1 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com 2 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook 3 * 4 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 5 * modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public 6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation. 7 * 8 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but 9 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 10 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU 11 * General Public License for more details. 12 */ 13 #include <linux/kernel.h> 14 #include <linux/types.h> 15 #include <linux/slab.h> 16 #include <linux/bpf.h> 17 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> 18 #include <linux/filter.h> 19 #include <net/netlink.h> 20 #include <linux/file.h> 21 #include <linux/vmalloc.h> 22 #include <linux/stringify.h> 23 24 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program 25 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. 26 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. 27 * 28 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. 29 * It rejects the following programs: 30 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns 31 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) 32 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) 33 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps 34 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. 35 * Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the 36 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of 37 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. 38 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k 39 * 40 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction 41 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. 42 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is 43 * copied to R1. 44 * 45 * All registers are 64-bit. 46 * R0 - return register 47 * R1-R5 argument passing registers 48 * R6-R9 callee saved registers 49 * R10 - frame pointer read-only 50 * 51 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context 52 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. 53 * 54 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: 55 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), 56 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), 57 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 58 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize 59 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. 60 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK 61 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). 62 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. 63 * 64 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which 65 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. 66 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) 67 * 68 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register 69 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK. These are three pointer 70 * types recognized by check_mem_access() function. 71 * 72 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' 73 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. 74 * 75 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against 76 * function argument constraints. 77 * 78 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. 79 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be 80 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as 81 * 'pointer to map element key' 82 * 83 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): 84 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, 85 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, 86 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 87 * 88 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' 89 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and 90 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside 91 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. 92 * 93 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: 94 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) 95 * { 96 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; 97 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; 98 * void *value; 99 * 100 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that 101 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on 102 * the stack of eBPF program. 103 * } 104 * 105 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: 106 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR 107 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK 108 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP 109 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), 110 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: 111 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, 112 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes 113 * 114 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, 115 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits 116 * and were initialized prior to this call. 117 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at 118 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets 119 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function 120 * returns ether pointer to map value or NULL. 121 * 122 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' 123 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to 124 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false 125 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). 126 * 127 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 128 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. 129 */ 130 131 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ 132 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { 133 /* verifer state is 'st' 134 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' 135 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' 136 */ 137 struct bpf_verifier_state st; 138 int insn_idx; 139 int prev_insn_idx; 140 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; 141 }; 142 143 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 131072 144 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024 145 146 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)0xeB9F + POISON_POINTER_DELTA) 147 148 struct bpf_call_arg_meta { 149 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 150 bool raw_mode; 151 bool pkt_access; 152 int regno; 153 int access_size; 154 }; 155 156 /* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing 157 * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars 158 */ 159 static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len; 160 static char *log_buf; 161 162 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); 163 164 /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier. 165 * verbose() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, so the user 166 * can figure out what's wrong with the program 167 */ 168 static __printf(1, 2) void verbose(const char *fmt, ...) 169 { 170 va_list args; 171 172 if (log_level == 0 || log_len >= log_size - 1) 173 return; 174 175 va_start(args, fmt); 176 log_len += vscnprintf(log_buf + log_len, log_size - log_len, fmt, args); 177 va_end(args); 178 } 179 180 static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 181 { 182 return type == PTR_TO_PACKET || 183 type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META; 184 } 185 186 /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */ 187 static const char * const reg_type_str[] = { 188 [NOT_INIT] = "?", 189 [SCALAR_VALUE] = "inv", 190 [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx", 191 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr", 192 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value", 193 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = "map_value_or_null", 194 [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp", 195 [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt", 196 [PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta", 197 [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", 198 }; 199 200 #define __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN(x) [BPF_FUNC_ ## x] = __stringify(bpf_ ## x) 201 static const char * const func_id_str[] = { 202 __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(__BPF_FUNC_STR_FN) 203 }; 204 #undef __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN 205 206 static const char *func_id_name(int id) 207 { 208 BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(func_id_str) != __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID); 209 210 if (id >= 0 && id < __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID && func_id_str[id]) 211 return func_id_str[id]; 212 else 213 return "unknown"; 214 } 215 216 static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 217 { 218 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 219 enum bpf_reg_type t; 220 int i; 221 222 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 223 reg = &state->regs[i]; 224 t = reg->type; 225 if (t == NOT_INIT) 226 continue; 227 verbose(" R%d=%s", i, reg_type_str[t]); 228 if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && 229 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 230 /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ 231 verbose("%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 232 } else { 233 verbose("(id=%d", reg->id); 234 if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) 235 verbose(",off=%d", reg->off); 236 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) 237 verbose(",r=%d", reg->range); 238 else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || 239 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 240 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) 241 verbose(",ks=%d,vs=%d", 242 reg->map_ptr->key_size, 243 reg->map_ptr->value_size); 244 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 245 /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but 246 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big 247 * for reg->off 248 */ 249 verbose(",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); 250 } else { 251 if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value && 252 reg->smin_value != S64_MIN) 253 verbose(",smin_value=%lld", 254 (long long)reg->smin_value); 255 if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value && 256 reg->smax_value != S64_MAX) 257 verbose(",smax_value=%lld", 258 (long long)reg->smax_value); 259 if (reg->umin_value != 0) 260 verbose(",umin_value=%llu", 261 (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value); 262 if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX) 263 verbose(",umax_value=%llu", 264 (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value); 265 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 266 char tn_buf[48]; 267 268 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 269 verbose(",var_off=%s", tn_buf); 270 } 271 } 272 verbose(")"); 273 } 274 } 275 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { 276 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_SPILL) 277 verbose(" fp%d=%s", -MAX_BPF_STACK + i, 278 reg_type_str[state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE].type]); 279 } 280 verbose("\n"); 281 } 282 283 static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = { 284 [BPF_LD] = "ld", 285 [BPF_LDX] = "ldx", 286 [BPF_ST] = "st", 287 [BPF_STX] = "stx", 288 [BPF_ALU] = "alu", 289 [BPF_JMP] = "jmp", 290 [BPF_RET] = "BUG", 291 [BPF_ALU64] = "alu64", 292 }; 293 294 static const char *const bpf_alu_string[16] = { 295 [BPF_ADD >> 4] = "+=", 296 [BPF_SUB >> 4] = "-=", 297 [BPF_MUL >> 4] = "*=", 298 [BPF_DIV >> 4] = "/=", 299 [BPF_OR >> 4] = "|=", 300 [BPF_AND >> 4] = "&=", 301 [BPF_LSH >> 4] = "<<=", 302 [BPF_RSH >> 4] = ">>=", 303 [BPF_NEG >> 4] = "neg", 304 [BPF_MOD >> 4] = "%=", 305 [BPF_XOR >> 4] = "^=", 306 [BPF_MOV >> 4] = "=", 307 [BPF_ARSH >> 4] = "s>>=", 308 [BPF_END >> 4] = "endian", 309 }; 310 311 static const char *const bpf_ldst_string[] = { 312 [BPF_W >> 3] = "u32", 313 [BPF_H >> 3] = "u16", 314 [BPF_B >> 3] = "u8", 315 [BPF_DW >> 3] = "u64", 316 }; 317 318 static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[16] = { 319 [BPF_JA >> 4] = "jmp", 320 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = "==", 321 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = ">", 322 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = "<", 323 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = ">=", 324 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = "<=", 325 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = "&", 326 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = "!=", 327 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = "s>", 328 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = "s<", 329 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = "s>=", 330 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = "s<=", 331 [BPF_CALL >> 4] = "call", 332 [BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit", 333 }; 334 335 static void print_bpf_end_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 336 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 337 { 338 verbose("(%02x) r%d = %s%d r%d\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg, 339 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_TO_BE ? "be" : "le", 340 insn->imm, insn->dst_reg); 341 } 342 343 static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 344 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 345 { 346 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 347 348 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 349 if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_END) { 350 if (class == BPF_ALU64) 351 verbose("BUG_alu64_%02x\n", insn->code); 352 else 353 print_bpf_end_insn(env, insn); 354 } else if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_NEG) { 355 verbose("(%02x) r%d = %s-r%d\n", 356 insn->code, insn->dst_reg, 357 class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", 358 insn->dst_reg); 359 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 360 verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n", 361 insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", 362 insn->dst_reg, 363 bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], 364 class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", 365 insn->src_reg); 366 } else { 367 verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n", 368 insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", 369 insn->dst_reg, 370 bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], 371 class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", 372 insn->imm); 373 } 374 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 375 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) 376 verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n", 377 insn->code, 378 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], 379 insn->dst_reg, 380 insn->off, insn->src_reg); 381 else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) 382 verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n", 383 insn->code, 384 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], 385 insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 386 insn->src_reg); 387 else 388 verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code); 389 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 390 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { 391 verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code); 392 return; 393 } 394 verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n", 395 insn->code, 396 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], 397 insn->dst_reg, 398 insn->off, insn->imm); 399 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 400 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { 401 verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code); 402 return; 403 } 404 verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n", 405 insn->code, insn->dst_reg, 406 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], 407 insn->src_reg, insn->off); 408 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 409 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) { 410 verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n", 411 insn->code, 412 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], 413 insn->imm); 414 } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) { 415 verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n", 416 insn->code, 417 bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], 418 insn->src_reg, insn->imm); 419 } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM && 420 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) { 421 /* At this point, we already made sure that the second 422 * part of the ldimm64 insn is accessible. 423 */ 424 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; 425 bool map_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD; 426 427 if (map_ptr && !env->allow_ptr_leaks) 428 imm = 0; 429 430 verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code, 431 insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm); 432 } else { 433 verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code); 434 return; 435 } 436 } else if (class == BPF_JMP) { 437 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 438 439 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 440 verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code, 441 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 442 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { 443 verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n", 444 insn->code, insn->off); 445 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) { 446 verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code); 447 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 448 verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n", 449 insn->code, insn->dst_reg, 450 bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], 451 insn->src_reg, insn->off); 452 } else { 453 verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n", 454 insn->code, insn->dst_reg, 455 bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], 456 insn->imm, insn->off); 457 } 458 } else { 459 verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]); 460 } 461 } 462 463 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx) 464 { 465 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 466 int insn_idx; 467 468 if (env->head == NULL) 469 return -1; 470 471 memcpy(&env->cur_state, &env->head->st, sizeof(env->cur_state)); 472 insn_idx = env->head->insn_idx; 473 if (prev_insn_idx) 474 *prev_insn_idx = env->head->prev_insn_idx; 475 elem = env->head->next; 476 kfree(env->head); 477 env->head = elem; 478 env->stack_size--; 479 return insn_idx; 480 } 481 482 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 483 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx) 484 { 485 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 486 487 elem = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 488 if (!elem) 489 goto err; 490 491 memcpy(&elem->st, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state)); 492 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 493 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 494 elem->next = env->head; 495 env->head = elem; 496 env->stack_size++; 497 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK) { 498 verbose("BPF program is too complex\n"); 499 goto err; 500 } 501 return &elem->st; 502 err: 503 /* pop all elements and return */ 504 while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0); 505 return NULL; 506 } 507 508 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 509 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { 510 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 511 }; 512 513 static void __mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 514 515 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as 516 * known to have the value @imm. 517 */ 518 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 519 { 520 reg->id = 0; 521 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); 522 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; 523 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; 524 reg->umin_value = imm; 525 reg->umax_value = imm; 526 } 527 528 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be 529 * used only on registers holding a pointer type. 530 */ 531 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 532 { 533 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 534 } 535 536 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 537 { 538 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 539 verbose("mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); 540 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 541 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 542 __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno); 543 return; 544 } 545 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); 546 } 547 548 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 549 { 550 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 551 } 552 553 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 554 { 555 return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || 556 reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; 557 } 558 559 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ 560 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 561 enum bpf_reg_type which) 562 { 563 /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. 