1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com 3 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook 4 * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io 5 */ 6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h> 7 #include <linux/kernel.h> 8 #include <linux/types.h> 9 #include <linux/slab.h> 10 #include <linux/bpf.h> 11 #include <linux/btf.h> 12 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> 13 #include <linux/filter.h> 14 #include <net/netlink.h> 15 #include <linux/file.h> 16 #include <linux/vmalloc.h> 17 #include <linux/stringify.h> 18 #include <linux/bsearch.h> 19 #include <linux/sort.h> 20 #include <linux/perf_event.h> 21 #include <linux/ctype.h> 22 #include <linux/error-injection.h> 23 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> 24 #include <linux/btf_ids.h> 25 26 #include "disasm.h" 27 28 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { 29 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \ 30 [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, 31 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) 32 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name) 33 #include <linux/bpf_types.h> 34 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE 35 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE 36 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE 37 }; 38 39 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program 40 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. 41 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. 42 * 43 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. 44 * It rejects the following programs: 45 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns 46 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) 47 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) 48 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps 49 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. 50 * Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the 51 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of 52 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. 53 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k 54 * 55 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction 56 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. 57 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is 58 * copied to R1. 59 * 60 * All registers are 64-bit. 61 * R0 - return register 62 * R1-R5 argument passing registers 63 * R6-R9 callee saved registers 64 * R10 - frame pointer read-only 65 * 66 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context 67 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. 68 * 69 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: 70 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), 71 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), 72 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 73 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize 74 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. 75 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK 76 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). 77 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. 78 * 79 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which 80 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. 81 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) 82 * 83 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register 84 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are 85 * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function. 86 * 87 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' 88 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. 89 * 90 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against 91 * function argument constraints. 92 * 93 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. 94 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be 95 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as 96 * 'pointer to map element key' 97 * 98 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): 99 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, 100 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, 101 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 102 * 103 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' 104 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and 105 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside 106 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. 107 * 108 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: 109 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) 110 * { 111 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; 112 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; 113 * void *value; 114 * 115 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that 116 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on 117 * the stack of eBPF program. 118 * } 119 * 120 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: 121 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR 122 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK 123 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP 124 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), 125 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: 126 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, 127 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes 128 * 129 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, 130 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits 131 * and were initialized prior to this call. 132 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at 133 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets 134 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function 135 * returns ether pointer to map value or NULL. 136 * 137 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' 138 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to 139 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false 140 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). 141 * 142 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 143 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. 144 * 145 * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel 146 * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by 147 * the BPF program: 148 * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET 149 * 150 * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a 151 * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state. 152 * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into 153 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type 154 * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is 155 * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference. 156 * 157 * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as 158 * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as 159 * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function, 160 * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased 161 * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it. 162 */ 163 164 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ 165 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { 166 /* verifer state is 'st' 167 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' 168 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' 169 */ 170 struct bpf_verifier_state st; 171 int insn_idx; 172 int prev_insn_idx; 173 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; 174 /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */ 175 u32 log_pos; 176 }; 177 178 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192 179 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64 180 181 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON (1ULL << 63) 182 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN (1ULL << 62) 183 184 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL 185 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \ 186 POISON_POINTER_DELTA)) 187 #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X) ((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV)) 188 189 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 190 { 191 return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON; 192 } 193 194 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 195 { 196 return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV; 197 } 198 199 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 200 const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv) 201 { 202 BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV); 203 unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux); 204 aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map | 205 (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL); 206 } 207 208 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 209 { 210 return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON; 211 } 212 213 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 214 { 215 return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN); 216 } 217 218 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 219 { 220 return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 221 } 222 223 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state) 224 { 225 bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux); 226 227 aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | 228 (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL); 229 } 230 231 struct bpf_call_arg_meta { 232 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 233 bool raw_mode; 234 bool pkt_access; 235 int regno; 236 int access_size; 237 int mem_size; 238 u64 msize_max_value; 239 int ref_obj_id; 240 int func_id; 241 u32 btf_id; 242 u32 ret_btf_id; 243 }; 244 245 struct btf *btf_vmlinux; 246 247 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); 248 249 static const struct bpf_line_info * 250 find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off) 251 { 252 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 253 const struct bpf_prog *prog; 254 u32 i, nr_linfo; 255 256 prog = env->prog; 257 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 258 259 if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len) 260 return NULL; 261 262 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 263 for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++) 264 if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off) 265 break; 266 267 return &linfo[i - 1]; 268 } 269 270 void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const char *fmt, 271 va_list args) 272 { 273 unsigned int n; 274 275 n = vscnprintf(log->kbuf, BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE, fmt, args); 276 277 WARN_ONCE(n >= BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE - 1, 278 "verifier log line truncated - local buffer too short\n"); 279 280 n = min(log->len_total - log->len_used - 1, n); 281 log->kbuf[n] = '\0'; 282 283 if (log->level == BPF_LOG_KERNEL) { 284 pr_err("BPF:%s\n", log->kbuf); 285 return; 286 } 287 if (!copy_to_user(log->ubuf + log->len_used, log->kbuf, n + 1)) 288 log->len_used += n; 289 else 290 log->ubuf = NULL; 291 } 292 293 static void bpf_vlog_reset(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 new_pos) 294 { 295 char zero = 0; 296 297 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) 298 return; 299 300 log->len_used = new_pos; 301 if (put_user(zero, log->ubuf + new_pos)) 302 log->ubuf = NULL; 303 } 304 305 /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier. 306 * bpf_verifier_log_write() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, 307 * so the user can figure out what's wrong with the program 308 */ 309 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 310 const char *fmt, ...) 311 { 312 va_list args; 313 314 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 315 return; 316 317 va_start(args, fmt); 318 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 319 va_end(args); 320 } 321 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_verifier_log_write); 322 323 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...) 324 { 325 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data; 326 va_list args; 327 328 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 329 return; 330 331 va_start(args, fmt); 332 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 333 va_end(args); 334 } 335 336 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_log(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 337 const char *fmt, ...) 338 { 339 va_list args; 340 341 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) 342 return; 343 344 va_start(args, fmt); 345 bpf_verifier_vlog(log, fmt, args); 346 va_end(args); 347 } 348 349 static const char *ltrim(const char *s) 350 { 351 while (isspace(*s)) 352 s++; 353 354 return s; 355 } 356 357 __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 358 u32 insn_off, 359 const char *prefix_fmt, ...) 360 { 361 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 362 363 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 364 return; 365 366 linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off); 367 if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo) 368 return; 369 370 if (prefix_fmt) { 371 va_list args; 372 373 va_start(args, prefix_fmt); 374 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args); 375 va_end(args); 376 } 377 378 verbose(env, "%s\n", 379 ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf, 380 linfo->line_off))); 381 382 env->prev_linfo = linfo; 383 } 384 385 static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 386 { 387 return type == PTR_TO_PACKET || 388 type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META; 389 } 390 391 static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 392 { 393 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 394 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 395 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 396 type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 397 } 398 399 static bool reg_type_not_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) 400 { 401 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 402 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 403 type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 404 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; 405 } 406 407 static bool reg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) 408 { 409 return type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL || 410 type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL || 411 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL || 412 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL || 413 type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL || 414 type == PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL || 415 type == PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL || 416 type == PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL; 417 } 418 419 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 420 { 421 return reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 422 map_value_has_spin_lock(reg->map_ptr); 423 } 424 425 static bool reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) 426 { 427 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 428 type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL || 429 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 430 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL || 431 type == PTR_TO_MEM || 432 type == PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL; 433 } 434 435 static bool arg_type_may_be_refcounted(enum bpf_arg_type type) 436 { 437 return type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; 438 } 439 440 static bool arg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_arg_type type) 441 { 442 return type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL || 443 type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL || 444 type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX_OR_NULL || 445 type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL || 446 type == ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL; 447 } 448 449 /* Determine whether the function releases some resources allocated by another 450 * function call. The first reference type argument will be assumed to be 451 * released by release_reference(). 452 */ 453 static bool is_release_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 454 { 455 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_release || 456 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit || 457 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard; 458 } 459 460 static bool may_be_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 461 { 462 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || 463 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || 464 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || 465 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || 466 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve; 467 } 468 469 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 470 const struct bpf_map *map) 471 { 472 enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC; 473 474 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || 475 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || 476 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || 477 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve) 478 return true; 479 480 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 481 (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 482 map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)) 483 return true; 484 485 return false; 486 } 487 488 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 489 { 490 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock || 491 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock || 492 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock || 493 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock || 494 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock || 495 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock || 496 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock; 497 } 498 499 /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */ 500 static const char * const reg_type_str[] = { 501 [NOT_INIT] = "?", 502 [SCALAR_VALUE] = "inv", 503 [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx", 504 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr", 505 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value", 506 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = "map_value_or_null", 507 [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp", 508 [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt", 509 [PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta", 510 [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", 511 [PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS] = "flow_keys", 512 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = "sock", 513 [PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL] = "sock_or_null", 514 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = "sock_common", 515 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL] = "sock_common_or_null", 516 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock", 517 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL] = "tcp_sock_or_null", 518 [PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer", 519 [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock", 520 [PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = "ptr_", 521 [PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL] = "ptr_or_null_", 522 [PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = "percpu_ptr_", 523 [PTR_TO_MEM] = "mem", 524 [PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL] = "mem_or_null", 525 [PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF] = "rdonly_buf", 526 [PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL] = "rdonly_buf_or_null", 527 [PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF] = "rdwr_buf", 528 [PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL] = "rdwr_buf_or_null", 529 }; 530 531 static char slot_type_char[] = { 532 [STACK_INVALID] = '?', 533 [STACK_SPILL] = 'r', 534 [STACK_MISC] = 'm', 535 [STACK_ZERO] = '0', 536 }; 537 538 static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 539 enum bpf_reg_liveness live) 540 { 541 if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN | REG_LIVE_DONE)) 542 verbose(env, "_"); 543 if (live & REG_LIVE_READ) 544 verbose(env, "r"); 545 if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 546 verbose(env, "w"); 547 if (live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 548 verbose(env, "D"); 549 } 550 551 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 552 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 553 { 554 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 555 556 return cur->frame[reg->frameno]; 557 } 558 559 const char *kernel_type_name(u32 id) 560 { 561 return btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, 562 btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, id)->name_off); 563 } 564 565 static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 566 const struct bpf_func_state *state) 567 { 568 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 569 enum bpf_reg_type t; 570 int i; 571 572 if (state->frameno) 573 verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno); 574 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 575 reg = &state->regs[i]; 576 t = reg->type; 577 if (t == NOT_INIT) 578 continue; 579 verbose(env, " R%d", i); 580 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 581 verbose(env, "=%s", reg_type_str[t]); 582 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 583 verbose(env, "P"); 584 if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && 585 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 586 /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ 587 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 588 } else { 589 if (t == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 590 t == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL || 591 t == PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID) 592 verbose(env, "%s", kernel_type_name(reg->btf_id)); 593 verbose(env, "(id=%d", reg->id); 594 if (reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(t)) 595 verbose(env, ",ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id); 596 if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) 597 verbose(env, ",off=%d", reg->off); 598 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) 599 verbose(env, ",r=%d", reg->range); 600 else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || 601 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 602 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) 603 verbose(env, ",ks=%d,vs=%d", 604 reg->map_ptr->key_size, 605 reg->map_ptr->value_size); 606 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 607 /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but 608 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big 609 * for reg->off 610 */ 611 verbose(env, ",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); 612 } else { 613 if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value && 614 reg->smin_value != S64_MIN) 615 verbose(env, ",smin_value=%lld", 616 (long long)reg->smin_value); 617 if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value && 618 reg->smax_value != S64_MAX) 619 verbose(env, ",smax_value=%lld", 620 (long long)reg->smax_value); 621 if (reg->umin_value != 0) 622 verbose(env, ",umin_value=%llu", 623 (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value); 624 if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX) 625 verbose(env, ",umax_value=%llu", 626 (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value); 627 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 628 char tn_buf[48]; 629 630 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 631 verbose(env, ",var_off=%s", tn_buf); 632 } 633 if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value && 634 reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN) 635 verbose(env, ",s32_min_value=%d", 636 (int)(reg->s32_min_value)); 637 if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value && 638 reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX) 639 verbose(env, ",s32_max_value=%d", 640 (int)(reg->s32_max_value)); 641 if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value && 642 reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN) 643 verbose(env, ",u32_min_value=%d", 644 (int)(reg->u32_min_value)); 645 if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value && 646 reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX) 647 verbose(env, ",u32_max_value=%d", 648 (int)(reg->u32_max_value)); 649 } 650 verbose(env, ")"); 651 } 652 } 653 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 654 char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE + 1]; 655 bool valid = false; 656 int j; 657 658 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 659 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] != STACK_INVALID) 660 valid = true; 661 types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[ 662 state->stack[i].slot_type[j]]; 663 } 664 types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0; 665 if (!valid) 666 continue; 667 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 668 print_liveness(env, state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live); 669 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) { 670 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 671 t = reg->type; 672 verbose(env, "=%s", reg_type_str[t]); 673 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 674 verbose(env, "P"); 675 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 676 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 677 } else { 678 verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf); 679 } 680 } 681 if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) { 682 verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id); 683 for (i = 1; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) 684 if (state->refs[i].id) 685 verbose(env, ",%d", state->refs[i].id); 686 } 687 verbose(env, "\n"); 688 } 689 690 #define COPY_STATE_FN(NAME, COUNT, FIELD, SIZE) \ 691 static int copy_##NAME##_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, \ 692 const struct bpf_func_state *src) \ 693 { \ 694 if (!src->FIELD) \ 695 return 0; \ 696 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dst->COUNT < src->COUNT)) { \ 697 /* internal bug, make state invalid to reject the program */ \ 698 memset(dst, 0, sizeof(*dst)); \ 699 return -EFAULT; \ 700 } \ 701 memcpy(dst->FIELD, src->FIELD, \ 702 sizeof(*src->FIELD) * (src->COUNT / SIZE)); \ 703 return 0; \ 704 } 705 /* copy_reference_state() */ 706 COPY_STATE_FN(reference, acquired_refs, refs, 1) 707 /* copy_stack_state() */ 708 COPY_STATE_FN(stack, allocated_stack, stack, BPF_REG_SIZE) 709 #undef COPY_STATE_FN 710 711 #define REALLOC_STATE_FN(NAME, COUNT, FIELD, SIZE) \ 712 static int realloc_##NAME##_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int size, \ 713 bool copy_old) \ 714 { \ 715 u32 old_size = state->COUNT; \ 716 struct bpf_##NAME##_state *new_##FIELD; \ 717 int slot = size / SIZE; \ 718 \ 719 if (size <= old_size || !size) { \ 720 if (copy_old) \ 721 return 0; \ 722 state->COUNT = slot * SIZE; \ 723 if (!size && old_size) { \ 724 kfree(state->FIELD); \ 725 state->FIELD = NULL; \ 726 } \ 727 return 0; \ 728 } \ 729 new_##FIELD = kmalloc_array(slot, sizeof(struct bpf_##NAME##_state), \ 730 GFP_KERNEL); \ 731 if (!new_##FIELD) \ 732 return -ENOMEM; \ 733 if (copy_old) { \ 734 if (state->FIELD) \ 735 memcpy(new_##FIELD, state->FIELD, \ 736 sizeof(*new_##FIELD) * (old_size / SIZE)); \ 737 memset(new_##FIELD + old_size / SIZE, 0, \ 738 sizeof(*new_##FIELD) * (size - old_size) / SIZE); \ 739 } \ 740 state->COUNT = slot * SIZE; \ 741 kfree(state->FIELD); \ 742 state->FIELD = new_##FIELD; \ 743 return 0; \ 744 } 745 /* realloc_reference_state() */ 746 REALLOC_STATE_FN(reference, acquired_refs, refs, 1) 747 /* realloc_stack_state() */ 748 REALLOC_STATE_FN(stack, allocated_stack, stack, BPF_REG_SIZE) 749 #undef REALLOC_STATE_FN 750 751 /* do_check() starts with zero-sized stack in struct bpf_verifier_state to 752 * make it consume minimal amount of memory. check_stack_write() access from 753 * the program calls into realloc_func_state() to grow the stack size. 754 * Note there is a non-zero 'parent' pointer inside bpf_verifier_state 755 * which realloc_stack_state() copies over. It points to previous 756 * bpf_verifier_state which is never reallocated. 757 */ 758 static int realloc_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int stack_size, 759 int refs_size, bool copy_old) 760 { 761 int err = realloc_reference_state(state, refs_size, copy_old); 762 if (err) 763 return err; 764 return realloc_stack_state(state, stack_size, copy_old); 765 } 766 767 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include 768 * this new pointer reference. 769 * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register 770 * On failure, returns a negative errno. 771 */ 772 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 773 { 774 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 775 int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs; 776 int id, err; 777 778 err = realloc_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1, true); 779 if (err) 780 return err; 781 id = ++env->id_gen; 782 state->refs[new_ofs].id = id; 783 state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx; 784 785 return id; 786 } 787 788 /* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */ 789 static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id) 790 { 791 int i, last_idx; 792 793 last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1; 794 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 795 if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) { 796 if (last_idx && i != last_idx) 797 memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx], 798 sizeof(*state->refs)); 799 memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs)); 800 state->acquired_refs--; 801 return 0; 802 } 803 } 804 return -EINVAL; 805 } 806 807 static int transfer_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, 808 struct bpf_func_state *src) 809 { 810 int err = realloc_reference_state(dst, src->acquired_refs, false); 811 if (err) 812 return err; 813 err = copy_reference_state(dst, src); 814 if (err) 815 return err; 816 return 0; 817 } 818 819 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) 820 { 821 if (!state) 822 return; 823 kfree(state->refs); 824 kfree(state->stack); 825 kfree(state); 826 } 827 828 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 829 { 830 kfree(state->jmp_history); 831 state->jmp_history = NULL; 832 state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; 833 } 834 835 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 836 bool free_self) 837 { 838 int i; 839 840 for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) { 841 free_func_state(state->frame[i]); 842 state->frame[i] = NULL; 843 } 844 clear_jmp_history(state); 845 if (free_self) 846 kfree(state); 847 } 848 849 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space 850 * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack 851 */ 852 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, 853 const struct bpf_func_state *src) 854 { 855 int err; 856 857 err = realloc_func_state(dst, src->allocated_stack, src->acquired_refs, 858 false); 859 if (err) 860 return err; 861 memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, acquired_refs)); 862 err = copy_reference_state(dst, src); 863 if (err) 864 return err; 865 return copy_stack_state(dst, src); 866 } 867 868 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, 869 const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) 870 { 871 struct bpf_func_state *dst; 872 u32 jmp_sz = sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair) * src->jmp_history_cnt; 873 int i, err; 874 875 if (dst_state->jmp_history_cnt < src->jmp_history_cnt) { 876 kfree(dst_state->jmp_history); 877 dst_state->jmp_history = kmalloc(jmp_sz, GFP_USER); 878 if (!dst_state->jmp_history) 879 return -ENOMEM; 880 } 881 memcpy(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, jmp_sz); 882 dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; 883 884 /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */ 885 for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { 886 free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); 887 dst_state->frame[i] = NULL; 888 } 889 dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; 890 dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; 891 dst_state->active_spin_lock = src->active_spin_lock; 892 dst_state->branches = src->branches; 893 dst_state->parent = src->parent; 894 dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; 895 dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; 896 for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { 897 dst = dst_state->frame[i]; 898 if (!dst) { 899 dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL); 900 if (!dst) 901 return -ENOMEM; 902 dst_state->frame[i] = dst; 903 } 904 err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]); 905 if (err) 906 return err; 907 } 908 return 0; 909 } 910 911 static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 912 { 913 while (st) { 914 u32 br = --st->branches; 915 916 /* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here, 917 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: 918 */ 919 WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0, 920 "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n", 921 br); 922 if (br) 923 break; 924 st = st->parent; 925 } 926 } 927 928 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, 929 int *insn_idx, bool pop_log) 930 { 931 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 932 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; 933 int err; 934 935 if (env->head == NULL) 936 return -ENOENT; 937 938 if (cur) { 939 err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st); 940 if (err) 941 return err; 942 } 943 if (pop_log) 944 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos); 945 if (insn_idx) 946 *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; 947 if (prev_insn_idx) 948 *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx; 949 elem = head->next; 950 free_verifier_state(&head->st, false); 951 kfree(head); 952 env->head = elem; 953 env->stack_size--; 954 return 0; 955 } 956 957 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 958 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 959 bool speculative) 960 { 961 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 962 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 963 int err; 964 965 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 966 if (!elem) 967 goto err; 968 969 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 970 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 971 elem->next = env->head; 972 elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used; 973 env->head = elem; 974 env->stack_size++; 975 err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); 976 if (err) 977 goto err; 978 elem->st.speculative |= speculative; 979 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 980 verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n", 981 env->stack_size); 982 goto err; 983 } 984 if (elem->st.parent) { 985 ++elem->st.parent->branches; 986 /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here, 987 * but 988 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch 989 * instructions 990 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create 991 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current 992 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state 993 * which might have large 'branches' count. 994 */ 995 } 996 return &elem->st; 997 err: 998 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 999 env->cur_state = NULL; 1000 /* pop all elements and return */ 1001 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 1002 return NULL; 1003 } 1004 1005 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 1006 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { 1007 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 1008 }; 1009 1010 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1011 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 1012 1013 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */ 1014 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1015 { 1016 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); 1017 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; 1018 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; 1019 reg->umin_value = imm; 1020 reg->umax_value = imm; 1021 1022 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 1023 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 1024 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 1025 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 1026 } 1027 1028 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as 1029 * known to have the value @imm. 1030 */ 1031 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1032 { 1033 /* Clear id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) */ 1034 memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0, 1035 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type)); 1036 ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm); 1037 } 1038 1039 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1040 { 1041 reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm); 1042 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 1043 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 1044 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 1045 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 1046 } 1047 1048 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be 1049 * used only on registers holding a pointer type. 1050 */ 1051 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1052 { 1053 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 1054 } 1055 1056 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1057 { 1058 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 1059 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1060 } 1061 1062 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1063 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1064 { 1065 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1066 verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1067 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 1068 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 1069 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1070 return; 1071 } 1072 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); 1073 } 1074 1075 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1076 { 1077 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 1078 } 1079 1080 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1081 { 1082 return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || 1083 reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; 1084 } 1085 1086 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ 1087 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1088 enum bpf_reg_type which) 1089 { 1090 /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. 1091 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its 1092 * origin. 1093 */ 1094 return reg->type == which && 1095 reg->id == 0 && 1096 reg->off == 0 && 1097 tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 1098 } 1099 1100 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ 1101 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1102 { 1103 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 1104 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 1105 reg->umin_value = 0; 1106 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 1107 1108 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 1109 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 1110 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 1111 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 1112 } 1113 1114 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1115 { 1116 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 1117 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 1118 reg->umin_value = 0; 1119 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 1120 } 1121 1122 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1123 { 1124 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 1125 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 1126 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 1127 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 1128 } 1129 1130 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1131 { 1132 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 1133 1134 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 1135 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, 1136 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN)); 1137 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 1138 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, 1139 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX)); 1140 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value); 1141 reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value, 1142 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask)); 1143 } 1144 1145 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1146 { 1147 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 1148 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, 1149 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); 1150 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 1151 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, 1152 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); 1153 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); 1154 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, 1155 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); 1156 } 1157 1158 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1159 { 1160 __update_reg32_bounds(reg); 1161 __update_reg64_bounds(reg); 1162 } 1163 1164 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ 1165 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1166 { 1167 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 1168 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 1169 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 1170 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 1171 */ 1172 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 || reg->s32_max_value < 0) { 1173 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 1174 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 1175 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 1176 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 1177 return; 1178 } 1179 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 1180 * boundary, so we must be careful. 