EACCES; 5671 } 5672 5673 return 0; 5674 } 5675 5676 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */ 5677 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5678 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 5679 bool zero_size_allowed) 5680 { 5681 bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed); 5682 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 5683 5684 if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size) 5685 return 0; 5686 5687 reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 5688 switch (reg->type) { 5689 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 5690 verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5691 mem_size, off, size); 5692 break; 5693 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 5694 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5695 mem_size, off, size); 5696 break; 5697 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 5698 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 5699 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 5700 verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", 5701 off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size); 5702 break; 5703 case PTR_TO_MEM: 5704 default: 5705 verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n", 5706 mem_size, off, size); 5707 } 5708 5709 return -EACCES; 5710 } 5711 5712 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */ 5713 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5714 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 5715 bool zero_size_allowed) 5716 { 5717 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5718 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5719 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 5720 int err; 5721 5722 /* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we 5723 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off 5724 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. 5725 * 5726 * The minimum value is only important with signed 5727 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a 5728 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our 5729 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use 5730 * will have a set floor within our range. 5731 */ 5732 if (reg->smin_value < 0 && 5733 (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN || 5734 (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) || 5735 reg->smin_value + off < 0)) { 5736 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 5737 regno); 5738 return -EACCES; 5739 } 5740 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, 5741 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 5742 if (err) { 5743 verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 5744 regno); 5745 return err; 5746 } 5747 5748 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be 5749 * sure we won't do bad things. 5750 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. 5751 */ 5752 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 5753 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n", 5754 regno); 5755 return -EACCES; 5756 } 5757 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, 5758 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 5759 if (err) { 5760 verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 5761 regno); 5762 return err; 5763 } 5764 5765 return 0; 5766 } 5767 5768 static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5769 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 5770 bool fixed_off_ok) 5771 { 5772 /* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper 5773 * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form. 5774 */ 5775 5776 if (reg->off < 0) { 5777 verbose(env, "negative offset %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 5778 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 5779 return -EACCES; 5780 } 5781 5782 if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) { 5783 verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 5784 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 5785 return -EACCES; 5786 } 5787 5788 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 5789 char tn_buf[48]; 5790 5791 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5792 verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n", 5793 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf); 5794 return -EACCES; 5795 } 5796 5797 return 0; 5798 } 5799 5800 static int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5801 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) 5802 { 5803 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 5804 } 5805 5806 static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5807 struct btf_field *kptr_field, 5808 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno) 5809 { 5810 const char *targ_name = btf_type_name(kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id); 5811 int perm_flags; 5812 const char *reg_name = ""; 5813 5814 if (btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 5815 perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED | MEM_RCU; 5816 5817 /* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */ 5818 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 5819 perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 5820 } else { 5821 perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_ALLOC; 5822 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU) 5823 perm_flags |= MEM_PERCPU; 5824 } 5825 5826 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags)) 5827 goto bad_type; 5828 5829 /* We need to verify reg->type and reg->btf, before accessing reg->btf */ 5830 reg_name = btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 5831 5832 /* For ref_ptr case, release function check should ensure we get one 5833 * referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and that its fixed offset is 0. For the 5834 * normal store of unreferenced kptr, we must ensure var_off is zero. 5835 * Since ref_ptr cannot be accessed directly by BPF insns, checks for 5836 * reg->off and reg->ref_obj_id are not needed here. 5837 */ 5838 if (__check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true)) 5839 return -EACCES; 5840 5841 /* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux, module or prog BTF, and 5842 * we also need to take into account the reg->off. 5843 * 5844 * We want to support cases like: 5845 * 5846 * struct foo { 5847 * struct bar br; 5848 * struct baz bz; 5849 * }; 5850 * 5851 * struct foo *v; 5852 * v = func(); // PTR_TO_BTF_ID 5853 * val->foo = v; // reg->off is zero, btf and btf_id match type 5854 * val->bar = &v->br; // reg->off is still zero, but we need to retry with 5855 * // first member type of struct after comparison fails 5856 * val->baz = &v->bz; // reg->off is non-zero, so struct needs to be walked 5857 * // to match type 5858 * 5859 * In the kptr_ref case, check_func_arg_reg_off already ensures reg->off 5860 * is zero. We must also ensure that btf_struct_ids_match does not walk 5861 * the struct to match type against first member of struct, i.e. reject 5862 * second case from above. Hence, when type is BPF_KPTR_REF, we set 5863 * strict mode to true for type match. 5864 */ 5865 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 5866 kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 5867 kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_UNREF)) 5868 goto bad_type; 5869 return 0; 5870 bad_type: 5871 verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno, 5872 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name); 5873 verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name); 5874 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 5875 verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED), 5876 targ_name); 5877 else 5878 verbose(env, "\n"); 5879 return -EINVAL; 5880 } 5881 5882 static bool in_sleepable(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5883 { 5884 return env->cur_state->in_sleepable; 5885 } 5886 5887 /* The non-sleepable programs and sleepable programs with explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() 5888 * can dereference RCU protected pointers and result is PTR_TRUSTED. 5889 */ 5890 static bool in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5891 { 5892 return env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks || 5893 env->cur_state->active_locks || 5894 !in_sleepable(env); 5895 } 5896 5897 /* Once GCC supports btf_type_tag the following mechanism will be replaced with tag check */ 5898 BTF_SET_START(rcu_protected_types) 5899 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 5900 BTF_ID(struct, prog_test_ref_kfunc) 5901 #endif 5902 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS 5903 BTF_ID(struct, cgroup) 5904 #endif 5905 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT 5906 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_cpumask) 5907 #endif 5908 BTF_ID(struct, task_struct) 5909 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO 5910 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_crypto_ctx) 5911 #endif 5912 BTF_SET_END(rcu_protected_types) 5913 5914 static bool rcu_protected_object(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id) 5915 { 5916 if (!btf_is_kernel(btf)) 5917 return true; 5918 return btf_id_set_contains(&rcu_protected_types, btf_id); 5919 } 5920 5921 static struct btf_record *kptr_pointee_btf_record(struct btf_field *kptr_field) 5922 { 5923 struct btf_struct_meta *meta; 5924 5925 if (btf_is_kernel(kptr_field->kptr.btf)) 5926 return NULL; 5927 5928 meta = btf_find_struct_meta(kptr_field->kptr.btf, 5929 kptr_field->kptr.btf_id); 5930 5931 return meta ? meta->record : NULL; 5932 } 5933 5934 static bool rcu_safe_kptr(const struct btf_field *field) 5935 { 5936 const struct btf_field_kptr *kptr = &field->kptr; 5937 5938 return field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU || 5939 (field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF && rcu_protected_object(kptr->btf, kptr->btf_id)); 5940 } 5941 5942 static u32 btf_ld_kptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct btf_field *kptr_field) 5943 { 5944 struct btf_record *rec; 5945 u32 ret; 5946 5947 ret = PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 5948 if (rcu_safe_kptr(kptr_field) && in_rcu_cs(env)) { 5949 ret |= MEM_RCU; 5950 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU) 5951 ret |= MEM_PERCPU; 5952 else if (!btf_is_kernel(kptr_field->kptr.btf)) 5953 ret |= MEM_ALLOC; 5954 5955 rec = kptr_pointee_btf_record(kptr_field); 5956 if (rec && btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_GRAPH_NODE)) 5957 ret |= NON_OWN_REF; 5958 } else { 5959 ret |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 5960 } 5961 5962 return ret; 5963 } 5964 5965 static int mark_uptr_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5966 struct btf_field *field) 5967 { 5968 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 5969 const struct btf_type *t; 5970 5971 t = btf_type_by_id(field->kptr.btf, field->kptr.btf_id); 5972 mark_reg_known_zero(env, cur_regs(env), regno); 5973 reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5974 reg->type = PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 5975 reg->mem_size = t->size; 5976 reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 5977 5978 return 0; 5979 } 5980 5981 static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5982 int value_regno, int insn_idx, 5983 struct btf_field *kptr_field) 5984 { 5985 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 5986 int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 5987 struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg; 5988 int ret; 5989 5990 /* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller: 5991 * - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr 5992 * - size of access (must be BPF_DW) 5993 * - tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) 5994 * - kptr_field->offset == off + reg->var_off.value 5995 */ 5996 /* Only BPF_[LDX,STX,ST] | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW is supported */ 5997 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { 5998 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_MEM instruction mode\n"); 5999 return -EACCES; 6000 } 6001 6002 /* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as 6003 * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr. 6004 */ 6005 if (class != BPF_LDX && 6006 (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF || kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU)) { 6007 verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n"); 6008 return -EACCES; 6009 } 6010 if (class != BPF_LDX && kptr_field->type == BPF_UPTR) { 6011 verbose(env, "store to uptr disallowed\n"); 6012 return -EACCES; 6013 } 6014 6015 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 6016 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_UPTR) 6017 return mark_uptr_ld_reg(env, value_regno, kptr_field); 6018 6019 /* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer 6020 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type. 6021 */ 6022 ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 6023 kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 6024 btf_ld_kptr_type(env, kptr_field)); 6025 if (ret < 0) 6026 return ret; 6027 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 6028 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 6029 if (!register_is_null(val_reg) && 6030 map_kptr_match_type(env, kptr_field, val_reg, value_regno)) 6031 return -EACCES; 6032 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 6033 if (insn->imm) { 6034 verbose(env, "BPF_ST imm must be 0 when storing to kptr at off=%u\n", 6035 kptr_field->offset); 6036 return -EACCES; 6037 } 6038 } else { 6039 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_LDX/BPF_STX/BPF_ST\n"); 6040 return -EACCES; 6041 } 6042 return 0; 6043 } 6044 6045 /* 6046 * Return the size of the memory region accessible from a pointer to map value. 6047 * For INSN_ARRAY maps whole bpf_insn_array->ips array is accessible. 6048 */ 6049 static u32 map_mem_size(const struct bpf_map *map) 6050 { 6051 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) 6052 return map->max_entries * sizeof(long); 6053 6054 return map->value_size; 6055 } 6056 6057 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ 6058 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 6059 int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed, 6060 enum bpf_access_src src) 6061 { 6062 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 6063 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 6064 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 6065 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 6066 u32 mem_size = map_mem_size(map); 6067 struct btf_record *rec; 6068 int err, i; 6069 6070 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 6071 if (err) 6072 return err; 6073 6074 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record)) 6075 return 0; 6076 rec = map->record; 6077 for (i = 0; i < rec->cnt; i++) { 6078 struct btf_field *field = &rec->fields[i]; 6079 u32 p = field->offset; 6080 6081 /* If any part of a field can be touched by load/store, reject 6082 * this program. To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2), 6083 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2. 6084 */ 6085 if (reg->smin_value + off < p + field->size && 6086 p < reg->umax_value + off + size) { 6087 switch (field->type) { 6088 case BPF_KPTR_UNREF: 6089 case BPF_KPTR_REF: 6090 case BPF_KPTR_PERCPU: 6091 case BPF_UPTR: 6092 if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) { 6093 verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n", 6094 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 6095 return -EACCES; 6096 } 6097 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6098 verbose(env, "%s access cannot have variable offset\n", 6099 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 6100 return -EACCES; 6101 } 6102 if (p != off + reg->var_off.value) { 6103 verbose(env, "%s access misaligned expected=%u off=%llu\n", 6104 btf_field_type_name(field->type), 6105 p, off + reg->var_off.value); 6106 return -EACCES; 6107 } 6108 if (size != bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_DW)) { 6109 verbose(env, "%s access size must be BPF_DW\n", 6110 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 6111 return -EACCES; 6112 } 6113 break; 6114 default: 6115 verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n", 6116 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 6117 return -EACCES; 6118 } 6119 } 6120 } 6121 return 0; 6122 } 6123 6124 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff 6125 6126 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6127 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 6128 enum bpf_access_type t) 6129 { 6130 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 6131 6132 switch (prog_type) { 6133 /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */ 6134 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: 6135 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: 6136 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL: 6137 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 6138 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 6139 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 6140 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 6141 return false; 6142 fallthrough; 6143 6144 /* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */ 6145 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 6146 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 6147 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 6148 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: 6149 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: 6150 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: 6151 if (meta) 6152 return meta->pkt_access; 6153 6154 env->seen_direct_write = true; 6155 return true; 6156 6157 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 6158 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 6159 env->seen_direct_write = true; 6160 6161 return true; 6162 6163 default: 6164 return false; 6165 } 6166 } 6167 6168 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, 6169 int size, bool zero_size_allowed) 6170 { 6171 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6172 int err; 6173 6174 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any 6175 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed 6176 * offset. 6177 */ 6178 6179 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough 6180 * detail to prove they're safe. 6181 */ 6182 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 6183 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 6184 regno); 6185 return -EACCES; 6186 } 6187 6188 err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL : 6189 __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range, 6190 zero_size_allowed); 6191 if (err) { 6192 verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); 6193 return err; 6194 } 6195 6196 /* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16. 6197 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff, 6198 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info 6199 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access. 6200 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32. 6201 */ 6202 env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = 6203 max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset, 6204 off + reg->umax_value + size - 1); 6205 6206 return err; 6207 } 6208 6209 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ 6210 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, 6211 enum bpf_access_type t, struct bpf_insn_access_aux *info) 6212 { 6213 if (env->ops->is_valid_access && 6214 env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, info)) { 6215 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a 6216 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole 6217 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower 6218 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size 6219 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other 6220 * type of narrower access. 6221 */ 6222 if (base_type(info->reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 6223 if (info->ref_obj_id && 6224 !find_reference_state(env->cur_state, info->ref_obj_id)) { 6225 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d. Reference may already be released\n", 6226 off); 6227 return -EACCES; 6228 } 6229 } else { 6230 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info->ctx_field_size; 6231 } 6232 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ 6233 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) 6234 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; 6235 return 0; 6236 } 6237 6238 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 6239 return -EACCES; 6240 } 6241 6242 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, 6243 int size) 6244 { 6245 if (size < 0 || off < 0 || 6246 (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) { 6247 verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n", 6248 off, size); 6249 return -EACCES; 6250 } 6251 return 0; 6252 } 6253 6254 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 6255 u32 regno, int off, int size, 6256 enum bpf_access_type t) 6257 { 6258 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6259 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {}; 6260 bool valid; 6261 6262 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 6263 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 6264 regno); 6265 return -EACCES; 6266 } 6267 6268 switch (reg->type) { 6269 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 6270 valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 6271 break; 6272 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 6273 valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 6274 break; 6275 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 6276 valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 6277 break; 6278 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 6279 valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 6280 break; 6281 default: 6282 valid = false; 6283 } 6284 6285 6286 if (valid) { 6287 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = 6288 info.ctx_field_size; 6289 return 0; 6290 } 6291 6292 verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n", 6293 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type), off, size); 6294 6295 return -EACCES; 6296 } 6297 6298 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 6299 { 6300 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno)); 6301 } 6302 6303 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 6304 { 6305 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6306 6307 return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; 6308 } 6309 6310 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 6311 { 6312 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6313 6314 return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type); 6315 } 6316 6317 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 6318 { 6319 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6320 6321 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 6322 } 6323 6324 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 6325 { 6326 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6327 6328 /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */ 6329 return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS; 6330 } 6331 6332 static bool is_arena_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 6333 { 6334 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6335 6336 return reg->type == PTR_TO_ARENA; 6337 } 6338 6339 /* Return false if @regno contains a pointer whose type isn't supported for 6340 * atomic instruction @insn. 6341 */ 6342 static bool atomic_ptr_type_ok(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 6343 struct bpf_insn *insn) 6344 { 6345 if (is_ctx_reg(env, regno)) 6346 return false; 6347 if (is_pkt_reg(env, regno)) 6348 return false; 6349 if (is_flow_key_reg(env, regno)) 6350 return false; 6351 if (is_sk_reg(env, regno)) 6352 return false; 6353 if (is_arena_reg(env, regno)) 6354 return bpf_jit_supports_insn(insn, true); 6355 6356 return true; 6357 } 6358 6359 static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = { 6360 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 6361 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK], 6362 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 6363 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_TCP], 6364 #endif 6365 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = btf_bpf_map_id, 6366 }; 6367 6368 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 6369 { 6370 /* A referenced register is always trusted. */ 6371 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 6372 return true; 6373 6374 /* Types listed in the reg2btf_ids are always trusted */ 6375 if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)] && 6376 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type)) 6377 return true; 6378 6379 /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the 6380 * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the 6381 * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in 6382 * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are 6383 * not. 6384 * 6385 * Eventually, we should make PTR_TRUSTED the single source of truth 6386 * for whether a register is trusted. 6387 */ 6388 return type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS && 6389 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type); 6390 } 6391 6392 static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 6393 { 6394 return reg->type & MEM_RCU; 6395 } 6396 6397 static void clear_trusted_flags(enum bpf_type_flag *flag) 6398 { 6399 *flag &= ~(BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS | MEM_RCU); 6400 } 6401 6402 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6403 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6404 int off, int size, bool strict) 6405 { 6406 struct tnum reg_off; 6407 int ip_align; 6408 6409 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 6410 if (!strict || size == 1) 6411 return 0; 6412 6413 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling 6414 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of 6415 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms 6416 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get 6417 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate 6418 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an 6419 * unconditional IP align value of '2'. 6420 */ 6421 ip_align = 2; 6422 6423 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); 6424 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 6425 char tn_buf[48]; 6426 6427 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6428 verbose(env, 6429 "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", 6430 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 6431 return -EACCES; 6432 } 6433 6434 return 0; 6435 } 6436 6437 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6438 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6439 const char *pointer_desc, 6440 int off, int size, bool strict) 6441 { 6442 struct tnum reg_off; 6443 6444 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 6445 if (!strict || size == 1) 6446 return 0; 6447 6448 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); 6449 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 6450 char tn_buf[48]; 6451 6452 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6453 verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", 6454 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 6455 return -EACCES; 6456 } 6457 6458 return 0; 6459 } 6460 6461 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6462 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, 6463 int size, bool strict_alignment_once) 6464 { 6465 bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once; 6466 const char *pointer_desc = ""; 6467 6468 switch (reg->type) { 6469 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 6470 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 6471 /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits 6472 * right in front, treat it the very same way. 6473 */ 6474 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); 6475 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 6476 pointer_desc = "flow keys "; 6477 break; 6478 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 6479 pointer_desc = "key "; 6480 break; 6481 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 6482 pointer_desc = "value "; 6483 if (reg->map_ptr->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) 6484 strict = true; 6485 break; 6486 case PTR_TO_CTX: 6487 pointer_desc = "context "; 6488 break; 6489 case PTR_TO_STACK: 6490 pointer_desc = "stack "; 6491 /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off() 6492 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being 6493 * aligned. 6494 */ 6495 strict = true; 6496 break; 6497 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 6498 pointer_desc = "sock "; 6499 break; 6500 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 6501 pointer_desc = "sock_common "; 6502 break; 6503 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 6504 pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; 6505 break; 6506 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 6507 pointer_desc = "xdp_sock "; 6508 break; 6509 case PTR_TO_ARENA: 6510 return 0; 6511 default: 6512 break; 6513 } 6514 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, 6515 strict); 6516 } 6517 6518 static enum priv_stack_mode bpf_enable_priv_stack(struct bpf_prog *prog) 6519 { 6520 if (!bpf_jit_supports_private_stack()) 6521 return NO_PRIV_STACK; 6522 6523 /* bpf_prog_check_recur() checks all prog types that use bpf trampoline 6524 * while kprobe/tp/perf_event/raw_tp don't use trampoline hence checked 6525 * explicitly. 6526 */ 6527 switch (prog->type) { 6528 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 6529 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: 6530 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: 6531 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 6532 return PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE; 6533 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 6534 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 6535 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: 6536 if (prog->aux->priv_stack_requested || bpf_prog_check_recur(prog)) 6537 return PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE; 6538 fallthrough; 6539 default: 6540 break; 6541 } 6542 6543 return NO_PRIV_STACK; 6544 } 6545 6546 static int round_up_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int stack_depth) 6547 { 6548 if (env->prog->jit_requested) 6549 return round_up(stack_depth, 16); 6550 6551 /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity 6552 * of interpreter stack size 6553 */ 6554 return round_up(max_t(u32, stack_depth, 1), 32); 6555 } 6556 6557 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function 6558 * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. 6559 * Ignore jump and exit insns. 6560 * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm 6561 * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites 6562 */ 6563 static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, 6564 bool priv_stack_supported) 6565 { 6566 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 6567 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 6568 int depth = 0, frame = 0, i, subprog_end, subprog_depth; 6569 bool tail_call_reachable = false; 6570 int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 6571 int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 6572 int j; 6573 6574 i = subprog[idx].start; 6575 if (!priv_stack_supported) 6576 subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode = NO_PRIV_STACK; 6577 process_func: 6578 /* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when 6579 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack 6580 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario 6581 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 6582 * 8k). 6583 * 6584 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example: 6585 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128 6586 * subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256 6587 * tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256 6588 * func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320) 6589 * subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64 6590 * subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128 6591 * tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128 6592 * func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416) 6593 * 6594 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid 6595 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above. 6596 */ 6597 if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) { 6598 verbose(env, 6599 "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n", 6600 depth); 6601 return -EACCES; 6602 } 6603 6604 subprog_depth = round_up_stack_depth(env, subprog[idx].stack_depth); 6605 if (priv_stack_supported) { 6606 /* Request private stack support only if the subprog stack 6607 * depth is no less than BPF_PRIV_STACK_MIN_SIZE. This is to 6608 * avoid jit penalty if the stack usage is small. 6609 */ 6610 if (subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_UNKNOWN && 6611 subprog_depth >= BPF_PRIV_STACK_MIN_SIZE) 6612 subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode = PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE; 6613 } 6614 6615 if (subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE) { 6616 if (subprog_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { 6617 verbose(env, "stack size of subprog %d is %d. Too large\n", 6618 idx, subprog_depth); 6619 return -EACCES; 6620 } 6621 } else { 6622 depth += subprog_depth; 6623 if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { 6624 verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n", 6625 frame + 1, depth); 6626 return -EACCES; 6627 } 6628 } 6629 continue_func: 6630 subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; 6631 for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { 6632 int next_insn, sidx; 6633 6634 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn + i) && !insn[i].off) { 6635 bool err = false; 6636 6637 if (!is_bpf_throw_kfunc(insn + i)) 6638 continue; 6639 if (subprog[idx].is_cb) 6640 err = true; 6641 for (int c = 0; c < frame && !err; c++) { 6642 if (subprog[ret_prog[c]].is_cb) { 6643 err = true; 6644 break; 6645 } 6646 } 6647 if (!err) 6648 continue; 6649 verbose(env, 6650 "bpf_throw kfunc (insn %d) cannot be called from callback subprog %d\n", 6651 i, idx); 6652 return -EINVAL; 6653 } 6654 6655 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i)) 6656 continue; 6657 /* remember insn and function to return to */ 6658 ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; 6659 ret_prog[frame] = idx; 6660 6661 /* find the callee */ 6662 next_insn = i + insn[i].imm + 1; 6663 sidx = find_subprog(env, next_insn); 6664 if (verifier_bug_if(sidx < 0, env, "callee not found at insn %d", next_insn)) 6665 return -EFAULT; 6666 if (subprog[sidx].is_async_cb) { 6667 if (subprog[sidx].has_tail_call) { 6668 verifier_bug(env, "subprog has tail_call and async cb"); 6669 return -EFAULT; 6670 } 6671 /* async callbacks don't increase bpf prog stack size unless called directly */ 6672 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i)) 6673 continue; 6674 if (subprog[sidx].is_exception_cb) { 6675 verbose(env, "insn %d cannot call exception cb directly", i); 6676 return -EINVAL; 6677 } 6678 } 6679 i = next_insn; 6680 idx = sidx; 6681 if (!priv_stack_supported) 6682 subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode = NO_PRIV_STACK; 6683 6684 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) 6685 tail_call_reachable = true; 6686 6687 frame++; 6688 if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 6689 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n", 6690 frame); 6691 return -E2BIG; 6692 } 6693 goto process_func; 6694 } 6695 /* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the 6696 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs; 6697 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the 6698 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls 6699 */ 6700 if (tail_call_reachable) 6701 for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) { 6702 if (subprog[ret_prog[j]].is_exception_cb) { 6703 verbose(env, "cannot tail call within exception cb\n"); 6704 return -EINVAL; 6705 } 6706 subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true; 6707 } 6708 if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable) 6709 env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true; 6710 6711 /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog' 6712 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT 6713 */ 6714 if (frame == 0) 6715 return 0; 6716 if (subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode != PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE) 6717 depth -= round_up_stack_depth(env, subprog[idx].stack_depth); 6718 frame--; 6719 i = ret_insn[frame]; 6720 idx = ret_prog[frame]; 6721 goto continue_func; 6722 } 6723 6724 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 6725 { 6726 enum priv_stack_mode priv_stack_mode = PRIV_STACK_UNKNOWN; 6727 struct bpf_subprog_info *si = env->subprog_info; 6728 bool priv_stack_supported; 6729 int ret; 6730 6731 for (int i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 6732 if (si[i].has_tail_call) { 6733 priv_stack_mode = NO_PRIV_STACK; 6734 break; 6735 } 6736 } 6737 6738 if (priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_UNKNOWN) 6739 priv_stack_mode = bpf_enable_priv_stack(env->prog); 6740 6741 /* All async_cb subprogs use normal kernel stack. If a particular 6742 * subprog appears in both main prog and async_cb subtree, that 6743 * subprog will use normal kernel stack to avoid potential nesting. 6744 * The reverse subprog traversal ensures when main prog subtree is 6745 * checked, the subprogs appearing in async_cb subtrees are already 6746 * marked as using normal kernel stack, so stack size checking can 6747 * be done properly. 6748 */ 6749 for (int i = env->subprog_cnt - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 6750 if (!i || si[i].is_async_cb) { 6751 priv_stack_supported = !i && priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE; 6752 ret = check_max_stack_depth_subprog(env, i, priv_stack_supported); 6753 if (ret < 0) 6754 return ret; 6755 } 6756 } 6757 6758 for (int i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 6759 if (si[i].priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE) { 6760 env->prog->aux->jits_use_priv_stack = true; 6761 break; 6762 } 6763 } 6764 6765 return 0; 6766 } 6767 6768 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 6769 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6770 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx) 6771 { 6772 int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog; 6773 6774 subprog = find_subprog(env, start); 6775 if (verifier_bug_if(subprog < 0, env, "get stack depth: no program at insn %d", start)) 6776 return -EFAULT; 6777 return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth; 6778 } 6779 #endif 6780 6781 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6782 const char *buf_info, 6783 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6784 int regno, int off, int size) 6785 { 6786 if (off < 0) { 6787 verbose(env, 6788 "R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n", 6789 regno, buf_info, off, size); 6790 return -EACCES; 6791 } 6792 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 6793 char tn_buf[48]; 6794 6795 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6796 verbose(env, 6797 "R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 6798 regno, off, tn_buf); 6799 return -EACCES; 6800 } 6801 6802 return 0; 6803 } 6804 6805 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6806 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6807 int regno, int off, int size) 6808 { 6809 int err; 6810 6811 err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size); 6812 if (err) 6813 return err; 6814 6815 if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access) 6816 env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size; 6817 6818 return 0; 6819 } 6820 6821 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6822 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6823 int regno, int off, int size, 6824 bool zero_size_allowed, 6825 u32 *max_access) 6826 { 6827 const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr"; 6828 int err; 6829 6830 err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size); 6831 if (err) 6832 return err; 6833 6834 if (off + size > *max_access) 6835 *max_access = off + size; 6836 6837 return 0; 6838 } 6839 6840 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */ 6841 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 6842 { 6843 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 6844 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 6845 } 6846 6847 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes) 6848 * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE 6849 */ 6850 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6851 { 6852 u64 mask; 6853 6854 /* clear high bits in bit representation */ 6855 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size); 6856 6857 /* fix arithmetic bounds */ 6858 mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1; 6859 if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) { 6860 reg->umin_value &= mask; 6861 reg->umax_value &= mask; 6862 } else { 6863 reg->umin_value = 0; 6864 reg->umax_value = mask; 6865 } 6866 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 6867 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 6868 6869 /* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register 6870 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into 6871 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already. 6872 */ 6873 if (size < 4) 6874 __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg); 6875 6876 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 6877 } 6878 6879 static void set_sext64_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6880 { 6881 if (size == 1) { 6882 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S8_MIN; 6883 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S8_MAX; 6884 } else if (size == 2) { 6885 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S16_MIN; 6886 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S16_MAX; 6887 } else { 6888 /* size == 4 */ 6889 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 6890 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 6891 } 6892 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value = 0; 6893 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 6894 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 6895 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 6896 } 6897 6898 static void coerce_reg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6899 { 6900 s64 init_s64_max, init_s64_min, s64_max, s64_min, u64_cval; 6901 u64 top_smax_value, top_smin_value; 6902 u64 num_bits = size * 8; 6903 6904 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6905 u64_cval = reg->var_off.value; 6906 if (size == 1) 6907 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s8)u64_cval); 6908 else if (size == 2) 6909 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s16)u64_cval); 6910 else 6911 /* size == 4 */ 6912 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s32)u64_cval); 6913 6914 u64_cval = reg->var_off.value; 6915 reg->smax_value = reg->smin_value = u64_cval; 6916 reg->umax_value = reg->umin_value = u64_cval; 6917 reg->s32_max_value = reg->s32_min_value = u64_cval; 6918 reg->u32_max_value = reg->u32_min_value = u64_cval; 6919 return; 6920 } 6921 6922 top_smax_value = ((u64)reg->smax_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6923 top_smin_value = ((u64)reg->smin_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6924 6925 if (top_smax_value != top_smin_value) 6926 goto out; 6927 6928 /* find the s64_min and s64_min after sign extension */ 6929 if (size == 1) { 6930 init_s64_max = (s8)reg->smax_value; 6931 init_s64_min = (s8)reg->smin_value; 6932 } else if (size == 2) { 6933 init_s64_max = (s16)reg->smax_value; 6934 init_s64_min = (s16)reg->smin_value; 6935 } else { 6936 init_s64_max = (s32)reg->smax_value; 6937 init_s64_min = (s32)reg->smin_value; 6938 } 6939 6940 s64_max = max(init_s64_max, init_s64_min); 6941 s64_min = min(init_s64_max, init_s64_min); 6942 6943 /* both of s64_max/s64_min positive or negative */ 6944 if ((s64_max >= 0) == (s64_min >= 0)) { 6945 reg->s32_min_value = reg->smin_value = s64_min; 6946 reg->s32_max_value = reg->smax_value = s64_max; 6947 reg->u32_min_value = reg->umin_value = s64_min; 6948 reg->u32_max_value = reg->umax_value = s64_max; 6949 reg->var_off = tnum_range(s64_min, s64_max); 6950 return; 6951 } 6952 6953 out: 6954 set_sext64_default_val(reg, size); 6955 } 6956 6957 static void set_sext32_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6958 { 6959 if (size == 1) { 6960 reg->s32_min_value = S8_MIN; 6961 reg->s32_max_value = S8_MAX; 6962 } else { 6963 /* size == 2 */ 6964 reg->s32_min_value = S16_MIN; 6965 reg->s32_max_value = S16_MAX; 6966 } 6967 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 6968 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 6969 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_unknown); 6970 } 6971 6972 static void coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6973 { 6974 s32 init_s32_max, init_s32_min, s32_max, s32_min, u32_val; 6975 u32 top_smax_value, top_smin_value; 6976 u32 num_bits = size * 8; 6977 6978 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6979 u32_val = reg->var_off.value; 6980 if (size == 1) 6981 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s8)u32_val); 6982 else 6983 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s16)u32_val); 6984 6985 u32_val = reg->var_off.value; 6986 reg->s32_min_value = reg->s32_max_value = u32_val; 6987 reg->u32_min_value = reg->u32_max_value = u32_val; 6988 return; 6989 } 6990 6991 top_smax_value = ((u32)reg->s32_max_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6992 top_smin_value = ((u32)reg->s32_min_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6993 6994 if (top_smax_value != top_smin_value) 6995 goto out; 6996 6997 /* find the s32_min and s32_min after sign extension */ 6998 if (size == 1) { 6999 init_s32_max = (s8)reg->s32_max_value; 7000 init_s32_min = (s8)reg->s32_min_value; 7001 } else { 7002 /* size == 2 */ 7003 init_s32_max = (s16)reg->s32_max_value; 7004 init_s32_min = (s16)reg->s32_min_value; 7005 } 7006 s32_max = max(init_s32_max, init_s32_min); 7007 s32_min = min(init_s32_max, init_s32_min); 7008 7009 if ((s32_min >= 0) == (s32_max >= 0)) { 7010 reg->s32_min_value = s32_min; 7011 reg->s32_max_value = s32_max; 7012 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)s32_min; 7013 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)s32_max; 7014 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_range(s32_min, s32_max)); 7015 return; 7016 } 7017 7018 out: 7019 set_sext32_default_val(reg, size); 7020 } 7021 7022 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map) 7023 { 7024 /* A map is considered read-only if the following condition are true: 7025 * 7026 * 1) BPF program side cannot change any of the map content. The 7027 * BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG flag is throughout the lifetime of a map 7028 * and was set at map creation time. 7029 * 2) The map value(s) have been initialized from user space by a 7030 * loader and then "frozen", such that no new map update/delete 7031 * operations from syscall side are possible for the rest of 7032 * the map's lifetime from that point onwards. 7033 * 3) Any parallel/pending map update/delete operations from syscall 7034 * side have been completed. Only after that point, it's safe to 7035 * assume that map value(s) are immutable. 7036 */ 7037 return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 7038 READ_ONCE(map->frozen) && 7039 !bpf_map_write_active(map); 7040 } 7041 7042 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val, 7043 bool is_ldsx) 7044 { 7045 void *ptr; 7046 u64 addr; 7047 int err; 7048 7049 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 7050 if (err) 7051 return err; 7052 ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off; 7053 7054 switch (size) { 7055 case sizeof(u8): 7056 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s8 *)ptr : (u64)*(u8 *)ptr; 7057 break; 7058 case sizeof(u16): 7059 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s16 *)ptr : (u64)*(u16 *)ptr; 7060 break; 7061 case sizeof(u32): 7062 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s32 *)ptr : (u64)*(u32 *)ptr; 7063 break; 7064 case sizeof(u64): 7065 *val = *(u64 *)ptr; 7066 break; 7067 default: 7068 return -EINVAL; 7069 } 7070 return 0; 7071 } 7072 7073 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu) 7074 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu_or_null) 7075 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted) 7076 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted_or_null) 7077 7078 /* 7079 * Allow list few fields as RCU trusted or full trusted. 7080 * This logic doesn't allow mix tagging and will be removed once GCC supports 7081 * btf_type_tag. 7082 */ 7083 7084 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and never NULL */ 7085 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct) { 7086 const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr; 7087 struct css_set __rcu *cgroups; 7088 struct task_struct __rcu *real_parent; 7089 struct task_struct *group_leader; 7090 }; 7091 7092 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup) { 7093 /* cgrp->kn is always accessible as documented in kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c */ 7094 struct kernfs_node *kn; 7095 }; 7096 7097 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set) { 7098 struct cgroup *dfl_cgrp; 7099 }; 7100 7101 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup_subsys_state) { 7102 struct cgroup *cgroup; 7103 }; 7104 7105 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and can be NULL */ 7106 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct) { 7107 struct file __rcu *exe_file; 7108 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG 7109 struct task_struct __rcu *owner; 7110 #endif 7111 }; 7112 7113 /* skb->sk, req->sk are not RCU protected, but we mark them as such 7114 * because bpf prog accessible sockets are SOCK_RCU_FREE. 7115 */ 7116 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff) { 7117 struct sock *sk; 7118 }; 7119 7120 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock) { 7121 struct sock *sk; 7122 }; 7123 7124 /* full trusted: these fields are trusted even outside of RCU CS and never NULL */ 7125 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta) { 7126 struct seq_file *seq; 7127 }; 7128 7129 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task) { 7130 struct bpf_iter_meta *meta; 7131 struct task_struct *task; 7132 }; 7133 7134 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm) { 7135 struct file *file; 7136 }; 7137 7138 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file) { 7139 struct inode *f_inode; 7140 }; 7141 7142 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry) { 7143 struct inode *d_inode; 7144 }; 7145 7146 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket) { 7147 struct sock *sk; 7148 }; 7149 7150 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct) { 7151 struct mm_struct *vm_mm; 7152 struct file *vm_file; 7153 }; 7154 7155 static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7156 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 7157 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 7158 { 7159 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct)); 7160 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup)); 7161 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set)); 7162 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup_subsys_state)); 7163 7164 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu"); 7165 } 7166 7167 static bool type_is_rcu_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7168 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 7169 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 7170 { 7171 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct)); 7172 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff)); 7173 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock)); 7174 7175 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu_or_null"); 7176 } 7177 7178 static bool type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7179 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 7180 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 7181 { 7182 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta)); 7183 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task)); 7184 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm)); 7185 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file)); 7186 7187 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_trusted"); 7188 } 7189 7190 static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7191 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 7192 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 7193 { 7194 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket)); 7195 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry)); 7196 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct)); 7197 7198 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, 7199 "__safe_trusted_or_null"); 7200 } 7201 7202 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7203 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 7204 int regno, int off, int size, 7205 enum bpf_access_type atype, 7206 int value_regno) 7207 { 7208 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 7209 const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 7210 const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off); 7211 const char *field_name = NULL; 7212 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 7213 u32 btf_id = 0; 7214 int ret; 7215 7216 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 7217 verbose(env, 7218 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 7219 tname); 7220 return -EPERM; 7221 } 7222 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 7223 verbose(env, 7224 "Cannot access kernel 'struct %s' from non-GPL compatible program\n", 7225 tname); 7226 return -EINVAL; 7227 } 7228 if (off < 0) { 7229 verbose(env, 7230 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 7231 regno, tname, off); 7232 return -EACCES; 7233 } 7234 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 7235 char tn_buf[48]; 7236 7237 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 7238 verbose(env, 7239 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 7240 regno, tname, off, tn_buf); 7241 return -EACCES; 7242 } 7243 7244 if (reg->type & MEM_USER) { 7245 verbose(env, 7246 "R%d is ptr_%s access user memory: off=%d\n", 7247 regno, tname, off); 7248 return -EACCES; 7249 } 7250 7251 if (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU) { 7252 verbose(env, 7253 "R%d is ptr_%s access percpu memory: off=%d\n", 7254 regno, tname, off); 7255 return -EACCES; 7256 } 7257 7258 if (env->ops->btf_struct_access && !type_is_alloc(reg->type) && atype == BPF_WRITE) { 7259 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 7260 verifier_bug(env, "reg->btf must be kernel btf"); 7261 return -EFAULT; 7262 } 7263 ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size); 7264 } else { 7265 /* Writes are permitted with default btf_struct_access for 7266 * program allocated objects (which always have ref_obj_id > 0), 7267 * but not for untrusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC. 7268 */ 7269 if (atype != BPF_READ && !type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 7270 verbose(env, "only read is supported\n"); 7271 return -EACCES; 7272 } 7273 7274 if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) && 7275 !(reg->type & MEM_RCU) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 7276 verifier_bug(env, "ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero"); 7277 return -EFAULT; 7278 } 7279 7280 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, &field_name); 7281 } 7282 7283 if (ret < 0) 7284 return ret; 7285 7286 if (ret != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 7287 /* just mark; */ 7288 7289 } else if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED) { 7290 /* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it 7291 * also inherit the untrusted flag. 7292 */ 7293 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED; 7294 7295 } else if (is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg)) { 7296 /* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is no 7297 * longer trusted, unless the field being accessed has explicitly been 7298 * marked as inheriting its parent's state of trust (either full or RCU). 7299 * For example: 7300 * 'cgroups' pointer is untrusted if task->cgroups dereference 7301 * happened in a sleepable program outside of bpf_rcu_read_lock() 7302 * section. In a non-sleepable program it's trusted while in RCU CS (aka MEM_RCU). 7303 * Note bpf_rcu_read_unlock() converts MEM_RCU pointers to PTR_UNTRUSTED. 7304 * 7305 * A regular RCU-protected pointer with __rcu tag can also be deemed 7306 * trusted if we are in an RCU CS. Such pointer can be NULL. 7307 */ 7308 if (type_is_trusted(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 7309 flag |= PTR_TRUSTED; 7310 } else if (type_is_trusted_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 7311 flag |= PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 7312 } else if (in_rcu_cs(env) && !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 7313 if (type_is_rcu(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 7314 /* ignore __rcu tag and mark it MEM_RCU */ 7315 flag |= MEM_RCU; 7316 } else if (flag & MEM_RCU || 7317 type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 7318 /* __rcu tagged pointers can be NULL */ 7319 flag |= MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 7320 7321 /* We always trust them */ 7322 if (type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id) && 7323 flag & PTR_UNTRUSTED) 7324 flag &= ~PTR_UNTRUSTED; 7325 } else if (flag & (MEM_PERCPU | MEM_USER)) { 7326 /* keep as-is */ 7327 } else { 7328 /* walking unknown pointers yields old deprecated PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 7329 clear_trusted_flags(&flag); 7330 } 7331 } else { 7332 /* 7333 * If not in RCU CS or MEM_RCU pointer can be NULL then 7334 * aggressively mark as untrusted otherwise such 7335 * pointers will be plain PTR_TO_BTF_ID without flags 7336 * and will be allowed to be passed into helpers for 7337 * compat reasons. 7338 */ 7339 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED; 7340 } 7341 } else { 7342 /* Old compat. Deprecated */ 7343 clear_trusted_flags(&flag); 7344 } 7345 7346 if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 7347 ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag); 7348 if (ret < 0) 7349 return ret; 7350 } 7351 7352 return 0; 7353 } 7354 7355 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7356 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 7357 int regno, int off, int size, 7358 enum bpf_access_type atype, 7359 int value_regno) 7360 { 7361 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 7362 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 7363 struct bpf_reg_state map_reg; 7364 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 7365 const struct btf_type *t; 7366 const char *tname; 7367 u32 btf_id; 7368 int ret; 7369 7370 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 7371 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 7372 return -ENOTSUPP; 7373 } 7374 7375 if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) { 7376 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n", 7377 map->map_type); 7378 return -ENOTSUPP; 7379 } 7380 7381 t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id); 7382 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 7383 7384 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 7385 verbose(env, 7386 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 7387 tname); 7388 return -EPERM; 7389 } 7390 7391 if (off < 0) { 7392 verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 7393 regno, tname, off); 7394 return -EACCES; 7395 } 7396 7397 if (atype != BPF_READ) { 7398 verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname); 7399 return -EACCES; 7400 } 7401 7402 /* Simulate access to a PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 7403 memset(&map_reg, 0, sizeof(map_reg)); 7404 ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 7405 btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0); 7406 if (ret < 0) 7407 return ret; 7408 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, &map_reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, NULL); 7409 if (ret < 0) 7410 return ret; 7411 7412 if (value_regno >= 0) { 7413 ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag); 7414 if (ret < 0) 7415 return ret; 7416 } 7417 7418 return 0; 7419 } 7420 7421 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The 7422 * maximum valid offset is -1. 7423 * 7424 * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and 7425 * -state->allocated_stack for reads. 7426 */ 7427 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7428 s64 off, 7429 struct bpf_func_state *state, 7430 enum bpf_access_type t) 7431 { 7432 int min_valid_off; 7433 7434 if (t == BPF_WRITE || env->allow_uninit_stack) 7435 min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK; 7436 else 7437 min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack; 7438 7439 if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1) 7440 return -EACCES; 7441 return 0; 7442 } 7443 7444 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack 7445 * bounds. 7446 * 7447 * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any). 7448 */ 7449 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( 7450 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7451 int regno, int off, int access_size, 7452 enum bpf_access_type type) 7453 { 7454 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 7455 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 7456 s64 min_off, max_off; 7457 int err; 7458 char *err_extra; 7459 7460 if (type == BPF_READ) 7461 err_extra = " read from"; 7462 else 7463 err_extra = " write to"; 7464 7465 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 7466 min_off = (s64)reg->var_off.value + off; 7467 max_off = min_off + access_size; 7468 } else { 7469 if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || 7470 reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 7471 verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n", 7472 err_extra, regno); 7473 return -EACCES; 7474 } 7475 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 7476 max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size; 7477 } 7478 7479 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(env, min_off, state, type); 7480 if (!err && max_off > 0) 7481 err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */ 7482 if (!err && access_size < 0) 7483 /* access_size should not be negative (or overflow an int); others checks 7484 * along the way should have prevented such an access. 7485 */ 7486 err = -EFAULT; /* invalid negative access size; integer overflow? */ 7487 7488 if (err) { 7489 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 7490 verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n", 7491 err_extra, regno, off, access_size); 7492 } else { 7493 char tn_buf[48]; 7494 7495 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 7496 verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", 7497 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, off, access_size); 7498 } 7499 return err; 7500 } 7501 7502 /* Note that there is no stack access with offset zero, so the needed stack 7503 * size is -min_off, not -min_off+1. 7504 */ 7505 return grow_stack_state(env, state, -min_off /* size */); 7506 } 7507 7508 static bool get_func_retval_range(struct bpf_prog *prog, 7509 struct bpf_retval_range *range) 7510 { 7511 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 7512 prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_MAC && 7513 !bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(prog, range)) { 7514 return true; 7515 } 7516 return false; 7517 } 7518 7519 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) 7520 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory 7521 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory 7522 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory 7523 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory 7524 */ 7525 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, 7526 int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, 7527 int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once, bool is_ldsx) 7528 { 7529 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7530 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 7531 int size, err = 0; 7532 7533 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); 7534 if (size < 0) 7535 return size; 7536 7537 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ 7538 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once); 7539 if (err) 7540 return err; 7541 7542 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ 7543 off += reg->off; 7544 7545 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { 7546 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 7547 verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno); 7548 return -EACCES; 7549 } 7550 7551 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 7552 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 7553 if (err) 7554 return err; 7555 if (value_regno >= 0) 7556 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7557 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 7558 struct btf_field *kptr_field = NULL; 7559 7560 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 7561 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 7562 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); 7563 return -EACCES; 7564 } 7565 err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t); 7566 if (err) 7567 return err; 7568 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false, ACCESS_DIRECT); 7569 if (err) 7570 return err; 7571 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 7572 kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record, 7573 off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR | BPF_UPTR); 7574 if (kptr_field) { 7575 err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field); 7576 } else if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 7577 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 7578 7579 /* 7580 * If map is read-only, track its contents as scalars, 7581 * unless it is an insn array (see the special case below) 7582 */ 7583 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && 7584 bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) && 7585 map->ops->map_direct_value_addr && 7586 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) { 7587 int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value; 7588 u64 val = 0; 7589 7590 err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size, 7591 &val, is_ldsx); 7592 if (err) 7593 return err; 7594 7595 regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 7596 __mark_reg_known(®s[value_regno], val); 7597 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) { 7598 if (bpf_size != BPF_DW) { 7599 verbose(env, "Invalid read of %d bytes from insn_array\n", 7600 size); 7601 return -EACCES; 7602 } 7603 copy_register_state(®s[value_regno], reg); 7604 regs[value_regno].type = PTR_TO_INSN; 7605 } else { 7606 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7607 } 7608 } 7609 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 7610 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 7611 bool rdonly_untrusted = rdonly_mem && (reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED); 7612 7613 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 7614 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 7615 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7616 return -EACCES; 7617 } 7618 7619 if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) { 7620 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 7621 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7622 return -EACCES; 7623 } 7624 7625 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 7626 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 7627 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno); 7628 return -EACCES; 7629 } 7630 7631 /* 7632 * Accesses to untrusted PTR_TO_MEM are done through probe 7633 * instructions, hence no need to check bounds in that case. 7634 */ 7635 if (!rdonly_untrusted) 7636 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 7637 reg->mem_size, false); 7638 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem)) 7639 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7640 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 7641 struct bpf_retval_range range; 7642 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { 7643 .reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE, 7644 .is_ldsx = is_ldsx, 7645 .log = &env->log, 7646 }; 7647 7648 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 7649 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 7650 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); 7651 return -EACCES; 7652 } 7653 7654 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno); 7655 if (err < 0) 7656 return err; 7657 7658 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, &info); 7659 if (err) 7660 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 7661 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 7662 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a 7663 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter 7664 * case, we know the offset is zero. 7665 */ 7666 if (info.reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 7667 if (info.is_retval && get_func_retval_range(env->prog, &range)) { 7668 err = __mark_reg_s32_range(env, regs, value_regno, 7669 range.minval, range.maxval); 7670 if (err) 7671 return err; 7672 } else { 7673 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7674 } 7675 } else { 7676 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, 7677 value_regno); 7678 if (type_may_be_null(info.reg_type)) 7679 regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 7680 /* A load of ctx field could have different 7681 * actual load size with the one encoded in the 7682 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not 7683 * a sub-register. 7684 */ 7685 regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 7686 if (base_type(info.reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 7687 regs[value_regno].btf = info.btf; 7688 regs[value_regno].btf_id = info.btf_id; 7689 regs[value_regno].ref_obj_id = info.ref_obj_id; 7690 } 7691 } 7692 regs[value_regno].type = info.reg_type; 7693 } 7694 7695 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 7696 /* Basic bounds checks. */ 7697 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, t); 7698 if (err) 7699 return err; 7700 7701 if (t == BPF_READ) 7702 err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size, 7703 value_regno); 7704 else 7705 err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size, 7706 value_regno, insn_idx); 7707 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { 7708 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { 7709 verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); 7710 return -EACCES; 7711 } 7712 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 7713 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 7714 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", 7715 value_regno); 7716 return -EACCES; 7717 } 7718 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false); 7719 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 7720 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7721 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) { 7722 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 7723 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 7724 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n", 7725 value_regno); 7726 return -EACCES; 7727 } 7728 7729 err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size); 7730 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 7731 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7732 } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) { 7733 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 7734 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 7735 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7736 return -EACCES; 7737 } 7738 err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); 7739 if (!err && value_regno >= 0) 7740 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7741 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) { 7742 err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size); 7743 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 7744 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7745 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 7746 !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 7747 err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 7748 value_regno); 7749 } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { 7750 err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 7751 value_regno); 7752 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BUF) { 7753 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 7754 u32 *max_access; 7755 7756 if (rdonly_mem) { 7757 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 7758 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 7759 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7760 return -EACCES; 7761 } 7762 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 7763 } else { 7764 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 7765 } 7766 7767 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, 7768 max_access); 7769 7770 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (rdonly_mem || t == BPF_READ)) 7771 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7772 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_ARENA) { 7773 if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 7774 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7775 } else { 7776 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 7777 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7778 return -EACCES; 7779 } 7780 7781 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && 7782 regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 7783 if (!is_ldsx) 7784 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ 7785 coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size); 7786 else 7787 coerce_reg_to_size_sx(®s[value_regno], size); 7788 } 7789 return err; 7790 } 7791 7792 static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type, 7793 bool allow_trust_mismatch); 7794 7795 static int check_load_mem(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 7796 bool strict_alignment_once, bool is_ldsx, 7797 bool allow_trust_mismatch, const char *ctx) 7798 { 7799 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7800 enum bpf_reg_type src_reg_type; 7801 int err; 7802 7803 /* check src operand */ 7804 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 7805 if (err) 7806 return err; 7807 7808 /* check dst operand */ 7809 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 7810 if (err) 7811 return err; 7812 7813 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; 7814 7815 /* Check if (src_reg + off) is readable. The state of dst_reg will be 7816 * updated by this call. 7817 */ 7818 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off, 7819 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, 7820 strict_alignment_once, is_ldsx); 7821 err = err ?: save_aux_ptr_type(env, src_reg_type, 7822 allow_trust_mismatch); 7823 err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, ®s[insn->dst_reg], ctx); 7824 7825 return err; 7826 } 7827 7828 static int check_store_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 7829 bool strict_alignment_once) 7830 { 7831 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7832 enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; 7833 int err; 7834 7835 /* check src1 operand */ 7836 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 7837 if (err) 7838 return err; 7839 7840 /* check src2 operand */ 7841 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 7842 if (err) 7843 return err; 7844 7845 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 7846 7847 /* Check if (dst_reg + off) is writeable. */ 7848 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 7849 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, 7850 strict_alignment_once, false); 7851 err = err ?: save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); 7852 7853 return err; 7854 } 7855 7856 static int check_atomic_rmw(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7857 struct bpf_insn *insn) 7858 { 7859 int load_reg; 7860 int err; 7861 7862 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 7863 verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n"); 7864 return -EINVAL; 7865 } 7866 7867 /* check src1 operand */ 7868 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 7869 if (err) 7870 return err; 7871 7872 /* check src2 operand */ 7873 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 7874 if (err) 7875 return err; 7876 7877 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) { 7878 /* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */ 7879 const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0; 7880 7881 err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP); 7882 if (err) 7883 return err; 7884 7885 if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) { 7886 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg); 7887 return -EACCES; 7888 } 7889 } 7890 7891 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 7892 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); 7893 return -EACCES; 7894 } 7895 7896 if (!atomic_ptr_type_ok(env, insn->dst_reg, insn)) { 7897 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 7898 insn->dst_reg, 7899 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 7900 return -EACCES; 7901 } 7902 7903 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) { 7904 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 7905 load_reg = BPF_REG_0; 7906 else 7907 load_reg = insn->src_reg; 7908 7909 /* check and record load of old value */ 7910 err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP); 7911 if (err) 7912 return err; 7913 } else { 7914 /* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't 7915 * actually load it into a register. 7916 */ 7917 load_reg = -1; 7918 } 7919 7920 /* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch 7921 * case to simulate the register fill. 7922 */ 7923 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 7924 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true, false); 7925 if (!err && load_reg >= 0) 7926 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 7927 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 7928 BPF_READ, load_reg, true, false); 7929 if (err) 7930 return err; 7931 7932 if (is_arena_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 7933 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, PTR_TO_ARENA, false); 7934 if (err) 7935 return err; 7936 } 7937 /* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */ 7938 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 7939 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true, false); 7940 if (err) 7941 return err; 7942 return 0; 7943 } 7944 7945 static int check_atomic_load(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7946 struct bpf_insn *insn) 7947 { 7948 int err; 7949 7950 err = check_load_mem(env, insn, true, false, false, "atomic_load"); 7951 if (err) 7952 return err; 7953 7954 if (!atomic_ptr_type_ok(env, insn->src_reg, insn)) { 7955 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC loads from R%d %s is not allowed\n", 7956 insn->src_reg, 7957 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->src_reg)->type)); 7958 return -EACCES; 7959 } 7960 7961 return 0; 7962 } 7963 7964 static int check_atomic_store(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7965 struct bpf_insn *insn) 7966 { 7967 int err; 7968 7969 err = check_store_reg(env, insn, true); 7970 if (err) 7971 return err; 7972 7973 if (!atomic_ptr_type_ok(env, insn->dst_reg, insn)) { 7974 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 7975 insn->dst_reg, 7976 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 7977 return -EACCES; 7978 } 7979 7980 return 0; 7981 } 7982 7983 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 7984 { 7985 switch (insn->imm) { 7986 case BPF_ADD: 7987 case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH: 7988 case BPF_AND: 7989 case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH: 7990 case BPF_OR: 7991 case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH: 7992 case BPF_XOR: 7993 case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH: 7994 case BPF_XCHG: 7995 case BPF_CMPXCHG: 7996 return check_atomic_rmw(env, insn); 7997 case BPF_LOAD_ACQ: 7998 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW && BITS_PER_LONG != 64) { 7999 verbose(env, 8000 "64-bit load-acquires are only supported on 64-bit arches\n"); 8001 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 8002 } 8003 return check_atomic_load(env, insn); 8004 case BPF_STORE_REL: 8005 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW && BITS_PER_LONG != 64) { 8006 verbose(env, 8007 "64-bit store-releases are only supported on 64-bit arches\n"); 8008 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 8009 } 8010 return check_atomic_store(env, insn); 8011 default: 8012 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", 8013 insn->imm); 8014 return -EINVAL; 8015 } 8016 } 8017 8018 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through 8019 * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending 8020 * on the access type and privileges, that all elements of the stack are 8021 * initialized. 8022 * 8023 * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any). 8024 * 8025 * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the 8026 * read offsets are marked as read. 8027 */ 8028 static int check_stack_range_initialized( 8029 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off, 8030 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 8031 enum bpf_access_type type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 8032 { 8033 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 8034 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 8035 int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi; 8036 /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are 8037 * read-only. 8038 */ 8039 bool clobber = false; 8040 8041 if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { 8042 verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n"); 8043 return -EACCES; 8044 } 8045 8046 if (type == BPF_WRITE) 8047 clobber = true; 8048 8049 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size, type); 8050 if (err) 8051 return err; 8052 8053 8054 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8055 min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 8056 } else { 8057 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for 8058 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in 8059 * Spectre masking for stack ALU. 8060 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 8061 */ 8062 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 8063 char tn_buf[48]; 8064 8065 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 8066 verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 8067 regno, tn_buf); 8068 return -EACCES; 8069 } 8070 /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed 8071 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to 8072 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on 8073 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may 8074 * cause uninitialized stack leaking. 8075 */ 8076 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) 8077 meta = NULL; 8078 8079 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 8080 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 8081 } 8082 8083 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 8084 /* Ensure we won't be overwriting dynptrs when simulating byte 8085 * by byte access in check_helper_call using meta.access_size. 8086 * This would be a problem if we have a helper in the future 8087 * which takes: 8088 * 8089 * helper(uninit_mem, len, dynptr) 8090 * 8091 * Now, uninint_mem may overlap with dynptr pointer. Hence, it 8092 * may end up writing to dynptr itself when touching memory from 8093 * arg 1. This can be relaxed on a case by case basis for known 8094 * safe cases, but reject due to the possibilitiy of aliasing by 8095 * default. 8096 */ 8097 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 8098 int stack_off = -i - 1; 8099 8100 spi = __get_spi(i); 8101 /* raw_mode may write past allocated_stack */ 8102 if (state->allocated_stack <= stack_off) 8103 continue; 8104 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[stack_off % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_DYNPTR) { 8105 verbose(env, "potential write to dynptr at off=%d disallowed\n", i); 8106 return -EACCES; 8107 } 8108 } 8109 meta->access_size = access_size; 8110 meta->regno = regno; 8111 return 0; 8112 } 8113 8114 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 8115 u8 *stype; 8116 8117 slot = -i - 1; 8118 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 8119 if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) { 8120 verbose(env, "allocated_stack too small\n"); 8121 return -EFAULT; 8122 } 8123 8124 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 8125 if (*stype == STACK_MISC) 8126 goto mark; 8127 if ((*stype == STACK_ZERO) || 8128 (*stype == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)) { 8129 if (clobber) { 8130 /* helper can write anything into the stack */ 8131 *stype = STACK_MISC; 8132 } 8133 goto mark; 8134 } 8135 8136 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 8137 (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE || 8138 env->allow_ptr_leaks)) { 8139 if (clobber) { 8140 __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 8141 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 8142 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]); 8143 } 8144 goto mark; 8145 } 8146 8147 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8148 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n", 8149 regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size); 8150 } else { 8151 char tn_buf[48]; 8152 8153 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 8154 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n", 8155 regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size); 8156 } 8157 return -EACCES; 8158 mark: 8159 /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause 8160 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' 8161 */ 8162 err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg->frameno, env->insn_idx, BIT(spi)); 8163 if (err) 8164 return err; 8165 /* We do not call bpf_mark_stack_write(), as we can not 8166 * be sure that whether stack slot is written to or not. Hence, 8167 * we must still conservatively propagate reads upwards even if 8168 * helper may write to the entire memory range. 8169 */ 8170 } 8171 return 0; 8172 } 8173 8174 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 8175 int access_size, enum bpf_access_type access_type, 8176 bool zero_size_allowed, 8177 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 8178 { 8179 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8180 u32 *max_access; 8181 8182 switch (base_type(reg->type)) { 8183 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 8184 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 8185 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 8186 zero_size_allowed); 8187 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 8188 if (access_type == BPF_WRITE) { 8189 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 8190 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8191 return -EACCES; 8192 } 8193 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 8194 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 8195 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 8196 if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, access_type)) 8197 return -EACCES; 8198 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 8199 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER); 8200 case PTR_TO_MEM: 8201 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 8202 if (access_type == BPF_WRITE) { 8203 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 8204 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8205 return -EACCES; 8206 } 8207 } 8208 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, 8209 access_size, reg->mem_size, 8210 zero_size_allowed); 8211 case PTR_TO_BUF: 8212 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 8213 if (access_type == BPF_WRITE) { 8214 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 8215 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8216 return -EACCES; 8217 } 8218 8219 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 8220 } else { 8221 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 8222 } 8223 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, 8224 access_size, zero_size_allowed, 8225 max_access); 8226 case PTR_TO_STACK: 8227 return check_stack_range_initialized( 8228 env, 8229 regno, reg->off, access_size, 8230 zero_size_allowed, access_type, meta); 8231 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 8232 return check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, reg->off, 8233 access_size, BPF_READ, -1); 8234 case PTR_TO_CTX: 8235 /* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context, 8236 * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we 8237 * can not statically check its size. 8238 * Dynamically check it now. 8239 */ 8240 if (!env->ops->convert_ctx_access) { 8241 int offset = access_size - 1; 8242 8243 /* Allow zero-byte read from PTR_TO_CTX */ 8244 if (access_size == 0) 8245 return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; 8246 8247 return check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, offset, BPF_B, 8248 access_type, -1, false, false); 8249 } 8250 8251 fallthrough; 8252 default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */ 8253 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ 8254 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && 8255 register_is_null(reg)) 8256 return 0; 8257 8258 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s ", regno, 8259 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8260 verbose(env, "expected=%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_STACK)); 8261 return -EACCES; 8262 } 8263 } 8264 8265 /* verify arguments to helpers or kfuncs consisting of a pointer and an access 8266 * size. 8267 * 8268 * @regno is the register containing the access size. regno-1 is the register 8269 * containing the pointer. 8270 */ 8271 static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8272 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 8273 enum bpf_access_type access_type, 8274 bool zero_size_allowed, 8275 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 8276 { 8277 int err; 8278 8279 /* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers 8280 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values. 8281 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine 8282 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register 8283 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors 8284 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an 8285 * int type and negative retvals are allowed. 