564 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its 565 * origin. 566 */ 567 return reg->type == which && 568 reg->id == 0 && 569 reg->off == 0 && 570 tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 571 } 572 573 /* Attempts to improve min/max values based on var_off information */ 574 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 575 { 576 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 577 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, 578 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); 579 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 580 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, 581 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); 582 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); 583 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, 584 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); 585 } 586 587 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ 588 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 589 { 590 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 591 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 592 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 593 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 594 */ 595 if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) { 596 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 597 reg->umin_value); 598 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 599 reg->umax_value); 600 return; 601 } 602 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 603 * boundary, so we must be careful. 604 */ 605 if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) { 606 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 607 * is positive, hence safe. 608 */ 609 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 610 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 611 reg->umax_value); 612 } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) { 613 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 614 * is negative, hence safe. 615 */ 616 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 617 reg->umin_value); 618 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 619 } 620 } 621 622 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ 623 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 624 { 625 reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 626 tnum_range(reg->umin_value, 627 reg->umax_value)); 628 } 629 630 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ 631 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 632 { 633 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 634 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 635 reg->umin_value = 0; 636 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 637 } 638 639 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ 640 static void __mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 641 { 642 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 643 reg->id = 0; 644 reg->off = 0; 645 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 646 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 647 } 648 649 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 650 { 651 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 652 verbose("mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); 653 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 654 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 655 __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno); 656 return; 657 } 658 __mark_reg_unknown(regs + regno); 659 } 660 661 static void __mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 662 { 663 __mark_reg_unknown(reg); 664 reg->type = NOT_INIT; 665 } 666 667 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 668 { 669 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 670 verbose("mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); 671 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 672 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 673 __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno); 674 return; 675 } 676 __mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno); 677 } 678 679 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 680 { 681 int i; 682 683 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 684 mark_reg_not_init(regs, i); 685 regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 686 } 687 688 /* frame pointer */ 689 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; 690 mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_FP); 691 692 /* 1st arg to a function */ 693 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; 694 mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_1); 695 } 696 697 enum reg_arg_type { 698 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ 699 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ 700 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ 701 }; 702 703 static void mark_reg_read(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno) 704 { 705 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent = state->parent; 706 707 while (parent) { 708 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ 709 if (state->regs[regno].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 710 break; 711 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ 712 parent->regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_READ; 713 state = parent; 714 parent = state->parent; 715 } 716 } 717 718 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 719 enum reg_arg_type t) 720 { 721 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs; 722 723 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { 724 verbose("R%d is invalid\n", regno); 725 return -EINVAL; 726 } 727 728 if (t == SRC_OP) { 729 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ 730 if (regs[regno].type == NOT_INIT) { 731 verbose("R%d !read_ok\n", regno); 732 return -EACCES; 733 } 734 mark_reg_read(&env->cur_state, regno); 735 } else { 736 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ 737 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { 738 verbose("frame pointer is read only\n"); 739 return -EACCES; 740 } 741 regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 742 if (t == DST_OP) 743 mark_reg_unknown(regs, regno); 744 } 745 return 0; 746 } 747 748 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) 749 { 750 switch (type) { 751 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 752 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: 753 case PTR_TO_STACK: 754 case PTR_TO_CTX: 755 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 756 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 757 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 758 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 759 return true; 760 default: 761 return false; 762 } 763 } 764 765 /* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers, 766 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() 767 */ 768 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, 769 int size, int value_regno) 770 { 771 int i, spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 772 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, 773 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits 774 */ 775 776 if (value_regno >= 0 && 777 is_spillable_regtype(state->regs[value_regno].type)) { 778 779 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ 780 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 781 verbose("invalid size of register spill\n"); 782 return -EACCES; 783 } 784 785 /* save register state */ 786 state->spilled_regs[spi] = state->regs[value_regno]; 787 state->spilled_regs[spi].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 788 789 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 790 state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_SPILL; 791 } else { 792 /* regular write of data into stack */ 793 state->spilled_regs[spi] = (struct bpf_reg_state) {}; 794 795 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 796 state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_MISC; 797 } 798 return 0; 799 } 800 801 static void mark_stack_slot_read(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int slot) 802 { 803 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent = state->parent; 804 805 while (parent) { 806 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ 807 if (state->spilled_regs[slot].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 808 break; 809 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ 810 parent->spilled_regs[slot].live |= REG_LIVE_READ; 811 state = parent; 812 parent = state->parent; 813 } 814 } 815 816 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size, 817 int value_regno) 818 { 819 u8 *slot_type; 820 int i, spi; 821 822 slot_type = &state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off]; 823 824 if (slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) { 825 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 826 verbose("invalid size of register spill\n"); 827 return -EACCES; 828 } 829 for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 830 if (slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) { 831 verbose("corrupted spill memory\n"); 832 return -EACCES; 833 } 834 } 835 836 spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 837 838 if (value_regno >= 0) { 839 /* restore register state from stack */ 840 state->regs[value_regno] = state->spilled_regs[spi]; 841 mark_stack_slot_read(state, spi); 842 } 843 return 0; 844 } else { 845 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 846 if (slot_type[i] != STACK_MISC) { 847 verbose("invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 848 off, i, size); 849 return -EACCES; 850 } 851 } 852 if (value_regno >= 0) 853 /* have read misc data from the stack */ 854 mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno); 855 return 0; 856 } 857 } 858 859 /* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */ 860 static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, 861 int size) 862 { 863 struct bpf_map *map = env->cur_state.regs[regno].map_ptr; 864 865 if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > map->value_size) { 866 verbose("invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 867 map->value_size, off, size); 868 return -EACCES; 869 } 870 return 0; 871 } 872 873 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ 874 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 875 int off, int size) 876 { 877 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state; 878 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 879 int err; 880 881 /* We may have adjusted the register to this map value, so we 882 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off 883 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. 884 */ 885 if (log_level) 886 print_verifier_state(state); 887 /* The minimum value is only important with signed 888 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a 889 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our 890 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use 891 * will have a set floor within our range. 892 */ 893 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 894 verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 895 regno); 896 return -EACCES; 897 } 898 err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size); 899 if (err) { 900 verbose("R%d min value is outside of the array range\n", regno); 901 return err; 902 } 903 904 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be 905 * sure we won't do bad things. 906 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. 907 */ 908 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 909 verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n", 910 regno); 911 return -EACCES; 912 } 913 err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size); 914 if (err) 915 verbose("R%d max value is outside of the array range\n", regno); 916 return err; 917 } 918 919 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff 920 921 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 922 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 923 enum bpf_access_type t) 924 { 925 switch (env->prog->type) { 926 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: 927 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: 928 /* dst_input() and dst_output() can't write for now */ 929 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 930 return false; 931 /* fallthrough */ 932 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 933 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 934 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 935 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: 936 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: 937 if (meta) 938 return meta->pkt_access; 939 940 env->seen_direct_write = true; 941 return true; 942 default: 943 return false; 944 } 945 } 946 947 static int __check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 948 int off, int size) 949 { 950 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs; 951 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 952 953 if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || (u64)off + size > reg->range) { 954 verbose("invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", 955 off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range); 956 return -EACCES; 957 } 958 return 0; 959 } 960 961 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, 962 int size) 963 { 964 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs; 965 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 966 int err; 967 968 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any 969 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed 970 * offset. 971 */ 972 973 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough 974 * detail to prove they're safe. 975 */ 976 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 977 verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 978 regno); 979 return -EACCES; 980 } 981 err = __check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size); 982 if (err) { 983 verbose("R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); 984 return err; 985 } 986 return err; 987 } 988 989 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ 990 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, 991 enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type) 992 { 993 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { 994 .reg_type = *reg_type, 995 }; 996 997 /* for analyzer ctx accesses are already validated and converted */ 998 if (env->analyzer_ops) 999 return 0; 1000 1001 if (env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access && 1002 env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info)) { 1003 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a 1004 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole 1005 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower 1006 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size 1007 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other 1008 * type of narrower access. 1009 */ 1010 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; 1011 *reg_type = info.reg_type; 1012 1013 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ 1014 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) 1015 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; 1016 return 0; 1017 } 1018 1019 verbose("invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 1020 return -EACCES; 1021 } 1022 1023 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, 1024 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1025 { 1026 if (allow_ptr_leaks) 1027 return false; 1028 1029 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; 1030 } 1031 1032 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 1033 { 1034 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, &env->cur_state.regs[regno]); 1035 } 1036 1037 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1038 int off, int size, bool strict) 1039 { 1040 struct tnum reg_off; 1041 int ip_align; 1042 1043 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 1044 if (!strict || size == 1) 1045 return 0; 1046 1047 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling 1048 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of 1049 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms 1050 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get 1051 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate 1052 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an 1053 * unconditional IP align value of '2'. 1054 */ 1055 ip_align = 2; 1056 1057 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); 1058 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 1059 char tn_buf[48]; 1060 1061 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 1062 verbose("misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", 1063 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 1064 return -EACCES; 1065 } 1066 1067 return 0; 1068 } 1069 1070 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1071 const char *pointer_desc, 1072 int off, int size, bool strict) 1073 { 1074 struct tnum reg_off; 1075 1076 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 1077 if (!strict || size == 1) 1078 return 0; 1079 1080 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); 1081 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 1082 char tn_buf[48]; 1083 1084 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 1085 verbose("misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", 1086 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 1087 return -EACCES; 1088 } 1089 1090 return 0; 1091 } 1092 1093 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1094 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1095 int off, int size) 1096 { 1097 bool strict = env->strict_alignment; 1098 const char *pointer_desc = ""; 1099 1100 switch (reg->type) { 1101 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 1102 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 1103 /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits 1104 * right in front, treat it the very same way. 1105 */ 1106 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size, strict); 1107 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 1108 pointer_desc = "value "; 1109 break; 1110 case PTR_TO_CTX: 1111 pointer_desc = "context "; 1112 break; 1113 case PTR_TO_STACK: 1114 pointer_desc = "stack "; 1115 break; 1116 default: 1117 break; 1118 } 1119 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(reg, pointer_desc, off, size, strict); 1120 } 1121 1122 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) 1123 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory 1124 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory 1125 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory 1126 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory 1127 */ 1128 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, int off, 1129 int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, 1130 int value_regno) 1131 { 1132 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state; 1133 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 1134 int size, err = 0; 1135 1136 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); 1137 if (size < 0) 1138 return size; 1139 1140 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ 1141 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size); 1142 if (err) 1143 return err; 1144 1145 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ 1146 off += reg->off; 1147 1148 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 1149 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 1150 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 1151 verbose("R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); 1152 return -EACCES; 1153 } 1154 1155 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size); 1156 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 1157 mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno); 1158 1159 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 1160 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1161 1162 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 1163 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 1164 verbose("R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); 1165 return -EACCES; 1166 } 1167 /* ctx accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can 1168 * determine what type of data were returned. 