1181 */ 1182 if ((s32)reg->u32_max_value >= 0) { 1183 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 1184 * is positive, hence safe. 1185 */ 1186 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value; 1187 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 1188 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 1189 } else if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value < 0) { 1190 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 1191 * is negative, hence safe. 1192 */ 1193 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 1194 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 1195 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value; 1196 } 1197 } 1198 1199 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1200 { 1201 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 1202 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 1203 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 1204 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 1205 */ 1206 if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) { 1207 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 1208 reg->umin_value); 1209 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 1210 reg->umax_value); 1211 return; 1212 } 1213 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 1214 * boundary, so we must be careful. 1215 */ 1216 if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) { 1217 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 1218 * is positive, hence safe. 1219 */ 1220 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 1221 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 1222 reg->umax_value); 1223 } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) { 1224 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 1225 * is negative, hence safe. 1226 */ 1227 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 1228 reg->umin_value); 1229 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 1230 } 1231 } 1232 1233 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1234 { 1235 __reg32_deduce_bounds(reg); 1236 __reg64_deduce_bounds(reg); 1237 } 1238 1239 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ 1240 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1241 { 1242 struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 1243 tnum_range(reg->umin_value, 1244 reg->umax_value)); 1245 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg->var_off), 1246 tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value, 1247 reg->u32_max_value)); 1248 1249 reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off); 1250 } 1251 1252 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1253 { 1254 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value; 1255 reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value; 1256 /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds 1257 * but must be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds 1258 * and refine later from tnum. 1259 */ 1260 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && reg->s32_max_value >= 0) 1261 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 1262 else 1263 reg->smax_value = U32_MAX; 1264 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0) 1265 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 1266 else 1267 reg->smin_value = 0; 1268 } 1269 1270 static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1271 { 1272 /* special case when 64-bit register has upper 32-bit register 1273 * zeroed. Typically happens after zext or <<32, >>32 sequence 1274 * allowing us to use 32-bit bounds directly, 1275 */ 1276 if (tnum_equals_const(tnum_clear_subreg(reg->var_off), 0)) { 1277 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 1278 } else { 1279 /* Otherwise the best we can do is push lower 32bit known and 1280 * unknown bits into register (var_off set from jmp logic) 1281 * then learn as much as possible from the 64-bit tnum 1282 * known and unknown bits. The previous smin/smax bounds are 1283 * invalid here because of jmp32 compare so mark them unknown 1284 * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation. 1285 */ 1286 __mark_reg64_unbounded(reg); 1287 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1288 } 1289 1290 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 1291 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 1292 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 1293 */ 1294 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 1295 __reg_bound_offset(reg); 1296 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1297 } 1298 1299 static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a) 1300 { 1301 if (a > S32_MIN && a < S32_MAX) 1302 return true; 1303 return false; 1304 } 1305 1306 static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a) 1307 { 1308 if (a > U32_MIN && a < U32_MAX) 1309 return true; 1310 return false; 1311 } 1312 1313 static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1314 { 1315 __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg); 1316 1317 if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value)) 1318 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value; 1319 if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) 1320 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value; 1321 if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umin_value)) 1322 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value; 1323 if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umax_value)) 1324 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value; 1325 1326 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 1327 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 1328 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 1329 */ 1330 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 1331 __reg_bound_offset(reg); 1332 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1333 } 1334 1335 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ 1336 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1337 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1338 { 1339 /* 1340 * Clear type, id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and 1341 * padding between 'type' and union 1342 */ 1343 memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)); 1344 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1345 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 1346 reg->frameno = 0; 1347 reg->precise = env->subprog_cnt > 1 || !env->bpf_capable; 1348 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 1349 } 1350 1351 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1352 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1353 { 1354 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1355 verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1356 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 1357 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 1358 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1359 return; 1360 } 1361 __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno); 1362 } 1363 1364 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1365 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1366 { 1367 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 1368 reg->type = NOT_INIT; 1369 } 1370 1371 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1372 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1373 { 1374 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1375 verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1376 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 1377 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 1378 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1379 return; 1380 } 1381 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1382 } 1383 1384 static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1385 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 1386 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, u32 btf_id) 1387 { 1388 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 1389 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 1390 return; 1391 } 1392 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); 1393 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 1394 regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; 1395 } 1396 1397 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) 1398 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1399 struct bpf_func_state *state) 1400 { 1401 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 1402 int i; 1403 1404 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 1405 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); 1406 regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 1407 regs[i].parent = NULL; 1408 regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 1409 } 1410 1411 /* frame pointer */ 1412 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; 1413 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); 1414 regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; 1415 } 1416 1417 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) 1418 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1419 struct bpf_func_state *state, 1420 int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno) 1421 { 1422 state->callsite = callsite; 1423 state->frameno = frameno; 1424 state->subprogno = subprogno; 1425 init_reg_state(env, state); 1426 } 1427 1428 enum reg_arg_type { 1429 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ 1430 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ 1431 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ 1432 }; 1433 1434 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b) 1435 { 1436 return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start - 1437 ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start; 1438 } 1439 1440 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 1441 { 1442 struct bpf_subprog_info *p; 1443 1444 p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 1445 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs); 1446 if (!p) 1447 return -ENOENT; 1448 return p - env->subprog_info; 1449 1450 } 1451 1452 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 1453 { 1454 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 1455 int ret; 1456 1457 if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) { 1458 verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n"); 1459 return -EINVAL; 1460 } 1461 ret = find_subprog(env, off); 1462 if (ret >= 0) 1463 return 0; 1464 if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { 1465 verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); 1466 return -E2BIG; 1467 } 1468 env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; 1469 sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 1470 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); 1471 return 0; 1472 } 1473 1474 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 1475 { 1476 int i, ret, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0; 1477 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 1478 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 1479 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 1480 1481 /* Add entry function. */ 1482 ret = add_subprog(env, 0); 1483 if (ret < 0) 1484 return ret; 1485 1486 /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ 1487 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 1488 if (insn[i].code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 1489 continue; 1490 if (insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 1491 continue; 1492 if (!env->bpf_capable) { 1493 verbose(env, 1494 "function calls to other bpf functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); 1495 return -EPERM; 1496 } 1497 ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn[i].imm + 1); 1498 if (ret < 0) 1499 return ret; 1500 } 1501 1502 /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration 1503 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased. 1504 */ 1505 subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; 1506 1507 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 1508 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 1509 verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); 1510 1511 /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */ 1512 subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start; 1513 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 1514 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 1515 u8 code = insn[i].code; 1516 1517 if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 1518 insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 1519 insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 1520 subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true; 1521 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD && 1522 (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND)) 1523 subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true; 1524 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) 1525 goto next; 1526 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) 1527 goto next; 1528 off = i + insn[i].off + 1; 1529 if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) { 1530 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off); 1531 return -EINVAL; 1532 } 1533 next: 1534 if (i == subprog_end - 1) { 1535 /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another 1536 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit 1537 * or unconditional jump back 1538 */ 1539 if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && 1540 code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { 1541 verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n"); 1542 return -EINVAL; 1543 } 1544 subprog_start = subprog_end; 1545 cur_subprog++; 1546 if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt) 1547 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 1548 } 1549 } 1550 return 0; 1551 } 1552 1553 /* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all 1554 * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc. 1555 */ 1556 static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1557 const struct bpf_reg_state *state, 1558 struct bpf_reg_state *parent, u8 flag) 1559 { 1560 bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ 1561 int cnt = 0; 1562 1563 while (parent) { 1564 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ 1565 if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 1566 break; 1567 if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 1568 verbose(env, "verifier BUG type %s var_off %lld off %d\n", 1569 reg_type_str[parent->type], 1570 parent->var_off.value, parent->off); 1571 return -EFAULT; 1572 } 1573 /* The first condition is more likely to be true than the 1574 * second, checked it first. 1575 */ 1576 if ((parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ) == flag || 1577 parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ64) 1578 /* The parentage chain never changes and 1579 * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ. 1580 * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and 1581 * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ. 1582 * This case happens when the same register is read 1583 * multiple times without writes into it in-between. 1584 * Also, if parent has the stronger REG_LIVE_READ64 set, 1585 * then no need to set the weak REG_LIVE_READ32. 1586 */ 1587 break; 1588 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ 1589 parent->live |= flag; 1590 /* REG_LIVE_READ64 overrides REG_LIVE_READ32. */ 1591 if (flag == REG_LIVE_READ64) 1592 parent->live &= ~REG_LIVE_READ32; 1593 state = parent; 1594 parent = state->parent; 1595 writes = true; 1596 cnt++; 1597 } 1598 1599 if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt) 1600 env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt; 1601 return 0; 1602 } 1603 1604 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization 1605 * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates 1606 * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE. 1607 */ 1608 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 1609 u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t) 1610 { 1611 u8 code, class, op; 1612 1613 code = insn->code; 1614 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 1615 op = BPF_OP(code); 1616 if (class == BPF_JMP) { 1617 /* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE 1618 * conservatively. 1619 */ 1620 if (op == BPF_EXIT) 1621 return true; 1622 if (op == BPF_CALL) { 1623 /* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking 1624 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we 1625 * don't care the register def because they are anyway 1626 * marked as NOT_INIT already. 1627 */ 1628 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 1629 return false; 1630 /* Helper call will reach here because of arg type 1631 * check, conservatively return TRUE. 1632 */ 1633 if (t == SRC_OP) 1634 return true; 1635 1636 return false; 1637 } 1638 } 1639 1640 if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP || 1641 /* BPF_END always use BPF_ALU class. */ 1642 (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64)) 1643 return true; 1644 1645 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32) 1646 return false; 1647 1648 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 1649 if (t != SRC_OP) 1650 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 1651 /* LDX source must be ptr. */ 1652 return true; 1653 } 1654 1655 if (class == BPF_STX) { 1656 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 1657 return true; 1658 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 1659 } 1660 1661 if (class == BPF_LD) { 1662 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code); 1663 1664 /* LD_IMM64 */ 1665 if (mode == BPF_IMM) 1666 return true; 1667 1668 /* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */ 1669 if (t != SRC_OP) 1670 return false; 1671 1672 /* Implicit ctx ptr. */ 1673 if (regno == BPF_REG_6) 1674 return true; 1675 1676 /* Explicit source could be any width. */ 1677 return true; 1678 } 1679 1680 if (class == BPF_ST) 1681 /* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */ 1682 return true; 1683 1684 /* Conservatively return true at default. */ 1685 return true; 1686 } 1687 1688 /* Return TRUE if INSN doesn't have explicit value define. */ 1689 static bool insn_no_def(struct bpf_insn *insn) 1690 { 1691 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 1692 1693 return (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32 || 1694 class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST); 1695 } 1696 1697 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */ 1698 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 1699 { 1700 if (insn_no_def(insn)) 1701 return false; 1702 1703 return !is_reg64(env, insn, insn->dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP); 1704 } 1705 1706 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1707 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1708 { 1709 s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def; 1710 1711 if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG) 1712 return; 1713 1714 env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true; 1715 /* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */ 1716 reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 1717 } 1718 1719 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 1720 enum reg_arg_type t) 1721 { 1722 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 1723 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 1724 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx; 1725 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs; 1726 bool rw64; 1727 1728 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { 1729 verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); 1730 return -EINVAL; 1731 } 1732 1733 reg = ®s[regno]; 1734 rw64 = is_reg64(env, insn, regno, reg, t); 1735 if (t == SRC_OP) { 1736 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ 1737 if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) { 1738 verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); 1739 return -EACCES; 1740 } 1741 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ 1742 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) 1743 return 0; 1744 1745 if (rw64) 1746 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 1747 1748 return mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, 1749 rw64 ? REG_LIVE_READ64 : REG_LIVE_READ32); 1750 } else { 1751 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ 1752 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { 1753 verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); 1754 return -EACCES; 1755 } 1756 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 1757 reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 1758 if (t == DST_OP) 1759 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 1760 } 1761 return 0; 1762 } 1763 1764 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ 1765 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1766 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 1767 { 1768 u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; 1769 struct bpf_idx_pair *p; 1770 1771 cnt++; 1772 p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, cnt * sizeof(*p), GFP_USER); 1773 if (!p) 1774 return -ENOMEM; 1775 p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx; 1776 p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 1777 cur->jmp_history = p; 1778 cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; 1779 return 0; 1780 } 1781 1782 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded 1783 * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. 1784 */ 1785 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, 1786 u32 *history) 1787 { 1788 u32 cnt = *history; 1789 1790 if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { 1791 i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; 1792 (*history)--; 1793 } else { 1794 i--; 1795 } 1796 return i; 1797 } 1798 1799 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to 1800 * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and 1801 * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. 1802 */ 1803 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, 1804 u32 *reg_mask, u64 *stack_mask) 1805 { 1806 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 1807 .cb_print = verbose, 1808 .private_data = env, 1809 }; 1810 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; 1811 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 1812 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 1813 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 1814 u32 dreg = 1u << insn->dst_reg; 1815 u32 sreg = 1u << insn->src_reg; 1816 u32 spi; 1817 1818 if (insn->code == 0) 1819 return 0; 1820 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 1821 verbose(env, "regs=%x stack=%llx before ", *reg_mask, *stack_mask); 1822 verbose(env, "%d: ", idx); 1823 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 1824 } 1825 1826 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 1827 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 1828 return 0; 1829 if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 1830 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 1831 /* dreg = sreg 1832 * dreg needs precision after this insn 1833 * sreg needs precision before this insn 1834 */ 1835 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 1836 *reg_mask |= sreg; 1837 } else { 1838 /* dreg = K 1839 * dreg needs precision after this insn. 1840 * Corresponding register is already marked 1841 * as precise=true in this verifier state. 1842 * No further markings in parent are necessary 1843 */ 1844 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 1845 } 1846 } else { 1847 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 1848 /* dreg += sreg 1849 * both dreg and sreg need precision 1850 * before this insn 1851 */ 1852 *reg_mask |= sreg; 1853 } /* else dreg += K 1854 * dreg still needs precision before this insn 1855 */ 1856 } 1857 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 1858 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 1859 return 0; 1860 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 1861 1862 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision. 1863 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended. 1864 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated 1865 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. 1866 * No further tracking necessary. 1867 */ 1868 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 1869 return 0; 1870 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) 1871 return 0; 1872 1873 /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. 1874 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be 1875 * tracked with precision 1876 */ 1877 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1878 if (spi >= 64) { 1879 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 1880 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 1881 return -EFAULT; 1882 } 1883 *stack_mask |= 1ull << spi; 1884 } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) { 1885 if (*reg_mask & dreg) 1886 /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg 1887 * to access memory. It means backtracking 1888 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction. 1889 */ 1890 return -ENOTSUPP; 1891 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ 1892 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 1893 return 0; 1894 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) 1895 return 0; 1896 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1897 if (spi >= 64) { 1898 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 1899 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 1900 return -EFAULT; 1901 } 1902 if (!(*stack_mask & (1ull << spi))) 1903 return 0; 1904 *stack_mask &= ~(1ull << spi); 1905 if (class == BPF_STX) 1906 *reg_mask |= sreg; 1907 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 1908 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 1909 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 1910 return -ENOTSUPP; 1911 /* regular helper call sets R0 */ 1912 *reg_mask &= ~1; 1913 if (*reg_mask & 0x3f) { 1914 /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5 1915 * they should have been found already. 1916 */ 1917 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", *reg_mask); 1918 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 1919 return -EFAULT; 1920 } 1921 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 1922 return -ENOTSUPP; 1923 } 1924 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 1925 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 1926 return 0; 1927 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 1928 /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind. 1929 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision 1930 * into parent is necessary 1931 */ 1932 if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS) 1933 /* to be analyzed */ 1934 return -ENOTSUPP; 1935 } 1936 return 0; 1937 } 1938 1939 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm: 1940 * . at the start all registers have precise=false. 1941 * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns. 1942 * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in: 1943 * . ptr + scalar alu 1944 * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) 1945 * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected 1946 * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and 1947 * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers 1948 * should be precise. 1949 * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) 1950 * are equivalent if both are not precise. 1951 * 1952 * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain, 1953 * since many different registers and stack slots could have been 1954 * used to compute single precise scalar. 1955 * 1956 * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then 1957 * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects 1958 * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper 1959 * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe. 1960 * 1961 * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states. 1962 * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn. 1963 * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later. 1964 * 1965 * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like: 1966 * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) 1967 * r9 -= r8 1968 * r5 = r9 1969 * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7 1970 * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff)) 1971 * r5 += 1 1972 * ... 1973 * call bpf_perf_event_output#25 1974 * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO 1975 * 1976 * and this case: 1977 * r6 = 1 1978 * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0 1979 * r0 += r6 1980 * if r0 == 0 goto 1981 * 1982 * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame. 1983 * 1984 * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started, 1985 * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees 1986 * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to 1987 * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences") 1988 * 1989 * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. 1990 */ 1991 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1992 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1993 { 1994 struct bpf_func_state *func; 1995 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 1996 int i, j; 1997 1998 /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. 1999 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. 2000 */ 2001 for (; st; st = st->parent) 2002 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 2003 func = st->frame[i]; 2004 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 2005 reg = &func->regs[j]; 2006 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2007 continue; 2008 reg->precise = true; 2009 } 2010 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 2011 if (func->stack[j].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) 2012 continue; 2013 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 2014 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2015 continue; 2016 reg->precise = true; 2017 } 2018 } 2019 } 2020 2021 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 2022 int spi) 2023 { 2024 struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; 2025 int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 2026 int last_idx = env->insn_idx; 2027 struct bpf_func_state *func; 2028 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 2029 u32 reg_mask = regno >= 0 ? 1u << regno : 0; 2030 u64 stack_mask = spi >= 0 ? 1ull << spi : 0; 2031 bool skip_first = true; 2032 bool new_marks = false; 2033 int i, err; 2034 2035 if (!env->bpf_capable) 2036 return 0; 2037 2038 func = st->frame[st->curframe]; 2039 if (regno >= 0) { 2040 reg = &func->regs[regno]; 2041 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2042 WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse"); 2043 return -EFAULT; 2044 } 2045 if (!reg->precise) 2046 new_marks = true; 2047 else 2048 reg_mask = 0; 2049 reg->precise = true; 2050 } 2051 2052 while (spi >= 0) { 2053 if (func->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) { 2054 stack_mask = 0; 2055 break; 2056 } 2057 reg = &func->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 2058 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2059 stack_mask = 0; 2060 break; 2061 } 2062 if (!reg->precise) 2063 new_marks = true; 2064 else 2065 stack_mask = 0; 2066 reg->precise = true; 2067 break; 2068 } 2069 2070 if (!new_marks) 2071 return 0; 2072 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 2073 return 0; 2074 for (;;) { 2075 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 2076 u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; 2077 2078 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 2079 verbose(env, "last_idx %d first_idx %d\n", last_idx, first_idx); 2080 for (i = last_idx;;) { 2081 if (skip_first) { 2082 err = 0; 2083 skip_first = false; 2084 } else { 2085 err = backtrack_insn(env, i, ®_mask, &stack_mask); 2086 } 2087 if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { 2088 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); 2089 return 0; 2090 } else if (err) { 2091 return err; 2092 } 2093 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 2094 /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state. 2095 * Since this state is already marked, just return. 2096 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state. 2097 */ 2098 return 0; 2099 if (i == first_idx) 2100 break; 2101 i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); 2102 if (i >= env->prog->len) { 2103 /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0 2104 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask 2105 * to backtrack. 2106 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where 2107 * particular register was initialized with a constant. 2108 */ 2109 verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i); 2110 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2111 return -EFAULT; 2112 } 2113 } 2114 st = st->parent; 2115 if (!st) 2116 break; 2117 2118 new_marks = false; 2119 func = st->frame[st->curframe]; 2120 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 2121 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 2122 reg = &func->regs[i]; 2123 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2124 reg_mask &= ~(1u << i); 2125 continue; 2126 } 2127 if (!reg->precise) 2128 new_marks = true; 2129 reg->precise = true; 2130 } 2131 2132 bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); 2133 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 2134 if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) { 2135 /* the sequence of instructions: 2136 * 2: (bf) r3 = r10 2137 * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0 2138 * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) 2139 * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked 2140 * as a single block. 2141 * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as 2142 * stack access, so at the end of backtracking 2143 * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask. 2144 * However the parent state may not have accessed 2145 * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space. 2146 * In such case fallback to conservative. 2147 */ 2148 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); 2149 return 0; 2150 } 2151 2152 if (func->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) { 2153 stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); 2154 continue; 2155 } 2156 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 2157 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2158 stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); 2159 continue; 2160 } 2161 if (!reg->precise) 2162 new_marks = true; 2163 reg->precise = true; 2164 } 2165 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 2166 print_verifier_state(env, func); 2167 verbose(env, "parent %s regs=%x stack=%llx marks\n", 2168 new_marks ? "didn't have" : "already had", 2169 reg_mask, stack_mask); 2170 } 2171 2172 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 2173 break; 2174 if (!new_marks) 2175 break; 2176 2177 last_idx = st->last_insn_idx; 2178 first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 2179 } 2180 return 0; 2181 } 2182 2183 static int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 2184 { 2185 return __mark_chain_precision(env, regno, -1); 2186 } 2187 2188 static int mark_chain_precision_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int spi) 2189 { 2190 return __mark_chain_precision(env, -1, spi); 2191 } 2192 2193 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) 2194 { 2195 switch (type) { 2196 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 2197 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: 2198 case PTR_TO_STACK: 2199 case PTR_TO_CTX: 2200 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 2201 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 2202 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 2203 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 2204 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 2205 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 2206 case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: 2207 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 2208 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: 2209 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 2210 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: 2211 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 2212 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 2213 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL: 2214 case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF: 2215 case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL: 2216 case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF: 2217 case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL: 2218 case PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: 2219 return true; 2220 default: 2221 return false; 2222 } 2223 } 2224 2225 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ 2226 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2227 { 2228 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 2229 } 2230 2231 static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2232 { 2233 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 2234 } 2235 2236 static bool __is_scalar_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2237 { 2238 return tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off) && 2239 reg->smin_value == S64_MIN && reg->smax_value == S64_MAX && 2240 reg->umin_value == 0 && reg->umax_value == U64_MAX && 2241 reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN && reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX && 2242 reg->u32_min_value == 0 && reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX; 2243 } 2244 2245 static bool register_is_bounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2246 { 2247 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !__is_scalar_unbounded(reg); 2248 } 2249 2250 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, 2251 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2252 { 2253 if (allow_ptr_leaks) 2254 return false; 2255 2256 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; 2257 } 2258 2259 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, 2260 int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2261 { 2262 int i; 2263 2264 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg; 2265 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2266 2267 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 2268 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL; 2269 } 2270 2271 /* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers, 2272 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() 2273 */ 2274 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2275 struct bpf_func_state *state, /* func where register points to */ 2276 int off, int size, int value_regno, int insn_idx) 2277 { 2278 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 2279 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; 2280 u32 dst_reg = env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx].dst_reg; 2281 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; 2282 2283 err = realloc_func_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE), 2284 state->acquired_refs, true); 2285 if (err) 2286 return err; 2287 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, 2288 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits 2289 */ 2290 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && 2291 state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 2292 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 2293 verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); 2294 return -EACCES; 2295 } 2296 2297 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 2298 if (value_regno >= 0) 2299 reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 2300 2301 if (reg && size == BPF_REG_SIZE && register_is_bounded(reg) && 2302 !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) { 2303 if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) { 2304 /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit 2305 * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of 2306 * scalar via different register has to be conervative. 2307 * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise 2308 * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant. 2309 */ 2310 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 2311 if (err) 2312 return err; 2313 } 2314 save_register_state(state, spi, reg); 2315 } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { 2316 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ 2317 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 2318 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 2319 verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); 2320 return -EACCES; 2321 } 2322 2323 if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 2324 verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); 2325 return -EINVAL; 2326 } 2327 2328 if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) { 2329 bool sanitize = false; 2330 2331 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 2332 register_is_const(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr)) 2333 sanitize = true; 2334 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 2335 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC) { 2336 sanitize = true; 2337 break; 2338 } 2339 if (sanitize) { 2340 int *poff = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off; 2341 int soff = (-spi - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE; 2342 2343 /* detected reuse of integer stack slot with a pointer 2344 * which means either llvm is reusing stack slot or 2345 * an attacker is trying to exploit CVE-2018-3639 2346 * (speculative store bypass) 2347 * Have to sanitize that slot with preemptive 2348 * store of zero. 2349 */ 2350 if (*poff && *poff != soff) { 2351 /* disallow programs where single insn stores 2352 * into two different stack slots, since verifier 2353 * cannot sanitize them 2354 */ 2355 verbose(env, 2356 "insn %d cannot access two stack slots fp%d and fp%d", 2357 insn_idx, *poff, soff); 2358 return -EINVAL; 2359 } 2360 *poff = soff; 2361 } 2362 } 2363 save_register_state(state, spi, reg); 2364 } else { 2365 u8 type = STACK_MISC; 2366 2367 /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ 2368 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 2369 /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr. */ 2370 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) 2371 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 2372 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_MISC; 2373 2374 /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written 2375 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon 2376 * when stack slots are partially written. 