8286 */ 8287 meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; 8288 8289 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check happens using 8290 * its boundaries. For unprivileged variable accesses, disable 8291 * raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all 8292 * the memory that the helper could just partially fill up. 8293 */ 8294 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 8295 meta = NULL; 8296 8297 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 8298 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", 8299 regno); 8300 return -EACCES; 8301 } 8302 8303 if (reg->umin_value == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { 8304 verbose(env, "R%d invalid zero-sized read: u64=[%lld,%lld]\n", 8305 regno, reg->umin_value, reg->umax_value); 8306 return -EACCES; 8307 } 8308 8309 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { 8310 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", 8311 regno); 8312 return -EACCES; 8313 } 8314 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, reg->umax_value, 8315 access_type, zero_size_allowed, meta); 8316 if (!err) 8317 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 8318 return err; 8319 } 8320 8321 static int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 8322 u32 regno, u32 mem_size) 8323 { 8324 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type); 8325 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 8326 int err; 8327 8328 if (register_is_null(reg)) 8329 return 0; 8330 8331 /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory 8332 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as 8333 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller. 8334 */ 8335 if (may_be_null) { 8336 saved_reg = *reg; 8337 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 8338 } 8339 8340 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, BPF_READ, true, NULL); 8341 err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, BPF_WRITE, true, NULL); 8342 8343 if (may_be_null) 8344 *reg = saved_reg; 8345 8346 return err; 8347 } 8348 8349 static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 8350 u32 regno) 8351 { 8352 struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1]; 8353 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type); 8354 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 8355 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 8356 int err; 8357 8358 WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5); 8359 8360 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 8361 8362 if (may_be_null) { 8363 saved_reg = *mem_reg; 8364 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg); 8365 } 8366 8367 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, BPF_READ, true, &meta); 8368 err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, BPF_WRITE, true, &meta); 8369 8370 if (may_be_null) 8371 *mem_reg = saved_reg; 8372 8373 return err; 8374 } 8375 8376 enum { 8377 PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK = (1 << 0), 8378 PROCESS_RES_LOCK = (1 << 1), 8379 PROCESS_LOCK_IRQ = (1 << 2), 8380 }; 8381 8382 /* Implementation details: 8383 * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL. 8384 * bpf_obj_new returns PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL. 8385 * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id. 8386 * Two separate bpf_obj_new will also have different reg->id. 8387 * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, the verifier 8388 * clears reg->id after value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only 8389 * cares about the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care 8390 * about actual address of the map element. 8391 * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps 8392 * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so 8393 * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that 8394 * point to different bpf_spin_locks. Likewise for pointers to allocated objects 8395 * returned from bpf_obj_new. 8396 * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid 8397 * dead-locks. 8398 * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than 8399 * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only 8400 * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs. 8401 * env->cur_state->active_locks remembers which map value element or allocated 8402 * object got locked and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock. 8403 */ 8404 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int flags) 8405 { 8406 bool is_lock = flags & PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK, is_res_lock = flags & PROCESS_RES_LOCK; 8407 const char *lock_str = is_res_lock ? "bpf_res_spin" : "bpf_spin"; 8408 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 8409 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 8410 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 8411 bool is_irq = flags & PROCESS_LOCK_IRQ; 8412 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 8413 struct bpf_map *map = NULL; 8414 struct btf *btf = NULL; 8415 struct btf_record *rec; 8416 u32 spin_lock_off; 8417 int err; 8418 8419 if (!is_const) { 8420 verbose(env, 8421 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s_lock has to be at the constant offset\n", 8422 regno, lock_str); 8423 return -EINVAL; 8424 } 8425 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 8426 map = reg->map_ptr; 8427 if (!map->btf) { 8428 verbose(env, 8429 "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use %s_lock\n", 8430 map->name, lock_str); 8431 return -EINVAL; 8432 } 8433 } else { 8434 btf = reg->btf; 8435 } 8436 8437 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 8438 if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, is_res_lock ? BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK : BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 8439 verbose(env, "%s '%s' has no valid %s_lock\n", map ? "map" : "local", 8440 map ? map->name : "kptr", lock_str); 8441 return -EINVAL; 8442 } 8443 spin_lock_off = is_res_lock ? rec->res_spin_lock_off : rec->spin_lock_off; 8444 if (spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { 8445 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct %s_lock' that is at %d\n", 8446 val + reg->off, lock_str, spin_lock_off); 8447 return -EINVAL; 8448 } 8449 if (is_lock) { 8450 void *ptr; 8451 int type; 8452 8453 if (map) 8454 ptr = map; 8455 else 8456 ptr = btf; 8457 8458 if (!is_res_lock && cur->active_locks) { 8459 if (find_lock_state(env->cur_state, REF_TYPE_LOCK, 0, NULL)) { 8460 verbose(env, 8461 "Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n"); 8462 return -EINVAL; 8463 } 8464 } else if (is_res_lock && cur->active_locks) { 8465 if (find_lock_state(env->cur_state, REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK | REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK_IRQ, reg->id, ptr)) { 8466 verbose(env, "Acquiring the same lock again, AA deadlock detected\n"); 8467 return -EINVAL; 8468 } 8469 } 8470 8471 if (is_res_lock && is_irq) 8472 type = REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK_IRQ; 8473 else if (is_res_lock) 8474 type = REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK; 8475 else 8476 type = REF_TYPE_LOCK; 8477 err = acquire_lock_state(env, env->insn_idx, type, reg->id, ptr); 8478 if (err < 0) { 8479 verbose(env, "Failed to acquire lock state\n"); 8480 return err; 8481 } 8482 } else { 8483 void *ptr; 8484 int type; 8485 8486 if (map) 8487 ptr = map; 8488 else 8489 ptr = btf; 8490 8491 if (!cur->active_locks) { 8492 verbose(env, "%s_unlock without taking a lock\n", lock_str); 8493 return -EINVAL; 8494 } 8495 8496 if (is_res_lock && is_irq) 8497 type = REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK_IRQ; 8498 else if (is_res_lock) 8499 type = REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK; 8500 else 8501 type = REF_TYPE_LOCK; 8502 if (!find_lock_state(cur, type, reg->id, ptr)) { 8503 verbose(env, "%s_unlock of different lock\n", lock_str); 8504 return -EINVAL; 8505 } 8506 if (reg->id != cur->active_lock_id || ptr != cur->active_lock_ptr) { 8507 verbose(env, "%s_unlock cannot be out of order\n", lock_str); 8508 return -EINVAL; 8509 } 8510 if (release_lock_state(cur, type, reg->id, ptr)) { 8511 verbose(env, "%s_unlock of different lock\n", lock_str); 8512 return -EINVAL; 8513 } 8514 8515 invalidate_non_owning_refs(env); 8516 } 8517 return 0; 8518 } 8519 8520 /* Check if @regno is a pointer to a specific field in a map value */ 8521 static int check_map_field_pointer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 8522 enum btf_field_type field_type) 8523 { 8524 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 8525 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 8526 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 8527 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 8528 const char *struct_name = btf_field_type_name(field_type); 8529 int field_off = -1; 8530 8531 if (!is_const) { 8532 verbose(env, 8533 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n", 8534 regno, struct_name); 8535 return -EINVAL; 8536 } 8537 if (!map->btf) { 8538 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use %s\n", map->name, 8539 struct_name); 8540 return -EINVAL; 8541 } 8542 if (!btf_record_has_field(map->record, field_type)) { 8543 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid %s\n", map->name, struct_name); 8544 return -EINVAL; 8545 } 8546 switch (field_type) { 8547 case BPF_TIMER: 8548 field_off = map->record->timer_off; 8549 break; 8550 case BPF_TASK_WORK: 8551 field_off = map->record->task_work_off; 8552 break; 8553 case BPF_WORKQUEUE: 8554 field_off = map->record->wq_off; 8555 break; 8556 default: 8557 verifier_bug(env, "unsupported BTF field type: %s\n", struct_name); 8558 return -EINVAL; 8559 } 8560 if (field_off != val + reg->off) { 8561 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct %s' that is at %d\n", 8562 val + reg->off, struct_name, field_off); 8563 return -EINVAL; 8564 } 8565 return 0; 8566 } 8567 8568 static int process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 8569 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 8570 { 8571 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 8572 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 8573 int err; 8574 8575 err = check_map_field_pointer(env, regno, BPF_TIMER); 8576 if (err) 8577 return err; 8578 8579 if (meta->map_ptr) { 8580 verifier_bug(env, "Two map pointers in a timer helper"); 8581 return -EFAULT; 8582 } 8583 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT)) { 8584 verbose(env, "bpf_timer cannot be used for PREEMPT_RT.\n"); 8585 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 8586 } 8587 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 8588 meta->map_ptr = map; 8589 return 0; 8590 } 8591 8592 static int process_wq_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 8593 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8594 { 8595 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 8596 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 8597 int err; 8598 8599 err = check_map_field_pointer(env, regno, BPF_WORKQUEUE); 8600 if (err) 8601 return err; 8602 8603 if (meta->map.ptr) { 8604 verifier_bug(env, "Two map pointers in a bpf_wq helper"); 8605 return -EFAULT; 8606 } 8607 8608 meta->map.uid = reg->map_uid; 8609 meta->map.ptr = map; 8610 return 0; 8611 } 8612 8613 static int process_task_work_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 8614 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8615 { 8616 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 8617 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 8618 int err; 8619 8620 err = check_map_field_pointer(env, regno, BPF_TASK_WORK); 8621 if (err) 8622 return err; 8623 8624 if (meta->map.ptr) { 8625 verifier_bug(env, "Two map pointers in a bpf_task_work helper"); 8626 return -EFAULT; 8627 } 8628 meta->map.uid = reg->map_uid; 8629 meta->map.ptr = map; 8630 return 0; 8631 } 8632 8633 static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 8634 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 8635 { 8636 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 8637 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 8638 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 8639 struct btf_record *rec; 8640 u32 kptr_off; 8641 8642 if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 8643 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 8644 } else { /* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE */ 8645 map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 8646 if (!map_ptr->btf) { 8647 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_kptr_xchg\n", 8648 map_ptr->name); 8649 return -EINVAL; 8650 } 8651 rec = map_ptr->record; 8652 meta->map_ptr = map_ptr; 8653 } 8654 8655 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8656 verbose(env, 8657 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. kptr has to be at the constant offset\n", 8658 regno); 8659 return -EINVAL; 8660 } 8661 8662 if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_KPTR)) { 8663 verbose(env, "R%d has no valid kptr\n", regno); 8664 return -EINVAL; 8665 } 8666 8667 kptr_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 8668 kptr_field = btf_record_find(rec, kptr_off, BPF_KPTR); 8669 if (!kptr_field) { 8670 verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off); 8671 return -EACCES; 8672 } 8673 if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF && kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_PERCPU) { 8674 verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off); 8675 return -EACCES; 8676 } 8677 meta->kptr_field = kptr_field; 8678 return 0; 8679 } 8680 8681 /* There are two register types representing a bpf_dynptr, one is PTR_TO_STACK 8682 * which points to a stack slot, and the other is CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR. 8683 * 8684 * In both cases we deal with the first 8 bytes, but need to mark the next 8 8685 * bytes as STACK_DYNPTR in case of PTR_TO_STACK. In case of 8686 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, we are guaranteed to get the beginning of the object. 8687 * 8688 * Mutability of bpf_dynptr is at two levels, one is at the level of struct 8689 * bpf_dynptr itself, i.e. whether the helper is receiving a pointer to struct 8690 * bpf_dynptr or pointer to const struct bpf_dynptr. In the former case, it can 8691 * mutate the view of the dynptr and also possibly destroy it. In the latter 8692 * case, it cannot mutate the bpf_dynptr itself but it can still mutate the 8693 * memory that dynptr points to. 8694 * 8695 * The verifier will keep track both levels of mutation (bpf_dynptr's in 8696 * reg->type and the memory's in reg->dynptr.type), but there is no support for 8697 * readonly dynptr view yet, hence only the first case is tracked and checked. 8698 * 8699 * This is consistent with how C applies the const modifier to a struct object, 8700 * where the pointer itself inside bpf_dynptr becomes const but not what it 8701 * points to. 8702 * 8703 * Helpers which do not mutate the bpf_dynptr set MEM_RDONLY in their argument 8704 * type, and declare it as 'const struct bpf_dynptr *' in their prototype. 8705 */ 8706 static int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx, 8707 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int clone_ref_obj_id) 8708 { 8709 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 8710 int err; 8711 8712 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK && reg->type != CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 8713 verbose(env, 8714 "arg#%d expected pointer to stack or const struct bpf_dynptr\n", 8715 regno - 1); 8716 return -EINVAL; 8717 } 8718 8719 /* MEM_UNINIT and MEM_RDONLY are exclusive, when applied to an 8720 * ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (or ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_*): 8721 */ 8722 if ((arg_type & (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) == (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) { 8723 verifier_bug(env, "misconfigured dynptr helper type flags"); 8724 return -EFAULT; 8725 } 8726 8727 /* MEM_UNINIT - Points to memory that is an appropriate candidate for 8728 * constructing a mutable bpf_dynptr object. 8729 * 8730 * Currently, this is only possible with PTR_TO_STACK 8731 * pointing to a region of at least 16 bytes which doesn't 8732 * contain an existing bpf_dynptr. 8733 * 8734 * MEM_RDONLY - Points to a initialized bpf_dynptr that will not be 8735 * mutated or destroyed. However, the memory it points to 8736 * may be mutated. 8737 * 8738 * None - Points to a initialized dynptr that can be mutated and 8739 * destroyed, including mutation of the memory it points 8740 * to. 8741 */ 8742 if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) { 8743 int i; 8744 8745 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) { 8746 verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n"); 8747 return -EINVAL; 8748 } 8749 8750 /* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */ 8751 for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) { 8752 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno, 8753 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 8754 if (err) 8755 return err; 8756 } 8757 8758 err = mark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, reg, arg_type, insn_idx, clone_ref_obj_id); 8759 } else /* MEM_RDONLY and None case from above */ { 8760 /* For the reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK case, bpf_dynptr is never const */ 8761 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR && !(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { 8762 verbose(env, "cannot pass pointer to const bpf_dynptr, the helper mutates it\n"); 8763 return -EINVAL; 8764 } 8765 8766 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) { 8767 verbose(env, 8768 "Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #%d\n", 8769 regno - 1); 8770 return -EINVAL; 8771 } 8772 8773 /* Fold modifiers (in this case, MEM_RDONLY) when checking expected type */ 8774 if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, arg_type & ~MEM_RDONLY)) { 8775 verbose(env, 8776 "Expected a dynptr of type %s as arg #%d\n", 8777 dynptr_type_str(arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type)), regno - 1); 8778 return -EINVAL; 8779 } 8780 8781 err = mark_dynptr_read(env, reg); 8782 } 8783 return err; 8784 } 8785 8786 static u32 iter_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int spi) 8787 { 8788 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 8789 8790 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 8791 } 8792 8793 static bool is_iter_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8794 { 8795 return meta->kfunc_flags & (KF_ITER_NEW | KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_ITER_DESTROY); 8796 } 8797 8798 static bool is_iter_new_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8799 { 8800 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEW; 8801 } 8802 8803 static bool is_iter_next_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8804 { 8805 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEXT; 8806 } 8807 8808 static bool is_iter_destroy_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8809 { 8810 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_DESTROY; 8811 } 8812 8813 static bool is_kfunc_arg_iter(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg_idx, 8814 const struct btf_param *arg) 8815 { 8816 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() guarantees that first argument of any iter 8817 * kfunc is iter state pointer 8818 */ 8819 if (is_iter_kfunc(meta)) 8820 return arg_idx == 0; 8821 8822 /* iter passed as an argument to a generic kfunc */ 8823 return btf_param_match_suffix(meta->btf, arg, "__iter"); 8824 } 8825 8826 static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx, 8827 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8828 { 8829 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 8830 const struct btf_type *t; 8831 int spi, err, i, nr_slots, btf_id; 8832 8833 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) { 8834 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to an iterator on stack\n", regno - 1); 8835 return -EINVAL; 8836 } 8837 8838 /* For iter_{new,next,destroy} functions, btf_check_iter_kfuncs() 8839 * ensures struct convention, so we wouldn't need to do any BTF 8840 * validation here. But given iter state can be passed as a parameter 8841 * to any kfunc, if arg has "__iter" suffix, we need to be a bit more 8842 * conservative here. 8843 */ 8844 btf_id = btf_check_iter_arg(meta->btf, meta->func_proto, regno - 1); 8845 if (btf_id < 0) { 8846 verbose(env, "expected valid iter pointer as arg #%d\n", regno - 1); 8847 return -EINVAL; 8848 } 8849 t = btf_type_by_id(meta->btf, btf_id); 8850 nr_slots = t->size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 8851 8852 if (is_iter_new_kfunc(meta)) { 8853 /* bpf_iter_<type>_new() expects pointer to uninit iter state */ 8854 if (!is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg, nr_slots)) { 8855 verbose(env, "expected uninitialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n", 8856 iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno - 1); 8857 return -EINVAL; 8858 } 8859 8860 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots * 8; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { 8861 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno, 8862 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 8863 if (err) 8864 return err; 8865 } 8866 8867 err = mark_stack_slots_iter(env, meta, reg, insn_idx, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots); 8868 if (err) 8869 return err; 8870 } else { 8871 /* iter_next() or iter_destroy(), as well as any kfunc 8872 * accepting iter argument, expect initialized iter state 8873 */ 8874 err = is_iter_reg_valid_init(env, reg, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots); 8875 switch (err) { 8876 case 0: 8877 break; 8878 case -EINVAL: 8879 verbose(env, "expected an initialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n", 8880 iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno - 1); 8881 return err; 8882 case -EPROTO: 8883 verbose(env, "expected an RCU CS when using %s\n", meta->func_name); 8884 return err; 8885 default: 8886 return err; 8887 } 8888 8889 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 8890 if (spi < 0) 8891 return spi; 8892 8893 err = mark_iter_read(env, reg, spi, nr_slots); 8894 if (err) 8895 return err; 8896 8897 /* remember meta->iter info for process_iter_next_call() */ 8898 meta->iter.spi = spi; 8899 meta->iter.frameno = reg->frameno; 8900 meta->ref_obj_id = iter_ref_obj_id(env, reg, spi); 8901 8902 if (is_iter_destroy_kfunc(meta)) { 8903 err = unmark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, nr_slots); 8904 if (err) 8905 return err; 8906 } 8907 } 8908 8909 return 0; 8910 } 8911 8912 /* Look for a previous loop entry at insn_idx: nearest parent state 8913 * stopped at insn_idx with callsites matching those in cur->frame. 8914 */ 8915 static struct bpf_verifier_state *find_prev_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8916 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 8917 int insn_idx) 8918 { 8919 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 8920 struct bpf_verifier_state *st; 8921 struct list_head *pos, *head; 8922 8923 /* Explored states are pushed in stack order, most recent states come first */ 8924 head = explored_state(env, insn_idx); 8925 list_for_each(pos, head) { 8926 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); 8927 /* If st->branches != 0 state is a part of current DFS verification path, 8928 * hence cur & st for a loop. 8929 */ 8930 st = &sl->state; 8931 if (st->insn_idx == insn_idx && st->branches && same_callsites(st, cur) && 8932 st->dfs_depth < cur->dfs_depth) 8933 return st; 8934 } 8935 8936 return NULL; 8937 } 8938 8939 static void reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 8940 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 8941 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 8942 struct bpf_idmap *idmap); 8943 8944 static void maybe_widen_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8945 struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 8946 struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 8947 { 8948 if (rold->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 8949 return; 8950 if (rold->type != rcur->type) 8951 return; 8952 if (rold->precise || rcur->precise || regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap)) 8953 return; 8954 __mark_reg_unknown(env, rcur); 8955 } 8956 8957 static int widen_imprecise_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8958 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 8959 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 8960 { 8961 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 8962 int i, fr, num_slots; 8963 8964 reset_idmap_scratch(env); 8965 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 8966 fold = old->frame[fr]; 8967 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 8968 8969 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 8970 maybe_widen_reg(env, 8971 &fold->regs[i], 8972 &fcur->regs[i], 8973 &env->idmap_scratch); 8974 8975 num_slots = min(fold->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, 8976 fcur->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE); 8977 for (i = 0; i < num_slots; i++) { 8978 if (!is_spilled_reg(&fold->stack[i]) || 8979 !is_spilled_reg(&fcur->stack[i])) 8980 continue; 8981 8982 maybe_widen_reg(env, 8983 &fold->stack[i].spilled_ptr, 8984 &fcur->stack[i].spilled_ptr, 8985 &env->idmap_scratch); 8986 } 8987 } 8988 return 0; 8989 } 8990 8991 static struct bpf_reg_state *get_iter_from_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st, 8992 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8993 { 8994 int iter_frameno = meta->iter.frameno; 8995 int iter_spi = meta->iter.spi; 8996 8997 return &cur_st->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr; 8998 } 8999 9000 /* process_iter_next_call() is called when verifier gets to iterator's next 9001 * "method" (e.g., bpf_iter_num_next() for numbers iterator) call. We'll refer 9002 * to it as just "iter_next()" in comments below. 9003 * 9004 * BPF verifier relies on a crucial contract for any iter_next() 9005 * implementation: it should *eventually* return NULL, and once that happens 9006 * it should keep returning NULL. That is, once iterator exhausts elements to 9007 * iterate, it should never reset or spuriously return new elements. 9008 * 9009 * With the assumption of such contract, process_iter_next_call() simulates 9010 * a fork in the verifier state to validate loop logic correctness and safety 9011 * without having to simulate infinite amount of iterations. 9012 * 9013 * In current state, we first assume that iter_next() returned NULL and 9014 * iterator state is set to DRAINED (BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED). In such 9015 * conditions we should not form an infinite loop and should eventually reach 9016 * exit. 9017 * 9018 * Besides that, we also fork current state and enqueue it for later 9019 * verification. In a forked state we keep iterator state as ACTIVE 9020 * (BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) and assume non-NULL return from iter_next(). We 9021 * also bump iteration depth to prevent erroneous infinite loop detection 9022 * later on (see iter_active_depths_differ() comment for details). In this 9023 * state we assume that we'll eventually loop back to another iter_next() 9024 * calls (it could be in exactly same location or in some other instruction, 9025 * it doesn't matter, we don't make any unnecessary assumptions about this, 9026 * everything revolves around iterator state in a stack slot, not which 9027 * instruction is calling iter_next()). When that happens, we either will come 9028 * to iter_next() with equivalent state and can conclude that next iteration 9029 * will proceed in exactly the same way as we just verified, so it's safe to 9030 * assume that loop converges. If not, we'll go on another iteration 9031 * simulation with a different input state, until all possible starting states 9032 * are validated or we reach maximum number of instructions limit. 9033 * 9034 * This way, we will either exhaustively discover all possible input states 9035 * that iterator loop can start with and eventually will converge, or we'll 9036 * effectively regress into bounded loop simulation logic and either reach 9037 * maximum number of instructions if loop is not provably convergent, or there 9038 * is some statically known limit on number of iterations (e.g., if there is 9039 * an explicit `if n > 100 then break;` statement somewhere in the loop). 9040 * 9041 * Iteration convergence logic in is_state_visited() relies on exact 9042 * states comparison, which ignores read and precision marks. 9043 * This is necessary because read and precision marks are not finalized 9044 * while in the loop. Exact comparison might preclude convergence for 9045 * simple programs like below: 9046 * 9047 * i = 0; 9048 * while(iter_next(&it)) 9049 * i++; 9050 * 9051 * At each iteration step i++ would produce a new distinct state and 9052 * eventually instruction processing limit would be reached. 9053 * 9054 * To avoid such behavior speculatively forget (widen) range for 9055 * imprecise scalar registers, if those registers were not precise at the 9056 * end of the previous iteration and do not match exactly. 9057 * 9058 * This is a conservative heuristic that allows to verify wide range of programs, 9059 * however it precludes verification of programs that conjure an 9060 * imprecise value on the first loop iteration and use it as precise on a second. 9061 * For example, the following safe program would fail to verify: 9062 * 9063 * struct bpf_num_iter it; 9064 * int arr[10]; 9065 * int i = 0, a = 0; 9066 * bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10); 9067 * while (bpf_iter_num_next(&it)) { 9068 * if (a == 0) { 9069 * a = 1; 9070 * i = 7; // Because i changed verifier would forget 9071 * // it's range on second loop entry. 9072 * } else { 9073 * arr[i] = 42; // This would fail to verify. 9074 * } 9075 * } 9076 * bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); 9077 */ 9078 static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 9079 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 9080 { 9081 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st, *prev_st; 9082 struct bpf_func_state *cur_fr = cur_st->frame[cur_st->curframe], *queued_fr; 9083 struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter, *queued_iter; 9084 9085 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(struct bpf_iter); 9086 9087 cur_iter = get_iter_from_state(cur_st, meta); 9088 9089 if (cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE && 9090 cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED) { 9091 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected iterator state %d (%s)", 9092 cur_iter->iter.state, iter_state_str(cur_iter->iter.state)); 9093 return -EFAULT; 9094 } 9095 9096 if (cur_iter->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) { 9097 /* Because iter_next() call is a checkpoint is_state_visitied() 9098 * should guarantee parent state with same call sites and insn_idx. 9099 */ 9100 if (!cur_st->parent || cur_st->parent->insn_idx != insn_idx || 9101 !same_callsites(cur_st->parent, cur_st)) { 9102 verifier_bug(env, "bad parent state for iter next call"); 9103 return -EFAULT; 9104 } 9105 /* Note cur_st->parent in the call below, it is necessary to skip 9106 * checkpoint created for cur_st by is_state_visited() 9107 * right at this instruction. 9108 */ 9109 prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, cur_st->parent, insn_idx); 9110 /* branch out active iter state */ 9111 queued_st = push_stack(env, insn_idx + 1, insn_idx, false); 9112 if (IS_ERR(queued_st)) 9113 return PTR_ERR(queued_st); 9114 9115 queued_iter = get_iter_from_state(queued_st, meta); 9116 queued_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE; 9117 queued_iter->iter.depth++; 9118 if (prev_st) 9119 widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st); 9120 9121 queued_fr = queued_st->frame[queued_st->curframe]; 9122 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&queued_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 9123 } 9124 9125 /* switch to DRAINED state, but keep the depth unchanged */ 9126 /* mark current iter state as drained and assume returned NULL */ 9127 cur_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED; 9128 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, &cur_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 9129 9130 return 0; 9131 } 9132 9133 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 9134 { 9135 return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || 9136 type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO; 9137 } 9138 9139 static bool arg_type_is_raw_mem(enum bpf_arg_type type) 9140 { 9141 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM && 9142 type & MEM_UNINIT; 9143 } 9144 9145 static bool arg_type_is_release(enum bpf_arg_type type) 9146 { 9147 return type & OBJ_RELEASE; 9148 } 9149 9150 static bool arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) 9151 { 9152 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 9153 } 9154 9155 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9156 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 9157 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type) 9158 { 9159 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 9160 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 9161 verifier_bug(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type"); 9162 return -EFAULT; 9163 } 9164 9165 switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { 9166 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 9167 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 9168 if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 9169 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON; 9170 } else { 9171 verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n"); 9172 return -EINVAL; 9173 } 9174 break; 9175 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 9176 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem) 9177 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 9178 break; 9179 default: 9180 break; 9181 } 9182 return 0; 9183 } 9184 9185 struct bpf_reg_types { 9186 const enum bpf_reg_type types[10]; 9187 u32 *btf_id; 9188 }; 9189 9190 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = { 9191 .types = { 9192 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 9193 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 9194 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 9195 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 9196 }, 9197 }; 9198 9199 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 9200 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = { 9201 .types = { 9202 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 9203 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 9204 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 9205 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 9206 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 9207 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 9208 }, 9209 .btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 9210 }; 9211 #endif 9212 9213 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { 9214 .types = { 9215 PTR_TO_STACK, 9216 PTR_TO_PACKET, 9217 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 9218 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 9219 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 9220 PTR_TO_MEM, 9221 PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF, 9222 PTR_TO_BUF, 9223 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 9224 }, 9225 }; 9226 9227 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { 9228 .types = { 9229 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 9230 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, 9231 } 9232 }; 9233 9234 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } }; 9235 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } }; 9236 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } }; 9237 static const struct bpf_reg_types ringbuf_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF } }; 9238 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } }; 9239 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { 9240 .types = { 9241 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 9242 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 9243 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU, 9244 }, 9245 }; 9246 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { 9247 .types = { 9248 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU, 9249 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_RCU, 9250 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED, 9251 } 9252 }; 9253 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } }; 9254 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } }; 9255 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 9256 static const struct bpf_reg_types timer_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 9257 static const struct bpf_reg_types kptr_xchg_dest_types = { 9258 .types = { 9259 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 9260 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC 9261 } 9262 }; 9263 static const struct bpf_reg_types dynptr_types = { 9264 .types = { 9265 PTR_TO_STACK, 9266 CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 9267 } 9268 }; 9269 9270 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { 9271 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &mem_types, 9272 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = &mem_types, 9273 [ARG_CONST_SIZE] = &scalar_types, 9274 [ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 9275 [ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 9276 [ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR] = &const_map_ptr_types, 9277 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX] = &context_types, 9278 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &sock_types, 9279 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 9280 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_id_sock_common_types, 9281 #endif 9282 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &fullsock_types, 9283 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = &btf_ptr_types, 9284 [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types, 9285 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types, 9286 [ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM] = &ringbuf_mem_types, 9287 [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, 9288 [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types, 9289 [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK] = &stack_ptr_types, 9290 [ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR] = &const_str_ptr_types, 9291 [ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER] = &timer_types, 9292 [ARG_KPTR_XCHG_DEST] = &kptr_xchg_dest_types, 9293 [ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = &dynptr_types, 9294 }; 9295 9296 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 9297 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, 9298 const u32 *arg_btf_id, 9299 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 9300 { 9301 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 9302 enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type; 9303 const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible; 9304 int i, j; 9305 9306 compatible = compatible_reg_types[base_type(arg_type)]; 9307 if (!compatible) { 9308 verifier_bug(env, "unsupported arg type %d", arg_type); 9309 return -EFAULT; 9310 } 9311 9312 /* ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY, 9313 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM and NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY 9314 * 9315 * Same for MAYBE_NULL: 9316 * 9317 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL, 9318 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM but NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL 9319 * 9320 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM that is tagged with a dynptr type. 9321 * 9322 * Therefore we fold these flags depending on the arg_type before comparison. 9323 */ 9324 if (arg_type & MEM_RDONLY) 9325 type &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 9326 if (arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) 9327 type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 9328 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 9329 type &= ~DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK; 9330 9331 /* Local kptr types are allowed as the source argument of bpf_kptr_xchg */ 9332 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && type_is_alloc(type) && regno == BPF_REG_2) { 9333 type &= ~MEM_ALLOC; 9334 type &= ~MEM_PERCPU; 9335 } 9336 9337 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) { 9338 expected = compatible->types[i]; 9339 if (expected == NOT_INIT) 9340 break; 9341 9342 if (type == expected) 9343 goto found; 9344 } 9345 9346 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 9347 for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++) 9348 verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 9349 verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 9350 return -EACCES; 9351 9352 found: 9353 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 9354 return 0; 9355 9356 if (compatible == &mem_types) { 9357 if (!(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { 9358 verbose(env, 9359 "%s() may write into memory pointed by R%d type=%s\n", 9360 func_id_name(meta->func_id), 9361 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 9362 return -EACCES; 9363 } 9364 return 0; 9365 } 9366 9367 switch ((int)reg->type) { 9368 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 9369 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 9370 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL: 9371 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: 9372 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL: 9373 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU: 9374 { 9375 /* For bpf_sk_release, it needs to match against first member 9376 * 'struct sock_common', hence make an exception for it. This 9377 * allows bpf_sk_release to work for multiple socket types. 9378 */ 9379 bool strict_type_match = arg_type_is_release(arg_type) && 9380 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_release; 9381 9382 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && 9383 (!type_may_be_null(arg_type) || arg_type_is_release(arg_type))) { 9384 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper arg%d\n", regno); 9385 return -EACCES; 9386 } 9387 9388 if (!arg_btf_id) { 9389 if (!compatible->btf_id) { 9390 verifier_bug(env, "missing arg compatible BTF ID"); 9391 return -EFAULT; 9392 } 9393 arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id; 9394 } 9395 9396 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 9397 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) 9398 return -EACCES; 9399 } else { 9400 if (arg_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 9401 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 9402 verbose(env, "R%d has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON type\n", 9403 regno); 9404 return -EACCES; 9405 } 9406 9407 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 9408 btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id, 9409 strict_type_match)) { 9410 verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n", 9411 regno, btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), 9412 btf_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)); 9413 return -EACCES; 9414 } 9415 } 9416 break; 9417 } 9418 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 9419 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_ALLOC: 9420 if (meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_lock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock && 9421 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 9422 verifier_bug(env, "unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC"); 9423 return -EFAULT; 9424 } 9425 /* Check if local kptr in src arg matches kptr in dst arg */ 9426 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && regno == BPF_REG_2) { 9427 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) 9428 return -EACCES; 9429 } 9430 break; 9431 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU: 9432 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_RCU: 9433 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED: 9434 /* Handled by helper specific checks */ 9435 break; 9436 default: 9437 verifier_bug(env, "invalid PTR_TO_BTF_ID register for type match"); 9438 return -EFAULT; 9439 } 9440 return 0; 9441 } 9442 9443 static struct btf_field * 9444 reg_find_field_offset(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, s32 off, u32 fields) 9445 { 9446 struct btf_field *field; 9447 struct btf_record *rec; 9448 9449 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 9450 if (!rec) 9451 return NULL; 9452 9453 field = btf_record_find(rec, off, fields); 9454 if (!field) 9455 return NULL; 9456 9457 return field; 9458 } 9459 9460 static int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9461 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 9462 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 9463 { 9464 u32 type = reg->type; 9465 9466 /* When referenced register is passed to release function, its fixed 9467 * offset must be 0. 9468 * 9469 * We will check arg_type_is_release reg has ref_obj_id when storing 9470 * meta->release_regno. 9471 */ 9472 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 9473 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR with OBJ_RELEASE is a bit special, as it 9474 * may not directly point to the object being released, but to 9475 * dynptr pointing to such object, which might be at some offset 9476 * on the stack. In that case, we simply to fallback to the 9477 * default handling. 9478 */ 9479 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && type == PTR_TO_STACK) 9480 return 0; 9481 9482 /* Doing check_ptr_off_reg check for the offset will catch this 9483 * because fixed_off_ok is false, but checking here allows us 9484 * to give the user a better error message. 9485 */ 9486 if (reg->off) { 9487 verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func or trusted arg to kfunc\n", 9488 regno); 9489 return -EINVAL; 9490 } 9491 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 9492 } 9493 9494 switch (type) { 9495 /* Pointer types where both fixed and variable offset is explicitly allowed: */ 9496 case PTR_TO_STACK: 9497 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 9498 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 9499 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 9500 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 9501 case PTR_TO_MEM: 9502 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY: 9503 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF: 9504 case PTR_TO_BUF: 9505 case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY: 9506 case PTR_TO_ARENA: 9507 case SCALAR_VALUE: 9508 return 0; 9509 /* All the rest must be rejected, except PTR_TO_BTF_ID which allows 9510 * fixed offset. 9511 */ 9512 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 9513 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 9514 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 9515 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: 9516 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF: 9517 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF | MEM_RCU: 9518 /* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function, 9519 * its fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset 9520 * can be non-zero. This was already checked above. So pass 9521 * fixed_off_ok as true to allow fixed offset for all other 9522 * cases. var_off always must be 0 for PTR_TO_BTF_ID, hence we 9523 * still need to do checks instead of returning. 9524 */ 9525 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true); 9526 default: 9527 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 9528 } 9529 } 9530 9531 static struct bpf_reg_state *get_dynptr_arg_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9532 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, 9533 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 9534 { 9535 struct bpf_reg_state *state = NULL; 9536 int i; 9537 9538 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) 9539 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[i])) { 9540 if (state) { 9541 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple dynptr args\n"); 9542 return NULL; 9543 } 9544 state = ®s[BPF_REG_1 + i]; 9545 } 9546 9547 if (!state) 9548 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr arg found\n"); 9549 9550 return state; 9551 } 9552 9553 static int dynptr_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 9554 { 9555 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 9556 int spi; 9557 9558 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 9559 return reg->id; 9560 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 9561 if (spi < 0) 9562 return spi; 9563 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 9564 } 9565 9566 static int dynptr_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 9567 { 9568 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 9569 int spi; 9570 9571 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 9572 return reg->ref_obj_id; 9573 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 9574 if (spi < 0) 9575 return spi; 9576 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 9577 } 9578 9579 static enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_get_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9580 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 9581 { 9582 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 9583 int spi; 9584 9585 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 9586 return reg->dynptr.type; 9587 9588 spi = __get_spi(reg->off); 9589 if (spi < 0) { 9590 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: invalid spi when querying dynptr type\n"); 9591 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 9592 } 9593 9594 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type; 9595 } 9596 9597 static int check_reg_const_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9598 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno) 9599 { 9600 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 9601 int err; 9602 int map_off; 9603 u64 map_addr; 9604 char *str_ptr; 9605 9606 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) 9607 return -EINVAL; 9608 9609 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) { 9610 verbose(env, "R%d points to insn_array map which cannot be used as const string\n", regno); 9611 return -EACCES; 9612 } 9613 9614 if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) { 9615 verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno); 9616 return -EACCES; 9617 } 9618 9619 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 9620 verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno); 9621 return -EACCES; 9622 } 9623 9624 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 9625 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 9626 return -EACCES; 9627 } 9628 9629 err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, 9630 map->value_size - reg->off, false, 9631 ACCESS_HELPER); 9632 if (err) 9633 return err; 9634 9635 map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 9636 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off); 9637 if (err) { 9638 verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n"); 9639 return err; 9640 } 9641 9642 str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr); 9643 if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) { 9644 verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n"); 9645 return -EINVAL; 9646 } 9647 return 0; 9648 } 9649 9650 /* Returns constant key value in `value` if possible, else negative error */ 9651 static int get_constant_map_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9652 struct bpf_reg_state *key, 9653 u32 key_size, 9654 s64 *value) 9655 { 9656 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, key); 9657 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 9658 int slot, spi, off; 9659 int spill_size = 0; 9660 int zero_size = 0; 9661 int stack_off; 9662 int i, err; 9663 u8 *stype; 9664 9665 if (!env->bpf_capable) 9666 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 9667 if (key->type != PTR_TO_STACK) 9668 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 9669 if (!tnum_is_const(key->var_off)) 9670 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 9671 9672 stack_off = key->off + key->var_off.value; 9673 slot = -stack_off - 1; 9674 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 9675 off = slot % BPF_REG_SIZE; 9676 stype = state->stack[spi].slot_type; 9677 9678 /* First handle precisely tracked STACK_ZERO */ 9679 for (i = off; i >= 0 && stype[i] == STACK_ZERO; i--) 9680 zero_size++; 9681 if (zero_size >= key_size) { 9682 *value = 0; 9683 return 0; 9684 } 9685 9686 /* Check that stack contains a scalar spill of expected size */ 9687 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&state->stack[spi])) 9688 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 9689 for (i = off; i >= 0 && stype[i] == STACK_SPILL; i--) 9690 spill_size++; 9691 if (spill_size != key_size) 9692 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 9693 9694 reg = &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 9695 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 9696 /* Stack value not statically known */ 9697 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 9698 9699 /* We are relying on a constant value. So mark as precise 9700 * to prevent pruning on it. 9701 */ 9702 bt_set_frame_slot(&env->bt, key->frameno, spi); 9703 err = mark_chain_precision_batch(env, env->cur_state); 9704 if (err < 0) 9705 return err; 9706 9707 *value = reg->var_off.value; 9708 return 0; 9709 } 9710 9711 static bool can_elide_value_nullness(enum bpf_map_type type); 9712 9713 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, 9714 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 9715 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, 9716 int insn_idx) 9717 { 9718 u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg; 9719 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 9720 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg]; 9721 enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; 9722 u32 *arg_btf_id = NULL; 9723 u32 key_size; 9724 int err = 0; 9725 9726 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) 9727 return 0; 9728 9729 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 9730 if (err) 9731 return err; 9732 9733 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 9734 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 9735 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", 9736 regno); 9737 return -EACCES; 9738 } 9739 return 0; 9740 } 9741 9742 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 9743 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { 9744 verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); 9745 return -EACCES; 9746 } 9747 9748 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 9749 err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type); 9750 if (err) 9751 return err; 9752 } 9753 9754 if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg_type)) 9755 /* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip 9756 * type checking. 9757 */ 9758 goto skip_type_check; 9759 9760 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 9761 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 9762 base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 9763 arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg]; 9764 9765 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta); 9766 if (err) 9767 return err; 9768 9769 err = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 9770 if (err) 9771 return err; 9772 9773 skip_type_check: 9774 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 9775 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) { 9776 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 9777 int spi; 9778 9779 /* Only dynptr created on stack can be released, thus 9780 * the get_spi and stack state checks for spilled_ptr 9781 * should only be done before process_dynptr_func for 9782 * PTR_TO_STACK. 9783 */ 9784 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 9785 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 9786 if (spi < 0 || !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id) { 9787 verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno); 9788 return -EINVAL; 9789 } 9790 } else { 9791 verbose(env, "cannot release unowned const bpf_dynptr\n"); 9792 return -EINVAL; 9793 } 9794 } else if (!reg->ref_obj_id && !register_is_null(reg)) { 9795 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced when passed to release function\n", 9796 regno); 9797 return -EINVAL; 9798 } 9799 if (meta->release_regno) { 9800 verifier_bug(env, "more than one release argument"); 9801 return -EFAULT; 9802 } 9803 meta->release_regno = regno; 9804 } 9805 9806 if (reg->ref_obj_id && base_type(arg_type) != ARG_KPTR_XCHG_DEST) { 9807 if (meta->ref_obj_id) { 9808 verbose(env, "more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u", 9809 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 9810 meta->ref_obj_id); 9811 return -EACCES; 9812 } 9813 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 9814 } 9815 9816 switch (base_type(arg_type)) { 9817 case ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR: 9818 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ 9819 if (meta->map_ptr) { 9820 /* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject: 9821 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1) 9822 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2) 9823 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) { 9824 * timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1); 9825 * if (timer) 9826 * // mismatch would have been allowed 9827 * bpf_timer_init(timer, inner_map2); 9828 * } 9829 * 9830 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps. 9831 */ 9832 if (meta->map_ptr != reg->map_ptr || 9833 meta->map_uid != reg->map_uid) { 9834 verbose(env, 9835 "timer pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n", 9836 meta->map_uid, reg->map_uid); 9837 return -EINVAL; 9838 } 9839 } 9840 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 9841 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 9842 break; 9843 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 9844 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: 9845 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within 9846 * stack limits and initialized 9847 */ 9848 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 9849 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before 9850 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before 9851 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means 9852 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier 9853 */ 9854 verifier_bug(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key"); 9855 return -EFAULT; 9856 } 9857 key_size = meta->map_ptr->key_size; 9858 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, key_size, BPF_READ, false, NULL); 9859 if (err) 9860 return err; 9861 if (can_elide_value_nullness(meta->map_ptr->map_type)) { 9862 err = get_constant_map_key(env, reg, key_size, &meta->const_map_key); 9863 if (err < 0) { 9864 meta->const_map_key = -1; 9865 if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP) 9866 err = 0; 9867 else 9868 return err; 9869 } 9870 } 9871 break; 9872 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 9873 if (type_may_be_null(arg_type) && register_is_null(reg)) 9874 return 0; 9875 9876 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: 9877 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity 9878 */ 9879 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 9880 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 9881 verifier_bug(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value"); 9882 return -EFAULT; 9883 } 9884 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 9885 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, meta->map_ptr->value_size, 9886 arg_type & MEM_WRITE ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ, 9887 false, meta); 9888 break; 9889 case ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: 9890 if (!reg->btf_id) { 9891 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno); 9892 return -EACCES; 9893 } 9894 meta->ret_btf = reg->btf; 9895 meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 9896 break; 9897 case ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK: 9898 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 9899 verbose(env, "can't spin_{lock,unlock} in rbtree cb\n"); 9900 return -EACCES; 9901 } 9902 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) { 9903 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK); 9904 if (err) 9905 return err; 9906 } else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 9907 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, 0); 9908 if (err) 9909 return err; 9910 } else { 9911 verifier_bug(env, "spin lock arg on unexpected helper"); 9912 return -EFAULT; 9913 } 9914 break; 9915 case ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER: 9916 err = process_timer_func(env, regno, meta); 9917 if (err) 9918 return err; 9919 break; 9920 case ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC: 9921 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 9922 break; 9923 case ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 9924 /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the 9925 * next is_mem_size argument below. 9926 */ 9927 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 9928 if (arg_type & MEM_FIXED_SIZE) { 9929 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, fn->arg_size[arg], 9930 arg_type & MEM_WRITE ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ, 9931 false, meta); 9932 if (err) 9933 return err; 9934 if (arg_type & MEM_ALIGNED) 9935 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, fn->arg_size[arg], true); 9936 } 9937 break; 9938 case ARG_CONST_SIZE: 9939 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, 9940 fn->arg_type[arg - 1] & MEM_WRITE ? 9941 BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ, 9942 false, meta); 9943 break; 9944 case ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 9945 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, 9946 fn->arg_type[arg - 1] & MEM_WRITE ? 9947 BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ, 9948 true, meta); 9949 break; 9950 case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 9951 err = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, arg_type, 0); 9952 if (err) 9953 return err; 9954 break; 9955 case ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 9956 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 9957 verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n", 9958 regno); 9959 return -EACCES; 9960 } 9961 meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; 9962 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 9963 if (err) 9964 return err; 9965 break; 9966 case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: 9967 { 9968 err = check_reg_const_str(env, reg, regno); 9969 if (err) 9970 return err; 9971 break; 9972 } 9973 case ARG_KPTR_XCHG_DEST: 9974 err = process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta); 9975 if (err) 9976 return err; 9977 break; 9978 } 9979 9980 return err; 9981 } 9982 9983 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) 9984 { 9985 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; 9986 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 9987 9988 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 9989 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem) 9990 return false; 9991 9992 /* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these 9993 * contexts, so updating is safe. 9994 */ 9995 switch (type) { 9996 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 9997 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER) 9998 return true; 9999 break; 10000 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 10001 /* map_update allowed only via dedicated helpers with event type checks */ 10002 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem) 10003 return true; 10004 break; 10005 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 10006 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 10007 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 10008 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 10009 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 10010 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 10011 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 10012 return true; 10013 default: 10014 break; 10015 } 10016 10017 verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n"); 10018 return false; 10019 } 10020 10021 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10022 { 10023 return env->prog->jit_requested && 10024 bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(); 10025 } 10026 10027 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10028 struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) 10029 { 10030 if (!map) 10031 return 0; 10032 10033 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ 10034 switch (map->map_type) { 10035 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: 10036 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 10037 goto error; 10038 break; 10039 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: 10040 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && 10041 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output && 10042 func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output && 10043 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value && 10044 func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output) 10045 goto error; 10046 break; 10047 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 10048 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output && 10049 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve && 10050 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query && 10051 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr && 10052 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr && 10053 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr) 10054 goto error; 10055 break; 10056 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 10057 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain) 10058 goto error; 10059 break; 10060 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: 10061 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) 10062 goto error; 10063 break; 10064 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: 10065 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && 10066 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) 10067 goto error; 10068 break; 10069 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE: 10070 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE: 10071 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage) 10072 goto error; 10073 break; 10074 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: 10075 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH: 10076 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 10077 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 10078 goto error; 10079 break; 10080 /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases 10081 * appear. 10082 */ 10083 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: 10084 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) 10085 goto error; 10086 break; 10087 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: 10088 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 10089 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 10090 goto error; 10091 break; 10092 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 10093 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 10094 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 10095 goto error; 10096 break; 10097 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 10098 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && 10099 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && 10100 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && 10101 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 10102 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 10103 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 10104 goto error; 10105 break; 10106 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 10107 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && 10108 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && 10109 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && 10110 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 10111 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 10112 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 10113 goto error; 10114 break; 10115 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: 10116 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) 10117 goto error; 10118 break; 10119 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: 10120 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: 10121 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 10122 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 10123 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 10124 goto error; 10125 break; 10126 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 10127 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get && 10128 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete && 10129 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 10130 goto error; 10131 break; 10132 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 10133 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get && 10134 func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete && 10135 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 10136 goto error; 10137 break; 10138 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 10139 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get && 10140 func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete && 10141 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 10142 goto error; 10143 break; 10144 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 10145 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get && 10146 func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete && 10147 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 10148 goto error; 10149 break; 10150 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 10151 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 10152 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 10153 goto error; 10154 break; 10155 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY: 10156 goto error; 10157 default: 10158 break; 10159 } 10160 10161 /* ... and second from the function itself. */ 10162 switch (func_id) { 10163 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 10164 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) 10165 goto error; 10166 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) { 10167 verbose(env, "mixing of tail_calls and bpf-to-bpf calls is not supported\n"); 10168 return -EINVAL; 10169 } 10170 break; 10171 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: 10172 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: 10173 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: 10174 case BPF_FUNC_skb_output: 10175 case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output: 10176 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) 10177 goto error; 10178 break; 10179 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output: 10180 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve: 10181 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query: 10182 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr: 10183 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr: 10184 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr: 10185 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF) 10186 goto error; 10187 break; 10188 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 10189 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF) 10190 goto error; 10191 break; 10192 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: 10193 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) 10194 goto error; 10195 break; 10196 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: 10197 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: 10198 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) 10199 goto error; 10200 break; 10201 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 10202 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP && 10203 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH && 10204 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP && 10205 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) 10206 goto error; 10207 break; 10208 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: 10209 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map: 10210 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: 10211 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) 10212 goto error; 10213 break; 10214 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash: 10215 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash: 10216 case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update: 10217 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 10218 goto error; 10219 break; 10220 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 10221 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE && 10222 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE) 10223 goto error; 10224 break; 10225 case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport: 10226 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY && 10227 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP && 10228 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 10229 goto error; 10230 break; 10231 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 10232 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 10233 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) 10234 goto error; 10235 break; 10236 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 10237 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 10238 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 10239 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK && 10240 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER) 10241 goto error; 10242 break; 10243 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 10244 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY && 10245 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && 10246 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH) 10247 goto error; 10248 break; 10249 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get: 10250 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete: 10251 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE) 10252 goto error; 10253 break; 10254 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get: 10255 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete: 10256 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) 10257 goto error; 10258 break; 10259 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get: 10260 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete: 10261 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE) 10262 goto error; 10263 break; 10264 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get: 10265 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete: 10266 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE) 10267 goto error; 10268 break; 10269 default: 10270 break; 10271 } 10272 10273 return 0; 10274 error: 10275 verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", 10276 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10277 return -EINVAL; 10278 } 10279 10280 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 10281 { 10282 int count = 0; 10283 10284 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg1_type)) 10285 count++; 10286 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg2_type)) 10287 count++; 10288 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg3_type)) 10289 count++; 10290 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg4_type)) 10291 count++; 10292 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg5_type)) 10293 count++; 10294 10295 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, 10296 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have 10297 * right now. 10298 */ 10299 return count <= 1; 10300 } 10301 10302 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int arg) 10303 { 10304 bool is_fixed = fn->arg_type[arg] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE; 10305 bool has_size = fn->arg_size[arg] != 0; 10306 bool is_next_size = false; 10307 10308 if (arg + 1 < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type)) 10309 is_next_size = arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg_type[arg + 1]); 10310 10311 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[arg]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 10312 return is_next_size; 10313 10314 return has_size == is_next_size || is_next_size == is_fixed; 10315 } 10316 10317 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 10318 { 10319 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' 10320 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need 10321 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy 10322 * helper function specification. 10323 */ 10324 if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) || 10325 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 0) || 10326 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 1) || 10327 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 2) || 10328 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 3) || 10329 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 4)) 10330 return false; 10331 10332 return true; 10333 } 10334 10335 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 10336 { 10337 int i; 10338 10339 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) { 10340 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 10341 return !!fn->arg_btf_id[i]; 10342 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 10343 return fn->arg_btf_id[i] == BPF_PTR_POISON; 10344 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i] && 10345 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 10346 (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || 10347 !(fn->arg_type[i] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE))) 10348 return false; 10349 } 10350 10351 return true; 10352 } 10353 10354 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 10355 { 10356 return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) && 10357 check_arg_pair_ok(fn) && 10358 check_btf_id_ok(fn) ? 0 : -EINVAL; 10359 } 10360 10361 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] 10362 * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. 10363 * 10364 * This also applies to dynptr slices belonging to skb and xdp dynptrs, 10365 * since these slices point to packet data. 10366 */ 10367 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10368 { 10369 struct bpf_func_state *state; 10370 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10371 10372 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 10373 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg) || reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(reg)) 10374 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 10375 })); 10376 } 10377 10378 enum { 10379 AT_PKT_END = -1, 10380 BEYOND_PKT_END = -2, 10381 }; 10382 10383 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open) 10384 { 10385 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 10386 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn]; 10387 10388 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET) 10389 /* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */ 10390 return; 10391 10392 /* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end. 10393 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown. 10394 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end 10395 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end 10396 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end 10397 */ 10398 if (range_open) 10399 reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END; 10400 else 10401 reg->range = AT_PKT_END; 10402 } 10403 10404 static int release_reference_nomark(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int ref_obj_id) 10405 { 10406 int i; 10407 10408 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 10409 if (state->refs[i].type != REF_TYPE_PTR) 10410 continue; 10411 if (state->refs[i].id == ref_obj_id) { 10412 release_reference_state(state, i); 10413 return 0; 10414 } 10415 } 10416 return -EINVAL; 10417 } 10418 10419 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel 10420 * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference. 10421 * 10422 * This is the release function corresponding to acquire_reference(). Idempotent. 10423 */ 10424 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id) 10425 { 10426 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 10427 struct bpf_func_state *state; 10428 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10429 int err; 10430 10431 err = release_reference_nomark(vstate, ref_obj_id); 10432 if (err) 10433 return err; 10434 10435 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 10436 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) 10437 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 10438 })); 10439 10440 return 0; 10441 } 10442 10443 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10444 { 10445 struct bpf_func_state *unused; 10446 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10447 10448 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({ 10449 if (type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 10450 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 10451 })); 10452 } 10453 10454 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10455 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 10456 { 10457 int i; 10458 10459 /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ 10460 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 10461 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 10462 __check_reg_arg(env, regs, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 10463 } 10464 } 10465 10466 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10467 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10468 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10469 int insn_idx); 10470 10471 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10472 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10473 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx); 10474 10475 static int setup_func_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, int callsite, 10476 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb, 10477 struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 10478 { 10479 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 10480 int err; 10481 10482 if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 10483 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n", 10484 state->curframe + 2); 10485 return -E2BIG; 10486 } 10487 10488 if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { 10489 verifier_bug(env, "Frame %d already allocated", state->curframe + 1); 10490 return -EFAULT; 10491 } 10492 10493 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 10494 callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 10495 if (!callee) 10496 return -ENOMEM; 10497 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; 10498 10499 /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write 10500 * into its own stack before reading from it. 10501 * callee can read/write into caller's stack 10502 */ 10503 init_func_state(env, callee, 10504 /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ 10505 callsite, 10506 state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, 10507 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 10508 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, callsite); 10509 if (err) 10510 goto err_out; 10511 10512 /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ 10513 state->curframe++; 10514 10515 return 0; 10516 10517 err_out: 10518 free_func_state(callee); 10519 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; 10520 return err; 10521 } 10522 10523 static int btf_check_func_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, 10524 const struct btf *btf, 10525 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 10526 { 10527 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub = subprog_info(env, subprog); 10528 struct bpf_verifier_log *log = &env->log; 10529 u32 i; 10530 int ret; 10531 10532 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog); 10533 if (ret) 10534 return ret; 10535 10536 /* check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the 10537 * verifier sees. 10538 */ 10539 for (i = 0; i < sub->arg_cnt; i++) { 10540 u32 regno = i + 1; 10541 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 10542 struct bpf_subprog_arg_info *arg = &sub->args[i]; 10543 10544 if (arg->arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 10545 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 10546 bpf_log(log, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno); 10547 return -EINVAL; 10548 } 10549 } else if (arg->arg_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) { 10550 /* 10551 * Anything is allowed for untrusted arguments, as these are 10552 * read-only and probe read instructions would protect against 10553 * invalid memory access. 10554 */ 10555 } else if (arg->arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 10556 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, ARG_DONTCARE); 10557 if (ret < 0) 10558 return ret; 10559 /* If function expects ctx type in BTF check that caller 10560 * is passing PTR_TO_CTX. 10561 */ 10562 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 10563 bpf_log(log, "arg#%d expects pointer to ctx\n", i); 10564 return -EINVAL; 10565 } 10566 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) { 10567 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, ARG_DONTCARE); 10568 if (ret < 0) 10569 return ret; 10570 if (check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, arg->mem_size)) 10571 return -EINVAL; 10572 if (!(arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && (reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL)) { 10573 bpf_log(log, "arg#%d is expected to be non-NULL\n", i); 10574 return -EINVAL; 10575 } 10576 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_ARENA) { 10577 /* 10578 * Can pass any value and the kernel won't crash, but 10579 * only PTR_TO_ARENA or SCALAR make sense. Everything 10580 * else is a bug in the bpf program. Point it out to 10581 * the user at the verification time instead of 10582 * run-time debug nightmare. 10583 */ 10584 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_ARENA && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 10585 bpf_log(log, "R%d is not a pointer to arena or scalar.\n", regno); 10586 return -EINVAL; 10587 } 10588 } else if (arg->arg_type == (ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY)) { 10589 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR); 10590 if (ret) 10591 return ret; 10592 10593 ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, -1, arg->arg_type, 0); 10594 if (ret) 10595 return ret; 10596 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 10597 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 10598 int err; 10599 10600 if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg->arg_type)) 10601 continue; 10602 10603 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); /* leave func_id as zero */ 10604 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg->arg_type, &arg->btf_id, &meta); 10605 err = err ?: check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg->arg_type); 10606 if (err) 10607 return err; 10608 } else { 10609 verifier_bug(env, "unrecognized arg#%d type %d", i, arg->arg_type); 10610 return -EFAULT; 10611 } 10612 } 10613 10614 return 0; 10615 } 10616 10617 /* Compare BTF of a function call with given bpf_reg_state. 10618 * Returns: 10619 * EFAULT - there is a verifier bug. Abort verification. 10620 * EINVAL - there is a type mismatch or BTF is not available. 10621 * 0 - BTF matches with what bpf_reg_state expects. 10622 * Only PTR_TO_CTX and SCALAR_VALUE states are recognized. 10623 */ 10624 static int btf_check_subprog_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, 10625 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 10626 { 10627 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 10628 struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf; 10629 u32 btf_id; 10630 int err; 10631 10632 if (!prog->aux->func_info) 10633 return -EINVAL; 10634 10635 btf_id = prog->aux->func_info[subprog].type_id; 10636 if (!btf_id) 10637 return -EFAULT; 10638 10639 if (prog->aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable) 10640 return -EINVAL; 10641 10642 err = btf_check_func_arg_match(env, subprog, btf, regs); 10643 /* Compiler optimizations can remove arguments from static functions 10644 * or mismatched type can be passed into a global function. 10645 * In such cases mark the function as unreliable from BTF point of view. 10646 */ 10647 if (err) 10648 prog->aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable = true; 10649 return err; 10650 } 10651 10652 static int push_callback_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 10653 int insn_idx, int subprog, 10654 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) 10655 { 10656 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *callback_state; 10657 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 10658 int err; 10659 10660 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 10661 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); 10662 if (err == -EFAULT) 10663 return err; 10664 10665 /* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are 10666 * interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as 10667 * callbacks 10668 */ 10669 env->subprog_info[subprog].is_cb = true; 10670 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && 10671 !is_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)) { 10672 verifier_bug(env, "kfunc %s#%d not marked as callback-calling", 10673 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 10674 return -EFAULT; 10675 } else if (!bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && 10676 !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { /* helper */ 10677 verifier_bug(env, "helper %s#%d not marked as callback-calling", 10678 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 10679 return -EFAULT; 10680 } 10681 10682 if (is_async_callback_calling_insn(insn)) { 10683 struct bpf_verifier_state *async_cb; 10684 10685 /* there is no real recursion here. timer and workqueue callbacks are async */ 10686 env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true; 10687 async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, 10688 insn_idx, subprog, 10689 is_async_cb_sleepable(env, insn)); 10690 if (IS_ERR(async_cb)) 10691 return PTR_ERR(async_cb); 10692 callee = async_cb->frame[0]; 10693 callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1; 10694 10695 /* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */ 10696 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, insn_idx); 10697 if (err) 10698 return err; 10699 10700 return 0; 10701 } 10702 10703 /* for callback functions enqueue entry to callback and 10704 * proceed with next instruction within current frame. 