1169 */ 1170 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 1171 char tn_buf[48]; 1172 1173 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 1174 verbose("variable ctx access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d", 1175 tn_buf, off, size); 1176 return -EACCES; 1177 } 1178 off += reg->var_off.value; 1179 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type); 1180 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 1181 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a 1182 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter 1183 * case, we know the offset is zero. 1184 */ 1185 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) 1186 mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno); 1187 else 1188 mark_reg_known_zero(state->regs, value_regno); 1189 state->regs[value_regno].id = 0; 1190 state->regs[value_regno].off = 0; 1191 state->regs[value_regno].range = 0; 1192 state->regs[value_regno].type = reg_type; 1193 } 1194 1195 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 1196 /* stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can 1197 * determine what type of data were returned. 1198 * See check_stack_read(). 1199 */ 1200 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 1201 char tn_buf[48]; 1202 1203 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 1204 verbose("variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d", 1205 tn_buf, off, size); 1206 return -EACCES; 1207 } 1208 off += reg->var_off.value; 1209 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { 1210 verbose("invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 1211 return -EACCES; 1212 } 1213 1214 if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off) 1215 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off; 1216 1217 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 1218 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && 1219 state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off] == STACK_SPILL && 1220 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 1221 verbose("attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); 1222 return -EACCES; 1223 } 1224 err = check_stack_write(state, off, size, value_regno); 1225 } else { 1226 err = check_stack_read(state, off, size, value_regno); 1227 } 1228 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { 1229 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { 1230 verbose("cannot write into packet\n"); 1231 return -EACCES; 1232 } 1233 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 1234 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 1235 verbose("R%d leaks addr into packet\n", value_regno); 1236 return -EACCES; 1237 } 1238 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size); 1239 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 1240 mark_reg_unknown(state->regs, value_regno); 1241 } else { 1242 verbose("R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", 1243 regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]); 1244 return -EACCES; 1245 } 1246 1247 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && 1248 state->regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 1249 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ 1250 state->regs[value_regno].var_off = tnum_cast( 1251 state->regs[value_regno].var_off, size); 1252 __update_reg_bounds(&state->regs[value_regno]); 1253 } 1254 return err; 1255 } 1256 1257 static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn) 1258 { 1259 int err; 1260 1261 if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) || 1262 insn->imm != 0) { 1263 verbose("BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n"); 1264 return -EINVAL; 1265 } 1266 1267 /* check src1 operand */ 1268 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 1269 if (err) 1270 return err; 1271 1272 /* check src2 operand */ 1273 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 1274 if (err) 1275 return err; 1276 1277 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 1278 verbose("R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); 1279 return -EACCES; 1280 } 1281 1282 /* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */ 1283 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 1284 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1); 1285 if (err) 1286 return err; 1287 1288 /* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */ 1289 return check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 1290 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1); 1291 } 1292 1293 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ 1294 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state reg) 1295 { 1296 return reg.type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg.var_off, 0); 1297 } 1298 1299 /* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size' 1300 * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary 1301 * and all elements of stack are initialized. 1302 * Unlike most pointer bounds-checking functions, this one doesn't take an 1303 * 'off' argument, so it has to add in reg->off itself. 1304 */ 1305 static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 1306 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 1307 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 1308 { 1309 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state; 1310 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 1311 int off, i; 1312 1313 if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) { 1314 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ 1315 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && 1316 register_is_null(regs[regno])) 1317 return 0; 1318 1319 verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno, 1320 reg_type_str[regs[regno].type], 1321 reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]); 1322 return -EACCES; 1323 } 1324 1325 /* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */ 1326 if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) { 1327 char tn_buf[48]; 1328 1329 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off); 1330 verbose("invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n", 1331 regno, tn_buf); 1332 } 1333 off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value; 1334 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 || 1335 access_size <= 0) { 1336 verbose("invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n", 1337 regno, off, access_size); 1338 return -EACCES; 1339 } 1340 1341 if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off) 1342 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off; 1343 1344 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 1345 meta->access_size = access_size; 1346 meta->regno = regno; 1347 return 0; 1348 } 1349 1350 for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) { 1351 if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) { 1352 verbose("invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 1353 off, i, access_size); 1354 return -EACCES; 1355 } 1356 } 1357 return 0; 1358 } 1359 1360 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 1361 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 1362 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 1363 { 1364 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *reg = ®s[regno]; 1365 1366 switch (reg->type) { 1367 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 1368 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 1369 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size); 1370 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 1371 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size); 1372 default: /* scalar_value|ptr_to_stack or invalid ptr */ 1373 return check_stack_boundary(env, regno, access_size, 1374 zero_size_allowed, meta); 1375 } 1376 } 1377 1378 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 1379 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, 1380 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 1381 { 1382 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *reg = ®s[regno]; 1383 enum bpf_reg_type expected_type, type = reg->type; 1384 int err = 0; 1385 1386 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) 1387 return 0; 1388 1389 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 1390 if (err) 1391 return err; 1392 1393 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 1394 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 1395 verbose("R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", regno); 1396 return -EACCES; 1397 } 1398 return 0; 1399 } 1400 1401 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 1402 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { 1403 verbose("helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); 1404 return -EACCES; 1405 } 1406 1407 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 1408 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 1409 expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK; 1410 if (!type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 1411 type != expected_type) 1412 goto err_type; 1413 } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || 1414 arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) { 1415 expected_type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1416 if (type != expected_type) 1417 goto err_type; 1418 } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) { 1419 expected_type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 1420 if (type != expected_type) 1421 goto err_type; 1422 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 1423 expected_type = PTR_TO_CTX; 1424 if (type != expected_type) 1425 goto err_type; 1426 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || 1427 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) { 1428 expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK; 1429 /* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be 1430 * passed in as argument, it's a SCALAR_VALUE type. Final test 1431 * happens during stack boundary checking. 1432 */ 1433 if (register_is_null(*reg)) 1434 /* final test in check_stack_boundary() */; 1435 else if (!type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 1436 type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 1437 type != expected_type) 1438 goto err_type; 1439 meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM; 1440 } else { 1441 verbose("unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type); 1442 return -EFAULT; 1443 } 1444 1445 if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) { 1446 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ 1447 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 1448 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { 1449 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: 1450 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within 1451 * stack limits and initialized 1452 */ 1453 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 1454 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before 1455 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before 1456 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means 1457 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier 1458 */ 1459 verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); 1460 return -EACCES; 1461 } 1462 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type)) 1463 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, 1464 meta->map_ptr->key_size); 1465 else 1466 err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno, 1467 meta->map_ptr->key_size, 1468 false, NULL); 1469 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 1470 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: 1471 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity 1472 */ 1473 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 1474 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 1475 verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); 1476 return -EACCES; 1477 } 1478 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type)) 1479 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, 1480 meta->map_ptr->value_size); 1481 else 1482 err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno, 1483 meta->map_ptr->value_size, 1484 false, NULL); 1485 } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || 1486 arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) { 1487 bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO); 1488 1489 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' bytes 1490 * from stack pointer 'buf'. Check it 1491 * note: regno == len, regno - 1 == buf 1492 */ 1493 if (regno == 0) { 1494 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 1495 verbose("ARG_CONST_SIZE cannot be first argument\n"); 1496 return -EACCES; 1497 } 1498 1499 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check 1500 * happens using its boundaries. 1501 */ 1502 1503 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 1504 /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw 1505 * mode so that the program is required to 1506 * initialize all the memory that the helper could 1507 * just partially fill up. 1508 */ 1509 meta = NULL; 1510 1511 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 1512 verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", 1513 regno); 1514 return -EACCES; 1515 } 1516 1517 if (reg->umin_value == 0) { 1518 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0, 1519 zero_size_allowed, 1520 meta); 1521 if (err) 1522 return err; 1523 } 1524 1525 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { 1526 verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", 1527 regno); 1528 return -EACCES; 1529 } 1530 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 1531 reg->umax_value, 1532 zero_size_allowed, meta); 1533 } 1534 1535 return err; 1536 err_type: 1537 verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno, 1538 reg_type_str[type], reg_type_str[expected_type]); 1539 return -EACCES; 1540 } 1541 1542 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) 1543 { 1544 if (!map) 1545 return 0; 1546 1547 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ 1548 switch (map->map_type) { 1549 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: 1550 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 1551 goto error; 1552 break; 1553 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: 1554 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && 1555 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output) 1556 goto error; 1557 break; 1558 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: 1559 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) 1560 goto error; 1561 break; 1562 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: 1563 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && 1564 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) 1565 goto error; 1566 break; 1567 /* devmap returns a pointer to a live net_device ifindex that we cannot 1568 * allow to be modified from bpf side. So do not allow lookup elements 1569 * for now. 1570 */ 1571 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: 1572 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) 1573 goto error; 1574 break; 1575 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 1576 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 1577 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 1578 goto error; 1579 break; 1580 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 1581 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && 1582 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && 1583 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem) 1584 goto error; 1585 break; 1586 default: 1587 break; 1588 } 1589 1590 /* ... and second from the function itself. */ 1591 switch (func_id) { 1592 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 1593 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) 1594 goto error; 1595 break; 1596 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: 1597 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: 1598 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) 1599 goto error; 1600 break; 1601 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: 1602 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) 1603 goto error; 1604 break; 1605 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: 1606 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: 1607 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) 1608 goto error; 1609 break; 1610 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 1611 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP) 1612 goto error; 1613 break; 1614 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: 1615 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) 1616 goto error; 1617 break; 1618 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: 1619 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) 1620 goto error; 1621 break; 1622 default: 1623 break; 1624 } 1625 1626 return 0; 1627 error: 1628 verbose("cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", 1629 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 1630 return -EINVAL; 1631 } 1632 1633 static int check_raw_mode(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 1634 { 1635 int count = 0; 1636 1637 if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 1638 count++; 1639 if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 1640 count++; 1641 if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 1642 count++; 1643 if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 1644 count++; 1645 if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 1646 count++; 1647 1648 return count > 1 ? -EINVAL : 0; 1649 } 1650 1651 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] 1652 * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. 1653 */ 1654 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 1655 { 1656 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state; 1657 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 1658 int i; 1659 1660 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 1661 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(®s[i])) 1662 mark_reg_unknown(regs, i); 1663 1664 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { 1665 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) 1666 continue; 1667 reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE]; 1668 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg)) 1669 __mark_reg_unknown(reg); 1670 } 1671 } 1672 1673 static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx) 1674 { 1675 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state; 1676 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; 1677 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 1678 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 1679 bool changes_data; 1680 int i, err; 1681 1682 /* find function prototype */ 1683 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { 1684 verbose("invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 1685 return -EINVAL; 1686 } 1687 1688 if (env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto) 1689 fn = env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(func_id); 1690 1691 if (!fn) { 1692 verbose("unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 1693 return -EINVAL; 1694 } 1695 1696 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ 1697 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { 1698 verbose("cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n"); 1699 return -EINVAL; 1700 } 1701 1702 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func); 1703 1704 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 1705 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; 1706 1707 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, which 1708 * is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now. 1709 */ 1710 err = check_raw_mode(fn); 1711 if (err) { 1712 verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 1713 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 1714 return err; 1715 } 1716 1717 /* check args */ 1718 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &meta); 1719 if (err) 1720 return err; 1721 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta); 1722 if (err) 1723 return err; 1724 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta); 1725 if (err) 1726 return err; 1727 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &meta); 1728 if (err) 1729 return err; 1730 err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_5, fn->arg5_type, &meta); 1731 if (err) 1732 return err; 1733 1734 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset 1735 * is inferred from register state. 