2377 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be 2378 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks 2379 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs 2380 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes 2381 */ 2382 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 2383 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2384 2385 /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ 2386 if (reg && register_is_null(reg)) { 2387 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 2388 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 2389 if (err) 2390 return err; 2391 type = STACK_ZERO; 2392 } 2393 2394 /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ 2395 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 2396 state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = 2397 type; 2398 } 2399 return 0; 2400 } 2401 2402 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2403 struct bpf_func_state *reg_state /* func where register points to */, 2404 int off, int size, int value_regno) 2405 { 2406 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 2407 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 2408 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 2409 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 2410 u8 *stype; 2411 2412 if (reg_state->allocated_stack <= slot) { 2413 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+0 size %d\n", 2414 off, size); 2415 return -EACCES; 2416 } 2417 stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 2418 reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 2419 2420 if (stype[0] == STACK_SPILL) { 2421 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 2422 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2423 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 2424 verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); 2425 return -EACCES; 2426 } 2427 if (value_regno >= 0) { 2428 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno); 2429 state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2430 } 2431 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 2432 return 0; 2433 } 2434 for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 2435 if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL) { 2436 verbose(env, "corrupted spill memory\n"); 2437 return -EACCES; 2438 } 2439 } 2440 2441 if (value_regno >= 0) { 2442 /* restore register state from stack */ 2443 state->regs[value_regno] = *reg; 2444 /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely 2445 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() 2446 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions 2447 */ 2448 state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2449 } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) { 2450 /* If value_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether 2451 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE 2452 * (e.g. for XADD). 2453 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that 2454 * with spilled pointers. 2455 */ 2456 verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n", 2457 off); 2458 return -EACCES; 2459 } 2460 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 2461 } else { 2462 int zeros = 0; 2463 2464 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 2465 if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC) 2466 continue; 2467 if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) { 2468 zeros++; 2469 continue; 2470 } 2471 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 2472 off, i, size); 2473 return -EACCES; 2474 } 2475 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 2476 if (value_regno >= 0) { 2477 if (zeros == size) { 2478 /* any size read into register is zero extended, 2479 * so the whole register == const_zero 2480 */ 2481 __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[value_regno]); 2482 /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet, 2483 * so mark it precise here, so that later 2484 * backtracking can stop here. 2485 * Backtracking may not need this if this register 2486 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment. 2487 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not 2488 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop 2489 * backtracking. Any register that contributed 2490 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill. 2491 */ 2492 state->regs[value_regno].precise = true; 2493 } else { 2494 /* have read misc data from the stack */ 2495 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno); 2496 } 2497 state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2498 } 2499 } 2500 return 0; 2501 } 2502 2503 static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2504 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 2505 int off, int size) 2506 { 2507 /* Stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we 2508 * can determine what type of data were returned. See 2509 * check_stack_read(). 2510 */ 2511 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 2512 char tn_buf[48]; 2513 2514 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 2515 verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", 2516 tn_buf, off, size); 2517 return -EACCES; 2518 } 2519 2520 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { 2521 verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 2522 return -EACCES; 2523 } 2524 2525 return 0; 2526 } 2527 2528 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 2529 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) 2530 { 2531 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 2532 struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr; 2533 u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map); 2534 2535 if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) { 2536 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 2537 map->value_size, off, size); 2538 return -EACCES; 2539 } 2540 2541 if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) { 2542 verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 2543 map->value_size, off, size); 2544 return -EACCES; 2545 } 2546 2547 return 0; 2548 } 2549 2550 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */ 2551 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 2552 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 2553 bool zero_size_allowed) 2554 { 2555 bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed); 2556 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 2557 2558 if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size) 2559 return 0; 2560 2561 reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 2562 switch (reg->type) { 2563 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 2564 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 2565 mem_size, off, size); 2566 break; 2567 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 2568 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 2569 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 2570 verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", 2571 off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size); 2572 break; 2573 case PTR_TO_MEM: 2574 default: 2575 verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n", 2576 mem_size, off, size); 2577 } 2578 2579 return -EACCES; 2580 } 2581 2582 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */ 2583 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 2584 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 2585 bool zero_size_allowed) 2586 { 2587 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 2588 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 2589 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 2590 int err; 2591 2592 /* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we 2593 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off 2594 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. 2595 */ 2596 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 2597 print_verifier_state(env, state); 2598 2599 /* The minimum value is only important with signed 2600 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a 2601 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our 2602 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use 2603 * will have a set floor within our range. 2604 */ 2605 if (reg->smin_value < 0 && 2606 (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN || 2607 (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) || 2608 reg->smin_value + off < 0)) { 2609 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 2610 regno); 2611 return -EACCES; 2612 } 2613 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, 2614 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 2615 if (err) { 2616 verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 2617 regno); 2618 return err; 2619 } 2620 2621 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be 2622 * sure we won't do bad things. 2623 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. 2624 */ 2625 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 2626 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n", 2627 regno); 2628 return -EACCES; 2629 } 2630 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, 2631 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 2632 if (err) { 2633 verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 2634 regno); 2635 return err; 2636 } 2637 2638 return 0; 2639 } 2640 2641 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ 2642 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 2643 int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed) 2644 { 2645 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 2646 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 2647 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 2648 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 2649 int err; 2650 2651 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size, 2652 zero_size_allowed); 2653 if (err) 2654 return err; 2655 2656 if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { 2657 u32 lock = map->spin_lock_off; 2658 2659 /* if any part of struct bpf_spin_lock can be touched by 2660 * load/store reject this program. 2661 * To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2) 2662 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2. 2663 */ 2664 if (reg->smin_value + off < lock + sizeof(struct bpf_spin_lock) && 2665 lock < reg->umax_value + off + size) { 2666 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n"); 2667 return -EACCES; 2668 } 2669 } 2670 return err; 2671 } 2672 2673 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff 2674 2675 static enum bpf_prog_type resolve_prog_type(struct bpf_prog *prog) 2676 { 2677 return prog->aux->dst_prog ? prog->aux->dst_prog->type : prog->type; 2678 } 2679 2680 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2681 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 2682 enum bpf_access_type t) 2683 { 2684 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 2685 2686 switch (prog_type) { 2687 /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */ 2688 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: 2689 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: 2690 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL: 2691 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 2692 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 2693 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 2694 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 2695 return false; 2696 fallthrough; 2697 2698 /* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */ 2699 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 2700 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 2701 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 2702 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: 2703 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: 2704 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: 2705 if (meta) 2706 return meta->pkt_access; 2707 2708 env->seen_direct_write = true; 2709 return true; 2710 2711 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 2712 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 2713 env->seen_direct_write = true; 2714 2715 return true; 2716 2717 default: 2718 return false; 2719 } 2720 } 2721 2722 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, 2723 int size, bool zero_size_allowed) 2724 { 2725 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 2726 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 2727 int err; 2728 2729 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any 2730 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed 2731 * offset. 2732 */ 2733 2734 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough 2735 * detail to prove they're safe. 2736 */ 2737 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 2738 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 2739 regno); 2740 return -EACCES; 2741 } 2742 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range, 2743 zero_size_allowed); 2744 if (err) { 2745 verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); 2746 return err; 2747 } 2748 2749 /* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16. 2750 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff, 2751 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info 2752 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access. 2753 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32. 2754 */ 2755 env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = 2756 max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset, 2757 off + reg->umax_value + size - 1); 2758 2759 return err; 2760 } 2761 2762 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ 2763 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, 2764 enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, 2765 u32 *btf_id) 2766 { 2767 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { 2768 .reg_type = *reg_type, 2769 .log = &env->log, 2770 }; 2771 2772 if (env->ops->is_valid_access && 2773 env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) { 2774 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a 2775 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole 2776 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower 2777 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size 2778 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other 2779 * type of narrower access. 2780 */ 2781 *reg_type = info.reg_type; 2782 2783 if (*reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || *reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) 2784 *btf_id = info.btf_id; 2785 else 2786 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; 2787 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ 2788 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) 2789 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; 2790 return 0; 2791 } 2792 2793 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 2794 return -EACCES; 2795 } 2796 2797 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, 2798 int size) 2799 { 2800 if (size < 0 || off < 0 || 2801 (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) { 2802 verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n", 2803 off, size); 2804 return -EACCES; 2805 } 2806 return 0; 2807 } 2808 2809 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 2810 u32 regno, int off, int size, 2811 enum bpf_access_type t) 2812 { 2813 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 2814 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 2815 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {}; 2816 bool valid; 2817 2818 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 2819 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 2820 regno); 2821 return -EACCES; 2822 } 2823 2824 switch (reg->type) { 2825 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 2826 valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 2827 break; 2828 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 2829 valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 2830 break; 2831 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 2832 valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 2833 break; 2834 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 2835 valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 2836 break; 2837 default: 2838 valid = false; 2839 } 2840 2841 2842 if (valid) { 2843 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = 2844 info.ctx_field_size; 2845 return 0; 2846 } 2847 2848 verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n", 2849 regno, reg_type_str[reg->type], off, size); 2850 2851 return -EACCES; 2852 } 2853 2854 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 2855 { 2856 return cur_regs(env) + regno; 2857 } 2858 2859 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 2860 { 2861 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno)); 2862 } 2863 2864 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 2865 { 2866 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 2867 2868 return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; 2869 } 2870 2871 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 2872 { 2873 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 2874 2875 return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type); 2876 } 2877 2878 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 2879 { 2880 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 2881 2882 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 2883 } 2884 2885 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 2886 { 2887 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 2888 2889 /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */ 2890 return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS; 2891 } 2892 2893 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2894 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 2895 int off, int size, bool strict) 2896 { 2897 struct tnum reg_off; 2898 int ip_align; 2899 2900 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 2901 if (!strict || size == 1) 2902 return 0; 2903 2904 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling 2905 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of 2906 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms 2907 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get 2908 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate 2909 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an 2910 * unconditional IP align value of '2'. 2911 */ 2912 ip_align = 2; 2913 2914 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); 2915 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 2916 char tn_buf[48]; 2917 2918 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 2919 verbose(env, 2920 "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", 2921 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 2922 return -EACCES; 2923 } 2924 2925 return 0; 2926 } 2927 2928 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2929 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 2930 const char *pointer_desc, 2931 int off, int size, bool strict) 2932 { 2933 struct tnum reg_off; 2934 2935 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 2936 if (!strict || size == 1) 2937 return 0; 2938 2939 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); 2940 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 2941 char tn_buf[48]; 2942 2943 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 2944 verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", 2945 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 2946 return -EACCES; 2947 } 2948 2949 return 0; 2950 } 2951 2952 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2953 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, 2954 int size, bool strict_alignment_once) 2955 { 2956 bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once; 2957 const char *pointer_desc = ""; 2958 2959 switch (reg->type) { 2960 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 2961 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 2962 /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits 2963 * right in front, treat it the very same way. 2964 */ 2965 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); 2966 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 2967 pointer_desc = "flow keys "; 2968 break; 2969 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 2970 pointer_desc = "value "; 2971 break; 2972 case PTR_TO_CTX: 2973 pointer_desc = "context "; 2974 break; 2975 case PTR_TO_STACK: 2976 pointer_desc = "stack "; 2977 /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write() 2978 * and check_stack_read() relies on stack accesses being 2979 * aligned. 2980 */ 2981 strict = true; 2982 break; 2983 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 2984 pointer_desc = "sock "; 2985 break; 2986 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 2987 pointer_desc = "sock_common "; 2988 break; 2989 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 2990 pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; 2991 break; 2992 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 2993 pointer_desc = "xdp_sock "; 2994 break; 2995 default: 2996 break; 2997 } 2998 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, 2999 strict); 3000 } 3001 3002 static int update_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3003 const struct bpf_func_state *func, 3004 int off) 3005 { 3006 u16 stack = env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth; 3007 3008 if (stack >= -off) 3009 return 0; 3010 3011 /* update known max for given subprogram */ 3012 env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth = -off; 3013 return 0; 3014 } 3015 3016 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function 3017 * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. 3018 * Ignore jump and exit insns. 3019 * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm 3020 * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites 3021 */ 3022 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3023 { 3024 int depth = 0, frame = 0, idx = 0, i = 0, subprog_end; 3025 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 3026 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 3027 bool tail_call_reachable = false; 3028 int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 3029 int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 3030 int j; 3031 3032 process_func: 3033 /* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when 3034 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack 3035 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario 3036 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 3037 * 8k). 3038 * 3039 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example: 3040 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128 3041 * subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256 3042 * tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256 3043 * func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320) 3044 * subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64 3045 * subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128 3046 * tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128 3047 * func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416) 3048 * 3049 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid 3050 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above. 3051 */ 3052 if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) { 3053 verbose(env, 3054 "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n", 3055 depth); 3056 return -EACCES; 3057 } 3058 /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity 3059 * of interpreter stack size 3060 */ 3061 depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 3062 if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { 3063 verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n", 3064 frame + 1, depth); 3065 return -EACCES; 3066 } 3067 continue_func: 3068 subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; 3069 for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { 3070 if (insn[i].code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 3071 continue; 3072 if (insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 3073 continue; 3074 /* remember insn and function to return to */ 3075 ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; 3076 ret_prog[frame] = idx; 3077 3078 /* find the callee */ 3079 i = i + insn[i].imm + 1; 3080 idx = find_subprog(env, i); 3081 if (idx < 0) { 3082 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 3083 i); 3084 return -EFAULT; 3085 } 3086 3087 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) 3088 tail_call_reachable = true; 3089 3090 frame++; 3091 if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 3092 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n", 3093 frame); 3094 return -E2BIG; 3095 } 3096 goto process_func; 3097 } 3098 /* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the 3099 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs; 3100 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the 3101 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls 3102 */ 3103 if (tail_call_reachable) 3104 for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) 3105 subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true; 3106 3107 /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog' 3108 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT 3109 */ 3110 if (frame == 0) 3111 return 0; 3112 depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 3113 frame--; 3114 i = ret_insn[frame]; 3115 idx = ret_prog[frame]; 3116 goto continue_func; 3117 } 3118 3119 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 3120 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3121 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx) 3122 { 3123 int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog; 3124 3125 subprog = find_subprog(env, start); 3126 if (subprog < 0) { 3127 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 3128 start); 3129 return -EFAULT; 3130 } 3131 return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth; 3132 } 3133 #endif 3134 3135 int check_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3136 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) 3137 { 3138 /* Access to ctx or passing it to a helper is only allowed in 3139 * its original, unmodified form. 3140 */ 3141 3142 if (reg->off) { 3143 verbose(env, "dereference of modified ctx ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 3144 regno, reg->off); 3145 return -EACCES; 3146 } 3147 3148 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 3149 char tn_buf[48]; 3150 3151 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3152 verbose(env, "variable ctx access var_off=%s disallowed\n", tn_buf); 3153 return -EACCES; 3154 } 3155 3156 return 0; 3157 } 3158 3159 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3160 const char *buf_info, 3161 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3162 int regno, int off, int size) 3163 { 3164 if (off < 0) { 3165 verbose(env, 3166 "R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n", 3167 regno, buf_info, off, size); 3168 return -EACCES; 3169 } 3170 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 3171 char tn_buf[48]; 3172 3173 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3174 verbose(env, 3175 "R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 3176 regno, off, tn_buf); 3177 return -EACCES; 3178 } 3179 3180 return 0; 3181 } 3182 3183 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3184 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3185 int regno, int off, int size) 3186 { 3187 int err; 3188 3189 err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size); 3190 if (err) 3191 return err; 3192 3193 if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access) 3194 env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size; 3195 3196 return 0; 3197 } 3198 3199 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3200 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3201 int regno, int off, int size, 3202 bool zero_size_allowed, 3203 const char *buf_info, 3204 u32 *max_access) 3205 { 3206 int err; 3207 3208 err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size); 3209 if (err) 3210 return err; 3211 3212 if (off + size > *max_access) 3213 *max_access = off + size; 3214 3215 return 0; 3216 } 3217 3218 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */ 3219 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3220 { 3221 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 3222 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 3223 } 3224 3225 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes) 3226 * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE 3227 */ 3228 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 3229 { 3230 u64 mask; 3231 3232 /* clear high bits in bit representation */ 3233 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size); 3234 3235 /* fix arithmetic bounds */ 3236 mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1; 3237 if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) { 3238 reg->umin_value &= mask; 3239 reg->umax_value &= mask; 3240 } else { 3241 reg->umin_value = 0; 3242 reg->umax_value = mask; 3243 } 3244 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 3245 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 3246 3247 /* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register 3248 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into 3249 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already. 3250 */ 3251 if (size >= 4) 3252 return; 3253 __reg_combine_64_into_32(reg); 3254 } 3255 3256 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map) 3257 { 3258 return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && map->frozen; 3259 } 3260 3261 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val) 3262 { 3263 void *ptr; 3264 u64 addr; 3265 int err; 3266 3267 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 3268 if (err) 3269 return err; 3270 ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off; 3271 3272 switch (size) { 3273 case sizeof(u8): 3274 *val = (u64)*(u8 *)ptr; 3275 break; 3276 case sizeof(u16): 3277 *val = (u64)*(u16 *)ptr; 3278 break; 3279 case sizeof(u32): 3280 *val = (u64)*(u32 *)ptr; 3281 break; 3282 case sizeof(u64): 3283 *val = *(u64 *)ptr; 3284 break; 3285 default: 3286 return -EINVAL; 3287 } 3288 return 0; 3289 } 3290 3291 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3292 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 3293 int regno, int off, int size, 3294 enum bpf_access_type atype, 3295 int value_regno) 3296 { 3297 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 3298 const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, reg->btf_id); 3299 const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 3300 u32 btf_id; 3301 int ret; 3302 3303 if (off < 0) { 3304 verbose(env, 3305 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 3306 regno, tname, off); 3307 return -EACCES; 3308 } 3309 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 3310 char tn_buf[48]; 3311 3312 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3313 verbose(env, 3314 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 3315 regno, tname, off, tn_buf); 3316 return -EACCES; 3317 } 3318 3319 if (env->ops->btf_struct_access) { 3320 ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, t, off, size, 3321 atype, &btf_id); 3322 } else { 3323 if (atype != BPF_READ) { 3324 verbose(env, "only read is supported\n"); 3325 return -EACCES; 3326 } 3327 3328 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, t, off, size, atype, 3329 &btf_id); 3330 } 3331 3332 if (ret < 0) 3333 return ret; 3334 3335 if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 3336 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_id); 3337 3338 return 0; 3339 } 3340 3341 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3342 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 3343 int regno, int off, int size, 3344 enum bpf_access_type atype, 3345 int value_regno) 3346 { 3347 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 3348 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 3349 const struct btf_type *t; 3350 const char *tname; 3351 u32 btf_id; 3352 int ret; 3353 3354 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 3355 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 3356 return -ENOTSUPP; 3357 } 3358 3359 if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) { 3360 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n", 3361 map->map_type); 3362 return -ENOTSUPP; 3363 } 3364 3365 t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id); 3366 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 3367 3368 if (!env->allow_ptr_to_map_access) { 3369 verbose(env, 3370 "%s access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 3371 tname); 3372 return -EPERM; 3373 } 3374 3375 if (off < 0) { 3376 verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 3377 regno, tname, off); 3378 return -EACCES; 3379 } 3380 3381 if (atype != BPF_READ) { 3382 verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname); 3383 return -EACCES; 3384 } 3385 3386 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, t, off, size, atype, &btf_id); 3387 if (ret < 0) 3388 return ret; 3389 3390 if (value_regno >= 0) 3391 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_id); 3392 3393 return 0; 3394 } 3395 3396 3397 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) 3398 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory 3399 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory 3400 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory 3401 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory 3402 */ 3403 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, 3404 int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, 3405 int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once) 3406 { 3407 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 3408 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 3409 struct bpf_func_state *state; 3410 int size, err = 0; 3411 3412 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); 3413 if (size < 0) 3414 return size; 3415 3416 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ 3417 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once); 3418 if (err) 3419 return err; 3420 3421 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ 3422 off += reg->off; 3423 3424 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 3425 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 3426 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 3427 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); 3428 return -EACCES; 3429 } 3430 err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t); 3431 if (err) 3432 return err; 3433 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false); 3434 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 3435 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 3436 3437 /* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */ 3438 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && 3439 bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) && 3440 map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 3441 int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value; 3442 u64 val = 0; 3443 3444 err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size, 3445 &val); 3446 if (err) 3447 return err; 3448 3449 regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 3450 __mark_reg_known(®s[value_regno], val); 3451 } else { 3452 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 3453 } 3454 } 3455 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MEM) { 3456 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 3457 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 3458 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno); 3459 return -EACCES; 3460 } 3461 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 3462 reg->mem_size, false); 3463 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 3464 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 3465 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 3466 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; 3467 u32 btf_id = 0; 3468 3469 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 3470 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 3471 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); 3472 return -EACCES; 3473 } 3474 3475 err = check_ctx_reg(env, reg, regno); 3476 if (err < 0) 3477 return err; 3478 3479 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type, &btf_id); 3480 if (err) 3481 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 3482 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 3483 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a 3484 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter 3485 * case, we know the offset is zero. 3486 */ 3487 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 3488 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 3489 } else { 3490 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, 3491 value_regno); 3492 if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg_type)) 3493 regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 3494 /* A load of ctx field could have different 3495 * actual load size with the one encoded in the 3496 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not 3497 * a sub-register. 3498 */ 3499 regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 3500 if (reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 3501 reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) 3502 regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id; 3503 } 3504 regs[value_regno].type = reg_type; 3505 } 3506 3507 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 3508 off += reg->var_off.value; 3509 err = check_stack_access(env, reg, off, size); 3510 if (err) 3511 return err; 3512 3513 state = func(env, reg); 3514 err = update_stack_depth(env, state, off); 3515 if (err) 3516 return err; 3517 3518 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 3519 err = check_stack_write(env, state, off, size, 3520 value_regno, insn_idx); 3521 else 3522 err = check_stack_read(env, state, off, size, 3523 value_regno); 3524 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { 3525 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { 3526 verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); 3527 return -EACCES; 3528 } 3529 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 3530 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 3531 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", 3532 value_regno); 3533 return -EACCES; 3534 } 3535 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false); 3536 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 3537 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 3538 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) { 3539 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 3540 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 3541 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n", 3542 value_regno); 3543 return -EACCES; 3544 } 3545 3546 err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size); 3547 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 3548 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 3549 } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) { 3550 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 3551 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 3552 regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]); 3553 return -EACCES; 3554 } 3555 err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); 3556 if (!err && value_regno >= 0) 3557 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 3558 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) { 3559 err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size); 3560 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 3561 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 3562 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 3563 err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 3564 value_regno); 3565 } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { 3566 err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 3567 value_regno); 3568 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF) { 3569 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 3570 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 3571 regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]); 3572 return -EACCES; 3573 } 3574 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, 3575 "rdonly", 3576 &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access); 3577 if (!err && value_regno >= 0) 3578 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 3579 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF) { 3580 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, 3581 "rdwr", 3582 &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access); 3583 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 3584 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 3585 } else { 3586 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 3587 reg_type_str[reg->type]); 3588 return -EACCES; 3589 } 3590 3591 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && 3592 regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 3593 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ 3594 coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size); 3595 } 3596 return err; 3597 } 3598 3599 static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn) 3600 { 3601 int err; 3602 3603 if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) || 3604 insn->imm != 0) { 3605 verbose(env, "BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n"); 3606 return -EINVAL; 3607 } 3608 3609 /* check src1 operand */ 3610 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 3611 if (err) 3612 return err; 3613 3614 /* check src2 operand */ 3615 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 3616 if (err) 3617 return err; 3618 3619 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 3620 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); 3621 return -EACCES; 3622 } 3623 3624 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 3625 is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 3626 is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 3627 is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 3628 verbose(env, "BPF_XADD stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 3629 insn->dst_reg, 3630 reg_type_str[reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type]); 3631 return -EACCES; 3632 } 3633 3634 /* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */ 3635 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 3636 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true); 3637 if (err) 3638 return err; 3639 3640 /* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */ 3641 return check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 3642 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true); 3643 } 3644 3645 static int __check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3646 int off, int access_size, 3647 bool zero_size_allowed) 3648 { 3649 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 3650 3651 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 || 3652 access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) { 3653 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 3654 verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n", 3655 regno, off, access_size); 3656 } else { 3657 char tn_buf[48]; 3658 3659 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3660 verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d var_off=%s access_size=%d\n", 3661 regno, tn_buf, access_size); 3662 } 3663 return -EACCES; 3664 } 3665 return 0; 3666 } 3667 3668 /* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size' 3669 * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary 3670 * and all elements of stack are initialized. 3671 * Unlike most pointer bounds-checking functions, this one doesn't take an 3672 * 'off' argument, so it has to add in reg->off itself. 