10705 */ 10706 callback_state = push_stack(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, insn_idx, false); 10707 if (IS_ERR(callback_state)) 10708 return PTR_ERR(callback_state); 10709 10710 err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, insn_idx, set_callee_state_cb, 10711 callback_state); 10712 if (err) 10713 return err; 10714 10715 callback_state->callback_unroll_depth++; 10716 callback_state->frame[callback_state->curframe - 1]->callback_depth++; 10717 caller->callback_depth = 0; 10718 return 0; 10719 } 10720 10721 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 10722 int *insn_idx) 10723 { 10724 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 10725 struct bpf_func_state *caller; 10726 int err, subprog, target_insn; 10727 10728 target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; 10729 subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); 10730 if (verifier_bug_if(subprog < 0, env, "target of func call at insn %d is not a program", 10731 target_insn)) 10732 return -EFAULT; 10733 10734 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 10735 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); 10736 if (err == -EFAULT) 10737 return err; 10738 if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) { 10739 const char *sub_name = subprog_name(env, subprog); 10740 10741 if (env->cur_state->active_locks) { 10742 verbose(env, "global function calls are not allowed while holding a lock,\n" 10743 "use static function instead\n"); 10744 return -EINVAL; 10745 } 10746 10747 if (env->subprog_info[subprog].might_sleep && 10748 (env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks || env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks || 10749 env->cur_state->active_irq_id || !in_sleepable(env))) { 10750 verbose(env, "global functions that may sleep are not allowed in non-sleepable context,\n" 10751 "i.e., in a RCU/IRQ/preempt-disabled section, or in\n" 10752 "a non-sleepable BPF program context\n"); 10753 return -EINVAL; 10754 } 10755 10756 if (err) { 10757 verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d ('%s')\n", 10758 subprog, sub_name); 10759 return err; 10760 } 10761 10762 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 10763 verbose(env, "Func#%d ('%s') is global and assumed valid.\n", 10764 subprog, sub_name); 10765 if (env->subprog_info[subprog].changes_pkt_data) 10766 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 10767 /* mark global subprog for verifying after main prog */ 10768 subprog_aux(env, subprog)->called = true; 10769 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 10770 10771 /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ 10772 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 10773 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 10774 10775 /* continue with next insn after call */ 10776 return 0; 10777 } 10778 10779 /* for regular function entry setup new frame and continue 10780 * from that frame. 10781 */ 10782 err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, *insn_idx, set_callee_state, state); 10783 if (err) 10784 return err; 10785 10786 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 10787 10788 /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ 10789 *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1; 10790 10791 bpf_reset_live_stack_callchain(env); 10792 10793 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 10794 verbose(env, "caller:\n"); 10795 print_verifier_state(env, state, caller->frameno, true); 10796 verbose(env, "callee:\n"); 10797 print_verifier_state(env, state, state->curframe, true); 10798 } 10799 10800 return 0; 10801 } 10802 10803 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10804 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10805 struct bpf_func_state *callee) 10806 { 10807 /* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, 10808 * void *callback_ctx, u64 flags); 10809 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 10810 * void *callback_ctx); 10811 */ 10812 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 10813 10814 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 10815 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 10816 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 10817 10818 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 10819 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 10820 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 10821 10822 /* pointer to stack or null */ 10823 callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 10824 10825 /* unused */ 10826 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 10827 return 0; 10828 } 10829 10830 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10831 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10832 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx) 10833 { 10834 int i; 10835 10836 /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent 10837 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain 10838 */ 10839 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 10840 callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; 10841 return 0; 10842 } 10843 10844 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10845 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10846 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10847 int insn_idx) 10848 { 10849 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 10850 struct bpf_map *map; 10851 int err; 10852 10853 /* valid map_ptr and poison value does not matter */ 10854 map = insn_aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr; 10855 if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args || 10856 !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) { 10857 verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n"); 10858 return -ENOTSUPP; 10859 } 10860 10861 err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee); 10862 if (err) 10863 return err; 10864 10865 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 10866 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1); 10867 return 0; 10868 } 10869 10870 static int set_loop_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10871 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10872 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10873 int insn_idx) 10874 { 10875 /* bpf_loop(u32 nr_loops, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, 10876 * u64 flags); 10877 * callback_fn(u64 index, void *callback_ctx); 10878 */ 10879 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 10880 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 10881 10882 /* unused */ 10883 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 10884 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 10885 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 10886 10887 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 10888 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1); 10889 return 0; 10890 } 10891 10892 static int set_timer_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10893 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10894 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10895 int insn_idx) 10896 { 10897 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 10898 10899 /* bpf_timer_set_callback(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn); 10900 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value); 10901 */ 10902 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 10903 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 10904 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr; 10905 10906 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 10907 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 10908 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr; 10909 10910 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 10911 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 10912 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr; 10913 10914 /* unused */ 10915 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 10916 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 10917 callee->in_async_callback_fn = true; 10918 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 0); 10919 return 0; 10920 } 10921 10922 static int set_find_vma_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10923 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10924 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10925 int insn_idx) 10926 { 10927 /* bpf_find_vma(struct task_struct *task, u64 addr, 10928 * void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags) 10929 * (callback_fn)(struct task_struct *task, 10930 * struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *callback_ctx); 10931 */ 10932 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 10933 10934 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 10935 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 10936 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf = btf_vmlinux; 10937 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_VMA]; 10938 10939 /* pointer to stack or null */ 10940 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_4]; 10941 10942 /* unused */ 10943 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 10944 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 10945 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 10946 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1); 10947 return 0; 10948 } 10949 10950 static int set_user_ringbuf_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10951 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10952 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10953 int insn_idx) 10954 { 10955 /* bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void 10956 * callback_ctx, u64 flags); 10957 * callback_fn(const struct bpf_dynptr_t* dynptr, void *callback_ctx); 10958 */ 10959 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 10960 mark_dynptr_cb_reg(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1], BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL); 10961 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 10962 10963 /* unused */ 10964 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 10965 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 10966 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 10967 10968 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 10969 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1); 10970 return 0; 10971 } 10972 10973 static int set_rbtree_add_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10974 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10975 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10976 int insn_idx) 10977 { 10978 /* void bpf_rbtree_add_impl(struct bpf_rb_root *root, struct bpf_rb_node *node, 10979 * bool (less)(struct bpf_rb_node *a, const struct bpf_rb_node *b)); 10980 * 10981 * 'struct bpf_rb_node *node' arg to bpf_rbtree_add_impl is the same PTR_TO_BTF_ID w/ offset 10982 * that 'less' callback args will be receiving. However, 'node' arg was release_reference'd 10983 * by this point, so look at 'root' 10984 */ 10985 struct btf_field *field; 10986 10987 field = reg_find_field_offset(&caller->regs[BPF_REG_1], caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].off, 10988 BPF_RB_ROOT); 10989 if (!field || !field->graph_root.value_btf_id) 10990 return -EFAULT; 10991 10992 mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_1, &field->graph_root); 10993 ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 10994 mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_2, &field->graph_root); 10995 ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 10996 10997 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 10998 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 10999 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 11000 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 11001 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1); 11002 return 0; 11003 } 11004 11005 static int set_task_work_schedule_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11006 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 11007 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 11008 int insn_idx) 11009 { 11010 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr; 11011 11012 /* 11013 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value); 11014 */ 11015 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 11016 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 11017 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr; 11018 11019 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 11020 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 11021 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr; 11022 11023 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 11024 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 11025 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr; 11026 11027 /* unused */ 11028 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 11029 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 11030 callee->in_async_callback_fn = true; 11031 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(S32_MIN, S32_MAX); 11032 return 0; 11033 } 11034 11035 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 11036 11037 /* Are we currently verifying the callback for a rbtree helper that must 11038 * be called with lock held? If so, no need to complain about unreleased 11039 * lock 11040 */ 11041 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11042 { 11043 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 11044 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 11045 struct bpf_func_state *callee; 11046 int kfunc_btf_id; 11047 11048 if (!state->curframe) 11049 return false; 11050 11051 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 11052 11053 if (!callee->in_callback_fn) 11054 return false; 11055 11056 kfunc_btf_id = insn[callee->callsite].imm; 11057 return is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 11058 } 11059 11060 static bool retval_range_within(struct bpf_retval_range range, const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 11061 bool return_32bit) 11062 { 11063 if (return_32bit) 11064 return range.minval <= reg->s32_min_value && reg->s32_max_value <= range.maxval; 11065 else 11066 return range.minval <= reg->smin_value && reg->smax_value <= range.maxval; 11067 } 11068 11069 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) 11070 { 11071 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *prev_st; 11072 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 11073 struct bpf_reg_state *r0; 11074 bool in_callback_fn; 11075 int err; 11076 11077 err = bpf_update_live_stack(env); 11078 if (err) 11079 return err; 11080 11081 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 11082 r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]; 11083 if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 11084 /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer 11085 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller, 11086 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack 11087 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits, 11088 * but let's be conservative 11089 */ 11090 verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n"); 11091 return -EINVAL; 11092 } 11093 11094 caller = state->frame[state->curframe - 1]; 11095 if (callee->in_callback_fn) { 11096 if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 11097 verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n"); 11098 return -EACCES; 11099 } 11100 11101 /* we are going to rely on register's precise value */ 11102 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_0); 11103 if (err) 11104 return err; 11105 11106 /* enforce R0 return value range, and bpf_callback_t returns 64bit */ 11107 if (!retval_range_within(callee->callback_ret_range, r0, false)) { 11108 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, callee->callback_ret_range, 11109 "At callback return", "R0"); 11110 return -EINVAL; 11111 } 11112 if (!bpf_calls_callback(env, callee->callsite)) { 11113 verifier_bug(env, "in callback at %d, callsite %d !calls_callback", 11114 *insn_idx, callee->callsite); 11115 return -EFAULT; 11116 } 11117 } else { 11118 /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ 11119 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; 11120 } 11121 11122 /* for callbacks like bpf_loop or bpf_for_each_map_elem go back to callsite, 11123 * there function call logic would reschedule callback visit. If iteration 11124 * converges is_state_visited() would prune that visit eventually. 11125 */ 11126 in_callback_fn = callee->in_callback_fn; 11127 if (in_callback_fn) 11128 *insn_idx = callee->callsite; 11129 else 11130 *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; 11131 11132 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 11133 verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); 11134 print_verifier_state(env, state, callee->frameno, true); 11135 verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); 11136 print_verifier_state(env, state, caller->frameno, true); 11137 } 11138 /* clear everything in the callee. In case of exceptional exits using 11139 * bpf_throw, this will be done by copy_verifier_state for extra frames. */ 11140 free_func_state(callee); 11141 state->frame[state->curframe--] = NULL; 11142 11143 /* for callbacks widen imprecise scalars to make programs like below verify: 11144 * 11145 * struct ctx { int i; } 11146 * void cb(int idx, struct ctx *ctx) { ctx->i++; ... } 11147 * ... 11148 * struct ctx = { .i = 0; } 11149 * bpf_loop(100, cb, &ctx, 0); 11150 * 11151 * This is similar to what is done in process_iter_next_call() for open 11152 * coded iterators. 11153 */ 11154 prev_st = in_callback_fn ? find_prev_entry(env, state, *insn_idx) : NULL; 11155 if (prev_st) { 11156 err = widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, state); 11157 if (err) 11158 return err; 11159 } 11160 return 0; 11161 } 11162 11163 static int do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11164 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, 11165 int func_id, 11166 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 11167 { 11168 struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; 11169 11170 if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER) 11171 return 0; 11172 11173 switch (func_id) { 11174 case BPF_FUNC_get_stack: 11175 case BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack: 11176 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str: 11177 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str: 11178 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str: 11179 ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; 11180 ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value; 11181 ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 11182 ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 11183 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg); 11184 break; 11185 case BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id: 11186 ret_reg->umax_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 11187 ret_reg->u32_max_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 11188 ret_reg->smax_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 11189 ret_reg->s32_max_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 11190 ret_reg->umin_value = 0; 11191 ret_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 11192 ret_reg->smin_value = 0; 11193 ret_reg->s32_min_value = 0; 11194 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg); 11195 break; 11196 } 11197 11198 return reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, ret_reg, "retval"); 11199 } 11200 11201 static int 11202 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 11203 int func_id, int insn_idx) 11204 { 11205 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 11206 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 11207 11208 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 11209 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 11210 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 11211 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 11212 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem && 11213 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 11214 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 11215 func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem && 11216 func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 11217 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem) 11218 return 0; 11219 11220 if (map == NULL) { 11221 verifier_bug(env, "expected map for helper call"); 11222 return -EFAULT; 11223 } 11224 11225 /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions 11226 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the 11227 * state of the map from program side. 11228 */ 11229 if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 11230 (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 11231 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 11232 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 11233 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) { 11234 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n"); 11235 return -EACCES; 11236 } 11237 11238 if (!aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr) 11239 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, 11240 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1, false); 11241 else if (aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr != meta->map_ptr) 11242 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, 11243 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1, true); 11244 return 0; 11245 } 11246 11247 static int 11248 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 11249 int func_id, int insn_idx) 11250 { 11251 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 11252 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11253 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 11254 u64 val, max; 11255 int err; 11256 11257 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 11258 return 0; 11259 if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { 11260 verbose(env, "expected prog array map for tail call"); 11261 return -EINVAL; 11262 } 11263 11264 reg = reg_state(env, BPF_REG_3); 11265 val = reg->var_off.value; 11266 max = map->max_entries; 11267 11268 if (!(is_reg_const(reg, false) && val < max)) { 11269 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 11270 return 0; 11271 } 11272 11273 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); 11274 if (err) 11275 return err; 11276 if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) 11277 bpf_map_key_store(aux, val); 11278 else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 11279 bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val) 11280 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 11281 return 0; 11282 } 11283 11284 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool exception_exit) 11285 { 11286 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 11287 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 11288 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, BPF_REG_0); 11289 bool refs_lingering = false; 11290 int i; 11291 11292 if (!exception_exit && cur_func(env)->frameno) 11293 return 0; 11294 11295 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 11296 if (state->refs[i].type != REF_TYPE_PTR) 11297 continue; 11298 /* Allow struct_ops programs to return a referenced kptr back to 11299 * kernel. Type checks are performed later in check_return_code. 11300 */ 11301 if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS && !exception_exit && 11302 reg->ref_obj_id == state->refs[i].id) 11303 continue; 11304 verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n", 11305 state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx); 11306 refs_lingering = true; 11307 } 11308 return refs_lingering ? -EINVAL : 0; 11309 } 11310 11311 static int check_resource_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool exception_exit, bool check_lock, const char *prefix) 11312 { 11313 int err; 11314 11315 if (check_lock && env->cur_state->active_locks) { 11316 verbose(env, "%s cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n", prefix); 11317 return -EINVAL; 11318 } 11319 11320 err = check_reference_leak(env, exception_exit); 11321 if (err) { 11322 verbose(env, "%s would lead to reference leak\n", prefix); 11323 return err; 11324 } 11325 11326 if (check_lock && env->cur_state->active_irq_id) { 11327 verbose(env, "%s cannot be used inside bpf_local_irq_save-ed region\n", prefix); 11328 return -EINVAL; 11329 } 11330 11331 if (check_lock && env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks) { 11332 verbose(env, "%s cannot be used inside bpf_rcu_read_lock-ed region\n", prefix); 11333 return -EINVAL; 11334 } 11335 11336 if (check_lock && env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks) { 11337 verbose(env, "%s cannot be used inside bpf_preempt_disable-ed region\n", prefix); 11338 return -EINVAL; 11339 } 11340 11341 return 0; 11342 } 11343 11344 static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11345 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 11346 { 11347 struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 11348 struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_5]; 11349 struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr; 11350 struct bpf_bprintf_data data = {}; 11351 int err, fmt_map_off, num_args; 11352 u64 fmt_addr; 11353 char *fmt; 11354 11355 /* data must be an array of u64 */ 11356 if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8) 11357 return -EINVAL; 11358 num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8; 11359 11360 /* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const 11361 * and map_direct_value_addr is set. 11362 */ 11363 fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value; 11364 err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr, 11365 fmt_map_off); 11366 if (err) { 11367 verbose(env, "failed to retrieve map value address\n"); 11368 return -EFAULT; 11369 } 11370 fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off; 11371 11372 /* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we 11373 * can focus on validating the format specifiers. 11374 */ 11375 err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, num_args, &data); 11376 if (err < 0) 11377 verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n"); 11378 11379 return err; 11380 } 11381 11382 static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11383 { 11384 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 11385 int func_id = BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip; 11386 11387 if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 11388 if (!bpf_prog_has_trampoline(env->prog)) { 11389 verbose(env, "func %s#%d supported only for fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs\n", 11390 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11391 return -ENOTSUPP; 11392 } 11393 return 0; 11394 } else if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) { 11395 return 0; 11396 } 11397 11398 verbose(env, "func %s#%d not supported for program type %d\n", 11399 func_id_name(func_id), func_id, type); 11400 return -ENOTSUPP; 11401 } 11402 11403 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11404 { 11405 return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; 11406 } 11407 11408 static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11409 { 11410 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, BPF_REG_4); 11411 bool reg_is_null = register_is_null(reg); 11412 11413 if (reg_is_null) 11414 mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4); 11415 11416 return reg_is_null; 11417 } 11418 11419 static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno) 11420 { 11421 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *state = &cur_aux(env)->loop_inline_state; 11422 11423 if (!state->initialized) { 11424 state->initialized = 1; 11425 state->fit_for_inline = loop_flag_is_zero(env); 11426 state->callback_subprogno = subprogno; 11427 return; 11428 } 11429 11430 if (!state->fit_for_inline) 11431 return; 11432 11433 state->fit_for_inline = (loop_flag_is_zero(env) && 11434 state->callback_subprogno == subprogno); 11435 } 11436 11437 /* Returns whether or not the given map type can potentially elide 11438 * lookup return value nullness check. This is possible if the key 11439 * is statically known. 11440 */ 11441 static bool can_elide_value_nullness(enum bpf_map_type type) 11442 { 11443 switch (type) { 11444 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: 11445 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY: 11446 return true; 11447 default: 11448 return false; 11449 } 11450 } 11451 11452 static int get_helper_proto(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, 11453 const struct bpf_func_proto **ptr) 11454 { 11455 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) 11456 return -ERANGE; 11457 11458 if (!env->ops->get_func_proto) 11459 return -EINVAL; 11460 11461 *ptr = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog); 11462 return *ptr && (*ptr)->func ? 0 : -EINVAL; 11463 } 11464 11465 /* Check if we're in a sleepable context. */ 11466 static inline bool in_sleepable_context(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11467 { 11468 return !env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks && 11469 !env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks && 11470 !env->cur_state->active_locks && 11471 !env->cur_state->active_irq_id && 11472 in_sleepable(env); 11473 } 11474 11475 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 11476 int *insn_idx_p) 11477 { 11478 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 11479 bool returns_cpu_specific_alloc_ptr = false; 11480 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; 11481 enum bpf_return_type ret_type; 11482 enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag; 11483 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 11484 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 11485 int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 11486 bool changes_data; 11487 int i, err, func_id; 11488 11489 /* find function prototype */ 11490 func_id = insn->imm; 11491 err = get_helper_proto(env, insn->imm, &fn); 11492 if (err == -ERANGE) { 11493 verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11494 return -EINVAL; 11495 } 11496 11497 if (err) { 11498 verbose(env, "program of this type cannot use helper %s#%d\n", 11499 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11500 return err; 11501 } 11502 11503 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ 11504 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { 11505 verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 11506 return -EINVAL; 11507 } 11508 11509 if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) { 11510 verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n"); 11511 return -EINVAL; 11512 } 11513 11514 if (!in_sleepable(env) && fn->might_sleep) { 11515 verbose(env, "helper call might sleep in a non-sleepable prog\n"); 11516 return -EINVAL; 11517 } 11518 11519 /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ 11520 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(func_id); 11521 if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 11522 verifier_bug(env, "func %s#%d: r1 != ctx", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11523 return -EFAULT; 11524 } 11525 11526 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 11527 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; 11528 11529 err = check_func_proto(fn); 11530 if (err) { 11531 verifier_bug(env, "incorrect func proto %s#%d", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11532 return err; 11533 } 11534 11535 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks) { 11536 if (fn->might_sleep) { 11537 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in rcu_read_lock region\n", 11538 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11539 return -EINVAL; 11540 } 11541 } 11542 11543 if (env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks) { 11544 if (fn->might_sleep) { 11545 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in non-preemptible region\n", 11546 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11547 return -EINVAL; 11548 } 11549 } 11550 11551 if (env->cur_state->active_irq_id) { 11552 if (fn->might_sleep) { 11553 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in IRQ-disabled region\n", 11554 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11555 return -EINVAL; 11556 } 11557 } 11558 11559 /* Track non-sleepable context for helpers. */ 11560 if (!in_sleepable_context(env)) 11561 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].non_sleepable = true; 11562 11563 meta.func_id = func_id; 11564 /* check args */ 11565 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { 11566 err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn, insn_idx); 11567 if (err) 11568 return err; 11569 } 11570 11571 err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 11572 if (err) 11573 return err; 11574 11575 err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 11576 if (err) 11577 return err; 11578 11579 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset 11580 * is inferred from register state. 11581 */ 11582 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { 11583 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, 11584 BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 11585 if (err) 11586 return err; 11587 } 11588 11589 regs = cur_regs(env); 11590 11591 if (meta.release_regno) { 11592 err = -EINVAL; 11593 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1])) { 11594 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.release_regno]); 11595 } else if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && meta.ref_obj_id) { 11596 u32 ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 11597 bool in_rcu = in_rcu_cs(env); 11598 struct bpf_func_state *state; 11599 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11600 11601 err = release_reference_nomark(env->cur_state, ref_obj_id); 11602 if (!err) { 11603 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 11604 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) { 11605 if (in_rcu && (reg->type & MEM_ALLOC) && (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU)) { 11606 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 11607 reg->type &= ~MEM_ALLOC; 11608 reg->type |= MEM_RCU; 11609 } else { 11610 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 11611 } 11612 } 11613 })); 11614 } 11615 } else if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 11616 err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id); 11617 } else if (register_is_null(®s[meta.release_regno])) { 11618 /* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be 11619 * released is NULL, which must be > R0. 11620 */ 11621 err = 0; 11622 } 11623 if (err) { 11624 verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 11625 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11626 return err; 11627 } 11628 } 11629 11630 switch (func_id) { 11631 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 11632 err = check_resource_leak(env, false, true, "tail_call"); 11633 if (err) 11634 return err; 11635 break; 11636 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 11637 /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0, 11638 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error. 11639 */ 11640 if (!register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) { 11641 verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n"); 11642 return -EINVAL; 11643 } 11644 break; 11645 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 11646 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 11647 set_map_elem_callback_state); 11648 break; 11649 case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback: 11650 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 11651 set_timer_callback_state); 11652 break; 11653 case BPF_FUNC_find_vma: 11654 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 11655 set_find_vma_callback_state); 11656 break; 11657 case BPF_FUNC_snprintf: 11658 err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs); 11659 break; 11660 case BPF_FUNC_loop: 11661 update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno); 11662 /* Verifier relies on R1 value to determine if bpf_loop() iteration 11663 * is finished, thus mark it precise. 11664 */ 11665 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_1); 11666 if (err) 11667 return err; 11668 if (cur_func(env)->callback_depth < regs[BPF_REG_1].umax_value) { 11669 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 11670 set_loop_callback_state); 11671 } else { 11672 cur_func(env)->callback_depth = 0; 11673 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 11674 verbose(env, "frame%d bpf_loop iteration limit reached\n", 11675 env->cur_state->curframe); 11676 } 11677 break; 11678 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem: 11679 if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 11680 verbose(env, "Unsupported reg type %s for bpf_dynptr_from_mem data\n", 11681 reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type)); 11682 return -EACCES; 11683 } 11684 break; 11685 case BPF_FUNC_set_retval: 11686 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 11687 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 11688 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 11689 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 11690 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 11691 */ 11692 verbose(env, "BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 11693 return -EINVAL; 11694 } 11695 } 11696 break; 11697 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data: 11698 { 11699 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11700 int id, ref_obj_id; 11701 11702 reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs); 11703 if (!reg) 11704 return -EFAULT; 11705 11706 11707 if (meta.dynptr_id) { 11708 verifier_bug(env, "meta.dynptr_id already set"); 11709 return -EFAULT; 11710 } 11711 if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 11712 verifier_bug(env, "meta.ref_obj_id already set"); 11713 return -EFAULT; 11714 } 11715 11716 id = dynptr_id(env, reg); 11717 if (id < 0) { 11718 verifier_bug(env, "failed to obtain dynptr id"); 11719 return id; 11720 } 11721 11722 ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); 11723 if (ref_obj_id < 0) { 11724 verifier_bug(env, "failed to obtain dynptr ref_obj_id"); 11725 return ref_obj_id; 11726 } 11727 11728 meta.dynptr_id = id; 11729 meta.ref_obj_id = ref_obj_id; 11730 11731 break; 11732 } 11733 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_write: 11734 { 11735 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 11736 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11737 11738 reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs); 11739 if (!reg) 11740 return -EFAULT; 11741 11742 dynptr_type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg); 11743 if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 11744 return -EFAULT; 11745 11746 if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB || 11747 dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META) 11748 /* this will trigger clear_all_pkt_pointers(), which will 11749 * invalidate all dynptr slices associated with the skb 11750 */ 11751 changes_data = true; 11752 11753 break; 11754 } 11755 case BPF_FUNC_per_cpu_ptr: 11756 case BPF_FUNC_this_cpu_ptr: 11757 { 11758 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_1]; 11759 const struct btf_type *type; 11760 11761 if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { 11762 type = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 11763 if (!type || !btf_type_is_struct(type)) { 11764 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf/btf_id in R1\n"); 11765 return -EFAULT; 11766 } 11767 returns_cpu_specific_alloc_ptr = true; 11768 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].call_with_percpu_alloc_ptr = true; 11769 } 11770 break; 11771 } 11772 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 11773 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 11774 set_user_ringbuf_callback_state); 11775 break; 11776 } 11777 11778 if (err) 11779 return err; 11780 11781 /* reset caller saved regs */ 11782 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 11783 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 11784 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 11785 } 11786 11787 /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */ 11788 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 11789 11790 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ 11791 ret_type = fn->ret_type; 11792 ret_flag = type_flag(ret_type); 11793 11794 switch (base_type(ret_type)) { 11795 case RET_INTEGER: 11796 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ 11797 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11798 break; 11799 case RET_VOID: 11800 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; 11801 break; 11802 case RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 11803 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ 11804 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11805 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() 11806 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access 11807 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() 11808 */ 11809 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { 11810 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected null map_ptr"); 11811 return -EFAULT; 11812 } 11813 11814 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 11815 can_elide_value_nullness(meta.map_ptr->map_type) && 11816 meta.const_map_key >= 0 && 11817 meta.const_map_key < meta.map_ptr->max_entries) 11818 ret_flag &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 11819 11820 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; 11821 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map_uid; 11822 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag; 11823 if (!type_may_be_null(ret_flag) && 11824 btf_record_has_field(meta.map_ptr->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK | BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK)) { 11825 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 11826 } 11827 break; 11828 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET: 11829 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11830 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET | ret_flag; 11831 break; 11832 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 11833 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11834 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | ret_flag; 11835 break; 11836 case RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 11837 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11838 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | ret_flag; 11839 break; 11840 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM: 11841 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11842 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 11843 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size; 11844 break; 11845 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID: 11846 { 11847 const struct btf_type *t; 11848 11849 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11850 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL); 11851 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 11852 u32 tsize; 11853 const struct btf_type *ret; 11854 const char *tname; 11855 11856 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 11857 ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize); 11858 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 11859 tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off); 11860 verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 11861 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 11862 return -EINVAL; 11863 } 11864 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 11865 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize; 11866 } else { 11867 if (returns_cpu_specific_alloc_ptr) { 11868 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | MEM_RCU; 11869 } else { 11870 /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it 11871 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise 11872 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in 11873 * check_mem_access(). 11874 */ 11875 ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 11876 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 11877 } 11878 11879 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf; 11880 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 11881 } 11882 break; 11883 } 11884 case RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 11885 { 11886 struct btf *ret_btf; 11887 int ret_btf_id; 11888 11889 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11890 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 11891 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 11892 ret_btf = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf; 11893 ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf_id; 11894 if (!btf_is_kernel(ret_btf)) { 11895 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_ALLOC; 11896 if (meta.kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU) 11897 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_PERCPU; 11898 } 11899 } else { 11900 if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 11901 verifier_bug(env, "func %s has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON return type", 11902 func_id_name(func_id)); 11903 return -EFAULT; 11904 } 11905 ret_btf = btf_vmlinux; 11906 ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id; 11907 } 11908 if (ret_btf_id == 0) { 11909 verbose(env, "invalid return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 11910 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), 11911 func_id); 11912 return -EINVAL; 11913 } 11914 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 11915 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 11916 break; 11917 } 11918 default: 11919 verbose(env, "unknown return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 11920 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11921 return -EINVAL; 11922 } 11923 11924 if (type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type)) 11925 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 11926 11927 if (helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 11928 verifier_bug(env, "func %s#%d sets ref_obj_id more than once", 11929 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11930 return -EFAULT; 11931 } 11932 11933 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 11934 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta.dynptr_id; 11935 11936 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id) || is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) { 11937 /* For release_reference() */ 11938 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 11939 } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 11940 int id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx); 11941 11942 if (id < 0) 11943 return id; 11944 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */ 11945 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 11946 /* For release_reference() */ 11947 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 11948 } 11949 11950 err = do_refine_retval_range(env, regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); 11951 if (err) 11952 return err; 11953 11954 err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); 11955 if (err) 11956 return err; 11957 11958 if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack || 11959 func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) && 11960 !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) { 11961 const char *err_str; 11962 11963 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 11964 err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); 11965 err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n"; 11966 #else 11967 err = -ENOTSUPP; 11968 err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n"; 11969 #endif 11970 if (err) { 11971 verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11972 return err; 11973 } 11974 11975 env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true; 11976 } 11977 11978 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack) 11979 env->prog->call_get_stack = true; 11980 11981 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 11982 if (check_get_func_ip(env)) 11983 return -ENOTSUPP; 11984 env->prog->call_get_func_ip = true; 11985 } 11986 11987 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 11988 if (env->cur_state->curframe) { 11989 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 11990 11991 mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0); 11992 branch = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, false); 11993 if (IS_ERR(branch)) 11994 return PTR_ERR(branch); 11995 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 11996 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11997 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); 11998 if (err) 11999 return err; 12000 env->insn_idx--; 12001 } else { 12002 changes_data = false; 12003 } 12004 } 12005 12006 if (changes_data) 12007 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 12008 return 0; 12009 } 12010 12011 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by 12012 * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument. 12013 */ 12014 static void __mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 12015 u32 regno, size_t reg_size) 12016 { 12017 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 12018 12019 if (regno == BPF_REG_0) { 12020 /* Function return value */ 12021 reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ? 12022 DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 12023 } else if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) { 12024 /* Function argument */ 12025 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 12026 } 12027 } 12028 12029 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 12030 size_t reg_size) 12031 { 12032 return __mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, cur_regs(env), regno, reg_size); 12033 } 12034 12035 static bool is_kfunc_acquire(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12036 { 12037 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ACQUIRE; 12038 } 12039 12040 static bool is_kfunc_release(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12041 { 12042 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RELEASE; 12043 } 12044 12045 static bool is_kfunc_sleepable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12046 { 12047 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_SLEEPABLE; 12048 } 12049 12050 static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12051 { 12052 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE; 12053 } 12054 12055 static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12056 { 12057 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU; 12058 } 12059 12060 static bool is_kfunc_rcu_protected(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12061 { 12062 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU_PROTECTED; 12063 } 12064 12065 static bool is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 12066 const struct btf_param *arg, 12067 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 12068 { 12069 const struct btf_type *t; 12070 12071 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 12072 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 12073 return false; 12074 12075 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__sz"); 12076 } 12077 12078 static bool is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 12079 const struct btf_param *arg, 12080 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 12081 { 12082 const struct btf_type *t; 12083 12084 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 12085 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 12086 return false; 12087 12088 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__szk"); 12089 } 12090 12091 static bool is_kfunc_arg_constant(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12092 { 12093 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__k"); 12094 } 12095 12096 static bool is_kfunc_arg_ignore(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12097 { 12098 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__ign"); 12099 } 12100 12101 static bool is_kfunc_arg_map(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12102 { 12103 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__map"); 12104 } 12105 12106 static bool is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12107 { 12108 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__alloc"); 12109 } 12110 12111 static bool is_kfunc_arg_uninit(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12112 { 12113 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__uninit"); 12114 } 12115 12116 static bool is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12117 { 12118 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__refcounted_kptr"); 12119 } 12120 12121 static bool is_kfunc_arg_nullable(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12122 { 12123 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__nullable"); 12124 } 12125 12126 static bool is_kfunc_arg_const_str(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12127 { 12128 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__str"); 12129 } 12130 12131 static bool is_kfunc_arg_irq_flag(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12132 { 12133 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__irq_flag"); 12134 } 12135 12136 static bool is_kfunc_arg_prog(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12137 { 12138 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__prog"); 12139 } 12140 12141 static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf *btf, 12142 const struct btf_param *arg, 12143 const char *name) 12144 { 12145 int len, target_len = strlen(name); 12146 const char *param_name; 12147 12148 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 12149 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 12150 return false; 12151 len = strlen(param_name); 12152 if (len != target_len) 12153 return false; 12154 if (strcmp(param_name, name)) 12155 return false; 12156 12157 return true; 12158 } 12159 12160 enum { 12161 KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID, 12162 KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID, 12163 KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID, 12164 KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID, 12165 KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID, 12166 KF_ARG_WORKQUEUE_ID, 12167 KF_ARG_RES_SPIN_LOCK_ID, 12168 KF_ARG_TASK_WORK_ID, 12169 }; 12170 12171 BTF_ID_LIST(kf_arg_btf_ids) 12172 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_dynptr) 12173 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_head) 12174 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_node) 12175 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_root) 12176 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_node) 12177 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_wq) 12178 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_res_spin_lock) 12179 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_task_work) 12180 12181 static bool __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(const struct btf *btf, 12182 const struct btf_param *arg, int type) 12183 { 12184 const struct btf_type *t; 12185 u32 res_id; 12186 12187 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 12188 if (!t) 12189 return false; 12190 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 12191 return false; 12192 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &res_id); 12193 if (!t) 12194 return false; 12195 return btf_types_are_same(btf, res_id, btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[type]); 12196 } 12197 12198 static bool is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12199 { 12200 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID); 12201 } 12202 12203 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_head(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12204 { 12205 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID); 12206 } 12207 12208 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12209 { 12210 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID); 12211 } 12212 12213 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12214 { 12215 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID); 12216 } 12217 12218 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12219 { 12220 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID); 12221 } 12222 12223 static bool is_kfunc_arg_wq(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12224 { 12225 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_WORKQUEUE_ID); 12226 } 12227 12228 static bool is_kfunc_arg_task_work(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12229 { 12230 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_TASK_WORK_ID); 12231 } 12232 12233 static bool is_kfunc_arg_res_spin_lock(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12234 { 12235 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RES_SPIN_LOCK_ID); 12236 } 12237 12238 static bool is_rbtree_node_type(const struct btf_type *t) 12239 { 12240 return t == btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID]); 12241 } 12242 12243 static bool is_list_node_type(const struct btf_type *t) 12244 { 12245 return t == btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID]); 12246 } 12247 12248 static bool is_kfunc_arg_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct btf *btf, 12249 const struct btf_param *arg) 12250 { 12251 const struct btf_type *t; 12252 12253 t = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf, arg->type, NULL); 12254 if (!t) 12255 return false; 12256 12257 return true; 12258 } 12259 12260 /* Returns true if struct is composed of scalars, 4 levels of nesting allowed */ 12261 static bool __btf_type_is_scalar_struct(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12262 const struct btf *btf, 12263 const struct btf_type *t, int rec) 12264 { 12265 const struct btf_type *member_type; 12266 const struct btf_member *member; 12267 u32 i; 12268 12269 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) 12270 return false; 12271 12272 for_each_member(i, t, member) { 12273 const struct btf_array *array; 12274 12275 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, member->type, NULL); 12276 if (btf_type_is_struct(member_type)) { 12277 if (rec >= 3) { 12278 verbose(env, "max struct nesting depth exceeded\n"); 12279 return false; 12280 } 12281 if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, btf, member_type, rec + 1)) 12282 return false; 12283 continue; 12284 } 12285 if (btf_type_is_array(member_type)) { 12286 array = btf_array(member_type); 12287 if (!array->nelems) 12288 return false; 12289 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, array->type, NULL); 12290 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 12291 return false; 12292 continue; 12293 } 12294 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 12295 return false; 12296 } 12297 return true; 12298 } 12299 12300 enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type { 12301 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, 12302 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID, /* Allocated object */ 12303 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR, /* Refcounted local kptr */ 12304 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 12305 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER, 12306 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD, 12307 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE, 12308 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID, /* Also covers reg2btf_ids conversions */ 12309 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, 12310 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE, /* Size derived from next argument, skip it */ 12311 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK, 12312 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT, 12313 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE, 12314 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL, 12315 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR, 12316 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MAP, 12317 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE, 12318 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_IRQ_FLAG, 12319 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK, 12320 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TASK_WORK, 12321 }; 12322 12323 enum special_kfunc_type { 12324 KF_bpf_obj_new_impl, 12325 KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl, 12326 KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl, 12327 KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl, 12328 KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl, 12329 KF_bpf_list_pop_front, 12330 KF_bpf_list_pop_back, 12331 KF_bpf_list_front, 12332 KF_bpf_list_back, 12333 KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx, 12334 KF_bpf_rdonly_cast, 12335 KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock, 12336 KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock, 12337 KF_bpf_rbtree_remove, 12338 KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl, 12339 KF_bpf_rbtree_first, 12340 KF_bpf_rbtree_root, 12341 KF_bpf_rbtree_left, 12342 KF_bpf_rbtree_right, 12343 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb, 12344 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp, 12345 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb_meta, 12346 KF_bpf_xdp_pull_data, 12347 KF_bpf_dynptr_slice, 12348 KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr, 12349 KF_bpf_dynptr_clone, 12350 KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl, 12351 KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl, 12352 KF_bpf_throw, 12353 KF_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl, 12354 KF_bpf_preempt_disable, 12355 KF_bpf_preempt_enable, 12356 KF_bpf_iter_css_task_new, 12357 KF_bpf_session_cookie, 12358 KF_bpf_get_kmem_cache, 12359 KF_bpf_local_irq_save, 12360 KF_bpf_local_irq_restore, 12361 KF_bpf_iter_num_new, 12362 KF_bpf_iter_num_next, 12363 KF_bpf_iter_num_destroy, 12364 KF_bpf_set_dentry_xattr, 12365 KF_bpf_remove_dentry_xattr, 12366 KF_bpf_res_spin_lock, 12367 KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock, 12368 KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave, 12369 KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore, 12370 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_file, 12371 KF_bpf_dynptr_file_discard, 12372 KF___bpf_trap, 12373 KF_bpf_task_work_schedule_signal_impl, 12374 KF_bpf_task_work_schedule_resume_impl, 12375 KF_bpf_arena_alloc_pages, 12376 KF_bpf_arena_free_pages, 12377 KF_bpf_arena_reserve_pages, 12378 }; 12379 12380 BTF_ID_LIST(special_kfunc_list) 12381 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 12382 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 12383 BTF_ID(func, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl) 12384 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front_impl) 12385 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back_impl) 12386 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 12387 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 12388 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_front) 12389 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_back) 12390 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 12391 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 12392 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_lock) 12393 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_unlock) 12394 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_remove) 12395 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_add_impl) 12396 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_first) 12397 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_root) 12398 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_left) 12399 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_right) 12400 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 12401 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb) 12402 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp) 12403 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb_meta) 12404 BTF_ID(func, bpf_xdp_pull_data) 12405 #else 12406 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12407 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12408 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12409 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12410 #endif 12411 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice) 12412 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr) 12413 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone) 12414 BTF_ID(func, bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl) 12415 BTF_ID(func, bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl) 12416 BTF_ID(func, bpf_throw) 12417 BTF_ID(func, bpf_wq_set_callback_impl) 12418 BTF_ID(func, bpf_preempt_disable) 12419 BTF_ID(func, bpf_preempt_enable) 12420 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS 12421 BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_css_task_new) 12422 #else 12423 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12424 #endif 12425 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_EVENTS 12426 BTF_ID(func, bpf_session_cookie) 12427 #else 12428 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12429 #endif 12430 BTF_ID(func, bpf_get_kmem_cache) 12431 BTF_ID(func, bpf_local_irq_save) 12432 BTF_ID(func, bpf_local_irq_restore) 12433 BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_num_new) 12434 BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_num_next) 12435 BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_num_destroy) 12436 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM 12437 BTF_ID(func, bpf_set_dentry_xattr) 12438 BTF_ID(func, bpf_remove_dentry_xattr) 12439 #else 12440 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12441 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12442 #endif 12443 BTF_ID(func, bpf_res_spin_lock) 12444 BTF_ID(func, bpf_res_spin_unlock) 12445 BTF_ID(func, bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave) 12446 BTF_ID(func, bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore) 12447 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_file) 12448 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_file_discard) 12449 BTF_ID(func, __bpf_trap) 12450 BTF_ID(func, bpf_task_work_schedule_signal_impl) 12451 BTF_ID(func, bpf_task_work_schedule_resume_impl) 12452 BTF_ID(func, bpf_arena_alloc_pages) 12453 BTF_ID(func, bpf_arena_free_pages) 12454 BTF_ID(func, bpf_arena_reserve_pages) 12455 12456 static bool is_task_work_add_kfunc(u32 func_id) 12457 { 12458 return func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_task_work_schedule_signal_impl] || 12459 func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_task_work_schedule_resume_impl]; 12460 } 12461 12462 static bool is_kfunc_ret_null(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12463 { 12464 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] && 12465 meta->arg_owning_ref) { 12466 return false; 12467 } 12468 12469 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RET_NULL; 12470 } 12471 12472 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12473 { 12474 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock]; 12475 } 12476 12477 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12478 { 12479 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock]; 12480 } 12481 12482 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_disable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12483 { 12484 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_preempt_disable]; 12485 } 12486 12487 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_enable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12488 { 12489 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_preempt_enable]; 12490 } 12491 12492 static bool is_kfunc_pkt_changing(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12493 { 12494 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_xdp_pull_data]; 12495 } 12496 12497 static enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type 12498 get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12499 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 12500 const struct btf_type *t, const struct btf_type *ref_t, 12501 const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args, 12502 int argno, int nargs) 12503 { 12504 u32 regno = argno + 1; 12505 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 12506 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 12507 bool arg_mem_size = false; 12508 12509 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) 12510 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 12511 12512 if (argno + 1 < nargs && 12513 (is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1]) || 12514 is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1]))) 12515 arg_mem_size = true; 12516 12517 /* In this function, we verify the kfunc's BTF as per the argument type, 12518 * leaving the rest of the verification with respect to the register 12519 * type to our caller. When a set of conditions hold in the BTF type of 12520 * arguments, we resolve it to a known kfunc_ptr_arg_type. 12521 */ 12522 if (btf_is_prog_ctx_type(&env->log, meta->btf, t, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), argno)) 12523 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 12524 12525 if (is_kfunc_arg_nullable(meta->btf, &args[argno]) && register_is_null(reg) && 12526 !arg_mem_size) 12527 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL; 12528 12529 if (is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12530 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID; 12531 12532 if (is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12533 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR; 12534 12535 if (is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12536 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 12537 12538 if (is_kfunc_arg_iter(meta, argno, &args[argno])) 12539 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER; 12540 12541 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_head(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12542 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD; 12543 12544 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12545 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE; 12546 12547 if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12548 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT; 12549 12550 if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12551 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE; 12552 12553 if (is_kfunc_arg_const_str(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12554 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR; 12555 12556 if (is_kfunc_arg_map(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12557 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MAP; 12558 12559 if (is_kfunc_arg_wq(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12560 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE; 12561 12562 if (is_kfunc_arg_task_work(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12563 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TASK_WORK; 12564 12565 if (is_kfunc_arg_irq_flag(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12566 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_IRQ_FLAG; 12567 12568 if (is_kfunc_arg_res_spin_lock(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12569 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK; 12570 12571 if ((base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])) { 12572 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) { 12573 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 12574 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 12575 return -EINVAL; 12576 } 12577 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 12578 } 12579 12580 if (is_kfunc_arg_callback(env, meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12581 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK; 12582 12583 /* This is the catch all argument type of register types supported by 12584 * check_helper_mem_access. However, we only allow when argument type is 12585 * pointer to scalar, or struct composed (recursively) of scalars. When 12586 * arg_mem_size is true, the pointer can be void *. 12587 */ 12588 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(ref_t) && !__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, meta->btf, ref_t, 0) && 12589 (arg_mem_size ? !btf_type_is_void(ref_t) : 1)) { 12590 verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s must point to %sscalar, or struct with scalar\n", 12591 argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, arg_mem_size ? "void, " : ""); 12592 return -EINVAL; 12593 } 12594 return arg_mem_size ? KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE : KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM; 12595 } 12596 12597 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12598 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 12599 const struct btf_type *ref_t, 12600 const char *ref_tname, u32 ref_id, 12601 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 12602 int argno) 12603 { 12604 const struct btf_type *reg_ref_t; 12605 bool strict_type_match = false; 12606 const struct btf *reg_btf; 12607 const char *reg_ref_tname; 12608 bool taking_projection; 12609 bool struct_same; 12610 u32 reg_ref_id; 12611 12612 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 12613 reg_btf = reg->btf; 12614 reg_ref_id = reg->btf_id; 12615 } else { 12616 reg_btf = btf_vmlinux; 12617 reg_ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]; 12618 } 12619 12620 /* Enforce strict type matching for calls to kfuncs that are acquiring 12621 * or releasing a reference, or are no-cast aliases. We do _not_ 12622 * enforce strict matching for kfuncs by default, 12623 * as we want to enable BPF programs to pass types that are bitwise 12624 * equivalent without forcing them to explicitly cast with something 12625 * like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx(). 12626 * 12627 * For example, say we had a type like the following: 12628 * 12629 * struct bpf_cpumask { 12630 * cpumask_t cpumask; 12631 * refcount_t usage; 12632 * }; 12633 * 12634 * Note that as specified in <linux/cpumask.h>, cpumask_t is typedef'ed 12635 * to a struct cpumask, so it would be safe to pass a struct 12636 * bpf_cpumask * to a kfunc expecting a struct cpumask *. 12637 * 12638 * The philosophy here is similar to how we allow scalars of different 12639 * types to be passed to kfuncs as long as the size is the same. The 12640 * only difference here is that we're simply allowing 12641 * btf_struct_ids_match() to walk the struct at the 0th offset, and 12642 * resolve types. 12643 */ 12644 if ((is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) || 12645 btf_type_ids_nocast_alias(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, meta->btf, ref_id)) 12646 strict_type_match = true; 12647 12648 WARN_ON_ONCE(is_kfunc_release(meta) && 12649 (reg->off || !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || 12650 reg->var_off.value)); 12651 12652 reg_ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(reg_btf, reg_ref_id, ®_ref_id); 12653 reg_ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg_btf, reg_ref_t->name_off); 12654 struct_same = btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, reg->off, meta->btf, ref_id, strict_type_match); 12655 /* If kfunc is accepting a projection type (ie. __sk_buff), it cannot 12656 * actually use it -- it must cast to the underlying type. So we allow 12657 * caller to pass in the underlying type. 12658 */ 12659 taking_projection = btf_is_projection_of(ref_tname, reg_ref_tname); 12660 if (!taking_projection && !struct_same) { 12661 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s but R%d has a pointer to %s %s\n", 12662 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, argno + 1, 12663 btf_type_str(reg_ref_t), reg_ref_tname); 12664 return -EINVAL; 12665 } 12666 return 0; 12667 } 12668 12669 static int process_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 12670 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12671 { 12672 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 12673 int err, kfunc_class = IRQ_NATIVE_KFUNC; 12674 bool irq_save; 12675 12676 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_local_irq_save] || 12677 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave]) { 12678 irq_save = true; 12679 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave]) 12680 kfunc_class = IRQ_LOCK_KFUNC; 12681 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_local_irq_restore] || 12682 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore]) { 12683 irq_save = false; 12684 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore]) 12685 kfunc_class = IRQ_LOCK_KFUNC; 12686 } else { 12687 verifier_bug(env, "unknown irq flags kfunc"); 12688 return -EFAULT; 12689 } 12690 12691 if (irq_save) { 12692 if (!is_irq_flag_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) { 12693 verbose(env, "expected uninitialized irq flag as arg#%d\n", regno - 1); 12694 return -EINVAL; 12695 } 12696 12697 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, 0, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 12698 if (err) 12699 return err; 12700 12701 err = mark_stack_slot_irq_flag(env, meta, reg, env->insn_idx, kfunc_class); 12702 if (err) 12703 return err; 12704 } else { 12705 err = is_irq_flag_reg_valid_init(env, reg); 12706 if (err) { 12707 verbose(env, "expected an initialized irq flag as arg#%d\n", regno - 1); 12708 return err; 12709 } 12710 12711 err = mark_irq_flag_read(env, reg); 12712 if (err) 12713 return err; 12714 12715 err = unmark_stack_slot_irq_flag(env, reg, kfunc_class); 12716 if (err) 12717 return err; 12718 } 12719 return 0; 12720 } 12721 12722 12723 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 12724 { 12725 struct btf_record *rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 12726 12727 if (!env->cur_state->active_locks) { 12728 verifier_bug(env, "%s w/o active lock", __func__); 12729 return -EFAULT; 12730 } 12731 12732 if (type_flag(reg->type) & NON_OWN_REF) { 12733 verifier_bug(env, "NON_OWN_REF already set"); 12734 return -EFAULT; 12735 } 12736 12737 reg->type |= NON_OWN_REF; 12738 if (rec->refcount_off >= 0) 12739 reg->type |= MEM_RCU; 12740 12741 return 0; 12742 } 12743 12744 static int ref_convert_owning_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 ref_obj_id) 12745 { 12746 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 12747 struct bpf_func_state *unused; 12748 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 12749 int i; 12750 12751 if (!ref_obj_id) { 12752 verifier_bug(env, "ref_obj_id is zero for owning -> non-owning conversion"); 12753 return -EFAULT; 12754 } 12755 12756 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 12757 if (state->refs[i].id != ref_obj_id) 12758 continue; 12759 12760 /* Clear ref_obj_id here so release_reference doesn't clobber 12761 * the whole reg 12762 */ 12763 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({ 12764 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) { 12765 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 12766 ref_set_non_owning(env, reg); 12767 } 12768 })); 12769 return 0; 12770 } 12771 12772 verifier_bug(env, "ref state missing for ref_obj_id"); 12773 return -EFAULT; 12774 } 12775 12776 /* Implementation details: 12777 * 12778 * Each register points to some region of memory, which we define as an 12779 * allocation. Each allocation may embed a bpf_spin_lock which protects any 12780 * special BPF objects (bpf_list_head, bpf_rb_root, etc.) part of the same 12781 * allocation. The lock and the data it protects are colocated in the same 12782 * memory region. 12783 * 12784 * Hence, everytime a register holds a pointer value pointing to such 12785 * allocation, the verifier preserves a unique reg->id for it. 12786 * 12787 * The verifier remembers the lock 'ptr' and the lock 'id' whenever 12788 * bpf_spin_lock is called. 12789 * 12790 * To enable this, lock state in the verifier captures two values: 12791 * active_lock.ptr = Register's type specific pointer 12792 * active_lock.id = A unique ID for each register pointer value 12793 * 12794 * Currently, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC are the two 12795 * supported register types. 12796 * 12797 * The active_lock.ptr in case of map values is the reg->map_ptr, and in case of 12798 * allocated objects is the reg->btf pointer. 12799 * 12800 * The active_lock.id is non-unique for maps supporting direct_value_addr, as we 12801 * can establish the provenance of the map value statically for each distinct 12802 * lookup into such maps. They always contain a single map value hence unique 12803 * IDs for each pseudo load pessimizes the algorithm and rejects valid programs. 12804 * 12805 * So, in case of global variables, they use array maps with max_entries = 1, 12806 * hence their active_lock.ptr becomes map_ptr and id = 0 (since they all point 12807 * into the same map value as max_entries is 1, as described above). 12808 * 12809 * In case of inner map lookups, the inner map pointer has same map_ptr as the 12810 * outer map pointer (in verifier context), but each lookup into an inner map 12811 * assigns a fresh reg->id to the lookup, so while lookups into distinct inner 12812 * maps from the same outer map share the same map_ptr as active_lock.ptr, they 12813 * will get different reg->id assigned to each lookup, hence different 12814 * active_lock.id. 12815 * 12816 * In case of allocated objects, active_lock.ptr is the reg->btf, and the 12817 * reg->id is a unique ID preserved after the NULL pointer check on the pointer 12818 * returned from bpf_obj_new. Each allocation receives a new reg->id. 12819 */ 12820 static int check_reg_allocation_locked(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 12821 { 12822 struct bpf_reference_state *s; 12823 void *ptr; 12824 u32 id; 12825 12826 switch ((int)reg->type) { 12827 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 12828 ptr = reg->map_ptr; 12829 break; 12830 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 12831 ptr = reg->btf; 12832 break; 12833 default: 12834 verifier_bug(env, "unknown reg type for lock check"); 12835 return -EFAULT; 12836 } 12837 id = reg->id; 12838 12839 if (!env->cur_state->active_locks) 12840 return -EINVAL; 12841 s = find_lock_state(env->cur_state, REF_TYPE_LOCK_MASK, id, ptr); 12842 if (!s) { 12843 verbose(env, "held lock and object are not in the same allocation\n"); 12844 return -EINVAL; 12845 } 12846 return 0; 12847 } 12848 12849 static bool is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12850 { 12851 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 12852 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 12853 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 12854 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back] || 12855 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_front] || 12856 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_back]; 12857 } 12858 12859 static bool is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12860 { 12861 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl] || 12862 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 12863 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first] || 12864 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_root] || 12865 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_left] || 12866 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_right]; 12867 } 12868 12869 static bool is_bpf_iter_num_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12870 { 12871 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_num_new] || 12872 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_num_next] || 12873 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_num_destroy]; 12874 } 12875 12876 static bool is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12877 { 12878 return is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(btf_id) || is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id) || 12879 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]; 12880 } 12881 12882 static bool is_bpf_res_spin_lock_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12883 { 12884 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] || 12885 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock] || 12886 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave] || 12887 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore]; 12888 } 12889 12890 static bool is_bpf_arena_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12891 { 12892 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_arena_alloc_pages] || 12893 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_arena_free_pages] || 12894 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_arena_reserve_pages]; 12895 } 12896 12897 static bool kfunc_spin_allowed(u32 btf_id) 12898 { 12899 return is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(btf_id) || is_bpf_iter_num_api_kfunc(btf_id) || 12900 is_bpf_res_spin_lock_kfunc(btf_id) || is_bpf_arena_kfunc(btf_id); 12901 } 12902 12903 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12904 { 12905 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]; 12906 } 12907 12908 static bool is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12909 { 12910 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl] || 12911 is_task_work_add_kfunc(btf_id); 12912 } 12913 12914 static bool is_bpf_throw_kfunc(struct bpf_insn *insn) 12915 { 12916 return bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && insn->off == 0 && 12917 insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_throw]; 12918 } 12919 12920 static bool is_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12921 { 12922 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl]; 12923 } 12924 12925 static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12926 { 12927 return is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(btf_id) || 12928 is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(btf_id); 12929 } 12930 12931 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12932 { 12933 return is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id); 12934 } 12935 12936 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12937 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 12938 u32 kfunc_btf_id) 12939 { 12940 bool ret; 12941 12942 switch (head_field_type) { 12943 case BPF_LIST_HEAD: 12944 ret = is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 12945 break; 12946 case BPF_RB_ROOT: 12947 ret = is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 12948 break; 12949 default: 12950 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph root argument type %s\n", 12951 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type)); 12952 return false; 12953 } 12954 12955 if (!ret) 12956 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s head arg for unknown kfunc\n", 12957 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type)); 12958 return ret; 12959 } 12960 12961 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12962 enum btf_field_type node_field_type, 12963 u32 kfunc_btf_id) 12964 { 12965 bool ret; 12966 12967 switch (node_field_type) { 12968 case BPF_LIST_NODE: 12969 ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 12970 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl]); 12971 break; 12972 case BPF_RB_NODE: 12973 ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 12974 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl] || 12975 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_left] || 12976 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_right]); 12977 break; 12978 default: 12979 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph node argument type %s\n", 12980 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type)); 12981 return false; 12982 } 12983 12984 if (!ret) 12985 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s node arg for unknown kfunc\n", 12986 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type)); 12987 return ret; 12988 } 12989 12990 static int 12991 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12992 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 12993 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 12994 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 12995 struct btf_field **head_field) 12996 { 12997 const char *head_type_name; 12998 struct btf_field *field; 12999 struct btf_record *rec; 13000 u32 head_off; 13001 13002 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) { 13003 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call"); 13004 return -EFAULT; 13005 } 13006 13007 if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(env, head_field_type, meta->func_id)) 13008 return -EFAULT; 13009 13010 head_type_name = btf_field_type_name(head_field_type); 13011 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 13012 verbose(env, 13013 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n", 13014 regno, head_type_name); 13015 return -EINVAL; 13016 } 13017 13018 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 13019 head_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 13020 field = btf_record_find(rec, head_off, head_field_type); 13021 if (!field) { 13022 verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", head_type_name, head_off); 13023 return -EINVAL; 13024 } 13025 13026 /* All functions require bpf_list_head to be protected using a bpf_spin_lock */ 13027 if (check_reg_allocation_locked(env, reg)) { 13028 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock at off=%d must be held for %s\n", 13029 rec->spin_lock_off, head_type_name); 13030 return -EINVAL; 13031 } 13032 13033 if (*head_field) { 13034 verifier_bug(env, "repeating %s arg", head_type_name); 13035 return -EFAULT; 13036 } 13037 *head_field = field; 13038 return 0; 13039 } 13040 13041 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13042 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 13043 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 13044 { 13045 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_LIST_HEAD, 13046 &meta->arg_list_head.field); 13047 } 13048 13049 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13050 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 13051 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 13052 { 13053 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_RB_ROOT, 13054 &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field); 13055 } 13056 13057 static int 13058 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13059 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 13060 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 13061 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 13062 enum btf_field_type node_field_type, 13063 struct btf_field **node_field) 13064 { 13065 const char *node_type_name; 13066 const struct btf_type *et, *t; 13067 struct btf_field *field; 13068 u32 node_off; 13069 13070 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) { 13071 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call"); 13072 return -EFAULT; 13073 } 13074 13075 if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(env, node_field_type, meta->func_id)) 13076 return -EFAULT; 13077 13078 node_type_name = btf_field_type_name(node_field_type); 13079 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 13080 verbose(env, 13081 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n", 13082 regno, node_type_name); 13083 return -EINVAL; 13084 } 13085 13086 node_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 13087 field = reg_find_field_offset(reg, node_off, node_field_type); 13088 if (!field) { 13089 verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", node_type_name, node_off); 13090 return -EINVAL; 13091 } 13092 13093 field = *node_field; 13094 13095 et = btf_type_by_id(field->graph_root.btf, field->graph_root.value_btf_id); 13096 t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 13097 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, 0, field->graph_root.btf, 13098 field->graph_root.value_btf_id, true)) { 13099 verbose(env, "operation on %s expects arg#1 %s at offset=%d " 13100 "in struct %s, but arg is at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 13101 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type), 13102 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type), 13103 field->graph_root.node_offset, 13104 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off), 13105 node_off, btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off)); 13106 return -EINVAL; 13107 } 13108 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 13109 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 13110 13111 if (node_off != field->graph_root.node_offset) { 13112 verbose(env, "arg#1 offset=%d, but expected %s at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 13113 node_off, btf_field_type_name(node_field_type), 13114 field->graph_root.node_offset, 13115 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off)); 13116 return -EINVAL; 13117 } 13118 13119 return 0; 13120 } 13121 13122 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13123 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 13124 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 13125 { 13126 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta, 13127 BPF_LIST_HEAD, BPF_LIST_NODE, 13128 &meta->arg_list_head.field); 13129 } 13130 13131 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13132 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 13133 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 13134 { 13135 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta, 13136 BPF_RB_ROOT, BPF_RB_NODE, 13137 &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field); 13138 } 13139 13140 /* 13141 * css_task iter allowlist is needed to avoid dead locking on css_set_lock. 13142 * LSM hooks and iters (both sleepable and non-sleepable) are safe. 13143 * Any sleepable progs are also safe since bpf_check_attach_target() enforce 13144 * them can only be attached to some specific hook points. 