1736 */ 1737 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { 1738 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1); 1739 if (err) 1740 return err; 1741 } 1742 1743 /* reset caller saved regs */ 1744 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 1745 mark_reg_not_init(regs, caller_saved[i]); 1746 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 1747 } 1748 1749 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ 1750 if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) { 1751 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ 1752 mark_reg_unknown(regs, BPF_REG_0); 1753 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) { 1754 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; 1755 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { 1756 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux; 1757 1758 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL; 1759 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ 1760 mark_reg_known_zero(regs, BPF_REG_0); 1761 regs[BPF_REG_0].off = 0; 1762 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() 1763 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access 1764 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() 1765 */ 1766 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { 1767 verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 1768 return -EINVAL; 1769 } 1770 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; 1771 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 1772 insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 1773 if (!insn_aux->map_ptr) 1774 insn_aux->map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; 1775 else if (insn_aux->map_ptr != meta.map_ptr) 1776 insn_aux->map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON; 1777 } else { 1778 verbose("unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n", 1779 fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 1780 return -EINVAL; 1781 } 1782 1783 err = check_map_func_compatibility(meta.map_ptr, func_id); 1784 if (err) 1785 return err; 1786 1787 if (changes_data) 1788 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 1789 return 0; 1790 } 1791 1792 static void coerce_reg_to_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1793 { 1794 /* clear high 32 bits */ 1795 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, 4); 1796 /* Update bounds */ 1797 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1798 } 1799 1800 static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 1801 { 1802 /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 1803 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b); 1804 1805 if (b < 0) 1806 return res > a; 1807 return res < a; 1808 } 1809 1810 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 1811 { 1812 /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 1813 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b); 1814 1815 if (b < 0) 1816 return res < a; 1817 return res > a; 1818 } 1819 1820 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. 1821 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. 1822 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a 1823 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. 1824 */ 1825 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1826 struct bpf_insn *insn, 1827 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 1828 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) 1829 { 1830 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg; 1831 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 1832 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, 1833 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; 1834 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, 1835 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; 1836 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 1837 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 1838 1839 dst_reg = ®s[dst]; 1840 1841 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (smin_val != smax_val))) { 1842 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state); 1843 verbose("verifier internal error: known but bad sbounds\n"); 1844 return -EINVAL; 1845 } 1846 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (umin_val != umax_val))) { 1847 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state); 1848 verbose("verifier internal error: known but bad ubounds\n"); 1849 return -EINVAL; 1850 } 1851 1852 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { 1853 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ 1854 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 1855 verbose("R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 1856 dst); 1857 return -EACCES; 1858 } 1859 1860 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { 1861 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 1862 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n", 1863 dst); 1864 return -EACCES; 1865 } 1866 if (ptr_reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { 1867 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 1868 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n", 1869 dst); 1870 return -EACCES; 1871 } 1872 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 1873 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 1874 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n", 1875 dst); 1876 return -EACCES; 1877 } 1878 1879 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. 1880 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. 1881 */ 1882 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; 1883 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 1884 1885 switch (opcode) { 1886 case BPF_ADD: 1887 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow 1888 * the s32 'off' field 1889 */ 1890 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == 1891 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { 1892 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ 1893 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 1894 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 1895 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 1896 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 1897 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 1898 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; 1899 dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range; 1900 break; 1901 } 1902 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off 1903 * == 0, since it's a scalar. 1904 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive 1905 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' 1906 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. 1907 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets 1908 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset 1909 * from ptr_reg. 1910 */ 1911 if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) || 1912 signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) { 1913 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 1914 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 1915 } else { 1916 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val; 1917 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val; 1918 } 1919 if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr || 1920 umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) { 1921 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 1922 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 1923 } else { 1924 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val; 1925 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val; 1926 } 1927 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 1928 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 1929 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 1930 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 1931 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 1932 dst_reg->range = 0; 1933 } 1934 break; 1935 case BPF_SUB: 1936 if (dst_reg == off_reg) { 1937 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ 1938 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 1939 verbose("R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", 1940 dst); 1941 return -EACCES; 1942 } 1943 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to 1944 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not 1945 * be able to deal with it. 1946 */ 1947 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 1948 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 1949 verbose("R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", 1950 dst); 1951 return -EACCES; 1952 } 1953 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == 1954 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { 1955 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ 1956 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 1957 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 1958 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 1959 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 1960 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 1961 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 1962 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; 1963 dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range; 1964 break; 1965 } 1966 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known 1967 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. 1968 */ 1969 if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) || 1970 signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) { 1971 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 1972 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 1973 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 1974 } else { 1975 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val; 1976 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val; 1977 } 1978 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { 1979 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 1980 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 1981 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 1982 } else { 1983 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 1984 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; 1985 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; 1986 } 1987 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 1988 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 1989 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 1990 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 1991 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 1992 if (smin_val < 0) 1993 dst_reg->range = 0; 1994 } 1995 break; 1996 case BPF_AND: 1997 case BPF_OR: 1998 case BPF_XOR: 1999 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit for now. 2000 * (However, in principle we could allow some cases, e.g. 2001 * ptr &= ~3 which would reduce min_value by 3.) 2002 */ 2003 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 2004 verbose("R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", 2005 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 2006 return -EACCES; 2007 default: 2008 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ 2009 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 2010 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", 2011 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 2012 return -EACCES; 2013 } 2014 2015 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 2016 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); 2017 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); 2018 return 0; 2019 } 2020 2021 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2022 struct bpf_insn *insn, 2023 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 2024 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) 2025 { 2026 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs; 2027 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 2028 bool src_known, dst_known; 2029 s64 smin_val, smax_val; 2030 u64 umin_val, umax_val; 2031 2032 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { 2033 /* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */ 2034 coerce_reg_to_32(dst_reg); 2035 coerce_reg_to_32(&src_reg); 2036 } 2037 smin_val = src_reg.smin_value; 2038 smax_val = src_reg.smax_value; 2039 umin_val = src_reg.umin_value; 2040 umax_val = src_reg.umax_value; 2041 src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 2042 dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 2043 2044 switch (opcode) { 2045 case BPF_ADD: 2046 if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) || 2047 signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) { 2048 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2049 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2050 } else { 2051 dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val; 2052 dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val; 2053 } 2054 if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val || 2055 dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 2056 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 2057 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2058 } else { 2059 dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val; 2060 dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val; 2061 } 2062 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 2063 break; 2064 case BPF_SUB: 2065 if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) || 2066 signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) { 2067 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 2068 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2069 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2070 } else { 2071 dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val; 2072 dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val; 2073 } 2074 if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { 2075 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 2076 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 2077 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2078 } else { 2079 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 2080 dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val; 2081 dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val; 2082 } 2083 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 2084 break; 2085 case BPF_MUL: 2086 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 2087 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) { 2088 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 2089 __mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg); 2090 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 2091 break; 2092 } 2093 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 2094 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX). 2095 */ 2096 if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) { 2097 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 2098 __mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg); 2099 /* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */ 2100 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 2101 break; 2102 } 2103 dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val; 2104 dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val; 2105 if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) { 2106 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 2107 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2108 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2109 } else { 2110 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 2111 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 2112 } 2113 break; 2114 case BPF_AND: 2115 if (src_known && dst_known) { 2116 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value & 2117 src_reg.var_off.value); 2118 break; 2119 } 2120 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 2121 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 2122 */ 2123 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 2124 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 2125 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); 2126 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 2127 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 2128 * ain't nobody got time for that. 2129 */ 2130 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2131 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2132 } else { 2133 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 2134 * cast result into s64. 2135 */ 2136 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 2137 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 2138 } 2139 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 2140 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 2141 break; 2142 case BPF_OR: 2143 if (src_known && dst_known) { 2144 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value | 2145 src_reg.var_off.value); 2146 break; 2147 } 2148 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 2149 * maximum of the operands' minima 2150 */ 2151 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 2152 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); 2153 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | 2154 dst_reg->var_off.mask; 2155 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 2156 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 2157 * ain't nobody got time for that. 2158 */ 2159 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2160 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2161 } else { 2162 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 2163 * cast result into s64. 2164 */ 2165 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 2166 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 2167 } 2168 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 2169 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 2170 break; 2171 case BPF_LSH: 2172 if (umax_val > 63) { 2173 /* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes 2174 * shifts by a negative number. 2175 */ 2176 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg); 2177 break; 2178 } 2179 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick 2180 * up from var_off) 2181 */ 2182 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2183 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2184 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 2185 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { 2186 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 2187 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2188 } else { 2189 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; 2190 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; 2191 } 2192 if (src_known) 2193 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 2194 else 2195 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val); 2196 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 2197 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 2198 break; 2199 case BPF_RSH: 2200 if (umax_val > 63) { 2201 /* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes 2202 * shifts by a negative number. 