3673 */ 3674 static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 3675 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 3676 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 3677 { 3678 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 3679 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3680 int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi; 3681 3682 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 3683 min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + reg->off; 3684 err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size, 3685 zero_size_allowed); 3686 if (err) 3687 return err; 3688 } else { 3689 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for 3690 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in 3691 * Spectre masking for stack ALU. 3692 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 3693 */ 3694 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 3695 char tn_buf[48]; 3696 3697 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3698 verbose(env, "R%d indirect variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 3699 regno, tn_buf); 3700 return -EACCES; 3701 } 3702 /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed 3703 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to 3704 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on 3705 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may 3706 * cause uninitialized stack leaking. 3707 */ 3708 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) 3709 meta = NULL; 3710 3711 if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || 3712 reg->smax_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 3713 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded indirect variable offset stack access\n", 3714 regno); 3715 return -EACCES; 3716 } 3717 min_off = reg->smin_value + reg->off; 3718 max_off = reg->smax_value + reg->off; 3719 err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size, 3720 zero_size_allowed); 3721 if (err) { 3722 verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of stack bound\n", 3723 regno); 3724 return err; 3725 } 3726 err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, max_off, access_size, 3727 zero_size_allowed); 3728 if (err) { 3729 verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of stack bound\n", 3730 regno); 3731 return err; 3732 } 3733 } 3734 3735 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 3736 meta->access_size = access_size; 3737 meta->regno = regno; 3738 return 0; 3739 } 3740 3741 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 3742 u8 *stype; 3743 3744 slot = -i - 1; 3745 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3746 if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) 3747 goto err; 3748 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 3749 if (*stype == STACK_MISC) 3750 goto mark; 3751 if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) { 3752 /* helper can write anything into the stack */ 3753 *stype = STACK_MISC; 3754 goto mark; 3755 } 3756 3757 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 3758 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 3759 goto mark; 3760 3761 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 3762 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 3763 __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 3764 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 3765 state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC; 3766 goto mark; 3767 } 3768 3769 err: 3770 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 3771 verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 3772 min_off, i - min_off, access_size); 3773 } else { 3774 char tn_buf[48]; 3775 3776 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3777 verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack var_off %s+%d size %d\n", 3778 tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size); 3779 } 3780 return -EACCES; 3781 mark: 3782 /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause 3783 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' 3784 */ 3785 mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 3786 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, 3787 REG_LIVE_READ64); 3788 } 3789 return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off); 3790 } 3791 3792 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 3793 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 3794 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 3795 { 3796 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 3797 3798 switch (reg->type) { 3799 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 3800 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 3801 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 3802 zero_size_allowed); 3803 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 3804 if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 3805 meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : 3806 BPF_READ)) 3807 return -EACCES; 3808 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 3809 zero_size_allowed); 3810 case PTR_TO_MEM: 3811 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, 3812 access_size, reg->mem_size, 3813 zero_size_allowed); 3814 case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF: 3815 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) 3816 return -EACCES; 3817 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, 3818 access_size, zero_size_allowed, 3819 "rdonly", 3820 &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access); 3821 case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF: 3822 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, 3823 access_size, zero_size_allowed, 3824 "rdwr", 3825 &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access); 3826 case PTR_TO_STACK: 3827 return check_stack_boundary(env, regno, access_size, 3828 zero_size_allowed, meta); 3829 default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */ 3830 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ 3831 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && 3832 register_is_null(reg)) 3833 return 0; 3834 3835 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno, 3836 reg_type_str[reg->type], 3837 reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]); 3838 return -EACCES; 3839 } 3840 } 3841 3842 /* Implementation details: 3843 * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL 3844 * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id. 3845 * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE the verifier clears reg->id after 3846 * value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only cares about 3847 * the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care about actual 3848 * address of the map element. 3849 * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps 3850 * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so 3851 * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that 3852 * point to different bpf_spin_locks. 3853 * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid 3854 * dead-locks. 3855 * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than 3856 * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only 3857 * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs. 3858 * cur_state->active_spin_lock remembers which map value element got locked 3859 * and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock. 3860 */ 3861 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 3862 bool is_lock) 3863 { 3864 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 3865 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 3866 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 3867 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 3868 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 3869 3870 if (!is_const) { 3871 verbose(env, 3872 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n", 3873 regno); 3874 return -EINVAL; 3875 } 3876 if (!map->btf) { 3877 verbose(env, 3878 "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_spin_lock\n", 3879 map->name); 3880 return -EINVAL; 3881 } 3882 if (!map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { 3883 if (map->spin_lock_off == -E2BIG) 3884 verbose(env, 3885 "map '%s' has more than one 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n", 3886 map->name); 3887 else if (map->spin_lock_off == -ENOENT) 3888 verbose(env, 3889 "map '%s' doesn't have 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n", 3890 map->name); 3891 else 3892 verbose(env, 3893 "map '%s' is not a struct type or bpf_spin_lock is mangled\n", 3894 map->name); 3895 return -EINVAL; 3896 } 3897 if (map->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { 3898 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n", 3899 val + reg->off); 3900 return -EINVAL; 3901 } 3902 if (is_lock) { 3903 if (cur->active_spin_lock) { 3904 verbose(env, 3905 "Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n"); 3906 return -EINVAL; 3907 } 3908 cur->active_spin_lock = reg->id; 3909 } else { 3910 if (!cur->active_spin_lock) { 3911 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock without taking a lock\n"); 3912 return -EINVAL; 3913 } 3914 if (cur->active_spin_lock != reg->id) { 3915 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock\n"); 3916 return -EINVAL; 3917 } 3918 cur->active_spin_lock = 0; 3919 } 3920 return 0; 3921 } 3922 3923 static bool arg_type_is_mem_ptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) 3924 { 3925 return type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || 3926 type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL || 3927 type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM; 3928 } 3929 3930 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 3931 { 3932 return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || 3933 type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO; 3934 } 3935 3936 static bool arg_type_is_alloc_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 3937 { 3938 return type == ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO; 3939 } 3940 3941 static bool arg_type_is_int_ptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) 3942 { 3943 return type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT || 3944 type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG; 3945 } 3946 3947 static int int_ptr_type_to_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 3948 { 3949 if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT) 3950 return sizeof(u32); 3951 else if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG) 3952 return sizeof(u64); 3953 3954 return -EINVAL; 3955 } 3956 3957 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3958 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 3959 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type) 3960 { 3961 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 3962 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 3963 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n"); 3964 return -EACCES; 3965 } 3966 3967 switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { 3968 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 3969 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 3970 if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 3971 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON; 3972 } else { 3973 verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n"); 3974 return -EINVAL; 3975 } 3976 break; 3977 3978 default: 3979 break; 3980 } 3981 return 0; 3982 } 3983 3984 struct bpf_reg_types { 3985 const enum bpf_reg_type types[10]; 3986 u32 *btf_id; 3987 }; 3988 3989 static const struct bpf_reg_types map_key_value_types = { 3990 .types = { 3991 PTR_TO_STACK, 3992 PTR_TO_PACKET, 3993 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 3994 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 3995 }, 3996 }; 3997 3998 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = { 3999 .types = { 4000 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 4001 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 4002 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 4003 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 4004 }, 4005 }; 4006 4007 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 4008 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = { 4009 .types = { 4010 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 4011 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 4012 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 4013 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 4014 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 4015 }, 4016 .btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 4017 }; 4018 #endif 4019 4020 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { 4021 .types = { 4022 PTR_TO_STACK, 4023 PTR_TO_PACKET, 4024 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 4025 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 4026 PTR_TO_MEM, 4027 PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF, 4028 PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF, 4029 }, 4030 }; 4031 4032 static const struct bpf_reg_types int_ptr_types = { 4033 .types = { 4034 PTR_TO_STACK, 4035 PTR_TO_PACKET, 4036 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 4037 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 4038 }, 4039 }; 4040 4041 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } }; 4042 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } }; 4043 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } }; 4044 static const struct bpf_reg_types alloc_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM } }; 4045 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } }; 4046 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_BTF_ID } }; 4047 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 4048 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID } }; 4049 4050 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { 4051 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &map_key_value_types, 4052 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = &map_key_value_types, 4053 [ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE] = &map_key_value_types, 4054 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = &map_key_value_types, 4055 [ARG_CONST_SIZE] = &scalar_types, 4056 [ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 4057 [ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 4058 [ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR] = &const_map_ptr_types, 4059 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX] = &context_types, 4060 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX_OR_NULL] = &context_types, 4061 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &sock_types, 4062 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 4063 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_id_sock_common_types, 4064 #endif 4065 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &fullsock_types, 4066 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL] = &fullsock_types, 4067 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = &btf_ptr_types, 4068 [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types, 4069 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types, 4070 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL] = &mem_types, 4071 [ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM] = &mem_types, 4072 [ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM] = &alloc_mem_types, 4073 [ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL] = &alloc_mem_types, 4074 [ARG_PTR_TO_INT] = &int_ptr_types, 4075 [ARG_PTR_TO_LONG] = &int_ptr_types, 4076 [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, 4077 }; 4078 4079 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 4080 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, 4081 const u32 *arg_btf_id) 4082 { 4083 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 4084 enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type; 4085 const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible; 4086 int i, j; 4087 4088 compatible = compatible_reg_types[arg_type]; 4089 if (!compatible) { 4090 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type); 4091 return -EFAULT; 4092 } 4093 4094 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) { 4095 expected = compatible->types[i]; 4096 if (expected == NOT_INIT) 4097 break; 4098 4099 if (type == expected) 4100 goto found; 4101 } 4102 4103 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str[type]); 4104 for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++) 4105 verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str[compatible->types[j]]); 4106 verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str[compatible->types[j]]); 4107 return -EACCES; 4108 4109 found: 4110 if (type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 4111 if (!arg_btf_id) { 4112 if (!compatible->btf_id) { 4113 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n"); 4114 return -EFAULT; 4115 } 4116 arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id; 4117 } 4118 4119 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->off, reg->btf_id, 4120 *arg_btf_id)) { 4121 verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n", 4122 regno, kernel_type_name(reg->btf_id), 4123 kernel_type_name(*arg_btf_id)); 4124 return -EACCES; 4125 } 4126 4127 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 4128 verbose(env, "R%d is a pointer to in-kernel struct with non-zero offset\n", 4129 regno); 4130 return -EACCES; 4131 } 4132 } 4133 4134 return 0; 4135 } 4136 4137 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, 4138 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 4139 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 4140 { 4141 u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg; 4142 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 4143 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg]; 4144 enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; 4145 int err = 0; 4146 4147 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) 4148 return 0; 4149 4150 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 4151 if (err) 4152 return err; 4153 4154 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 4155 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 4156 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", 4157 regno); 4158 return -EACCES; 4159 } 4160 return 0; 4161 } 4162 4163 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 4164 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { 4165 verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); 4166 return -EACCES; 4167 } 4168 4169 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 4170 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE || 4171 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { 4172 err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type); 4173 if (err) 4174 return err; 4175 } 4176 4177 if (register_is_null(reg) && arg_type_may_be_null(arg_type)) 4178 /* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip 4179 * type checking. 4180 */ 4181 goto skip_type_check; 4182 4183 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, fn->arg_btf_id[arg]); 4184 if (err) 4185 return err; 4186 4187 if (type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 4188 err = check_ctx_reg(env, reg, regno); 4189 if (err < 0) 4190 return err; 4191 } 4192 4193 skip_type_check: 4194 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 4195 if (meta->ref_obj_id) { 4196 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 4197 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 4198 meta->ref_obj_id); 4199 return -EFAULT; 4200 } 4201 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 4202 } 4203 4204 if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) { 4205 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ 4206 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 4207 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { 4208 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: 4209 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within 4210 * stack limits and initialized 4211 */ 4212 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 4213 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before 4214 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before 4215 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means 4216 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier 4217 */ 4218 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); 4219 return -EACCES; 4220 } 4221 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 4222 meta->map_ptr->key_size, false, 4223 NULL); 4224 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 4225 (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && 4226 !register_is_null(reg)) || 4227 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE) { 4228 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: 4229 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity 4230 */ 4231 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 4232 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 4233 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); 4234 return -EACCES; 4235 } 4236 meta->raw_mode = (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE); 4237 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 4238 meta->map_ptr->value_size, false, 4239 meta); 4240 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID) { 4241 if (!reg->btf_id) { 4242 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno); 4243 return -EACCES; 4244 } 4245 meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 4246 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) { 4247 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) { 4248 if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, true)) 4249 return -EACCES; 4250 } else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 4251 if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, false)) 4252 return -EACCES; 4253 } else { 4254 verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n"); 4255 return -EFAULT; 4256 } 4257 } else if (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_type)) { 4258 /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the 4259 * next is_mem_size argument below. 4260 */ 4261 meta->raw_mode = (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM); 4262 } else if (arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_type)) { 4263 bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO); 4264 4265 /* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers 4266 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values. 4267 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine 4268 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register 4269 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors 4270 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an 4271 * int type and negative retvals are allowed. 4272 */ 4273 meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; 4274 4275 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check 4276 * happens using its boundaries. 4277 */ 4278 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 4279 /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw 4280 * mode so that the program is required to 4281 * initialize all the memory that the helper could 4282 * just partially fill up. 4283 */ 4284 meta = NULL; 4285 4286 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 4287 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", 4288 regno); 4289 return -EACCES; 4290 } 4291 4292 if (reg->umin_value == 0) { 4293 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0, 4294 zero_size_allowed, 4295 meta); 4296 if (err) 4297 return err; 4298 } 4299 4300 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { 4301 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", 4302 regno); 4303 return -EACCES; 4304 } 4305 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 4306 reg->umax_value, 4307 zero_size_allowed, meta); 4308 if (!err) 4309 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 4310 } else if (arg_type_is_alloc_size(arg_type)) { 4311 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 4312 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded size, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", 4313 regno); 4314 return -EACCES; 4315 } 4316 meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; 4317 } else if (arg_type_is_int_ptr(arg_type)) { 4318 int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type); 4319 4320 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, false, meta); 4321 if (err) 4322 return err; 4323 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, size, true); 4324 } 4325 4326 return err; 4327 } 4328 4329 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) 4330 { 4331 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; 4332 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 4333 4334 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem) 4335 return false; 4336 4337 /* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these 4338 * contexts, so updating is safe. 4339 */ 4340 switch (type) { 4341 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 4342 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER) 4343 return true; 4344 break; 4345 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 4346 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 4347 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 4348 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 4349 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 4350 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 4351 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 4352 return true; 4353 default: 4354 break; 4355 } 4356 4357 verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n"); 4358 return false; 4359 } 4360 4361 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4362 { 4363 return env->prog->jit_requested && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64); 4364 } 4365 4366 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4367 struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) 4368 { 4369 if (!map) 4370 return 0; 4371 4372 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ 4373 switch (map->map_type) { 4374 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: 4375 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 4376 goto error; 4377 break; 4378 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: 4379 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && 4380 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output && 4381 func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output && 4382 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value && 4383 func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output) 4384 goto error; 4385 break; 4386 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 4387 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output && 4388 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve && 4389 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit && 4390 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard && 4391 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query) 4392 goto error; 4393 break; 4394 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: 4395 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) 4396 goto error; 4397 break; 4398 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: 4399 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && 4400 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) 4401 goto error; 4402 break; 4403 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE: 4404 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE: 4405 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage) 4406 goto error; 4407 break; 4408 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: 4409 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH: 4410 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 4411 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 4412 goto error; 4413 break; 4414 /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases 4415 * appear. 4416 */ 4417 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: 4418 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) 4419 goto error; 4420 break; 4421 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: 4422 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 4423 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 4424 goto error; 4425 break; 4426 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 4427 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 4428 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 4429 goto error; 4430 break; 4431 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 4432 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && 4433 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && 4434 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 4435 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && 4436 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 4437 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 4438 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 4439 goto error; 4440 break; 4441 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 4442 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && 4443 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && 4444 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 4445 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && 4446 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 4447 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 4448 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 4449 goto error; 4450 break; 4451 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: 4452 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) 4453 goto error; 4454 break; 4455 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: 4456 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: 4457 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 4458 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 4459 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 4460 goto error; 4461 break; 4462 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 4463 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get && 4464 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete) 4465 goto error; 4466 break; 4467 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 4468 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get && 4469 func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete) 4470 goto error; 4471 break; 4472 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 4473 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get && 4474 func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete) 4475 goto error; 4476 break; 4477 default: 4478 break; 4479 } 4480 4481 /* ... and second from the function itself. */ 4482 switch (func_id) { 4483 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 4484 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) 4485 goto error; 4486 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) { 4487 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 4488 return -EINVAL; 4489 } 4490 break; 4491 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: 4492 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: 4493 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: 4494 case BPF_FUNC_skb_output: 4495 case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output: 4496 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) 4497 goto error; 4498 break; 4499 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: 4500 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) 4501 goto error; 4502 break; 4503 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: 4504 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: 4505 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) 4506 goto error; 4507 break; 4508 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 4509 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP && 4510 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH && 4511 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP && 4512 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) 4513 goto error; 4514 break; 4515 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: 4516 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map: 4517 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: 4518 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) 4519 goto error; 4520 break; 4521 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash: 4522 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash: 4523 case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update: 4524 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 4525 goto error; 4526 break; 4527 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 4528 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE && 4529 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE) 4530 goto error; 4531 break; 4532 case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport: 4533 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY && 4534 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP && 4535 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 4536 goto error; 4537 break; 4538 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 4539 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 4540 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 4541 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 4542 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) 4543 goto error; 4544 break; 4545 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get: 4546 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete: 4547 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE) 4548 goto error; 4549 break; 4550 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get: 4551 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete: 4552 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) 4553 goto error; 4554 break; 4555 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get: 4556 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete: 4557 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE) 4558 goto error; 4559 break; 4560 default: 4561 break; 4562 } 4563 4564 return 0; 4565 error: 4566 verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", 4567 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 4568 return -EINVAL; 4569 } 4570 4571 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 4572 { 4573 int count = 0; 4574 4575 if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 4576 count++; 4577 if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 4578 count++; 4579 if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 4580 count++; 4581 if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 4582 count++; 4583 if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 4584 count++; 4585 4586 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, 4587 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have 4588 * right now. 4589 */ 4590 return count <= 1; 4591 } 4592 4593 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(enum bpf_arg_type arg_curr, 4594 enum bpf_arg_type arg_next) 4595 { 4596 return (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_curr) && 4597 !arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_next)) || 4598 (!arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_curr) && 4599 arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_next)); 4600 } 4601 4602 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 4603 { 4604 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' 4605 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need 4606 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy 4607 * helper function specification. 4608 */ 4609 if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) || 4610 arg_type_is_mem_ptr(fn->arg5_type) || 4611 check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg1_type, fn->arg2_type) || 4612 check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg2_type, fn->arg3_type) || 4613 check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg3_type, fn->arg4_type) || 4614 check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg4_type, fn->arg5_type)) 4615 return false; 4616 4617 return true; 4618 } 4619 4620 static bool check_refcount_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) 4621 { 4622 int count = 0; 4623 4624 if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg1_type)) 4625 count++; 4626 if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg2_type)) 4627 count++; 4628 if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg3_type)) 4629 count++; 4630 if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg4_type)) 4631 count++; 4632 if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg5_type)) 4633 count++; 4634 4635 /* A reference acquiring function cannot acquire 4636 * another refcounted ptr. 4637 */ 4638 if (may_be_acquire_function(func_id) && count) 4639 return false; 4640 4641 /* We only support one arg being unreferenced at the moment, 4642 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now. 4643 */ 4644 return count <= 1; 4645 } 4646 4647 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 4648 { 4649 int i; 4650 4651 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) { 4652 if (fn->arg_type[i] == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && !fn->arg_btf_id[i]) 4653 return false; 4654 4655 if (fn->arg_type[i] != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i]) 4656 return false; 4657 } 4658 4659 return true; 4660 } 4661 4662 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) 4663 { 4664 return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) && 4665 check_arg_pair_ok(fn) && 4666 check_btf_id_ok(fn) && 4667 check_refcount_ok(fn, func_id) ? 0 : -EINVAL; 4668 } 4669 4670 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] 4671 * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. 4672 */ 4673 static void __clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4674 struct bpf_func_state *state) 4675 { 4676 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 4677 int i; 4678 4679 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 4680 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(®s[i])) 4681 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 4682 4683 bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) { 4684 if (!reg) 4685 continue; 4686 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg)) 4687 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 4688 } 4689 } 4690 4691 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4692 { 4693 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 4694 int i; 4695 4696 for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) 4697 __clear_all_pkt_pointers(env, vstate->frame[i]); 4698 } 4699 4700 static void release_reg_references(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4701 struct bpf_func_state *state, 4702 int ref_obj_id) 4703 { 4704 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 4705 int i; 4706 4707 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 4708 if (regs[i].ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) 4709 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 4710 4711 bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) { 4712 if (!reg) 4713 continue; 4714 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) 4715 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 4716 } 4717 } 4718 4719 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel 4720 * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference. 