13145 */ 13146 static bool check_css_task_iter_allowlist(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 13147 { 13148 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 13149 13150 switch (prog_type) { 13151 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 13152 return true; 13153 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 13154 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) 13155 return true; 13156 fallthrough; 13157 default: 13158 return in_sleepable(env); 13159 } 13160 } 13161 13162 static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 13163 int insn_idx) 13164 { 13165 const char *func_name = meta->func_name, *ref_tname; 13166 const struct btf *btf = meta->btf; 13167 const struct btf_param *args; 13168 struct btf_record *rec; 13169 u32 i, nargs; 13170 int ret; 13171 13172 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta->func_proto + 1); 13173 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta->func_proto); 13174 if (nargs > MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) { 13175 verbose(env, "Function %s has %d > %d args\n", func_name, nargs, 13176 MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS); 13177 return -EINVAL; 13178 } 13179 13180 /* Check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the 13181 * verifier sees. 13182 */ 13183 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 13184 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[i + 1]; 13185 const struct btf_type *t, *ref_t, *resolve_ret; 13186 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = ARG_DONTCARE; 13187 u32 regno = i + 1, ref_id, type_size; 13188 bool is_ret_buf_sz = false; 13189 int kf_arg_type; 13190 13191 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, args[i].type, NULL); 13192 13193 if (is_kfunc_arg_ignore(btf, &args[i])) 13194 continue; 13195 13196 if (is_kfunc_arg_prog(btf, &args[i])) { 13197 /* Used to reject repeated use of __prog. */ 13198 if (meta->arg_prog) { 13199 verifier_bug(env, "Only 1 prog->aux argument supported per-kfunc"); 13200 return -EFAULT; 13201 } 13202 meta->arg_prog = true; 13203 cur_aux(env)->arg_prog = regno; 13204 continue; 13205 } 13206 13207 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 13208 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 13209 verbose(env, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno); 13210 return -EINVAL; 13211 } 13212 13213 if (is_kfunc_arg_constant(meta->btf, &args[i])) { 13214 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 13215 verifier_bug(env, "only one constant argument permitted"); 13216 return -EFAULT; 13217 } 13218 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 13219 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno); 13220 return -EINVAL; 13221 } 13222 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 13223 if (ret < 0) 13224 return ret; 13225 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 13226 meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value; 13227 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdonly_buf_size")) { 13228 meta->r0_rdonly = true; 13229 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 13230 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdwr_buf_size")) { 13231 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 13232 } 13233 13234 if (is_ret_buf_sz) { 13235 if (meta->r0_size) { 13236 verbose(env, "2 or more rdonly/rdwr_buf_size parameters for kfunc"); 13237 return -EINVAL; 13238 } 13239 13240 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 13241 verbose(env, "R%d is not a const\n", regno); 13242 return -EINVAL; 13243 } 13244 13245 meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value; 13246 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 13247 if (ret) 13248 return ret; 13249 } 13250 continue; 13251 } 13252 13253 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 13254 verbose(env, "Unrecognized arg#%d type %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 13255 return -EINVAL; 13256 } 13257 13258 if ((register_is_null(reg) || type_may_be_null(reg->type)) && 13259 !is_kfunc_arg_nullable(meta->btf, &args[i])) { 13260 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg%d\n", i); 13261 return -EACCES; 13262 } 13263 13264 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 13265 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) { 13266 verifier_bug(env, "more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u", 13267 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 13268 meta->ref_obj_id); 13269 return -EFAULT; 13270 } 13271 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 13272 if (is_kfunc_release(meta)) 13273 meta->release_regno = regno; 13274 } 13275 13276 ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &ref_id); 13277 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off); 13278 13279 kf_arg_type = get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(env, meta, t, ref_t, ref_tname, args, i, nargs); 13280 if (kf_arg_type < 0) 13281 return kf_arg_type; 13282 13283 switch (kf_arg_type) { 13284 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL: 13285 continue; 13286 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MAP: 13287 if (!reg->map_ptr) { 13288 verbose(env, "pointer in R%d isn't map pointer\n", regno); 13289 return -EINVAL; 13290 } 13291 if (meta->map.ptr && (reg->map_ptr->record->wq_off >= 0 || 13292 reg->map_ptr->record->task_work_off >= 0)) { 13293 /* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject: 13294 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1) 13295 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2) 13296 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) { 13297 * wq = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1); 13298 * if (wq) 13299 * // mismatch would have been allowed 13300 * bpf_wq_init(wq, inner_map2); 13301 * } 13302 * 13303 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps. 13304 */ 13305 if (meta->map.ptr != reg->map_ptr || 13306 meta->map.uid != reg->map_uid) { 13307 if (reg->map_ptr->record->task_work_off >= 0) { 13308 verbose(env, 13309 "bpf_task_work pointer in R2 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R3 map_uid=%d\n", 13310 meta->map.uid, reg->map_uid); 13311 return -EINVAL; 13312 } 13313 verbose(env, 13314 "workqueue pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n", 13315 meta->map.uid, reg->map_uid); 13316 return -EINVAL; 13317 } 13318 } 13319 meta->map.ptr = reg->map_ptr; 13320 meta->map.uid = reg->map_uid; 13321 fallthrough; 13322 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 13323 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 13324 if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) { 13325 if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) { 13326 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); 13327 return -EINVAL; 13328 } 13329 if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) { 13330 verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno); 13331 return -EINVAL; 13332 } 13333 } 13334 fallthrough; 13335 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 13336 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 13337 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER: 13338 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 13339 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 13340 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT: 13341 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE: 13342 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 13343 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 13344 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK: 13345 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR: 13346 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: 13347 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE: 13348 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TASK_WORK: 13349 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_IRQ_FLAG: 13350 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK: 13351 break; 13352 default: 13353 verifier_bug(env, "unknown kfunc arg type %d", kf_arg_type); 13354 return -EFAULT; 13355 } 13356 13357 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) 13358 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 13359 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 13360 if (ret < 0) 13361 return ret; 13362 13363 switch (kf_arg_type) { 13364 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 13365 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 13366 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to ctx, but got %s\n", 13367 i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 13368 return -EINVAL; 13369 } 13370 13371 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 13372 ret = get_kern_ctx_btf_id(&env->log, resolve_prog_type(env->prog)); 13373 if (ret < 0) 13374 return -EINVAL; 13375 meta->ret_btf_id = ret; 13376 } 13377 break; 13378 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 13379 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 13380 if (meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 13381 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected for bpf_obj_drop_impl()\n", i); 13382 return -EINVAL; 13383 } 13384 } else if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | MEM_PERCPU)) { 13385 if (meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl]) { 13386 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected for bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl()\n", i); 13387 return -EINVAL; 13388 } 13389 } else { 13390 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 13391 return -EINVAL; 13392 } 13393 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 13394 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 13395 return -EINVAL; 13396 } 13397 if (meta->btf == btf_vmlinux) { 13398 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 13399 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 13400 } 13401 break; 13402 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 13403 { 13404 enum bpf_arg_type dynptr_arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 13405 int clone_ref_obj_id = 0; 13406 13407 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 13408 dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_RDONLY; 13409 13410 if (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, &args[i])) 13411 dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT; 13412 13413 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) { 13414 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 13415 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp]) { 13416 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 13417 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb_meta]) { 13418 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META; 13419 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_file]) { 13420 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE; 13421 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_file_discard]) { 13422 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE; 13423 meta->release_regno = regno; 13424 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_clone] && 13425 (dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) { 13426 enum bpf_dynptr_type parent_type = meta->initialized_dynptr.type; 13427 13428 if (parent_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) { 13429 verifier_bug(env, "no dynptr type for parent of clone"); 13430 return -EFAULT; 13431 } 13432 13433 dynptr_arg_type |= (unsigned int)get_dynptr_type_flag(parent_type); 13434 clone_ref_obj_id = meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id; 13435 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(parent_type) && !clone_ref_obj_id) { 13436 verifier_bug(env, "missing ref obj id for parent of clone"); 13437 return -EFAULT; 13438 } 13439 } 13440 13441 ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, dynptr_arg_type, clone_ref_obj_id); 13442 if (ret < 0) 13443 return ret; 13444 13445 if (!(dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) { 13446 int id = dynptr_id(env, reg); 13447 13448 if (id < 0) { 13449 verifier_bug(env, "failed to obtain dynptr id"); 13450 return id; 13451 } 13452 meta->initialized_dynptr.id = id; 13453 meta->initialized_dynptr.type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg); 13454 meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); 13455 } 13456 13457 break; 13458 } 13459 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER: 13460 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_css_task_new]) { 13461 if (!check_css_task_iter_allowlist(env)) { 13462 verbose(env, "css_task_iter is only allowed in bpf_lsm, bpf_iter and sleepable progs\n"); 13463 return -EINVAL; 13464 } 13465 } 13466 ret = process_iter_arg(env, regno, insn_idx, meta); 13467 if (ret < 0) 13468 return ret; 13469 break; 13470 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 13471 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 13472 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 13473 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 13474 return -EINVAL; 13475 } 13476 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 13477 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 13478 return -EINVAL; 13479 } 13480 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(env, reg, regno, meta); 13481 if (ret < 0) 13482 return ret; 13483 break; 13484 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT: 13485 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 13486 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 13487 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 13488 return -EINVAL; 13489 } 13490 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 13491 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 13492 return -EINVAL; 13493 } 13494 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(env, reg, regno, meta); 13495 if (ret < 0) 13496 return ret; 13497 break; 13498 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 13499 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 13500 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 13501 return -EINVAL; 13502 } 13503 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 13504 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 13505 return -EINVAL; 13506 } 13507 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 13508 if (ret < 0) 13509 return ret; 13510 break; 13511 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE: 13512 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 13513 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 13514 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 13515 return -EINVAL; 13516 } 13517 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 13518 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 13519 return -EINVAL; 13520 } 13521 } else { 13522 if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 13523 verbose(env, "%s can only take non-owning or refcounted bpf_rb_node pointer\n", func_name); 13524 return -EINVAL; 13525 } 13526 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 13527 verbose(env, "%s not allowed in rbtree cb\n", func_name); 13528 return -EINVAL; 13529 } 13530 } 13531 13532 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 13533 if (ret < 0) 13534 return ret; 13535 break; 13536 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MAP: 13537 /* If argument has '__map' suffix expect 'struct bpf_map *' */ 13538 ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[CONST_PTR_TO_MAP]; 13539 ref_t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, ref_id); 13540 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off); 13541 fallthrough; 13542 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 13543 /* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */ 13544 if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 13545 (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) && 13546 !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) { 13547 verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 13548 verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n", 13549 reg_type_str(env, base_type(reg->type) | 13550 (type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS))); 13551 return -EINVAL; 13552 } 13553 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, ref_id, meta, i); 13554 if (ret < 0) 13555 return ret; 13556 break; 13557 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 13558 resolve_ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, ref_t, &type_size); 13559 if (IS_ERR(resolve_ret)) { 13560 verbose(env, "arg#%d reference type('%s %s') size cannot be determined: %ld\n", 13561 i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, PTR_ERR(resolve_ret)); 13562 return -EINVAL; 13563 } 13564 ret = check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, type_size); 13565 if (ret < 0) 13566 return ret; 13567 break; 13568 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 13569 { 13570 struct bpf_reg_state *buff_reg = ®s[regno]; 13571 const struct btf_param *buff_arg = &args[i]; 13572 struct bpf_reg_state *size_reg = ®s[regno + 1]; 13573 const struct btf_param *size_arg = &args[i + 1]; 13574 13575 if (!register_is_null(buff_reg) || !is_kfunc_arg_nullable(meta->btf, buff_arg)) { 13576 ret = check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(env, size_reg, regno + 1); 13577 if (ret < 0) { 13578 verbose(env, "arg#%d arg#%d memory, len pair leads to invalid memory access\n", i, i + 1); 13579 return ret; 13580 } 13581 } 13582 13583 if (is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, size_arg, size_reg)) { 13584 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 13585 verifier_bug(env, "only one constant argument permitted"); 13586 return -EFAULT; 13587 } 13588 if (!tnum_is_const(size_reg->var_off)) { 13589 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno + 1); 13590 return -EINVAL; 13591 } 13592 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 13593 meta->arg_constant.value = size_reg->var_off.value; 13594 } 13595 13596 /* Skip next '__sz' or '__szk' argument */ 13597 i++; 13598 break; 13599 } 13600 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK: 13601 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_FUNC) { 13602 verbose(env, "arg%d expected pointer to func\n", i); 13603 return -EINVAL; 13604 } 13605 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 13606 break; 13607 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR: 13608 if (!type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 13609 verbose(env, "arg#%d is neither owning or non-owning ref\n", i); 13610 return -EINVAL; 13611 } 13612 if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 13613 meta->arg_owning_ref = true; 13614 13615 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 13616 if (!rec) { 13617 verifier_bug(env, "Couldn't find btf_record"); 13618 return -EFAULT; 13619 } 13620 13621 if (rec->refcount_off < 0) { 13622 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a type with bpf_refcount field\n", i); 13623 return -EINVAL; 13624 } 13625 13626 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 13627 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 13628 break; 13629 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: 13630 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 13631 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a const string\n", i); 13632 return -EINVAL; 13633 } 13634 ret = check_reg_const_str(env, reg, regno); 13635 if (ret) 13636 return ret; 13637 break; 13638 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE: 13639 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 13640 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a map value\n", i); 13641 return -EINVAL; 13642 } 13643 ret = process_wq_func(env, regno, meta); 13644 if (ret < 0) 13645 return ret; 13646 break; 13647 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TASK_WORK: 13648 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 13649 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a map value\n", i); 13650 return -EINVAL; 13651 } 13652 ret = process_task_work_func(env, regno, meta); 13653 if (ret < 0) 13654 return ret; 13655 break; 13656 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_IRQ_FLAG: 13657 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) { 13658 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to an irq flag on stack\n", i); 13659 return -EINVAL; 13660 } 13661 ret = process_irq_flag(env, regno, meta); 13662 if (ret < 0) 13663 return ret; 13664 break; 13665 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK: 13666 { 13667 int flags = PROCESS_RES_LOCK; 13668 13669 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 13670 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to map value or allocated object\n", i); 13671 return -EINVAL; 13672 } 13673 13674 if (!is_bpf_res_spin_lock_kfunc(meta->func_id)) 13675 return -EFAULT; 13676 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] || 13677 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave]) 13678 flags |= PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK; 13679 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave] || 13680 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore]) 13681 flags |= PROCESS_LOCK_IRQ; 13682 ret = process_spin_lock(env, regno, flags); 13683 if (ret < 0) 13684 return ret; 13685 break; 13686 } 13687 } 13688 } 13689 13690 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && !meta->release_regno) { 13691 verbose(env, "release kernel function %s expects refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n", 13692 func_name); 13693 return -EINVAL; 13694 } 13695 13696 return 0; 13697 } 13698 13699 static int fetch_kfunc_meta(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13700 struct bpf_insn *insn, 13701 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 13702 const char **kfunc_name) 13703 { 13704 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 13705 u32 func_id, *kfunc_flags; 13706 const char *func_name; 13707 struct btf *desc_btf; 13708 13709 if (kfunc_name) 13710 *kfunc_name = NULL; 13711 13712 if (!insn->imm) 13713 return -EINVAL; 13714 13715 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, insn->off); 13716 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 13717 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 13718 13719 func_id = insn->imm; 13720 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 13721 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 13722 if (kfunc_name) 13723 *kfunc_name = func_name; 13724 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 13725 13726 kfunc_flags = btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(desc_btf, func_id, env->prog); 13727 if (!kfunc_flags) { 13728 return -EACCES; 13729 } 13730 13731 memset(meta, 0, sizeof(*meta)); 13732 meta->btf = desc_btf; 13733 meta->func_id = func_id; 13734 meta->kfunc_flags = *kfunc_flags; 13735 meta->func_proto = func_proto; 13736 meta->func_name = func_name; 13737 13738 return 0; 13739 } 13740 13741 /* check special kfuncs and return: 13742 * 1 - not fall-through to 'else' branch, continue verification 13743 * 0 - fall-through to 'else' branch 13744 * < 0 - not fall-through to 'else' branch, return error 13745 */ 13746 static int check_special_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 13747 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux, 13748 const struct btf_type *ptr_type, struct btf *desc_btf) 13749 { 13750 const struct btf_type *ret_t; 13751 int err = 0; 13752 13753 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) 13754 return 0; 13755 13756 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] || 13757 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) { 13758 struct btf_struct_meta *struct_meta; 13759 struct btf *ret_btf; 13760 u32 ret_btf_id; 13761 13762 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] && !bpf_global_ma_set) 13763 return -ENOMEM; 13764 13765 if (((u64)(u32)meta->arg_constant.value) != meta->arg_constant.value) { 13766 verbose(env, "local type ID argument must be in range [0, U32_MAX]\n"); 13767 return -EINVAL; 13768 } 13769 13770 ret_btf = env->prog->aux->btf; 13771 ret_btf_id = meta->arg_constant.value; 13772 13773 /* This may be NULL due to user not supplying a BTF */ 13774 if (!ret_btf) { 13775 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new/bpf_percpu_obj_new requires prog BTF\n"); 13776 return -EINVAL; 13777 } 13778 13779 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 13780 if (!ret_t || !__btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 13781 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new/bpf_percpu_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 13782 return -EINVAL; 13783 } 13784 13785 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) { 13786 if (ret_t->size > BPF_GLOBAL_PERCPU_MA_MAX_SIZE) { 13787 verbose(env, "bpf_percpu_obj_new type size (%d) is greater than %d\n", 13788 ret_t->size, BPF_GLOBAL_PERCPU_MA_MAX_SIZE); 13789 return -EINVAL; 13790 } 13791 13792 if (!bpf_global_percpu_ma_set) { 13793 mutex_lock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock); 13794 if (!bpf_global_percpu_ma_set) { 13795 /* Charge memory allocated with bpf_global_percpu_ma to 13796 * root memcg. The obj_cgroup for root memcg is NULL. 13797 */ 13798 err = bpf_mem_alloc_percpu_init(&bpf_global_percpu_ma, NULL); 13799 if (!err) 13800 bpf_global_percpu_ma_set = true; 13801 } 13802 mutex_unlock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock); 13803 if (err) 13804 return err; 13805 } 13806 13807 mutex_lock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock); 13808 err = bpf_mem_alloc_percpu_unit_init(&bpf_global_percpu_ma, ret_t->size); 13809 mutex_unlock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock); 13810 if (err) 13811 return err; 13812 } 13813 13814 struct_meta = btf_find_struct_meta(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 13815 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) { 13816 if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, ret_btf, ret_t, 0)) { 13817 verbose(env, "bpf_percpu_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct of scalars\n"); 13818 return -EINVAL; 13819 } 13820 13821 if (struct_meta) { 13822 verbose(env, "bpf_percpu_obj_new type ID argument must not contain special fields\n"); 13823 return -EINVAL; 13824 } 13825 } 13826 13827 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13828 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 13829 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 13830 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 13831 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) 13832 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_PERCPU; 13833 13834 insn_aux->obj_new_size = ret_t->size; 13835 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = struct_meta; 13836 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) { 13837 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13838 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 13839 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta->arg_btf; 13840 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta->arg_btf_id; 13841 13842 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 13843 btf_find_struct_meta(meta->arg_btf, 13844 meta->arg_btf_id); 13845 } else if (is_list_node_type(ptr_type)) { 13846 struct btf_field *field = meta->arg_list_head.field; 13847 13848 mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root); 13849 } else if (is_rbtree_node_type(ptr_type)) { 13850 struct btf_field *field = meta->arg_rbtree_root.field; 13851 13852 mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root); 13853 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 13854 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13855 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED; 13856 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 13857 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta->ret_btf_id; 13858 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 13859 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, meta->arg_constant.value); 13860 if (!ret_t) { 13861 verbose(env, "Unknown type ID %lld passed to kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast\n", 13862 meta->arg_constant.value); 13863 return -EINVAL; 13864 } else if (btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 13865 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13866 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 13867 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 13868 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta->arg_constant.value; 13869 } else if (btf_type_is_void(ret_t)) { 13870 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13871 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 13872 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = 0; 13873 } else { 13874 verbose(env, 13875 "kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast type ID argument must be of a struct or void\n"); 13876 return -EINVAL; 13877 } 13878 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice] || 13879 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr]) { 13880 enum bpf_type_flag type_flag = get_dynptr_type_flag(meta->initialized_dynptr.type); 13881 13882 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13883 13884 if (!meta->arg_constant.found) { 13885 verifier_bug(env, "bpf_dynptr_slice(_rdwr) no constant size"); 13886 return -EFAULT; 13887 } 13888 13889 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta->arg_constant.value; 13890 13891 /* PTR_MAYBE_NULL will be added when is_kfunc_ret_null is checked */ 13892 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | type_flag; 13893 13894 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice]) { 13895 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 13896 } else { 13897 /* this will set env->seen_direct_write to true */ 13898 if (!may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE)) { 13899 verbose(env, "the prog does not allow writes to packet data\n"); 13900 return -EINVAL; 13901 } 13902 } 13903 13904 if (!meta->initialized_dynptr.id) { 13905 verifier_bug(env, "no dynptr id"); 13906 return -EFAULT; 13907 } 13908 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta->initialized_dynptr.id; 13909 13910 /* we don't need to set BPF_REG_0's ref obj id 13911 * because packet slices are not refcounted (see 13912 * dynptr_type_refcounted) 13913 */ 13914 } else { 13915 return 0; 13916 } 13917 13918 return 1; 13919 } 13920 13921 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, const char *reg_name); 13922 13923 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 13924 int *insn_idx_p) 13925 { 13926 bool sleepable, rcu_lock, rcu_unlock, preempt_disable, preempt_enable; 13927 u32 i, nargs, ptr_type_id, release_ref_obj_id; 13928 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 13929 const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name; 13930 const struct btf_type *t, *ptr_type; 13931 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 13932 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux; 13933 int err, insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 13934 const struct btf_param *args; 13935 struct btf *desc_btf; 13936 13937 /* skip for now, but return error when we find this in fixup_kfunc_call */ 13938 if (!insn->imm) 13939 return 0; 13940 13941 err = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, insn, &meta, &func_name); 13942 if (err == -EACCES && func_name) 13943 verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n", func_name); 13944 if (err) 13945 return err; 13946 desc_btf = meta.btf; 13947 insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 13948 13949 insn_aux->is_iter_next = is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta); 13950 13951 if (!insn->off && 13952 (insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] || 13953 insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave])) { 13954 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 13955 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 13956 13957 branch = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, false); 13958 if (IS_ERR(branch)) { 13959 verbose(env, "failed to push state for failed lock acquisition\n"); 13960 return PTR_ERR(branch); 13961 } 13962 13963 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs; 13964 13965 /* Clear r0-r5 registers in forked state */ 13966 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) 13967 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 13968 13969 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13970 err = __mark_reg_s32_range(env, regs, BPF_REG_0, -MAX_ERRNO, -1); 13971 if (err) { 13972 verbose(env, "failed to mark s32 range for retval in forked state for lock\n"); 13973 return err; 13974 } 13975 __mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regs, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(u32)); 13976 } else if (!insn->off && insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF___bpf_trap]) { 13977 verbose(env, "unexpected __bpf_trap() due to uninitialized variable?\n"); 13978 return -EFAULT; 13979 } 13980 13981 if (is_kfunc_destructive(&meta) && !capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) { 13982 verbose(env, "destructive kfunc calls require CAP_SYS_BOOT capability\n"); 13983 return -EACCES; 13984 } 13985 13986 sleepable = is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta); 13987 if (sleepable && !in_sleepable(env)) { 13988 verbose(env, "program must be sleepable to call sleepable kfunc %s\n", func_name); 13989 return -EACCES; 13990 } 13991 13992 /* Track non-sleepable context for kfuncs, same as for helpers. */ 13993 if (!in_sleepable_context(env)) 13994 insn_aux->non_sleepable = true; 13995 13996 /* Check the arguments */ 13997 err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta, insn_idx); 13998 if (err < 0) 13999 return err; 14000 14001 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 14002 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 14003 set_rbtree_add_callback_state); 14004 if (err) { 14005 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n", 14006 func_name, meta.func_id); 14007 return err; 14008 } 14009 } 14010 14011 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_session_cookie]) { 14012 meta.r0_size = sizeof(u64); 14013 meta.r0_rdonly = false; 14014 } 14015 14016 if (is_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl_kfunc(meta.func_id)) { 14017 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 14018 set_timer_callback_state); 14019 if (err) { 14020 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n", 14021 func_name, meta.func_id); 14022 return err; 14023 } 14024 } 14025 14026 if (is_task_work_add_kfunc(meta.func_id)) { 14027 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 14028 set_task_work_schedule_callback_state); 14029 if (err) { 14030 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n", 14031 func_name, meta.func_id); 14032 return err; 14033 } 14034 } 14035 14036 rcu_lock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(&meta); 14037 rcu_unlock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(&meta); 14038 14039 preempt_disable = is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_disable(&meta); 14040 preempt_enable = is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_enable(&meta); 14041 14042 if (rcu_lock) { 14043 env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks++; 14044 } else if (rcu_unlock) { 14045 struct bpf_func_state *state; 14046 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 14047 u32 clear_mask = (1 << STACK_SPILL) | (1 << STACK_ITER); 14048 14049 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks == 0) { 14050 verbose(env, "unmatched rcu read unlock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 14051 return -EINVAL; 14052 } 14053 if (--env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks == 0) { 14054 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate_mask(env->cur_state, state, reg, clear_mask, ({ 14055 if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { 14056 reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL); 14057 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 14058 } 14059 })); 14060 } 14061 } else if (sleepable && env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks) { 14062 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within rcu_read_lock region\n", func_name); 14063 return -EACCES; 14064 } 14065 14066 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env) && (rcu_lock || rcu_unlock)) { 14067 verbose(env, "Calling bpf_rcu_read_{lock,unlock} in unnecessary rbtree callback\n"); 14068 return -EACCES; 14069 } 14070 14071 if (env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks) { 14072 if (preempt_disable) { 14073 env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks++; 14074 } else if (preempt_enable) { 14075 env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks--; 14076 } else if (sleepable) { 14077 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within non-preemptible region\n", func_name); 14078 return -EACCES; 14079 } 14080 } else if (preempt_disable) { 14081 env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks++; 14082 } else if (preempt_enable) { 14083 verbose(env, "unmatched attempt to enable preemption (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 14084 return -EINVAL; 14085 } 14086 14087 if (env->cur_state->active_irq_id && sleepable) { 14088 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within IRQ-disabled region\n", func_name); 14089 return -EACCES; 14090 } 14091 14092 if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(&meta) && !in_rcu_cs(env)) { 14093 verbose(env, "kernel func %s requires RCU critical section protection\n", func_name); 14094 return -EACCES; 14095 } 14096 14097 /* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted 14098 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now. 14099 */ 14100 if (meta.release_regno) { 14101 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[meta.release_regno]; 14102 14103 if (meta.initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id) { 14104 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, reg); 14105 } else { 14106 err = release_reference(env, reg->ref_obj_id); 14107 if (err) 14108 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 14109 func_name, meta.func_id); 14110 } 14111 if (err) 14112 return err; 14113 } 14114 14115 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 14116 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 14117 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 14118 release_ref_obj_id = regs[BPF_REG_2].ref_obj_id; 14119 insn_aux->insert_off = regs[BPF_REG_2].off; 14120 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, meta.arg_btf_id); 14121 err = ref_convert_owning_non_owning(env, release_ref_obj_id); 14122 if (err) { 14123 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d conversion of owning ref to non-owning failed\n", 14124 func_name, meta.func_id); 14125 return err; 14126 } 14127 14128 err = release_reference(env, release_ref_obj_id); 14129 if (err) { 14130 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 14131 func_name, meta.func_id); 14132 return err; 14133 } 14134 } 14135 14136 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_throw]) { 14137 if (!bpf_jit_supports_exceptions()) { 14138 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kfunc %s#%d\n", 14139 func_name, meta.func_id); 14140 return -ENOTSUPP; 14141 } 14142 env->seen_exception = true; 14143 14144 /* In the case of the default callback, the cookie value passed 14145 * to bpf_throw becomes the return value of the program. 14146 */ 14147 if (!env->exception_callback_subprog) { 14148 err = check_return_code(env, BPF_REG_1, "R1"); 14149 if (err < 0) 14150 return err; 14151 } 14152 } 14153 14154 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) 14155 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 14156 14157 /* Check return type */ 14158 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, meta.func_proto->type, NULL); 14159 14160 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta) && !btf_type_is_struct_ptr(meta.btf, t)) { 14161 /* Only exception is bpf_obj_new_impl */ 14162 if (meta.btf != btf_vmlinux || 14163 (meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] && 14164 meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl] && 14165 meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl])) { 14166 verbose(env, "acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n"); 14167 return -EINVAL; 14168 } 14169 } 14170 14171 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 14172 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 14173 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] || 14174 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave])) 14175 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, ®s[BPF_REG_0]); 14176 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size); 14177 } else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 14178 ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t->type, &ptr_type_id); 14179 err = check_special_kfunc(env, &meta, regs, insn_aux, ptr_type, desc_btf); 14180 if (err) { 14181 if (err < 0) 14182 return err; 14183 } else if (btf_type_is_void(ptr_type)) { 14184 /* kfunc returning 'void *' is equivalent to returning scalar */ 14185 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 14186 } else if (!__btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) { 14187 if (!meta.r0_size) { 14188 __u32 sz; 14189 14190 if (!IS_ERR(btf_resolve_size(desc_btf, ptr_type, &sz))) { 14191 meta.r0_size = sz; 14192 meta.r0_rdonly = true; 14193 } 14194 } 14195 if (!meta.r0_size) { 14196 ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, 14197 ptr_type->name_off); 14198 verbose(env, 14199 "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 14200 func_name, 14201 btf_type_str(ptr_type), 14202 ptr_type_name); 14203 return -EINVAL; 14204 } 14205 14206 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 14207 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM; 14208 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size; 14209 14210 if (meta.r0_rdonly) 14211 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 14212 14213 /* Ensures we don't access the memory after a release_reference() */ 14214 if (meta.ref_obj_id) 14215 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 14216 14217 if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(&meta)) 14218 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RCU; 14219 } else { 14220 enum bpf_reg_type type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 14221 14222 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_get_kmem_cache]) 14223 type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 14224 else if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(&meta) || 14225 (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta) && 14226 (get_iter_from_state(env->cur_state, &meta) 14227 ->type & MEM_RCU))) { 14228 /* 14229 * If the iterator's constructor (the _new 14230 * function e.g., bpf_iter_task_new) has been 14231 * annotated with BPF kfunc flag 14232 * KF_RCU_PROTECTED and was called within a RCU 14233 * read-side critical section, also propagate 14234 * the MEM_RCU flag to the pointer returned from 14235 * the iterator's next function (e.g., 14236 * bpf_iter_task_next). 14237 */ 14238 type |= MEM_RCU; 14239 } else { 14240 /* 14241 * Any PTR_TO_BTF_ID that is returned from a BPF 14242 * kfunc should by default be treated as 14243 * implicitly trusted. 14244 */ 14245 type |= PTR_TRUSTED; 14246 } 14247 14248 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 14249 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 14250 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = type; 14251 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id; 14252 } 14253 14254 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) { 14255 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 14256 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg, see 93c230e3f5bd6 */ 14257 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 14258 } 14259 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *)); 14260 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta)) { 14261 int id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx); 14262 14263 if (id < 0) 14264 return id; 14265 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) 14266 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 14267 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 14268 } else if (is_rbtree_node_type(ptr_type) || is_list_node_type(ptr_type)) { 14269 ref_set_non_owning(env, ®s[BPF_REG_0]); 14270 } 14271 14272 if (reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(®s[BPF_REG_0]) && !regs[BPF_REG_0].id) 14273 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 14274 } else if (btf_type_is_void(t)) { 14275 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux) { 14276 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl] || 14277 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl]) { 14278 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 14279 btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, 14280 meta.arg_btf_id); 14281 } 14282 } 14283 } 14284 14285 if (is_kfunc_pkt_changing(&meta)) 14286 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 14287 14288 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta.func_proto); 14289 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta.func_proto + 1); 14290 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 14291 u32 regno = i + 1; 14292 14293 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, args[i].type, NULL); 14294 if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 14295 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *)); 14296 else 14297 /* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */ 14298 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size); 14299 } 14300 14301 if (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 14302 err = process_iter_next_call(env, insn_idx, &meta); 14303 if (err) 14304 return err; 14305 } 14306 14307 return 0; 14308 } 14309 14310 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14311 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 14312 enum bpf_reg_type type) 14313 { 14314 bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 14315 s64 val = reg->var_off.value; 14316 s64 smin = reg->smin_value; 14317 14318 if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { 14319 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", 14320 reg_type_str(env, type), val); 14321 return false; 14322 } 14323 14324 if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 14325 verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", 14326 reg_type_str(env, type), reg->off); 14327 return false; 14328 } 14329 14330 if (smin == S64_MIN) { 14331 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", 14332 reg_type_str(env, type)); 14333 return false; 14334 } 14335 14336 if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 14337 verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", 14338 smin, reg_type_str(env, type)); 14339 return false; 14340 } 14341 14342 return true; 14343 } 14344 14345 enum { 14346 REASON_BOUNDS = -1, 14347 REASON_TYPE = -2, 14348 REASON_PATHS = -3, 14349 REASON_LIMIT = -4, 14350 REASON_STACK = -5, 14351 }; 14352 14353 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 14354 u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left) 14355 { 14356 u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; 14357 14358 switch (ptr_reg->type) { 14359 case PTR_TO_STACK: 14360 /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the 14361 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar 14362 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is 14363 * currently prohibited for unprivileged. 14364 */ 14365 max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; 14366 ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off); 14367 break; 14368 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 14369 max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size; 14370 ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ? 14371 ptr_reg->smin_value : 14372 ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off; 14373 break; 14374 default: 14375 return REASON_TYPE; 14376 } 14377 14378 if (ptr_limit >= max) 14379 return REASON_LIMIT; 14380 *alu_limit = ptr_limit; 14381 return 0; 14382 } 14383 14384 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14385 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 14386 { 14387 return env->bypass_spec_v1 || 14388 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K || 14389 cur_aux(env)->nospec; 14390 } 14391 14392 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 14393 u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit) 14394 { 14395 /* If we arrived here from different branches with different 14396 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work. 14397 */ 14398 if (aux->alu_state && 14399 (aux->alu_state != alu_state || 14400 aux->alu_limit != alu_limit)) 14401 return REASON_PATHS; 14402 14403 /* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */ 14404 aux->alu_state = alu_state; 14405 aux->alu_limit = alu_limit; 14406 return 0; 14407 } 14408 14409 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14410 struct bpf_insn *insn) 14411 { 14412 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 14413 14414 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 14415 return 0; 14416 14417 return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0); 14418 } 14419 14420 static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode) 14421 { 14422 return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB; 14423 } 14424 14425 struct bpf_sanitize_info { 14426 struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux; 14427 bool mask_to_left; 14428 }; 14429 14430 static int sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14431 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 14432 u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx) 14433 { 14434 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 14435 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 14436 14437 branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true); 14438 if (!IS_ERR(branch) && insn) { 14439 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs; 14440 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 14441 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 14442 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 14443 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 14444 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg); 14445 } 14446 } 14447 return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(branch); 14448 } 14449 14450 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14451 struct bpf_insn *insn, 14452 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 14453 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 14454 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14455 struct bpf_sanitize_info *info, 14456 const bool commit_window) 14457 { 14458 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux; 14459 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 14460 bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 14461 bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; 14462 bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; 14463 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 14464 u32 alu_state, alu_limit; 14465 struct bpf_reg_state tmp; 14466 int err; 14467 14468 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 14469 return 0; 14470 14471 /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative 14472 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care 14473 * to explore bad access from here. 14474 */ 14475 if (vstate->speculative) 14476 goto do_sim; 14477 14478 if (!commit_window) { 14479 if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) && 14480 (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0)) 14481 return REASON_BOUNDS; 14482 14483 info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || 14484 (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); 14485 } 14486 14487 err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left); 14488 if (err < 0) 14489 return err; 14490 14491 if (commit_window) { 14492 /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on 14493 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation. 14494 */ 14495 alu_state = info->aux.alu_state; 14496 alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit); 14497 } else { 14498 alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; 14499 alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0; 14500 alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? 14501 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; 14502 14503 /* Limit pruning on unknown scalars to enable deep search for 14504 * potential masking differences from other program paths. 14505 */ 14506 if (!off_is_imm) 14507 env->explore_alu_limits = true; 14508 } 14509 14510 err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); 14511 if (err < 0) 14512 return err; 14513 do_sim: 14514 /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already 14515 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification 14516 * stack. 14517 * 14518 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based 14519 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as 14520 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either). 14521 */ 14522 if (commit_window || off_is_imm) 14523 return 0; 14524 14525 /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under 14526 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of 14527 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off 14528 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there 14529 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example, 14530 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction 14531 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore 14532 * bad access. 14533 */ 14534 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) { 14535 tmp = *dst_reg; 14536 copy_register_state(dst_reg, ptr_reg); 14537 } 14538 err = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx); 14539 if (err < 0) 14540 return REASON_STACK; 14541 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) 14542 *dst_reg = tmp; 14543 return 0; 14544 } 14545 14546 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14547 { 14548 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 14549 14550 /* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the 14551 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in 14552 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still 14553 * rewrite/sanitize them. 14554 */ 14555 if (!vstate->speculative) 14556 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; 14557 } 14558 14559 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14560 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason, 14561 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 14562 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 14563 { 14564 static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root"; 14565 const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub"; 14566 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; 14567 14568 switch (reason) { 14569 case REASON_BOUNDS: 14570 verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n", 14571 off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err); 14572 break; 14573 case REASON_TYPE: 14574 verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n", 14575 off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err); 14576 break; 14577 case REASON_PATHS: 14578 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n", 14579 dst, op, err); 14580 break; 14581 case REASON_LIMIT: 14582 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n", 14583 dst, op, err); 14584 break; 14585 case REASON_STACK: 14586 verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n", 14587 dst, err); 14588 return -ENOMEM; 14589 default: 14590 verifier_bug(env, "unknown reason (%d)", reason); 14591 break; 14592 } 14593 14594 return -EACCES; 14595 } 14596 14597 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't 14598 * have a variable offset. 14599 * 14600 * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it 14601 * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also 14602 * retrieve_ptr_limit(). 14603 * 14604 * 14605 * 'off' includes 'reg->off'. 14606 */ 14607 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( 14608 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14609 int regno, 14610 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 14611 int off) 14612 { 14613 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 14614 char tn_buf[48]; 14615 14616 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 14617 verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n", 14618 regno, tn_buf, off); 14619 return -EACCES; 14620 } 14621 14622 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { 14623 verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " 14624 "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off); 14625 return -EACCES; 14626 } 14627 14628 return 0; 14629 } 14630 14631 static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14632 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 14633 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 14634 { 14635 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 14636 14637 /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds 14638 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. 14639 */ 14640 if (env->bypass_spec_v1) 14641 return 0; 14642 14643 switch (dst_reg->type) { 14644 case PTR_TO_STACK: 14645 if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg, 14646 dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value)) 14647 return -EACCES; 14648 break; 14649 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 14650 if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false, ACCESS_HELPER)) { 14651 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " 14652 "prohibited for !root\n", dst); 14653 return -EACCES; 14654 } 14655 break; 14656 default: 14657 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 14658 } 14659 14660 return 0; 14661 } 14662 14663 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. 14664 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. 14665 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a 14666 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. 14667 */ 14668 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14669 struct bpf_insn *insn, 14670 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 14671 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) 14672 { 14673 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 14674 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 14675 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg; 14676 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 14677 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, 14678 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; 14679 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, 14680 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; 14681 struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {}; 14682 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 14683 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 14684 int ret, bounds_ret; 14685 14686 dst_reg = ®s[dst]; 14687 14688 if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 14689 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 14690 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from 14691 * e.g. dead branches. 14692 */ 14693 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 14694 return 0; 14695 } 14696 14697 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { 14698 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ 14699 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 14700 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 14701 return 0; 14702 } 14703 14704 verbose(env, 14705 "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 14706 dst); 14707 return -EACCES; 14708 } 14709 14710 if (ptr_reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 14711 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n", 14712 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 14713 return -EACCES; 14714 } 14715 14716 /* 14717 * Accesses to untrusted PTR_TO_MEM are done through probe 14718 * instructions, hence no need to track offsets. 14719 */ 14720 if (base_type(ptr_reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && (ptr_reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) 14721 return 0; 14722 14723 switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) { 14724 case PTR_TO_CTX: 14725 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 14726 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 14727 case PTR_TO_STACK: 14728 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 14729 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 14730 case PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER: 14731 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 14732 case PTR_TO_MEM: 14733 case PTR_TO_BUF: 14734 case PTR_TO_FUNC: 14735 case CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 14736 break; 14737 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 14738 if (known) 14739 break; 14740 fallthrough; 14741 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 14742 /* smin_val represents the known value */ 14743 if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) 14744 break; 14745 fallthrough; 14746 default: 14747 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", 14748 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 14749 return -EACCES; 14750 } 14751 14752 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. 14753 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. 14754 */ 14755 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; 14756 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 14757 14758 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || 14759 !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 14760 return -EINVAL; 14761 14762 /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ 14763 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 14764 14765 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 14766 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 14767 &info, false); 14768 if (ret < 0) 14769 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 14770 } 14771 14772 switch (opcode) { 14773 case BPF_ADD: 14774 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow 14775 * the s32 'off' field 14776 */ 14777 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == 14778 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { 14779 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ 14780 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 14781 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 14782 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 14783 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 14784 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 14785 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; 14786 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 14787 break; 14788 } 14789 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off 14790 * == 0, since it's a scalar. 14791 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive 14792 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' 14793 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. 14794 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets 14795 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset 14796 * from ptr_reg. 14797 */ 14798 if (check_add_overflow(smin_ptr, smin_val, &dst_reg->smin_value) || 14799 check_add_overflow(smax_ptr, smax_val, &dst_reg->smax_value)) { 14800 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 14801 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 14802 } 14803 if (check_add_overflow(umin_ptr, umin_val, &dst_reg->umin_value) || 14804 check_add_overflow(umax_ptr, umax_val, &dst_reg->umax_value)) { 14805 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 14806 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 14807 } 14808 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 14809 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 14810 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 14811 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 14812 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 14813 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 14814 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 14815 } 14816 break; 14817 case BPF_SUB: 14818 if (dst_reg == off_reg) { 14819 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ 14820 verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", 14821 dst); 14822 return -EACCES; 14823 } 14824 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to 14825 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not 14826 * be able to deal with it. 14827 */ 14828 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 14829 verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", 14830 dst); 14831 return -EACCES; 14832 } 14833 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == 14834 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { 14835 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ 14836 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 14837 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 14838 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 14839 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 14840 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 14841 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 14842 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; 14843 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 14844 break; 14845 } 14846 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known 14847 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. 14848 */ 14849 if (check_sub_overflow(smin_ptr, smax_val, &dst_reg->smin_value) || 14850 check_sub_overflow(smax_ptr, smin_val, &dst_reg->smax_value)) { 14851 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 14852 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 14853 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 14854 } 14855 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { 14856 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 14857 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 14858 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 14859 } else { 14860 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 14861 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; 14862 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; 14863 } 14864 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 14865 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 14866 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 14867 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 14868 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 14869 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 14870 if (smin_val < 0) 14871 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 14872 } 14873 break; 14874 case BPF_AND: 14875 case BPF_OR: 14876 case BPF_XOR: 14877 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */ 14878 verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", 14879 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 14880 return -EACCES; 14881 default: 14882 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ 14883 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", 14884 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 14885 return -EACCES; 14886 } 14887 14888 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 14889 return -EINVAL; 14890 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 14891 bounds_ret = sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg); 14892 if (bounds_ret == -EACCES) 14893 return bounds_ret; 14894 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 14895 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 14896 &info, true); 14897 if (verifier_bug_if(!can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn) 14898 && !env->cur_state->speculative 14899 && bounds_ret 14900 && !ret, 14901 env, "Pointer type unsupported by sanitize_check_bounds() not rejected by retrieve_ptr_limit() as required")) { 14902 return -EFAULT; 14903 } 14904 if (ret < 0) 14905 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 14906 } 14907 14908 return 0; 14909 } 14910 14911 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14912 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 14913 { 14914 s32 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->s32_min_value; 14915 s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value; 14916 u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value; 14917 u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value; 14918 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 14919 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 14920 bool min_overflow, max_overflow; 14921 14922 if (check_add_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_min_value, dst_smin) || 14923 check_add_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_max_value, dst_smax)) { 14924 *dst_smin = S32_MIN; 14925 *dst_smax = S32_MAX; 14926 } 14927 14928 /* If either all additions overflow or no additions overflow, then 14929 * it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin + src_umin, dst_umax = 14930 * dst_umax + src_umax. Otherwise (some additions overflow), set 14931 * the output bounds to unbounded. 14932 */ 14933 min_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umin, umin_val, dst_umin); 14934 max_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umax, umax_val, dst_umax); 14935 14936 if (!min_overflow && max_overflow) { 14937 *dst_umin = 0; 14938 *dst_umax = U32_MAX; 14939 } 14940 } 14941 14942 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14943 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 14944 { 14945 s64 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->smin_value; 14946 s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value; 14947 u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value; 14948 u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value; 14949 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 14950 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 14951 bool min_overflow, max_overflow; 14952 14953 if (check_add_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smin_value, dst_smin) || 14954 check_add_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smax_value, dst_smax)) { 14955 *dst_smin = S64_MIN; 14956 *dst_smax = S64_MAX; 14957 } 14958 14959 /* If either all additions overflow or no additions overflow, then 14960 * it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin + src_umin, dst_umax = 14961 * dst_umax + src_umax. Otherwise (some additions overflow), set 14962 * the output bounds to unbounded. 14963 */ 14964 min_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umin, umin_val, dst_umin); 14965 max_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umax, umax_val, dst_umax); 14966 14967 if (!min_overflow && max_overflow) { 14968 *dst_umin = 0; 14969 *dst_umax = U64_MAX; 14970 } 14971 } 14972 14973 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14974 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 14975 { 14976 s32 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->s32_min_value; 14977 s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value; 14978 u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value; 14979 u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value; 14980 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 14981 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 14982 bool min_underflow, max_underflow; 14983 14984 if (check_sub_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_max_value, dst_smin) || 14985 check_sub_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_min_value, dst_smax)) { 14986 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 14987 *dst_smin = S32_MIN; 14988 *dst_smax = S32_MAX; 14989 } 14990 14991 /* If either all subtractions underflow or no subtractions 14992 * underflow, it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin - src_umax, 14993 * dst_umax = dst_umax - src_umin. Otherwise (some subtractions 14994 * underflow), set the output bounds to unbounded. 14995 */ 14996 min_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umin, umax_val, dst_umin); 14997 max_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umax, umin_val, dst_umax); 14998 14999 if (min_underflow && !max_underflow) { 15000 *dst_umin = 0; 15001 *dst_umax = U32_MAX; 15002 } 15003 } 15004 15005 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15006 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15007 { 15008 s64 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->smin_value; 15009 s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value; 15010 u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value; 15011 u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value; 15012 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 15013 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 15014 bool min_underflow, max_underflow; 15015 15016 if (check_sub_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smax_value, dst_smin) || 15017 check_sub_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smin_value, dst_smax)) { 15018 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 15019 *dst_smin = S64_MIN; 15020 *dst_smax = S64_MAX; 15021 } 15022 15023 /* If either all subtractions underflow or no subtractions 15024 * underflow, it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin - src_umax, 15025 * dst_umax = dst_umax - src_umin. Otherwise (some subtractions 15026 * underflow), set the output bounds to unbounded. 15027 */ 15028 min_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umin, umax_val, dst_umin); 15029 max_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umax, umin_val, dst_umax); 15030 15031 if (min_underflow && !max_underflow) { 15032 *dst_umin = 0; 15033 *dst_umax = U64_MAX; 15034 } 15035 } 15036 15037 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15038 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15039 { 15040 s32 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->s32_min_value; 15041 s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value; 15042 u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value; 15043 u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value; 15044 s32 tmp_prod[4]; 15045 15046 if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_umax, src_reg->u32_max_value, dst_umax) || 15047 check_mul_overflow(*dst_umin, src_reg->u32_min_value, dst_umin)) { 15048 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 15049 *dst_umin = 0; 15050 *dst_umax = U32_MAX; 15051 } 15052 if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_min_value, &tmp_prod[0]) || 15053 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_max_value, &tmp_prod[1]) || 15054 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_min_value, &tmp_prod[2]) || 15055 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_max_value, &tmp_prod[3])) { 15056 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 15057 *dst_smin = S32_MIN; 15058 *dst_smax = S32_MAX; 15059 } else { 15060 *dst_smin = min_array(tmp_prod, 4); 15061 *dst_smax = max_array(tmp_prod, 4); 15062 } 15063 } 15064 15065 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15066 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15067 { 15068 s64 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->smin_value; 15069 s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value; 15070 u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value; 15071 u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value; 15072 s64 tmp_prod[4]; 15073 15074 if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_umax, src_reg->umax_value, dst_umax) || 15075 check_mul_overflow(*dst_umin, src_reg->umin_value, dst_umin)) { 15076 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 15077 *dst_umin = 0; 15078 *dst_umax = U64_MAX; 15079 } 15080 if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smin_value, &tmp_prod[0]) || 15081 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smax_value, &tmp_prod[1]) || 15082 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smin_value, &tmp_prod[2]) || 15083 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smax_value, &tmp_prod[3])) { 15084 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 15085 *dst_smin = S64_MIN; 15086 *dst_smax = S64_MAX; 15087 } else { 15088 *dst_smin = min_array(tmp_prod, 4); 15089 *dst_smax = max_array(tmp_prod, 4); 15090 } 15091 } 15092 15093 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15094 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15095 { 15096 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 15097 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 15098 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 15099 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 15100 15101 if (src_known && dst_known) { 15102 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 15103 return; 15104 } 15105 15106 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 15107 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 15108 */ 15109 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 15110 dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val); 15111 15112 /* Safe to set s32 bounds by casting u32 result into s32 when u32 15113 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s32 bounds to unbounded. 15114 */ 15115 if ((s32)dst_reg->u32_min_value <= (s32)dst_reg->u32_max_value) { 15116 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 15117 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 15118 } else { 15119 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 15120 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 15121 } 15122 } 15123 15124 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15125 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15126 { 15127 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 15128 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 15129 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 15130 15131 if (src_known && dst_known) { 15132 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 15133 return; 15134 } 15135 15136 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 15137 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 15138 */ 15139 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 15140 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); 15141 15142 /* Safe to set s64 bounds by casting u64 result into s64 when u64 15143 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s64 bounds to unbounded. 15144 */ 15145 if ((s64)dst_reg->umin_value <= (s64)dst_reg->umax_value) { 15146 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 15147 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 15148 } else { 15149 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 15150 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 15151 } 15152 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 15153 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 15154 } 15155 15156 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15157 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15158 { 15159 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 15160 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 15161 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 15162 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 15163 15164 if (src_known && dst_known) { 15165 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 15166 return; 15167 } 15168 15169 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 15170 * maximum of the operands' minima 15171 */ 15172 dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val); 15173 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 15174 15175 /* Safe to set s32 bounds by casting u32 result into s32 when u32 15176 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s32 bounds to unbounded. 15177 */ 15178 if ((s32)dst_reg->u32_min_value <= (s32)dst_reg->u32_max_value) { 15179 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 15180 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 15181 } else { 15182 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 15183 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 15184 } 15185 } 15186 15187 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15188 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15189 { 15190 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 15191 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 15192 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 15193 15194 if (src_known && dst_known) { 15195 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 15196 return; 15197 } 15198 15199 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 15200 * maximum of the operands' minima 15201 */ 15202 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); 15203 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 15204 15205 /* Safe to set s64 bounds by casting u64 result into s64 when u64 15206 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s64 bounds to unbounded. 15207 */ 15208 if ((s64)dst_reg->umin_value <= (s64)dst_reg->umax_value) { 15209 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 15210 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 15211 } else { 15212 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 15213 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 15214 } 15215 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 15216 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 15217 } 15218 15219 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15220 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15221 { 15222 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 15223 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 15224 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 15225 15226 if (src_known && dst_known) { 15227 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 15228 return; 15229 } 15230 15231 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */ 15232 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 15233 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 15234 15235 /* Safe to set s32 bounds by casting u32 result into s32 when u32 15236 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s32 bounds to unbounded. 15237 */ 15238 if ((s32)dst_reg->u32_min_value <= (s32)dst_reg->u32_max_value) { 15239 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 15240 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 15241 } else { 15242 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 15243 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 15244 } 15245 } 15246 15247 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15248 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15249 { 15250 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 15251 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 15252 15253 if (src_known && dst_known) { 15254 /* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */ 15255 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 15256 return; 15257 } 15258 15259 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */ 15260 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 15261 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 15262 15263 /* Safe to set s64 bounds by casting u64 result into s64 when u64 15264 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s64 bounds to unbounded. 15265 */ 15266 if ((s64)dst_reg->umin_value <= (s64)dst_reg->umax_value) { 15267 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 15268 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 15269 } else { 15270 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 15271 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 15272 } 15273 15274 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 15275 } 15276 15277 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15278 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 15279 { 15280 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick 15281 * up from var_off) 15282 */ 15283 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 15284 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 15285 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 15286 if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) { 15287 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 15288 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 15289 } else { 15290 dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val; 15291 dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val; 15292 } 15293 } 15294 15295 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15296 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15297 { 15298 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 15299 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 15300 /* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */ 15301 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 15302 15303 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 15304 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val)); 15305 /* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so 15306 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and 15307 * if some path skips this step we are still safe. 15308 */ 15309 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 15310 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 15311 } 15312 15313 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15314 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 15315 { 15316 /* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign 15317 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. smin/smax assignments are correct 15318 * because s32 bounds don't flip sign when shifting to the left by 15319 * 32bits. 15320 */ 15321 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32) { 15322 dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32; 15323 dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32; 15324 } else { 15325 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 15326 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 15327 } 15328 15329 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 15330 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { 15331 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 15332 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 15333 } else { 15334 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; 15335 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; 15336 } 15337 } 15338 15339 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15340 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15341 { 15342 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 15343 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 15344 15345 /* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */ 15346 __scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 15347 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 15348 15349 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 15350 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 15351 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 15352 } 15353 15354 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15355 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15356 { 15357 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 15358 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 15359 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 15360 15361 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 15362 * be negative, then either: 15363 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 15364 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 15365 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 15366 * signed bounds 15367 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 15368 * about the result 15369 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 15370 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 15371 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 15372 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 15373 * var_off of the result. 15374 */ 15375 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 15376 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 15377 15378 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val); 15379 dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val; 15380 dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val; 15381 15382 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 15383 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 15384 } 15385 15386 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15387 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15388 { 15389 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 15390 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 15391 15392 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 15393 * be negative, then either: 15394 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 15395 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 15396 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 15397 * signed bounds 15398 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 15399 * about the result 15400 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 15401 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 15402 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 15403 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 15404 * var_off of the result. 