2203 */ 2204 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg); 2205 break; 2206 } 2207 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift, so make the appropriate casts */ 2208 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0) { 2209 if (umin_val) { 2210 /* Sign bit will be cleared */ 2211 dst_reg->smin_value = 0; 2212 } else { 2213 /* Lost sign bit information */ 2214 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2215 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2216 } 2217 } else { 2218 dst_reg->smin_value = 2219 (u64)(dst_reg->smin_value) >> umax_val; 2220 } 2221 if (src_known) 2222 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, 2223 umin_val); 2224 else 2225 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val); 2226 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; 2227 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; 2228 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 2229 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 2230 break; 2231 default: 2232 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg); 2233 break; 2234 } 2235 2236 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); 2237 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); 2238 return 0; 2239 } 2240 2241 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max 2242 * and var_off. 2243 */ 2244 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2245 struct bpf_insn *insn) 2246 { 2247 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; 2248 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; 2249 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 2250 int rc; 2251 2252 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 2253 src_reg = NULL; 2254 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2255 ptr_reg = dst_reg; 2256 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2257 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 2258 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2259 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2260 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields 2261 * an arbitrary scalar. 2262 */ 2263 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 2264 verbose("R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", 2265 insn->dst_reg, 2266 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 2267 return -EACCES; 2268 } 2269 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg); 2270 return 0; 2271 } else { 2272 /* scalar += pointer 2273 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our 2274 * src/dest handling in computing the range 2275 */ 2276 rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 2277 src_reg, dst_reg); 2278 if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 2279 /* scalar += unknown scalar */ 2280 __mark_reg_unknown(&off_reg); 2281 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals( 2282 env, insn, 2283 dst_reg, off_reg); 2284 } 2285 return rc; 2286 } 2287 } else if (ptr_reg) { 2288 /* pointer += scalar */ 2289 rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 2290 dst_reg, src_reg); 2291 if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 2292 /* unknown scalar += scalar */ 2293 __mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg); 2294 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals( 2295 env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); 2296 } 2297 return rc; 2298 } 2299 } else { 2300 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only 2301 * need to be able to read from this state. 2302 */ 2303 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2304 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); 2305 src_reg = &off_reg; 2306 if (ptr_reg) { /* pointer += K */ 2307 rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 2308 ptr_reg, src_reg); 2309 if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 2310 /* unknown scalar += K */ 2311 __mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg); 2312 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals( 2313 env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg); 2314 } 2315 return rc; 2316 } 2317 } 2318 2319 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ 2320 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { 2321 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state); 2322 verbose("verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); 2323 return -EINVAL; 2324 } 2325 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { 2326 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state); 2327 verbose("verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); 2328 return -EINVAL; 2329 } 2330 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); 2331 } 2332 2333 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ 2334 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 2335 { 2336 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs; 2337 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 2338 int err; 2339 2340 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 2341 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { 2342 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 || 2343 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 2344 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { 2345 verbose("BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); 2346 return -EINVAL; 2347 } 2348 } else { 2349 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 2350 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || 2351 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 2352 verbose("BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); 2353 return -EINVAL; 2354 } 2355 } 2356 2357 /* check src operand */ 2358 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 2359 if (err) 2360 return err; 2361 2362 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 2363 verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 2364 insn->dst_reg); 2365 return -EACCES; 2366 } 2367 2368 /* check dest operand */ 2369 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 2370 if (err) 2371 return err; 2372 2373 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 2374 2375 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2376 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 2377 verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 2378 return -EINVAL; 2379 } 2380 2381 /* check src operand */ 2382 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 2383 if (err) 2384 return err; 2385 } else { 2386 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 2387 verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 2388 return -EINVAL; 2389 } 2390 } 2391 2392 /* check dest operand */ 2393 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 2394 if (err) 2395 return err; 2396 2397 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2398 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 2399 /* case: R1 = R2 2400 * copy register state to dest reg 2401 */ 2402 regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg]; 2403 } else { 2404 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ 2405 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 2406 verbose("R%d partial copy of pointer\n", 2407 insn->src_reg); 2408 return -EACCES; 2409 } 2410 mark_reg_unknown(regs, insn->dst_reg); 2411 /* high 32 bits are known zero. */ 2412 regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off = tnum_cast( 2413 regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off, 4); 2414 __update_reg_bounds(®s[insn->dst_reg]); 2415 } 2416 } else { 2417 /* case: R = imm 2418 * remember the value we stored into this reg 2419 */ 2420 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2421 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, insn->imm); 2422 } 2423 2424 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { 2425 verbose("invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); 2426 return -EINVAL; 2427 2428 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ 2429 2430 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2431 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 2432 verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 2433 return -EINVAL; 2434 } 2435 /* check src1 operand */ 2436 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 2437 if (err) 2438 return err; 2439 } else { 2440 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 2441 verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 2442 return -EINVAL; 2443 } 2444 } 2445 2446 /* check src2 operand */ 2447 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 2448 if (err) 2449 return err; 2450 2451 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && 2452 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { 2453 verbose("div by zero\n"); 2454 return -EINVAL; 2455 } 2456 2457 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || 2458 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 2459 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; 2460 2461 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { 2462 verbose("invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); 2463 return -EINVAL; 2464 } 2465 } 2466 2467 /* check dest operand */ 2468 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 2469 if (err) 2470 return err; 2471 2472 return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); 2473 } 2474 2475 return 0; 2476 } 2477 2478 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 2479 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 2480 enum bpf_reg_type type) 2481 { 2482 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 2483 int i; 2484 2485 if (dst_reg->off < 0) 2486 /* This doesn't give us any range */ 2487 return; 2488 2489 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || 2490 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) 2491 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less 2492 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. 2493 */ 2494 return; 2495 2496 /* LLVM can generate four kind of checks: 2497 * 2498 * Type 1/2: 2499 * 2500 * r2 = r3; 2501 * r2 += 8; 2502 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> 2503 * <access okay> 2504 * 2505 * r2 = r3; 2506 * r2 += 8; 2507 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> 2508 * <handle exception> 2509 * 2510 * Where: 2511 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg 2512 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 2513 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 2514 * 2515 * Type 3/4: 2516 * 2517 * r2 = r3; 2518 * r2 += 8; 2519 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> 2520 * <handle exception> 2521 * 2522 * r2 = r3; 2523 * r2 += 8; 2524 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> 2525 * <access okay> 2526 * 2527 * Where: 2528 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg 2529 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 2530 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 2531 * 2532 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) 2533 * so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) is safe to access. 2534 */ 2535 2536 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we 2537 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big 2538 * the range won't allow anything. 2539 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. 2540 */ 2541 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 2542 if (regs[i].type == type && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id) 2543 /* keep the maximum range already checked */ 2544 regs[i].range = max_t(u16, regs[i].range, dst_reg->off); 2545 2546 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { 2547 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) 2548 continue; 2549 reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE]; 2550 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 2551 reg->range = max_t(u16, reg->range, dst_reg->off); 2552 } 2553 } 2554 2555 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the 2556 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're 2557 * simply doing a BPF_K check. 2558 * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values. 2559 */ 2560 static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 2561 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val, 2562 u8 opcode) 2563 { 2564 /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its 2565 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into 2566 * the same object, but we don't bother with that. 2567 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we 2568 * only need to check one of them for pointerness. 2569 */ 2570 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) 2571 return; 2572 2573 switch (opcode) { 2574 case BPF_JEQ: 2575 /* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is 2576 * true then we know for sure. 2577 */ 2578 __mark_reg_known(true_reg, val); 2579 break; 2580 case BPF_JNE: 2581 /* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false 2582 * we know the value for sure; 2583 */ 2584 __mark_reg_known(false_reg, val); 2585 break; 2586 case BPF_JGT: 2587 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val); 2588 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val + 1); 2589 break; 2590 case BPF_JSGT: 2591 false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val); 2592 true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val + 1); 2593 break; 2594 case BPF_JLT: 2595 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val); 2596 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val - 1); 2597 break; 2598 case BPF_JSLT: 2599 false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val); 2600 true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val - 1); 2601 break; 2602 case BPF_JGE: 2603 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val - 1); 2604 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val); 2605 break; 2606 case BPF_JSGE: 2607 false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val - 1); 2608 true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val); 2609 break; 2610 case BPF_JLE: 2611 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val + 1); 2612 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val); 2613 break; 2614 case BPF_JSLE: 2615 false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val + 1); 2616 true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val); 2617 break; 2618 default: 2619 break; 2620 } 2621 2622 __reg_deduce_bounds(false_reg); 2623 __reg_deduce_bounds(true_reg); 2624 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 2625 __reg_bound_offset(false_reg); 2626 __reg_bound_offset(true_reg); 2627 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 2628 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 2629 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 2630 */ 2631 __update_reg_bounds(false_reg); 2632 __update_reg_bounds(true_reg); 2633 } 2634 2635 /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is 2636 * the variable reg. 2637 */ 2638 static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 2639 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val, 2640 u8 opcode) 2641 { 2642 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) 2643 return; 2644 2645 switch (opcode) { 2646 case BPF_JEQ: 2647 /* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is 2648 * true then we know for sure. 2649 */ 2650 __mark_reg_known(true_reg, val); 2651 break; 2652 case BPF_JNE: 2653 /* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false 2654 * we know the value for sure; 2655 */ 2656 __mark_reg_known(false_reg, val); 2657 break; 2658 case BPF_JGT: 2659 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val - 1); 2660 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val); 2661 break; 2662 case BPF_JSGT: 2663 true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val - 1); 2664 false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val); 2665 break; 2666 case BPF_JLT: 2667 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val + 1); 2668 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val); 2669 break; 2670 case BPF_JSLT: 2671 true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val + 1); 2672 false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val); 2673 break; 2674 case BPF_JGE: 2675 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val); 2676 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val + 1); 2677 break; 2678 case BPF_JSGE: 2679 true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val); 2680 false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val + 1); 2681 break; 2682 case BPF_JLE: 2683 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val); 2684 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val - 1); 2685 break; 2686 case BPF_JSLE: 2687 true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val); 2688 false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val - 1); 2689 break; 2690 default: 2691 break; 2692 } 2693 2694 __reg_deduce_bounds(false_reg); 2695 __reg_deduce_bounds(true_reg); 2696 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 2697 __reg_bound_offset(false_reg); 2698 __reg_bound_offset(true_reg); 2699 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 2700 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 2701 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 2702 */ 2703 __update_reg_bounds(false_reg); 2704 __update_reg_bounds(true_reg); 2705 } 2706 2707 /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */ 2708 static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 2709 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 2710 { 2711 src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value, 2712 dst_reg->umin_value); 2713 src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value, 2714 dst_reg->umax_value); 2715 src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value, 2716 dst_reg->smin_value); 2717 src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value, 2718 dst_reg->smax_value); 2719 src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off, 2720 dst_reg->var_off); 2721 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ 2722 __update_reg_bounds(src_reg); 2723 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 2724 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ 2725 __reg_deduce_bounds(src_reg); 2726 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); 2727 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 2728 __reg_bound_offset(src_reg); 2729 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); 2730 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 2731 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 2732 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 2733 */ 2734 __update_reg_bounds(src_reg); 2735 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 2736 } 2737 2738 static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src, 2739 struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst, 2740 struct bpf_reg_state *false_src, 2741 struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst, 2742 u8 opcode) 2743 { 2744 switch (opcode) { 2745 case BPF_JEQ: 2746 __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst); 2747 break; 2748 case BPF_JNE: 2749 __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst); 2750 break; 2751 } 2752 } 2753 2754 static void mark_map_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, u32 id, 2755 bool is_null) 2756 { 2757 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 2758 2759 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && reg->id == id) { 2760 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should 2761 * have been known-zero, because we don't allow pointer 2762 * arithmetic on pointers that might be NULL. 2763 */ 2764 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || 2765 !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0) || 2766 reg->off)) { 2767 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg); 2768 reg->off = 0; 2769 } 2770 if (is_null) { 2771 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2772 } else if (reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta) { 2773 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 2774 reg->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta; 2775 } else { 2776 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 2777 } 2778 /* We don't need id from this point onwards anymore, thus we 2779 * should better reset it, so that state pruning has chances 2780 * to take effect. 2781 */ 2782 reg->id = 0; 2783 } 2784 } 2785 2786 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually 2787 * be folded together at some point. 