4721 */ 4722 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4723 int ref_obj_id) 4724 { 4725 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 4726 int err; 4727 int i; 4728 4729 err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id); 4730 if (err) 4731 return err; 4732 4733 for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) 4734 release_reg_references(env, vstate->frame[i], ref_obj_id); 4735 4736 return 0; 4737 } 4738 4739 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4740 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 4741 { 4742 int i; 4743 4744 /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ 4745 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 4746 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 4747 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 4748 } 4749 } 4750 4751 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 4752 int *insn_idx) 4753 { 4754 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 4755 struct bpf_func_info_aux *func_info_aux; 4756 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 4757 int i, err, subprog, target_insn; 4758 bool is_global = false; 4759 4760 if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 4761 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n", 4762 state->curframe + 2); 4763 return -E2BIG; 4764 } 4765 4766 target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm; 4767 subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn + 1); 4768 if (subprog < 0) { 4769 verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 4770 target_insn + 1); 4771 return -EFAULT; 4772 } 4773 4774 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 4775 if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { 4776 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n", 4777 state->curframe + 1); 4778 return -EFAULT; 4779 } 4780 4781 func_info_aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux; 4782 if (func_info_aux) 4783 is_global = func_info_aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL; 4784 err = btf_check_func_arg_match(env, subprog, caller->regs); 4785 if (err == -EFAULT) 4786 return err; 4787 if (is_global) { 4788 if (err) { 4789 verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n", 4790 subprog); 4791 return err; 4792 } else { 4793 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 4794 verbose(env, 4795 "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", 4796 subprog); 4797 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 4798 4799 /* All global functions return SCALAR_VALUE */ 4800 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 4801 4802 /* continue with next insn after call */ 4803 return 0; 4804 } 4805 } 4806 4807 callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); 4808 if (!callee) 4809 return -ENOMEM; 4810 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; 4811 4812 /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write 4813 * into its own stack before reading from it. 4814 * callee can read/write into caller's stack 4815 */ 4816 init_func_state(env, callee, 4817 /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ 4818 *insn_idx /* callsite */, 4819 state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, 4820 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 4821 4822 /* Transfer references to the callee */ 4823 err = transfer_reference_state(callee, caller); 4824 if (err) 4825 return err; 4826 4827 /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent 4828 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain 4829 */ 4830 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 4831 callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; 4832 4833 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 4834 4835 /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ 4836 state->curframe++; 4837 4838 /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ 4839 *insn_idx = target_insn; 4840 4841 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 4842 verbose(env, "caller:\n"); 4843 print_verifier_state(env, caller); 4844 verbose(env, "callee:\n"); 4845 print_verifier_state(env, callee); 4846 } 4847 return 0; 4848 } 4849 4850 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) 4851 { 4852 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 4853 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 4854 struct bpf_reg_state *r0; 4855 int err; 4856 4857 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 4858 r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]; 4859 if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 4860 /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer 4861 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller, 4862 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack 4863 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits, 4864 * but let's be conservative 4865 */ 4866 verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n"); 4867 return -EINVAL; 4868 } 4869 4870 state->curframe--; 4871 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 4872 /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ 4873 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; 4874 4875 /* Transfer references to the caller */ 4876 err = transfer_reference_state(caller, callee); 4877 if (err) 4878 return err; 4879 4880 *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; 4881 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 4882 verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); 4883 print_verifier_state(env, callee); 4884 verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); 4885 print_verifier_state(env, caller); 4886 } 4887 /* clear everything in the callee */ 4888 free_func_state(callee); 4889 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; 4890 return 0; 4891 } 4892 4893 static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, 4894 int func_id, 4895 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 4896 { 4897 struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; 4898 4899 if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER || 4900 (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack && 4901 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str && 4902 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str && 4903 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str)) 4904 return; 4905 4906 ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; 4907 ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value; 4908 __reg_deduce_bounds(ret_reg); 4909 __reg_bound_offset(ret_reg); 4910 __update_reg_bounds(ret_reg); 4911 } 4912 4913 static int 4914 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 4915 int func_id, int insn_idx) 4916 { 4917 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 4918 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 4919 4920 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 4921 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 4922 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 4923 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 4924 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem && 4925 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 4926 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem) 4927 return 0; 4928 4929 if (map == NULL) { 4930 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 4931 return -EINVAL; 4932 } 4933 4934 /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions 4935 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the 4936 * state of the map from program side. 4937 */ 4938 if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 4939 (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 4940 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 4941 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 4942 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) { 4943 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n"); 4944 return -EACCES; 4945 } 4946 4947 if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state)) 4948 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, 4949 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 4950 else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr) 4951 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON, 4952 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 4953 return 0; 4954 } 4955 4956 static int 4957 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 4958 int func_id, int insn_idx) 4959 { 4960 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 4961 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg; 4962 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 4963 struct tnum range; 4964 u64 val; 4965 int err; 4966 4967 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 4968 return 0; 4969 if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { 4970 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 4971 return -EINVAL; 4972 } 4973 4974 range = tnum_range(0, map->max_entries - 1); 4975 reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 4976 4977 if (!register_is_const(reg) || !tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { 4978 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 4979 return 0; 4980 } 4981 4982 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); 4983 if (err) 4984 return err; 4985 4986 val = reg->var_off.value; 4987 if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) 4988 bpf_map_key_store(aux, val); 4989 else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 4990 bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val) 4991 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 4992 return 0; 4993 } 4994 4995 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4996 { 4997 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 4998 int i; 4999 5000 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 5001 verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n", 5002 state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx); 5003 } 5004 return state->acquired_refs ? -EINVAL : 0; 5005 } 5006 5007 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx) 5008 { 5009 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; 5010 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 5011 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 5012 bool changes_data; 5013 int i, err; 5014 5015 /* find function prototype */ 5016 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { 5017 verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 5018 func_id); 5019 return -EINVAL; 5020 } 5021 5022 if (env->ops->get_func_proto) 5023 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog); 5024 if (!fn) { 5025 verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 5026 func_id); 5027 return -EINVAL; 5028 } 5029 5030 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ 5031 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { 5032 verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 5033 return -EINVAL; 5034 } 5035 5036 if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) { 5037 verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n"); 5038 return -EINVAL; 5039 } 5040 5041 /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ 5042 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func); 5043 if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 5044 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n", 5045 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 5046 return -EINVAL; 5047 } 5048 5049 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 5050 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; 5051 5052 err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id); 5053 if (err) { 5054 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 5055 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 5056 return err; 5057 } 5058 5059 meta.func_id = func_id; 5060 /* check args */ 5061 for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { 5062 err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn); 5063 if (err) 5064 return err; 5065 } 5066 5067 err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 5068 if (err) 5069 return err; 5070 5071 err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 5072 if (err) 5073 return err; 5074 5075 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset 5076 * is inferred from register state. 5077 */ 5078 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { 5079 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, 5080 BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 5081 if (err) 5082 return err; 5083 } 5084 5085 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 5086 err = check_reference_leak(env); 5087 if (err) { 5088 verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n"); 5089 return err; 5090 } 5091 } else if (is_release_function(func_id)) { 5092 err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id); 5093 if (err) { 5094 verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 5095 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 5096 return err; 5097 } 5098 } 5099 5100 regs = cur_regs(env); 5101 5102 /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0, 5103 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error. 5104 */ 5105 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage && 5106 !register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) { 5107 verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n"); 5108 return -EINVAL; 5109 } 5110 5111 /* reset caller saved regs */ 5112 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 5113 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 5114 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 5115 } 5116 5117 /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */ 5118 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 5119 5120 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ 5121 if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) { 5122 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ 5123 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 5124 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) { 5125 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; 5126 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL || 5127 fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 5128 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ 5129 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 5130 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() 5131 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access 5132 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() 5133 */ 5134 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { 5135 verbose(env, 5136 "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 5137 return -EINVAL; 5138 } 5139 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; 5140 if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 5141 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 5142 if (map_value_has_spin_lock(meta.map_ptr)) 5143 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 5144 } else { 5145 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL; 5146 } 5147 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) { 5148 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 5149 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL; 5150 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL) { 5151 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 5152 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL; 5153 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL) { 5154 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 5155 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL; 5156 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL) { 5157 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 5158 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL; 5159 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size; 5160 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID_OR_NULL || 5161 fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID) { 5162 const struct btf_type *t; 5163 5164 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 5165 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf_vmlinux, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL); 5166 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 5167 u32 tsize; 5168 const struct btf_type *ret; 5169 const char *tname; 5170 5171 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 5172 ret = btf_resolve_size(btf_vmlinux, t, &tsize); 5173 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 5174 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 5175 verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 5176 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 5177 return -EINVAL; 5178 } 5179 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = 5180 fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID ? 5181 PTR_TO_MEM : PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL; 5182 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize; 5183 } else { 5184 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = 5185 fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID ? 5186 PTR_TO_BTF_ID : PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL; 5187 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 5188 } 5189 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) { 5190 int ret_btf_id; 5191 5192 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 5193 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL; 5194 ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id; 5195 if (ret_btf_id == 0) { 5196 verbose(env, "invalid return type %d of func %s#%d\n", 5197 fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 5198 return -EINVAL; 5199 } 5200 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 5201 } else { 5202 verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n", 5203 fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 5204 return -EINVAL; 5205 } 5206 5207 if (reg_type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type)) 5208 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 5209 5210 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) { 5211 /* For release_reference() */ 5212 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 5213 } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 5214 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 5215 5216 if (id < 0) 5217 return id; 5218 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */ 5219 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 5220 /* For release_reference() */ 5221 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 5222 } 5223 5224 do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); 5225 5226 err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); 5227 if (err) 5228 return err; 5229 5230 if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack || 5231 func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) && 5232 !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) { 5233 const char *err_str; 5234 5235 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 5236 err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); 5237 err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n"; 5238 #else 5239 err = -ENOTSUPP; 5240 err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n"; 5241 #endif 5242 if (err) { 5243 verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 5244 return err; 5245 } 5246 5247 env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true; 5248 } 5249 5250 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack) 5251 env->prog->call_get_stack = true; 5252 5253 if (changes_data) 5254 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 5255 return 0; 5256 } 5257 5258 static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 5259 { 5260 /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 5261 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b); 5262 5263 if (b < 0) 5264 return res > a; 5265 return res < a; 5266 } 5267 5268 static bool signed_add32_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 5269 { 5270 /* Do the add in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 5271 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a + (u32)b); 5272 5273 if (b < 0) 5274 return res > a; 5275 return res < a; 5276 } 5277 5278 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 5279 { 5280 /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 5281 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b); 5282 5283 if (b < 0) 5284 return res < a; 5285 return res > a; 5286 } 5287 5288 static bool signed_sub32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 5289 { 5290 /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 5291 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a - (u32)b); 5292 5293 if (b < 0) 5294 return res < a; 5295 return res > a; 5296 } 5297 5298 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5299 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5300 enum bpf_reg_type type) 5301 { 5302 bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 5303 s64 val = reg->var_off.value; 5304 s64 smin = reg->smin_value; 5305 5306 if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { 5307 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", 5308 reg_type_str[type], val); 5309 return false; 5310 } 5311 5312 if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 5313 verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", 5314 reg_type_str[type], reg->off); 5315 return false; 5316 } 5317 5318 if (smin == S64_MIN) { 5319 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", 5320 reg_type_str[type]); 5321 return false; 5322 } 5323 5324 if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 5325 verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", 5326 smin, reg_type_str[type]); 5327 return false; 5328 } 5329 5330 return true; 5331 } 5332 5333 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5334 { 5335 return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; 5336 } 5337 5338 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 5339 u32 *ptr_limit, u8 opcode, bool off_is_neg) 5340 { 5341 bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || 5342 (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); 5343 u32 off; 5344 5345 switch (ptr_reg->type) { 5346 case PTR_TO_STACK: 5347 /* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in 5348 * unprivileged mode so it's not handled here. 5349 */ 5350 off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value; 5351 if (mask_to_left) 5352 *ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off; 5353 else 5354 *ptr_limit = -off; 5355 return 0; 5356 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 5357 if (mask_to_left) { 5358 *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off; 5359 } else { 5360 off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off; 5361 *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off; 5362 } 5363 return 0; 5364 default: 5365 return -EINVAL; 5366 } 5367 } 5368 5369 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5370 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 5371 { 5372 return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K; 5373 } 5374 5375 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 5376 u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit) 5377 { 5378 /* If we arrived here from different branches with different 5379 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work. 5380 */ 5381 if (aux->alu_state && 5382 (aux->alu_state != alu_state || 5383 aux->alu_limit != alu_limit)) 5384 return -EACCES; 5385 5386 /* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */ 5387 aux->alu_state = alu_state; 5388 aux->alu_limit = alu_limit; 5389 return 0; 5390 } 5391 5392 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5393 struct bpf_insn *insn) 5394 { 5395 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 5396 5397 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 5398 return 0; 5399 5400 return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0); 5401 } 5402 5403 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5404 struct bpf_insn *insn, 5405 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 5406 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 5407 bool off_is_neg) 5408 { 5409 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5410 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 5411 bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; 5412 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 5413 u32 alu_state, alu_limit; 5414 struct bpf_reg_state tmp; 5415 bool ret; 5416 5417 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 5418 return 0; 5419 5420 /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative 5421 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care 5422 * to explore bad access from here. 5423 */ 5424 if (vstate->speculative) 5425 goto do_sim; 5426 5427 alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; 5428 alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? 5429 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; 5430 5431 if (retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg)) 5432 return 0; 5433 if (update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit)) 5434 return -EACCES; 5435 do_sim: 5436 /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under 5437 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of 5438 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off 5439 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there 5440 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example, 5441 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction 5442 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore 5443 * bad access. 5444 */ 5445 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) { 5446 tmp = *dst_reg; 5447 *dst_reg = *ptr_reg; 5448 } 5449 ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true); 5450 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret) 5451 *dst_reg = tmp; 5452 return !ret ? -EFAULT : 0; 5453 } 5454 5455 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. 5456 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. 5457 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a 5458 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. 5459 */ 5460 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5461 struct bpf_insn *insn, 5462 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 5463 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) 5464 { 5465 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5466 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5467 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg; 5468 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 5469 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, 5470 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; 5471 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, 5472 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; 5473 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; 5474 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 5475 int ret; 5476 5477 dst_reg = ®s[dst]; 5478 5479 if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 5480 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 5481 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from 5482 * e.g. dead branches. 5483 */ 5484 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 5485 return 0; 5486 } 5487 5488 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { 5489 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ 5490 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 5491 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 5492 return 0; 5493 } 5494 5495 verbose(env, 5496 "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 5497 dst); 5498 return -EACCES; 5499 } 5500 5501 switch (ptr_reg->type) { 5502 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: 5503 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n", 5504 dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]); 5505 return -EACCES; 5506 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 5507 /* smin_val represents the known value */ 5508 if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) 5509 break; 5510 fallthrough; 5511 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 5512 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 5513 case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: 5514 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 5515 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: 5516 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 5517 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: 5518 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 5519 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", 5520 dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]); 5521 return -EACCES; 5522 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 5523 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) { 5524 verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n", 5525 off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src); 5526 return -EACCES; 5527 } 5528 fallthrough; 5529 default: 5530 break; 5531 } 5532 5533 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. 5534 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. 5535 */ 5536 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; 5537 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 5538 5539 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || 5540 !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 5541 return -EINVAL; 5542 5543 /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ 5544 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 5545 5546 switch (opcode) { 5547 case BPF_ADD: 5548 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val < 0); 5549 if (ret < 0) { 5550 verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different maps or paths\n", dst); 5551 return ret; 5552 } 5553 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow 5554 * the s32 'off' field 5555 */ 5556 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == 5557 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { 5558 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ 5559 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 5560 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 5561 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 5562 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 5563 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 5564 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; 5565 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 5566 break; 5567 } 5568 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off 5569 * == 0, since it's a scalar. 5570 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive 5571 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' 5572 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. 5573 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets 5574 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset 5575 * from ptr_reg. 5576 */ 5577 if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) || 5578 signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) { 5579 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 5580 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 5581 } else { 5582 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val; 5583 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val; 5584 } 5585 if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr || 5586 umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) { 5587 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 5588 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 5589 } else { 5590 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val; 5591 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val; 5592 } 5593 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 5594 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 5595 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 5596 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 5597 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 5598 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 5599 dst_reg->raw = 0; 5600 } 5601 break; 5602 case BPF_SUB: 5603 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val < 0); 5604 if (ret < 0) { 5605 verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different maps or paths\n", dst); 5606 return ret; 5607 } 5608 if (dst_reg == off_reg) { 5609 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ 5610 verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", 5611 dst); 5612 return -EACCES; 5613 } 5614 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to 5615 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not 5616 * be able to deal with it. 5617 */ 5618 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 5619 verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", 5620 dst); 5621 return -EACCES; 5622 } 5623 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == 5624 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { 5625 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ 5626 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 5627 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 5628 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 5629 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 5630 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 5631 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 5632 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; 5633 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 5634 break; 5635 } 5636 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known 5637 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. 5638 */ 5639 if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) || 5640 signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) { 5641 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 5642 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 5643 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 5644 } else { 5645 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val; 5646 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val; 5647 } 5648 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { 5649 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 5650 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 5651 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 5652 } else { 5653 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 5654 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; 5655 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; 5656 } 5657 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 5658 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 5659 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 5660 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 5661 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 5662 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 5663 if (smin_val < 0) 5664 dst_reg->raw = 0; 5665 } 5666 break; 5667 case BPF_AND: 5668 case BPF_OR: 5669 case BPF_XOR: 5670 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */ 5671 verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", 5672 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 5673 return -EACCES; 5674 default: 5675 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ 5676 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", 5677 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 5678 return -EACCES; 5679 } 5680 5681 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 5682 return -EINVAL; 5683 5684 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 5685 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); 5686 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); 5687 5688 /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds 5689 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. 5690 */ 5691 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 5692 if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 5693 check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) { 5694 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " 5695 "prohibited for !root\n", dst); 5696 return -EACCES; 5697 } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK && 5698 check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off + 5699 dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) { 5700 verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " 5701 "prohibited for !root\n", dst); 5702 return -EACCES; 5703 } 5704 } 5705 5706 return 0; 5707 } 5708 5709 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 5710 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 5711 { 5712 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 5713 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 5714 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 5715 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 5716 5717 if (signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smin_val) || 5718 signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smax_val)) { 5719 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 5720 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 5721 } else { 5722 dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val; 5723 dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val; 5724 } 5725 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val || 5726 dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 5727 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 5728 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 5729 } else { 5730 dst_reg->u32_min_value += umin_val; 5731 dst_reg->u32_max_value += umax_val; 5732 } 5733 } 5734 5735 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 5736 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 5737 { 5738 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 5739 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 5740 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 5741 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 5742 5743 if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) || 5744 signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) { 5745 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 5746 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 5747 } else { 5748 dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val; 5749 dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val; 5750 } 5751 if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val || 5752 dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 5753 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 5754 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 5755 } else { 5756 dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val; 5757 dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val; 5758 } 5759 } 5760 5761 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 5762 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 5763 { 5764 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 5765 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 5766 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 5767 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 5768 5769 if (signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smax_val) || 5770 signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smin_val)) { 5771 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 5772 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 5773 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 5774 } else { 5775 dst_reg->s32_min_value -= smax_val; 5776 dst_reg->s32_max_value -= smin_val; 5777 } 5778 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) { 5779 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 5780 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 5781 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 5782 } else { 5783 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 5784 dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val; 5785 dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val; 5786 } 5787 } 5788 5789 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 5790 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 5791 { 5792 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 5793 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 5794 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 5795 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 5796 5797 if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) || 5798 signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) { 5799 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 5800 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 5801 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 5802 } else { 5803 dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val; 5804 dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val; 5805 } 5806 if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { 5807 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 5808 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 5809 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 5810 } else { 5811 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 5812 dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val; 5813 dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val; 5814 } 5815 } 5816 5817 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 5818 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 5819 { 5820 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 5821 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 5822 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 5823 5824 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) { 5825 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 5826 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 5827 return; 5828 } 5829 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 5830 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX). 5831 */ 5832 if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) { 5833 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 5834 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 5835 return; 5836 } 5837 dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val; 5838 dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val; 5839 if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) { 5840 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 5841 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 5842 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 5843 } else { 5844 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 5845 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 5846 } 5847 } 5848 5849 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 5850 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 5851 { 5852 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 5853 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 5854 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 5855 5856 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) { 5857 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 5858 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 5859 return; 5860 } 5861 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 5862 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX). 5863 */ 5864 if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) { 5865 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 5866 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 5867 return; 5868 } 5869 dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val; 5870 dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val; 5871 if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) { 5872 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 5873 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 5874 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 5875 } else { 5876 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 5877 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 5878 } 5879 } 5880 5881 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 5882 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 5883 { 5884 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 5885 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 5886 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 5887 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 5888 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 5889 5890 /* Assuming scalar64_min_max_and will be called so its safe 5891 * to skip updating register for known 32-bit case. 5892 */ 5893 if (src_known && dst_known) 5894 return; 5895 5896 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 5897 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 5898 */ 5899 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 5900 dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val); 5901 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 5902 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 5903 * ain't nobody got time for that. 5904 */ 5905 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 5906 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 5907 } else { 5908 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 5909 * cast result into s64. 5910 */ 5911 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 5912 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 5913 } 5914 5915 } 5916 5917 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 5918 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 5919 { 5920 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 5921 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 5922 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 5923 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 5924 5925 if (src_known && dst_known) { 5926 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 5927 return; 5928 } 5929 5930 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 5931 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 5932 */ 5933 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 5934 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); 5935 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 5936 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 5937 * ain't nobody got time for that. 5938 */ 5939 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 5940 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 5941 } else { 5942 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 5943 * cast result into s64. 5944 */ 5945 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 5946 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 5947 } 5948 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 5949 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 5950 } 5951 5952 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 5953 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 5954 { 5955 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 5956 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 5957 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 5958 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 5959 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 5960 5961 /* Assuming scalar64_min_max_or will be called so it is safe 5962 * to skip updating register for known case. 5963 */ 5964 if (src_known && dst_known) 5965 return; 5966 5967 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 5968 * maximum of the operands' minima 5969 */ 5970 dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val); 5971 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 5972 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 5973 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 5974 * ain't nobody got time for that. 5975 */ 5976 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 5977 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 5978 } else { 5979 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 5980 * cast result into s64. 