15405 */ 15406 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 15407 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 15408 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 15409 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; 15410 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; 15411 15412 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 15413 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded 15414 * so we can recalculate later from tnum. 15415 */ 15416 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 15417 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 15418 } 15419 15420 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15421 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15422 { 15423 u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 15424 15425 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and 15426 * umax_val is equal to umin_val. 15427 */ 15428 dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val); 15429 dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val); 15430 15431 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32); 15432 15433 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 15434 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 15435 */ 15436 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 15437 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 15438 15439 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 15440 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 15441 } 15442 15443 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15444 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15445 { 15446 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 15447 15448 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal 15449 * to umin_val. 15450 */ 15451 dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val; 15452 dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val; 15453 15454 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64); 15455 15456 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 15457 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 15458 */ 15459 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 15460 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 15461 15462 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 15463 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out 15464 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum. 15465 */ 15466 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 15467 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 15468 } 15469 15470 static bool is_safe_to_compute_dst_reg_range(struct bpf_insn *insn, 15471 const struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15472 { 15473 bool src_is_const = false; 15474 u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32; 15475 15476 if (insn_bitness == 32) { 15477 if (tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off) 15478 && src_reg->s32_min_value == src_reg->s32_max_value 15479 && src_reg->u32_min_value == src_reg->u32_max_value) 15480 src_is_const = true; 15481 } else { 15482 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) 15483 && src_reg->smin_value == src_reg->smax_value 15484 && src_reg->umin_value == src_reg->umax_value) 15485 src_is_const = true; 15486 } 15487 15488 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 15489 case BPF_ADD: 15490 case BPF_SUB: 15491 case BPF_NEG: 15492 case BPF_AND: 15493 case BPF_XOR: 15494 case BPF_OR: 15495 case BPF_MUL: 15496 return true; 15497 15498 /* Shift operators range is only computable if shift dimension operand 15499 * is a constant. Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. This 15500 * includes shifts by a negative number. 15501 */ 15502 case BPF_LSH: 15503 case BPF_RSH: 15504 case BPF_ARSH: 15505 return (src_is_const && src_reg->umax_value < insn_bitness); 15506 default: 15507 return false; 15508 } 15509 } 15510 15511 static int maybe_fork_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 15512 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 15513 { 15514 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 15515 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 15516 bool alu32; 15517 15518 if (dst_reg->smin_value == -1 && dst_reg->smax_value == 0) 15519 alu32 = false; 15520 else if (dst_reg->s32_min_value == -1 && dst_reg->s32_max_value == 0) 15521 alu32 = true; 15522 else 15523 return 0; 15524 15525 branch = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, false); 15526 if (IS_ERR(branch)) 15527 return PTR_ERR(branch); 15528 15529 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs; 15530 if (alu32) { 15531 __mark_reg32_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], 0); 15532 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, -1ull); 15533 } else { 15534 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], 0); 15535 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, -1ull); 15536 } 15537 return 0; 15538 } 15539 15540 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual 15541 * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts 15542 * need extra checks in the 32-bit case. 15543 */ 15544 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15545 struct bpf_insn *insn, 15546 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15547 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) 15548 { 15549 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 15550 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); 15551 int ret; 15552 15553 if (!is_safe_to_compute_dst_reg_range(insn, &src_reg)) { 15554 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 15555 return 0; 15556 } 15557 15558 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 15559 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); 15560 if (ret < 0) 15561 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL); 15562 } 15563 15564 /* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops. 15565 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both 15566 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the 15567 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32 15568 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD, 15569 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to 15570 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops. 15571 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of 15572 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy 15573 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may 15574 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark 15575 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting 15576 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds. 15577 */ 15578 switch (opcode) { 15579 case BPF_ADD: 15580 scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15581 scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15582 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 15583 break; 15584 case BPF_SUB: 15585 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15586 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15587 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 15588 break; 15589 case BPF_NEG: 15590 env->fake_reg[0] = *dst_reg; 15591 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, 0); 15592 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[0]); 15593 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[0]); 15594 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_neg(env->fake_reg[0].var_off); 15595 break; 15596 case BPF_MUL: 15597 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 15598 scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15599 scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15600 break; 15601 case BPF_AND: 15602 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off)) { 15603 ret = maybe_fork_scalars(env, insn, dst_reg); 15604 if (ret) 15605 return ret; 15606 } 15607 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 15608 scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15609 scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15610 break; 15611 case BPF_OR: 15612 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off)) { 15613 ret = maybe_fork_scalars(env, insn, dst_reg); 15614 if (ret) 15615 return ret; 15616 } 15617 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 15618 scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15619 scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15620 break; 15621 case BPF_XOR: 15622 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 15623 scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15624 scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15625 break; 15626 case BPF_LSH: 15627 if (alu32) 15628 scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15629 else 15630 scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15631 break; 15632 case BPF_RSH: 15633 if (alu32) 15634 scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15635 else 15636 scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15637 break; 15638 case BPF_ARSH: 15639 if (alu32) 15640 scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15641 else 15642 scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15643 break; 15644 default: 15645 break; 15646 } 15647 15648 /* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */ 15649 if (alu32) 15650 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 15651 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 15652 return 0; 15653 } 15654 15655 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max 15656 * and var_off. 15657 */ 15658 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15659 struct bpf_insn *insn) 15660 { 15661 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 15662 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 15663 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; 15664 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; 15665 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); 15666 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 15667 int err; 15668 15669 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 15670 src_reg = NULL; 15671 15672 if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_ARENA) { 15673 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 15674 15675 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) 15676 /* 15677 * 32-bit operations zero upper bits automatically. 15678 * 64-bit operations need to be converted to 32. 15679 */ 15680 aux->needs_zext = true; 15681 15682 /* Any arithmetic operations are allowed on arena pointers */ 15683 return 0; 15684 } 15685 15686 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 15687 ptr_reg = dst_reg; 15688 15689 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 15690 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 15691 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 15692 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 15693 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields 15694 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except 15695 * pointer subtraction 15696 */ 15697 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 15698 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 15699 return 0; 15700 } 15701 verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", 15702 insn->dst_reg, 15703 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 15704 return -EACCES; 15705 } else { 15706 /* scalar += pointer 15707 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our 15708 * src/dest handling in computing the range 15709 */ 15710 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 15711 if (err) 15712 return err; 15713 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 15714 src_reg, dst_reg); 15715 } 15716 } else if (ptr_reg) { 15717 /* pointer += scalar */ 15718 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 15719 if (err) 15720 return err; 15721 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 15722 dst_reg, src_reg); 15723 } else if (dst_reg->precise) { 15724 /* if dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well */ 15725 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 15726 if (err) 15727 return err; 15728 } 15729 } else { 15730 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only 15731 * need to be able to read from this state. 15732 */ 15733 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 15734 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); 15735 src_reg = &off_reg; 15736 if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */ 15737 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 15738 ptr_reg, src_reg); 15739 } 15740 15741 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ 15742 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { 15743 print_verifier_state(env, vstate, vstate->curframe, true); 15744 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); 15745 return -EFAULT; 15746 } 15747 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { 15748 print_verifier_state(env, vstate, vstate->curframe, true); 15749 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); 15750 return -EFAULT; 15751 } 15752 err = adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); 15753 if (err) 15754 return err; 15755 /* 15756 * Compilers can generate the code 15757 * r1 = r2 15758 * r1 += 0x1 15759 * if r2 < 1000 goto ... 15760 * use r1 in memory access 15761 * So for 64-bit alu remember constant delta between r2 and r1 and 15762 * update r1 after 'if' condition. 15763 */ 15764 if (env->bpf_capable && 15765 BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD && !alu32 && 15766 dst_reg->id && is_reg_const(src_reg, false)) { 15767 u64 val = reg_const_value(src_reg, false); 15768 15769 if ((dst_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) || 15770 /* prevent overflow in sync_linked_regs() later */ 15771 val > (u32)S32_MAX) { 15772 /* 15773 * If the register already went through rX += val 15774 * we cannot accumulate another val into rx->off. 15775 */ 15776 dst_reg->off = 0; 15777 dst_reg->id = 0; 15778 } else { 15779 dst_reg->id |= BPF_ADD_CONST; 15780 dst_reg->off = val; 15781 } 15782 } else { 15783 /* 15784 * Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be 15785 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by sync_linked_regs() 15786 */ 15787 dst_reg->id = 0; 15788 } 15789 return 0; 15790 } 15791 15792 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ 15793 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 15794 { 15795 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 15796 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 15797 int err; 15798 15799 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 15800 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { 15801 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 15802 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 15803 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { 15804 verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); 15805 return -EINVAL; 15806 } 15807 } else { 15808 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 15809 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || 15810 (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 && 15811 BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_TO_LE)) { 15812 verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); 15813 return -EINVAL; 15814 } 15815 } 15816 15817 /* check src operand */ 15818 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 15819 if (err) 15820 return err; 15821 15822 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 15823 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 15824 insn->dst_reg); 15825 return -EACCES; 15826 } 15827 15828 /* check dest operand */ 15829 if (opcode == BPF_NEG && 15830 regs[insn->dst_reg].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 15831 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 15832 err = err ?: adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, 15833 ®s[insn->dst_reg], 15834 regs[insn->dst_reg]); 15835 } else { 15836 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 15837 } 15838 if (err) 15839 return err; 15840 15841 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 15842 15843 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 15844 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU) { 15845 if ((insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 8 && insn->off != 16) || 15846 insn->imm) { 15847 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 15848 return -EINVAL; 15849 } 15850 } else if (insn->off == BPF_ADDR_SPACE_CAST) { 15851 if (insn->imm != 1 && insn->imm != 1u << 16) { 15852 verbose(env, "addr_space_cast insn can only convert between address space 1 and 0\n"); 15853 return -EINVAL; 15854 } 15855 if (!env->prog->aux->arena) { 15856 verbose(env, "addr_space_cast insn can only be used in a program that has an associated arena\n"); 15857 return -EINVAL; 15858 } 15859 } else { 15860 if ((insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 8 && insn->off != 16 && 15861 insn->off != 32) || insn->imm) { 15862 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 15863 return -EINVAL; 15864 } 15865 } 15866 15867 /* check src operand */ 15868 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 15869 if (err) 15870 return err; 15871 } else { 15872 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 15873 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 15874 return -EINVAL; 15875 } 15876 } 15877 15878 /* check dest operand, mark as required later */ 15879 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 15880 if (err) 15881 return err; 15882 15883 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 15884 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg; 15885 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg; 15886 15887 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 15888 if (insn->imm) { 15889 /* off == BPF_ADDR_SPACE_CAST */ 15890 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 15891 if (insn->imm == 1) { /* cast from as(1) to as(0) */ 15892 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_ARENA; 15893 /* PTR_TO_ARENA is 32-bit */ 15894 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 15895 } 15896 } else if (insn->off == 0) { 15897 /* case: R1 = R2 15898 * copy register state to dest reg 15899 */ 15900 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, src_reg); 15901 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 15902 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 15903 } else { 15904 /* case: R1 = (s8, s16 s32)R2 */ 15905 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 15906 verbose(env, 15907 "R%d sign-extension part of pointer\n", 15908 insn->src_reg); 15909 return -EACCES; 15910 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 15911 bool no_sext; 15912 15913 no_sext = src_reg->umax_value < (1ULL << (insn->off - 1)); 15914 if (no_sext) 15915 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, src_reg); 15916 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 15917 if (!no_sext) 15918 dst_reg->id = 0; 15919 coerce_reg_to_size_sx(dst_reg, insn->off >> 3); 15920 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 15921 } else { 15922 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 15923 } 15924 } 15925 } else { 15926 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ 15927 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 15928 verbose(env, 15929 "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", 15930 insn->src_reg); 15931 return -EACCES; 15932 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 15933 if (insn->off == 0) { 15934 bool is_src_reg_u32 = get_reg_width(src_reg) <= 32; 15935 15936 if (is_src_reg_u32) 15937 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, src_reg); 15938 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 15939 /* Make sure ID is cleared if src_reg is not in u32 15940 * range otherwise dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly 15941 * propagated into src_reg by sync_linked_regs() 15942 */ 15943 if (!is_src_reg_u32) 15944 dst_reg->id = 0; 15945 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 15946 } else { 15947 /* case: W1 = (s8, s16)W2 */ 15948 bool no_sext = src_reg->umax_value < (1ULL << (insn->off - 1)); 15949 15950 if (no_sext) 15951 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, src_reg); 15952 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 15953 if (!no_sext) 15954 dst_reg->id = 0; 15955 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 15956 coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(dst_reg, insn->off >> 3); 15957 } 15958 } else { 15959 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, 15960 insn->dst_reg); 15961 } 15962 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 15963 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 15964 } 15965 } else { 15966 /* case: R = imm 15967 * remember the value we stored into this reg 15968 */ 15969 /* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */ 15970 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 15971 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 15972 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 15973 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 15974 insn->imm); 15975 } else { 15976 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 15977 (u32)insn->imm); 15978 } 15979 } 15980 15981 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { 15982 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); 15983 return -EINVAL; 15984 15985 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ 15986 15987 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 15988 if (insn->imm != 0 || (insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 1) || 15989 (insn->off == 1 && opcode != BPF_MOD && opcode != BPF_DIV)) { 15990 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 15991 return -EINVAL; 15992 } 15993 /* check src1 operand */ 15994 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 15995 if (err) 15996 return err; 15997 } else { 15998 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || (insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 1) || 15999 (insn->off == 1 && opcode != BPF_MOD && opcode != BPF_DIV)) { 16000 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 16001 return -EINVAL; 16002 } 16003 } 16004 16005 /* check src2 operand */ 16006 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 16007 if (err) 16008 return err; 16009 16010 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && 16011 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { 16012 verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); 16013 return -EINVAL; 16014 } 16015 16016 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || 16017 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 16018 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; 16019 16020 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { 16021 verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); 16022 return -EINVAL; 16023 } 16024 } 16025 16026 /* check dest operand */ 16027 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 16028 err = err ?: adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); 16029 if (err) 16030 return err; 16031 } 16032 16033 return reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, ®s[insn->dst_reg], "alu"); 16034 } 16035 16036 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 16037 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 16038 enum bpf_reg_type type, 16039 bool range_right_open) 16040 { 16041 struct bpf_func_state *state; 16042 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 16043 int new_range; 16044 16045 if (dst_reg->off < 0 || 16046 (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open)) 16047 /* This doesn't give us any range */ 16048 return; 16049 16050 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || 16051 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) 16052 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less 16053 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. 16054 */ 16055 return; 16056 16057 new_range = dst_reg->off; 16058 if (range_right_open) 16059 new_range++; 16060 16061 /* Examples for register markings: 16062 * 16063 * pkt_data in dst register: 16064 * 16065 * r2 = r3; 16066 * r2 += 8; 16067 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> 16068 * <access okay> 16069 * 16070 * r2 = r3; 16071 * r2 += 8; 16072 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> 16073 * <handle exception> 16074 * 16075 * Where: 16076 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg 16077 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 16078 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 16079 * 16080 * pkt_data in src register: 16081 * 16082 * r2 = r3; 16083 * r2 += 8; 16084 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> 16085 * <handle exception> 16086 * 16087 * r2 = r3; 16088 * r2 += 8; 16089 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> 16090 * <access okay> 16091 * 16092 * Where: 16093 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg 16094 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 16095 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 16096 * 16097 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) 16098 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) 16099 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on 16100 * the check. 16101 */ 16102 16103 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we 16104 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big 16105 * the range won't allow anything. 16106 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. 16107 */ 16108 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 16109 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 16110 /* keep the maximum range already checked */ 16111 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); 16112 })); 16113 } 16114 16115 /* 16116 * <reg1> <op> <reg2>, currently assuming reg2 is a constant 16117 */ 16118 static int is_scalar_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state *reg2, 16119 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 16120 { 16121 struct tnum t1 = is_jmp32 ? tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off) : reg1->var_off; 16122 struct tnum t2 = is_jmp32 ? tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off) : reg2->var_off; 16123 u64 umin1 = is_jmp32 ? (u64)reg1->u32_min_value : reg1->umin_value; 16124 u64 umax1 = is_jmp32 ? (u64)reg1->u32_max_value : reg1->umax_value; 16125 s64 smin1 = is_jmp32 ? (s64)reg1->s32_min_value : reg1->smin_value; 16126 s64 smax1 = is_jmp32 ? (s64)reg1->s32_max_value : reg1->smax_value; 16127 u64 umin2 = is_jmp32 ? (u64)reg2->u32_min_value : reg2->umin_value; 16128 u64 umax2 = is_jmp32 ? (u64)reg2->u32_max_value : reg2->umax_value; 16129 s64 smin2 = is_jmp32 ? (s64)reg2->s32_min_value : reg2->smin_value; 16130 s64 smax2 = is_jmp32 ? (s64)reg2->s32_max_value : reg2->smax_value; 16131 16132 if (reg1 == reg2) { 16133 switch (opcode) { 16134 case BPF_JGE: 16135 case BPF_JLE: 16136 case BPF_JSGE: 16137 case BPF_JSLE: 16138 case BPF_JEQ: 16139 return 1; 16140 case BPF_JGT: 16141 case BPF_JLT: 16142 case BPF_JSGT: 16143 case BPF_JSLT: 16144 case BPF_JNE: 16145 return 0; 16146 case BPF_JSET: 16147 if (tnum_is_const(t1)) 16148 return t1.value != 0; 16149 else 16150 return (smin1 <= 0 && smax1 >= 0) ? -1 : 1; 16151 default: 16152 return -1; 16153 } 16154 } 16155 16156 switch (opcode) { 16157 case BPF_JEQ: 16158 /* constants, umin/umax and smin/smax checks would be 16159 * redundant in this case because they all should match 16160 */ 16161 if (tnum_is_const(t1) && tnum_is_const(t2)) 16162 return t1.value == t2.value; 16163 if (!tnum_overlap(t1, t2)) 16164 return 0; 16165 /* non-overlapping ranges */ 16166 if (umin1 > umax2 || umax1 < umin2) 16167 return 0; 16168 if (smin1 > smax2 || smax1 < smin2) 16169 return 0; 16170 if (!is_jmp32) { 16171 /* if 64-bit ranges are inconclusive, see if we can 16172 * utilize 32-bit subrange knowledge to eliminate 16173 * branches that can't be taken a priori 16174 */ 16175 if (reg1->u32_min_value > reg2->u32_max_value || 16176 reg1->u32_max_value < reg2->u32_min_value) 16177 return 0; 16178 if (reg1->s32_min_value > reg2->s32_max_value || 16179 reg1->s32_max_value < reg2->s32_min_value) 16180 return 0; 16181 } 16182 break; 16183 case BPF_JNE: 16184 /* constants, umin/umax and smin/smax checks would be 16185 * redundant in this case because they all should match 16186 */ 16187 if (tnum_is_const(t1) && tnum_is_const(t2)) 16188 return t1.value != t2.value; 16189 if (!tnum_overlap(t1, t2)) 16190 return 1; 16191 /* non-overlapping ranges */ 16192 if (umin1 > umax2 || umax1 < umin2) 16193 return 1; 16194 if (smin1 > smax2 || smax1 < smin2) 16195 return 1; 16196 if (!is_jmp32) { 16197 /* if 64-bit ranges are inconclusive, see if we can 16198 * utilize 32-bit subrange knowledge to eliminate 16199 * branches that can't be taken a priori 16200 */ 16201 if (reg1->u32_min_value > reg2->u32_max_value || 16202 reg1->u32_max_value < reg2->u32_min_value) 16203 return 1; 16204 if (reg1->s32_min_value > reg2->s32_max_value || 16205 reg1->s32_max_value < reg2->s32_min_value) 16206 return 1; 16207 } 16208 break; 16209 case BPF_JSET: 16210 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) { 16211 swap(reg1, reg2); 16212 swap(t1, t2); 16213 } 16214 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16215 return -1; 16216 if ((~t1.mask & t1.value) & t2.value) 16217 return 1; 16218 if (!((t1.mask | t1.value) & t2.value)) 16219 return 0; 16220 break; 16221 case BPF_JGT: 16222 if (umin1 > umax2) 16223 return 1; 16224 else if (umax1 <= umin2) 16225 return 0; 16226 break; 16227 case BPF_JSGT: 16228 if (smin1 > smax2) 16229 return 1; 16230 else if (smax1 <= smin2) 16231 return 0; 16232 break; 16233 case BPF_JLT: 16234 if (umax1 < umin2) 16235 return 1; 16236 else if (umin1 >= umax2) 16237 return 0; 16238 break; 16239 case BPF_JSLT: 16240 if (smax1 < smin2) 16241 return 1; 16242 else if (smin1 >= smax2) 16243 return 0; 16244 break; 16245 case BPF_JGE: 16246 if (umin1 >= umax2) 16247 return 1; 16248 else if (umax1 < umin2) 16249 return 0; 16250 break; 16251 case BPF_JSGE: 16252 if (smin1 >= smax2) 16253 return 1; 16254 else if (smax1 < smin2) 16255 return 0; 16256 break; 16257 case BPF_JLE: 16258 if (umax1 <= umin2) 16259 return 1; 16260 else if (umin1 > umax2) 16261 return 0; 16262 break; 16263 case BPF_JSLE: 16264 if (smax1 <= smin2) 16265 return 1; 16266 else if (smin1 > smax2) 16267 return 0; 16268 break; 16269 } 16270 16271 return -1; 16272 } 16273 16274 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode) 16275 { 16276 /* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */ 16277 static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = { 16278 /* these stay the same */ 16279 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ, 16280 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE, 16281 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET, 16282 /* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */ 16283 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = BPF_JLE, 16284 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = BPF_JLT, 16285 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = BPF_JGE, 16286 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = BPF_JGT, 16287 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE, 16288 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT, 16289 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE, 16290 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT 16291 }; 16292 return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4]; 16293 } 16294 16295 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 16296 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 16297 u8 opcode) 16298 { 16299 struct bpf_reg_state *pkt; 16300 16301 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 16302 pkt = dst_reg; 16303 } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 16304 pkt = src_reg; 16305 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 16306 } else { 16307 return -1; 16308 } 16309 16310 if (pkt->range >= 0) 16311 return -1; 16312 16313 switch (opcode) { 16314 case BPF_JLE: 16315 /* pkt <= pkt_end */ 16316 fallthrough; 16317 case BPF_JGT: 16318 /* pkt > pkt_end */ 16319 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END) 16320 /* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */ 16321 return opcode == BPF_JGT; 16322 break; 16323 case BPF_JLT: 16324 /* pkt < pkt_end */ 16325 fallthrough; 16326 case BPF_JGE: 16327 /* pkt >= pkt_end */ 16328 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END) 16329 return opcode == BPF_JGE; 16330 break; 16331 } 16332 return -1; 16333 } 16334 16335 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (<reg1> opcode <reg2>) goto target;" 16336 * and return: 16337 * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed 16338 * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn 16339 * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg1 < 5)" is unknown when register value 16340 * range [0,10] 16341 */ 16342 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state *reg2, 16343 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 16344 { 16345 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg1) && reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg2) && !is_jmp32) 16346 return is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(reg1, reg2, opcode); 16347 16348 if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg1) || __is_pointer_value(false, reg2)) { 16349 u64 val; 16350 16351 /* arrange that reg2 is a scalar, and reg1 is a pointer */ 16352 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) { 16353 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 16354 swap(reg1, reg2); 16355 } 16356 /* and ensure that reg2 is a constant */ 16357 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16358 return -1; 16359 16360 if (!reg_not_null(reg1)) 16361 return -1; 16362 16363 /* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can 16364 * use this to direct branch taken. 16365 */ 16366 val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32); 16367 if (val != 0) 16368 return -1; 16369 16370 switch (opcode) { 16371 case BPF_JEQ: 16372 return 0; 16373 case BPF_JNE: 16374 return 1; 16375 default: 16376 return -1; 16377 } 16378 } 16379 16380 /* now deal with two scalars, but not necessarily constants */ 16381 return is_scalar_branch_taken(reg1, reg2, opcode, is_jmp32); 16382 } 16383 16384 /* Opcode that corresponds to a *false* branch condition. 16385 * E.g., if r1 < r2, then reverse (false) condition is r1 >= r2 16386 */ 16387 static u8 rev_opcode(u8 opcode) 16388 { 16389 switch (opcode) { 16390 case BPF_JEQ: return BPF_JNE; 16391 case BPF_JNE: return BPF_JEQ; 16392 /* JSET doesn't have it's reverse opcode in BPF, so add 16393 * BPF_X flag to denote the reverse of that operation 16394 */ 16395 case BPF_JSET: return BPF_JSET | BPF_X; 16396 case BPF_JSET | BPF_X: return BPF_JSET; 16397 case BPF_JGE: return BPF_JLT; 16398 case BPF_JGT: return BPF_JLE; 16399 case BPF_JLE: return BPF_JGT; 16400 case BPF_JLT: return BPF_JGE; 16401 case BPF_JSGE: return BPF_JSLT; 16402 case BPF_JSGT: return BPF_JSLE; 16403 case BPF_JSLE: return BPF_JSGT; 16404 case BPF_JSLT: return BPF_JSGE; 16405 default: return 0; 16406 } 16407 } 16408 16409 /* Refine range knowledge for <reg1> <op> <reg>2 conditional operation. */ 16410 static void regs_refine_cond_op(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state *reg2, 16411 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 16412 { 16413 struct tnum t; 16414 u64 val; 16415 16416 /* In case of GE/GT/SGE/JST, reuse LE/LT/SLE/SLT logic from below */ 16417 switch (opcode) { 16418 case BPF_JGE: 16419 case BPF_JGT: 16420 case BPF_JSGE: 16421 case BPF_JSGT: 16422 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 16423 swap(reg1, reg2); 16424 break; 16425 default: 16426 break; 16427 } 16428 16429 switch (opcode) { 16430 case BPF_JEQ: 16431 if (is_jmp32) { 16432 reg1->u32_min_value = max(reg1->u32_min_value, reg2->u32_min_value); 16433 reg1->u32_max_value = min(reg1->u32_max_value, reg2->u32_max_value); 16434 reg1->s32_min_value = max(reg1->s32_min_value, reg2->s32_min_value); 16435 reg1->s32_max_value = min(reg1->s32_max_value, reg2->s32_max_value); 16436 reg2->u32_min_value = reg1->u32_min_value; 16437 reg2->u32_max_value = reg1->u32_max_value; 16438 reg2->s32_min_value = reg1->s32_min_value; 16439 reg2->s32_max_value = reg1->s32_max_value; 16440 16441 t = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off)); 16442 reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t); 16443 reg2->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg2->var_off, t); 16444 } else { 16445 reg1->umin_value = max(reg1->umin_value, reg2->umin_value); 16446 reg1->umax_value = min(reg1->umax_value, reg2->umax_value); 16447 reg1->smin_value = max(reg1->smin_value, reg2->smin_value); 16448 reg1->smax_value = min(reg1->smax_value, reg2->smax_value); 16449 reg2->umin_value = reg1->umin_value; 16450 reg2->umax_value = reg1->umax_value; 16451 reg2->smin_value = reg1->smin_value; 16452 reg2->smax_value = reg1->smax_value; 16453 16454 reg1->var_off = tnum_intersect(reg1->var_off, reg2->var_off); 16455 reg2->var_off = reg1->var_off; 16456 } 16457 break; 16458 case BPF_JNE: 16459 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16460 swap(reg1, reg2); 16461 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16462 break; 16463 16464 /* try to recompute the bound of reg1 if reg2 is a const and 16465 * is exactly the edge of reg1. 16466 */ 16467 val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32); 16468 if (is_jmp32) { 16469 /* u32_min_value is not equal to 0xffffffff at this point, 16470 * because otherwise u32_max_value is 0xffffffff as well, 16471 * in such a case both reg1 and reg2 would be constants, 16472 * jump would be predicted and reg_set_min_max() won't 16473 * be called. 16474 * 16475 * Same reasoning works for all {u,s}{min,max}{32,64} cases 16476 * below. 16477 */ 16478 if (reg1->u32_min_value == (u32)val) 16479 reg1->u32_min_value++; 16480 if (reg1->u32_max_value == (u32)val) 16481 reg1->u32_max_value--; 16482 if (reg1->s32_min_value == (s32)val) 16483 reg1->s32_min_value++; 16484 if (reg1->s32_max_value == (s32)val) 16485 reg1->s32_max_value--; 16486 } else { 16487 if (reg1->umin_value == (u64)val) 16488 reg1->umin_value++; 16489 if (reg1->umax_value == (u64)val) 16490 reg1->umax_value--; 16491 if (reg1->smin_value == (s64)val) 16492 reg1->smin_value++; 16493 if (reg1->smax_value == (s64)val) 16494 reg1->smax_value--; 16495 } 16496 break; 16497 case BPF_JSET: 16498 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16499 swap(reg1, reg2); 16500 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16501 break; 16502 val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32); 16503 /* BPF_JSET (i.e., TRUE branch, *not* BPF_JSET | BPF_X) 16504 * requires single bit to learn something useful. E.g., if we 16505 * know that `r1 & 0x3` is true, then which bits (0, 1, or both) 16506 * are actually set? We can learn something definite only if 16507 * it's a single-bit value to begin with. 16508 * 16509 * BPF_JSET | BPF_X (i.e., negation of BPF_JSET) doesn't have 16510 * this restriction. I.e., !(r1 & 0x3) means neither bit 0 nor 16511 * bit 1 is set, which we can readily use in adjustments. 16512 */ 16513 if (!is_power_of_2(val)) 16514 break; 16515 if (is_jmp32) { 16516 t = tnum_or(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_const(val)); 16517 reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t); 16518 } else { 16519 reg1->var_off = tnum_or(reg1->var_off, tnum_const(val)); 16520 } 16521 break; 16522 case BPF_JSET | BPF_X: /* reverse of BPF_JSET, see rev_opcode() */ 16523 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16524 swap(reg1, reg2); 16525 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16526 break; 16527 val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32); 16528 /* Forget the ranges before narrowing tnums, to avoid invariant 16529 * violations if we're on a dead branch. 16530 */ 16531 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg1); 16532 if (is_jmp32) { 16533 t = tnum_and(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_const(~val)); 16534 reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t); 16535 } else { 16536 reg1->var_off = tnum_and(reg1->var_off, tnum_const(~val)); 16537 } 16538 break; 16539 case BPF_JLE: 16540 if (is_jmp32) { 16541 reg1->u32_max_value = min(reg1->u32_max_value, reg2->u32_max_value); 16542 reg2->u32_min_value = max(reg1->u32_min_value, reg2->u32_min_value); 16543 } else { 16544 reg1->umax_value = min(reg1->umax_value, reg2->umax_value); 16545 reg2->umin_value = max(reg1->umin_value, reg2->umin_value); 16546 } 16547 break; 16548 case BPF_JLT: 16549 if (is_jmp32) { 16550 reg1->u32_max_value = min(reg1->u32_max_value, reg2->u32_max_value - 1); 16551 reg2->u32_min_value = max(reg1->u32_min_value + 1, reg2->u32_min_value); 16552 } else { 16553 reg1->umax_value = min(reg1->umax_value, reg2->umax_value - 1); 16554 reg2->umin_value = max(reg1->umin_value + 1, reg2->umin_value); 16555 } 16556 break; 16557 case BPF_JSLE: 16558 if (is_jmp32) { 16559 reg1->s32_max_value = min(reg1->s32_max_value, reg2->s32_max_value); 16560 reg2->s32_min_value = max(reg1->s32_min_value, reg2->s32_min_value); 16561 } else { 16562 reg1->smax_value = min(reg1->smax_value, reg2->smax_value); 16563 reg2->smin_value = max(reg1->smin_value, reg2->smin_value); 16564 } 16565 break; 16566 case BPF_JSLT: 16567 if (is_jmp32) { 16568 reg1->s32_max_value = min(reg1->s32_max_value, reg2->s32_max_value - 1); 16569 reg2->s32_min_value = max(reg1->s32_min_value + 1, reg2->s32_min_value); 16570 } else { 16571 reg1->smax_value = min(reg1->smax_value, reg2->smax_value - 1); 16572 reg2->smin_value = max(reg1->smin_value + 1, reg2->smin_value); 16573 } 16574 break; 16575 default: 16576 return; 16577 } 16578 } 16579 16580 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg and 16581 * src_reg are both SCALAR_VALUE registers (or we are simply doing a BPF_K 16582 * check, in which case we have a fake SCALAR_VALUE representing insn->imm). 16583 * Technically we can do similar adjustments for pointers to the same object, 16584 * but we don't support that right now. 16585 */ 16586 static int reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16587 struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg1, 16588 struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg2, 16589 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg1, 16590 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg2, 16591 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 16592 { 16593 int err; 16594 16595 /* If either register is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its 16596 * variable offset from the compare (unless they were a pointer into 16597 * the same object, but we don't bother with that). 16598 */ 16599 if (false_reg1->type != SCALAR_VALUE || false_reg2->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 16600 return 0; 16601 16602 /* We compute branch direction for same SCALAR_VALUE registers in 16603 * is_scalar_branch_taken(). For unknown branch directions (e.g., BPF_JSET) 16604 * on the same registers, we don't need to adjust the min/max values. 16605 */ 16606 if (false_reg1 == false_reg2) 16607 return 0; 16608 16609 /* fallthrough (FALSE) branch */ 16610 regs_refine_cond_op(false_reg1, false_reg2, rev_opcode(opcode), is_jmp32); 16611 reg_bounds_sync(false_reg1); 16612 reg_bounds_sync(false_reg2); 16613 16614 /* jump (TRUE) branch */ 16615 regs_refine_cond_op(true_reg1, true_reg2, opcode, is_jmp32); 16616 reg_bounds_sync(true_reg1); 16617 reg_bounds_sync(true_reg2); 16618 16619 err = reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, true_reg1, "true_reg1"); 16620 err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, true_reg2, "true_reg2"); 16621 err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, false_reg1, "false_reg1"); 16622 err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, false_reg2, "false_reg2"); 16623 return err; 16624 } 16625 16626 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, 16627 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id, 16628 bool is_null) 16629 { 16630 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id && 16631 (is_rcu_reg(reg) || !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id))) { 16632 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been 16633 * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on 16634 * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't 16635 * convert the register. 16636 * 16637 * But in some cases, some helpers that return local kptrs 16638 * advance offset for the returned pointer. In those cases, it 16639 * is fine to expect to see reg->off. 16640 */ 16641 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0))) 16642 return; 16643 if (!(type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type) || type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) && 16644 WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->off)) 16645 return; 16646 16647 if (is_null) { 16648 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 16649 /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point 16650 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it, 16651 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect. 16652 */ 16653 reg->id = 0; 16654 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 16655 16656 return; 16657 } 16658 16659 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 16660 16661 if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) { 16662 /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset 16663 * in release_reference(). 16664 * 16665 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other 16666 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset. 16667 */ 16668 reg->id = 0; 16669 } 16670 } 16671 } 16672 16673 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually 16674 * be folded together at some point. 16675 */ 16676 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno, 16677 bool is_null) 16678 { 16679 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 16680 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 16681 u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id; 16682 u32 id = regs[regno].id; 16683 16684 if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null) 16685 /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch. 16686 * No one could have freed the reference state before 16687 * doing the NULL check. 16688 */ 16689 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_nomark(vstate, id)); 16690 16691 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 16692 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null); 16693 })); 16694 } 16695 16696 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn, 16697 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 16698 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 16699 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch, 16700 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch) 16701 { 16702 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X) 16703 return false; 16704 16705 /* Pointers are always 64-bit. */ 16706 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32) 16707 return false; 16708 16709 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 16710 case BPF_JGT: 16711 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 16712 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 16713 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 16714 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 16715 /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */ 16716 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 16717 dst_reg->type, false); 16718 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 16719 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 16720 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 16721 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 16722 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 16723 /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 16724 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 16725 src_reg->type, true); 16726 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 16727 } else { 16728 return false; 16729 } 16730 break; 16731 case BPF_JLT: 16732 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 16733 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 16734 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 16735 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 16736 /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */ 16737 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 16738 dst_reg->type, true); 16739 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 16740 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 16741 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 16742 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 16743 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 16744 /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 16745 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 16746 src_reg->type, false); 16747 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 16748 } else { 16749 return false; 16750 } 16751 break; 16752 case BPF_JGE: 16753 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 16754 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 16755 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 16756 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 16757 /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */ 16758 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 16759 dst_reg->type, true); 16760 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 16761 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 16762 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 16763 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 16764 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 16765 /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */ 16766 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 16767 src_reg->type, false); 16768 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 16769 } else { 16770 return false; 16771 } 16772 break; 16773 case BPF_JLE: 16774 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 16775 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 16776 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 16777 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 16778 /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */ 16779 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 16780 dst_reg->type, false); 16781 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 16782 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 16783 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 16784 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 16785 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 16786 /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */ 16787 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 16788 src_reg->type, true); 16789 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 16790 } else { 16791 return false; 16792 } 16793 break; 16794 default: 16795 return false; 16796 } 16797 16798 return true; 16799 } 16800 16801 static void __collect_linked_regs(struct linked_regs *reg_set, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 16802 u32 id, u32 frameno, u32 spi_or_reg, bool is_reg) 16803 { 16804 struct linked_reg *e; 16805 16806 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || (reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST) != id) 16807 return; 16808 16809 e = linked_regs_push(reg_set); 16810 if (e) { 16811 e->frameno = frameno; 16812 e->is_reg = is_reg; 16813 e->regno = spi_or_reg; 16814 } else { 16815 reg->id = 0; 16816 } 16817 } 16818 16819 /* For all R being scalar registers or spilled scalar registers 16820 * in verifier state, save R in linked_regs if R->id == id. 16821 * If there are too many Rs sharing same id, reset id for leftover Rs. 16822 */ 16823 static void collect_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 id, 16824 struct linked_regs *linked_regs) 16825 { 16826 struct bpf_func_state *func; 16827 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 16828 int i, j; 16829 16830 id = id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST; 16831 for (i = vstate->curframe; i >= 0; i--) { 16832 func = vstate->frame[i]; 16833 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 16834 reg = &func->regs[j]; 16835 __collect_linked_regs(linked_regs, reg, id, i, j, true); 16836 } 16837 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 16838 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 16839 continue; 16840 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 16841 __collect_linked_regs(linked_regs, reg, id, i, j, false); 16842 } 16843 } 16844 } 16845 16846 /* For all R in linked_regs, copy known_reg range into R 16847 * if R->id == known_reg->id. 16848 */ 16849 static void sync_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg, 16850 struct linked_regs *linked_regs) 16851 { 16852 struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg; 16853 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 16854 struct linked_reg *e; 16855 int i; 16856 16857 for (i = 0; i < linked_regs->cnt; ++i) { 16858 e = &linked_regs->entries[i]; 16859 reg = e->is_reg ? &vstate->frame[e->frameno]->regs[e->regno] 16860 : &vstate->frame[e->frameno]->stack[e->spi].spilled_ptr; 16861 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg == known_reg) 16862 continue; 16863 if ((reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST) != (known_reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST)) 16864 continue; 16865 if ((!(reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) && !(known_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST)) || 16866 reg->off == known_reg->off) { 16867 s32 saved_subreg_def = reg->subreg_def; 16868 16869 copy_register_state(reg, known_reg); 16870 reg->subreg_def = saved_subreg_def; 16871 } else { 16872 s32 saved_subreg_def = reg->subreg_def; 16873 s32 saved_off = reg->off; 16874 16875 fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 16876 __mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, (s32)reg->off - (s32)known_reg->off); 16877 16878 /* reg = known_reg; reg += delta */ 16879 copy_register_state(reg, known_reg); 16880 /* 16881 * Must preserve off, id and add_const flag, 16882 * otherwise another sync_linked_regs() will be incorrect. 16883 */ 16884 reg->off = saved_off; 16885 reg->subreg_def = saved_subreg_def; 16886 16887 scalar32_min_max_add(reg, &fake_reg); 16888 scalar_min_max_add(reg, &fake_reg); 16889 reg->var_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, fake_reg.var_off); 16890 } 16891 } 16892 } 16893 16894 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16895 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) 16896 { 16897 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; 16898 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; 16899 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; 16900 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL; 16901 struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs; 16902 struct linked_regs linked_regs = {}; 16903 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 16904 int insn_flags = 0; 16905 bool is_jmp32; 16906 int pred = -1; 16907 int err; 16908 16909 /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ 16910 if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JCOND) { 16911 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode); 16912 return -EINVAL; 16913 } 16914 16915 if (opcode == BPF_JCOND) { 16916 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st, *prev_st; 16917 int idx = *insn_idx; 16918 16919 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND) || 16920 insn->src_reg != BPF_MAY_GOTO || 16921 insn->dst_reg || insn->imm) { 16922 verbose(env, "invalid may_goto imm %d\n", insn->imm); 16923 return -EINVAL; 16924 } 16925 prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, cur_st->parent, idx); 16926 16927 /* branch out 'fallthrough' insn as a new state to explore */ 16928 queued_st = push_stack(env, idx + 1, idx, false); 16929 if (IS_ERR(queued_st)) 16930 return PTR_ERR(queued_st); 16931 16932 queued_st->may_goto_depth++; 16933 if (prev_st) 16934 widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st); 16935 *insn_idx += insn->off; 16936 return 0; 16937 } 16938 16939 /* check src2 operand */ 16940 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 16941 if (err) 16942 return err; 16943 16944 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 16945 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 16946 if (insn->imm != 0) { 16947 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 16948 return -EINVAL; 16949 } 16950 16951 /* check src1 operand */ 16952 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 16953 if (err) 16954 return err; 16955 16956 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 16957 if (!(reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg)) && 16958 is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 16959 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 16960 insn->src_reg); 16961 return -EACCES; 16962 } 16963 16964 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) 16965 insn_flags |= INSN_F_SRC_REG_STACK; 16966 if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) 16967 insn_flags |= INSN_F_DST_REG_STACK; 16968 } else { 16969 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 16970 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 16971 return -EINVAL; 16972 } 16973 src_reg = &env->fake_reg[0]; 16974 memset(src_reg, 0, sizeof(*src_reg)); 16975 src_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 16976 __mark_reg_known(src_reg, insn->imm); 16977 16978 if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) 16979 insn_flags |= INSN_F_DST_REG_STACK; 16980 } 16981 16982 if (insn_flags) { 16983 err = push_jmp_history(env, this_branch, insn_flags, 0); 16984 if (err) 16985 return err; 16986 } 16987 16988 is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32; 16989 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode, is_jmp32); 16990 if (pred >= 0) { 16991 /* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because 16992 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison. 16993 */ 16994 if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg)) 16995 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 16996 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err && 16997 !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg)) 16998 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 16999 if (err) 17000 return err; 17001 } 17002 17003 if (pred == 1) { 17004 /* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push 17005 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative 17006 * execution. 17007 */ 17008 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 17009 err = sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1, *insn_idx); 17010 if (err < 0) 17011 return err; 17012 } 17013 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 17014 print_insn_state(env, this_branch, this_branch->curframe); 17015 *insn_idx += insn->off; 17016 return 0; 17017 } else if (pred == 0) { 17018 /* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the 17019 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for 17020 * simulation under speculative execution. 17021 */ 17022 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 17023 err = sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, 17024 *insn_idx); 17025 if (err < 0) 17026 return err; 17027 } 17028 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 17029 print_insn_state(env, this_branch, this_branch->curframe); 17030 return 0; 17031 } 17032 17033 /* Push scalar registers sharing same ID to jump history, 17034 * do this before creating 'other_branch', so that both 17035 * 'this_branch' and 'other_branch' share this history 17036 * if parent state is created. 17037 */ 17038 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && src_reg->id) 17039 collect_linked_regs(this_branch, src_reg->id, &linked_regs); 17040 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id) 17041 collect_linked_regs(this_branch, dst_reg->id, &linked_regs); 17042 if (linked_regs.cnt > 1) { 17043 err = push_jmp_history(env, this_branch, 0, linked_regs_pack(&linked_regs)); 17044 if (err) 17045 return err; 17046 } 17047 17048 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, false); 17049 if (IS_ERR(other_branch)) 17050 return PTR_ERR(other_branch); 17051 other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs; 17052 17053 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 17054 err = reg_set_min_max(env, 17055 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 17056 &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 17057 dst_reg, src_reg, opcode, is_jmp32); 17058 } else /* BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K */ { 17059 /* reg_set_min_max() can mangle the fake_reg. Make a copy 17060 * so that these are two different memory locations. The 17061 * src_reg is not used beyond here in context of K. 17062 */ 17063 memcpy(&env->fake_reg[1], &env->fake_reg[0], 17064 sizeof(env->fake_reg[0])); 17065 err = reg_set_min_max(env, 17066 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 17067 &env->fake_reg[0], 17068 dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[1], 17069 opcode, is_jmp32); 17070 } 17071 if (err) 17072 return err; 17073 17074 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && 17075 src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && src_reg->id && 17076 !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) { 17077 sync_linked_regs(this_branch, src_reg, &linked_regs); 17078 sync_linked_regs(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], &linked_regs); 17079 } 17080 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id && 17081 !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) { 17082 sync_linked_regs(this_branch, dst_reg, &linked_regs); 17083 sync_linked_regs(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], &linked_regs); 17084 } 17085 17086 /* if one pointer register is compared to another pointer 17087 * register check if PTR_MAYBE_NULL could be lifted. 17088 * E.g. register A - maybe null 17089 * register B - not null 17090 * for JNE A, B, ... - A is not null in the false branch; 17091 * for JEQ A, B, ... - A is not null in the true branch. 17092 * 17093 * Since PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to a kernel struct that does 17094 * not need to be null checked by the BPF program, i.e., 17095 * could be null even without PTR_MAYBE_NULL marking, so 17096 * only propagate nullness when neither reg is that type. 17097 */ 17098 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && 17099 __is_pointer_value(false, src_reg) && __is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg) && 17100 type_may_be_null(src_reg->type) != type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type) && 17101 base_type(src_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 17102 base_type(dst_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 17103 eq_branch_regs = NULL; 17104 switch (opcode) { 17105 case BPF_JEQ: 17106 eq_branch_regs = other_branch_regs; 17107 break; 17108 case BPF_JNE: 17109 eq_branch_regs = regs; 17110 break; 17111 default: 17112 /* do nothing */ 17113 break; 17114 } 17115 if (eq_branch_regs) { 17116 if (type_may_be_null(src_reg->type)) 17117 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 17118 else 17119 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 17120 } 17121 } 17122 17123 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem(). 17124 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison 17125 * which will never be JMP32. 17126 */ 17127 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && 17128 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && 17129 type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) { 17130 /* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either 17131 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. 17132 */ 17133 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, 17134 opcode == BPF_JNE); 17135 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, 17136 opcode == BPF_JEQ); 17137 } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg], 17138 this_branch, other_branch) && 17139 is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 17140 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 17141 insn->dst_reg); 17142 return -EACCES; 17143 } 17144 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 17145 print_insn_state(env, this_branch, this_branch->curframe); 17146 return 0; 17147 } 17148 17149 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 17150 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 17151 { 17152 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 17153 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 17154 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; 17155 struct bpf_map *map; 17156 int err; 17157 17158 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 17159 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); 17160 return -EINVAL; 17161 } 17162 if (insn->off != 0) { 17163 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); 17164 return -EINVAL; 17165 } 17166 17167 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 17168 if (err) 17169 return err; 17170 17171 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 17172 if (insn->src_reg == 0) { 17173 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; 17174 17175 dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 17176 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); 17177 return 0; 17178 } 17179 17180 /* All special src_reg cases are listed below. From this point onwards 17181 * we either succeed and assign a corresponding dst_reg->type after 17182 * zeroing the offset, or fail and reject the program. 17183 */ 17184 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 17185 17186 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 17187 dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type; 17188 switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) { 17189 case PTR_TO_MEM: 17190 dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size; 17191 break; 17192 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 17193 dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf; 17194 dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id; 17195 break; 17196 default: 17197 verifier_bug(env, "pseudo btf id: unexpected dst reg type"); 17198 return -EFAULT; 17199 } 17200 return 0; 17201 } 17202 17203 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 17204 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 17205 u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env, 17206 env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1); 17207 17208 if (!aux->func_info) { 17209 verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n"); 17210 return -EINVAL; 17211 } 17212 if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) { 17213 verbose(env, "callback function not static\n"); 17214 return -EINVAL; 17215 } 17216 17217 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 17218 dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno; 17219 return 0; 17220 } 17221 17222 map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; 17223 dst_reg->map_ptr = map; 17224 17225 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE || 17226 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) { 17227 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA) { 17228 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 17229 return 0; 17230 } 17231 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 17232 dst_reg->off = aux->map_off; 17233 WARN_ON_ONCE(map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY && 17234 map->max_entries != 1); 17235 /* We want reg->id to be same (0) as map_value is not distinct */ 17236 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 17237 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 17238 dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 17239 } else { 17240 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected src reg value for ldimm64"); 17241 return -EFAULT; 17242 } 17243 17244 return 0; 17245 } 17246 17247 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) 17248 { 17249 switch (type) { 17250 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 17251 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 17252 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 17253 return true; 17254 default: 17255 return false; 17256 } 17257 } 17258 17259 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: 17260 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb 17261 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, 17262 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 17263 * 17264 * Implicit input: 17265 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX 17266 * 17267 * Explicit input: 17268 * SRC == any register 17269 * IMM == 32-bit immediate 17270 * 17271 * Output: 17272 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness 17273 */ 17274 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 17275 { 17276 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 17277 static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6; 17278 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 17279 int i, err; 17280 17281 if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) { 17282 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); 17283 return -EINVAL; 17284 } 17285 17286 if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { 17287 verifier_bug(env, "gen_ld_abs is null"); 17288 return -EFAULT; 17289 } 17290 17291 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 17292 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || 17293 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { 17294 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); 17295 return -EINVAL; 17296 } 17297 17298 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ 17299 err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP); 17300 if (err) 17301 return err; 17302 17303 /* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as 17304 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to 17305 * reference leak. 17306 */ 17307 err = check_resource_leak(env, false, true, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND]"); 17308 if (err) 17309 return err; 17310 17311 if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 17312 verbose(env, 17313 "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); 17314 return -EINVAL; 17315 } 17316 17317 if (mode == BPF_IND) { 17318 /* check explicit source operand */ 17319 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 17320 if (err) 17321 return err; 17322 } 17323 17324 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); 17325 if (err < 0) 17326 return err; 17327 17328 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ 17329 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 17330 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 17331 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 17332 } 17333 17334 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains 17335 * the value fetched from the packet. 17336 * Already marked as written above. 17337 */ 17338 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 17339 /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ 17340 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 17341 return 0; 17342 } 17343 17344 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, const char *reg_name) 17345 { 17346 const char *exit_ctx = "At program exit"; 17347 struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown; 17348 const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 17349 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 17350 struct bpf_retval_range range = retval_range(0, 1); 17351 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 17352 int err; 17353 struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0]; 17354 const bool is_subprog = frame->subprogno; 17355 bool return_32bit = false; 17356 const struct btf_type *reg_type, *ret_type = NULL; 17357 17358 /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ 17359 if (!is_subprog || frame->in_exception_callback_fn) { 17360 switch (prog_type) { 17361 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 17362 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) 17363 /* See below, can be 0 or 0-1 depending on hook. */ 17364 break; 17365 if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 17366 return 0; 17367 break; 17368 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: 17369 if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 17370 return 0; 17371 17372 if (frame->in_exception_callback_fn) 17373 break; 17374 17375 /* Allow a struct_ops program to return a referenced kptr if it 17376 * matches the operator's return type and is in its unmodified 17377 * form. A scalar zero (i.e., a null pointer) is also allowed. 17378 */ 17379 reg_type = reg->btf ? btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id) : NULL; 17380 ret_type = btf_type_resolve_ptr(prog->aux->attach_btf, 17381 prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type, 17382 NULL); 17383 if (ret_type && ret_type == reg_type && reg->ref_obj_id) 17384 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 17385 break; 17386 default: 17387 break; 17388 } 17389 } 17390 17391 /* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used 17392 * to return the value from eBPF program. 17393 * Make sure that it's readable at this time 17394 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote 17395 * something into it earlier 17396 */ 17397 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 17398 if (err) 17399 return err; 17400 17401 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 17402 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr as return value\n", regno); 17403 return -EACCES; 17404 } 17405 17406 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn) { 17407 exit_ctx = "At async callback return"; 17408 range = frame->callback_ret_range; 17409 goto enforce_retval; 17410 } 17411 17412 if (is_subprog && !frame->in_exception_callback_fn) { 17413 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 17414 verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R%d is not a scalar value (%s)\n", 17415 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 17416 return -EINVAL; 17417 } 17418 return 0; 17419 } 17420 17421 switch (prog_type) { 17422 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: 17423 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || 17424 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG || 17425 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_RECVMSG || 17426 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME || 17427 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME || 17428 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME || 17429 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME || 17430 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME || 17431 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME) 17432 range = retval_range(1, 1); 17433 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND || 17434 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND) 17435 range = retval_range(0, 3); 17436 break; 17437 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 17438 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) { 17439 range = retval_range(0, 3); 17440 enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3); 17441 } 17442 break; 17443 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: 17444 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 17445 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: 17446 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: 17447 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 17448 break; 17449 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 17450 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id) 17451 return 0; 17452 range = retval_range(0, 0); 17453 break; 17454 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 17455 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { 17456 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 17457 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 17458 range = retval_range(0, 0); 17459 break; 17460 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 17461 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 17462 return 0; 17463 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 17464 break; 17465 default: 17466 return -ENOTSUPP; 17467 } 17468 break; 17469 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 17470 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { 17471 case BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_SESSION: 17472 case BPF_TRACE_UPROBE_SESSION: 17473 range = retval_range(0, 1); 17474 break; 17475 default: 17476 return 0; 17477 } 17478 break; 17479 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 17480 range = retval_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS); 17481 break; 17482 17483 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 17484 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 17485 /* no range found, any return value is allowed */ 17486 if (!get_func_retval_range(env->prog, &range)) 17487 return 0; 17488 /* no restricted range, any return value is allowed */ 17489 if (range.minval == S32_MIN && range.maxval == S32_MAX) 17490 return 0; 17491 return_32bit = true; 17492 } else if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 17493 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 17494 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 17495 */ 17496 range = retval_range(1, 1); 17497 } 17498 break; 17499 17500 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_NETFILTER: 17501 range = retval_range(NF_DROP, NF_ACCEPT); 17502 break; 17503 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: 17504 if (!ret_type) 17505 return 0; 17506 range = retval_range(0, 0); 17507 break; 17508 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: 17509 /* freplace program can return anything as its return value 17510 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program. 17511 */ 17512 default: 17513 return 0; 17514 } 17515 17516 enforce_retval: 17517 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 17518 verbose(env, "%s the register R%d is not a known value (%s)\n", 17519 exit_ctx, regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 17520 return -EINVAL; 17521 } 17522 17523 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 17524 if (err) 17525 return err; 17526 17527 if (!retval_range_within(range, reg, return_32bit)) { 17528 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, range, exit_ctx, reg_name); 17529 if (!is_subprog && 17530 prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP && 17531 prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 17532 !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 17533 verbose(env, "Note, BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 17534 return -EINVAL; 17535 } 17536 17537 if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) && 17538 tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off)) 17539 env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1; 17540 return 0; 17541 } 17542 17543 static void mark_subprog_changes_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 17544 { 17545 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog; 17546 17547 subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, off); 17548 subprog->changes_pkt_data = true; 17549 } 17550 17551 static void mark_subprog_might_sleep(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 17552 { 17553 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog; 17554 17555 subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, off); 17556 subprog->might_sleep = true; 17557 } 17558 17559 /* 't' is an index of a call-site. 17560 * 'w' is a callee entry point. 17561 * Eventually this function would be called when env->cfg.insn_state[w] == EXPLORED. 17562 * Rely on DFS traversal order and absence of recursive calls to guarantee that 17563 * callee's change_pkt_data marks would be correct at that moment. 17564 */ 17565 static void merge_callee_effects(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int t, int w) 17566 { 17567 struct bpf_subprog_info *caller, *callee; 17568 17569 caller = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, t); 17570 callee = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, w); 17571 caller->changes_pkt_data |= callee->changes_pkt_data; 17572 caller->might_sleep |= callee->might_sleep; 17573 } 17574 17575 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code 17576 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): 17577 * 2 label v as discovered 17578 * 3 let S be a stack 17579 * 4 S.push(v) 17580 * 5 while S is not empty 17581 * 6 t <- S.peek() 17582 * 7 if t is what we're looking for: 17583 * 8 return t 17584 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do 17585 * 10 if edge e is already labelled 17586 * 11 continue with the next edge 17587 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) 17588 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored 17589 * 14 label e as tree-edge 17590 * 15 label w as discovered 17591 * 16 S.push(w) 17592 * 17 continue at 5 17593 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered 17594 * 19 label e as back-edge 17595 * 20 else 17596 * 21 // vertex w is explored 17597 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge 17598 * 23 label t as explored 17599 * 24 S.pop() 17600 * 17601 * convention: 17602 * 0x10 - discovered 17603 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled 17604 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled 17605 * 0x20 - explored 17606 */ 17607 17608 enum { 17609 DISCOVERED = 0x10, 17610 EXPLORED = 0x20, 17611 FALLTHROUGH = 1, 17612 BRANCH = 2, 17613 }; 17614 17615 static void mark_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 17616 { 17617 env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true; 17618 } 17619 17620 static bool is_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 17621 { 17622 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point; 17623 } 17624 17625 static void mark_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 17626 { 17627 env->insn_aux_data[idx].force_checkpoint = true; 17628 } 17629 17630 static bool is_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 17631 { 17632 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].force_checkpoint; 17633 } 17634 17635 static void mark_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 17636 { 17637 env->insn_aux_data[idx].calls_callback = true; 17638 } 17639 17640 bool bpf_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 17641 { 17642 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].calls_callback; 17643 } 17644 17645 enum { 17646 DONE_EXPLORING = 0, 17647 KEEP_EXPLORING = 1, 17648 }; 17649 17650 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: 17651 * t - index of current instruction 17652 * w - next instruction 17653 * e - edge 17654 */ 17655 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17656 { 17657 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; 17658 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; 17659 17660 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) 17661 return DONE_EXPLORING; 17662 17663 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) 17664 return DONE_EXPLORING; 17665 17666 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 17667 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 17668 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 17669 return -EINVAL; 17670 } 17671 17672 if (e == BRANCH) { 17673 /* mark branch target for state pruning */ 17674 mark_prune_point(env, w); 17675 mark_jmp_point(env, w); 17676 } 17677 17678 if (insn_state[w] == 0) { 17679 /* tree-edge */ 17680 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 17681 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; 17682 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 17683 return -E2BIG; 17684 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; 17685 return KEEP_EXPLORING; 17686 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { 17687 if (env->bpf_capable) 17688 return DONE_EXPLORING; 17689 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 17690 verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); 17691 verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 17692 return -EINVAL; 17693 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { 17694 /* forward- or cross-edge */ 17695 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 17696 } else { 17697 verifier_bug(env, "insn state internal bug"); 17698 return -EFAULT; 17699 } 17700 return DONE_EXPLORING; 17701 } 17702 17703 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, struct bpf_insn *insns, 17704 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17705 bool visit_callee) 17706 { 17707 int ret, insn_sz; 17708 int w; 17709 17710 insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[t]) ? 2 : 1; 17711 ret = push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env); 17712 if (ret) 17713 return ret; 17714 17715 mark_prune_point(env, t + insn_sz); 17716 /* when we exit from subprog, we need to record non-linear history */ 17717 mark_jmp_point(env, t + insn_sz); 17718 17719 if (visit_callee) { 17720 w = t + insns[t].imm + 1; 17721 mark_prune_point(env, t); 17722 merge_callee_effects(env, t, w); 17723 ret = push_insn(t, w, BRANCH, env); 17724 } 17725 return ret; 17726 } 17727 17728 /* Bitmask with 1s for all caller saved registers */ 17729 #define ALL_CALLER_SAVED_REGS ((1u << CALLER_SAVED_REGS) - 1) 17730 17731 /* True if do_misc_fixups() replaces calls to helper number 'imm', 17732 * replacement patch is presumed to follow bpf_fastcall contract 17733 * (see mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call() below). 17734 */ 17735 static bool verifier_inlines_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s32 imm) 17736 { 17737 switch (imm) { 17738 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 17739 case BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id: 17740 return env->prog->jit_requested && bpf_jit_supports_percpu_insn(); 17741 #endif 17742 default: 17743 return false; 17744 } 17745 } 17746 17747 struct call_summary { 17748 u8 num_params; 17749 bool is_void; 17750 bool fastcall; 17751 }; 17752 17753 /* If @call is a kfunc or helper call, fills @cs and returns true, 17754 * otherwise returns false. 17755 */ 17756 static bool get_call_summary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *call, 17757 struct call_summary *cs) 17758 { 17759 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 17760 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 17761 int i; 17762 17763 if (bpf_helper_call(call)) { 17764 17765 if (get_helper_proto(env, call->imm, &fn) < 0) 17766 /* error would be reported later */ 17767 return false; 17768 cs->fastcall = fn->allow_fastcall && 17769 (verifier_inlines_helper_call(env, call->imm) || 17770 bpf_jit_inlines_helper_call(call->imm)); 17771 cs->is_void = fn->ret_type == RET_VOID; 17772 cs->num_params = 0; 17773 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); ++i) { 17774 if (fn->arg_type[i] == ARG_DONTCARE) 17775 break; 17776 cs->num_params++; 17777 } 17778 return true; 17779 } 17780 17781 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(call)) { 17782 int err; 17783 17784 err = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, call, &meta, NULL); 17785 if (err < 0) 17786 /* error would be reported later */ 17787 return false; 17788 cs->num_params = btf_type_vlen(meta.func_proto); 17789 cs->fastcall = meta.kfunc_flags & KF_FASTCALL; 17790 cs->is_void = btf_type_is_void(btf_type_by_id(meta.btf, meta.func_proto->type)); 17791 return true; 17792 } 17793 17794 return false; 17795 } 17796 17797 /* LLVM define a bpf_fastcall function attribute. 17798 * This attribute means that function scratches only some of 17799 * the caller saved registers defined by ABI. 17800 * For BPF the set of such registers could be defined as follows: 17801 * - R0 is scratched only if function is non-void; 17802 * - R1-R5 are scratched only if corresponding parameter type is defined 17803 * in the function prototype. 17804 * 17805 * The contract between kernel and clang allows to simultaneously use 17806 * such functions and maintain backwards compatibility with old 17807 * kernels that don't understand bpf_fastcall calls: 17808 * 17809 * - for bpf_fastcall calls clang allocates registers as-if relevant r0-r5 17810 * registers are not scratched by the call; 17811 * 17812 * - as a post-processing step, clang visits each bpf_fastcall call and adds 17813 * spill/fill for every live r0-r5; 17814 * 17815 * - stack offsets used for the spill/fill are allocated as lowest 17816 * stack offsets in whole function and are not used for any other 17817 * purposes; 17818 * 17819 * - when kernel loads a program, it looks for such patterns 17820 * (bpf_fastcall function surrounded by spills/fills) and checks if 17821 * spill/fill stack offsets are used exclusively in fastcall patterns; 17822 * 17823 * - if so, and if verifier or current JIT inlines the call to the 17824 * bpf_fastcall function (e.g. a helper call), kernel removes unnecessary 17825 * spill/fill pairs; 17826 * 17827 * - when old kernel loads a program, presence of spill/fill pairs 17828 * keeps BPF program valid, albeit slightly less efficient. 17829 * 17830 * For example: 17831 * 17832 * r1 = 1; 17833 * r2 = 2; 17834 * *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1; r1 = 1; 17835 * *(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r2; r2 = 2; 17836 * call %[to_be_inlined] --> call %[to_be_inlined] 17837 * r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 16); r0 = r1; 17838 * r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 += r2; 17839 * r0 = r1; exit; 17840 * r0 += r2; 17841 * exit; 17842 * 17843 * The purpose of mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call is to: 17844 * - look for such patterns; 17845 * - mark spill and fill instructions in env->insn_aux_data[*].fastcall_pattern; 17846 * - mark set env->insn_aux_data[*].fastcall_spills_num for call instruction; 17847 * - update env->subprog_info[*]->fastcall_stack_off to find an offset 17848 * at which bpf_fastcall spill/fill stack slots start; 17849 * - update env->subprog_info[*]->keep_fastcall_stack. 17850 * 17851 * The .fastcall_pattern and .fastcall_stack_off are used by 17852 * check_fastcall_stack_contract() to check if every stack access to 17853 * fastcall spill/fill stack slot originates from spill/fill 17854 * instructions, members of fastcall patterns. 17855 * 17856 * If such condition holds true for a subprogram, fastcall patterns could 17857 * be rewritten by remove_fastcall_spills_fills(). 17858 * Otherwise bpf_fastcall patterns are not changed in the subprogram 17859 * (code, presumably, generated by an older clang version). 17860 * 17861 * For example, it is *not* safe to remove spill/fill below: 17862 * 17863 * r1 = 1; 17864 * *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1; r1 = 1; 17865 * call %[to_be_inlined] --> call %[to_be_inlined] 17866 * r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); <---- wrong !!! 17867 * r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 += r1; 17868 * r0 += r1; exit; 17869 * exit; 17870 */ 17871 static void mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17872 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog, 17873 int insn_idx, s16 lowest_off) 17874 { 17875 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi, *stx, *ldx; 17876 struct bpf_insn *call = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 17877 u32 clobbered_regs_mask; 17878 struct call_summary cs; 17879 u32 expected_regs_mask; 17880 s16 off; 17881 int i; 17882 17883 if (!get_call_summary(env, call, &cs)) 17884 return; 17885 17886 /* A bitmask specifying which caller saved registers are clobbered 17887 * by a call to a helper/kfunc *as if* this helper/kfunc follows 17888 * bpf_fastcall contract: 17889 * - includes R0 if function is non-void; 17890 * - includes R1-R5 if corresponding parameter has is described 17891 * in the function prototype. 17892 */ 17893 clobbered_regs_mask = GENMASK(cs.num_params, cs.is_void ? 