2788 */ 2789 static void mark_map_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno, 2790 bool is_null) 2791 { 2792 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 2793 u32 id = regs[regno].id; 2794 int i; 2795 2796 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 2797 mark_map_reg(regs, i, id, is_null); 2798 2799 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { 2800 if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) 2801 continue; 2802 mark_map_reg(state->spilled_regs, i / BPF_REG_SIZE, id, is_null); 2803 } 2804 } 2805 2806 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2807 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) 2808 { 2809 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch, *this_branch = &env->cur_state; 2810 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->regs, *dst_reg; 2811 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 2812 int err; 2813 2814 if (opcode > BPF_JSLE) { 2815 verbose("invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode); 2816 return -EINVAL; 2817 } 2818 2819 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2820 if (insn->imm != 0) { 2821 verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n"); 2822 return -EINVAL; 2823 } 2824 2825 /* check src1 operand */ 2826 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 2827 if (err) 2828 return err; 2829 2830 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 2831 verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 2832 insn->src_reg); 2833 return -EACCES; 2834 } 2835 } else { 2836 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 2837 verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n"); 2838 return -EINVAL; 2839 } 2840 } 2841 2842 /* check src2 operand */ 2843 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 2844 if (err) 2845 return err; 2846 2847 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 2848 2849 /* detect if R == 0 where R was initialized to zero earlier */ 2850 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && 2851 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && 2852 dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 2853 tnum_equals_const(dst_reg->var_off, insn->imm)) { 2854 if (opcode == BPF_JEQ) { 2855 /* if (imm == imm) goto pc+off; 2856 * only follow the goto, ignore fall-through 2857 */ 2858 *insn_idx += insn->off; 2859 return 0; 2860 } else { 2861 /* if (imm != imm) goto pc+off; 2862 * only follow fall-through branch, since 2863 * that's where the program will go 2864 */ 2865 return 0; 2866 } 2867 } 2868 2869 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx); 2870 if (!other_branch) 2871 return -EFAULT; 2872 2873 /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust 2874 * our min/max values for our dst register. 2875 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same 2876 * object, I suppose, but we don't support that right now), because 2877 * otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't 2878 * comparable. 2879 */ 2880 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2881 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 2882 regs[insn->src_reg].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 2883 if (tnum_is_const(regs[insn->src_reg].var_off)) 2884 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg], 2885 dst_reg, regs[insn->src_reg].var_off.value, 2886 opcode); 2887 else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off)) 2888 reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch->regs[insn->src_reg], 2889 ®s[insn->src_reg], 2890 dst_reg->var_off.value, opcode); 2891 else if (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) 2892 /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */ 2893 reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->src_reg], 2894 &other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg], 2895 ®s[insn->src_reg], 2896 ®s[insn->dst_reg], opcode); 2897 } 2898 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 2899 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg], 2900 dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode); 2901 } 2902 2903 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() */ 2904 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && 2905 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && 2906 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { 2907 /* Mark all identical map registers in each branch as either 2908 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. 2909 */ 2910 mark_map_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, opcode == BPF_JNE); 2911 mark_map_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, opcode == BPF_JEQ); 2912 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT && 2913 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 2914 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 2915 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET); 2916 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLT && 2917 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 2918 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 2919 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET); 2920 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE && 2921 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 2922 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) { 2923 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, ®s[insn->src_reg], 2924 PTR_TO_PACKET); 2925 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLE && 2926 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 2927 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) { 2928 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, ®s[insn->src_reg], 2929 PTR_TO_PACKET); 2930 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT && 2931 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 2932 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(®s[insn->src_reg], PTR_TO_PACKET)) { 2933 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET_META); 2934 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLT && 2935 dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 2936 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(®s[insn->src_reg], PTR_TO_PACKET)) { 2937 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET_META); 2938 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE && 2939 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 2940 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META) { 2941 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, ®s[insn->src_reg], 2942 PTR_TO_PACKET_META); 2943 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLE && 2944 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 2945 regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META) { 2946 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, ®s[insn->src_reg], 2947 PTR_TO_PACKET_META); 2948 } else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 2949 verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg); 2950 return -EACCES; 2951 } 2952 if (log_level) 2953 print_verifier_state(this_branch); 2954 return 0; 2955 } 2956 2957 /* return the map pointer stored inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 2958 static struct bpf_map *ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(struct bpf_insn *insn) 2959 { 2960 u64 imm64 = ((u64) (u32) insn[0].imm) | ((u64) (u32) insn[1].imm) << 32; 2961 2962 return (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) imm64; 2963 } 2964 2965 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 2966 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 2967 { 2968 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs; 2969 int err; 2970 2971 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 2972 verbose("invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); 2973 return -EINVAL; 2974 } 2975 if (insn->off != 0) { 2976 verbose("BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); 2977 return -EINVAL; 2978 } 2979 2980 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 2981 if (err) 2982 return err; 2983 2984 if (insn->src_reg == 0) { 2985 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; 2986 2987 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2988 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); 2989 return 0; 2990 } 2991 2992 /* replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() should have caught bad ld_imm64 */ 2993 BUG_ON(insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD); 2994 2995 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 2996 regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(insn); 2997 return 0; 2998 } 2999 3000 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) 3001 { 3002 switch (type) { 3003 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 3004 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 3005 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 3006 return true; 3007 default: 3008 return false; 3009 } 3010 } 3011 3012 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: 3013 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb 3014 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, 3015 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 3016 * 3017 * Implicit input: 3018 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX 3019 * 3020 * Explicit input: 3021 * SRC == any register 3022 * IMM == 32-bit immediate 3023 * 3024 * Output: 3025 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness 3026 */ 3027 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 3028 { 3029 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs; 3030 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 3031 int i, err; 3032 3033 if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) { 3034 verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); 3035 return -EINVAL; 3036 } 3037 3038 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 3039 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || 3040 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { 3041 verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); 3042 return -EINVAL; 3043 } 3044 3045 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ 3046 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_6, SRC_OP); 3047 if (err) 3048 return err; 3049 3050 if (regs[BPF_REG_6].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 3051 verbose("at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); 3052 return -EINVAL; 3053 } 3054 3055 if (mode == BPF_IND) { 3056 /* check explicit source operand */ 3057 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 3058 if (err) 3059 return err; 3060 } 3061 3062 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ 3063 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 3064 mark_reg_not_init(regs, caller_saved[i]); 3065 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 3066 } 3067 3068 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains 3069 * the value fetched from the packet. 3070 * Already marked as written above. 3071 */ 3072 mark_reg_unknown(regs, BPF_REG_0); 3073 return 0; 3074 } 3075 3076 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3077 { 3078 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3079 struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); 3080 3081 switch (env->prog->type) { 3082 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 3083 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: 3084 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 3085 break; 3086 default: 3087 return 0; 3088 } 3089 3090 reg = &env->cur_state.regs[BPF_REG_0]; 3091 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3092 verbose("At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 3093 reg_type_str[reg->type]); 3094 return -EINVAL; 3095 } 3096 3097 if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { 3098 verbose("At program exit the register R0 "); 3099 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 3100 char tn_buf[48]; 3101 3102 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3103 verbose("has value %s", tn_buf); 3104 } else { 3105 verbose("has unknown scalar value"); 3106 } 3107 verbose(" should have been 0 or 1\n"); 3108 return -EINVAL; 3109 } 3110 return 0; 3111 } 3112 3113 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code 3114 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): 3115 * 2 label v as discovered 3116 * 3 let S be a stack 3117 * 4 S.push(v) 3118 * 5 while S is not empty 3119 * 6 t <- S.pop() 3120 * 7 if t is what we're looking for: 3121 * 8 return t 3122 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do 3123 * 10 if edge e is already labelled 3124 * 11 continue with the next edge 3125 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) 3126 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored 3127 * 14 label e as tree-edge 3128 * 15 label w as discovered 3129 * 16 S.push(w) 3130 * 17 continue at 5 3131 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered 3132 * 19 label e as back-edge 3133 * 20 else 3134 * 21 // vertex w is explored 3135 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge 3136 * 23 label t as explored 3137 * 24 S.pop() 3138 * 3139 * convention: 3140 * 0x10 - discovered 3141 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled 3142 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled 3143 * 0x20 - explored 3144 */ 3145 3146 enum { 3147 DISCOVERED = 0x10, 3148 EXPLORED = 0x20, 3149 FALLTHROUGH = 1, 3150 BRANCH = 2, 3151 }; 3152 3153 #define STATE_LIST_MARK ((struct bpf_verifier_state_list *) -1L) 3154 3155 static int *insn_stack; /* stack of insns to process */ 3156 static int cur_stack; /* current stack index */ 3157 static int *insn_state; 3158 3159 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: 3160 * t - index of current instruction 3161 * w - next instruction 3162 * e - edge 3163 */ 3164 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3165 { 3166 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) 3167 return 0; 3168 3169 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) 3170 return 0; 3171 3172 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 3173 verbose("jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 3174 return -EINVAL; 3175 } 3176 3177 if (e == BRANCH) 3178 /* mark branch target for state pruning */ 3179 env->explored_states[w] = STATE_LIST_MARK; 3180 3181 if (insn_state[w] == 0) { 3182 /* tree-edge */ 3183 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 3184 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; 3185 if (cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 3186 return -E2BIG; 3187 insn_stack[cur_stack++] = w; 3188 return 1; 3189 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { 3190 verbose("back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 3191 return -EINVAL; 3192 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { 3193 /* forward- or cross-edge */ 3194 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 3195 } else { 3196 verbose("insn state internal bug\n"); 3197 return -EFAULT; 3198 } 3199 return 0; 3200 } 3201 3202 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program 3203 * loop == back-edge in directed graph 3204 */ 3205 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3206 { 3207 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 3208 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 3209 int ret = 0; 3210 int i, t; 3211 3212 insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 3213 if (!insn_state) 3214 return -ENOMEM; 3215 3216 insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 3217 if (!insn_stack) { 3218 kfree(insn_state); 3219 return -ENOMEM; 3220 } 3221 3222 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ 3223 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ 3224 cur_stack = 1; 3225 3226 peek_stack: 3227 if (cur_stack == 0) 3228 goto check_state; 3229 t = insn_stack[cur_stack - 1]; 3230 3231 if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP) { 3232 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code); 3233 3234 if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 3235 goto mark_explored; 3236 } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 3237 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); 3238 if (ret == 1) 3239 goto peek_stack; 3240 else if (ret < 0) 3241 goto err_free; 3242 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) 3243 env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK; 3244 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 3245 if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) { 3246 ret = -EINVAL; 3247 goto err_free; 3248 } 3249 /* unconditional jump with single edge */ 3250 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, 3251 FALLTHROUGH, env); 3252 if (ret == 1) 3253 goto peek_stack; 3254 else if (ret < 0) 3255 goto err_free; 3256 /* tell verifier to check for equivalent states 3257 * after every call and jump 3258 */ 3259 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) 3260 env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK; 3261 } else { 3262 /* conditional jump with two edges */ 3263 env->explored_states[t] = STATE_LIST_MARK; 3264 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); 3265 if (ret == 1) 3266 goto peek_stack; 3267 else if (ret < 0) 3268 goto err_free; 3269 3270 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env); 3271 if (ret == 1) 3272 goto peek_stack; 3273 else if (ret < 0) 3274 goto err_free; 3275 } 3276 } else { 3277 /* all other non-branch instructions with single 3278 * fall-through edge 3279 */ 3280 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); 3281 if (ret == 1) 3282 goto peek_stack; 3283 else if (ret < 0) 3284 goto err_free; 3285 } 3286 3287 mark_explored: 3288 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; 3289 if (cur_stack-- <= 0) { 3290 verbose("pop stack internal bug\n"); 3291 ret = -EFAULT; 3292 goto err_free; 3293 } 3294 goto peek_stack; 3295 3296 check_state: 3297 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 3298 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { 3299 verbose("unreachable insn %d\n", i); 3300 ret = -EINVAL; 3301 goto err_free; 3302 } 3303 } 3304 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ 3305 3306 err_free: 3307 kfree(insn_state); 3308 kfree(insn_stack); 3309 return ret; 3310 } 3311 3312 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ 3313 static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old, 3314 struct bpf_reg_state *cur) 3315 { 3316 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && 3317 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && 3318 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && 3319 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value; 3320 } 3321 3322 /* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */ 3323 #define ID_MAP_SIZE (MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) 3324 struct idpair { 3325 u32 old; 3326 u32 cur; 3327 }; 3328 3329 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have 3330 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from 3331 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. 3332 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent 3333 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But 3334 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about 3335 * that. 3336 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If 3337 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. 3338 */ 3339 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct idpair *idmap) 3340 { 3341 unsigned int i; 3342 3343 for (i = 0; i < ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { 3344 if (!idmap[i].old) { 3345 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ 3346 idmap[i].old = old_id; 3347 idmap[i].cur = cur_id; 3348 return true; 3349 } 3350 if (idmap[i].old == old_id) 3351 return idmap[i].cur == cur_id; 3352 } 3353 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ 3354 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 3355 return false; 3356 } 3357 3358 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ 3359 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 3360 struct idpair *idmap) 3361 { 3362 if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 3363 /* explored state didn't use this */ 3364 return true; 3365 3366 if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, live)) == 0) 3367 return true; 3368 3369 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) 3370 /* explored state can't have used this */ 3371 return true; 3372 if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT) 3373 return false; 3374 switch (rold->type) { 3375 case SCALAR_VALUE: 3376 if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 3377 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 3378 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 3379 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 3380 } else { 3381 /* if we knew anything about the old value, we're not 3382 * equal, because we can't know anything about the 3383 * scalar value of the pointer in the new value. 