5981 */ 5982 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 5983 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 5984 } 5985 } 5986 5987 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 5988 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 5989 { 5990 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 5991 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 5992 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 5993 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 5994 5995 if (src_known && dst_known) { 5996 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 5997 return; 5998 } 5999 6000 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 6001 * maximum of the operands' minima 6002 */ 6003 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); 6004 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 6005 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 6006 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 6007 * ain't nobody got time for that. 6008 */ 6009 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 6010 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 6011 } else { 6012 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 6013 * cast result into s64. 6014 */ 6015 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 6016 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 6017 } 6018 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 6019 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 6020 } 6021 6022 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6023 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6024 { 6025 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 6026 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 6027 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 6028 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 6029 6030 /* Assuming scalar64_min_max_xor will be called so it is safe 6031 * to skip updating register for known case. 6032 */ 6033 if (src_known && dst_known) 6034 return; 6035 6036 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */ 6037 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 6038 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 6039 6040 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 6041 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 6042 * so safe to cast u32 result into s32. 6043 */ 6044 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 6045 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 6046 } else { 6047 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 6048 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 6049 } 6050 } 6051 6052 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6053 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6054 { 6055 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 6056 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 6057 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 6058 6059 if (src_known && dst_known) { 6060 /* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */ 6061 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 6062 return; 6063 } 6064 6065 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */ 6066 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 6067 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 6068 6069 if (dst_reg->smin_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 6070 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 6071 * so safe to cast u64 result into s64. 6072 */ 6073 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 6074 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 6075 } else { 6076 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 6077 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 6078 } 6079 6080 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 6081 } 6082 6083 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6084 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 6085 { 6086 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick 6087 * up from var_off) 6088 */ 6089 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 6090 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 6091 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 6092 if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) { 6093 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 6094 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 6095 } else { 6096 dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val; 6097 dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val; 6098 } 6099 } 6100 6101 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6102 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6103 { 6104 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 6105 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 6106 /* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */ 6107 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 6108 6109 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 6110 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val)); 6111 /* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so 6112 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and 6113 * if some path skips this step we are still safe. 6114 */ 6115 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 6116 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 6117 } 6118 6119 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6120 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 6121 { 6122 /* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign 6123 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are 6124 * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track 6125 * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except 6126 * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this 6127 * later to shifts of any length. 6128 */ 6129 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0) 6130 dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32; 6131 else 6132 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 6133 6134 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0) 6135 dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32; 6136 else 6137 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 6138 6139 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 6140 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { 6141 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 6142 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 6143 } else { 6144 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; 6145 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; 6146 } 6147 } 6148 6149 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6150 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6151 { 6152 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 6153 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 6154 6155 /* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */ 6156 __scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 6157 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 6158 6159 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 6160 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 6161 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 6162 } 6163 6164 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6165 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6166 { 6167 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 6168 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 6169 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 6170 6171 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 6172 * be negative, then either: 6173 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 6174 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 6175 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 6176 * signed bounds 6177 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 6178 * about the result 6179 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 6180 * unsigned bounts capture the signed bounds. 6181 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 6182 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 6183 * var_off of the result. 6184 */ 6185 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 6186 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 6187 6188 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val); 6189 dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val; 6190 dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val; 6191 6192 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 6193 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 6194 } 6195 6196 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6197 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6198 { 6199 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 6200 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 6201 6202 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 6203 * be negative, then either: 6204 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 6205 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 6206 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 6207 * signed bounds 6208 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 6209 * about the result 6210 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 6211 * unsigned bounts capture the signed bounds. 6212 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 6213 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 6214 * var_off of the result. 6215 */ 6216 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 6217 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 6218 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 6219 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; 6220 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; 6221 6222 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 6223 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded 6224 * so we can recalculate later from tnum. 6225 */ 6226 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 6227 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 6228 } 6229 6230 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6231 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6232 { 6233 u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 6234 6235 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and 6236 * umax_val is equal to umin_val. 6237 */ 6238 dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val); 6239 dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val); 6240 6241 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32); 6242 6243 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 6244 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 6245 */ 6246 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 6247 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 6248 6249 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 6250 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 6251 } 6252 6253 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6254 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6255 { 6256 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 6257 6258 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal 6259 * to umin_val. 6260 */ 6261 dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val; 6262 dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val; 6263 6264 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64); 6265 6266 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 6267 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 6268 */ 6269 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 6270 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 6271 6272 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 6273 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out 6274 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum. 6275 */ 6276 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 6277 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 6278 } 6279 6280 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual 6281 * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts 6282 * need extra checks in the 32-bit case. 6283 */ 6284 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6285 struct bpf_insn *insn, 6286 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6287 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) 6288 { 6289 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 6290 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 6291 bool src_known; 6292 s64 smin_val, smax_val; 6293 u64 umin_val, umax_val; 6294 s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val; 6295 u32 u32_min_val, u32_max_val; 6296 u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32; 6297 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 6298 int ret; 6299 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); 6300 6301 smin_val = src_reg.smin_value; 6302 smax_val = src_reg.smax_value; 6303 umin_val = src_reg.umin_value; 6304 umax_val = src_reg.umax_value; 6305 6306 s32_min_val = src_reg.s32_min_value; 6307 s32_max_val = src_reg.s32_max_value; 6308 u32_min_val = src_reg.u32_min_value; 6309 u32_max_val = src_reg.u32_max_value; 6310 6311 if (alu32) { 6312 src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 6313 if ((src_known && 6314 (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) || 6315 s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) { 6316 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 6317 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 6318 */ 6319 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 6320 return 0; 6321 } 6322 } else { 6323 src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 6324 if ((src_known && 6325 (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 6326 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 6327 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 6328 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 6329 */ 6330 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 6331 return 0; 6332 } 6333 } 6334 6335 if (!src_known && 6336 opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) { 6337 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 6338 return 0; 6339 } 6340 6341 /* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops. 6342 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both 6343 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the 6344 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32 6345 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD, 6346 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to 6347 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops. 6348 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of 6349 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy 6350 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may 6351 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark 6352 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting 6353 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds. 6354 */ 6355 switch (opcode) { 6356 case BPF_ADD: 6357 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); 6358 if (ret < 0) { 6359 verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different pointers or scalars\n", dst); 6360 return ret; 6361 } 6362 scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6363 scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6364 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 6365 break; 6366 case BPF_SUB: 6367 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); 6368 if (ret < 0) { 6369 verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different pointers or scalars\n", dst); 6370 return ret; 6371 } 6372 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6373 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6374 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 6375 break; 6376 case BPF_MUL: 6377 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 6378 scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6379 scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6380 break; 6381 case BPF_AND: 6382 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 6383 scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6384 scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6385 break; 6386 case BPF_OR: 6387 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 6388 scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6389 scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6390 break; 6391 case BPF_XOR: 6392 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 6393 scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6394 scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6395 break; 6396 case BPF_LSH: 6397 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 6398 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 6399 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 6400 */ 6401 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 6402 break; 6403 } 6404 if (alu32) 6405 scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6406 else 6407 scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6408 break; 6409 case BPF_RSH: 6410 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 6411 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 6412 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 6413 */ 6414 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 6415 break; 6416 } 6417 if (alu32) 6418 scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6419 else 6420 scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6421 break; 6422 case BPF_ARSH: 6423 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 6424 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 6425 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 6426 */ 6427 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 6428 break; 6429 } 6430 if (alu32) 6431 scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6432 else 6433 scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 6434 break; 6435 default: 6436 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 6437 break; 6438 } 6439 6440 /* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */ 6441 if (alu32) 6442 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 6443 6444 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 6445 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); 6446 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); 6447 return 0; 6448 } 6449 6450 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max 6451 * and var_off. 6452 */ 6453 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6454 struct bpf_insn *insn) 6455 { 6456 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 6457 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 6458 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; 6459 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; 6460 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 6461 int err; 6462 6463 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 6464 src_reg = NULL; 6465 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 6466 ptr_reg = dst_reg; 6467 else 6468 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be 6469 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars() 6470 */ 6471 dst_reg->id = 0; 6472 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 6473 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 6474 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 6475 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 6476 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields 6477 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except 6478 * pointer subtraction 6479 */ 6480 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 6481 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 6482 return 0; 6483 } 6484 verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", 6485 insn->dst_reg, 6486 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 6487 return -EACCES; 6488 } else { 6489 /* scalar += pointer 6490 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our 6491 * src/dest handling in computing the range 6492 */ 6493 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 6494 if (err) 6495 return err; 6496 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 6497 src_reg, dst_reg); 6498 } 6499 } else if (ptr_reg) { 6500 /* pointer += scalar */ 6501 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 6502 if (err) 6503 return err; 6504 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 6505 dst_reg, src_reg); 6506 } 6507 } else { 6508 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only 6509 * need to be able to read from this state. 6510 */ 6511 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 6512 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); 6513 src_reg = &off_reg; 6514 if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */ 6515 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 6516 ptr_reg, src_reg); 6517 } 6518 6519 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ 6520 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { 6521 print_verifier_state(env, state); 6522 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); 6523 return -EINVAL; 6524 } 6525 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { 6526 print_verifier_state(env, state); 6527 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); 6528 return -EINVAL; 6529 } 6530 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); 6531 } 6532 6533 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ 6534 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 6535 { 6536 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 6537 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 6538 int err; 6539 6540 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 6541 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { 6542 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 || 6543 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 6544 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { 6545 verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); 6546 return -EINVAL; 6547 } 6548 } else { 6549 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 6550 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || 6551 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 6552 verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); 6553 return -EINVAL; 6554 } 6555 } 6556 6557 /* check src operand */ 6558 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 6559 if (err) 6560 return err; 6561 6562 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 6563 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 6564 insn->dst_reg); 6565 return -EACCES; 6566 } 6567 6568 /* check dest operand */ 6569 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 6570 if (err) 6571 return err; 6572 6573 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 6574 6575 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 6576 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 6577 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 6578 return -EINVAL; 6579 } 6580 6581 /* check src operand */ 6582 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 6583 if (err) 6584 return err; 6585 } else { 6586 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 6587 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 6588 return -EINVAL; 6589 } 6590 } 6591 6592 /* check dest operand, mark as required later */ 6593 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 6594 if (err) 6595 return err; 6596 6597 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 6598 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg; 6599 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg; 6600 6601 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 6602 /* case: R1 = R2 6603 * copy register state to dest reg 6604 */ 6605 if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id) 6606 /* Assign src and dst registers the same ID 6607 * that will be used by find_equal_scalars() 6608 * to propagate min/max range. 6609 */ 6610 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 6611 *dst_reg = *src_reg; 6612 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 6613 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 6614 } else { 6615 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ 6616 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 6617 verbose(env, 6618 "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", 6619 insn->src_reg); 6620 return -EACCES; 6621 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 6622 *dst_reg = *src_reg; 6623 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise 6624 * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly 6625 * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars() 6626 */ 6627 dst_reg->id = 0; 6628 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 6629 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 6630 } else { 6631 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, 6632 insn->dst_reg); 6633 } 6634 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 6635 } 6636 } else { 6637 /* case: R = imm 6638 * remember the value we stored into this reg 6639 */ 6640 /* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */ 6641 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 6642 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 6643 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 6644 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 6645 insn->imm); 6646 } else { 6647 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 6648 (u32)insn->imm); 6649 } 6650 } 6651 6652 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { 6653 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); 6654 return -EINVAL; 6655 6656 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ 6657 6658 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 6659 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 6660 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 6661 return -EINVAL; 6662 } 6663 /* check src1 operand */ 6664 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 6665 if (err) 6666 return err; 6667 } else { 6668 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 6669 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 6670 return -EINVAL; 6671 } 6672 } 6673 6674 /* check src2 operand */ 6675 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 6676 if (err) 6677 return err; 6678 6679 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && 6680 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { 6681 verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); 6682 return -EINVAL; 6683 } 6684 6685 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || 6686 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 6687 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; 6688 6689 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { 6690 verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); 6691 return -EINVAL; 6692 } 6693 } 6694 6695 /* check dest operand */ 6696 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 6697 if (err) 6698 return err; 6699 6700 return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); 6701 } 6702 6703 return 0; 6704 } 6705 6706 static void __find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_func_state *state, 6707 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6708 enum bpf_reg_type type, u16 new_range) 6709 { 6710 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 6711 int i; 6712 6713 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 6714 reg = &state->regs[i]; 6715 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 6716 /* keep the maximum range already checked */ 6717 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); 6718 } 6719 6720 bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) { 6721 if (!reg) 6722 continue; 6723 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 6724 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); 6725 } 6726 } 6727 6728 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 6729 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6730 enum bpf_reg_type type, 6731 bool range_right_open) 6732 { 6733 u16 new_range; 6734 int i; 6735 6736 if (dst_reg->off < 0 || 6737 (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open)) 6738 /* This doesn't give us any range */ 6739 return; 6740 6741 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || 6742 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) 6743 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less 6744 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. 6745 */ 6746 return; 6747 6748 new_range = dst_reg->off; 6749 if (range_right_open) 6750 new_range--; 6751 6752 /* Examples for register markings: 6753 * 6754 * pkt_data in dst register: 6755 * 6756 * r2 = r3; 6757 * r2 += 8; 6758 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> 6759 * <access okay> 6760 * 6761 * r2 = r3; 6762 * r2 += 8; 6763 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> 6764 * <handle exception> 6765 * 6766 * Where: 6767 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg 6768 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 6769 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 6770 * 6771 * pkt_data in src register: 6772 * 6773 * r2 = r3; 6774 * r2 += 8; 6775 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> 6776 * <handle exception> 6777 * 6778 * r2 = r3; 6779 * r2 += 8; 6780 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> 6781 * <access okay> 6782 * 6783 * Where: 6784 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg 6785 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 6786 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 6787 * 6788 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) 6789 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) 6790 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on 6791 * the check. 6792 */ 6793 6794 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we 6795 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big 6796 * the range won't allow anything. 6797 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. 6798 */ 6799 for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) 6800 __find_good_pkt_pointers(vstate->frame[i], dst_reg, type, 6801 new_range); 6802 } 6803 6804 static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode) 6805 { 6806 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 6807 s32 sval = (s32)val; 6808 6809 switch (opcode) { 6810 case BPF_JEQ: 6811 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 6812 return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 6813 break; 6814 case BPF_JNE: 6815 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 6816 return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 6817 break; 6818 case BPF_JSET: 6819 if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val) 6820 return 1; 6821 if (!((subreg.mask | subreg.value) & val)) 6822 return 0; 6823 break; 6824 case BPF_JGT: 6825 if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 6826 return 1; 6827 else if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 6828 return 0; 6829 break; 6830 case BPF_JSGT: 6831 if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 6832 return 1; 6833 else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 6834 return 0; 6835 break; 6836 case BPF_JLT: 6837 if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 6838 return 1; 6839 else if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 6840 return 0; 6841 break; 6842 case BPF_JSLT: 6843 if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 6844 return 1; 6845 else if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 6846 return 0; 6847 break; 6848 case BPF_JGE: 6849 if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 6850 return 1; 6851 else if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 6852 return 0; 6853 break; 6854 case BPF_JSGE: 6855 if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 6856 return 1; 6857 else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 6858 return 0; 6859 break; 6860 case BPF_JLE: 6861 if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 6862 return 1; 6863 else if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 6864 return 0; 6865 break; 6866 case BPF_JSLE: 6867 if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 6868 return 1; 6869 else if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 6870 return 0; 6871 break; 6872 } 6873 6874 return -1; 6875 } 6876 6877 6878 static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode) 6879 { 6880 s64 sval = (s64)val; 6881 6882 switch (opcode) { 6883 case BPF_JEQ: 6884 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 6885 return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 6886 break; 6887 case BPF_JNE: 6888 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 6889 return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 6890 break; 6891 case BPF_JSET: 6892 if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val) 6893 return 1; 6894 if (!((reg->var_off.mask | reg->var_off.value) & val)) 6895 return 0; 6896 break; 6897 case BPF_JGT: 6898 if (reg->umin_value > val) 6899 return 1; 6900 else if (reg->umax_value <= val) 6901 return 0; 6902 break; 6903 case BPF_JSGT: 6904 if (reg->smin_value > sval) 6905 return 1; 6906 else if (reg->smax_value < sval) 6907 return 0; 6908 break; 6909 case BPF_JLT: 6910 if (reg->umax_value < val) 6911 return 1; 6912 else if (reg->umin_value >= val) 6913 return 0; 6914 break; 6915 case BPF_JSLT: 6916 if (reg->smax_value < sval) 6917 return 1; 6918 else if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 6919 return 0; 6920 break; 6921 case BPF_JGE: 6922 if (reg->umin_value >= val) 6923 return 1; 6924 else if (reg->umax_value < val) 6925 return 0; 6926 break; 6927 case BPF_JSGE: 6928 if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 6929 return 1; 6930 else if (reg->smax_value < sval) 6931 return 0; 6932 break; 6933 case BPF_JLE: 6934 if (reg->umax_value <= val) 6935 return 1; 6936 else if (reg->umin_value > val) 6937 return 0; 6938 break; 6939 case BPF_JSLE: 6940 if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 6941 return 1; 6942 else if (reg->smin_value > sval) 6943 return 0; 6944 break; 6945 } 6946 6947 return -1; 6948 } 6949 6950 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;" 6951 * and return: 6952 * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed 6953 * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn 6954 * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value 6955 * range [0,10] 6956 */ 6957 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode, 6958 bool is_jmp32) 6959 { 6960 if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg)) { 6961 if (!reg_type_not_null(reg->type)) 6962 return -1; 6963 6964 /* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can 6965 * use this to direct branch taken. 6966 */ 6967 if (val != 0) 6968 return -1; 6969 6970 switch (opcode) { 6971 case BPF_JEQ: 6972 return 0; 6973 case BPF_JNE: 6974 return 1; 6975 default: 6976 return -1; 6977 } 6978 } 6979 6980 if (is_jmp32) 6981 return is_branch32_taken(reg, val, opcode); 6982 return is_branch64_taken(reg, val, opcode); 6983 } 6984 6985 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the 6986 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're 6987 * simply doing a BPF_K check. 6988 * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values. 6989 */ 6990 static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 6991 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 6992 u64 val, u32 val32, 6993 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 6994 { 6995 struct tnum false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 6996 struct tnum false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 6997 struct tnum true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 6998 struct tnum true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 6999 s64 sval = (s64)val; 7000 s32 sval32 = (s32)val32; 7001 7002 /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its 7003 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into 7004 * the same object, but we don't bother with that. 7005 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we 7006 * only need to check one of them for pointerness. 7007 */ 7008 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) 7009 return; 7010 7011 switch (opcode) { 7012 case BPF_JEQ: 7013 case BPF_JNE: 7014 { 7015 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = 7016 opcode == BPF_JEQ ? true_reg : false_reg; 7017 7018 /* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence. 7019 * r1 = r2; 7020 * if (r1 == 42) goto label; 7021 * ... 7022 * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42. 7023 * 7024 * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID. 7025 */ 7026 if (is_jmp32) 7027 __mark_reg32_known(reg, val32); 7028 else 7029 ___mark_reg_known(reg, val); 7030 break; 7031 } 7032 case BPF_JSET: 7033 if (is_jmp32) { 7034 false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32)); 7035 if (is_power_of_2(val32)) 7036 true_32off = tnum_or(true_32off, 7037 tnum_const(val32)); 7038 } else { 7039 false_64off = tnum_and(false_64off, tnum_const(~val)); 7040 if (is_power_of_2(val)) 7041 true_64off = tnum_or(true_64off, 7042 tnum_const(val)); 7043 } 7044 break; 7045 case BPF_JGE: 7046 case BPF_JGT: 7047 { 7048 if (is_jmp32) { 7049 u32 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 : val32 - 1; 7050 u32 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 + 1 : val32; 7051 7052 false_reg->u32_max_value = min(false_reg->u32_max_value, 7053 false_umax); 7054 true_reg->u32_min_value = max(true_reg->u32_min_value, 7055 true_umin); 7056 } else { 7057 u64 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val : val - 1; 7058 u64 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val + 1 : val; 7059 7060 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, false_umax); 7061 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, true_umin); 7062 } 7063 break; 7064 } 7065 case BPF_JSGE: 7066 case BPF_JSGT: 7067 { 7068 if (is_jmp32) { 7069 s32 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 : sval32 - 1; 7070 s32 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 + 1 : sval32; 7071 7072 false_reg->s32_max_value = min(false_reg->s32_max_value, false_smax); 7073 true_reg->s32_min_value = max(true_reg->s32_min_value, true_smin); 7074 } else { 7075 s64 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval : sval - 1; 7076 s64 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval + 1 : sval; 7077 7078 false_reg->smax_value = min(false_reg->smax_value, false_smax); 7079 true_reg->smin_value = max(true_reg->smin_value, true_smin); 7080 } 7081 break; 7082 } 7083 case BPF_JLE: 7084 case BPF_JLT: 7085 { 7086 if (is_jmp32) { 7087 u32 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 : val32 + 1; 7088 u32 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 - 1 : val32; 7089 7090 false_reg->u32_min_value = max(false_reg->u32_min_value, 7091 false_umin); 7092 true_reg->u32_max_value = min(true_reg->u32_max_value, 7093 true_umax); 7094 } else { 7095 u64 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val : val + 1; 7096 u64 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val - 1 : val; 7097 7098 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, false_umin); 7099 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, true_umax); 7100 } 7101 break; 7102 } 7103 case BPF_JSLE: 7104 case BPF_JSLT: 7105 { 7106 if (is_jmp32) { 7107 s32 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 : sval32 + 1; 7108 s32 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 - 1 : sval32; 7109 7110 false_reg->s32_min_value = max(false_reg->s32_min_value, false_smin); 7111 true_reg->s32_max_value = min(true_reg->s32_max_value, true_smax); 7112 } else { 7113 s64 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval : sval + 1; 7114 s64 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval - 1 : sval; 7115 7116 false_reg->smin_value = max(false_reg->smin_value, false_smin); 7117 true_reg->smax_value = min(true_reg->smax_value, true_smax); 7118 } 7119 break; 7120 } 7121 default: 7122 return; 7123 } 7124 7125 if (is_jmp32) { 7126 false_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(false_64off), 7127 tnum_subreg(false_32off)); 7128 true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(true_64off), 7129 tnum_subreg(true_32off)); 7130 __reg_combine_32_into_64(false_reg); 7131 __reg_combine_32_into_64(true_reg); 7132 } else { 7133 false_reg->var_off = false_64off; 7134 true_reg->var_off = true_64off; 7135 __reg_combine_64_into_32(false_reg); 7136 __reg_combine_64_into_32(true_reg); 7137 } 7138 } 7139 7140 /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is 7141 * the variable reg. 7142 */ 7143 static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 7144 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 7145 u64 val, u32 val32, 7146 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 7147 { 7148 /* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */ 7149 static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = { 7150 /* these stay the same */ 7151 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ, 7152 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE, 7153 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET, 7154 /* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */ 7155 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = BPF_JLE, 7156 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = BPF_JLT, 7157 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = BPF_JGE, 7158 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = BPF_JGT, 7159 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE, 7160 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT, 7161 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE, 7162 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT 7163 }; 7164 opcode = opcode_flip[opcode >> 4]; 7165 /* This uses zero as "not present in table"; luckily the zero opcode, 7166 * BPF_JA, can't get here. 7167 */ 7168 if (opcode) 7169 reg_set_min_max(true_reg, false_reg, val, val32, opcode, is_jmp32); 7170 } 7171 7172 /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */ 7173 static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 7174 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 7175 { 7176 src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value, 7177 dst_reg->umin_value); 7178 src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value, 7179 dst_reg->umax_value); 7180 src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value, 7181 dst_reg->smin_value); 7182 src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value, 7183 dst_reg->smax_value); 7184 src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off, 7185 dst_reg->var_off); 7186 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ 7187 __update_reg_bounds(src_reg); 7188 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 7189 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ 7190 __reg_deduce_bounds(src_reg); 7191 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); 7192 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 7193 __reg_bound_offset(src_reg); 7194 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); 7195 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 7196 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 7197 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 7198 */ 7199 __update_reg_bounds(src_reg); 7200 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 7201 } 7202 7203 static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src, 7204 struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst, 7205 struct bpf_reg_state *false_src, 7206 struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst, 7207 u8 opcode) 7208 { 7209 switch (opcode) { 7210 case BPF_JEQ: 7211 __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst); 7212 break; 7213 case BPF_JNE: 7214 __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst); 7215 break; 7216 } 7217 } 7218 7219 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, 7220 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id, 7221 bool is_null) 7222 { 7223 if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id && 7224 !