1 : 0); 17894 /* e.g. if helper call clobbers r{0,1}, expect r{2,3,4,5} in the pattern */ 17895 expected_regs_mask = ~clobbered_regs_mask & ALL_CALLER_SAVED_REGS; 17896 17897 /* match pairs of form: 17898 * 17899 * *(u64 *)(r10 - Y) = rX (where Y % 8 == 0) 17900 * ... 17901 * call %[to_be_inlined] 17902 * ... 17903 * rX = *(u64 *)(r10 - Y) 17904 */ 17905 for (i = 1, off = lowest_off; i <= ARRAY_SIZE(caller_saved); ++i, off += BPF_REG_SIZE) { 17906 if (insn_idx - i < 0 || insn_idx + i >= env->prog->len) 17907 break; 17908 stx = &insns[insn_idx - i]; 17909 ldx = &insns[insn_idx + i]; 17910 /* must be a stack spill/fill pair */ 17911 if (stx->code != (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 17912 ldx->code != (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 17913 stx->dst_reg != BPF_REG_10 || 17914 ldx->src_reg != BPF_REG_10) 17915 break; 17916 /* must be a spill/fill for the same reg */ 17917 if (stx->src_reg != ldx->dst_reg) 17918 break; 17919 /* must be one of the previously unseen registers */ 17920 if ((BIT(stx->src_reg) & expected_regs_mask) == 0) 17921 break; 17922 /* must be a spill/fill for the same expected offset, 17923 * no need to check offset alignment, BPF_DW stack access 17924 * is always 8-byte aligned. 17925 */ 17926 if (stx->off != off || ldx->off != off) 17927 break; 17928 expected_regs_mask &= ~BIT(stx->src_reg); 17929 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx - i].fastcall_pattern = 1; 17930 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx + i].fastcall_pattern = 1; 17931 } 17932 if (i == 1) 17933 return; 17934 17935 /* Conditionally set 'fastcall_spills_num' to allow forward 17936 * compatibility when more helper functions are marked as 17937 * bpf_fastcall at compile time than current kernel supports, e.g: 17938 * 17939 * 1: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1 17940 * 2: call A ;; assume A is bpf_fastcall for current kernel 17941 * 3: r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) 17942 * 4: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1 17943 * 5: call B ;; assume B is not bpf_fastcall for current kernel 17944 * 6: r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) 17945 * 17946 * There is no need to block bpf_fastcall rewrite for such program. 17947 * Set 'fastcall_pattern' for both calls to keep check_fastcall_stack_contract() happy, 17948 * don't set 'fastcall_spills_num' for call B so that remove_fastcall_spills_fills() 17949 * does not remove spill/fill pair {4,6}. 17950 */ 17951 if (cs.fastcall) 17952 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].fastcall_spills_num = i - 1; 17953 else 17954 subprog->keep_fastcall_stack = 1; 17955 subprog->fastcall_stack_off = min(subprog->fastcall_stack_off, off); 17956 } 17957 17958 static int mark_fastcall_patterns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17959 { 17960 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 17961 struct bpf_insn *insn; 17962 s16 lowest_off; 17963 int s, i; 17964 17965 for (s = 0; s < env->subprog_cnt; ++s, ++subprog) { 17966 /* find lowest stack spill offset used in this subprog */ 17967 lowest_off = 0; 17968 for (i = subprog->start; i < (subprog + 1)->start; ++i) { 17969 insn = env->prog->insnsi + i; 17970 if (insn->code != (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 17971 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_10) 17972 continue; 17973 lowest_off = min(lowest_off, insn->off); 17974 } 17975 /* use this offset to find fastcall patterns */ 17976 for (i = subprog->start; i < (subprog + 1)->start; ++i) { 17977 insn = env->prog->insnsi + i; 17978 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 17979 continue; 17980 mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call(env, subprog, i, lowest_off); 17981 } 17982 } 17983 return 0; 17984 } 17985 17986 static struct bpf_iarray *iarray_realloc(struct bpf_iarray *old, size_t n_elem) 17987 { 17988 size_t new_size = sizeof(struct bpf_iarray) + n_elem * sizeof(old->items[0]); 17989 struct bpf_iarray *new; 17990 17991 new = kvrealloc(old, new_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 17992 if (!new) { 17993 /* this is what callers always want, so simplify the call site */ 17994 kvfree(old); 17995 return NULL; 17996 } 17997 17998 new->cnt = n_elem; 17999 return new; 18000 } 18001 18002 static int copy_insn_array(struct bpf_map *map, u32 start, u32 end, u32 *items) 18003 { 18004 struct bpf_insn_array_value *value; 18005 u32 i; 18006 18007 for (i = start; i <= end; i++) { 18008 value = map->ops->map_lookup_elem(map, &i); 18009 /* 18010 * map_lookup_elem of an array map will never return an error, 18011 * but not checking it makes some static analysers to worry 18012 */ 18013 if (IS_ERR(value)) 18014 return PTR_ERR(value); 18015 else if (!value) 18016 return -EINVAL; 18017 items[i - start] = value->xlated_off; 18018 } 18019 return 0; 18020 } 18021 18022 static int cmp_ptr_to_u32(const void *a, const void *b) 18023 { 18024 return *(u32 *)a - *(u32 *)b; 18025 } 18026 18027 static int sort_insn_array_uniq(u32 *items, int cnt) 18028 { 18029 int unique = 1; 18030 int i; 18031 18032 sort(items, cnt, sizeof(items[0]), cmp_ptr_to_u32, NULL); 18033 18034 for (i = 1; i < cnt; i++) 18035 if (items[i] != items[unique - 1]) 18036 items[unique++] = items[i]; 18037 18038 return unique; 18039 } 18040 18041 /* 18042 * sort_unique({map[start], ..., map[end]}) into off 18043 */ 18044 static int copy_insn_array_uniq(struct bpf_map *map, u32 start, u32 end, u32 *off) 18045 { 18046 u32 n = end - start + 1; 18047 int err; 18048 18049 err = copy_insn_array(map, start, end, off); 18050 if (err) 18051 return err; 18052 18053 return sort_insn_array_uniq(off, n); 18054 } 18055 18056 /* 18057 * Copy all unique offsets from the map 18058 */ 18059 static struct bpf_iarray *jt_from_map(struct bpf_map *map) 18060 { 18061 struct bpf_iarray *jt; 18062 int err; 18063 int n; 18064 18065 jt = iarray_realloc(NULL, map->max_entries); 18066 if (!jt) 18067 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 18068 18069 n = copy_insn_array_uniq(map, 0, map->max_entries - 1, jt->items); 18070 if (n < 0) { 18071 err = n; 18072 goto err_free; 18073 } 18074 if (n == 0) { 18075 err = -EINVAL; 18076 goto err_free; 18077 } 18078 jt->cnt = n; 18079 return jt; 18080 18081 err_free: 18082 kvfree(jt); 18083 return ERR_PTR(err); 18084 } 18085 18086 /* 18087 * Find and collect all maps which fit in the subprog. Return the result as one 18088 * combined jump table in jt->items (allocated with kvcalloc) 18089 */ 18090 static struct bpf_iarray *jt_from_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18091 int subprog_start, int subprog_end) 18092 { 18093 struct bpf_iarray *jt = NULL; 18094 struct bpf_map *map; 18095 struct bpf_iarray *jt_cur; 18096 int i; 18097 18098 for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++) { 18099 /* 18100 * TODO (when needed): collect only jump tables, not static keys 18101 * or maps for indirect calls 18102 */ 18103 map = env->insn_array_maps[i]; 18104 18105 jt_cur = jt_from_map(map); 18106 if (IS_ERR(jt_cur)) { 18107 kvfree(jt); 18108 return jt_cur; 18109 } 18110 18111 /* 18112 * This is enough to check one element. The full table is 18113 * checked to fit inside the subprog later in create_jt() 18114 */ 18115 if (jt_cur->items[0] >= subprog_start && jt_cur->items[0] < subprog_end) { 18116 u32 old_cnt = jt ? jt->cnt : 0; 18117 jt = iarray_realloc(jt, old_cnt + jt_cur->cnt); 18118 if (!jt) { 18119 kvfree(jt_cur); 18120 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 18121 } 18122 memcpy(jt->items + old_cnt, jt_cur->items, jt_cur->cnt << 2); 18123 } 18124 18125 kvfree(jt_cur); 18126 } 18127 18128 if (!jt) { 18129 verbose(env, "no jump tables found for subprog starting at %u\n", subprog_start); 18130 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 18131 } 18132 18133 jt->cnt = sort_insn_array_uniq(jt->items, jt->cnt); 18134 return jt; 18135 } 18136 18137 static struct bpf_iarray * 18138 create_jt(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18139 { 18140 static struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog; 18141 int subprog_start, subprog_end; 18142 struct bpf_iarray *jt; 18143 int i; 18144 18145 subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, t); 18146 subprog_start = subprog->start; 18147 subprog_end = (subprog + 1)->start; 18148 jt = jt_from_subprog(env, subprog_start, subprog_end); 18149 if (IS_ERR(jt)) 18150 return jt; 18151 18152 /* Check that the every element of the jump table fits within the given subprogram */ 18153 for (i = 0; i < jt->cnt; i++) { 18154 if (jt->items[i] < subprog_start || jt->items[i] >= subprog_end) { 18155 verbose(env, "jump table for insn %d points outside of the subprog [%u,%u]\n", 18156 t, subprog_start, subprog_end); 18157 kvfree(jt); 18158 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 18159 } 18160 } 18161 18162 return jt; 18163 } 18164 18165 /* "conditional jump with N edges" */ 18166 static int visit_gotox_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18167 { 18168 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; 18169 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; 18170 bool keep_exploring = false; 18171 struct bpf_iarray *jt; 18172 int i, w; 18173 18174 jt = env->insn_aux_data[t].jt; 18175 if (!jt) { 18176 jt = create_jt(t, env); 18177 if (IS_ERR(jt)) 18178 return PTR_ERR(jt); 18179 18180 env->insn_aux_data[t].jt = jt; 18181 } 18182 18183 mark_prune_point(env, t); 18184 for (i = 0; i < jt->cnt; i++) { 18185 w = jt->items[i]; 18186 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 18187 verbose(env, "indirect jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 18188 return -EINVAL; 18189 } 18190 18191 mark_jmp_point(env, w); 18192 18193 /* EXPLORED || DISCOVERED */ 18194 if (insn_state[w]) 18195 continue; 18196 18197 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 18198 return -E2BIG; 18199 18200 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; 18201 insn_state[w] |= DISCOVERED; 18202 keep_exploring = true; 18203 } 18204 18205 return keep_exploring ? KEEP_EXPLORING : DONE_EXPLORING; 18206 } 18207 18208 static int visit_tailcall_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int t) 18209 { 18210 static struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog; 18211 struct bpf_iarray *jt; 18212 18213 if (env->insn_aux_data[t].jt) 18214 return 0; 18215 18216 jt = iarray_realloc(NULL, 2); 18217 if (!jt) 18218 return -ENOMEM; 18219 18220 subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, t); 18221 jt->items[0] = t + 1; 18222 jt->items[1] = subprog->exit_idx; 18223 env->insn_aux_data[t].jt = jt; 18224 return 0; 18225 } 18226 18227 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following: 18228 * < 0 - an error occurred 18229 * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored 18230 * KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored 18231 */ 18232 static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18233 { 18234 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi, *insn = &insns[t]; 18235 int ret, off, insn_sz; 18236 18237 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) 18238 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, true); 18239 18240 /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */ 18241 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP && 18242 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP32) { 18243 insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(insn) ? 2 : 1; 18244 return push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env); 18245 } 18246 18247 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 18248 case BPF_EXIT: 18249 return DONE_EXPLORING; 18250 18251 case BPF_CALL: 18252 if (is_async_callback_calling_insn(insn)) 18253 /* Mark this call insn as a prune point to trigger 18254 * is_state_visited() check before call itself is 18255 * processed by __check_func_call(). Otherwise new 18256 * async state will be pushed for further exploration. 18257 */ 18258 mark_prune_point(env, t); 18259 /* For functions that invoke callbacks it is not known how many times 18260 * callback would be called. Verifier models callback calling functions 18261 * by repeatedly visiting callback bodies and returning to origin call 18262 * instruction. 18263 * In order to stop such iteration verifier needs to identify when a 18264 * state identical some state from a previous iteration is reached. 18265 * Check below forces creation of checkpoint before callback calling 18266 * instruction to allow search for such identical states. 18267 */ 18268 if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn)) { 18269 mark_calls_callback(env, t); 18270 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); 18271 mark_prune_point(env, t); 18272 mark_jmp_point(env, t); 18273 } 18274 if (bpf_helper_call(insn)) { 18275 const struct bpf_func_proto *fp; 18276 18277 ret = get_helper_proto(env, insn->imm, &fp); 18278 /* If called in a non-sleepable context program will be 18279 * rejected anyway, so we should end up with precise 18280 * sleepable marks on subprogs, except for dead code 18281 * elimination. 18282 */ 18283 if (ret == 0 && fp->might_sleep) 18284 mark_subprog_might_sleep(env, t); 18285 if (bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(insn->imm)) 18286 mark_subprog_changes_pkt_data(env, t); 18287 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 18288 visit_tailcall_insn(env, t); 18289 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 18290 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 18291 18292 ret = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, insn, &meta, NULL); 18293 if (ret == 0 && is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 18294 mark_prune_point(env, t); 18295 /* Checking and saving state checkpoints at iter_next() call 18296 * is crucial for fast convergence of open-coded iterator loop 18297 * logic, so we need to force it. If we don't do that, 18298 * is_state_visited() might skip saving a checkpoint, causing 18299 * unnecessarily long sequence of not checkpointed 18300 * instructions and jumps, leading to exhaustion of jump 18301 * history buffer, and potentially other undesired outcomes. 18302 * It is expected that with correct open-coded iterators 18303 * convergence will happen quickly, so we don't run a risk of 18304 * exhausting memory. 18305 */ 18306 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); 18307 } 18308 /* Same as helpers, if called in a non-sleepable context 18309 * program will be rejected anyway, so we should end up 18310 * with precise sleepable marks on subprogs, except for 18311 * dead code elimination. 18312 */ 18313 if (ret == 0 && is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta)) 18314 mark_subprog_might_sleep(env, t); 18315 if (ret == 0 && is_kfunc_pkt_changing(&meta)) 18316 mark_subprog_changes_pkt_data(env, t); 18317 } 18318 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL); 18319 18320 case BPF_JA: 18321 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) 18322 return visit_gotox_insn(t, env); 18323 18324 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP) 18325 off = insn->off; 18326 else 18327 off = insn->imm; 18328 18329 /* unconditional jump with single edge */ 18330 ret = push_insn(t, t + off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); 18331 if (ret) 18332 return ret; 18333 18334 mark_prune_point(env, t + off + 1); 18335 mark_jmp_point(env, t + off + 1); 18336 18337 return ret; 18338 18339 default: 18340 /* conditional jump with two edges */ 18341 mark_prune_point(env, t); 18342 if (is_may_goto_insn(insn)) 18343 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); 18344 18345 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); 18346 if (ret) 18347 return ret; 18348 18349 return push_insn(t, t + insn->off + 1, BRANCH, env); 18350 } 18351 } 18352 18353 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program 18354 * loop == back-edge in directed graph 18355 */ 18356 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18357 { 18358 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18359 int *insn_stack, *insn_state; 18360 int ex_insn_beg, i, ret = 0; 18361 18362 insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 18363 if (!insn_state) 18364 return -ENOMEM; 18365 18366 insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 18367 if (!insn_stack) { 18368 kvfree(insn_state); 18369 return -ENOMEM; 18370 } 18371 18372 ex_insn_beg = env->exception_callback_subprog 18373 ? env->subprog_info[env->exception_callback_subprog].start 18374 : 0; 18375 18376 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ 18377 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ 18378 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; 18379 18380 walk_cfg: 18381 while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) { 18382 int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; 18383 18384 ret = visit_insn(t, env); 18385 switch (ret) { 18386 case DONE_EXPLORING: 18387 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; 18388 env->cfg.cur_stack--; 18389 break; 18390 case KEEP_EXPLORING: 18391 break; 18392 default: 18393 if (ret > 0) { 18394 verifier_bug(env, "visit_insn internal bug"); 18395 ret = -EFAULT; 18396 } 18397 goto err_free; 18398 } 18399 } 18400 18401 if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) { 18402 verifier_bug(env, "pop stack internal bug"); 18403 ret = -EFAULT; 18404 goto err_free; 18405 } 18406 18407 if (ex_insn_beg && insn_state[ex_insn_beg] != EXPLORED) { 18408 insn_state[ex_insn_beg] = DISCOVERED; 18409 insn_stack[0] = ex_insn_beg; 18410 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; 18411 goto walk_cfg; 18412 } 18413 18414 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 18415 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[i]; 18416 18417 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { 18418 verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); 18419 ret = -EINVAL; 18420 goto err_free; 18421 } 18422 if (bpf_is_ldimm64(insn)) { 18423 if (insn_state[i + 1] != 0) { 18424 verbose(env, "jump into the middle of ldimm64 insn %d\n", i); 18425 ret = -EINVAL; 18426 goto err_free; 18427 } 18428 i++; /* skip second half of ldimm64 */ 18429 } 18430 } 18431 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ 18432 env->prog->aux->changes_pkt_data = env->subprog_info[0].changes_pkt_data; 18433 env->prog->aux->might_sleep = env->subprog_info[0].might_sleep; 18434 18435 err_free: 18436 kvfree(insn_state); 18437 kvfree(insn_stack); 18438 env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL; 18439 return ret; 18440 } 18441 18442 /* 18443 * For each subprogram 'i' fill array env->cfg.insn_subprogram sub-range 18444 * [env->subprog_info[i].postorder_start, env->subprog_info[i+1].postorder_start) 18445 * with indices of 'i' instructions in postorder. 18446 */ 18447 static int compute_postorder(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18448 { 18449 u32 cur_postorder, i, top, stack_sz, s; 18450 int *stack = NULL, *postorder = NULL, *state = NULL; 18451 struct bpf_iarray *succ; 18452 18453 postorder = kvcalloc(env->prog->len, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 18454 state = kvcalloc(env->prog->len, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 18455 stack = kvcalloc(env->prog->len, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 18456 if (!postorder || !state || !stack) { 18457 kvfree(postorder); 18458 kvfree(state); 18459 kvfree(stack); 18460 return -ENOMEM; 18461 } 18462 cur_postorder = 0; 18463 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18464 env->subprog_info[i].postorder_start = cur_postorder; 18465 stack[0] = env->subprog_info[i].start; 18466 stack_sz = 1; 18467 do { 18468 top = stack[stack_sz - 1]; 18469 state[top] |= DISCOVERED; 18470 if (state[top] & EXPLORED) { 18471 postorder[cur_postorder++] = top; 18472 stack_sz--; 18473 continue; 18474 } 18475 succ = bpf_insn_successors(env, top); 18476 for (s = 0; s < succ->cnt; ++s) { 18477 if (!state[succ->items[s]]) { 18478 stack[stack_sz++] = succ->items[s]; 18479 state[succ->items[s]] |= DISCOVERED; 18480 } 18481 } 18482 state[top] |= EXPLORED; 18483 } while (stack_sz); 18484 } 18485 env->subprog_info[i].postorder_start = cur_postorder; 18486 env->cfg.insn_postorder = postorder; 18487 env->cfg.cur_postorder = cur_postorder; 18488 kvfree(stack); 18489 kvfree(state); 18490 return 0; 18491 } 18492 18493 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18494 { 18495 int i; 18496 18497 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18498 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 18499 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 18500 return -EINVAL; 18501 } 18502 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 18503 verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 18504 return -EINVAL; 18505 } 18506 } 18507 return 0; 18508 } 18509 18510 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */ 18511 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8 18512 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252 18513 18514 static int check_btf_func_early(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18515 const union bpf_attr *attr, 18516 bpfptr_t uattr) 18517 { 18518 u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info); 18519 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto; 18520 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size; 18521 struct bpf_func_info *krecord; 18522 struct bpf_prog *prog; 18523 const struct btf *btf; 18524 u32 prev_offset = 0; 18525 bpfptr_t urecord; 18526 int ret = -ENOMEM; 18527 18528 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; 18529 if (!nfuncs) { 18530 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 18531 return -EINVAL; 18532 return 0; 18533 } 18534 18535 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; 18536 if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE || 18537 urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE || 18538 urec_size % sizeof(u32)) { 18539 verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size); 18540 return -EINVAL; 18541 } 18542 18543 prog = env->prog; 18544 btf = prog->aux->btf; 18545 18546 urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); 18547 min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size); 18548 18549 krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN); 18550 if (!krecord) 18551 return -ENOMEM; 18552 18553 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { 18554 ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size); 18555 if (ret) { 18556 if (ret == -E2BIG) { 18557 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info"); 18558 /* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero 18559 * out the rest of the record. 18560 */ 18561 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 18562 offsetof(union bpf_attr, func_info_rec_size), 18563 &min_size, sizeof(min_size))) 18564 ret = -EFAULT; 18565 } 18566 goto err_free; 18567 } 18568 18569 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) { 18570 ret = -EFAULT; 18571 goto err_free; 18572 } 18573 18574 /* check insn_off */ 18575 ret = -EINVAL; 18576 if (i == 0) { 18577 if (krecord[i].insn_off) { 18578 verbose(env, 18579 "nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record", 18580 krecord[i].insn_off); 18581 goto err_free; 18582 } 18583 } else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) { 18584 verbose(env, 18585 "same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)", 18586 krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset); 18587 goto err_free; 18588 } 18589 18590 /* check type_id */ 18591 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); 18592 if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) { 18593 verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info", 18594 krecord[i].type_id); 18595 goto err_free; 18596 } 18597 18598 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); 18599 if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto))) 18600 /* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */ 18601 goto err_free; 18602 18603 prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off; 18604 bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size); 18605 } 18606 18607 prog->aux->func_info = krecord; 18608 prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs; 18609 return 0; 18610 18611 err_free: 18612 kvfree(krecord); 18613 return ret; 18614 } 18615 18616 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18617 const union bpf_attr *attr, 18618 bpfptr_t uattr) 18619 { 18620 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type; 18621 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size; 18622 struct bpf_func_info *krecord; 18623 struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL; 18624 struct bpf_prog *prog; 18625 const struct btf *btf; 18626 bpfptr_t urecord; 18627 bool scalar_return; 18628 int ret = -ENOMEM; 18629 18630 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; 18631 if (!nfuncs) { 18632 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 18633 return -EINVAL; 18634 return 0; 18635 } 18636 if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) { 18637 verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n"); 18638 return -EINVAL; 18639 } 18640 18641 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; 18642 18643 prog = env->prog; 18644 btf = prog->aux->btf; 18645 18646 urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); 18647 18648 krecord = prog->aux->func_info; 18649 info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN); 18650 if (!info_aux) 18651 return -ENOMEM; 18652 18653 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { 18654 /* check insn_off */ 18655 ret = -EINVAL; 18656 18657 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) { 18658 verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n"); 18659 goto err_free; 18660 } 18661 18662 /* Already checked type_id */ 18663 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); 18664 info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info); 18665 /* Already checked func_proto */ 18666 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); 18667 18668 ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 18669 scalar_return = 18670 btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_is_any_enum(ret_type); 18671 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 18672 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 18673 goto err_free; 18674 } 18675 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 18676 verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 18677 goto err_free; 18678 } 18679 18680 bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size); 18681 } 18682 18683 prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux; 18684 return 0; 18685 18686 err_free: 18687 kfree(info_aux); 18688 return ret; 18689 } 18690 18691 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18692 { 18693 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 18694 int i; 18695 18696 if (!aux->func_info) 18697 return; 18698 18699 /* func_info is not available for hidden subprogs */ 18700 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt - env->hidden_subprog_cnt; i++) 18701 aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start; 18702 } 18703 18704 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE offsetofend(struct bpf_line_info, line_col) 18705 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 18706 18707 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18708 const union bpf_attr *attr, 18709 bpfptr_t uattr) 18710 { 18711 u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0; 18712 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub; 18713 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 18714 struct bpf_prog *prog; 18715 const struct btf *btf; 18716 bpfptr_t ulinfo; 18717 int err; 18718 18719 nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt; 18720 if (!nr_linfo) 18721 return 0; 18722 if (nr_linfo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_line_info)) 18723 return -EINVAL; 18724 18725 rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size; 18726 if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE || 18727 rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE || 18728 rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1)) 18729 return -EINVAL; 18730 18731 /* Need to zero it in case the userspace may 18732 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object. 18733 */ 18734 linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info), 18735 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN); 18736 if (!linfo) 18737 return -ENOMEM; 18738 18739 prog = env->prog; 18740 btf = prog->aux->btf; 18741 18742 s = 0; 18743 sub = env->subprog_info; 18744 ulinfo = make_bpfptr(attr->line_info, uattr.is_kernel); 18745 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info); 18746 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 18747 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) { 18748 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size); 18749 if (err) { 18750 if (err == -E2BIG) { 18751 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info"); 18752 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 18753 offsetof(union bpf_attr, line_info_rec_size), 18754 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 18755 err = -EFAULT; 18756 } 18757 goto err_free; 18758 } 18759 18760 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) { 18761 err = -EFAULT; 18762 goto err_free; 18763 } 18764 18765 /* 18766 * Check insn_off to ensure 18767 * 1) strictly increasing AND 18768 * 2) bounded by prog->len 18769 * 18770 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into 18771 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case 18772 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the 18773 * first sub also and the first sub must have 18774 * subprog_info[0].start == 0. 18775 */ 18776 if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) || 18777 linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) { 18778 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n", 18779 i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset, 18780 prog->len); 18781 err = -EINVAL; 18782 goto err_free; 18783 } 18784 18785 if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) { 18786 verbose(env, 18787 "Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n", 18788 i); 18789 err = -EINVAL; 18790 goto err_free; 18791 } 18792 18793 if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) || 18794 !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) { 18795 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i); 18796 err = -EINVAL; 18797 goto err_free; 18798 } 18799 18800 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 18801 if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) { 18802 sub[s].linfo_idx = i; 18803 s++; 18804 } else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) { 18805 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s); 18806 err = -EINVAL; 18807 goto err_free; 18808 } 18809 } 18810 18811 prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off; 18812 bpfptr_add(&ulinfo, rec_size); 18813 } 18814 18815 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 18816 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n", 18817 env->subprog_cnt - s, s); 18818 err = -EINVAL; 18819 goto err_free; 18820 } 18821 18822 prog->aux->linfo = linfo; 18823 prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo; 18824 18825 return 0; 18826 18827 err_free: 18828 kvfree(linfo); 18829 return err; 18830 } 18831 18832 #define MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo) 18833 #define MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 18834 18835 static int check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18836 const union bpf_attr *attr, 18837 bpfptr_t uattr) 18838 { 18839 u32 i, nr_core_relo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size; 18840 struct bpf_core_relo core_relo = {}; 18841 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 18842 const struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf; 18843 struct bpf_core_ctx ctx = { 18844 .log = &env->log, 18845 .btf = btf, 18846 }; 18847 bpfptr_t u_core_relo; 18848 int err; 18849 18850 nr_core_relo = attr->core_relo_cnt; 18851 if (!nr_core_relo) 18852 return 0; 18853 if (nr_core_relo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo)) 18854 return -EINVAL; 18855 18856 rec_size = attr->core_relo_rec_size; 18857 if (rec_size < MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 18858 rec_size > MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 18859 rec_size % sizeof(u32)) 18860 return -EINVAL; 18861 18862 u_core_relo = make_bpfptr(attr->core_relos, uattr.is_kernel); 18863 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo); 18864 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 18865 18866 /* Unlike func_info and line_info, copy and apply each CO-RE 18867 * relocation record one at a time. 18868 */ 18869 for (i = 0; i < nr_core_relo; i++) { 18870 /* future proofing when sizeof(bpf_core_relo) changes */ 18871 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(u_core_relo, expected_size, rec_size); 18872 if (err) { 18873 if (err == -E2BIG) { 18874 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in core_relo"); 18875 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 18876 offsetof(union bpf_attr, core_relo_rec_size), 18877 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 18878 err = -EFAULT; 18879 } 18880 break; 18881 } 18882 18883 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&core_relo, u_core_relo, ncopy)) { 18884 err = -EFAULT; 18885 break; 18886 } 18887 18888 if (core_relo.insn_off % 8 || core_relo.insn_off / 8 >= prog->len) { 18889 verbose(env, "Invalid core_relo[%u].insn_off:%u prog->len:%u\n", 18890 i, core_relo.insn_off, prog->len); 18891 err = -EINVAL; 18892 break; 18893 } 18894 18895 err = bpf_core_apply(&ctx, &core_relo, i, 18896 &prog->insnsi[core_relo.insn_off / 8]); 18897 if (err) 18898 break; 18899 bpfptr_add(&u_core_relo, rec_size); 18900 } 18901 return err; 18902 } 18903 18904 static int check_btf_info_early(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18905 const union bpf_attr *attr, 18906 bpfptr_t uattr) 18907 { 18908 struct btf *btf; 18909 int err; 18910 18911 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { 18912 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 18913 return -EINVAL; 18914 return 0; 18915 } 18916 18917 btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd); 18918 if (IS_ERR(btf)) 18919 return PTR_ERR(btf); 18920 if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) { 18921 btf_put(btf); 18922 return -EACCES; 18923 } 18924 env->prog->aux->btf = btf; 18925 18926 err = check_btf_func_early(env, attr, uattr); 18927 if (err) 18928 return err; 18929 return 0; 18930 } 18931 18932 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18933 const union bpf_attr *attr, 18934 bpfptr_t uattr) 18935 { 18936 int err; 18937 18938 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { 18939 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 18940 return -EINVAL; 18941 return 0; 18942 } 18943 18944 err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr); 18945 if (err) 18946 return err; 18947 18948 err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr); 18949 if (err) 18950 return err; 18951 18952 err = check_core_relo(env, attr, uattr); 18953 if (err) 18954 return err; 18955 18956 return 0; 18957 } 18958 18959 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ 18960 static bool range_within(const struct bpf_reg_state *old, 18961 const struct bpf_reg_state *cur) 18962 { 18963 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && 18964 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && 18965 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && 18966 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value && 18967 old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value && 18968 old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value && 18969 old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value && 18970 old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value; 18971 } 18972 18973 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have 18974 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from 18975 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. 18976 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent 18977 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But 18978 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about 18979 * that. 18980 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If 18981 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. 18982 */ 18983 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 18984 { 18985 struct bpf_id_pair *map = idmap->map; 18986 unsigned int i; 18987 18988 /* either both IDs should be set or both should be zero */ 18989 if (!!old_id != !!cur_id) 18990 return false; 18991 18992 if (old_id == 0) /* cur_id == 0 as well */ 18993 return true; 18994 18995 for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { 18996 if (!map[i].old) { 18997 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ 18998 map[i].old = old_id; 18999 map[i].cur = cur_id; 19000 return true; 19001 } 19002 if (map[i].old == old_id) 19003 return map[i].cur == cur_id; 19004 if (map[i].cur == cur_id) 19005 return false; 19006 } 19007 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ 19008 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 19009 return false; 19010 } 19011 19012 /* Similar to check_ids(), but allocate a unique temporary ID 19013 * for 'old_id' or 'cur_id' of zero. 19014 * This makes pairs like '0 vs unique ID', 'unique ID vs 0' valid. 19015 */ 19016 static bool check_scalar_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 19017 { 19018 old_id = old_id ? old_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen; 19019 cur_id = cur_id ? cur_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen; 19020 19021 return check_ids(old_id, cur_id, idmap); 19022 } 19023 19024 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19025 struct bpf_func_state *st, 19026 u32 ip) 19027 { 19028 u16 live_regs = env->insn_aux_data[ip].live_regs_before; 19029 int i, j; 19030 19031 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 19032 /* liveness must not touch this register anymore */ 19033 if (!(live_regs & BIT(i))) 19034 /* since the register is unused, clear its state 19035 * to make further comparison simpler 19036 */ 19037 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]); 19038 } 19039 19040 for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 19041 if (!bpf_stack_slot_alive(env, st->frameno, i)) { 19042 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr); 19043 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 19044 st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 19045 } 19046 } 19047 } 19048 19049 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19050 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 19051 { 19052 int i, ip; 19053 19054 bpf_live_stack_query_init(env, st); 19055 st->cleaned = true; 19056 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 19057 ip = frame_insn_idx(st, i); 19058 clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i], ip); 19059 } 19060 } 19061 19062 /* the parentage chains form a tree. 19063 * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and 19064 * pushed into state stack for future exploration. 19065 * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifier states 19066 * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already, 19067 * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when 19068 * the verifier explores other branches. 19069 * Example: 19070 * 1: *(u64)(r10 - 8) = 1 19071 * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1 19072 * 3: *(u64)(r10 - 8) = 2 19073 * 4: r0 = *(u64)(r10 - 8) 19074 * 5: exit 19075 * when the verifier reaches exit insn the stack slot -8 in the state list of 19076 * insn 2 is not yet marked alive. Then the verifier pops the other_branch 19077 * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. After the insn 4 read, liveness 19078 * analysis would propagate read mark for -8 at insn 2. 19079 * 19080 * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring 19081 * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second 19082 * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and 19083 * their final liveness marks are already propagated. 19084 * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited() 19085 * we can call this clean_live_states() function to clear dead the registers and stack 19086 * slots to simplify state merging. 19087 * 19088 * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee 19089 * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare 19090 * the callsites 19091 */ 19092 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, 19093 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 19094 { 19095 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 19096 struct list_head *pos, *head; 19097 19098 head = explored_state(env, insn); 19099 list_for_each(pos, head) { 19100 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); 19101 if (sl->state.branches) 19102 continue; 19103 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || 19104 !same_callsites(&sl->state, cur)) 19105 continue; 19106 if (sl->state.cleaned) 19107 /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ 19108 continue; 19109 if (incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state)) 19110 continue; 19111 clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state); 19112 } 19113 } 19114 19115 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 19116 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 19117 struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 19118 { 19119 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 19120 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && 19121 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); 19122 } 19123 19124 enum exact_level { 19125 NOT_EXACT, 19126 EXACT, 19127 RANGE_WITHIN 19128 }; 19129 19130 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ 19131 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 19132 struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap, 19133 enum exact_level exact) 19134 { 19135 if (exact == EXACT) 19136 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap); 19137 19138 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) 19139 /* explored state can't have used this */ 19140 return true; 19141 19142 /* Enforce that register types have to match exactly, including their 19143 * modifiers (like PTR_MAYBE_NULL, MEM_RDONLY, etc), as a general 19144 * rule. 19145 * 19146 * One can make a point that using a pointer register as unbounded 19147 * SCALAR would be technically acceptable, but this could lead to 19148 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak while pointers 19149 * are not. We could make this safe in special cases if root is 19150 * calling us, but it's probably not worth the hassle. 19151 * 19152 * Also, register types that are *not* MAYBE_NULL could technically be 19153 * safe to use as their MAYBE_NULL variants (e.g., PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE 19154 * is safe to be used as PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, provided both point 19155 * to the same map). 19156 * However, if the old MAYBE_NULL register then got NULL checked, 19157 * doing so could have affected others with the same id, and we can't 19158 * check for that because we lost the id when we converted to 19159 * a non-MAYBE_NULL variant. 19160 * So, as a general rule we don't allow mixing MAYBE_NULL and 19161 * non-MAYBE_NULL registers as well. 19162 */ 19163 if (rold->type != rcur->type) 19164 return false; 19165 19166 switch (base_type(rold->type)) { 19167 case SCALAR_VALUE: 19168 if (env->explore_alu_limits) { 19169 /* explore_alu_limits disables tnum_in() and range_within() 19170 * logic and requires everything to be strict 19171 */ 19172 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 19173 check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 19174 } 19175 if (!rold->precise && exact == NOT_EXACT) 19176 return true; 19177 if ((rold->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) != (rcur->id & BPF_ADD_CONST)) 19178 return false; 19179 if ((rold->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) && (rold->off != rcur->off)) 19180 return false; 19181 /* Why check_ids() for scalar registers? 19182 * 19183 * Consider the following BPF code: 19184 * 1: r6 = ... unbound scalar, ID=a ... 19185 * 2: r7 = ... unbound scalar, ID=b ... 19186 * 3: if (r6 > r7) goto +1 19187 * 4: r6 = r7 19188 * 5: if (r6 > X) goto ... 19189 * 6: ... memory operation using r7 ... 19190 * 19191 * First verification path is [1-6]: 19192 * - at (4) same bpf_reg_state::id (b) would be assigned to r6 and r7; 19193 * - at (5) r6 would be marked <= X, sync_linked_regs() would also mark 19194 * r7 <= X, because r6 and r7 share same id. 19195 * Next verification path is [1-4, 6]. 19196 * 19197 * Instruction (6) would be reached in two states: 19198 * I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6; 19199 * II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6. 19200 * 19201 * Use check_ids() to distinguish these states. 19202 * --- 19203 * Also verify that new value satisfies old value range knowledge. 19204 */ 19205 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 19206 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && 19207 check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 19208 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 19209 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 19210 case PTR_TO_MEM: 19211 case PTR_TO_BUF: 19212 case PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER: 19213 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and 19214 * everything else matches, we are OK. 19215 */ 19216 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 && 19217 range_within(rold, rcur) && 19218 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && 19219 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && 19220 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); 19221 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 19222 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 19223 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr 19224 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are 19225 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, 19226 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or 19227 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. 19228 */ 19229 if (rold->range > rcur->range) 19230 return false; 19231 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; 19232 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. 19233 */ 19234 if (rold->off != rcur->off) 19235 return false; 19236 /* id relations must be preserved */ 19237 if (!check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) 19238 return false; 19239 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 19240 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 19241 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 19242 case PTR_TO_STACK: 19243 /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to 19244 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar 19245 */ 19246 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap) && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; 19247 case PTR_TO_ARENA: 19248 return true; 19249 case PTR_TO_INSN: 19250 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 && 19251 rold->off == rcur->off && range_within(rold, rcur) && 19252 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 19253 default: 19254 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap); 19255 } 19256 } 19257 19258 static struct bpf_reg_state unbound_reg; 19259 19260 static __init int unbound_reg_init(void) 19261 { 19262 __mark_reg_unknown_imprecise(&unbound_reg); 19263 return 0; 19264 } 19265 late_initcall(unbound_reg_init); 19266 19267 static bool is_stack_all_misc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19268 struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 19269 { 19270 u32 i; 19271 19272 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(stack->slot_type); ++i) { 19273 if ((stack->slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC) || 19274 (stack->slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)) 19275 continue; 19276 return false; 19277 } 19278 19279 return true; 19280 } 19281 19282 static struct bpf_reg_state *scalar_reg_for_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19283 struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 19284 { 19285 if (is_spilled_scalar_reg64(stack)) 19286 return &stack->spilled_ptr; 19287 19288 if (is_stack_all_misc(env, stack)) 19289 return &unbound_reg; 19290 19291 return NULL; 19292 } 19293 19294 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 19295 struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap, 19296 enum exact_level exact) 19297 { 19298 int i, spi; 19299 19300 /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional 19301 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state 19302 * didn't use them 19303 */ 19304 for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) { 19305 struct bpf_reg_state *old_reg, *cur_reg; 19306 19307 spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; 19308 19309 if (exact == EXACT && 19310 (i >= cur->allocated_stack || 19311 old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 19312 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])) 19313 return false; 19314 19315 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) 19316 continue; 19317 19318 if (env->allow_uninit_stack && 19319 old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC) 19320 continue; 19321 19322 /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack 19323 * and these slots were used 19324 */ 19325 if (i >= cur->allocated_stack) 19326 return false; 19327 19328 /* 64-bit scalar spill vs all slots MISC and vice versa. 19329 * Load from all slots MISC produces unbound scalar. 19330 * Construct a fake register for such stack and call 19331 * regsafe() to ensure scalar ids are compared. 19332 */ 19333 old_reg = scalar_reg_for_stack(env, &old->stack[spi]); 19334 cur_reg = scalar_reg_for_stack(env, &cur->stack[spi]); 19335 if (old_reg && cur_reg) { 19336 if (!regsafe(env, old_reg, cur_reg, idmap, exact)) 19337 return false; 19338 i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; 19339 continue; 19340 } 19341 19342 /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack 19343 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack. 19344 * The opposite is not true 19345 */ 19346 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC && 19347 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) 19348 continue; 19349 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 19350 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) 19351 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in 19352 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC -> 19353 * this verifier states are not equivalent, 19354 * return false to continue verification of this path 19355 */ 19356 return false; 19357 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE != BPF_REG_SIZE - 1) 19358 continue; 19359 /* Both old and cur are having same slot_type */ 19360 switch (old->stack[spi].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) { 19361 case STACK_SPILL: 19362 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing 19363 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types 19364 * are the same as well. 19365 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored 19366 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} 19367 * but current path has stored: 19368 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} 19369 * such verifier states are not equivalent. 19370 * return false to continue verification of this path 19371 */ 19372 if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 19373 &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap, exact)) 19374 return false; 19375 break; 19376 case STACK_DYNPTR: 19377 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19378 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19379 if (old_reg->dynptr.type != cur_reg->dynptr.type || 19380 old_reg->dynptr.first_slot != cur_reg->dynptr.first_slot || 19381 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap)) 19382 return false; 19383 break; 19384 case STACK_ITER: 19385 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19386 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19387 /* iter.depth is not compared between states as it 19388 * doesn't matter for correctness and would otherwise 19389 * prevent convergence; we maintain it only to prevent 19390 * infinite loop check triggering, see 19391 * iter_active_depths_differ() 19392 */ 19393 if (old_reg->iter.btf != cur_reg->iter.btf || 19394 old_reg->iter.btf_id != cur_reg->iter.btf_id || 19395 old_reg->iter.state != cur_reg->iter.state || 19396 /* ignore {old_reg,cur_reg}->iter.depth, see above */ 19397 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap)) 19398 return false; 19399 break; 19400 case STACK_IRQ_FLAG: 19401 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19402 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19403 if (!check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap) || 19404 old_reg->irq.kfunc_class != cur_reg->irq.kfunc_class) 19405 return false; 19406 break; 19407 case STACK_MISC: 19408 case STACK_ZERO: 19409 case STACK_INVALID: 19410 continue; 19411 /* Ensure that new unhandled slot types return false by default */ 19412 default: 19413 return false; 19414 } 19415 } 19416 return true; 19417 } 19418 19419 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 19420 struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 19421 { 19422 int i; 19423 19424 if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs) 19425 return false; 19426 19427 if (old->active_locks != cur->active_locks) 19428 return false; 19429 19430 if (old->active_preempt_locks != cur->active_preempt_locks) 19431 return false; 19432 19433 if (old->active_rcu_locks != cur->active_rcu_locks) 19434 return false; 19435 19436 if (!check_ids(old->active_irq_id, cur->active_irq_id, idmap)) 19437 return false; 19438 19439 if (!check_ids(old->active_lock_id, cur->active_lock_id, idmap) || 19440 old->active_lock_ptr != cur->active_lock_ptr) 19441 return false; 19442 19443 for (i = 0; i < old->acquired_refs; i++) { 19444 if (!check_ids(old->refs[i].id, cur->refs[i].id, idmap) || 19445 old->refs[i].type != cur->refs[i].type) 19446 return false; 19447 switch (old->refs[i].type) { 19448 case REF_TYPE_PTR: 19449 case REF_TYPE_IRQ: 19450 break; 19451 case REF_TYPE_LOCK: 19452 case REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK: 19453 case REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK_IRQ: 19454 if (old->refs[i].ptr != cur->refs[i].ptr) 19455 return false; 19456 break; 19457 default: 19458 WARN_ONCE(1, "Unhandled enum type for reference state: %d\n", old->refs[i].type); 19459 return false; 19460 } 19461 } 19462 19463 return true; 19464 } 19465 19466 /* compare two verifier states 19467 * 19468 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since 19469 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them 19470 * 19471 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of 19472 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has 19473 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution 19474 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already 19475 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. 19476 * 19477 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative 19478 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. 19479 * Example: 19480 * explored current 19481 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) 19482 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) 19483 * 19484 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more 19485 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means 19486 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too 19487 * 19488 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid 19489 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that 19490 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely 19491 */ 19492 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 19493 struct bpf_func_state *cur, u32 insn_idx, enum exact_level exact) 19494 { 19495 u16 live_regs = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].live_regs_before; 19496 u16 i; 19497 19498 if (old->callback_depth > cur->callback_depth) 19499 return false; 19500 19501 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 19502 if (((1 << i) & live_regs) && 19503 !regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], 19504 &env->idmap_scratch, exact)) 19505 return false; 19506 19507 if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch, exact)) 19508 return false; 19509 19510 return true; 19511 } 19512 19513 static void reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19514 { 19515 env->idmap_scratch.tmp_id_gen = env->id_gen; 19516 memset(&env->idmap_scratch.map, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch.map)); 19517 } 19518 19519 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19520 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 19521 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 19522 enum exact_level exact) 19523 { 19524 u32 insn_idx; 19525 int i; 19526 19527 if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) 19528 return false; 19529 19530 reset_idmap_scratch(env); 19531 19532 /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation 19533 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. 19534 */ 19535 if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative) 19536 return false; 19537 19538 if (old->in_sleepable != cur->in_sleepable) 19539 return false; 19540 19541 if (!refsafe(old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch)) 19542 return false; 19543 19544 /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same 19545 * and all frame states need to be equivalent 19546 */ 19547 for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { 19548 insn_idx = frame_insn_idx(old, i); 19549 if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 19550 return false; 19551 if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i], insn_idx, exact)) 19552 return false; 19553 } 19554 return true; 19555 } 19556 19557 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and 19558 * propagate them into the current state 19559 */ 19560 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19561 const struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 19562 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 19563 bool *changed) 19564 { 19565 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; 19566 struct bpf_func_state *state; 19567 int i, err = 0, fr; 19568 bool first; 19569 19570 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 19571 state = old->frame[fr]; 19572 state_reg = state->regs; 19573 first = true; 19574 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { 19575 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 19576 !state_reg->precise) 19577 continue; 19578 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 19579 if (first) 19580 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating r%d", fr, i); 19581 else 19582 verbose(env, ",r%d", i); 19583 } 19584 bt_set_frame_reg(&env->bt, fr, i); 19585 first = false; 19586 } 19587 19588 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 19589 if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) 19590 continue; 19591 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 19592 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 19593 !state_reg->precise) 19594 continue; 19595 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 19596 if (first) 19597 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating fp%d", 19598 fr, (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 19599 else 19600 verbose(env, ",fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 19601 } 19602 bt_set_frame_slot(&env->bt, fr, i); 19603 first = false; 19604 } 19605 if (!first && (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)) 19606 verbose(env, "\n"); 19607 } 19608 19609 err = __mark_chain_precision(env, cur, -1, changed); 19610 if (err < 0) 19611 return err; 19612 19613 return 0; 19614 } 19615 19616 #define MAX_BACKEDGE_ITERS 64 19617 19618 /* Propagate read and precision marks from visit->backedges[*].state->equal_state 19619 * to corresponding parent states of visit->backedges[*].state until fixed point is reached, 19620 * then free visit->backedges. 19621 * After execution of this function incomplete_read_marks() will return false 19622 * for all states corresponding to @visit->callchain. 19623 */ 19624 static int propagate_backedges(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_scc_visit *visit) 19625 { 19626 struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge; 19627 struct bpf_verifier_state *st; 19628 bool changed; 19629 int i, err; 19630 19631 i = 0; 19632 do { 19633 if (i++ > MAX_BACKEDGE_ITERS) { 19634 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 19635 verbose(env, "%s: too many iterations\n", __func__); 19636 for (backedge = visit->backedges; backedge; backedge = backedge->next) 19637 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, &backedge->state); 19638 break; 19639 } 19640 changed = false; 19641 for (backedge = visit->backedges; backedge; backedge = backedge->next) { 19642 st = &backedge->state; 19643 err = propagate_precision(env, st->equal_state, st, &changed); 19644 if (err) 19645 return err; 19646 } 19647 } while (changed); 19648 19649 free_backedges(visit); 19650 return 0; 19651 } 19652 19653 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 19654 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 19655 { 19656 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 19657 int i, fr = cur->curframe; 19658 19659 if (old->curframe != fr) 19660 return false; 19661 19662 fold = old->frame[fr]; 19663 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 19664 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 19665 if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i], 19666 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, frameno))) 19667 return false; 19668 return true; 19669 } 19670 19671 static bool is_iter_next_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 19672 { 19673 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].is_iter_next; 19674 } 19675 19676 /* is_state_visited() handles iter_next() (see process_iter_next_call() for 19677 * terminology) calls specially: as opposed to bounded BPF loops, it *expects* 19678 * states to match, which otherwise would look like an infinite loop. So while 19679 * iter_next() calls are taken care of, we still need to be careful and 19680 * prevent erroneous and too eager declaration of "infinite loop", when 19681 * iterators are involved. 19682 * 19683 * Here's a situation in pseudo-BPF assembly form: 19684 * 19685 * 0: again: ; set up iter_next() call args 19686 * 1: r1 = &it ; <CHECKPOINT HERE> 19687 * 2: call bpf_iter_num_next ; this is iter_next() call 19688 * 3: if r0 == 0 goto done 19689 * 4: ... something useful here ... 19690 * 5: goto again ; another iteration 19691 * 6: done: 19692 * 7: r1 = &it 19693 * 8: call bpf_iter_num_destroy ; clean up iter state 19694 * 9: exit 19695 * 19696 * This is a typical loop. Let's assume that we have a prune point at 1:, 19697 * before we get to `call bpf_iter_num_next` (e.g., because of that `goto 19698 * again`, assuming other heuristics don't get in a way). 19699 * 19700 * When we first time come to 1:, let's say we have some state X. We proceed 19701 * to 2:, fork states, enqueue ACTIVE, validate NULL case successfully, exit. 19702 * Now we come back to validate that forked ACTIVE state. We proceed through 19703 * 3-5, come to goto, jump to 1:. Let's assume our state didn't change, so we 19704 * are converging. But the problem is that we don't know that yet, as this 19705 * convergence has to happen at iter_next() call site only. So if nothing is 19706 * done, at 1: verifier will use bounded loop logic and declare infinite 19707 * looping (and would be *technically* correct, if not for iterator's 19708 * "eventual sticky NULL" contract, see process_iter_next_call()). But we 19709 * don't want that. So what we do in process_iter_next_call() when we go on 19710 * another ACTIVE iteration, we bump slot->iter.depth, to mark that it's 19711 * a different iteration. So when we suspect an infinite loop, we additionally 19712 * check if any of the *ACTIVE* iterator states depths differ. If yes, we 19713 * pretend we are not looping and wait for next iter_next() call. 19714 * 19715 * This only applies to ACTIVE state. In DRAINED state we don't expect to 19716 * loop, because that would actually mean infinite loop, as DRAINED state is 19717 * "sticky", and so we'll keep returning into the same instruction with the 19718 * same state (at least in one of possible code paths). 19719 * 19720 * This approach allows to keep infinite loop heuristic even in the face of 19721 * active iterator. E.g., C snippet below is and will be detected as 19722 * infinitely looping: 19723 * 19724 * struct bpf_iter_num it; 19725 * int *p, x; 19726 * 19727 * bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10); 19728 * while ((p = bpf_iter_num_next(&t))) { 19729 * x = p; 19730 * while (x--) {} // <<-- infinite loop here 19731 * } 19732 * 19733 */ 19734 static bool iter_active_depths_differ(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 19735 { 19736 struct bpf_reg_state *slot, *cur_slot; 19737 struct bpf_func_state *state; 19738 int i, fr; 19739 19740 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 19741 state = old->frame[fr]; 19742 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 19743 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_ITER) 19744 continue; 19745 19746 slot = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 19747 if (slot->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) 19748 continue; 19749 19750 cur_slot = &cur->frame[fr]->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 19751 if (cur_slot->iter.depth != slot->iter.depth) 19752 return true; 19753 } 19754 } 19755 return false; 19756 } 19757 19758 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 19759 { 19760 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; 19761 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 19762 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new; 19763 bool force_new_state, add_new_state, loop; 19764 int n, err, states_cnt = 0; 19765 struct list_head *pos, *tmp, *head; 19766 19767 force_new_state = env->test_state_freq || is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx) || 19768 /* Avoid accumulating infinitely long jmp history */ 19769 cur->jmp_history_cnt > 40; 19770 19771 /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions 19772 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 19773 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen 19774 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions. 19775 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric. 19776 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier 19777 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup. 19778 */ 19779 add_new_state = force_new_state; 19780 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 && 19781 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8) 19782 add_new_state = true; 19783 19784 clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur); 19785 19786 loop = false; 19787 head = explored_state(env, insn_idx); 19788 list_for_each_safe(pos, tmp, head) { 19789 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); 19790 states_cnt++; 19791 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx) 19792 continue; 19793 19794 if (sl->state.branches) { 19795 struct bpf_func_state *frame = sl->state.frame[sl->state.curframe]; 19796 19797 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn && 19798 frame->async_entry_cnt != cur->frame[cur->curframe]->async_entry_cnt) { 19799 /* Different async_entry_cnt means that the verifier is 19800 * processing another entry into async callback. 19801 * Seeing the same state is not an indication of infinite 19802 * loop or infinite recursion. 19803 * But finding the same state doesn't mean that it's safe 19804 * to stop processing the current state. The previous state 19805 * hasn't yet reached bpf_exit, since state.branches > 0. 19806 * Checking in_async_callback_fn alone is not enough either. 19807 * Since the verifier still needs to catch infinite loops 19808 * inside async callbacks. 19809 */ 19810 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 19811 } 19812 /* BPF open-coded iterators loop detection is special. 19813 * states_maybe_looping() logic is too simplistic in detecting 19814 * states that *might* be equivalent, because it doesn't know 19815 * about ID remapping, so don't even perform it. 19816 * See process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ() 19817 * for overview of the logic. When current and one of parent 19818 * states are detected as equivalent, it's a good thing: we prove 19819 * convergence and can stop simulating further iterations. 19820 * It's safe to assume that iterator loop will finish, taking into 19821 * account iter_next() contract of eventually returning 19822 * sticky NULL result. 19823 * 19824 * Note, that states have to be compared exactly in this case because 19825 * read and precision marks might not be finalized inside the loop. 19826 * E.g. as in the program below: 19827 * 19828 * 1. r7 = -16 19829 * 2. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 19830 * 3. while (bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8])) { 19831 * 4. if (r6 != 42) { 19832 * 5. r7 = -32 19833 * 6. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 19834 * 7. continue 19835 * 8. } 19836 * 9. r0 = r10 19837 * 10. r0 += r7 19838 * 11. r8 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0) 19839 * 12. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 19840 * 13. } 19841 * 19842 * Here verifier would first visit path 1-3, create a checkpoint at 3 19843 * with r7=-16, continue to 4-7,3. Existing checkpoint at 3 does 19844 * not have read or precision mark for r7 yet, thus inexact states 19845 * comparison would discard current state with r7=-32 19846 * => unsafe memory access at 11 would not be caught. 19847 */ 19848 if (is_iter_next_insn(env, insn_idx)) { 19849 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN)) { 19850 struct bpf_func_state *cur_frame; 19851 struct bpf_reg_state *iter_state, *iter_reg; 19852 int spi; 19853 19854 cur_frame = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 19855 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() enforces that 19856 * iter state pointer is always the first arg 19857 */ 19858 iter_reg = &cur_frame->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 19859 /* current state is valid due to states_equal(), 19860 * so we can assume valid iter and reg state, 19861 * no need for extra (re-)validations 19862 */ 19863 spi = __get_spi(iter_reg->off + iter_reg->var_off.value); 19864 iter_state = &func(env, iter_reg)->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19865 if (iter_state->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) { 19866 loop = true; 19867 goto hit; 19868 } 19869 } 19870 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 19871 } 19872 if (is_may_goto_insn_at(env, insn_idx)) { 19873 if (sl->state.may_goto_depth != cur->may_goto_depth && 19874 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN)) { 19875 loop = true; 19876 goto hit; 19877 } 19878 } 19879 if (bpf_calls_callback(env, insn_idx)) { 19880 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN)) { 19881 loop = true; 19882 goto hit; 19883 } 19884 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 19885 } 19886 /* attempt to detect infinite loop to avoid unnecessary doomed work */ 19887 if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && 19888 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, EXACT) && 19889 !iter_active_depths_differ(&sl->state, cur) && 19890 sl->state.may_goto_depth == cur->may_goto_depth && 19891 sl->state.callback_unroll_depth == cur->callback_unroll_depth) { 19892 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 19893 verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); 19894 verbose(env, "cur state:"); 19895 print_verifier_state(env, cur, cur->curframe, true); 19896 verbose(env, "old state:"); 19897 print_verifier_state(env, &sl->state, cur->curframe, true); 19898 return -EINVAL; 19899 } 19900 /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state 19901 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct 19902 * states and may not help future pruning. 19903 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that 19904 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly. 19905 * The most abusive loop will be: 19906 * r1 += 1 19907 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2 19908 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states. 19909 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states 19910 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning. 19911 */ 19912 skip_inf_loop_check: 19913 if (!force_new_state && 19914 env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 && 19915 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100) 19916 add_new_state = false; 19917 goto miss; 19918 } 19919 /* See comments for mark_all_regs_read_and_precise() */ 19920 loop = incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state); 19921 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, loop ? RANGE_WITHIN : NOT_EXACT)) { 19922 hit: 19923 sl->hit_cnt++; 19924 19925 /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and 19926 * current state is equivalent to it (except precision marks) 19927 * the precision needs to be propagated back in 19928 * the current state. 19929 */ 19930 err = 0; 19931 if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) 19932 err = push_jmp_history(env, cur, 0, 0); 19933 err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state, cur, NULL); 19934 if (err) 19935 return err; 19936 /* When processing iterator based loops above propagate_liveness and 19937 * propagate_precision calls are not sufficient to transfer all relevant 19938 * read and precision marks. E.g. consider the following case: 19939 * 19940 * .-> A --. Assume the states are visited in the order A, B, C. 19941 * | | | Assume that state B reaches a state equivalent to state A. 19942 * | v v At this point, state C is not processed yet, so state A 19943 * '-- B C has not received any read or precision marks from C. 19944 * Thus, marks propagated from A to B are incomplete. 19945 * 19946 * The verifier mitigates this by performing the following steps: 19947 * 19948 * - Prior to the main verification pass, strongly connected components 19949 * (SCCs) are computed over the program's control flow graph, 19950 * intraprocedurally. 19951 * 19952 * - During the main verification pass, `maybe_enter_scc()` checks 19953 * whether the current verifier state is entering an SCC. If so, an 19954 * instance of a `bpf_scc_visit` object is created, and the state 19955 * entering the SCC is recorded as the entry state. 19956 * 19957 * - This instance is associated not with the SCC itself, but with a 19958 * `bpf_scc_callchain`: a tuple consisting of the call sites leading to 19959 * the SCC and the SCC id. See `compute_scc_callchain()`. 19960 * 19961 * - When a verification path encounters a `states_equal(..., 19962 * RANGE_WITHIN)` condition, there exists a call chain describing the 19963 * current state and a corresponding `bpf_scc_visit` instance. A copy 19964 * of the current state is created and added to 19965 * `bpf_scc_visit->backedges`. 19966 * 19967 * - When a verification path terminates, `maybe_exit_scc()` is called 19968 * from `update_branch_counts()`. For states with `branches == 0`, it 19969 * checks whether the state is the entry state of any `bpf_scc_visit` 19970 * instance. If it is, this indicates that all paths originating from 19971 * this SCC visit have been explored. `propagate_backedges()` is then 19972 * called, which propagates read and precision marks through the 19973 * backedges until a fixed point is reached. 19974 * (In the earlier example, this would propagate marks from A to B, 19975 * from C to A, and then again from A to B.) 19976 * 19977 * A note on callchains 19978 * -------------------- 19979 * 19980 * Consider the following example: 19981 * 19982 * void foo() { loop { ... SCC#1 ... } } 19983 * void main() { 19984 * A: foo(); 19985 * B: ... 19986 * C: foo(); 19987 * } 19988 * 19989 * Here, there are two distinct callchains leading to SCC#1: 19990 * - (A, SCC#1) 19991 * - (C, SCC#1) 19992 * 19993 * Each callchain identifies a separate `bpf_scc_visit` instance that 19994 * accumulates backedge states. The `propagate_{liveness,precision}()` 19995 * functions traverse the parent state of each backedge state, which 19996 * means these parent states must remain valid (i.e., not freed) while 19997 * the corresponding `bpf_scc_visit` instance exists. 19998 * 19999 * Associating `bpf_scc_visit` instances directly with SCCs instead of 20000 * callchains would break this invariant: 20001 * - States explored during `C: foo()` would contribute backedges to 20002 * SCC#1, but SCC#1 would only be exited once the exploration of 20003 * `A: foo()` completes. 20004 * - By that time, the states explored between `A: foo()` and `C: foo()` 20005 * (i.e., `B: ...`) may have already been freed, causing the parent 20006 * links for states from `C: foo()` to become invalid. 20007 */ 20008 if (loop) { 20009 struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge; 20010 20011 backedge = kzalloc(sizeof(*backedge), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 20012 if (!backedge) 20013 return -ENOMEM; 20014 err = copy_verifier_state(&backedge->state, cur); 20015 backedge->state.equal_state = &sl->state; 20016 backedge->state.insn_idx = insn_idx; 20017 err = err ?: add_scc_backedge(env, &sl->state, backedge); 20018 if (err) { 20019 free_verifier_state(&backedge->state, false); 20020 kfree(backedge); 20021 return err; 20022 } 20023 } 20024 return 1; 20025 } 20026 miss: 20027 /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count. 20028 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state 20029 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have 20030 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning 20031 * and some at the end) to help pruning. 20032 */ 20033 if (add_new_state) 20034 sl->miss_cnt++; 20035 /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial 20036 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view. 20037 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time, 20038 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed. 20039 * 'n' controls how many times state could miss before eviction. 20040 * Use bigger 'n' for checkpoints because evicting checkpoint states 20041 * too early would hinder iterator convergence. 20042 */ 20043 n = is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx) && sl->state.branches > 0 ? 64 : 3; 20044 if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * n + n) { 20045 /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to 20046 * speed up verification 20047 */ 20048 sl->in_free_list = true; 20049 list_del(&sl->node); 20050 list_add(&sl->node, &env->free_list); 20051 env->free_list_size++; 20052 env->explored_states_size--; 20053 maybe_free_verifier_state(env, sl); 20054 } 20055 } 20056 20057 if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) 20058 env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; 20059 20060 if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) 20061 return 0; 20062 20063 if (!add_new_state) 20064 return 0; 20065 20066 /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one. 20067 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, 20068 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) 20069 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be 20070 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) 20071 * again on the way to bpf_exit. 20072 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state 20073 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. 20074 */ 20075 new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 20076 if (!new_sl) 20077 return -ENOMEM; 20078 env->total_states++; 20079 env->explored_states_size++; 20080 update_peak_states(env); 20081 env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; 20082 env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; 20083 20084 /* forget precise markings we inherited, see __mark_chain_precision */ 20085 if (env->bpf_capable) 20086 mark_all_scalars_imprecise(env, cur); 20087 20088 /* add new state to the head of linked list */ 20089 new = &new_sl->state; 20090 err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); 20091 if (err) { 20092 free_verifier_state(new, false); 20093 kfree(new_sl); 20094 return err; 20095 } 20096 new->insn_idx = insn_idx; 20097 verifier_bug_if(new->branches != 1, env, 20098 "%s:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d", 20099 __func__, new->branches, insn_idx); 20100 err = maybe_enter_scc(env, new); 20101 if (err) { 20102 free_verifier_state(new, false); 20103 kfree(new_sl); 20104 return err; 20105 } 20106 20107 cur->parent = new; 20108 cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; 20109 cur->dfs_depth = new->dfs_depth + 1; 20110 clear_jmp_history(cur); 20111 list_add(&new_sl->node, head); 20112 return 0; 20113 } 20114 20115 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */ 20116 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) 20117 { 20118 switch (base_type(type)) { 20119 case PTR_TO_CTX: 20120 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 20121 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 20122 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 20123 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 20124 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 20125 case PTR_TO_ARENA: 20126 return false; 20127 default: 20128 return true; 20129 } 20130 } 20131 20132 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we 20133 * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok 20134 * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch: 20135 * 20136 * R1 = sock_ptr 20137 * goto X; 20138 * ... 20139 * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr; 20140 * goto X; 20141 * ... 20142 * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0); 20143 */ 20144 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) 20145 { 20146 return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) || 20147 !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); 20148 } 20149 20150 static bool is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(enum bpf_reg_type type) 20151 { 20152 switch (base_type(type)) { 20153 case PTR_TO_MEM: 20154 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 20155 return true; 20156 default: 20157 return false; 20158 } 20159 } 20160 20161 static bool is_ptr_to_mem(enum bpf_reg_type type) 20162 { 20163 return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_MEM; 20164 } 20165 20166 static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type, 20167 bool allow_trust_mismatch) 20168 { 20169 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 20170 enum bpf_reg_type merged_type; 20171 20172 if (*prev_type == NOT_INIT) { 20173 /* Saw a valid insn 20174 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) 20175 * save type to validate intersecting paths 20176 */ 20177 *prev_type = type; 20178 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(type, *prev_type)) { 20179 /* Abuser program is trying to use the same insn 20180 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) 20181 * with different pointer types: 20182 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and 20183 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. 20184 * Reject it. 20185 */ 20186 if (allow_trust_mismatch && 20187 is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(type) && 20188 is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(*prev_type)) { 20189 /* 20190 * Have to support a use case when one path through 20191 * the program yields TRUSTED pointer while another 20192 * is UNTRUSTED. Fallback to UNTRUSTED to generate 20193 * BPF_PROBE_MEM/BPF_PROBE_MEMSX. 20194 * Same behavior of MEM_RDONLY flag. 20195 */ 20196 if (is_ptr_to_mem(type) || is_ptr_to_mem(*prev_type)) 20197 merged_type = PTR_TO_MEM; 20198 else 20199 merged_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 20200 if ((type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) || (*prev_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) 20201 merged_type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 20202 if ((type & MEM_RDONLY) || (*prev_type & MEM_RDONLY)) 20203 merged_type |= MEM_RDONLY; 20204 *prev_type = merged_type; 20205 } else { 20206 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 20207 return -EINVAL; 20208 } 20209 } 20210 20211 return 0; 20212 } 20213 20214 enum { 20215 PROCESS_BPF_EXIT = 1 20216 }; 20217 20218 static int process_bpf_exit_full(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 20219 bool *do_print_state, 20220 bool exception_exit) 20221 { 20222 /* We must do check_reference_leak here before 20223 * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when 20224 * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback function, 20225 * for which reference_state must match caller reference 20226 * state when it exits. 20227 */ 20228 int err = check_resource_leak(env, exception_exit, 20229 !env->cur_state->curframe, 20230 "BPF_EXIT instruction in main prog"); 20231 if (err) 20232 return err; 20233 20234 /* The side effect of the prepare_func_exit which is 20235 * being skipped is that it frees bpf_func_state. 20236 * Typically, process_bpf_exit will only be hit with 20237 * outermost exit. copy_verifier_state in pop_stack will 20238 * handle freeing of any extra bpf_func_state left over 20239 * from not processing all nested function exits. We 20240 * also skip return code checks as they are not needed 20241 * for exceptional exits. 20242 */ 20243 if (exception_exit) 20244 return PROCESS_BPF_EXIT; 20245 20246 if (env->cur_state->curframe) { 20247 /* exit from nested function */ 20248 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); 20249 if (err) 20250 return err; 20251 *do_print_state = true; 20252 return 0; 20253 } 20254 20255 err = check_return_code(env, BPF_REG_0, "R0"); 20256 if (err) 20257 return err; 20258 return PROCESS_BPF_EXIT; 20259 } 20260 20261 static int indirect_jump_min_max_index(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 20262 int regno, 20263 struct bpf_map *map, 20264 u32 *pmin_index, u32 *pmax_index) 20265 { 20266 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 20267 u64 min_index, max_index; 20268 const u32 size = 8; 20269 20270 if (check_add_overflow(reg->umin_value, reg->off, &min_index) || 20271 (min_index > (u64) U32_MAX * size)) { 20272 verbose(env, "the sum of R%u umin_value %llu and off %u is too big\n", 20273 regno, reg->umin_value, reg->off); 20274 return -ERANGE; 20275 } 20276 if (check_add_overflow(reg->umax_value, reg->off, &max_index) || 20277 (max_index > (u64) U32_MAX * size)) { 20278 verbose(env, "the sum of R%u umax_value %llu and off %u is too big\n", 20279 regno, reg->umax_value, reg->off); 20280 return -ERANGE; 20281 } 20282 20283 min_index /= size; 20284 max_index /= size; 20285 20286 if (max_index >= map->max_entries) { 20287 verbose(env, "R%u points to outside of jump table: [%llu,%llu] max_entries %u\n", 20288 regno, min_index, max_index, map->max_entries); 20289 return -EINVAL; 20290 } 20291 20292 *pmin_index = min_index; 20293 *pmax_index = max_index; 20294 return 0; 20295 } 20296 20297 /* gotox *dst_reg */ 20298 static int check_indirect_jump(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 20299 { 20300 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; 20301 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; 20302 struct bpf_map *map; 20303 u32 min_index, max_index; 20304 int err = 0; 20305 int n; 20306 int i; 20307 20308 dst_reg = reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg); 20309 if (dst_reg->type != PTR_TO_INSN) { 20310 verbose(env, "R%d has type %s, expected PTR_TO_INSN\n", 20311 insn->dst_reg, reg_type_str(env, dst_reg->type)); 20312 return -EINVAL; 20313 } 20314 20315 map = dst_reg->map_ptr; 20316 if (verifier_bug_if(!map, env, "R%d has an empty map pointer", insn->dst_reg)) 20317 return -EFAULT; 20318 20319 if (verifier_bug_if(map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY, env, 20320 "R%d has incorrect map type %d", insn->dst_reg, map->map_type)) 20321 return -EFAULT; 20322 20323 err = indirect_jump_min_max_index(env, insn->dst_reg, map, &min_index, &max_index); 20324 if (err) 20325 return err; 20326 20327 /* Ensure that the buffer is large enough */ 20328 if (!env->gotox_tmp_buf || env->gotox_tmp_buf->cnt < max_index - min_index + 1) { 20329 env->gotox_tmp_buf = iarray_realloc(env->gotox_tmp_buf, 20330 max_index - min_index + 1); 20331 if (!env->gotox_tmp_buf) 20332 return -ENOMEM; 20333 } 20334 20335 n = copy_insn_array_uniq(map, min_index, max_index, env->gotox_tmp_buf->items); 20336 if (n < 0) 20337 return n; 20338 if (n == 0) { 20339 verbose(env, "register R%d doesn't point to any offset in map id=%d\n", 20340 insn->dst_reg, map->id); 20341 return -EINVAL; 20342 } 20343 20344 for (i = 0; i < n - 1; i++) { 20345 other_branch = push_stack(env, env->gotox_tmp_buf->items[i], 20346 env->insn_idx, env->cur_state->speculative); 20347 if (IS_ERR(other_branch)) 20348 return PTR_ERR(other_branch); 20349 } 20350 env->insn_idx = env->gotox_tmp_buf->items[n-1]; 20351 return 0; 20352 } 20353 20354 static int do_check_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool *do_print_state) 20355 { 20356 int err; 20357 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[env->insn_idx]; 20358 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 20359 20360 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 20361 err = check_alu_op(env, insn); 20362 if (err) 20363 return err; 20364 20365 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 20366 bool is_ldsx = BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX; 20367 20368 /* Check for reserved fields is already done in 20369 * resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(). 