3384 */ 3385 return rold->umin_value == 0 && 3386 rold->umax_value == U64_MAX && 3387 rold->smin_value == S64_MIN && 3388 rold->smax_value == S64_MAX && 3389 tnum_is_unknown(rold->var_off); 3390 } 3391 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 3392 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and 3393 * everything else matches, we are OK. 3394 * We don't care about the 'id' value, because nothing 3395 * uses it for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (only for ..._OR_NULL) 3396 */ 3397 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 3398 range_within(rold, rcur) && 3399 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 3400 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: 3401 /* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a 3402 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map. 3403 * However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL- 3404 * checked, doing so could have affected others with the same 3405 * id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when 3406 * we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. 3407 */ 3408 if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) 3409 return false; 3410 if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id))) 3411 return false; 3412 /* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */ 3413 return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 3414 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 3415 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 3416 if (rcur->type != rold->type) 3417 return false; 3418 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr 3419 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are 3420 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, 3421 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or 3422 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. 3423 */ 3424 if (rold->range > rcur->range) 3425 return false; 3426 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; 3427 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. 3428 */ 3429 if (rold->off != rcur->off) 3430 return false; 3431 /* id relations must be preserved */ 3432 if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) 3433 return false; 3434 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 3435 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 3436 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 3437 case PTR_TO_CTX: 3438 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 3439 case PTR_TO_STACK: 3440 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 3441 /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above 3442 * would have accepted 3443 */ 3444 default: 3445 /* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */ 3446 return false; 3447 } 3448 3449 /* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */ 3450 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 3451 return false; 3452 } 3453 3454 /* compare two verifier states 3455 * 3456 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since 3457 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them 3458 * 3459 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of 3460 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has 3461 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution 3462 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already 3463 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. 3464 * 3465 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative 3466 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. 3467 * Example: 3468 * explored current 3469 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) 3470 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) 3471 * 3472 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more 3473 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means 3474 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too 3475 * 3476 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid 3477 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that 3478 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely 3479 */ 3480 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3481 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 3482 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 3483 { 3484 struct idpair *idmap; 3485 bool ret = false; 3486 int i; 3487 3488 idmap = kcalloc(ID_MAP_SIZE, sizeof(struct idpair), GFP_KERNEL); 3489 /* If we failed to allocate the idmap, just say it's not safe */ 3490 if (!idmap) 3491 return false; 3492 3493 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 3494 if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], idmap)) 3495 goto out_free; 3496 } 3497 3498 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i++) { 3499 if (old->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID) 3500 continue; 3501 if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != cur->stack_slot_type[i]) 3502 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in 3503 * this stack slot, but current has has STACK_MISC -> 3504 * this verifier states are not equivalent, 3505 * return false to continue verification of this path 3506 */ 3507 goto out_free; 3508 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE) 3509 continue; 3510 if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) 3511 continue; 3512 if (!regsafe(&old->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE], 3513 &cur->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE], 3514 idmap)) 3515 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing 3516 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types 3517 * are the same as well. 3518 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored 3519 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} 3520 * but current path has stored: 3521 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} 3522 * such verifier states are not equivalent. 3523 * return false to continue verification of this path 3524 */ 3525 goto out_free; 3526 else 3527 continue; 3528 } 3529 ret = true; 3530 out_free: 3531 kfree(idmap); 3532 return ret; 3533 } 3534 3535 /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the 3536 * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at a 3537 * jump target (in the first iteration of the propagate_liveness() loop), 3538 * we didn't arrive by the straight-line code, so read marks in state must 3539 * propagate to parent regardless of state's write marks. 3540 */ 3541 static bool do_propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 3542 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent) 3543 { 3544 bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ 3545 bool touched = false; /* any changes made? */ 3546 int i; 3547 3548 if (!parent) 3549 return touched; 3550 /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */ 3551 BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG); 3552 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ 3553 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 3554 if (parent->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) 3555 continue; 3556 if (writes && (state->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)) 3557 continue; 3558 if (state->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) { 3559 parent->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_READ; 3560 touched = true; 3561 } 3562 } 3563 /* ... and stack slots */ 3564 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 3565 if (parent->stack_slot_type[i * BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL) 3566 continue; 3567 if (state->stack_slot_type[i * BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL) 3568 continue; 3569 if (parent->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) 3570 continue; 3571 if (writes && (state->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)) 3572 continue; 3573 if (state->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) { 3574 parent->spilled_regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_READ; 3575 touched = true; 3576 } 3577 } 3578 return touched; 3579 } 3580 3581 /* "parent" is "a state from which we reach the current state", but initially 3582 * it is not the state->parent (i.e. "the state whose straight-line code leads 3583 * to the current state"), instead it is the state that happened to arrive at 3584 * a (prunable) equivalent of the current state. See comment above 3585 * do_propagate_liveness() for consequences of this. 3586 * This function is just a more efficient way of calling mark_reg_read() or 3587 * mark_stack_slot_read() on each reg in "parent" that is read in "state", 3588 * though it requires that parent != state->parent in the call arguments. 3589 */ 3590 static void propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 3591 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent) 3592 { 3593 while (do_propagate_liveness(state, parent)) { 3594 /* Something changed, so we need to feed those changes onward */ 3595 state = parent; 3596 parent = state->parent; 3597 } 3598 } 3599 3600 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 3601 { 3602 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; 3603 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 3604 int i; 3605 3606 sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx]; 3607 if (!sl) 3608 /* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not 3609 * be doing state search here 3610 */ 3611 return 0; 3612 3613 while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) { 3614 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, &env->cur_state)) { 3615 /* reached equivalent register/stack state, 3616 * prune the search. 3617 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us. 3618 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they 3619 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation 3620 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our 3621 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but 3622 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning 3623 * this state and will pop a new one. 3624 */ 3625 propagate_liveness(&sl->state, &env->cur_state); 3626 return 1; 3627 } 3628 sl = sl->next; 3629 } 3630 3631 /* there were no equivalent states, remember current one. 3632 * technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, 3633 * but it will either reach bpf_exit (which means it's safe) or 3634 * it will be rejected. Since there are no loops, we won't be 3635 * seeing this 'insn_idx' instruction again on the way to bpf_exit 3636 */ 3637 new_sl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_USER); 3638 if (!new_sl) 3639 return -ENOMEM; 3640 3641 /* add new state to the head of linked list */ 3642 memcpy(&new_sl->state, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state)); 3643 new_sl->next = env->explored_states[insn_idx]; 3644 env->explored_states[insn_idx] = new_sl; 3645 /* connect new state to parentage chain */ 3646 env->cur_state.parent = &new_sl->state; 3647 /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes 3648 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. 3649 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark 3650 * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only 3651 * explored_states can get read marks.) 3652 */ 3653 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 3654 env->cur_state.regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 3655 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 3656 if (env->cur_state.stack_slot_type[i * BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_SPILL) 3657 env->cur_state.spilled_regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 3658 return 0; 3659 } 3660 3661 static int ext_analyzer_insn_hook(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3662 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx) 3663 { 3664 if (!env->analyzer_ops || !env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook) 3665 return 0; 3666 3667 return env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx); 3668 } 3669 3670 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3671 { 3672 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state; 3673 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 3674 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 3675 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 3676 int insn_idx, prev_insn_idx = 0; 3677 int insn_processed = 0; 3678 bool do_print_state = false; 3679 3680 init_reg_state(regs); 3681 state->parent = NULL; 3682 insn_idx = 0; 3683 for (;;) { 3684 struct bpf_insn *insn; 3685 u8 class; 3686 int err; 3687 3688 if (insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { 3689 verbose("invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", 3690 insn_idx, insn_cnt); 3691 return -EFAULT; 3692 } 3693 3694 insn = &insns[insn_idx]; 3695 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 3696 3697 if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { 3698 verbose("BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", 3699 insn_processed); 3700 return -E2BIG; 3701 } 3702 3703 err = is_state_visited(env, insn_idx); 3704 if (err < 0) 3705 return err; 3706 if (err == 1) { 3707 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ 3708 if (log_level) { 3709 if (do_print_state) 3710 verbose("\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n", 3711 prev_insn_idx, insn_idx); 3712 else 3713 verbose("%d: safe\n", insn_idx); 3714 } 3715 goto process_bpf_exit; 3716 } 3717 3718 if (need_resched()) 3719 cond_resched(); 3720 3721 if (log_level > 1 || (log_level && do_print_state)) { 3722 if (log_level > 1) 3723 verbose("%d:", insn_idx); 3724 else 3725 verbose("\nfrom %d to %d:", 3726 prev_insn_idx, insn_idx); 3727 print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state); 3728 do_print_state = false; 3729 } 3730 3731 if (log_level) { 3732 verbose("%d: ", insn_idx); 3733 print_bpf_insn(env, insn); 3734 } 3735 3736 err = ext_analyzer_insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx); 3737 if (err) 3738 return err; 3739 3740 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 3741 err = check_alu_op(env, insn); 3742 if (err) 3743 return err; 3744 3745 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 3746 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type; 3747 3748 /* check for reserved fields is already done */ 3749 3750 /* check src operand */ 3751 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 3752 if (err) 3753 return err; 3754 3755 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 3756 if (err) 3757 return err; 3758 3759 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; 3760 3761 /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable, 3762 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func 3763 */ 3764 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off, 3765 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, 3766 insn->dst_reg); 3767 if (err) 3768 return err; 3769 3770 prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type; 3771 3772 if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) { 3773 /* saw a valid insn 3774 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) 3775 * save type to validate intersecting paths 3776 */ 3777 *prev_src_type = src_reg_type; 3778 3779 } else if (src_reg_type != *prev_src_type && 3780 (src_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX || 3781 *prev_src_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) { 3782 /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn 3783 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) 3784 * with different pointer types: 3785 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and 3786 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. 3787 * Reject it. 3788 */ 3789 verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 3790 return -EINVAL; 3791 } 3792 3793 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 3794 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type; 3795 3796 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) { 3797 err = check_xadd(env, insn_idx, insn); 3798 if (err) 3799 return err; 3800 insn_idx++; 3801 continue; 3802 } 3803 3804 /* check src1 operand */ 3805 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 3806 if (err) 3807 return err; 3808 /* check src2 operand */ 3809 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 3810 if (err) 3811 return err; 3812 3813 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 3814 3815 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 3816 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 3817 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, 3818 insn->src_reg); 3819 if (err) 3820 return err; 3821 3822 prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type; 3823 3824 if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) { 3825 *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type; 3826 } else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type && 3827 (dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX || 3828 *prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) { 3829 verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 3830 return -EINVAL; 3831 } 3832 3833 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 3834 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || 3835 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 3836 verbose("BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); 3837 return -EINVAL; 3838 } 3839 /* check src operand */ 3840 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 3841 if (err) 3842 return err; 3843 3844 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 3845 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 3846 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, 3847 -1); 3848 if (err) 3849 return err; 3850 3851 } else if (class == BPF_JMP) { 3852 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 3853 3854 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 3855 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 3856 insn->off != 0 || 3857 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 3858 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 3859 verbose("BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); 3860 return -EINVAL; 3861 } 3862 3863 err = check_call(env, insn->imm, insn_idx); 3864 if (err) 3865 return err; 3866 3867 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 3868 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 3869 insn->imm != 0 || 3870 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 3871 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 3872 verbose("BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); 3873 return -EINVAL; 3874 } 3875 3876 insn_idx += insn->off + 1; 3877 continue; 3878 3879 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 3880 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 3881 insn->imm != 0 || 3882 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 3883 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 3884 verbose("BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); 3885 return -EINVAL; 3886 } 3887 3888 /* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used 3889 * to return the value from eBPF program. 3890 * Make sure that it's readable at this time 3891 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote 3892 * something into it earlier 3893 */ 3894 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); 3895 if (err) 3896 return err; 3897 3898 if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) { 3899 verbose("R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); 3900 return -EACCES; 3901 } 3902 3903 err = check_return_code(env); 3904 if (err) 3905 return err; 3906 process_bpf_exit: 3907 insn_idx = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx); 3908 if (insn_idx < 0) { 3909 break; 3910 } else { 3911 do_print_state = true; 3912 continue; 3913 } 3914 } else { 3915 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &insn_idx); 3916 if (err) 3917 return err; 3918 } 3919 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 3920 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 3921 3922 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { 3923 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); 3924 if (err) 3925 return err; 3926 3927 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { 3928 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); 3929 if (err) 3930 return err; 3931 3932 insn_idx++; 3933 } else { 3934 verbose("invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); 3935 return -EINVAL; 3936 } 3937 } else { 3938 verbose("unknown insn class %d\n", class); 3939 return -EINVAL; 3940 } 3941 3942 insn_idx++; 3943 } 3944 3945 verbose("processed %d insns, stack depth %d\n", 3946 insn_processed, env->prog->aux->stack_depth); 3947 return 0; 3948 } 3949 3950 static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map) 3951 { 3952 return (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH && 3953 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && 3954 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS) || 3955 !