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id)) { 7225 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should 7226 * have been known-zero, because we don't allow pointer 7227 * arithmetic on pointers that might be NULL. 7228 */ 7229 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || 7230 !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0) || 7231 reg->off)) { 7232 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg); 7233 reg->off = 0; 7234 } 7235 if (is_null) { 7236 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 7237 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { 7238 const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 7239 7240 if (map->inner_map_meta) { 7241 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 7242 reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta; 7243 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { 7244 reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 7245 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 7246 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) { 7247 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; 7248 } else { 7249 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 7250 } 7251 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) { 7252 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; 7253 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL) { 7254 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; 7255 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL) { 7256 reg->type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK; 7257 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) { 7258 reg->type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 7259 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL) { 7260 reg->type = PTR_TO_MEM; 7261 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL) { 7262 reg->type = PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF; 7263 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL) { 7264 reg->type = PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF; 7265 } 7266 if (is_null) { 7267 /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point 7268 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it, 7269 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect. 7270 */ 7271 reg->id = 0; 7272 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 7273 } else if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) { 7274 /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset 7275 * in release_reg_references(). 7276 * 7277 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other 7278 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset. 7279 */ 7280 reg->id = 0; 7281 } 7282 } 7283 } 7284 7285 static void __mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_func_state *state, u32 id, 7286 bool is_null) 7287 { 7288 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 7289 int i; 7290 7291 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 7292 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, &state->regs[i], id, is_null); 7293 7294 bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) { 7295 if (!reg) 7296 continue; 7297 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null); 7298 } 7299 } 7300 7301 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually 7302 * be folded together at some point. 7303 */ 7304 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno, 7305 bool is_null) 7306 { 7307 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 7308 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 7309 u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id; 7310 u32 id = regs[regno].id; 7311 int i; 7312 7313 if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null) 7314 /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch. 7315 * No one could have freed the reference state before 7316 * doing the NULL check. 7317 */ 7318 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id)); 7319 7320 for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) 7321 __mark_ptr_or_null_regs(vstate->frame[i], id, is_null); 7322 } 7323 7324 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn, 7325 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7326 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 7327 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch, 7328 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch) 7329 { 7330 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X) 7331 return false; 7332 7333 /* Pointers are always 64-bit. */ 7334 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32) 7335 return false; 7336 7337 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 7338 case BPF_JGT: 7339 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 7340 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 7341 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 7342 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 7343 /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */ 7344 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 7345 dst_reg->type, false); 7346 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 7347 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 7348 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 7349 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 7350 /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 7351 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 7352 src_reg->type, true); 7353 } else { 7354 return false; 7355 } 7356 break; 7357 case BPF_JLT: 7358 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 7359 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 7360 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 7361 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 7362 /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */ 7363 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 7364 dst_reg->type, true); 7365 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 7366 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 7367 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 7368 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 7369 /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 7370 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 7371 src_reg->type, false); 7372 } else { 7373 return false; 7374 } 7375 break; 7376 case BPF_JGE: 7377 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 7378 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 7379 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 7380 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 7381 /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */ 7382 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 7383 dst_reg->type, true); 7384 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 7385 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 7386 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 7387 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 7388 /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */ 7389 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 7390 src_reg->type, false); 7391 } else { 7392 return false; 7393 } 7394 break; 7395 case BPF_JLE: 7396 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 7397 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 7398 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 7399 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 7400 /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */ 7401 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 7402 dst_reg->type, false); 7403 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 7404 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 7405 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 7406 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 7407 /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */ 7408 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 7409 src_reg->type, true); 7410 } else { 7411 return false; 7412 } 7413 break; 7414 default: 7415 return false; 7416 } 7417 7418 return true; 7419 } 7420 7421 static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 7422 struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg) 7423 { 7424 struct bpf_func_state *state; 7425 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 7426 int i, j; 7427 7428 for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) { 7429 state = vstate->frame[i]; 7430 for (j = 0; j < MAX_BPF_REG; j++) { 7431 reg = &state->regs[j]; 7432 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) 7433 *reg = *known_reg; 7434 } 7435 7436 bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(j, state, reg) { 7437 if (!reg) 7438 continue; 7439 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) 7440 *reg = *known_reg; 7441 } 7442 } 7443 } 7444 7445 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7446 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) 7447 { 7448 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; 7449 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; 7450 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; 7451 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL; 7452 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 7453 bool is_jmp32; 7454 int pred = -1; 7455 int err; 7456 7457 /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ 7458 if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) { 7459 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode); 7460 return -EINVAL; 7461 } 7462 7463 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 7464 if (insn->imm != 0) { 7465 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 7466 return -EINVAL; 7467 } 7468 7469 /* check src1 operand */ 7470 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 7471 if (err) 7472 return err; 7473 7474 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 7475 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 7476 insn->src_reg); 7477 return -EACCES; 7478 } 7479 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 7480 } else { 7481 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 7482 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 7483 return -EINVAL; 7484 } 7485 } 7486 7487 /* check src2 operand */ 7488 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 7489 if (err) 7490 return err; 7491 7492 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 7493 is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32; 7494 7495 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 7496 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, is_jmp32); 7497 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 7498 is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))) { 7499 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 7500 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 7501 opcode, 7502 is_jmp32); 7503 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 7504 !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) { 7505 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 7506 src_reg->var_off.value, 7507 opcode, 7508 is_jmp32); 7509 } 7510 7511 if (pred >= 0) { 7512 /* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because 7513 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison. 7514 */ 7515 if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg)) 7516 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 7517 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err) 7518 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 7519 if (err) 7520 return err; 7521 } 7522 if (pred == 1) { 7523 /* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through */ 7524 *insn_idx += insn->off; 7525 return 0; 7526 } else if (pred == 0) { 7527 /* only follow fall-through branch, since 7528 * that's where the program will go 7529 */ 7530 return 0; 7531 } 7532 7533 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, 7534 false); 7535 if (!other_branch) 7536 return -EFAULT; 7537 other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs; 7538 7539 /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust 7540 * our min/max values for our dst register. 7541 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same 7542 * object, I suppose, but we don't support that right now), because 7543 * otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't 7544 * comparable. 7545 */ 7546 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 7547 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 7548 7549 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 7550 src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 7551 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) || 7552 (is_jmp32 && 7553 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off)))) 7554 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 7555 dst_reg, 7556 src_reg->var_off.value, 7557 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 7558 opcode, is_jmp32); 7559 else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off) || 7560 (is_jmp32 && 7561 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off)))) 7562 reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 7563 src_reg, 7564 dst_reg->var_off.value, 7565 tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value, 7566 opcode, is_jmp32); 7567 else if (!is_jmp32 && 7568 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)) 7569 /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */ 7570 reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 7571 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 7572 src_reg, dst_reg, opcode); 7573 if (src_reg->id && 7574 !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) { 7575 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg); 7576 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 7577 } 7578 7579 } 7580 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 7581 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 7582 dst_reg, insn->imm, (u32)insn->imm, 7583 opcode, is_jmp32); 7584 } 7585 7586 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id && 7587 !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) { 7588 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg); 7589 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 7590 } 7591 7592 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem(). 7593 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison 7594 * which will never be JMP32. 7595 */ 7596 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && 7597 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && 7598 reg_type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) { 7599 /* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either 7600 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. 7601 */ 7602 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, 7603 opcode == BPF_JNE); 7604 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, 7605 opcode == BPF_JEQ); 7606 } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg], 7607 this_branch, other_branch) && 7608 is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 7609 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 7610 insn->dst_reg); 7611 return -EACCES; 7612 } 7613 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 7614 print_verifier_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); 7615 return 0; 7616 } 7617 7618 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 7619 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 7620 { 7621 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 7622 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7623 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; 7624 struct bpf_map *map; 7625 int err; 7626 7627 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 7628 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); 7629 return -EINVAL; 7630 } 7631 if (insn->off != 0) { 7632 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); 7633 return -EINVAL; 7634 } 7635 7636 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 7637 if (err) 7638 return err; 7639 7640 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 7641 if (insn->src_reg == 0) { 7642 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; 7643 7644 dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 7645 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); 7646 return 0; 7647 } 7648 7649 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 7650 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 7651 7652 dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type; 7653 switch (dst_reg->type) { 7654 case PTR_TO_MEM: 7655 dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size; 7656 break; 7657 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 7658 case PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: 7659 dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id; 7660 break; 7661 default: 7662 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 7663 return -EFAULT; 7664 } 7665 return 0; 7666 } 7667 7668 map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; 7669 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 7670 dst_reg->map_ptr = map; 7671 7672 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE) { 7673 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 7674 dst_reg->off = aux->map_off; 7675 if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) 7676 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 7677 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) { 7678 dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 7679 } else { 7680 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 7681 return -EINVAL; 7682 } 7683 7684 return 0; 7685 } 7686 7687 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) 7688 { 7689 switch (type) { 7690 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 7691 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 7692 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 7693 return true; 7694 default: 7695 return false; 7696 } 7697 } 7698 7699 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: 7700 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb 7701 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, 7702 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 7703 * 7704 * Implicit input: 7705 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX 7706 * 7707 * Explicit input: 7708 * SRC == any register 7709 * IMM == 32-bit immediate 7710 * 7711 * Output: 7712 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness 7713 */ 7714 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 7715 { 7716 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7717 static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6; 7718 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 7719 int i, err; 7720 7721 if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) { 7722 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); 7723 return -EINVAL; 7724 } 7725 7726 if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { 7727 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 7728 return -EINVAL; 7729 } 7730 7731 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 7732 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || 7733 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { 7734 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); 7735 return -EINVAL; 7736 } 7737 7738 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ 7739 err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP); 7740 if (err) 7741 return err; 7742 7743 /* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as 7744 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to 7745 * reference leak. 7746 */ 7747 err = check_reference_leak(env); 7748 if (err) { 7749 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n"); 7750 return err; 7751 } 7752 7753 if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock) { 7754 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n"); 7755 return -EINVAL; 7756 } 7757 7758 if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 7759 verbose(env, 7760 "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); 7761 return -EINVAL; 7762 } 7763 7764 if (mode == BPF_IND) { 7765 /* check explicit source operand */ 7766 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 7767 if (err) 7768 return err; 7769 } 7770 7771 err = check_ctx_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); 7772 if (err < 0) 7773 return err; 7774 7775 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ 7776 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 7777 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 7778 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 7779 } 7780 7781 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains 7782 * the value fetched from the packet. 7783 * Already marked as written above. 7784 */ 7785 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7786 /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ 7787 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 7788 return 0; 7789 } 7790 7791 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7792 { 7793 struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown; 7794 const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 7795 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 7796 struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7797 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 7798 int err; 7799 7800 /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ 7801 if ((prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS || 7802 prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) && 7803 !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 7804 return 0; 7805 7806 /* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used 7807 * to return the value from eBPF program. 7808 * Make sure that it's readable at this time 7809 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote 7810 * something into it earlier 7811 */ 7812 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); 7813 if (err) 7814 return err; 7815 7816 if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) { 7817 verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); 7818 return -EACCES; 7819 } 7820 7821 switch (prog_type) { 7822 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: 7823 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || 7824 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG || 7825 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME || 7826 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME || 7827 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME || 7828 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME) 7829 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 7830 break; 7831 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 7832 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) { 7833 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 7834 enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3); 7835 } 7836 break; 7837 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: 7838 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 7839 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: 7840 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: 7841 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 7842 break; 7843 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 7844 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id) 7845 return 0; 7846 range = tnum_const(0); 7847 break; 7848 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 7849 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { 7850 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 7851 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 7852 range = tnum_const(0); 7853 break; 7854 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 7855 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 7856 return 0; 7857 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 7858 break; 7859 default: 7860 return -ENOTSUPP; 7861 } 7862 break; 7863 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 7864 range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS); 7865 break; 7866 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: 7867 /* freplace program can return anything as its return value 7868 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program. 7869 */ 7870 default: 7871 return 0; 7872 } 7873 7874 reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0; 7875 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 7876 verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 7877 reg_type_str[reg->type]); 7878 return -EINVAL; 7879 } 7880 7881 if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { 7882 char tn_buf[48]; 7883 7884 verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 "); 7885 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 7886 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 7887 verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); 7888 } else { 7889 verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); 7890 } 7891 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), range); 7892 verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf); 7893 return -EINVAL; 7894 } 7895 7896 if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) && 7897 tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off)) 7898 env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1; 7899 return 0; 7900 } 7901 7902 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code 7903 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): 7904 * 2 label v as discovered 7905 * 3 let S be a stack 7906 * 4 S.push(v) 7907 * 5 while S is not empty 7908 * 6 t <- S.pop() 7909 * 7 if t is what we're looking for: 7910 * 8 return t 7911 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do 7912 * 10 if edge e is already labelled 7913 * 11 continue with the next edge 7914 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) 7915 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored 7916 * 14 label e as tree-edge 7917 * 15 label w as discovered 7918 * 16 S.push(w) 7919 * 17 continue at 5 7920 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered 7921 * 19 label e as back-edge 7922 * 20 else 7923 * 21 // vertex w is explored 7924 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge 7925 * 23 label t as explored 7926 * 24 S.pop() 7927 * 7928 * convention: 7929 * 0x10 - discovered 7930 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled 7931 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled 7932 * 0x20 - explored 7933 */ 7934 7935 enum { 7936 DISCOVERED = 0x10, 7937 EXPLORED = 0x20, 7938 FALLTHROUGH = 1, 7939 BRANCH = 2, 7940 }; 7941 7942 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7943 { 7944 return env->prog->len; 7945 } 7946 7947 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state( 7948 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7949 int idx) 7950 { 7951 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 7952 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 7953 7954 return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)]; 7955 } 7956 7957 static void init_explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 7958 { 7959 env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true; 7960 } 7961 7962 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: 7963 * t - index of current instruction 7964 * w - next instruction 7965 * e - edge 7966 */ 7967 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7968 bool loop_ok) 7969 { 7970 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; 7971 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; 7972 7973 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) 7974 return 0; 7975 7976 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) 7977 return 0; 7978 7979 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 7980 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 7981 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 7982 return -EINVAL; 7983 } 7984 7985 if (e == BRANCH) 7986 /* mark branch target for state pruning */ 7987 init_explored_state(env, w); 7988 7989 if (insn_state[w] == 0) { 7990 /* tree-edge */ 7991 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 7992 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; 7993 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 7994 return -E2BIG; 7995 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; 7996 return 1; 7997 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { 7998 if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable) 7999 return 0; 8000 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 8001 verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); 8002 verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 8003 return -EINVAL; 8004 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { 8005 /* forward- or cross-edge */ 8006 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 8007 } else { 8008 verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); 8009 return -EFAULT; 8010 } 8011 return 0; 8012 } 8013 8014 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program 8015 * loop == back-edge in directed graph 8016 */ 8017 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 8018 { 8019 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 8020 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 8021 int *insn_stack, *insn_state; 8022 int ret = 0; 8023 int i, t; 8024 8025 insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 8026 if (!insn_state) 8027 return -ENOMEM; 8028 8029 insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 8030 if (!insn_stack) { 8031 kvfree(insn_state); 8032 return -ENOMEM; 8033 } 8034 8035 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ 8036 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ 8037 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; 8038 8039 peek_stack: 8040 if (env->cfg.cur_stack == 0) 8041 goto check_state; 8042 t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; 8043 8044 if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP || 8045 BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP32) { 8046 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code); 8047 8048 if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 8049 goto mark_explored; 8050 } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 8051 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); 8052 if (ret == 1) 8053 goto peek_stack; 8054 else if (ret < 0) 8055 goto err_free; 8056 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) 8057 init_explored_state(env, t + 1); 8058 if (insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) { 8059 init_explored_state(env, t); 8060 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, 8061 env, false); 8062 if (ret == 1) 8063 goto peek_stack; 8064 else if (ret < 0) 8065 goto err_free; 8066 } 8067 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 8068 if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) { 8069 ret = -EINVAL; 8070 goto err_free; 8071 } 8072 /* unconditional jump with single edge */ 8073 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, 8074 FALLTHROUGH, env, true); 8075 if (ret == 1) 8076 goto peek_stack; 8077 else if (ret < 0) 8078 goto err_free; 8079 /* unconditional jmp is not a good pruning point, 8080 * but it's marked, since backtracking needs 8081 * to record jmp history in is_state_visited(). 8082 */ 8083 init_explored_state(env, t + insns[t].off + 1); 8084 /* tell verifier to check for equivalent states 8085 * after every call and jump 8086 */ 8087 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) 8088 init_explored_state(env, t + 1); 8089 } else { 8090 /* conditional jump with two edges */ 8091 init_explored_state(env, t); 8092 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true); 8093 if (ret == 1) 8094 goto peek_stack; 8095 else if (ret < 0) 8096 goto err_free; 8097 8098 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env, true); 8099 if (ret == 1) 8100 goto peek_stack; 8101 else if (ret < 0) 8102 goto err_free; 8103 } 8104 } else { 8105 /* all other non-branch instructions with single 8106 * fall-through edge 8107 */ 8108 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); 8109 if (ret == 1) 8110 goto peek_stack; 8111 else if (ret < 0) 8112 goto err_free; 8113 } 8114 8115 mark_explored: 8116 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; 8117 if (env->cfg.cur_stack-- <= 0) { 8118 verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); 8119 ret = -EFAULT; 8120 goto err_free; 8121 } 8122 goto peek_stack; 8123 8124 check_state: 8125 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 8126 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { 8127 verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); 8128 ret = -EINVAL; 8129 goto err_free; 8130 } 8131 } 8132 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ 8133 8134 err_free: 8135 kvfree(insn_state); 8136 kvfree(insn_stack); 8137 env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL; 8138 return ret; 8139 } 8140 8141 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 8142 { 8143 int i; 8144 8145 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 8146 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 8147 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 8148 return -EINVAL; 8149 } 8150 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 8151 verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 8152 return -EINVAL; 8153 } 8154 } 8155 return 0; 8156 } 8157 8158 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */ 8159 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8 8160 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252 8161 8162 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8163 const union bpf_attr *attr, 8164 union bpf_attr __user *uattr) 8165 { 8166 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type; 8167 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size; 8168 u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info); 8169 struct bpf_func_info *krecord; 8170 struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL; 8171 struct bpf_prog *prog; 8172 const struct btf *btf; 8173 void __user *urecord; 8174 u32 prev_offset = 0; 8175 bool scalar_return; 8176 int ret = -ENOMEM; 8177 8178 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; 8179 if (!nfuncs) { 8180 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 8181 return -EINVAL; 8182 return 0; 8183 } 8184 8185 if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) { 8186 verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n"); 8187 return -EINVAL; 8188 } 8189 8190 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; 8191 if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE || 8192 urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE || 8193 urec_size % sizeof(u32)) { 8194 verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size); 8195 return -EINVAL; 8196 } 8197 8198 prog = env->prog; 8199 btf = prog->aux->btf; 8200 8201 urecord = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->func_info); 8202 min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size); 8203 8204 krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 8205 if (!krecord) 8206 return -ENOMEM; 8207 info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 8208 if (!info_aux) 8209 goto err_free; 8210 8211 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { 8212 ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size); 8213 if (ret) { 8214 if (ret == -E2BIG) { 8215 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info"); 8216 /* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero 8217 * out the rest of the record. 8218 */ 8219 if (put_user(min_size, &uattr->func_info_rec_size)) 8220 ret = -EFAULT; 8221 } 8222 goto err_free; 8223 } 8224 8225 if (copy_from_user(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) { 8226 ret = -EFAULT; 8227 goto err_free; 8228 } 8229 8230 /* check insn_off */ 8231 ret = -EINVAL; 8232 if (i == 0) { 8233 if (krecord[i].insn_off) { 8234 verbose(env, 8235 "nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record", 8236 krecord[i].insn_off); 8237 goto err_free; 8238 } 8239 } else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) { 8240 verbose(env, 8241 "same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)", 8242 krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset); 8243 goto err_free; 8244 } 8245 8246 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) { 8247 verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n"); 8248 goto err_free; 8249 } 8250 8251 /* check type_id */ 8252 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); 8253 if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) { 8254 verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info", 8255 krecord[i].type_id); 8256 goto err_free; 8257 } 8258 info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info); 8259 8260 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); 8261 if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto))) 8262 /* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */ 8263 goto err_free; 8264 ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 8265 scalar_return = 8266 btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_type_is_enum(ret_type); 8267 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 8268 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 8269 goto err_free; 8270 } 8271 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 8272 verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 8273 goto err_free; 8274 } 8275 8276 prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off; 8277 urecord += urec_size; 8278 } 8279 8280 prog->aux->func_info = krecord; 8281 prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs; 8282 prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux; 8283 return 0; 8284 8285 err_free: 8286 kvfree(krecord); 8287 kfree(info_aux); 8288 return ret; 8289 } 8290 8291 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 8292 { 8293 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 8294 int i; 8295 8296 if (!aux->func_info) 8297 return; 8298 8299 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 8300 aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start; 8301 } 8302 8303 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE (offsetof(struct bpf_line_info, line_col) + \ 8304 sizeof(((struct bpf_line_info *)(0))->line_col)) 8305 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 8306 8307 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8308 const union bpf_attr *attr, 8309 union bpf_attr __user *uattr) 8310 { 8311 u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0; 8312 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub; 8313 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 8314 struct bpf_prog *prog; 8315 const struct btf *btf; 8316 void __user *ulinfo; 8317 int err; 8318 8319 nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt; 8320 if (!nr_linfo) 8321 return 0; 8322 8323 rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size; 8324 if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE || 8325 rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE || 8326 rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1)) 8327 return -EINVAL; 8328 8329 /* Need to zero it in case the userspace may 8330 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object. 8331 */ 8332 linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info), 8333 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 8334 if (!linfo) 8335 return -ENOMEM; 8336 8337 prog = env->prog; 8338 btf = prog->aux->btf; 8339 8340 s = 0; 8341 sub = env->subprog_info; 8342 ulinfo = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->line_info); 8343 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info); 8344 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 8345 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) { 8346 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size); 8347 if (err) { 8348 if (err == -E2BIG) { 8349 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info"); 8350 if (put_user(expected_size, 8351 &uattr->line_info_rec_size)) 8352 err = -EFAULT; 8353 } 8354 goto err_free; 8355 } 8356 8357 if (copy_from_user(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) { 8358 err = -EFAULT; 8359 goto err_free; 8360 } 8361 8362 /* 8363 * Check insn_off to ensure 8364 * 1) strictly increasing AND 8365 * 2) bounded by prog->len 8366 * 8367 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into 8368 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case 8369 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the 8370 * first sub also and the first sub must have 8371 * subprog_info[0].start == 0. 8372 */ 8373 if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) || 8374 linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) { 8375 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n", 8376 i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset, 8377 prog->len); 8378 err = -EINVAL; 8379 goto err_free; 8380 } 8381 8382 if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) { 8383 verbose(env, 8384 "Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n", 8385 i); 8386 err = -EINVAL; 8387 goto err_free; 8388 } 8389 8390 if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) || 8391 !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) { 8392 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i); 8393 err = -EINVAL; 8394 goto err_free; 8395 } 8396 8397 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 8398 if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) { 8399 sub[s].linfo_idx = i; 8400 s++; 8401 } else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) { 8402 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s); 8403 err = -EINVAL; 8404 goto err_free; 8405 } 8406 } 8407 8408 prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off; 8409 ulinfo += rec_size; 8410 } 8411 8412 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 8413 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n", 8414 env->subprog_cnt - s, s); 8415 err = -EINVAL; 8416 goto err_free; 8417 } 8418 8419 prog->aux->linfo = linfo; 8420 prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo; 8421 8422 return 0; 8423 8424 err_free: 8425 kvfree(linfo); 8426 return err; 8427 } 8428 8429 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8430 const union bpf_attr *attr, 8431 union bpf_attr __user *uattr) 8432 { 8433 struct btf *btf; 8434 int err; 8435 8436 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { 8437 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 8438 return -EINVAL; 8439 return 0; 8440 } 8441 8442 btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd); 8443 if (IS_ERR(btf)) 8444 return PTR_ERR(btf); 8445 env->prog->aux->btf = btf; 8446 8447 err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr); 8448 if (err) 8449 return err; 8450 8451 err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr); 8452 if (err) 8453 return err; 8454 8455 return 0; 8456 } 8457 8458 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ 8459 static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old, 8460 struct bpf_reg_state *cur) 8461 { 8462 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && 8463 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && 8464 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && 8465 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value; 8466 } 8467 8468 /* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */ 8469 #define ID_MAP_SIZE (MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) 8470 struct idpair { 8471 u32 old; 8472 u32 cur; 8473 }; 8474 8475 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have 8476 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from 8477 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. 