20370 */ 20371 err = check_load_mem(env, insn, false, is_ldsx, true, "ldx"); 20372 if (err) 20373 return err; 20374 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 20375 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { 20376 err = check_atomic(env, insn); 20377 if (err) 20378 return err; 20379 env->insn_idx++; 20380 return 0; 20381 } 20382 20383 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) { 20384 verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); 20385 return -EINVAL; 20386 } 20387 20388 err = check_store_reg(env, insn, false); 20389 if (err) 20390 return err; 20391 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 20392 enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; 20393 20394 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || 20395 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 20396 verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); 20397 return -EINVAL; 20398 } 20399 /* check src operand */ 20400 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 20401 if (err) 20402 return err; 20403 20404 dst_reg_type = cur_regs(env)[insn->dst_reg].type; 20405 20406 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 20407 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 20408 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 20409 BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 20410 if (err) 20411 return err; 20412 20413 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); 20414 if (err) 20415 return err; 20416 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 20417 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 20418 20419 env->jmps_processed++; 20420 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 20421 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 20422 (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && 20423 insn->off != 0) || 20424 (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && 20425 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && 20426 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) || 20427 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || class == BPF_JMP32) { 20428 verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); 20429 return -EINVAL; 20430 } 20431 20432 if (env->cur_state->active_locks) { 20433 if ((insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && 20434 insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) || 20435 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && 20436 (insn->off != 0 || !kfunc_spin_allowed(insn->imm)))) { 20437 verbose(env, 20438 "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); 20439 return -EINVAL; 20440 } 20441 } 20442 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) { 20443 err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 20444 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 20445 err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 20446 if (!err && is_bpf_throw_kfunc(insn)) 20447 return process_bpf_exit_full(env, do_print_state, true); 20448 } else { 20449 err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 20450 } 20451 if (err) 20452 return err; 20453 20454 mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0); 20455 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 20456 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 20457 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 20458 insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 20459 verbose(env, "BPF_JA|BPF_X uses reserved fields\n"); 20460 return -EINVAL; 20461 } 20462 return check_indirect_jump(env, insn); 20463 } 20464 20465 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 20466 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 20467 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 20468 (class == BPF_JMP && insn->imm != 0) || 20469 (class == BPF_JMP32 && insn->off != 0)) { 20470 verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); 20471 return -EINVAL; 20472 } 20473 20474 if (class == BPF_JMP) 20475 env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; 20476 else 20477 env->insn_idx += insn->imm + 1; 20478 return 0; 20479 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 20480 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 20481 insn->imm != 0 || 20482 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 20483 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 20484 class == BPF_JMP32) { 20485 verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); 20486 return -EINVAL; 20487 } 20488 return process_bpf_exit_full(env, do_print_state, false); 20489 } else { 20490 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 20491 if (err) 20492 return err; 20493 } 20494 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 20495 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 20496 20497 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { 20498 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); 20499 if (err) 20500 return err; 20501 20502 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { 20503 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); 20504 if (err) 20505 return err; 20506 20507 env->insn_idx++; 20508 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 20509 } else { 20510 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); 20511 return -EINVAL; 20512 } 20513 } else { 20514 verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); 20515 return -EINVAL; 20516 } 20517 20518 env->insn_idx++; 20519 return 0; 20520 } 20521 20522 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 20523 { 20524 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 20525 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 20526 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 20527 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 20528 bool do_print_state = false; 20529 int prev_insn_idx = -1; 20530 20531 for (;;) { 20532 struct bpf_insn *insn; 20533 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux; 20534 int err, marks_err; 20535 20536 /* reset current history entry on each new instruction */ 20537 env->cur_hist_ent = NULL; 20538 20539 env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 20540 if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { 20541 verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", 20542 env->insn_idx, insn_cnt); 20543 return -EFAULT; 20544 } 20545 20546 insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; 20547 insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; 20548 20549 if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { 20550 verbose(env, 20551 "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", 20552 env->insn_processed); 20553 return -E2BIG; 20554 } 20555 20556 state->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 20557 state->insn_idx = env->insn_idx; 20558 20559 if (is_prune_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 20560 err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx); 20561 if (err < 0) 20562 return err; 20563 if (err == 1) { 20564 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ 20565 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 20566 if (do_print_state) 20567 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n", 20568 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 20569 env->cur_state->speculative ? 20570 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 20571 else 20572 verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx); 20573 } 20574 goto process_bpf_exit; 20575 } 20576 } 20577 20578 if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 20579 err = push_jmp_history(env, state, 0, 0); 20580 if (err) 20581 return err; 20582 } 20583 20584 if (signal_pending(current)) 20585 return -EAGAIN; 20586 20587 if (need_resched()) 20588 cond_resched(); 20589 20590 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 && do_print_state) { 20591 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:", 20592 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 20593 env->cur_state->speculative ? 20594 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 20595 print_verifier_state(env, state, state->curframe, true); 20596 do_print_state = false; 20597 } 20598 20599 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 20600 if (verifier_state_scratched(env)) 20601 print_insn_state(env, state, state->curframe); 20602 20603 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 20604 env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 20605 verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx); 20606 verbose_insn(env, insn); 20607 env->prev_insn_print_pos = env->log.end_pos - env->prev_log_pos; 20608 env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 20609 } 20610 20611 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 20612 err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx, 20613 env->prev_insn_idx); 20614 if (err) 20615 return err; 20616 } 20617 20618 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 20619 prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; 20620 20621 /* Reduce verification complexity by stopping speculative path 20622 * verification when a nospec is encountered. 20623 */ 20624 if (state->speculative && insn_aux->nospec) 20625 goto process_bpf_exit; 20626 20627 err = bpf_reset_stack_write_marks(env, env->insn_idx); 20628 if (err) 20629 return err; 20630 err = do_check_insn(env, &do_print_state); 20631 if (err >= 0 || error_recoverable_with_nospec(err)) { 20632 marks_err = bpf_commit_stack_write_marks(env); 20633 if (marks_err) 20634 return marks_err; 20635 } 20636 if (error_recoverable_with_nospec(err) && state->speculative) { 20637 /* Prevent this speculative path from ever reaching the 20638 * insn that would have been unsafe to execute. 20639 */ 20640 insn_aux->nospec = true; 20641 /* If it was an ADD/SUB insn, potentially remove any 20642 * markings for alu sanitization. 20643 */ 20644 insn_aux->alu_state = 0; 20645 goto process_bpf_exit; 20646 } else if (err < 0) { 20647 return err; 20648 } else if (err == PROCESS_BPF_EXIT) { 20649 goto process_bpf_exit; 20650 } 20651 WARN_ON_ONCE(err); 20652 20653 if (state->speculative && insn_aux->nospec_result) { 20654 /* If we are on a path that performed a jump-op, this 20655 * may skip a nospec patched-in after the jump. This can 20656 * currently never happen because nospec_result is only 20657 * used for the write-ops 20658 * `*(size*)(dst_reg+off)=src_reg|imm32` which must 20659 * never skip the following insn. Still, add a warning 20660 * to document this in case nospec_result is used 20661 * elsewhere in the future. 20662 * 20663 * All non-branch instructions have a single 20664 * fall-through edge. For these, nospec_result should 20665 * already work. 20666 */ 20667 if (verifier_bug_if(BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP || 20668 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32, env, 20669 "speculation barrier after jump instruction may not have the desired effect")) 20670 return -EFAULT; 20671 process_bpf_exit: 20672 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 20673 err = update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); 20674 if (err) 20675 return err; 20676 err = bpf_update_live_stack(env); 20677 if (err) 20678 return err; 20679 err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, &env->insn_idx, 20680 pop_log); 20681 if (err < 0) { 20682 if (err != -ENOENT) 20683 return err; 20684 break; 20685 } else { 20686 do_print_state = true; 20687 continue; 20688 } 20689 } 20690 } 20691 20692 return 0; 20693 } 20694 20695 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf) 20696 { 20697 const struct btf_type *t; 20698 const char *tname; 20699 int i, n; 20700 20701 /* 20702 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu" 20703 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF 20704 * types to look at only module's own BTF types. 20705 */ 20706 n = btf_nr_types(btf); 20707 for (i = btf_named_start_id(btf, true); i < n; i++) { 20708 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i); 20709 if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC) 20710 continue; 20711 20712 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 20713 if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu")) 20714 return i; 20715 } 20716 20717 return -ENOENT; 20718 } 20719 20720 /* 20721 * Add btf to the used_btfs array and return the index. (If the btf was 20722 * already added, then just return the index.) Upon successful insertion 20723 * increase btf refcnt, and, if present, also refcount the corresponding 20724 * kernel module. 20725 */ 20726 static int __add_used_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct btf *btf) 20727 { 20728 struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod; 20729 int i; 20730 20731 /* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */ 20732 for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) 20733 if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) 20734 return i; 20735 20736 if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) { 20737 verbose(env, "The total number of btfs per program has reached the limit of %u\n", 20738 MAX_USED_BTFS); 20739 return -E2BIG; 20740 } 20741 20742 btf_get(btf); 20743 20744 btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt]; 20745 btf_mod->btf = btf; 20746 btf_mod->module = NULL; 20747 20748 /* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */ 20749 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 20750 btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf); 20751 if (!btf_mod->module) { 20752 btf_put(btf); 20753 return -ENXIO; 20754 } 20755 } 20756 20757 return env->used_btf_cnt++; 20758 } 20759 20760 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */ 20761 static int __check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 20762 struct bpf_insn *insn, 20763 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 20764 struct btf *btf) 20765 { 20766 const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi; 20767 const struct btf_type *datasec; 20768 const struct btf_type *t; 20769 const char *sym_name; 20770 bool percpu = false; 20771 u32 type, id = insn->imm; 20772 s32 datasec_id; 20773 u64 addr; 20774 int i; 20775 20776 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id); 20777 if (!t) { 20778 verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id); 20779 return -ENOENT; 20780 } 20781 20782 if (!btf_type_is_var(t) && !btf_type_is_func(t)) { 20783 verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR or KIND_FUNC\n", id); 20784 return -EINVAL; 20785 } 20786 20787 sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 20788 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name); 20789 if (!addr) { 20790 verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n", 20791 sym_name); 20792 return -ENOENT; 20793 } 20794 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 20795 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 20796 20797 if (btf_type_is_func(t)) { 20798 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 20799 aux->btf_var.mem_size = 0; 20800 return 0; 20801 } 20802 20803 datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf); 20804 if (datasec_id > 0) { 20805 datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id); 20806 for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) { 20807 if (vsi->type == id) { 20808 percpu = true; 20809 break; 20810 } 20811 } 20812 } 20813 20814 type = t->type; 20815 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL); 20816 if (percpu) { 20817 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU; 20818 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 20819 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 20820 } else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 20821 const struct btf_type *ret; 20822 const char *tname; 20823 u32 tsize; 20824 20825 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 20826 ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize); 20827 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 20828 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 20829 verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 20830 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 20831 return -EINVAL; 20832 } 20833 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 20834 aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize; 20835 } else { 20836 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 20837 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 20838 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 20839 } 20840 20841 return 0; 20842 } 20843 20844 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 20845 struct bpf_insn *insn, 20846 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 20847 { 20848 struct btf *btf; 20849 int btf_fd; 20850 int err; 20851 20852 btf_fd = insn[1].imm; 20853 if (btf_fd) { 20854 CLASS(fd, f)(btf_fd); 20855 20856 btf = __btf_get_by_fd(f); 20857 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 20858 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n"); 20859 return -EINVAL; 20860 } 20861 } else { 20862 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 20863 verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n"); 20864 return -EINVAL; 20865 } 20866 btf = btf_vmlinux; 20867 } 20868 20869 err = __check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux, btf); 20870 if (err) 20871 return err; 20872 20873 err = __add_used_btf(env, btf); 20874 if (err < 0) 20875 return err; 20876 return 0; 20877 } 20878 20879 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type) 20880 { 20881 switch (type) { 20882 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 20883 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: 20884 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: 20885 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 20886 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE: 20887 return true; 20888 default: 20889 return false; 20890 } 20891 } 20892 20893 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map) 20894 { 20895 return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE || 20896 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE); 20897 } 20898 20899 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 20900 struct bpf_map *map, 20901 struct bpf_prog *prog) 20902 20903 { 20904 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 20905 20906 if (map->excl_prog_sha && 20907 memcmp(map->excl_prog_sha, prog->digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) { 20908 verbose(env, "program's hash doesn't match map's excl_prog_hash\n"); 20909 return -EACCES; 20910 } 20911 20912 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_LIST_HEAD) || 20913 btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_RB_ROOT)) { 20914 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 20915 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_{list_head,rb_root} yet\n"); 20916 return -EINVAL; 20917 } 20918 } 20919 20920 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK | BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK)) { 20921 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) { 20922 verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 20923 return -EINVAL; 20924 } 20925 20926 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 20927 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 20928 return -EINVAL; 20929 } 20930 } 20931 20932 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 20933 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 20934 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_timer yet\n"); 20935 return -EINVAL; 20936 } 20937 } 20938 20939 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_WORKQUEUE)) { 20940 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 20941 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_wq yet\n"); 20942 return -EINVAL; 20943 } 20944 } 20945 20946 if ((bpf_prog_is_offloaded(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_offloaded(map)) && 20947 !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) { 20948 verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n"); 20949 return -EINVAL; 20950 } 20951 20952 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 20953 verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n"); 20954 return -EINVAL; 20955 } 20956 20957 if (prog->sleepable) 20958 switch (map->map_type) { 20959 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH: 20960 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH: 20961 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: 20962 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH: 20963 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY: 20964 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH: 20965 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 20966 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 20967 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 20968 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 20969 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 20970 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 20971 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 20972 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 20973 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: 20974 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: 20975 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA: 20976 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY: 20977 break; 20978 default: 20979 verbose(env, 20980 "Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, ringbuf and local storage maps\n"); 20981 return -EINVAL; 20982 } 20983 20984 if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) && 20985 bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) { 20986 verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n"); 20987 return -EBUSY; 20988 } 20989 20990 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA) { 20991 if (env->prog->aux->arena) { 20992 verbose(env, "Only one arena per program\n"); 20993 return -EBUSY; 20994 } 20995 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks || !env->bpf_capable) { 20996 verbose(env, "CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON are required to use arena\n"); 20997 return -EPERM; 20998 } 20999 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) { 21000 verbose(env, "JIT is required to use arena\n"); 21001 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 21002 } 21003 if (!bpf_jit_supports_arena()) { 21004 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support arena\n"); 21005 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 21006 } 21007 env->prog->aux->arena = (void *)map; 21008 if (!bpf_arena_get_user_vm_start(env->prog->aux->arena)) { 21009 verbose(env, "arena's user address must be set via map_extra or mmap()\n"); 21010 return -EINVAL; 21011 } 21012 } 21013 21014 return 0; 21015 } 21016 21017 static int __add_used_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_map *map) 21018 { 21019 int i, err; 21020 21021 /* check whether we recorded this map already */ 21022 for (i = 0; i < env->used_map_cnt; i++) 21023 if (env->used_maps[i] == map) 21024 return i; 21025 21026 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { 21027 verbose(env, "The total number of maps per program has reached the limit of %u\n", 21028 MAX_USED_MAPS); 21029 return -E2BIG; 21030 } 21031 21032 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); 21033 if (err) 21034 return err; 21035 21036 if (env->prog->sleepable) 21037 atomic64_inc(&map->sleepable_refcnt); 21038 21039 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, 21040 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it 21041 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded 21042 * and all maps are released in bpf_free_used_maps() 21043 */ 21044 bpf_map_inc(map); 21045 21046 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; 21047 21048 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) { 21049 err = bpf_insn_array_init(map, env->prog); 21050 if (err) { 21051 verbose(env, "Failed to properly initialize insn array\n"); 21052 return err; 21053 } 21054 env->insn_array_maps[env->insn_array_map_cnt++] = map; 21055 } 21056 21057 return env->used_map_cnt - 1; 21058 } 21059 21060 /* Add map behind fd to used maps list, if it's not already there, and return 21061 * its index. 21062 * Returns <0 on error, or >= 0 index, on success. 21063 */ 21064 static int add_used_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int fd) 21065 { 21066 struct bpf_map *map; 21067 CLASS(fd, f)(fd); 21068 21069 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 21070 if (IS_ERR(map)) { 21071 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", fd); 21072 return PTR_ERR(map); 21073 } 21074 21075 return __add_used_map(env, map); 21076 } 21077 21078 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions: 21079 * 21080 * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer. 21081 * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var. 21082 * 21083 * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id. 21084 */ 21085 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21086 { 21087 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 21088 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21089 int i, err; 21090 21091 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); 21092 if (err) 21093 return err; 21094 21095 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 21096 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 21097 ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM && BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEMSX) || 21098 insn->imm != 0)) { 21099 verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); 21100 return -EINVAL; 21101 } 21102 21103 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { 21104 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 21105 struct bpf_map *map; 21106 int map_idx; 21107 u64 addr; 21108 u32 fd; 21109 21110 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || 21111 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || 21112 insn[1].off != 0) { 21113 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 21114 return -EINVAL; 21115 } 21116 21117 if (insn[0].src_reg == 0) 21118 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ 21119 goto next_insn; 21120 21121 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 21122 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 21123 err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux); 21124 if (err) 21125 return err; 21126 goto next_insn; 21127 } 21128 21129 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 21130 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 21131 aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 21132 goto next_insn; 21133 } 21134 21135 /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is 21136 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn. 21137 */ 21138 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 21139 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE: 21140 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 21141 break; 21142 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD: 21143 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 21144 if (insn[1].imm == 0) 21145 break; 21146 fallthrough; 21147 default: 21148 verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 21149 return -EINVAL; 21150 } 21151 21152 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 21153 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 21154 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 21155 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 21156 verbose(env, "fd_idx without fd_array is invalid\n"); 21157 return -EPROTO; 21158 } 21159 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array, 21160 insn[0].imm * sizeof(fd), 21161 sizeof(fd))) 21162 return -EFAULT; 21163 break; 21164 default: 21165 fd = insn[0].imm; 21166 break; 21167 } 21168 21169 map_idx = add_used_map(env, fd); 21170 if (map_idx < 0) 21171 return map_idx; 21172 map = env->used_maps[map_idx]; 21173 21174 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 21175 aux->map_index = map_idx; 21176 21177 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 21178 insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 21179 addr = (unsigned long)map; 21180 } else { 21181 u32 off = insn[1].imm; 21182 21183 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 21184 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 21185 return -EINVAL; 21186 } 21187 21188 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 21189 if (err) { 21190 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n", 21191 map->value_size, off); 21192 return err; 21193 } 21194 21195 aux->map_off = off; 21196 addr += off; 21197 } 21198 21199 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 21200 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 21201 21202 next_insn: 21203 insn++; 21204 i++; 21205 continue; 21206 } 21207 21208 /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */ 21209 if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) { 21210 verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code); 21211 return -EINVAL; 21212 } 21213 } 21214 21215 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid 21216 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. 21217 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. 21218 */ 21219 return 0; 21220 } 21221 21222 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 21223 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21224 { 21225 __bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps, 21226 env->used_map_cnt); 21227 } 21228 21229 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 21230 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21231 { 21232 __bpf_free_used_btfs(env->used_btfs, env->used_btf_cnt); 21233 } 21234 21235 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ 21236 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21237 { 21238 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 21239 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21240 int i; 21241 21242 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 21243 if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) 21244 continue; 21245 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) 21246 continue; 21247 insn->src_reg = 0; 21248 } 21249 } 21250 21251 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range 21252 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying 21253 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero 21254 */ 21255 static void adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 21256 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt) 21257 { 21258 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *data = env->insn_aux_data; 21259 struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi; 21260 u32 old_seen = data[off].seen; 21261 u32 prog_len; 21262 int i; 21263 21264 /* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path 21265 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the 21266 * original insn at old prog. 21267 */ 21268 data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(insn + off + cnt - 1); 21269 21270 if (cnt == 1) 21271 return; 21272 prog_len = new_prog->len; 21273 21274 memmove(data + off + cnt - 1, data + off, 21275 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); 21276 memset(data + off, 0, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (cnt - 1)); 21277 for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) { 21278 /* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */ 21279 data[i].seen = old_seen; 21280 data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(insn + i); 21281 } 21282 } 21283 21284 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 21285 { 21286 int i; 21287 21288 if (len == 1) 21289 return; 21290 /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */ 21291 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 21292 if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off) 21293 continue; 21294 env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1; 21295 } 21296 } 21297 21298 static void release_insn_arrays(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21299 { 21300 int i; 21301 21302 for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++) 21303 bpf_insn_array_release(env->insn_array_maps[i]); 21304 } 21305 21306 static void adjust_insn_arrays(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 21307 { 21308 int i; 21309 21310 if (len == 1) 21311 return; 21312 21313 for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++) 21314 bpf_insn_array_adjust(env->insn_array_maps[i], off, len); 21315 } 21316 21317 static void adjust_insn_arrays_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 21318 { 21319 int i; 21320 21321 for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++) 21322 bpf_insn_array_adjust_after_remove(env->insn_array_maps[i], off, len); 21323 } 21324 21325 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len) 21326 { 21327 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 21328 int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 21329 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc; 21330 21331 for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) { 21332 desc = &tab[i]; 21333 if (desc->insn_idx <= off) 21334 continue; 21335 desc->insn_idx += len - 1; 21336 } 21337 } 21338 21339 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 21340 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) 21341 { 21342 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 21343 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data = NULL; 21344 21345 if (len > 1) { 21346 new_data = vrealloc(env->insn_aux_data, 21347 array_size(env->prog->len + len - 1, 21348 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data)), 21349 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO); 21350 if (!new_data) 21351 return NULL; 21352 21353 env->insn_aux_data = new_data; 21354 } 21355 21356 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); 21357 if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) { 21358 if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE) 21359 verbose(env, 21360 "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n", 21361 env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx); 21362 return NULL; 21363 } 21364 adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog, off, len); 21365 adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len); 21366 adjust_insn_arrays(env, off, len); 21367 adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, off, len); 21368 return new_prog; 21369 } 21370 21371 /* 21372 * For all jmp insns in a given 'prog' that point to 'tgt_idx' insn adjust the 21373 * jump offset by 'delta'. 21374 */ 21375 static int adjust_jmp_off(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 tgt_idx, u32 delta) 21376 { 21377 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 21378 u32 insn_cnt = prog->len, i; 21379 s32 imm; 21380 s16 off; 21381 21382 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 21383 u8 code = insn->code; 21384 21385 if (tgt_idx <= i && i < tgt_idx + delta) 21386 continue; 21387 21388 if ((BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) || 21389 BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT) 21390 continue; 21391 21392 if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA)) { 21393 if (i + 1 + insn->imm != tgt_idx) 21394 continue; 21395 if (check_add_overflow(insn->imm, delta, &imm)) 21396 return -ERANGE; 21397 insn->imm = imm; 21398 } else { 21399 if (i + 1 + insn->off != tgt_idx) 21400 continue; 21401 if (check_add_overflow(insn->off, delta, &off)) 21402 return -ERANGE; 21403 insn->off = off; 21404 } 21405 } 21406 return 0; 21407 } 21408 21409 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 21410 u32 off, u32 cnt) 21411 { 21412 int i, j; 21413 21414 /* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */ 21415 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 21416 if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off) 21417 break; 21418 /* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */ 21419 for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++) 21420 if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt) 21421 break; 21422 /* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing 21423 * the front of previous prog 21424 */ 21425 if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt) 21426 j--; 21427 21428 if (j > i) { 21429 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 21430 int move; 21431 21432 /* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 21433 move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j; 21434 21435 memmove(env->subprog_info + i, 21436 env->subprog_info + j, 21437 sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move); 21438 env->subprog_cnt -= j - i; 21439 21440 /* remove func_info */ 21441 if (aux->func_info) { 21442 move = aux->func_info_cnt - j; 21443 21444 memmove(aux->func_info + i, 21445 aux->func_info + j, 21446 sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move); 21447 aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i; 21448 /* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites, 21449 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust 21450 */ 21451 } 21452 } else { 21453 /* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */ 21454 if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off) 21455 i++; 21456 } 21457 21458 /* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 21459 for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 21460 env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt; 21461 21462 return 0; 21463 } 21464 21465 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 21466 u32 cnt) 21467 { 21468 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 21469 u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo; 21470 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 21471 21472 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 21473 if (!nr_linfo) 21474 return 0; 21475 21476 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 21477 21478 /* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */ 21479 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) 21480 if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off) 21481 break; 21482 21483 l_off = i; 21484 l_cnt = 0; 21485 for (; i < nr_linfo; i++) 21486 if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt) 21487 l_cnt++; 21488 else 21489 break; 21490 21491 /* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit" 21492 * last removed linfo. prog is already modified, so prog->len == off 21493 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed). 21494 */ 21495 if (prog->len != off && l_cnt && 21496 (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) { 21497 l_cnt--; 21498 linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt; 21499 } 21500 21501 /* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */ 21502 if (l_cnt) { 21503 memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i, 21504 sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i)); 21505 21506 prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt; 21507 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 21508 } 21509 21510 /* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */ 21511 for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++) 21512 linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt; 21513 21514 /* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */ 21515 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 21516 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) { 21517 /* program may have started in the removed region but 21518 * may not be fully removed 21519 */ 21520 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt) 21521 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt; 21522 else 21523 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off; 21524 } 21525 21526 return 0; 21527 } 21528 21529 /* 21530 * Clean up dynamically allocated fields of aux data for instructions [start, ...] 21531 */ 21532 static void clear_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int start, int len) 21533 { 21534 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 21535 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 21536 int end = start + len; 21537 int i; 21538 21539 for (i = start; i < end; i++) { 21540 if (aux_data[i].jt) { 21541 kvfree(aux_data[i].jt); 21542 aux_data[i].jt = NULL; 21543 } 21544 21545 if (bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[i])) 21546 i++; 21547 } 21548 } 21549 21550 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt) 21551 { 21552 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 21553 unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len; 21554 int err; 21555 21556 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 21557 bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt); 21558 21559 /* Should be called before bpf_remove_insns, as it uses prog->insnsi */ 21560 clear_insn_aux_data(env, off, cnt); 21561 21562 err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt); 21563 if (err) 21564 return err; 21565 21566 err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 21567 if (err) 21568 return err; 21569 21570 err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 21571 if (err) 21572 return err; 21573 21574 adjust_insn_arrays_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 21575 21576 memmove(aux_data + off, aux_data + off + cnt, 21577 sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt)); 21578 21579 return 0; 21580 } 21581 21582 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not 21583 * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can 21584 * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code 21585 * with 'ja -1'. 21586 * 21587 * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the 21588 * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then 21589 * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception 21590 * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead 21591 * code could be located. 21592 */ 21593 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21594 { 21595 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 21596 struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1); 21597 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 21598 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21599 int i; 21600 21601 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 21602 if (aux_data[i].seen) 21603 continue; 21604 memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap)); 21605 aux_data[i].zext_dst = false; 21606 } 21607 } 21608 21609 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code) 21610 { 21611 u8 op; 21612 21613 op = BPF_OP(code); 21614 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32) 21615 return op != BPF_JA; 21616 21617 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP) 21618 return false; 21619 21620 return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL; 21621 } 21622 21623 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21624 { 21625 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 21626 struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 21627 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 21628 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21629 int i; 21630 21631 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 21632 if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code)) 21633 continue; 21634 21635 if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen) 21636 ja.off = insn->off; 21637 else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen) 21638 ja.off = 0; 21639 else 21640 continue; 21641 21642 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 21643 bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja); 21644 21645 memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja)); 21646 } 21647 } 21648 21649 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21650 { 21651 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 21652 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21653 int i, err; 21654 21655 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 21656 int j; 21657 21658 j = 0; 21659 while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen) 21660 j++; 21661 if (!j) 21662 continue; 21663 21664 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j); 21665 if (err) 21666 return err; 21667 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21668 } 21669 21670 return 0; 21671 } 21672 21673 static const struct bpf_insn NOP = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 21674 static const struct bpf_insn MAY_GOTO_0 = BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND, 0, 0, 0, 0); 21675 21676 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21677 { 21678 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 21679 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21680 bool is_may_goto_0, is_ja; 21681 int i, err; 21682 21683 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 21684 is_may_goto_0 = !memcmp(&insn[i], &MAY_GOTO_0, sizeof(MAY_GOTO_0)); 21685 is_ja = !memcmp(&insn[i], &NOP, sizeof(NOP)); 21686 21687 if (!is_may_goto_0 && !is_ja) 21688 continue; 21689 21690 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1); 21691 if (err) 21692 return err; 21693 insn_cnt--; 21694 /* Go back one insn to catch may_goto +1; may_goto +0 sequence */ 21695 i -= (is_may_goto_0 && i > 0) ? 2 : 1; 21696 } 21697 21698 return 0; 21699 } 21700 21701 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 21702 const union bpf_attr *attr) 21703 { 21704 struct bpf_insn *patch; 21705 /* use env->insn_buf as two independent buffers */ 21706 struct bpf_insn *zext_patch = env->insn_buf; 21707 struct bpf_insn *rnd_hi32_patch = &env->insn_buf[2]; 21708 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 21709 int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len; 21710 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 21711 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 21712 bool rnd_hi32; 21713 21714 rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32; 21715 zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0); 21716 rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 21717 rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); 21718 rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX); 21719 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { 21720 int adj_idx = i + delta; 21721 struct bpf_insn insn; 21722 int load_reg; 21723 21724 insn = insns[adj_idx]; 21725 load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn); 21726 if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) { 21727 u8 code, class; 21728 u32 imm_rnd; 21729 21730 if (!rnd_hi32) 21731 continue; 21732 21733 code = insn.code; 21734 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 21735 if (load_reg == -1) 21736 continue; 21737 21738 /* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for 21739 * BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL 21740 * here. 21741 */ 21742 if (is_reg64(&insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) { 21743 if (class == BPF_LD && 21744 BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM) 21745 i++; 21746 continue; 21747 } 21748 21749 /* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */ 21750 if (class == BPF_LDX && 21751 aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX) 21752 continue; 21753 21754 imm_rnd = get_random_u32(); 21755 rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn; 21756 rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd; 21757 rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg; 21758 patch = rnd_hi32_patch; 21759 patch_len = 4; 21760 goto apply_patch_buffer; 21761 } 21762 21763 /* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested 21764 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG. 21765 * 21766 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into 21767 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs' 21768 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the 21769 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is 21770 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the 21771 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext. 21772 */ 21773 if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn)) 21774 continue; 21775 21776 /* Zero-extension is done by the caller. */ 21777 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(&insn)) 21778 continue; 21779 21780 if (verifier_bug_if(load_reg == -1, env, 21781 "zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined")) 21782 return -EFAULT; 21783 21784 zext_patch[0] = insn; 21785 zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg; 21786 zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg; 21787 patch = zext_patch; 21788 patch_len = 2; 21789 apply_patch_buffer: 21790 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len); 21791 if (!new_prog) 21792 return -ENOMEM; 21793 env->prog = new_prog; 21794 insns = new_prog->insnsi; 21795 aux = env->insn_aux_data; 21796 delta += patch_len - 1; 21797 } 21798 21799 return 0; 21800 } 21801 21802 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a 21803 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure: 21804 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff 21805 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock 21806 */ 21807 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21808 { 21809 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; 21810 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops; 21811 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, ret, delta = 0, epilogue_cnt = 0; 21812 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21813 struct bpf_insn *epilogue_buf = env->epilogue_buf; 21814 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf = env->insn_buf; 21815 struct bpf_insn *insn; 21816 u32 target_size, size_default, off; 21817 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 21818 enum bpf_access_type type; 21819 bool is_narrower_load; 21820 int epilogue_idx = 0; 21821 21822 if (ops->gen_epilogue) { 21823 epilogue_cnt = ops->gen_epilogue(epilogue_buf, env->prog, 21824 -(subprogs[0].stack_depth + 8)); 21825 if (epilogue_cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { 21826 verifier_bug(env, "epilogue is too long"); 21827 return -EFAULT; 21828 } else if (epilogue_cnt) { 21829 /* Save the ARG_PTR_TO_CTX for the epilogue to use */ 21830 cnt = 0; 21831 subprogs[0].stack_depth += 8; 21832 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_1, 21833 -subprogs[0].stack_depth); 21834 insn_buf[cnt++] = env->prog->insnsi[0]; 21835 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 21836 if (!new_prog) 21837 return -ENOMEM; 21838 env->prog = new_prog; 21839 delta += cnt - 1; 21840 21841 ret = add_kfunc_in_insns(env, epilogue_buf, epilogue_cnt - 1); 21842 if (ret < 0) 21843 return ret; 21844 } 21845 } 21846 21847 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { 21848 if (!ops->gen_prologue) { 21849 verifier_bug(env, "gen_prologue is null"); 21850 return -EFAULT; 21851 } 21852 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, 21853 env->prog); 21854 if (cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { 21855 verifier_bug(env, "prologue is too long"); 21856 return -EFAULT; 21857 } else if (cnt) { 21858 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 21859 if (!new_prog) 21860 return -ENOMEM; 21861 21862 env->prog = new_prog; 21863 delta += cnt - 1; 21864 21865 ret = add_kfunc_in_insns(env, insn_buf, cnt - 1); 21866 if (ret < 0) 21867 return ret; 21868 } 21869 } 21870 21871 if (delta) 21872 WARN_ON(adjust_jmp_off(env->prog, 0, delta)); 21873 21874 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 21875 return 0; 21876 21877 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; 21878 21879 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 21880 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; 21881 u8 mode; 21882 21883 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].nospec) { 21884 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].alu_state); 21885 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 21886 21887 *patch++ = BPF_ST_NOSPEC(); 21888 *patch++ = *insn; 21889 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 21890 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 21891 if (!new_prog) 21892 return -ENOMEM; 21893 21894 delta += cnt - 1; 21895 env->prog = new_prog; 21896 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 21897 /* This can not be easily merged with the 21898 * nospec_result-case, because an insn may require a 21899 * nospec before and after itself. Therefore also do not 21900 * 'continue' here but potentially apply further 21901 * patching to insn. *insn should equal patch[1] now. 21902 */ 21903 } 21904 21905 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 21906 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 21907 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 21908 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 21909 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_B) || 21910 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_H) || 21911 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_W)) { 21912 type = BPF_READ; 21913 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 21914 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 21915 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 21916 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 21917 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 21918 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 21919 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 21920 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 21921 type = BPF_WRITE; 21922 } else if ((insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_B) || 21923 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_H) || 21924 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_W) || 21925 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_DW)) && 21926 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type == PTR_TO_ARENA) { 21927 insn->code = BPF_STX | BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC | BPF_SIZE(insn->code); 21928 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 21929 continue; 21930 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && 21931 epilogue_cnt && 21932 i + delta < subprogs[1].start) { 21933 /* Generate epilogue for the main prog */ 21934 if (epilogue_idx) { 21935 /* jump back to the earlier generated epilogue */ 21936 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP32_A(epilogue_idx - i - delta - 1); 21937 cnt = 1; 21938 } else { 21939 memcpy(insn_buf, epilogue_buf, 21940 epilogue_cnt * sizeof(*epilogue_buf)); 21941 cnt = epilogue_cnt; 21942 /* epilogue_idx cannot be 0. It must have at 21943 * least one ctx ptr saving insn before the 21944 * epilogue. 21945 */ 21946 epilogue_idx = i + delta; 21947 } 21948 goto patch_insn_buf; 21949 } else { 21950 continue; 21951 } 21952 21953 if (type == BPF_WRITE && 21954 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].nospec_result) { 21955 /* nospec_result is only used to mitigate Spectre v4 and 21956 * to limit verification-time for Spectre v1. 21957 */ 21958 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 21959 21960 *patch++ = *insn; 21961 *patch++ = BPF_ST_NOSPEC(); 21962 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 21963 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 21964 if (!new_prog) 21965 return -ENOMEM; 21966 21967 delta += cnt - 1; 21968 env->prog = new_prog; 21969 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 21970 continue; 21971 } 21972 21973 switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { 21974 case PTR_TO_CTX: 21975 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) 21976 continue; 21977 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access; 21978 break; 21979 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 21980 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 21981 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; 21982 break; 21983 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 21984 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 21985 break; 21986 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 21987 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 21988 break; 21989 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 21990 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 21991 /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike 21992 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot 21993 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle 21994 * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed 21995 * for this case. 21996 */ 21997 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 21998 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 21999 if (type == BPF_READ) { 22000 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) 22001 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | 22002 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 22003 else 22004 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEMSX | 22005 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 22006 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 22007 } 22008 continue; 22009 case PTR_TO_ARENA: 22010 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX) { 22011 if (!bpf_jit_supports_insn(insn, true)) { 22012 verbose(env, "sign extending loads from arena are not supported yet\n"); 22013 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 22014 } 22015 insn->code = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) | BPF_PROBE_MEM32SX | BPF_SIZE(insn->code); 22016 } else { 22017 insn->code = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) | BPF_PROBE_MEM32 | BPF_SIZE(insn->code); 22018 } 22019 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 22020 continue; 22021 default: 22022 continue; 22023 } 22024 22025 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; 22026 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); 22027 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 22028 22029 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, 22030 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific 22031 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, 22032 * we will apply proper mask to the result. 22033 */ 22034 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; 22035 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size); 22036 off = insn->off; 22037 if (is_narrower_load) { 22038 u8 size_code; 22039 22040 if (type == BPF_WRITE) { 22041 verifier_bug(env, "narrow ctx access misconfigured"); 22042 return -EFAULT; 22043 } 22044 22045 size_code = BPF_H; 22046 if (ctx_field_size == 4) 22047 size_code = BPF_W; 22048 else if (ctx_field_size == 8) 22049 size_code = BPF_DW; 22050 22051 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); 22052 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; 22053 } 22054 22055 target_size = 0; 22056 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, 22057 &target_size); 22058 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE || 22059 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { 22060 verifier_bug(env, "error during ctx access conversion (%d)", cnt); 22061 return -EFAULT; 22062 } 22063 22064 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { 22065 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( 22066 off, size, size_default) * 8; 22067 if (shift && cnt + 1 >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { 22068 verifier_bug(env, "narrow ctx load misconfigured"); 22069 return -EFAULT; 22070 } 22071 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { 22072 if (shift) 22073 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, 22074 insn->dst_reg, 22075 shift); 22076 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 22077 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 22078 } else { 22079 if (shift) 22080 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, 22081 insn->dst_reg, 22082 shift); 22083 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 22084 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1); 22085 } 22086 } 22087 if (mode == BPF_MEMSX) 22088 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X, 22089 insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg, 22090 size * 8, 0); 22091 22092 patch_insn_buf: 22093 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22094 if (!new_prog) 22095 return -ENOMEM; 22096 22097 delta += cnt - 1; 22098 22099 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 22100 env->prog = new_prog; 22101 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22102 } 22103 22104 return 0; 22105 } 22106 22107 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 22108 { 22109 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp; 22110 int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog; 22111 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 22112 struct bpf_insn *insn; 22113 void *old_bpf_func; 22114 int err, num_exentries; 22115 int old_len, subprog_start_adjustment = 0; 22116 22117 if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) 22118 return 0; 22119 22120 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 22121 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 22122 continue; 22123 22124 /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but 22125 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is 22126 * propagated in any case. 22127 */ 22128 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 22129 if (verifier_bug_if(subprog < 0, env, "No program to jit at insn %d", 22130 i + insn->imm + 1)) 22131 return -EFAULT; 22132 /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of 22133 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs 22134 */ 22135 insn->off = subprog; 22136 /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback 22137 * to interpreter will be needed 22138 */ 22139 env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; 22140 /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ 22141 insn->imm = 1; 22142 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 22143 #if defined(MODULES_VADDR) 22144 u64 addr = MODULES_VADDR; 22145 #else 22146 u64 addr = VMALLOC_START; 22147 #endif 22148 /* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions 22149 * if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm. 22150 * Set close enough to possible prog address. 22151 */ 22152 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 22153 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 22154 } 22155 } 22156 22157 err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog); 22158 if (err) 22159 goto out_undo_insn; 22160 22161 err = -ENOMEM; 22162 func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL); 22163 if (!func) 22164 goto out_undo_insn; 22165 22166 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 22167 subprog_start = subprog_end; 22168 subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start; 22169 22170 len = subprog_end - subprog_start; 22171 /* bpf_prog_run() doesn't call subprogs directly, 22172 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs. 22173 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id 22174 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL 22175 */ 22176 func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER); 22177 if (!func[i]) 22178 goto out_free; 22179 memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start], 22180 len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); 22181 func[i]->type = prog->type; 22182 func[i]->len = len; 22183 if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i])) 22184 goto out_free; 22185 func[i]->is_func = 1; 22186 func[i]->sleepable = prog->sleepable; 22187 func[i]->aux->func_idx = i; 22188 /* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */ 22189 func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf; 22190 func[i]->aux->subprog_start = subprog_start + subprog_start_adjustment; 22191 func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info; 22192 func[i]->aux->func_info_cnt = prog->aux->func_info_cnt; 22193 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 22194 func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 22195 func[i]->aux->main_prog_aux = prog->aux; 22196 22197 for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { 22198 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke; 22199 22200 poke = &prog->aux->poke_tab[j]; 22201 if (poke->insn_idx < subprog_end && 22202 poke->insn_idx >= subprog_start) 22203 poke->aux = func[i]->aux; 22204 } 22205 22206 func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F'; 22207 func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 22208 if (env->subprog_info[i].priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE) 22209 func[i]->aux->jits_use_priv_stack = true; 22210 22211 func[i]->jit_requested = 1; 22212 func[i]->blinding_requested = prog->blinding_requested; 22213 func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 22214 func[i]->aux->kfunc_btf_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 22215 func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 22216 func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 22217 func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo; 22218 func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx; 22219 func[i]->aux->arena = prog->aux->arena; 22220 func[i]->aux->used_maps = env->used_maps; 22221 func[i]->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 22222 num_exentries = 0; 22223 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 22224 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 22225 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 22226 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM || 22227 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM32 || 22228 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM32SX || 22229 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) 22230 num_exentries++; 22231 if ((BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX || 22232 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ST) && 22233 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM32) 22234 num_exentries++; 22235 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 22236 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC) 22237 num_exentries++; 22238 } 22239 func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries; 22240 func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable; 22241 func[i]->aux->exception_cb = env->subprog_info[i].is_exception_cb; 22242 func[i]->aux->changes_pkt_data = env->subprog_info[i].changes_pkt_data; 22243 func[i]->aux->might_sleep = env->subprog_info[i].might_sleep; 22244 if (!i) 22245 func[i]->aux->exception_boundary = env->seen_exception; 22246 22247 /* 22248 * To properly pass the absolute subprog start to jit 22249 * all instruction adjustments should be accumulated 22250 */ 22251 old_len = func[i]->len; 22252 func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 22253 subprog_start_adjustment += func[i]->len - old_len; 22254 22255 if (!func[i]->jited) { 22256 err = -ENOTSUPP; 22257 goto out_free; 22258 } 22259 cond_resched(); 22260 } 22261 22262 /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed 22263 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and 22264 * run last pass of JIT 22265 */ 22266 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 22267 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 22268 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 22269 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 22270 subprog = insn->off; 22271 insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func; 22272 insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32; 22273 continue; 22274 } 22275 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 22276 continue; 22277 subprog = insn->off; 22278 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(func[subprog]->bpf_func); 22279 } 22280 22281 /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses 22282 * of the JITed images for each function in the program 22283 * 22284 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field 22285 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start 22286 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base 22287 * 22288 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee 22289 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of 22290 * the call instruction, as an index for this list 22291 */ 22292 func[i]->aux->func = func; 22293 func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt - env->hidden_subprog_cnt; 22294 func[i]->aux->real_func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 22295 } 22296 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 22297 old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func; 22298 tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 22299 if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) { 22300 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 22301 err = -ENOTSUPP; 22302 goto out_free; 22303 } 22304 cond_resched(); 22305 } 22306 22307 /* 22308 * Cleanup func[i]->aux fields which aren't required 22309 * or can become invalid in future 22310 */ 22311 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 22312 func[i]->aux->used_maps = NULL; 22313 func[i]->aux->used_map_cnt = 0; 22314 } 22315 22316 /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and 22317 * populate kallsysm. Begin at the first subprogram, since 22318 * bpf_prog_load will add the kallsyms for the main program. 22319 */ 22320 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 22321 err = bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]); 22322 if (err) 22323 goto out_free; 22324 } 22325 22326 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 22327 bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]); 22328 22329 /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main 22330 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can 22331 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. 22332 */ 22333 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 22334 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 22335 insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 22336 insn[1].imm = insn->off; 22337 insn->off = 0; 22338 continue; 22339 } 22340 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 22341 continue; 22342 insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 22343 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); 22344 insn->imm = subprog; 22345 } 22346 22347 prog->jited = 1; 22348 prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func; 22349 prog->jited_len = func[0]->jited_len; 22350 prog->aux->extable = func[0]->aux->extable; 22351 prog->aux->num_exentries = func[0]->aux->num_exentries; 22352 prog->aux->func = func; 22353 prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt - env->hidden_subprog_cnt; 22354 prog->aux->real_func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 22355 prog->aux->bpf_exception_cb = (void *)func[env->exception_callback_subprog]->bpf_func; 22356 prog->aux->exception_boundary = func[0]->aux->exception_boundary; 22357 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 22358 return 0; 22359 out_free: 22360 /* We failed JIT'ing, so at this point we need to unregister poke 22361 * descriptors from subprogs, so that kernel is not attempting to 22362 * patch it anymore as we're freeing the subprog JIT memory. 22363 */ 22364 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 22365 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 22366 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux); 22367 } 22368 /* At this point we're guaranteed that poke descriptors are not 22369 * live anymore. We can just unlink its descriptor table as it's 22370 * released with the main prog. 22371 */ 22372 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 22373 if (!func[i]) 22374 continue; 22375 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = NULL; 22376 bpf_jit_free(func[i]); 22377 } 22378 kfree(func); 22379 out_undo_insn: 22380 /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ 22381 prog->jit_requested = 0; 22382 prog->blinding_requested = 0; 22383 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 22384 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 22385 continue; 22386 insn->off = 0; 22387 insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 22388 } 22389 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 22390 return err; 22391 } 22392 22393 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 22394 { 22395 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 22396 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 22397 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 22398 bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog); 22399 int i, depth; 22400 #endif 22401 int err = 0; 22402 22403 if (env->prog->jit_requested && 22404 !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 22405 err = jit_subprogs(env); 22406 if (err == 0) 22407 return 0; 22408 if (err == -EFAULT) 22409 return err; 22410 } 22411 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 22412 if (has_kfunc_call) { 22413 verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 22414 return -EINVAL; 22415 } 22416 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) { 22417 /* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls 22418 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 22419 */ 22420 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 22421 return -EINVAL; 22422 } 22423 for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 22424 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 22425 /* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls 22426 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 22427 */ 22428 verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 22429 return -EINVAL; 22430 } 22431 22432 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 22433 continue; 22434 depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); 22435 if (depth < 0) 22436 return depth; 22437 bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth); 22438 } 22439 err = 0; 22440 #endif 22441 return err; 22442 } 22443 22444 /* replace a generic kfunc with a specialized version if necessary */ 22445 static int specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc, int insn_idx) 22446 { 22447 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 22448 bool seen_direct_write; 22449 void *xdp_kfunc; 22450 bool is_rdonly; 22451 u32 func_id = desc->func_id; 22452 u16 offset = desc->offset; 22453 unsigned long addr = desc->addr; 22454 22455 if (offset) /* return if module BTF is used */ 22456 return 0; 22457 22458 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) { 22459 xdp_kfunc = bpf_dev_bound_resolve_kfunc(prog, func_id); 22460 if (xdp_kfunc) 22461 addr = (unsigned long)xdp_kfunc; 22462 /* fallback to default kfunc when not supported by netdev */ 22463 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) { 22464 seen_direct_write = env->seen_direct_write; 22465 is_rdonly = !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE); 22466 22467 if (is_rdonly) 22468 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly; 22469 22470 /* restore env->seen_direct_write to its original value, since 22471 * may_access_direct_pkt_data mutates it 22472 */ 22473 env->seen_direct_write = seen_direct_write; 22474 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_set_dentry_xattr]) { 22475 if (bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked(prog)) 22476 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked; 22477 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_remove_dentry_xattr]) { 22478 if (bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked(prog)) 22479 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked; 22480 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_file]) { 22481 if (!env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].non_sleepable) 22482 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_dynptr_from_file_sleepable; 22483 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_arena_alloc_pages]) { 22484 if (env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].non_sleepable) 22485 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_arena_alloc_pages_non_sleepable; 22486 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_arena_free_pages]) { 22487 if (env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].non_sleepable) 22488 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_arena_free_pages_non_sleepable; 22489 } 22490 desc->addr = addr; 22491 return 0; 22492 } 22493 22494 static void __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux, 22495 u16 struct_meta_reg, 22496 u16 node_offset_reg, 22497 struct bpf_insn *insn, 22498 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, 22499 int *cnt) 22500 { 22501 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta; 22502 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(struct_meta_reg, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 22503 22504 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 22505 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 22506 insn_buf[2] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(node_offset_reg, insn_aux->insert_off); 22507 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 22508 *cnt = 4; 22509 } 22510 22511 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 22512 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, int insn_idx, int *cnt) 22513 { 22514 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 22515 int err; 22516 22517 if (!insn->imm) { 22518 verbose(env, "invalid kernel function call not eliminated in verifier pass\n"); 22519 return -EINVAL; 22520 } 22521 22522 *cnt = 0; 22523 22524 /* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with an offset relative to 22525 * __bpf_call_base, unless the JIT needs to call functions that are 22526 * further than 32 bits away (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()). 22527 */ 22528 desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off); 22529 if (!desc) { 22530 verifier_bug(env, "kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u", 22531 insn->imm); 22532 return -EFAULT; 22533 } 22534 22535 err = specialize_kfunc(env, desc, insn_idx); 22536 if (err) 22537 return err; 22538 22539 if (!bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()) 22540 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr); 22541 22542 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] || 22543 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) { 22544 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 22545 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 22546 u64 obj_new_size = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size; 22547 22548 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl] && kptr_struct_meta) { 22549 verifier_bug(env, "NULL kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d", 22550 insn_idx); 22551 return -EFAULT; 22552 } 22553 22554 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, obj_new_size); 22555 insn_buf[1] = addr[0]; 22556 insn_buf[2] = addr[1]; 22557 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 22558 *cnt = 4; 22559 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl] || 22560 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl] || 22561 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) { 22562 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 22563 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 22564 22565 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl] && kptr_struct_meta) { 22566 verifier_bug(env, "NULL kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d", 22567 insn_idx); 22568 return -EFAULT; 22569 } 22570 22571 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] && 22572 !kptr_struct_meta) { 22573 verifier_bug(env, "kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d", 22574 insn_idx); 22575 return -EFAULT; 22576 } 22577 22578 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 22579 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 22580 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 22581 *cnt = 3; 22582 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 22583 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 22584 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 22585 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 22586 int struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_3; 22587 int node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_4; 22588 22589 /* rbtree_add has extra 'less' arg, so args-to-fixup are in diff regs */ 22590 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 22591 struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_4; 22592 node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_5; 22593 } 22594 22595 if (!kptr_struct_meta) { 22596 verifier_bug(env, "kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d", 22597 insn_idx); 22598 return -EFAULT; 22599 } 22600 22601 __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(&env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx], struct_meta_reg, 22602 node_offset_reg, insn, insn_buf, cnt); 22603 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] || 22604 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 22605 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 22606 *cnt = 1; 22607 } 22608 22609 if (env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].arg_prog) { 22610 u32 regno = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].arg_prog; 22611 struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(regno, (long)env->prog->aux) }; 22612 int idx = *cnt; 22613 22614 insn_buf[idx++] = ld_addrs[0]; 22615 insn_buf[idx++] = ld_addrs[1]; 22616 insn_buf[idx++] = *insn; 22617 *cnt = idx; 22618 } 22619 return 0; 22620 } 22621 22622 /* The function requires that first instruction in 'patch' is insnsi[prog->len - 1] */ 22623 static int add_hidden_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *patch, int len) 22624 { 22625 struct bpf_subprog_info *info = env->subprog_info; 22626 int cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 22627 struct bpf_prog *prog; 22628 22629 /* We only reserve one slot for hidden subprogs in subprog_info. */ 22630 if (env->hidden_subprog_cnt) { 22631 verifier_bug(env, "only one hidden subprog supported"); 22632 return -EFAULT; 22633 } 22634 /* We're not patching any existing instruction, just appending the new 22635 * ones for the hidden subprog. Hence all of the adjustment operations 22636 * in bpf_patch_insn_data are no-ops. 22637 */ 22638 prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, env->prog->len - 1, patch, len); 22639 if (!prog) 22640 return -ENOMEM; 22641 env->prog = prog; 22642 info[cnt + 1].start = info[cnt].start; 22643 info[cnt].start = prog->len - len + 1; 22644 env->subprog_cnt++; 22645 env->hidden_subprog_cnt++; 22646 return 0; 22647 } 22648 22649 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass. 22650 * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations. 22651 */ 22652 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 22653 { 22654 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 22655 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = prog->expected_attach_type; 22656 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 22657 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 22658 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 22659 const int insn_cnt = prog->len; 22660 const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; 22661 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 22662 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf = env->insn_buf; 22663 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 22664 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 22665 int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0, cur_subprog = 0; 22666 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; 22667 u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 22668 u16 stack_depth_extra = 0; 22669 22670 if (env->seen_exception && !env->exception_callback_subprog) { 22671 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 22672 22673 *patch++ = env->prog->insnsi[insn_cnt - 1]; 22674 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 22675 *patch++ = BPF_EXIT_INSN(); 22676 ret = add_hidden_subprog(env, insn_buf, patch - insn_buf); 22677 if (ret < 0) 22678 return ret; 22679 prog = env->prog; 22680 insn = prog->insnsi; 22681 22682 env->exception_callback_subprog = env->subprog_cnt - 1; 22683 /* Don't update insn_cnt, as add_hidden_subprog always appends insns */ 22684 mark_subprog_exc_cb(env, env->exception_callback_subprog); 22685 } 22686 22687 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt;) { 22688 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X) && insn->imm) { 22689 if ((insn->off == BPF_ADDR_SPACE_CAST && insn->imm == 1) || 22690 (((struct bpf_map *)env->prog->aux->arena)->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_USER_CONV)) { 22691 /* convert to 32-bit mov that clears upper 32-bit */ 22692 insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_X; 22693 /* clear off and imm, so it's a normal 'wX = wY' from JIT pov */ 22694 insn->off = 0; 22695 insn->imm = 0; 22696 } /* cast from as(0) to as(1) should be handled by JIT */ 22697 goto next_insn; 22698 } 22699 22700 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].needs_zext) 22701 /* Convert BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 to 32-bit ALU */ 22702 insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_OP(insn->code) | BPF_SRC(insn->code); 22703 22704 /* Make sdiv/smod divide-by-minus-one exceptions impossible. */ 22705 if ((insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K) || 22706 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K) || 22707 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_K) || 22708 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_K)) && 22709 insn->off == 1 && insn->imm == -1) { 22710 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; 22711 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; 22712 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 22713 22714 if (isdiv) 22715 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | 22716 BPF_NEG | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg, 22717 0, 0, 0); 22718 else 22719 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0); 22720 22721 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22722 22723 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22724 if (!new_prog) 22725 return -ENOMEM; 22726 22727 delta += cnt - 1; 22728 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22729 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22730 goto next_insn; 22731 } 22732 22733 /* Make divide-by-zero and divide-by-minus-one exceptions impossible. */ 22734 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 22735 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || 22736 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 22737 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { 22738 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; 22739 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; 22740 bool is_sdiv = isdiv && insn->off == 1; 22741 bool is_smod = !isdiv && insn->off == 1; 22742 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 22743 22744 if (is_sdiv) { 22745 /* [R,W]x sdiv 0 -> 0 22746 * LLONG_MIN sdiv -1 -> LLONG_MIN 22747 * INT_MIN sdiv -1 -> INT_MIN 22748 */ 22749 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg); 22750 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | 22751 BPF_ADD | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, 22752 0, 0, 1); 22753 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 22754 BPF_JGT | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, 22755 0, 4, 1); 22756 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 22757 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, 22758 0, 1, 0); 22759 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | 22760 BPF_MOV | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg, 22761 0, 0, 0); 22762 /* BPF_NEG(LLONG_MIN) == -LLONG_MIN == LLONG_MIN */ 22763 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | 22764 BPF_NEG | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg, 22765 0, 0, 0); 22766 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); 22767 *patch++ = *insn; 22768 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22769 } else if (is_smod) { 22770 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ 22771 /* [R,W]x mod -1 -> 0 */ 22772 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg); 22773 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | 22774 BPF_ADD | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, 22775 0, 0, 1); 22776 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 22777 BPF_JGT | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, 22778 0, 3, 1); 22779 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 22780 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, 22781 0, 3 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 1); 22782 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0); 22783 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); 22784 *patch++ = *insn; 22785 22786 if (!is64) { 22787 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); 22788 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg); 22789 } 22790 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22791 } else if (isdiv) { 22792 /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */ 22793 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 22794 BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 22795 0, 2, 0); 22796 *patch++ = BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg); 22797 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); 22798 *patch++ = *insn; 22799 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22800 } else { 22801 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ 22802 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 22803 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 22804 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0); 22805 *patch++ = *insn; 22806 22807 if (!is64) { 22808 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); 22809 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg); 22810 } 22811 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22812 } 22813 22814 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22815 if (!new_prog) 22816 return -ENOMEM; 22817 22818 delta += cnt - 1; 22819 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22820 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22821 goto next_insn; 22822 } 22823 22824 /* Make it impossible to de-reference a userspace address */ 22825 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 22826 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM || 22827 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) { 22828 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 22829 u64 uaddress_limit = bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(); 22830 22831 if (!uaddress_limit) 22832 goto next_insn; 22833 22834 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg); 22835 if (insn->off) 22836 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_AX, insn->off); 22837 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); 22838 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_AX, uaddress_limit >> 32, 2); 22839 *patch++ = *insn; 22840 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); 22841 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0); 22842 22843 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22844 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22845 if (!new_prog) 22846 return -ENOMEM; 22847 22848 delta += cnt - 1; 22849 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22850 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22851 goto next_insn; 22852 } 22853 22854 /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */ 22855 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && 22856 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || 22857 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { 22858 cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); 22859 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { 22860 verifier_bug(env, "%d insns generated for ld_abs", cnt); 22861 return -EFAULT; 22862 } 22863 22864 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22865 if (!new_prog) 22866 return -ENOMEM; 22867 22868 delta += cnt - 1; 22869 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22870 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22871 goto next_insn; 22872 } 22873 22874 /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */ 22875 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) || 22876 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) { 22877 const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X; 22878 const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X; 22879 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 22880 bool issrc, isneg, isimm; 22881 u32 off_reg; 22882 22883 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 22884 if (!aux->alu_state || 22885 aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER) 22886 goto next_insn; 22887 22888 isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE; 22889 issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) == 22890 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC; 22891 isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE; 22892 22893 off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg; 22894 if (isimm) { 22895 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 22896 } else { 22897 if (isneg) 22898 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 22899 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 22900 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 22901 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 22902 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 22903 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63); 22904 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 22905 } 22906 if (!issrc) 22907 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg); 22908 insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX; 22909 if (isneg) 22910 insn->code = insn->code == code_add ? 