(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC); 3956 } 3957 3958 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, 3959 struct bpf_prog *prog) 3960 3961 { 3962 /* Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use 3963 * preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation 3964 * in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got 3965 * triggered. 3966 */ 3967 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) { 3968 if (!check_map_prealloc(map)) { 3969 verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n"); 3970 return -EINVAL; 3971 } 3972 if (map->inner_map_meta && 3973 !check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta)) { 3974 verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated inner hash map\n"); 3975 return -EINVAL; 3976 } 3977 } 3978 return 0; 3979 } 3980 3981 /* look for pseudo eBPF instructions that access map FDs and 3982 * replace them with actual map pointers 3983 */ 3984 static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3985 { 3986 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 3987 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 3988 int i, j, err; 3989 3990 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); 3991 if (err) 3992 return err; 3993 3994 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 3995 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 3996 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) { 3997 verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); 3998 return -EINVAL; 3999 } 4000 4001 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 4002 ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM && 4003 BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) { 4004 verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); 4005 return -EINVAL; 4006 } 4007 4008 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { 4009 struct bpf_map *map; 4010 struct fd f; 4011 4012 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || 4013 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || 4014 insn[1].off != 0) { 4015 verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 4016 return -EINVAL; 4017 } 4018 4019 if (insn->src_reg == 0) 4020 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ 4021 goto next_insn; 4022 4023 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) { 4024 verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 4025 return -EINVAL; 4026 } 4027 4028 f = fdget(insn->imm); 4029 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 4030 if (IS_ERR(map)) { 4031 verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", 4032 insn->imm); 4033 return PTR_ERR(map); 4034 } 4035 4036 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(map, env->prog); 4037 if (err) { 4038 fdput(f); 4039 return err; 4040 } 4041 4042 /* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 4043 insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map; 4044 insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32; 4045 4046 /* check whether we recorded this map already */ 4047 for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) 4048 if (env->used_maps[j] == map) { 4049 fdput(f); 4050 goto next_insn; 4051 } 4052 4053 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { 4054 fdput(f); 4055 return -E2BIG; 4056 } 4057 4058 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, 4059 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it 4060 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded 4061 * and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info() 4062 */ 4063 map = bpf_map_inc(map, false); 4064 if (IS_ERR(map)) { 4065 fdput(f); 4066 return PTR_ERR(map); 4067 } 4068 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; 4069 4070 fdput(f); 4071 next_insn: 4072 insn++; 4073 i++; 4074 } 4075 } 4076 4077 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid 4078 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. 4079 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. 4080 */ 4081 return 0; 4082 } 4083 4084 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 4085 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4086 { 4087 int i; 4088 4089 for (i = 0; i < env->used_map_cnt; i++) 4090 bpf_map_put(env->used_maps[i]); 4091 } 4092 4093 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ 4094 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4095 { 4096 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 4097 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 4098 int i; 4099 4100 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) 4101 if (insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) 4102 insn->src_reg = 0; 4103 } 4104 4105 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range 4106 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying 4107 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero 4108 */ 4109 static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len, 4110 u32 off, u32 cnt) 4111 { 4112 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data; 4113 4114 if (cnt == 1) 4115 return 0; 4116 new_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * prog_len); 4117 if (!new_data) 4118 return -ENOMEM; 4119 memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off); 4120 memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off, 4121 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); 4122 env->insn_aux_data = new_data; 4123 vfree(old_data); 4124 return 0; 4125 } 4126 4127 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 4128 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) 4129 { 4130 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 4131 4132 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); 4133 if (!new_prog) 4134 return NULL; 4135 if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog->len, off, len)) 4136 return NULL; 4137 return new_prog; 4138 } 4139 4140 /* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff' 4141 * into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff' 4142 */ 4143 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4144 { 4145 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->prog->aux->ops; 4146 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0; 4147 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 4148 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn; 4149 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 4150 enum bpf_access_type type; 4151 bool is_narrower_load; 4152 u32 target_size; 4153 4154 if (ops->gen_prologue) { 4155 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, 4156 env->prog); 4157 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 4158 verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 4159 return -EINVAL; 4160 } else if (cnt) { 4161 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 4162 if (!new_prog) 4163 return -ENOMEM; 4164 4165 env->prog = new_prog; 4166 delta += cnt - 1; 4167 } 4168 } 4169 4170 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) 4171 return 0; 4172 4173 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; 4174 4175 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 4176 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 4177 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 4178 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 4179 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) 4180 type = BPF_READ; 4181 else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 4182 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 4183 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 4184 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) 4185 type = BPF_WRITE; 4186 else 4187 continue; 4188 4189 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX) 4190 continue; 4191 4192 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; 4193 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); 4194 4195 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, 4196 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific 4197 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, 4198 * we will apply proper mask to the result. 4199 */ 4200 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; 4201 if (is_narrower_load) { 4202 u32 off = insn->off; 4203 u8 size_code; 4204 4205 if (type == BPF_WRITE) { 4206 verbose("bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); 4207 return -EINVAL; 4208 } 4209 4210 size_code = BPF_H; 4211 if (ctx_field_size == 4) 4212 size_code = BPF_W; 4213 else if (ctx_field_size == 8) 4214 size_code = BPF_DW; 4215 4216 insn->off = off & ~(ctx_field_size - 1); 4217 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; 4218 } 4219 4220 target_size = 0; 4221 cnt = ops->convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, 4222 &target_size); 4223 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || 4224 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { 4225 verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 4226 return -EINVAL; 4227 } 4228 4229 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { 4230 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) 4231 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 4232 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 4233 else 4234 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 4235 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 4236 } 4237 4238 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 4239 if (!new_prog) 4240 return -ENOMEM; 4241 4242 delta += cnt - 1; 4243 4244 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 4245 env->prog = new_prog; 4246 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 4247 } 4248 4249 return 0; 4250 } 4251 4252 /* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions 4253 * and inline eligible helpers as explicit sequence of BPF instructions 4254 * 4255 * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification 4256 */ 4257 static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4258 { 4259 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 4260 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 4261 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 4262 const int insn_cnt = prog->len; 4263 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; 4264 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 4265 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 4266 int i, cnt, delta = 0; 4267 4268 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 4269 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 4270 continue; 4271 4272 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) 4273 prog->dst_needed = 1; 4274 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) 4275 bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); 4276 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 4277 /* If we tail call into other programs, we 4278 * cannot make any assumptions since they can 4279 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in 4280 * the program array. 4281 */ 4282 prog->cb_access = 1; 4283 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; 4284 4285 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid 4286 * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal 4287 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler 4288 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet 4289 */ 4290 insn->imm = 0; 4291 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; 4292 continue; 4293 } 4294 4295 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup 4296 * handlers are currently limited to 64 bit only. 4297 */ 4298 if (ebpf_jit_enabled() && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 4299 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) { 4300 map_ptr = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].map_ptr; 4301 if (map_ptr == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON || 4302 !map_ptr->ops->map_gen_lookup) 4303 goto patch_call_imm; 4304 4305 cnt = map_ptr->ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); 4306 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 4307 verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 4308 return -EINVAL; 4309 } 4310 4311 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 4312 cnt); 4313 if (!new_prog) 4314 return -ENOMEM; 4315 4316 delta += cnt - 1; 4317 4318 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 4319 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 4320 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 4321 continue; 4322 } 4323 4324 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) { 4325 /* Note, we cannot use prog directly as imm as subsequent 4326 * rewrites would still change the prog pointer. The only 4327 * stable address we can use is aux, which also works with 4328 * prog clones during blinding. 4329 */ 4330 u64 addr = (unsigned long)prog->aux; 4331 struct bpf_insn r4_ld[] = { 4332 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_4, addr), 4333 *insn, 4334 }; 4335 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(r4_ld); 4336 4337 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, r4_ld, cnt); 4338 if (!new_prog) 4339 return -ENOMEM; 4340 4341 delta += cnt - 1; 4342 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 4343 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 4344 } 4345 patch_call_imm: 4346 fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm); 4347 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed 4348 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions 4349 */ 4350 if (!fn->func) { 4351 verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 4352 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 4353 return -EFAULT; 4354 } 4355 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; 4356 } 4357 4358 return 0; 4359 } 4360 4361 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4362 { 4363 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln; 4364 int i; 4365 4366 if (!env->explored_states) 4367 return; 4368 4369 for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) { 4370 sl = env->explored_states[i]; 4371 4372 if (sl) 4373 while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) { 4374 sln = sl->next; 4375 kfree(sl); 4376 sl = sln; 4377 } 4378 } 4379 4380 kfree(env->explored_states); 4381 } 4382 4383 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) 4384 { 4385 char __user *log_ubuf = NULL; 4386 struct bpf_verifier_env *env; 4387 int ret = -EINVAL; 4388 4389 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, 4390 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called 4391 */ 4392 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); 4393 if (!env) 4394 return -ENOMEM; 4395 4396 env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * 4397 (*prog)->len); 4398 ret = -ENOMEM; 4399 if (!env->insn_aux_data) 4400 goto err_free_env; 4401 env->prog = *prog; 4402 4403 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ 4404 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 4405 4406 if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) { 4407 /* user requested verbose verifier output 4408 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace 4409 */ 4410 log_level = attr->log_level; 4411 log_ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf; 4412 log_size = attr->log_size; 4413 log_len = 0; 4414 4415 ret = -EINVAL; 4416 /* log_* values have to be sane */ 4417 if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 || 4418 log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL) 4419 goto err_unlock; 4420 4421 ret = -ENOMEM; 4422 log_buf = vmalloc(log_size); 4423 if (!log_buf) 4424 goto err_unlock; 4425 } else { 4426 log_level = 0; 4427 } 4428 4429 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); 4430 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) 4431 env->strict_alignment = true; 4432 4433 ret = replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(env); 4434 if (ret < 0) 4435 goto skip_full_check; 4436 4437 env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len, 4438 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), 4439 GFP_USER); 4440 ret = -ENOMEM; 4441 if (!env->explored_states) 4442 goto skip_full_check; 4443 4444 ret = check_cfg(env); 4445 if (ret < 0) 4446 goto skip_full_check; 4447 4448 env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); 4449 4450 ret = do_check(env); 4451 4452 skip_full_check: 4453 while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0); 4454 free_states(env); 4455 4456 if (ret == 0) 4457 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ 4458 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); 4459 4460 if (ret == 0) 4461 ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env); 4462 4463 if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) { 4464 BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size); 4465 /* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */ 4466 ret = -ENOSPC; 4467 /* fall through to return what was recorded */ 4468 } 4469 4470 /* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */ 4471 if (log_level && copy_to_user(log_ubuf, log_buf, log_len + 1) != 0) { 4472 ret = -EFAULT; 4473 goto free_log_buf; 4474 } 4475 4476 if (ret == 0 && env->used_map_cnt) { 4477 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ 4478 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, 4479 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), 4480 GFP_KERNEL); 4481 4482 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { 4483 ret = -ENOMEM; 4484 goto free_log_buf; 4485 } 4486 4487 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, 4488 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); 4489 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 4490 4491 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic 4492 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions 4493 */ 4494 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); 4495 } 4496 4497 free_log_buf: 4498 if (log_level) 4499 vfree(log_buf); 4500 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) 4501 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release 4502 * them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them. 4503 */ 4504 release_maps(env); 4505 *prog = env->prog; 4506 err_unlock: 4507 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 4508 vfree(env->insn_aux_data); 4509 err_free_env: 4510 kfree(env); 4511 return ret; 4512 } 4513 4514 int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops, 4515 void *priv) 4516 { 4517 struct bpf_verifier_env *env; 4518 int ret; 4519 4520 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); 4521 if (!env) 4522 return -ENOMEM; 4523 4524 env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * 4525 prog->len); 4526 ret = -ENOMEM; 4527 if (!env->insn_aux_data) 4528 goto err_free_env; 4529 env->prog = prog; 4530 env->analyzer_ops = ops; 4531 env->analyzer_priv = priv; 4532 4533 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ 4534 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 4535 4536 log_level = 0; 4537 4538 env->strict_alignment = false; 4539 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) 4540 env->strict_alignment = true; 4541 4542 env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len, 4543 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), 4544 GFP_KERNEL); 4545 ret = -ENOMEM; 4546 if (!env->explored_states) 4547 goto skip_full_check; 4548 4549 ret = check_cfg(env); 4550 if (ret < 0) 4551 goto skip_full_check; 4552 4553 env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); 4554 4555 ret = do_check(env); 4556 4557 skip_full_check: 4558 while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0); 4559 free_states(env); 4560 4561 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 4562 vfree(env->insn_aux_data); 4563 err_free_env: 4564 kfree(env); 4565 return ret; 4566 } 4567 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_analyzer); 4568