22911 code_sub : code_add; 22912 *patch++ = *insn; 22913 if (issrc && isneg && !isimm) 22914 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 22915 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22916 22917 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22918 if (!new_prog) 22919 return -ENOMEM; 22920 22921 delta += cnt - 1; 22922 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22923 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22924 goto next_insn; 22925 } 22926 22927 if (is_may_goto_insn(insn) && bpf_jit_supports_timed_may_goto()) { 22928 int stack_off_cnt = -stack_depth - 16; 22929 22930 /* 22931 * Two 8 byte slots, depth-16 stores the count, and 22932 * depth-8 stores the start timestamp of the loop. 22933 * 22934 * The starting value of count is BPF_MAX_TIMED_LOOPS 22935 * (0xffff). Every iteration loads it and subs it by 1, 22936 * until the value becomes 0 in AX (thus, 1 in stack), 22937 * after which we call arch_bpf_timed_may_goto, which 22938 * either sets AX to 0xffff to keep looping, or to 0 22939 * upon timeout. AX is then stored into the stack. In 22940 * the next iteration, we either see 0 and break out, or 22941 * continue iterating until the next time value is 0 22942 * after subtraction, rinse and repeat. 22943 */ 22944 stack_depth_extra = 16; 22945 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_AX, BPF_REG_10, stack_off_cnt); 22946 if (insn->off >= 0) 22947 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off + 5); 22948 else 22949 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off - 1); 22950 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, 1); 22951 insn_buf[3] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_AX, 0, 2); 22952 /* 22953 * AX is used as an argument to pass in stack_off_cnt 22954 * (to add to r10/fp), and also as the return value of 22955 * the call to arch_bpf_timed_may_goto. 22956 */ 22957 insn_buf[4] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, stack_off_cnt); 22958 insn_buf[5] = BPF_EMIT_CALL(arch_bpf_timed_may_goto); 22959 insn_buf[6] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_AX, stack_off_cnt); 22960 cnt = 7; 22961 22962 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22963 if (!new_prog) 22964 return -ENOMEM; 22965 22966 delta += cnt - 1; 22967 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22968 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22969 goto next_insn; 22970 } else if (is_may_goto_insn(insn)) { 22971 int stack_off = -stack_depth - 8; 22972 22973 stack_depth_extra = 8; 22974 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_AX, BPF_REG_10, stack_off); 22975 if (insn->off >= 0) 22976 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off + 2); 22977 else 22978 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off - 1); 22979 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, 1); 22980 insn_buf[3] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_AX, stack_off); 22981 cnt = 4; 22982 22983 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22984 if (!new_prog) 22985 return -ENOMEM; 22986 22987 delta += cnt - 1; 22988 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22989 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22990 goto next_insn; 22991 } 22992 22993 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 22994 goto next_insn; 22995 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 22996 goto next_insn; 22997 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 22998 ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn, insn_buf, i + delta, &cnt); 22999 if (ret) 23000 return ret; 23001 if (cnt == 0) 23002 goto next_insn; 23003 23004 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23005 if (!new_prog) 23006 return -ENOMEM; 23007 23008 delta += cnt - 1; 23009 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23010 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23011 goto next_insn; 23012 } 23013 23014 /* Skip inlining the helper call if the JIT does it. */ 23015 if (bpf_jit_inlines_helper_call(insn->imm)) 23016 goto next_insn; 23017 23018 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) 23019 prog->dst_needed = 1; 23020 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) 23021 bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); 23022 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return) 23023 prog->kprobe_override = 1; 23024 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 23025 /* If we tail call into other programs, we 23026 * cannot make any assumptions since they can 23027 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in 23028 * the program array. 23029 */ 23030 prog->cb_access = 1; 23031 if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) 23032 prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; 23033 prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF; 23034 23035 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid 23036 * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal 23037 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler 23038 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet 23039 */ 23040 insn->imm = 0; 23041 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; 23042 23043 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 23044 if (env->bpf_capable && !prog->blinding_requested && 23045 prog->jit_requested && 23046 !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 23047 !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) && 23048 !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) { 23049 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = { 23050 .reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL, 23051 .tail_call.map = aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr, 23052 .tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux), 23053 .insn_idx = i + delta, 23054 }; 23055 23056 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc); 23057 if (ret < 0) { 23058 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); 23059 return ret; 23060 } 23061 23062 insn->imm = ret + 1; 23063 goto next_insn; 23064 } 23065 23066 if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) 23067 goto next_insn; 23068 23069 /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call 23070 * emit two extra insns: 23071 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out; 23072 * index &= array->index_mask; 23073 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation 23074 */ 23075 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) { 23076 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 23077 return -EINVAL; 23078 } 23079 23080 map_ptr = aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr; 23081 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, 23082 map_ptr->max_entries, 2); 23083 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 23084 container_of(map_ptr, 23085 struct bpf_array, 23086 map)->index_mask); 23087 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 23088 cnt = 3; 23089 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23090 if (!new_prog) 23091 return -ENOMEM; 23092 23093 delta += cnt - 1; 23094 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23095 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23096 goto next_insn; 23097 } 23098 23099 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 23100 /* The verifier will process callback_fn as many times as necessary 23101 * with different maps and the register states prepared by 23102 * set_timer_callback_state will be accurate. 23103 * 23104 * The following use case is valid: 23105 * map1 is shared by prog1, prog2, prog3. 23106 * prog1 calls bpf_timer_init for some map1 elements 23107 * prog2 calls bpf_timer_set_callback for some map1 elements. 23108 * Those that were not bpf_timer_init-ed will return -EINVAL. 23109 * prog3 calls bpf_timer_start for some map1 elements. 23110 * Those that were not both bpf_timer_init-ed and 23111 * bpf_timer_set_callback-ed will return -EINVAL. 23112 */ 23113 struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = { 23114 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, (long)prog->aux), 23115 }; 23116 23117 insn_buf[0] = ld_addrs[0]; 23118 insn_buf[1] = ld_addrs[1]; 23119 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 23120 cnt = 3; 23121 23122 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23123 if (!new_prog) 23124 return -ENOMEM; 23125 23126 delta += cnt - 1; 23127 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23128 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23129 goto patch_call_imm; 23130 } 23131 23132 if (is_storage_get_function(insn->imm)) { 23133 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].non_sleepable) 23134 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_ATOMIC); 23135 else 23136 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_KERNEL); 23137 insn_buf[1] = *insn; 23138 cnt = 2; 23139 23140 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23141 if (!new_prog) 23142 return -ENOMEM; 23143 23144 delta += cnt - 1; 23145 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23146 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23147 goto patch_call_imm; 23148 } 23149 23150 /* bpf_per_cpu_ptr() and bpf_this_cpu_ptr() */ 23151 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].call_with_percpu_alloc_ptr) { 23152 /* patch with 'r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0)' since for percpu data, 23153 * bpf_mem_alloc() returns a ptr to the percpu data ptr. 23154 */ 23155 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, 0); 23156 insn_buf[1] = *insn; 23157 cnt = 2; 23158 23159 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23160 if (!new_prog) 23161 return -ENOMEM; 23162 23163 delta += cnt - 1; 23164 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23165 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23166 goto patch_call_imm; 23167 } 23168 23169 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup 23170 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit 23171 * only. 23172 */ 23173 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 23174 (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || 23175 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 23176 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 23177 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 23178 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem || 23179 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem || 23180 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map || 23181 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 23182 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)) { 23183 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 23184 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) 23185 goto patch_call_imm; 23186 23187 map_ptr = aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr; 23188 ops = map_ptr->ops; 23189 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 23190 ops->map_gen_lookup) { 23191 cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); 23192 if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP) 23193 goto patch_map_ops_generic; 23194 if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { 23195 verifier_bug(env, "%d insns generated for map lookup", cnt); 23196 return -EFAULT; 23197 } 23198 23199 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, 23200 insn_buf, cnt); 23201 if (!new_prog) 23202 return -ENOMEM; 23203 23204 delta += cnt - 1; 23205 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23206 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23207 goto next_insn; 23208 } 23209 23210 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, 23211 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 23212 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem, 23213 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 23214 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem, 23215 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 23216 u64 flags))NULL)); 23217 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem, 23218 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value, 23219 u64 flags))NULL)); 23220 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem, 23221 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 23222 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem, 23223 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 23224 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect, 23225 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u64 index, u64 flags))NULL)); 23226 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_for_each_callback, 23227 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, 23228 bpf_callback_t callback_fn, 23229 void *callback_ctx, 23230 u64 flags))NULL)); 23231 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem, 23232 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 cpu))NULL)); 23233 23234 patch_map_ops_generic: 23235 switch (insn->imm) { 23236 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: 23237 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_elem); 23238 goto next_insn; 23239 case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: 23240 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_update_elem); 23241 goto next_insn; 23242 case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: 23243 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_delete_elem); 23244 goto next_insn; 23245 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 23246 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_push_elem); 23247 goto next_insn; 23248 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 23249 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_pop_elem); 23250 goto next_insn; 23251 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 23252 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_peek_elem); 23253 goto next_insn; 23254 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 23255 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_redirect); 23256 goto next_insn; 23257 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 23258 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_for_each_callback); 23259 goto next_insn; 23260 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 23261 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem); 23262 goto next_insn; 23263 } 23264 23265 goto patch_call_imm; 23266 } 23267 23268 /* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */ 23269 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 23270 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) { 23271 struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = { 23272 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 23273 (unsigned long)&jiffies), 23274 }; 23275 23276 insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0]; 23277 insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1]; 23278 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 23279 BPF_REG_0, 0); 23280 cnt = 3; 23281 23282 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 23283 cnt); 23284 if (!new_prog) 23285 return -ENOMEM; 23286 23287 delta += cnt - 1; 23288 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23289 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23290 goto next_insn; 23291 } 23292 23293 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && !defined(CONFIG_UML) 23294 /* Implement bpf_get_smp_processor_id() inline. */ 23295 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id && 23296 verifier_inlines_helper_call(env, insn->imm)) { 23297 /* BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id inlining is an 23298 * optimization, so if cpu_number is ever 23299 * changed in some incompatible and hard to support 23300 * way, it's fine to back out this inlining logic 23301 */ 23302 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP 23303 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, (u32)(unsigned long)&cpu_number); 23304 insn_buf[1] = BPF_MOV64_PERCPU_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0); 23305 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0); 23306 cnt = 3; 23307 #else 23308 insn_buf[0] = BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0); 23309 cnt = 1; 23310 #endif 23311 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23312 if (!new_prog) 23313 return -ENOMEM; 23314 23315 delta += cnt - 1; 23316 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23317 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23318 goto next_insn; 23319 } 23320 #endif 23321 /* Implement bpf_get_func_arg inline. */ 23322 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 23323 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg) { 23324 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 23325 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 23326 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, 6); 23327 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 3); 23328 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1); 23329 insn_buf[4] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0); 23330 insn_buf[5] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 23331 insn_buf[6] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 23332 insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(1); 23333 insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL); 23334 cnt = 9; 23335 23336 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23337 if (!new_prog) 23338 return -ENOMEM; 23339 23340 delta += cnt - 1; 23341 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23342 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23343 goto next_insn; 23344 } 23345 23346 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ret inline. */ 23347 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 23348 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ret) { 23349 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || 23350 eatype == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 23351 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 23352 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 23353 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_0, 3); 23354 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 23355 insn_buf[3] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 23356 insn_buf[4] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, 0); 23357 insn_buf[5] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 23358 cnt = 6; 23359 } else { 23360 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EOPNOTSUPP); 23361 cnt = 1; 23362 } 23363 23364 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23365 if (!new_prog) 23366 return -ENOMEM; 23367 23368 delta += cnt - 1; 23369 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23370 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23371 goto next_insn; 23372 } 23373 23374 /* Implement get_func_arg_cnt inline. */ 23375 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 23376 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg_cnt) { 23377 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 23378 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 23379 23380 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 23381 if (!new_prog) 23382 return -ENOMEM; 23383 23384 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23385 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23386 goto next_insn; 23387 } 23388 23389 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ip inline. */ 23390 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 23391 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 23392 /* Load IP address from ctx - 16 */ 23393 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -16); 23394 23395 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 23396 if (!new_prog) 23397 return -ENOMEM; 23398 23399 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23400 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23401 goto next_insn; 23402 } 23403 23404 /* Implement bpf_get_branch_snapshot inline. */ 23405 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) && 23406 prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 23407 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_branch_snapshot) { 23408 /* We are dealing with the following func protos: 23409 * u64 bpf_get_branch_snapshot(void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags); 23410 * int perf_snapshot_branch_stack(struct perf_branch_entry *entries, u32 cnt); 23411 */ 23412 const u32 br_entry_size = sizeof(struct perf_branch_entry); 23413 23414 /* struct perf_branch_entry is part of UAPI and is 23415 * used as an array element, so extremely unlikely to 23416 * ever grow or shrink 23417 */ 23418 BUILD_BUG_ON(br_entry_size != 24); 23419 23420 /* if (unlikely(flags)) return -EINVAL */ 23421 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_3, 0, 7); 23422 23423 /* Transform size (bytes) into number of entries (cnt = size / 24). 23424 * But to avoid expensive division instruction, we implement 23425 * divide-by-3 through multiplication, followed by further 23426 * division by 8 through 3-bit right shift. 23427 * Refer to book "Hacker's Delight, 2nd ed." by Henry S. Warren, Jr., 23428 * p. 227, chapter "Unsigned Division by 3" for details and proofs. 23429 * 23430 * N / 3 <=> M * N / 2^33, where M = (2^33 + 1) / 3 = 0xaaaaaaab. 23431 */ 23432 insn_buf[1] = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0xaaaaaaab); 23433 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MUL, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0); 23434 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_2, 36); 23435 23436 /* call perf_snapshot_branch_stack implementation */ 23437 insn_buf[4] = BPF_EMIT_CALL(static_call_query(perf_snapshot_branch_stack)); 23438 /* if (entry_cnt == 0) return -ENOENT */ 23439 insn_buf[5] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 4); 23440 /* return entry_cnt * sizeof(struct perf_branch_entry) */ 23441 insn_buf[6] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MUL, BPF_REG_0, br_entry_size); 23442 insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(3); 23443 /* return -EINVAL; */ 23444 insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL); 23445 insn_buf[9] = BPF_JMP_A(1); 23446 /* return -ENOENT; */ 23447 insn_buf[10] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -ENOENT); 23448 cnt = 11; 23449 23450 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23451 if (!new_prog) 23452 return -ENOMEM; 23453 23454 delta += cnt - 1; 23455 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23456 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23457 goto next_insn; 23458 } 23459 23460 /* Implement bpf_kptr_xchg inline */ 23461 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 23462 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && 23463 bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg()) { 23464 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2); 23465 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ATOMIC_OP(BPF_DW, BPF_XCHG, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0); 23466 cnt = 2; 23467 23468 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23469 if (!new_prog) 23470 return -ENOMEM; 23471 23472 delta += cnt - 1; 23473 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23474 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23475 goto next_insn; 23476 } 23477 patch_call_imm: 23478 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); 23479 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed 23480 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions 23481 */ 23482 if (!fn->func) { 23483 verifier_bug(env, 23484 "not inlined functions %s#%d is missing func", 23485 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 23486 return -EFAULT; 23487 } 23488 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; 23489 next_insn: 23490 if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) { 23491 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra; 23492 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_extra = stack_depth_extra; 23493 23494 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 23495 if (stack_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK && !prog->jit_requested) { 23496 verbose(env, "stack size %d(extra %d) is too large\n", 23497 stack_depth, stack_depth_extra); 23498 return -EINVAL; 23499 } 23500 cur_subprog++; 23501 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 23502 stack_depth_extra = 0; 23503 } 23504 i++; 23505 insn++; 23506 } 23507 23508 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = subprogs[0].stack_depth; 23509 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 23510 int delta = bpf_jit_supports_timed_may_goto() ? 2 : 1; 23511 int subprog_start = subprogs[i].start; 23512 int stack_slots = subprogs[i].stack_extra / 8; 23513 int slots = delta, cnt = 0; 23514 23515 if (!stack_slots) 23516 continue; 23517 /* We need two slots in case timed may_goto is supported. */ 23518 if (stack_slots > slots) { 23519 verifier_bug(env, "stack_slots supports may_goto only"); 23520 return -EFAULT; 23521 } 23522 23523 stack_depth = subprogs[i].stack_depth; 23524 if (bpf_jit_supports_timed_may_goto()) { 23525 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, -stack_depth, 23526 BPF_MAX_TIMED_LOOPS); 23527 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, -stack_depth + 8, 0); 23528 } else { 23529 /* Add ST insn to subprog prologue to init extra stack */ 23530 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, -stack_depth, 23531 BPF_MAX_LOOPS); 23532 } 23533 /* Copy first actual insn to preserve it */ 23534 insn_buf[cnt++] = env->prog->insnsi[subprog_start]; 23535 23536 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, subprog_start, insn_buf, cnt); 23537 if (!new_prog) 23538 return -ENOMEM; 23539 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23540 /* 23541 * If may_goto is a first insn of a prog there could be a jmp 23542 * insn that points to it, hence adjust all such jmps to point 23543 * to insn after BPF_ST that inits may_goto count. 23544 * Adjustment will succeed because bpf_patch_insn_data() didn't fail. 23545 */ 23546 WARN_ON(adjust_jmp_off(env->prog, subprog_start, delta)); 23547 } 23548 23549 /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */ 23550 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 23551 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 23552 if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || 23553 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || 23554 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { 23555 verifier_bug(env, "poke tab is misconfigured"); 23556 return -EFAULT; 23557 } 23558 23559 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); 23560 if (ret < 0) { 23561 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); 23562 return ret; 23563 } 23564 } 23565 23566 ret = sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(env); 23567 if (ret) 23568 return ret; 23569 23570 return 0; 23571 } 23572 23573 static struct bpf_prog *inline_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 23574 int position, 23575 s32 stack_base, 23576 u32 callback_subprogno, 23577 u32 *total_cnt) 23578 { 23579 s32 r6_offset = stack_base + 0 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 23580 s32 r7_offset = stack_base + 1 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 23581 s32 r8_offset = stack_base + 2 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 23582 int reg_loop_max = BPF_REG_6; 23583 int reg_loop_cnt = BPF_REG_7; 23584 int reg_loop_ctx = BPF_REG_8; 23585 23586 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf = env->insn_buf; 23587 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 23588 u32 callback_start; 23589 u32 call_insn_offset; 23590 s32 callback_offset; 23591 u32 cnt = 0; 23592 23593 /* This represents an inlined version of bpf_iter.c:bpf_loop, 23594 * be careful to modify this code in sync. 23595 */ 23596 23597 /* Return error and jump to the end of the patch if 23598 * expected number of iterations is too big. 23599 */ 23600 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_1, BPF_MAX_LOOPS, 2); 23601 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -E2BIG); 23602 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 16); 23603 /* spill R6, R7, R8 to use these as loop vars */ 23604 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, r6_offset); 23605 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, r7_offset); 23606 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_8, r8_offset); 23607 /* initialize loop vars */ 23608 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_max, BPF_REG_1); 23609 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV32_IMM(reg_loop_cnt, 0); 23610 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_ctx, BPF_REG_3); 23611 /* loop header, 23612 * if reg_loop_cnt >= reg_loop_max skip the loop body 23613 */ 23614 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, reg_loop_cnt, reg_loop_max, 5); 23615 /* callback call, 23616 * correct callback offset would be set after patching 23617 */ 23618 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, reg_loop_cnt); 23619 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, reg_loop_ctx); 23620 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_CALL_REL(0); 23621 /* increment loop counter */ 23622 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, reg_loop_cnt, 1); 23623 /* jump to loop header if callback returned 0 */ 23624 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, -6); 23625 /* return value of bpf_loop, 23626 * set R0 to the number of iterations 23627 */ 23628 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, reg_loop_cnt); 23629 /* restore original values of R6, R7, R8 */ 23630 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, r6_offset); 23631 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, r7_offset); 23632 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, r8_offset); 23633 23634 *total_cnt = cnt; 23635 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, position, insn_buf, cnt); 23636 if (!new_prog) 23637 return new_prog; 23638 23639 /* callback start is known only after patching */ 23640 callback_start = env->subprog_info[callback_subprogno].start; 23641 /* Note: insn_buf[12] is an offset of BPF_CALL_REL instruction */ 23642 call_insn_offset = position + 12; 23643 callback_offset = callback_start - call_insn_offset - 1; 23644 new_prog->insnsi[call_insn_offset].imm = callback_offset; 23645 23646 return new_prog; 23647 } 23648 23649 static bool is_bpf_loop_call(struct bpf_insn *insn) 23650 { 23651 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 23652 insn->src_reg == 0 && 23653 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_loop; 23654 } 23655 23656 /* For all sub-programs in the program (including main) check 23657 * insn_aux_data to see if there are bpf_loop calls that require 23658 * inlining. If such calls are found the calls are replaced with a 23659 * sequence of instructions produced by `inline_bpf_loop` function and 23660 * subprog stack_depth is increased by the size of 3 registers. 23661 * This stack space is used to spill values of the R6, R7, R8. These 23662 * registers are used to store the loop bound, counter and context 23663 * variables. 23664 */ 23665 static int optimize_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 23666 { 23667 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; 23668 int i, cur_subprog = 0, cnt, delta = 0; 23669 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 23670 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 23671 u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 23672 u16 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 23673 u16 stack_depth_extra = 0; 23674 23675 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 23676 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *inline_state = 23677 &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].loop_inline_state; 23678 23679 if (is_bpf_loop_call(insn) && inline_state->fit_for_inline) { 23680 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 23681 23682 stack_depth_extra = BPF_REG_SIZE * 3 + stack_depth_roundup; 23683 new_prog = inline_bpf_loop(env, 23684 i + delta, 23685 -(stack_depth + stack_depth_extra), 23686 inline_state->callback_subprogno, 23687 &cnt); 23688 if (!new_prog) 23689 return -ENOMEM; 23690 23691 delta += cnt - 1; 23692 env->prog = new_prog; 23693 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23694 } 23695 23696 if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) { 23697 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra; 23698 cur_subprog++; 23699 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 23700 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 23701 stack_depth_extra = 0; 23702 } 23703 } 23704 23705 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 23706 23707 return 0; 23708 } 23709 23710 /* Remove unnecessary spill/fill pairs, members of fastcall pattern, 23711 * adjust subprograms stack depth when possible. 23712 */ 23713 static int remove_fastcall_spills_fills(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 23714 { 23715 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 23716 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 23717 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 23718 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 23719 u32 spills_num; 23720 bool modified = false; 23721 int i, j; 23722 23723 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 23724 if (aux[i].fastcall_spills_num > 0) { 23725 spills_num = aux[i].fastcall_spills_num; 23726 /* NOPs would be removed by opt_remove_nops() */ 23727 for (j = 1; j <= spills_num; ++j) { 23728 *(insn - j) = NOP; 23729 *(insn + j) = NOP; 23730 } 23731 modified = true; 23732 } 23733 if ((subprog + 1)->start == i + 1) { 23734 if (modified && !subprog->keep_fastcall_stack) 23735 subprog->stack_depth = -subprog->fastcall_stack_off; 23736 subprog++; 23737 modified = false; 23738 } 23739 } 23740 23741 return 0; 23742 } 23743 23744 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 23745 { 23746 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 23747 struct list_head *head, *pos, *tmp; 23748 struct bpf_scc_info *info; 23749 int i, j; 23750 23751 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 23752 env->cur_state = NULL; 23753 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 23754 23755 list_for_each_safe(pos, tmp, &env->free_list) { 23756 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); 23757 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 23758 kfree(sl); 23759 } 23760 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->free_list); 23761 23762 for (i = 0; i < env->scc_cnt; ++i) { 23763 info = env->scc_info[i]; 23764 if (!info) 23765 continue; 23766 for (j = 0; j < info->num_visits; j++) 23767 free_backedges(&info->visits[j]); 23768 kvfree(info); 23769 env->scc_info[i] = NULL; 23770 } 23771 23772 if (!env->explored_states) 23773 return; 23774 23775 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) { 23776 head = &env->explored_states[i]; 23777 23778 list_for_each_safe(pos, tmp, head) { 23779 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); 23780 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 23781 kfree(sl); 23782 } 23783 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->explored_states[i]); 23784 } 23785 } 23786 23787 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 23788 { 23789 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 23790 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub = subprog_info(env, subprog); 23791 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 23792 struct bpf_verifier_state *state; 23793 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 23794 int ret, i; 23795 23796 env->prev_linfo = NULL; 23797 env->pass_cnt++; 23798 23799 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 23800 if (!state) 23801 return -ENOMEM; 23802 state->curframe = 0; 23803 state->speculative = false; 23804 state->branches = 1; 23805 state->in_sleepable = env->prog->sleepable; 23806 state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 23807 if (!state->frame[0]) { 23808 kfree(state); 23809 return -ENOMEM; 23810 } 23811 env->cur_state = state; 23812 init_func_state(env, state->frame[0], 23813 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 23814 0 /* frameno */, 23815 subprog); 23816 state->first_insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start; 23817 state->last_insn_idx = -1; 23818 23819 regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs; 23820 if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 23821 const char *sub_name = subprog_name(env, subprog); 23822 struct bpf_subprog_arg_info *arg; 23823 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 23824 23825 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 23826 verbose(env, "Validating %s() func#%d...\n", sub_name, subprog); 23827 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog); 23828 if (ret) 23829 goto out; 23830 23831 if (subprog_is_exc_cb(env, subprog)) { 23832 state->frame[0]->in_exception_callback_fn = true; 23833 /* We have already ensured that the callback returns an integer, just 23834 * like all global subprogs. We need to determine it only has a single 23835 * scalar argument. 23836 */ 23837 if (sub->arg_cnt != 1 || sub->args[0].arg_type != ARG_ANYTHING) { 23838 verbose(env, "exception cb only supports single integer argument\n"); 23839 ret = -EINVAL; 23840 goto out; 23841 } 23842 } 23843 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= sub->arg_cnt; i++) { 23844 arg = &sub->args[i - BPF_REG_1]; 23845 reg = ®s[i]; 23846 23847 if (arg->arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 23848 reg->type = PTR_TO_CTX; 23849 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 23850 } else if (arg->arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 23851 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 23852 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 23853 } else if (arg->arg_type == (ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY)) { 23854 /* assume unspecial LOCAL dynptr type */ 23855 __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL, true, ++env->id_gen); 23856 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) { 23857 reg->type = PTR_TO_MEM; 23858 reg->type |= arg->arg_type & 23859 (PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED | MEM_RDONLY); 23860 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 23861 reg->mem_size = arg->mem_size; 23862 if (arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) 23863 reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 23864 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 23865 reg->type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 23866 if (arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) 23867 reg->type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 23868 if (arg->arg_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) 23869 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 23870 if (arg->arg_type & PTR_TRUSTED) 23871 reg->type |= PTR_TRUSTED; 23872 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 23873 reg->btf = bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); /* can't fail at this point */ 23874 reg->btf_id = arg->btf_id; 23875 reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 23876 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_ARENA) { 23877 /* caller can pass either PTR_TO_ARENA or SCALAR */ 23878 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 23879 } else { 23880 verifier_bug(env, "unhandled arg#%d type %d", 23881 i - BPF_REG_1, arg->arg_type); 23882 ret = -EFAULT; 23883 goto out; 23884 } 23885 } 23886 } else { 23887 /* if main BPF program has associated BTF info, validate that 23888 * it's matching expected signature, and otherwise mark BTF 23889 * info for main program as unreliable 23890 */ 23891 if (env->prog->aux->func_info_aux) { 23892 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, 0); 23893 if (ret || sub->arg_cnt != 1 || sub->args[0].arg_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) 23894 env->prog->aux->func_info_aux[0].unreliable = true; 23895 } 23896 23897 /* 1st arg to a function */ 23898 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; 23899 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); 23900 } 23901 23902 /* Acquire references for struct_ops program arguments tagged with "__ref" */ 23903 if (!subprog && env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 23904 for (i = 0; i < aux->ctx_arg_info_size; i++) 23905 aux->ctx_arg_info[i].ref_obj_id = aux->ctx_arg_info[i].refcounted ? 23906 acquire_reference(env, 0) : 0; 23907 } 23908 23909 ret = do_check(env); 23910 out: 23911 if (!ret && pop_log) 23912 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); 23913 free_states(env); 23914 return ret; 23915 } 23916 23917 /* Lazily verify all global functions based on their BTF, if they are called 23918 * from main BPF program or any of subprograms transitively. 23919 * BPF global subprogs called from dead code are not validated. 23920 * All callable global functions must pass verification. 23921 * Otherwise the whole program is rejected. 23922 * Consider: 23923 * int bar(int); 23924 * int foo(int f) 23925 * { 23926 * return bar(f); 23927 * } 23928 * int bar(int b) 23929 * { 23930 * ... 23931 * } 23932 * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it 23933 * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar() 23934 * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified 23935 * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value. 23936 */ 23937 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 23938 { 23939 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 23940 struct bpf_func_info_aux *sub_aux; 23941 int i, ret, new_cnt; 23942 23943 if (!aux->func_info) 23944 return 0; 23945 23946 /* exception callback is presumed to be always called */ 23947 if (env->exception_callback_subprog) 23948 subprog_aux(env, env->exception_callback_subprog)->called = true; 23949 23950 again: 23951 new_cnt = 0; 23952 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 23953 if (!subprog_is_global(env, i)) 23954 continue; 23955 23956 sub_aux = subprog_aux(env, i); 23957 if (!sub_aux->called || sub_aux->verified) 23958 continue; 23959 23960 env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start; 23961 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0); 23962 ret = do_check_common(env, i); 23963 if (ret) { 23964 return ret; 23965 } else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 23966 verbose(env, "Func#%d ('%s') is safe for any args that match its prototype\n", 23967 i, subprog_name(env, i)); 23968 } 23969 23970 /* We verified new global subprog, it might have called some 23971 * more global subprogs that we haven't verified yet, so we 23972 * need to do another pass over subprogs to verify those. 23973 */ 23974 sub_aux->verified = true; 23975 new_cnt++; 23976 } 23977 23978 /* We can't loop forever as we verify at least one global subprog on 23979 * each pass. 23980 */ 23981 if (new_cnt) 23982 goto again; 23983 23984 return 0; 23985 } 23986 23987 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 23988 { 23989 int ret; 23990 23991 env->insn_idx = 0; 23992 ret = do_check_common(env, 0); 23993 if (!ret) 23994 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 23995 return ret; 23996 } 23997 23998 23999 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 24000 { 24001 int i; 24002 24003 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) { 24004 verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n", 24005 div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000)); 24006 verbose(env, "stack depth "); 24007 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 24008 u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 24009 24010 verbose(env, "%d", depth); 24011 if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) 24012 verbose(env, "+"); 24013 } 24014 verbose(env, "\n"); 24015 } 24016 verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d " 24017 "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n", 24018 env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS, 24019 env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states, 24020 env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk); 24021 } 24022 24023 int bpf_prog_ctx_arg_info_init(struct bpf_prog *prog, 24024 const struct bpf_ctx_arg_aux *info, u32 cnt) 24025 { 24026 prog->aux->ctx_arg_info = kmemdup_array(info, cnt, sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 24027 prog->aux->ctx_arg_info_size = cnt; 24028 24029 return prog->aux->ctx_arg_info ? 0 : -ENOMEM; 24030 } 24031 24032 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 24033 { 24034 const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto; 24035 const struct bpf_struct_ops_desc *st_ops_desc; 24036 const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops; 24037 const struct btf_member *member; 24038 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 24039 bool has_refcounted_arg = false; 24040 u32 btf_id, member_idx, member_off; 24041 struct btf *btf; 24042 const char *mname; 24043 int i, err; 24044 24045 if (!prog->gpl_compatible) { 24046 verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n"); 24047 return -EINVAL; 24048 } 24049 24050 if (!prog->aux->attach_btf_id) 24051 return -ENOTSUPP; 24052 24053 btf = prog->aux->attach_btf; 24054 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 24055 /* Make sure st_ops is valid through the lifetime of env */ 24056 env->attach_btf_mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 24057 if (!env->attach_btf_mod) { 24058 verbose(env, "struct_ops module %s is not found\n", 24059 btf_get_name(btf)); 24060 return -ENOTSUPP; 24061 } 24062 } 24063 24064 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 24065 st_ops_desc = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf, btf_id); 24066 if (!st_ops_desc) { 24067 verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n", 24068 btf_id); 24069 return -ENOTSUPP; 24070 } 24071 st_ops = st_ops_desc->st_ops; 24072 24073 t = st_ops_desc->type; 24074 member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type; 24075 if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) { 24076 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n", 24077 member_idx, st_ops->name); 24078 return -EINVAL; 24079 } 24080 24081 member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx]; 24082 mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, member->name_off); 24083 func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf, member->type, 24084 NULL); 24085 if (!func_proto) { 24086 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n", 24087 mname, member_idx, st_ops->name); 24088 return -EINVAL; 24089 } 24090 24091 member_off = __btf_member_bit_offset(t, member) / 8; 24092 err = bpf_struct_ops_supported(st_ops, member_off); 24093 if (err) { 24094 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", 24095 mname, st_ops->name); 24096 return err; 24097 } 24098 24099 if (st_ops->check_member) { 24100 err = st_ops->check_member(t, member, prog); 24101 24102 if (err) { 24103 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", 24104 mname, st_ops->name); 24105 return err; 24106 } 24107 } 24108 24109 if (prog->aux->priv_stack_requested && !bpf_jit_supports_private_stack()) { 24110 verbose(env, "Private stack not supported by jit\n"); 24111 return -EACCES; 24112 } 24113 24114 for (i = 0; i < st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].cnt; i++) { 24115 if (st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].info->refcounted) { 24116 has_refcounted_arg = true; 24117 break; 24118 } 24119 } 24120 24121 /* Tail call is not allowed for programs with refcounted arguments since we 24122 * cannot guarantee that valid refcounted kptrs will be passed to the callee. 24123 */ 24124 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 24125 if (has_refcounted_arg && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 24126 verbose(env, "program with __ref argument cannot tail call\n"); 24127 return -EINVAL; 24128 } 24129 } 24130 24131 prog->aux->st_ops = st_ops; 24132 prog->aux->attach_st_ops_member_off = member_off; 24133 24134 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto; 24135 prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname; 24136 env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops; 24137 24138 return bpf_prog_ctx_arg_info_init(prog, st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].info, 24139 st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].cnt); 24140 } 24141 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" 24142 24143 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name) 24144 { 24145 if (within_error_injection_list(addr) || 24146 !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) 24147 return 0; 24148 24149 return -EINVAL; 24150 } 24151 24152 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on 24153 * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list 24154 */ 24155 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 24156 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context. 24157 * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view. 24158 */ 24159 BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio) 24160 #ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_PAGE_ALLOC 24161 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page) 24162 #endif 24163 #ifdef CONFIG_FAILSLAB 24164 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab) 24165 #endif 24166 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 24167 24168 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id) 24169 { 24170 return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); 24171 } 24172 24173 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 24174 const struct bpf_prog *prog, 24175 const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, 24176 u32 btf_id, 24177 struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info) 24178 { 24179 bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT; 24180 bool prog_tracing = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING; 24181 char trace_symbol[KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN]; 24182 const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_"; 24183 struct bpf_raw_event_map *btp; 24184 int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i; 24185 const struct btf_type *t; 24186 bool conservative = true; 24187 const char *tname, *fname; 24188 struct btf *btf; 24189 long addr = 0; 24190 struct module *mod = NULL; 24191 24192 if (!btf_id) { 24193 bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n"); 24194 return -EINVAL; 24195 } 24196 btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf; 24197 if (!btf) { 24198 bpf_log(log, 24199 "FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n"); 24200 return -EINVAL; 24201 } 24202 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id); 24203 if (!t) { 24204 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id); 24205 return -EINVAL; 24206 } 24207 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 24208 if (!tname) { 24209 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id); 24210 return -EINVAL; 24211 } 24212 if (tgt_prog) { 24213 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux; 24214 bool tgt_changes_pkt_data; 24215 bool tgt_might_sleep; 24216 24217 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) && 24218 !bpf_prog_dev_bound_match(prog, tgt_prog)) { 24219 bpf_log(log, "Target program bound device mismatch"); 24220 return -EINVAL; 24221 } 24222 24223 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) 24224 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) { 24225 subprog = i; 24226 break; 24227 } 24228 if (subprog == -1) { 24229 bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname); 24230 return -EINVAL; 24231 } 24232 if (aux->func && aux->func[subprog]->aux->exception_cb) { 24233 bpf_log(log, 24234 "%s programs cannot attach to exception callback\n", 24235 prog_extension ? "Extension" : "FENTRY/FEXIT"); 24236 return -EINVAL; 24237 } 24238 conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable; 24239 if (prog_extension) { 24240 if (conservative) { 24241 bpf_log(log, 24242 "Cannot replace static functions\n"); 24243 return -EINVAL; 24244 } 24245 if (!prog->jit_requested) { 24246 bpf_log(log, 24247 "Extension programs should be JITed\n"); 24248 return -EINVAL; 24249 } 24250 tgt_changes_pkt_data = aux->func 24251 ? aux->func[subprog]->aux->changes_pkt_data 24252 : aux->changes_pkt_data; 24253 if (prog->aux->changes_pkt_data && !tgt_changes_pkt_data) { 24254 bpf_log(log, 24255 "Extension program changes packet data, while original does not\n"); 24256 return -EINVAL; 24257 } 24258 24259 tgt_might_sleep = aux->func 24260 ? aux->func[subprog]->aux->might_sleep 24261 : aux->might_sleep; 24262 if (prog->aux->might_sleep && !tgt_might_sleep) { 24263 bpf_log(log, 24264 "Extension program may sleep, while original does not\n"); 24265 return -EINVAL; 24266 } 24267 } 24268 if (!tgt_prog->jited) { 24269 bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n"); 24270 return -EINVAL; 24271 } 24272 if (prog_tracing) { 24273 if (aux->attach_tracing_prog) { 24274 /* 24275 * Target program is an fentry/fexit which is already attached 24276 * to another tracing program. More levels of nesting 24277 * attachment are not allowed. 24278 */ 24279 bpf_log(log, "Cannot nest tracing program attach more than once\n"); 24280 return -EINVAL; 24281 } 24282 } else if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) { 24283 /* 24284 * To avoid potential call chain cycles, prevent attaching of a 24285 * program extension to another extension. It's ok to attach 24286 * fentry/fexit to extension program. 24287 */ 24288 bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n"); 24289 return -EINVAL; 24290 } 24291 if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 24292 prog_extension && 24293 (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY || 24294 tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) { 24295 /* Program extensions can extend all program types 24296 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following. 24297 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance 24298 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program 24299 * type. When extension program is replacing XDP function 24300 * it is necessary to allow performance analysis of all 24301 * functions. Both original XDP program and its program 24302 * extension. Hence attaching fentry/fexit to 24303 * BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is allowed. If extending of 24304 * fentry/fexit was allowed it would be possible to create 24305 * long call chain fentry->extension->fentry->extension 24306 * beyond reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry 24307 * is not allowed. 24308 */ 24309 bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n"); 24310 return -EINVAL; 24311 } 24312 } else { 24313 if (prog_extension) { 24314 bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n"); 24315 return -EINVAL; 24316 } 24317 } 24318 24319 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 24320 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 24321 if (tgt_prog) { 24322 bpf_log(log, 24323 "Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n"); 24324 return -EINVAL; 24325 } 24326 if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) { 24327 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n", 24328 btf_id); 24329 return -EINVAL; 24330 } 24331 if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) { 24332 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n", 24333 btf_id, tname); 24334 return -EINVAL; 24335 } 24336 tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1; 24337 24338 /* The func_proto of "btf_trace_##tname" is generated from typedef without argument 24339 * names. Thus using bpf_raw_event_map to get argument names. 24340 */ 24341 btp = bpf_get_raw_tracepoint(tname); 24342 if (!btp) 24343 return -EINVAL; 24344 fname = kallsyms_lookup((unsigned long)btp->bpf_func, NULL, NULL, NULL, 24345 trace_symbol); 24346 bpf_put_raw_tracepoint(btp); 24347 24348 if (fname) 24349 ret = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, fname, BTF_KIND_FUNC); 24350 24351 if (!fname || ret < 0) { 24352 bpf_log(log, "Cannot find btf of tracepoint template, fall back to %s%s.\n", 24353 prefix, tname); 24354 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 24355 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 24356 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 24357 return -EINVAL; 24358 } else { 24359 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, ret); 24360 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) 24361 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 24362 return -EINVAL; 24363 } 24364 24365 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 24366 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 24367 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 24368 return -EINVAL; 24369 24370 break; 24371 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 24372 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 24373 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 24374 btf_id); 24375 return -EINVAL; 24376 } 24377 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 24378 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 24379 return -EINVAL; 24380 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 24381 if (ret) 24382 return ret; 24383 break; 24384 default: 24385 if (!prog_extension) 24386 return -EINVAL; 24387 fallthrough; 24388 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 24389 case BPF_LSM_MAC: 24390 case BPF_LSM_CGROUP: 24391 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 24392 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 24393 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 24394 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 24395 btf_id); 24396 return -EINVAL; 24397 } 24398 if (prog_extension && 24399 btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t)) 24400 return -EINVAL; 24401 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 24402 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 24403 return -EINVAL; 24404 24405 if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) && 24406 (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type || 24407 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type)) 24408 return -EINVAL; 24409 24410 if (tgt_prog && conservative) 24411 t = NULL; 24412 24413 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 24414 if (ret < 0) 24415 return ret; 24416 24417 if (tgt_prog) { 24418 if (subprog == 0) 24419 addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func; 24420 else 24421 addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func; 24422 } else { 24423 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 24424 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 24425 if (mod) 24426 addr = find_kallsyms_symbol_value(mod, tname); 24427 else 24428 addr = 0; 24429 } else { 24430 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname); 24431 } 24432 if (!addr) { 24433 module_put(mod); 24434 bpf_log(log, 24435 "The address of function %s cannot be found\n", 24436 tname); 24437 return -ENOENT; 24438 } 24439 } 24440 24441 if (prog->sleepable) { 24442 ret = -EINVAL; 24443 switch (prog->type) { 24444 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 24445 24446 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are 24447 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. 24448 */ 24449 if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) && 24450 within_error_injection_list(addr)) 24451 ret = 0; 24452 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can also be sleepable if they are 24453 * in the fmodret id set with the KF_SLEEPABLE flag. 24454 */ 24455 else { 24456 u32 *flags = btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id, 24457 prog); 24458 24459 if (flags && (*flags & KF_SLEEPABLE)) 24460 ret = 0; 24461 } 24462 break; 24463 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 24464 /* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs. 24465 * Only some of them are sleepable. 24466 */ 24467 if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id)) 24468 ret = 0; 24469 break; 24470 default: 24471 break; 24472 } 24473 if (ret) { 24474 module_put(mod); 24475 bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname); 24476 return ret; 24477 } 24478 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 24479 if (tgt_prog) { 24480 module_put(mod); 24481 bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n"); 24482 return -EINVAL; 24483 } 24484 ret = -EINVAL; 24485 if (btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id, prog) || 24486 !check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname)) 24487 ret = 0; 24488 if (ret) { 24489 module_put(mod); 24490 bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname); 24491 return ret; 24492 } 24493 } 24494 24495 break; 24496 } 24497 tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr; 24498 tgt_info->tgt_name = tname; 24499 tgt_info->tgt_type = t; 24500 tgt_info->tgt_mod = mod; 24501 return 0; 24502 } 24503 24504 BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny) 24505 BTF_ID_UNUSED 24506 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP 24507 BTF_ID(func, ___migrate_enable) 24508 BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable) 24509 BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable) 24510 #endif 24511 #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU 24512 BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict) 24513 #endif 24514 #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) || defined(CONFIG_TRACE_PREEMPT_TOGGLE) 24515 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_add) 24516 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_sub) 24517 #endif 24518 #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU 24519 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_lock) 24520 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_unlock) 24521 #endif 24522 BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny) 24523 24524 /* fexit and fmod_ret can't be used to attach to __noreturn functions. 24525 * Currently, we must manually list all __noreturn functions here. Once a more 24526 * robust solution is implemented, this workaround can be removed. 24527 */ 24528 BTF_SET_START(noreturn_deny) 24529 #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION 24530 BTF_ID(func, __ia32_sys_exit) 24531 BTF_ID(func, __ia32_sys_exit_group) 24532 #endif 24533 #ifdef CONFIG_KUNIT 24534 BTF_ID(func, __kunit_abort) 24535 BTF_ID(func, kunit_try_catch_throw) 24536 #endif 24537 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES 24538 BTF_ID(func, __module_put_and_kthread_exit) 24539 #endif 24540 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 24541 BTF_ID(func, __x64_sys_exit) 24542 BTF_ID(func, __x64_sys_exit_group) 24543 #endif 24544 BTF_ID(func, do_exit) 24545 BTF_ID(func, do_group_exit) 24546 BTF_ID(func, kthread_complete_and_exit) 24547 BTF_ID(func, kthread_exit) 24548 BTF_ID(func, make_task_dead) 24549 BTF_SET_END(noreturn_deny) 24550 24551 static bool can_be_sleepable(struct bpf_prog *prog) 24552 { 24553 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 24554 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 24555 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 24556 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 24557 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 24558 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 24559 return true; 24560 default: 24561 return false; 24562 } 24563 } 24564 return prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM || 24565 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE /* only for uprobes */ || 24566 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS; 24567 } 24568 24569 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 24570 { 24571 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 24572 struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog; 24573 struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {}; 24574 u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 24575 struct bpf_trampoline *tr; 24576 int ret; 24577 u64 key; 24578 24579 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL) { 24580 if (prog->sleepable) 24581 /* attach_btf_id checked to be zero already */ 24582 return 0; 24583 verbose(env, "Syscall programs can only be sleepable\n"); 24584 return -EINVAL; 24585 } 24586 24587 if (prog->sleepable && !can_be_sleepable(prog)) { 24588 verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret, lsm, iter, uprobe, and struct_ops programs can be sleepable\n"); 24589 return -EINVAL; 24590 } 24591 24592 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) 24593 return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env); 24594 24595 if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 24596 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 24597 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 24598 return 0; 24599 24600 ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info); 24601 if (ret) 24602 return ret; 24603 24604 if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 24605 /* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to 24606 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the 24607 * verification 24608 */ 24609 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type]; 24610 prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 24611 } 24612 24613 /* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */ 24614 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type; 24615 prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name; 24616 prog->aux->mod = tgt_info.tgt_mod; 24617 24618 if (tgt_prog) { 24619 prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type; 24620 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 24621 } 24622 24623 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) { 24624 prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true; 24625 return 0; 24626 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) { 24627 return bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog); 24628 } 24629 24630 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { 24631 ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog); 24632 if (ret < 0) 24633 return ret; 24634 } else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 24635 btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) { 24636 verbose(env, "Attaching tracing programs to function '%s' is rejected.\n", 24637 tgt_info.tgt_name); 24638 return -EINVAL; 24639 } else if ((prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || 24640 prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) && 24641 btf_id_set_contains(&noreturn_deny, btf_id)) { 24642 verbose(env, "Attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn function '%s' is rejected.\n", 24643 tgt_info.tgt_name); 24644 return -EINVAL; 24645 } 24646 24647 key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id); 24648 tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info); 24649 if (!tr) 24650 return -ENOMEM; 24651 24652 if (tgt_prog && tgt_prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) 24653 tr->flags = BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX; 24654 24655 prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr; 24656 return 0; 24657 } 24658 24659 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) 24660 { 24661 if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { 24662 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 24663 if (!btf_vmlinux) 24664 btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); 24665 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 24666 } 24667 return btf_vmlinux; 24668 } 24669 24670 /* 24671 * The add_fd_from_fd_array() is executed only if fd_array_cnt is non-zero. In 24672 * this case expect that every file descriptor in the array is either a map or 24673 * a BTF. Everything else is considered to be trash. 24674 */ 24675 static int add_fd_from_fd_array(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int fd) 24676 { 24677 struct bpf_map *map; 24678 struct btf *btf; 24679 CLASS(fd, f)(fd); 24680 int err; 24681 24682 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 24683 if (!IS_ERR(map)) { 24684 err = __add_used_map(env, map); 24685 if (err < 0) 24686 return err; 24687 return 0; 24688 } 24689 24690 btf = __btf_get_by_fd(f); 24691 if (!IS_ERR(btf)) { 24692 err = __add_used_btf(env, btf); 24693 if (err < 0) 24694 return err; 24695 return 0; 24696 } 24697 24698 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map or btf\n", fd); 24699 return PTR_ERR(map); 24700 } 24701 24702 static int process_fd_array(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) 24703 { 24704 size_t size = sizeof(int); 24705 int ret; 24706 int fd; 24707 u32 i; 24708 24709 env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel); 24710 24711 /* 24712 * The only difference between old (no fd_array_cnt is given) and new 24713 * APIs is that in the latter case the fd_array is expected to be 24714 * continuous and is scanned for map fds right away 24715 */ 24716 if (!attr->fd_array_cnt) 24717 return 0; 24718 24719 /* Check for integer overflow */ 24720 if (attr->fd_array_cnt >= (U32_MAX / size)) { 24721 verbose(env, "fd_array_cnt is too big (%u)\n", attr->fd_array_cnt); 24722 return -EINVAL; 24723 } 24724 24725 for (i = 0; i < attr->fd_array_cnt; i++) { 24726 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array, i * size, size)) 24727 return -EFAULT; 24728 24729 ret = add_fd_from_fd_array(env, fd); 24730 if (ret) 24731 return ret; 24732 } 24733 24734 return 0; 24735 } 24736 24737 /* Each field is a register bitmask */ 24738 struct insn_live_regs { 24739 u16 use; /* registers read by instruction */ 24740 u16 def; /* registers written by instruction */ 24741 u16 in; /* registers that may be alive before instruction */ 24742 u16 out; /* registers that may be alive after instruction */ 24743 }; 24744 24745 /* Bitmask with 1s for all caller saved registers */ 24746 #define ALL_CALLER_SAVED_REGS ((1u << CALLER_SAVED_REGS) - 1) 24747 24748 /* Compute info->{use,def} fields for the instruction */ 24749 static void compute_insn_live_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 24750 struct bpf_insn *insn, 24751 struct insn_live_regs *info) 24752 { 24753 struct call_summary cs; 24754 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 24755 u8 code = BPF_OP(insn->code); 24756 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 24757 u16 src = BIT(insn->src_reg); 24758 u16 dst = BIT(insn->dst_reg); 24759 u16 r0 = BIT(0); 24760 u16 def = 0; 24761 u16 use = 0xffff; 24762 24763 switch (class) { 24764 case BPF_LD: 24765 switch (mode) { 24766 case BPF_IMM: 24767 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) { 24768 def = dst; 24769 use = 0; 24770 } 24771 break; 24772 case BPF_LD | BPF_ABS: 24773 case BPF_LD | BPF_IND: 24774 /* stick with defaults */ 24775 break; 24776 } 24777 break; 24778 case BPF_LDX: 24779 switch (mode) { 24780 case BPF_MEM: 24781 case BPF_MEMSX: 24782 def = dst; 24783 use = src; 24784 break; 24785 } 24786 break; 24787 case BPF_ST: 24788 switch (mode) { 24789 case BPF_MEM: 24790 def = 0; 24791 use = dst; 24792 break; 24793 } 24794 break; 24795 case BPF_STX: 24796 switch (mode) { 24797 case BPF_MEM: 24798 def = 0; 24799 use = dst | src; 24800 break; 24801 case BPF_ATOMIC: 24802 switch (insn->imm) { 24803 case BPF_CMPXCHG: 24804 use = r0 | dst | src; 24805 def = r0; 24806 break; 24807 case BPF_LOAD_ACQ: 24808 def = dst; 24809 use = src; 24810 break; 24811 case BPF_STORE_REL: 24812 def = 0; 24813 use = dst | src; 24814 break; 24815 default: 24816 use = dst | src; 24817 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) 24818 def = src; 24819 else 24820 def = 0; 24821 } 24822 break; 24823 } 24824 break; 24825 case BPF_ALU: 24826 case BPF_ALU64: 24827 switch (code) { 24828 case BPF_END: 24829 use = dst; 24830 def = dst; 24831 break; 24832 case BPF_MOV: 24833 def = dst; 24834 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) 24835 use = 0; 24836 else 24837 use = src; 24838 break; 24839 default: 24840 def = dst; 24841 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) 24842 use = dst; 24843 else 24844 use = dst | src; 24845 } 24846 break; 24847 case BPF_JMP: 24848 case BPF_JMP32: 24849 switch (code) { 24850 case BPF_JA: 24851 case BPF_JCOND: 24852 def = 0; 24853 use = 0; 24854 break; 24855 case BPF_EXIT: 24856 def = 0; 24857 use = r0; 24858 break; 24859 case BPF_CALL: 24860 def = ALL_CALLER_SAVED_REGS; 24861 use = def & ~BIT(BPF_REG_0); 24862 if (get_call_summary(env, insn, &cs)) 24863 use = GENMASK(cs.num_params, 1); 24864 break; 24865 default: 24866 def = 0; 24867 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) 24868 use = dst; 24869 else 24870 use = dst | src; 24871 } 24872 break; 24873 } 24874 24875 info->def = def; 24876 info->use = use; 24877 } 24878 24879 /* Compute may-live registers after each instruction in the program. 24880 * The register is live after the instruction I if it is read by some 24881 * instruction S following I during program execution and is not 24882 * overwritten between I and S. 24883 * 24884 * Store result in env->insn_aux_data[i].live_regs. 24885 */ 24886 static int compute_live_registers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 24887 { 24888 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = env->insn_aux_data; 24889 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 24890 struct insn_live_regs *state; 24891 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 24892 int err = 0, i, j; 24893 bool changed; 24894 24895 /* Use the following algorithm: 24896 * - define the following: 24897 * - I.use : a set of all registers read by instruction I; 24898 * - I.def : a set of all registers written by instruction I; 24899 * - I.in : a set of all registers that may be alive before I execution; 24900 * - I.out : a set of all registers that may be alive after I execution; 24901 * - insn_successors(I): a set of instructions S that might immediately 24902 * follow I for some program execution; 24903 * - associate separate empty sets 'I.in' and 'I.out' with each instruction; 24904 * - visit each instruction in a postorder and update 24905 * state[i].in, state[i].out as follows: 24906 * 24907 * state[i].out = U [state[s].in for S in insn_successors(i)] 24908 * state[i].in = (state[i].out / state[i].def) U state[i].use 24909 * 24910 * (where U stands for set union, / stands for set difference) 24911 * - repeat the computation while {in,out} fields changes for 24912 * any instruction. 24913 */ 24914 state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(*state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 24915 if (!state) { 24916 err = -ENOMEM; 24917 goto out; 24918 } 24919 24920 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; ++i) 24921 compute_insn_live_regs(env, &insns[i], &state[i]); 24922 24923 changed = true; 24924 while (changed) { 24925 changed = false; 24926 for (i = 0; i < env->cfg.cur_postorder; ++i) { 24927 int insn_idx = env->cfg.insn_postorder[i]; 24928 struct insn_live_regs *live = &state[insn_idx]; 24929 struct bpf_iarray *succ; 24930 u16 new_out = 0; 24931 u16 new_in = 0; 24932 24933 succ = bpf_insn_successors(env, insn_idx); 24934 for (int s = 0; s < succ->cnt; ++s) 24935 new_out |= state[succ->items[s]].in; 24936 new_in = (new_out & ~live->def) | live->use; 24937 if (new_out != live->out || new_in != live->in) { 24938 live->in = new_in; 24939 live->out = new_out; 24940 changed = true; 24941 } 24942 } 24943 } 24944 24945 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; ++i) 24946 insn_aux[i].live_regs_before = state[i].in; 24947 24948 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 24949 verbose(env, "Live regs before insn:\n"); 24950 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; ++i) { 24951 if (env->insn_aux_data[i].scc) 24952 verbose(env, "%3d ", env->insn_aux_data[i].scc); 24953 else 24954 verbose(env, " "); 24955 verbose(env, "%3d: ", i); 24956 for (j = BPF_REG_0; j < BPF_REG_10; ++j) 24957 if (insn_aux[i].live_regs_before & BIT(j)) 24958 verbose(env, "%d", j); 24959 else 24960 verbose(env, "."); 24961 verbose(env, " "); 24962 verbose_insn(env, &insns[i]); 24963 if (bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[i])) 24964 i++; 24965 } 24966 } 24967 24968 out: 24969 kvfree(state); 24970 return err; 24971 } 24972 24973 /* 24974 * Compute strongly connected components (SCCs) on the CFG. 24975 * Assign an SCC number to each instruction, recorded in env->insn_aux[*].scc. 24976 * If instruction is a sole member of its SCC and there are no self edges, 24977 * assign it SCC number of zero. 24978 * Uses a non-recursive adaptation of Tarjan's algorithm for SCC computation. 24979 */ 24980 static int compute_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 24981 { 24982 const u32 NOT_ON_STACK = U32_MAX; 24983 24984 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 24985 const u32 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 24986 int stack_sz, dfs_sz, err = 0; 24987 u32 *stack, *pre, *low, *dfs; 24988 u32 i, j, t, w; 24989 u32 next_preorder_num; 24990 u32 next_scc_id; 24991 bool assign_scc; 24992 struct bpf_iarray *succ; 24993 24994 next_preorder_num = 1; 24995 next_scc_id = 1; 24996 /* 24997 * - 'stack' accumulates vertices in DFS order, see invariant comment below; 24998 * - 'pre[t] == p' => preorder number of vertex 't' is 'p'; 24999 * - 'low[t] == n' => smallest preorder number of the vertex reachable from 't' is 'n'; 25000 * - 'dfs' DFS traversal stack, used to emulate explicit recursion. 25001 */ 25002 stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25003 pre = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25004 low = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25005 dfs = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(*dfs), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25006 if (!stack || !pre || !low || !dfs) { 25007 err = -ENOMEM; 25008 goto exit; 25009 } 25010 /* 25011 * References: 25012 * [1] R. Tarjan "Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms" 25013 * [2] D. J. Pearce "A Space-Efficient Algorithm for Finding Strongly Connected Components" 25014 * 25015 * The algorithm maintains the following invariant: 25016 * - suppose there is a path 'u' ~> 'v', such that 'pre[v] < pre[u]'; 25017 * - then, vertex 'u' remains on stack while vertex 'v' is on stack. 25018 * 25019 * Consequently: 25020 * - If 'low[v] < pre[v]', there is a path from 'v' to some vertex 'u', 25021 * such that 'pre[u] == low[v]'; vertex 'u' is currently on the stack, 25022 * and thus there is an SCC (loop) containing both 'u' and 'v'. 25023 * - If 'low[v] == pre[v]', loops containing 'v' have been explored, 25024 * and 'v' can be considered the root of some SCC. 25025 * 25026 * Here is a pseudo-code for an explicitly recursive version of the algorithm: 25027 * 25028 * NOT_ON_STACK = insn_cnt + 1 25029 * pre = [0] * insn_cnt 25030 * low = [0] * insn_cnt 25031 * scc = [0] * insn_cnt 25032 * stack = [] 25033 * 25034 * next_preorder_num = 1 25035 * next_scc_id = 1 25036 * 25037 * def recur(w): 25038 * nonlocal next_preorder_num 25039 * nonlocal next_scc_id 25040 * 25041 * pre[w] = next_preorder_num 25042 * low[w] = next_preorder_num 25043 * next_preorder_num += 1 25044 * stack.append(w) 25045 * for s in successors(w): 25046 * # Note: for classic algorithm the block below should look as: 25047 * # 25048 * # if pre[s] == 0: 25049 * # recur(s) 25050 * # low[w] = min(low[w], low[s]) 25051 * # elif low[s] != NOT_ON_STACK: 25052 * # low[w] = min(low[w], pre[s]) 25053 * # 25054 * # But replacing both 'min' instructions with 'low[w] = min(low[w], low[s])' 25055 * # does not break the invariant and makes itartive version of the algorithm 25056 * # simpler. See 'Algorithm #3' from [2]. 25057 * 25058 * # 's' not yet visited 25059 * if pre[s] == 0: 25060 * recur(s) 25061 * # if 's' is on stack, pick lowest reachable preorder number from it; 25062 * # if 's' is not on stack 'low[s] == NOT_ON_STACK > low[w]', 25063 * # so 'min' would be a noop. 25064 * low[w] = min(low[w], low[s]) 25065 * 25066 * if low[w] == pre[w]: 25067 * # 'w' is the root of an SCC, pop all vertices 25068 * # below 'w' on stack and assign same SCC to them. 25069 * while True: 25070 * t = stack.pop() 25071 * low[t] = NOT_ON_STACK 25072 * scc[t] = next_scc_id 25073 * if t == w: 25074 * break 25075 * next_scc_id += 1 25076 * 25077 * for i in range(0, insn_cnt): 25078 * if pre[i] == 0: 25079 * recur(i) 25080 * 25081 * Below implementation replaces explicit recursion with array 'dfs'. 25082 */ 25083 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 25084 if (pre[i]) 25085 continue; 25086 stack_sz = 0; 25087 dfs_sz = 1; 25088 dfs[0] = i; 25089 dfs_continue: 25090 while (dfs_sz) { 25091 w = dfs[dfs_sz - 1]; 25092 if (pre[w] == 0) { 25093 low[w] = next_preorder_num; 25094 pre[w] = next_preorder_num; 25095 next_preorder_num++; 25096 stack[stack_sz++] = w; 25097 } 25098 /* Visit 'w' successors */ 25099 succ = bpf_insn_successors(env, w); 25100 for (j = 0; j < succ->cnt; ++j) { 25101 if (pre[succ->items[j]]) { 25102 low[w] = min(low[w], low[succ->items[j]]); 25103 } else { 25104 dfs[dfs_sz++] = succ->items[j]; 25105 goto dfs_continue; 25106 } 25107 } 25108 /* 25109 * Preserve the invariant: if some vertex above in the stack 25110 * is reachable from 'w', keep 'w' on the stack. 25111 */ 25112 if (low[w] < pre[w]) { 25113 dfs_sz--; 25114 goto dfs_continue; 25115 } 25116 /* 25117 * Assign SCC number only if component has two or more elements, 25118 * or if component has a self reference, or if instruction is a 25119 * callback calling function (implicit loop). 25120 */ 25121 assign_scc = stack[stack_sz - 1] != w; /* two or more elements? */ 25122 for (j = 0; j < succ->cnt; ++j) { /* self reference? */ 25123 if (succ->items[j] == w) { 25124 assign_scc = true; 25125 break; 25126 } 25127 } 25128 if (bpf_calls_callback(env, w)) /* implicit loop? */ 25129 assign_scc = true; 25130 /* Pop component elements from stack */ 25131 do { 25132 t = stack[--stack_sz]; 25133 low[t] = NOT_ON_STACK; 25134 if (assign_scc) 25135 aux[t].scc = next_scc_id; 25136 } while (t != w); 25137 if (assign_scc) 25138 next_scc_id++; 25139 dfs_sz--; 25140 } 25141 } 25142 env->scc_info = kvcalloc(next_scc_id, sizeof(*env->scc_info), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25143 if (!env->scc_info) { 25144 err = -ENOMEM; 25145 goto exit; 25146 } 25147 env->scc_cnt = next_scc_id; 25148 exit: 25149 kvfree(stack); 25150 kvfree(pre); 25151 kvfree(low); 25152 kvfree(dfs); 25153 return err; 25154 } 25155 25156 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u32 uattr_size) 25157 { 25158 u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); 25159 struct bpf_verifier_env *env; 25160 int i, len, ret = -EINVAL, err; 25161 u32 log_true_size; 25162 bool is_priv; 25163 25164 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(enum bpf_features); 25165 25166 /* no program is valid */ 25167 if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) 25168 return -EINVAL; 25169 25170 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, 25171 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called 25172 */ 25173 env = kvzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25174 if (!env) 25175 return -ENOMEM; 25176 25177 env->bt.env = env; 25178 25179 len = (*prog)->len; 25180 env->insn_aux_data = 25181 vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len)); 25182 ret = -ENOMEM; 25183 if (!env->insn_aux_data) 25184 goto err_free_env; 25185 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 25186 env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i; 25187 env->succ = iarray_realloc(NULL, 2); 25188 if (!env->succ) 25189 goto err_free_env; 25190 env->prog = *prog; 25191 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; 25192 25193 env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(env->prog->aux->token); 25194 env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(env->prog->aux->token); 25195 env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(env->prog->aux->token); 25196 env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(env->prog->aux->token); 25197 env->bpf_capable = is_priv = bpf_token_capable(env->prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF); 25198 25199 bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); 25200 25201 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ 25202 if (!is_priv) 25203 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 25204 25205 /* user could have requested verbose verifier output 25206 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace 25207 */ 25208 ret = bpf_vlog_init(&env->log, attr->log_level, 25209 (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf, 25210 attr->log_size); 25211 if (ret) 25212 goto err_unlock; 25213 25214 ret = process_fd_array(env, attr, uattr); 25215 if (ret) 25216 goto skip_full_check; 25217 25218 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 25219 25220 if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) { 25221 /* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */ 25222 verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n"); 25223 ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux); 25224 goto skip_full_check; 25225 } 25226 25227 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); 25228 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) 25229 env->strict_alignment = true; 25230 if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) 25231 env->strict_alignment = false; 25232 25233 if (is_priv) 25234 env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ; 25235 env->test_reg_invariants = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS; 25236 25237 env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env), 25238 sizeof(struct list_head), 25239 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25240 ret = -ENOMEM; 25241 if (!env->explored_states) 25242 goto skip_full_check; 25243 25244 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) 25245 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->explored_states[i]); 25246 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->free_list); 25247 25248 ret = check_btf_info_early(env, attr, uattr); 25249 if (ret < 0) 25250 goto skip_full_check; 25251 25252 ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env); 25253 if (ret < 0) 25254 goto skip_full_check; 25255 25256 ret = check_subprogs(env); 25257 if (ret < 0) 25258 goto skip_full_check; 25259 25260 ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr); 25261 if (ret < 0) 25262 goto skip_full_check; 25263 25264 ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env); 25265 if (ret < 0) 25266 goto skip_full_check; 25267 25268 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 25269 ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog); 25270 if (ret) 25271 goto skip_full_check; 25272 } 25273 25274 ret = check_cfg(env); 25275 if (ret < 0) 25276 goto skip_full_check; 25277 25278 ret = compute_postorder(env); 25279 if (ret < 0) 25280 goto skip_full_check; 25281 25282 ret = bpf_stack_liveness_init(env); 25283 if (ret) 25284 goto skip_full_check; 25285 25286 ret = check_attach_btf_id(env); 25287 if (ret) 25288 goto skip_full_check; 25289 25290 ret = compute_scc(env); 25291 if (ret < 0) 25292 goto skip_full_check; 25293 25294 ret = compute_live_registers(env); 25295 if (ret < 0) 25296 goto skip_full_check; 25297 25298 ret = mark_fastcall_patterns(env); 25299 if (ret < 0) 25300 goto skip_full_check; 25301 25302 ret = do_check_main(env); 25303 ret = ret ?: do_check_subprogs(env); 25304 25305 if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 25306 ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env); 25307 25308 skip_full_check: 25309 kvfree(env->explored_states); 25310 25311 /* might decrease stack depth, keep it before passes that 25312 * allocate additional slots. 25313 */ 25314 if (ret == 0) 25315 ret = remove_fastcall_spills_fills(env); 25316 25317 if (ret == 0) 25318 ret = check_max_stack_depth(env); 25319 25320 /* instruction rewrites happen after this point */ 25321 if (ret == 0) 25322 ret = optimize_bpf_loop(env); 25323 25324 if (is_priv) { 25325 if (ret == 0) 25326 opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env); 25327 if (ret == 0) 25328 ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env); 25329 if (ret == 0) 25330 ret = opt_remove_nops(env); 25331 } else { 25332 if (ret == 0) 25333 sanitize_dead_code(env); 25334 } 25335 25336 if (ret == 0) 25337 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ 25338 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); 25339 25340 if (ret == 0) 25341 ret = do_misc_fixups(env); 25342 25343 /* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched 25344 * insns could be handled correctly. 25345 */ 25346 if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 25347 ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr); 25348 env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret 25349 : false; 25350 } 25351 25352 if (ret == 0) 25353 ret = fixup_call_args(env); 25354 25355 env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time; 25356 print_verification_stats(env); 25357 env->prog->aux->verified_insns = env->insn_processed; 25358 25359 /* preserve original error even if log finalization is successful */ 25360 err = bpf_vlog_finalize(&env->log, &log_true_size); 25361 if (err) 25362 ret = err; 25363 25364 if (uattr_size >= offsetofend(union bpf_attr, log_true_size) && 25365 copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, offsetof(union bpf_attr, log_true_size), 25366 &log_true_size, sizeof(log_true_size))) { 25367 ret = -EFAULT; 25368 goto err_release_maps; 25369 } 25370 25371 if (ret) 25372 goto err_release_maps; 25373 25374 if (env->used_map_cnt) { 25375 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ 25376 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, 25377 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), 25378 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25379 25380 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { 25381 ret = -ENOMEM; 25382 goto err_release_maps; 25383 } 25384 25385 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, 25386 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); 25387 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 25388 } 25389 if (env->used_btf_cnt) { 25390 /* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */ 25391 env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt, 25392 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]), 25393 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25394 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) { 25395 ret = -ENOMEM; 25396 goto err_release_maps; 25397 } 25398 25399 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs, 25400 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt); 25401 env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt; 25402 } 25403 if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) { 25404 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic 25405 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions 25406 */ 25407 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); 25408 } 25409 25410 adjust_btf_func(env); 25411 25412 err_release_maps: 25413 if (ret) 25414 release_insn_arrays(env); 25415 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) 25416 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release 25417 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them. 25418 */ 25419 release_maps(env); 25420 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) 25421 release_btfs(env); 25422 25423 /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets 25424 for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning 25425 */ 25426 if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 25427 env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0; 25428 25429 *prog = env->prog; 25430 25431 module_put(env->attach_btf_mod); 25432 err_unlock: 25433 if (!is_priv) 25434 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 25435 clear_insn_aux_data(env, 0, env->prog->len); 25436 vfree(env->insn_aux_data); 25437 err_free_env: 25438 bpf_stack_liveness_free(env); 25439 kvfree(env->cfg.insn_postorder); 25440 kvfree(env->scc_info); 25441 kvfree(env->succ); 25442 kvfree(env->gotox_tmp_buf); 25443 kvfree(env); 25444 return ret; 25445 } 25446