8478 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent 8479 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But 8480 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about 8481 * that. 8482 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If 8483 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. 8484 */ 8485 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct idpair *idmap) 8486 { 8487 unsigned int i; 8488 8489 for (i = 0; i < ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { 8490 if (!idmap[i].old) { 8491 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ 8492 idmap[i].old = old_id; 8493 idmap[i].cur = cur_id; 8494 return true; 8495 } 8496 if (idmap[i].old == old_id) 8497 return idmap[i].cur == cur_id; 8498 } 8499 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ 8500 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 8501 return false; 8502 } 8503 8504 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8505 struct bpf_func_state *st) 8506 { 8507 enum bpf_reg_liveness live; 8508 int i, j; 8509 8510 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 8511 live = st->regs[i].live; 8512 /* liveness must not touch this register anymore */ 8513 st->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 8514 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 8515 /* since the register is unused, clear its state 8516 * to make further comparison simpler 8517 */ 8518 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]); 8519 } 8520 8521 for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 8522 live = st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live; 8523 /* liveness must not touch this stack slot anymore */ 8524 st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 8525 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 8526 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr); 8527 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 8528 st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 8529 } 8530 } 8531 } 8532 8533 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8534 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 8535 { 8536 int i; 8537 8538 if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 8539 /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ 8540 return; 8541 8542 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) 8543 clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]); 8544 } 8545 8546 /* the parentage chains form a tree. 8547 * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and 8548 * pushed into state stack for future exploration. 8549 * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states 8550 * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already, 8551 * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when 8552 * the verifier explores other branches. 8553 * Example: 8554 * 1: r0 = 1 8555 * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1 8556 * 3: r0 = 2 8557 * 4: exit 8558 * when the verifier reaches exit insn the register r0 in the state list of 8559 * insn 2 will be seen as !REG_LIVE_READ. Then the verifier pops the other_branch 8560 * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. At the insn 4 it will walk the 8561 * parentage chain from insn 4 into insn 2 and will mark r0 as REG_LIVE_READ. 8562 * 8563 * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring 8564 * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second 8565 * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and 8566 * their final liveness markes are already propagated. 8567 * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited() 8568 * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states 8569 * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state' 8570 * will not be used. 8571 * This function also clears the registers and stack for states that !READ 8572 * to simplify state merging. 8573 * 8574 * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee 8575 * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare 8576 * the callsites 8577 */ 8578 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, 8579 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 8580 { 8581 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 8582 int i; 8583 8584 sl = *explored_state(env, insn); 8585 while (sl) { 8586 if (sl->state.branches) 8587 goto next; 8588 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || 8589 sl->state.curframe != cur->curframe) 8590 goto next; 8591 for (i = 0; i <= cur->curframe; i++) 8592 if (sl->state.frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 8593 goto next; 8594 clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state); 8595 next: 8596 sl = sl->next; 8597 } 8598 } 8599 8600 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ 8601 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 8602 struct idpair *idmap) 8603 { 8604 bool equal; 8605 8606 if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 8607 /* explored state didn't use this */ 8608 return true; 8609 8610 equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0; 8611 8612 if (rold->type == PTR_TO_STACK) 8613 /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to 8614 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar 8615 */ 8616 return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; 8617 8618 if (equal) 8619 return true; 8620 8621 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) 8622 /* explored state can't have used this */ 8623 return true; 8624 if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT) 8625 return false; 8626 switch (rold->type) { 8627 case SCALAR_VALUE: 8628 if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 8629 if (!rold->precise && !rcur->precise) 8630 return true; 8631 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 8632 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 8633 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 8634 } else { 8635 /* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar. 8636 * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to 8637 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak 8638 * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in 8639 * special cases if root is calling us, but it's 8640 * probably not worth the hassle. 8641 */ 8642 return false; 8643 } 8644 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 8645 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and 8646 * everything else matches, we are OK. 8647 * 'id' is not compared, since it's only used for maps with 8648 * bpf_spin_lock inside map element and in such cases if 8649 * the rest of the prog is valid for one map element then 8650 * it's valid for all map elements regardless of the key 8651 * used in bpf_map_lookup() 8652 */ 8653 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 8654 range_within(rold, rcur) && 8655 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 8656 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: 8657 /* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a 8658 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map. 8659 * However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL- 8660 * checked, doing so could have affected others with the same 8661 * id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when 8662 * we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. 8663 */ 8664 if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) 8665 return false; 8666 if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id))) 8667 return false; 8668 /* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */ 8669 return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 8670 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 8671 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 8672 if (rcur->type != rold->type) 8673 return false; 8674 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr 8675 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are 8676 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, 8677 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or 8678 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. 8679 */ 8680 if (rold->range > rcur->range) 8681 return false; 8682 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; 8683 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. 8684 */ 8685 if (rold->off != rcur->off) 8686 return false; 8687 /* id relations must be preserved */ 8688 if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) 8689 return false; 8690 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 8691 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 8692 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 8693 case PTR_TO_CTX: 8694 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 8695 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 8696 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 8697 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 8698 case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: 8699 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 8700 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: 8701 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 8702 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: 8703 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 8704 /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above 8705 * would have accepted 8706 */ 8707 default: 8708 /* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */ 8709 return false; 8710 } 8711 8712 /* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */ 8713 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 8714 return false; 8715 } 8716 8717 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, 8718 struct bpf_func_state *cur, 8719 struct idpair *idmap) 8720 { 8721 int i, spi; 8722 8723 /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional 8724 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state 8725 * didn't use them 8726 */ 8727 for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) { 8728 spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; 8729 8730 if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 8731 i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; 8732 /* explored state didn't use this */ 8733 continue; 8734 } 8735 8736 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) 8737 continue; 8738 8739 /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack 8740 * and these slots were used 8741 */ 8742 if (i >= cur->allocated_stack) 8743 return false; 8744 8745 /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack 8746 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack. 8747 * The opposite is not true 8748 */ 8749 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC && 8750 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) 8751 continue; 8752 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 8753 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) 8754 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in 8755 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC -> 8756 * this verifier states are not equivalent, 8757 * return false to continue verification of this path 8758 */ 8759 return false; 8760 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE) 8761 continue; 8762 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) 8763 continue; 8764 if (!regsafe(&old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 8765 &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 8766 idmap)) 8767 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing 8768 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types 8769 * are the same as well. 8770 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored 8771 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} 8772 * but current path has stored: 8773 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} 8774 * such verifier states are not equivalent. 8775 * return false to continue verification of this path 8776 */ 8777 return false; 8778 } 8779 return true; 8780 } 8781 8782 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur) 8783 { 8784 if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs) 8785 return false; 8786 return !memcmp(old->refs, cur->refs, 8787 sizeof(*old->refs) * old->acquired_refs); 8788 } 8789 8790 /* compare two verifier states 8791 * 8792 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since 8793 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them 8794 * 8795 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of 8796 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has 8797 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution 8798 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already 8799 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. 8800 * 8801 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative 8802 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. 8803 * Example: 8804 * explored current 8805 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) 8806 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) 8807 * 8808 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more 8809 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means 8810 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too 8811 * 8812 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid 8813 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that 8814 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely 8815 */ 8816 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_func_state *old, 8817 struct bpf_func_state *cur) 8818 { 8819 struct idpair *idmap; 8820 bool ret = false; 8821 int i; 8822 8823 idmap = kcalloc(ID_MAP_SIZE, sizeof(struct idpair), GFP_KERNEL); 8824 /* If we failed to allocate the idmap, just say it's not safe */ 8825 if (!idmap) 8826 return false; 8827 8828 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 8829 if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], idmap)) 8830 goto out_free; 8831 } 8832 8833 if (!stacksafe(old, cur, idmap)) 8834 goto out_free; 8835 8836 if (!refsafe(old, cur)) 8837 goto out_free; 8838 ret = true; 8839 out_free: 8840 kfree(idmap); 8841 return ret; 8842 } 8843 8844 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8845 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 8846 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 8847 { 8848 int i; 8849 8850 if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) 8851 return false; 8852 8853 /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation 8854 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. 8855 */ 8856 if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative) 8857 return false; 8858 8859 if (old->active_spin_lock != cur->active_spin_lock) 8860 return false; 8861 8862 /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same 8863 * and all frame states need to be equivalent 8864 */ 8865 for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { 8866 if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 8867 return false; 8868 if (!func_states_equal(old->frame[i], cur->frame[i])) 8869 return false; 8870 } 8871 return true; 8872 } 8873 8874 /* Return 0 if no propagation happened. Return negative error code if error 8875 * happened. Otherwise, return the propagated bit. 8876 */ 8877 static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8878 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 8879 struct bpf_reg_state *parent_reg) 8880 { 8881 u8 parent_flag = parent_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 8882 u8 flag = reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 8883 int err; 8884 8885 /* When comes here, read flags of PARENT_REG or REG could be any of 8886 * REG_LIVE_READ64, REG_LIVE_READ32, REG_LIVE_NONE. There is no need 8887 * of propagation if PARENT_REG has strongest REG_LIVE_READ64. 8888 */ 8889 if (parent_flag == REG_LIVE_READ64 || 8890 /* Or if there is no read flag from REG. */ 8891 !flag || 8892 /* Or if the read flag from REG is the same as PARENT_REG. */ 8893 parent_flag == flag) 8894 return 0; 8895 8896 err = mark_reg_read(env, reg, parent_reg, flag); 8897 if (err) 8898 return err; 8899 8900 return flag; 8901 } 8902 8903 /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the 8904 * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at an 8905 * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line 8906 * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless 8907 * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison 8908 * in mark_reg_read() is for. 8909 */ 8910 static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8911 const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 8912 struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent) 8913 { 8914 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg; 8915 struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent; 8916 int i, frame, err = 0; 8917 8918 if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) { 8919 WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n", 8920 vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe); 8921 return -EFAULT; 8922 } 8923 /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */ 8924 BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG); 8925 for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) { 8926 parent = vparent->frame[frame]; 8927 state = vstate->frame[frame]; 8928 parent_reg = parent->regs; 8929 state_reg = state->regs; 8930 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */ 8931 for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 8932 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, &state_reg[i], 8933 &parent_reg[i]); 8934 if (err < 0) 8935 return err; 8936 if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64) 8937 mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]); 8938 } 8939 8940 /* Propagate stack slots. */ 8941 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE && 8942 i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 8943 parent_reg = &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 8944 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 8945 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg, 8946 parent_reg); 8947 if (err < 0) 8948 return err; 8949 } 8950 } 8951 return 0; 8952 } 8953 8954 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and 8955 * propagate them into the current state 8956 */ 8957 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8958 const struct bpf_verifier_state *old) 8959 { 8960 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; 8961 struct bpf_func_state *state; 8962 int i, err = 0; 8963 8964 state = old->frame[old->curframe]; 8965 state_reg = state->regs; 8966 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { 8967 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 8968 !state_reg->precise) 8969 continue; 8970 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 8971 verbose(env, "propagating r%d\n", i); 8972 err = mark_chain_precision(env, i); 8973 if (err < 0) 8974 return err; 8975 } 8976 8977 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 8978 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) 8979 continue; 8980 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 8981 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 8982 !state_reg->precise) 8983 continue; 8984 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 8985 verbose(env, "propagating fp%d\n", 8986 (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 8987 err = mark_chain_precision_stack(env, i); 8988 if (err < 0) 8989 return err; 8990 } 8991 return 0; 8992 } 8993 8994 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 8995 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 8996 { 8997 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 8998 int i, fr = cur->curframe; 8999 9000 if (old->curframe != fr) 9001 return false; 9002 9003 fold = old->frame[fr]; 9004 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 9005 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 9006 if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i], 9007 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent))) 9008 return false; 9009 return true; 9010 } 9011 9012 9013 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 9014 { 9015 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; 9016 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev; 9017 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new; 9018 int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0; 9019 bool add_new_state = env->test_state_freq ? true : false; 9020 9021 cur->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 9022 if (!env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point) 9023 /* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not 9024 * be doing state search here 9025 */ 9026 return 0; 9027 9028 /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions 9029 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 9030 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen 9031 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions. 9032 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric. 9033 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier 9034 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup. 9035 */ 9036 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 && 9037 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8) 9038 add_new_state = true; 9039 9040 pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx); 9041 sl = *pprev; 9042 9043 clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur); 9044 9045 while (sl) { 9046 states_cnt++; 9047 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx) 9048 goto next; 9049 if (sl->state.branches) { 9050 if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && 9051 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { 9052 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 9053 verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); 9054 return -EINVAL; 9055 } 9056 /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state 9057 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct 9058 * states and may not help future pruning. 9059 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that 9060 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly. 9061 * The most abusive loop will be: 9062 * r1 += 1 9063 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2 9064 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states. 9065 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states 9066 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning. 9067 */ 9068 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 && 9069 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100) 9070 add_new_state = false; 9071 goto miss; 9072 } 9073 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { 9074 sl->hit_cnt++; 9075 /* reached equivalent register/stack state, 9076 * prune the search. 9077 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us. 9078 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they 9079 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation 9080 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our 9081 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but 9082 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning 9083 * this state and will pop a new one. 9084 */ 9085 err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur); 9086 9087 /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and 9088 * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks) 9089 * the precision needs to be propagated back in 9090 * the current state. 9091 */ 9092 err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur); 9093 err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state); 9094 if (err) 9095 return err; 9096 return 1; 9097 } 9098 miss: 9099 /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count. 9100 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state 9101 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have 9102 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning 9103 * and some at the end) to help pruning. 9104 */ 9105 if (add_new_state) 9106 sl->miss_cnt++; 9107 /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial 9108 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view. 9109 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time, 9110 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed. 9111 */ 9112 if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) { 9113 /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to 9114 * speed up verification 9115 */ 9116 *pprev = sl->next; 9117 if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 9118 u32 br = sl->state.branches; 9119 9120 WARN_ONCE(br, 9121 "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n", 9122 br); 9123 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 9124 kfree(sl); 9125 env->peak_states--; 9126 } else { 9127 /* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may 9128 * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to 9129 * be freed at the end of verification 9130 */ 9131 sl->next = env->free_list; 9132 env->free_list = sl; 9133 } 9134 sl = *pprev; 9135 continue; 9136 } 9137 next: 9138 pprev = &sl->next; 9139 sl = *pprev; 9140 } 9141 9142 if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) 9143 env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; 9144 9145 if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) 9146 return push_jmp_history(env, cur); 9147 9148 if (!add_new_state) 9149 return push_jmp_history(env, cur); 9150 9151 /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one. 9152 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, 9153 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) 9154 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be 9155 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) 9156 * again on the way to bpf_exit. 9157 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state 9158 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. 9159 */ 9160 new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); 9161 if (!new_sl) 9162 return -ENOMEM; 9163 env->total_states++; 9164 env->peak_states++; 9165 env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; 9166 env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; 9167 9168 /* add new state to the head of linked list */ 9169 new = &new_sl->state; 9170 err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); 9171 if (err) { 9172 free_verifier_state(new, false); 9173 kfree(new_sl); 9174 return err; 9175 } 9176 new->insn_idx = insn_idx; 9177 WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1, 9178 "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx); 9179 9180 cur->parent = new; 9181 cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; 9182 clear_jmp_history(cur); 9183 new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx); 9184 *explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl; 9185 /* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all 9186 * registers connected. Only r6 - r9 of the callers are alive (pushed 9187 * to the stack implicitly by JITs) so in callers' frames connect just 9188 * r6 - r9 as an optimization. Callers will have r1 - r5 connected to 9189 * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes 9190 * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway. 9191 */ 9192 /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes 9193 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. 9194 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark 9195 * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only 9196 * explored_states can get read marks.) 9197 */ 9198 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 9199 for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 9200 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i]; 9201 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 9202 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 9203 } 9204 9205 /* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */ 9206 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 9207 struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j]; 9208 struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j]; 9209 9210 for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 9211 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 9212 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent = 9213 &newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 9214 } 9215 } 9216 return 0; 9217 } 9218 9219 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */ 9220 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) 9221 { 9222 switch (type) { 9223 case PTR_TO_CTX: 9224 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 9225 case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: 9226 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 9227 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: 9228 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 9229 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: 9230 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 9231 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 9232 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL: 9233 return false; 9234 default: 9235 return true; 9236 } 9237 } 9238 9239 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we 9240 * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok 9241 * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch: 9242 * 9243 * R1 = sock_ptr 9244 * goto X; 9245 * ... 9246 * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr; 9247 * goto X; 9248 * ... 9249 * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0); 9250 */ 9251 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) 9252 { 9253 return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) || 9254 !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); 9255 } 9256 9257 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9258 { 9259 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 9260 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 9261 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 9262 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 9263 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 9264 bool do_print_state = false; 9265 int prev_insn_idx = -1; 9266 9267 for (;;) { 9268 struct bpf_insn *insn; 9269 u8 class; 9270 int err; 9271 9272 env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 9273 if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { 9274 verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", 9275 env->insn_idx, insn_cnt); 9276 return -EFAULT; 9277 } 9278 9279 insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; 9280 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 9281 9282 if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { 9283 verbose(env, 9284 "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", 9285 env->insn_processed); 9286 return -E2BIG; 9287 } 9288 9289 err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx); 9290 if (err < 0) 9291 return err; 9292 if (err == 1) { 9293 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ 9294 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 9295 if (do_print_state) 9296 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n", 9297 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 9298 env->cur_state->speculative ? 9299 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 9300 else 9301 verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx); 9302 } 9303 goto process_bpf_exit; 9304 } 9305 9306 if (signal_pending(current)) 9307 return -EAGAIN; 9308 9309 if (need_resched()) 9310 cond_resched(); 9311 9312 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 || 9313 (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL && do_print_state)) { 9314 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 9315 verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx); 9316 else 9317 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:", 9318 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 9319 env->cur_state->speculative ? 9320 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 9321 print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]); 9322 do_print_state = false; 9323 } 9324 9325 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 9326 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 9327 .cb_print = verbose, 9328 .private_data = env, 9329 }; 9330 9331 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 9332 verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx); 9333 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 9334 } 9335 9336 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 9337 err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx, 9338 env->prev_insn_idx); 9339 if (err) 9340 return err; 9341 } 9342 9343 regs = cur_regs(env); 9344 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; 9345 prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; 9346 9347 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 9348 err = check_alu_op(env, insn); 9349 if (err) 9350 return err; 9351 9352 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 9353 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type; 9354 9355 /* check for reserved fields is already done */ 9356 9357 /* check src operand */ 9358 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 9359 if (err) 9360 return err; 9361 9362 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 9363 if (err) 9364 return err; 9365 9366 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; 9367 9368 /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable, 9369 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func 9370 */ 9371 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, 9372 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 9373 BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false); 9374 if (err) 9375 return err; 9376 9377 prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 9378 9379 if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) { 9380 /* saw a valid insn 9381 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) 9382 * save type to validate intersecting paths 9383 */ 9384 *prev_src_type = src_reg_type; 9385 9386 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(src_reg_type, *prev_src_type)) { 9387 /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn 9388 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) 9389 * with different pointer types: 9390 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and 9391 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. 9392 * Reject it. 9393 */ 9394 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 9395 return -EINVAL; 9396 } 9397 9398 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 9399 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type; 9400 9401 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) { 9402 err = check_xadd(env, env->insn_idx, insn); 9403 if (err) 9404 return err; 9405 env->insn_idx++; 9406 continue; 9407 } 9408 9409 /* check src1 operand */ 9410 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 9411 if (err) 9412 return err; 9413 /* check src2 operand */ 9414 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 9415 if (err) 9416 return err; 9417 9418 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 9419 9420 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 9421 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 9422 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 9423 BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false); 9424 if (err) 9425 return err; 9426 9427 prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 9428 9429 if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) { 9430 *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type; 9431 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(dst_reg_type, *prev_dst_type)) { 9432 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 9433 return -EINVAL; 9434 } 9435 9436 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 9437 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || 9438 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 9439 verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); 9440 return -EINVAL; 9441 } 9442 /* check src operand */ 9443 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 9444 if (err) 9445 return err; 9446 9447 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 9448 verbose(env, "BPF_ST stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 9449 insn->dst_reg, 9450 reg_type_str[reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type]); 9451 return -EACCES; 9452 } 9453 9454 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 9455 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 9456 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 9457 BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 9458 if (err) 9459 return err; 9460 9461 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 9462 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 9463 9464 env->jmps_processed++; 9465 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 9466 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 9467 insn->off != 0 || 9468 (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && 9469 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) || 9470 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 9471 class == BPF_JMP32) { 9472 verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); 9473 return -EINVAL; 9474 } 9475 9476 if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock && 9477 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL || 9478 insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock)) { 9479 verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); 9480 return -EINVAL; 9481 } 9482 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 9483 err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 9484 else 9485 err = check_helper_call(env, insn->imm, env->insn_idx); 9486 if (err) 9487 return err; 9488 9489 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 9490 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 9491 insn->imm != 0 || 9492 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 9493 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 9494 class == BPF_JMP32) { 9495 verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); 9496 return -EINVAL; 9497 } 9498 9499 env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; 9500 continue; 9501 9502 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 9503 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 9504 insn->imm != 0 || 9505 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 9506 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 9507 class == BPF_JMP32) { 9508 verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); 9509 return -EINVAL; 9510 } 9511 9512 if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock) { 9513 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n"); 9514 return -EINVAL; 9515 } 9516 9517 if (state->curframe) { 9518 /* exit from nested function */ 9519 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); 9520 if (err) 9521 return err; 9522 do_print_state = true; 9523 continue; 9524 } 9525 9526 err = check_reference_leak(env); 9527 if (err) 9528 return err; 9529 9530 err = check_return_code(env); 9531 if (err) 9532 return err; 9533 process_bpf_exit: 9534 update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); 9535 err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, 9536 &env->insn_idx, pop_log); 9537 if (err < 0) { 9538 if (err != -ENOENT) 9539 return err; 9540 break; 9541 } else { 9542 do_print_state = true; 9543 continue; 9544 } 9545 } else { 9546 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 9547 if (err) 9548 return err; 9549 } 9550 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 9551 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 9552 9553 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { 9554 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); 9555 if (err) 9556 return err; 9557 9558 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { 9559 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); 9560 if (err) 9561 return err; 9562 9563 env->insn_idx++; 9564 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; 9565 } else { 9566 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); 9567 return -EINVAL; 9568 } 9569 } else { 9570 verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); 9571 return -EINVAL; 9572 } 9573 9574 env->insn_idx++; 9575 } 9576 9577 return 0; 9578 } 9579 9580 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */ 9581 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9582 struct bpf_insn *insn, 9583 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 9584 { 9585 u32 datasec_id, type, id = insn->imm; 9586 const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi; 9587 const struct btf_type *datasec; 9588 const struct btf_type *t; 9589 const char *sym_name; 9590 bool percpu = false; 9591 u64 addr; 9592 int i; 9593 9594 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 9595 verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n"); 9596 return -EINVAL; 9597 } 9598 9599 if (insn[1].imm != 0) { 9600 verbose(env, "reserved field (insn[1].imm) is used in pseudo_btf_id ldimm64 insn.\n"); 9601 return -EINVAL; 9602 } 9603 9604 t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, id); 9605 if (!t) { 9606 verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id); 9607 return -ENOENT; 9608 } 9609 9610 if (!btf_type_is_var(t)) { 9611 verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR.\n", 9612 id); 9613 return -EINVAL; 9614 } 9615 9616 sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 9617 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name); 9618 if (!addr) { 9619 verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n", 9620 sym_name); 9621 return -ENOENT; 9622 } 9623 9624 datasec_id = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf_vmlinux, ".data..percpu", 9625 BTF_KIND_DATASEC); 9626 if (datasec_id > 0) { 9627 datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, datasec_id); 9628 for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) { 9629 if (vsi->type == id) { 9630 percpu = true; 9631 break; 9632 } 9633 } 9634 } 9635 9636 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 9637 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 9638 9639 type = t->type; 9640 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf_vmlinux, type, NULL); 9641 if (percpu) { 9642 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID; 9643 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 9644 } else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 9645 const struct btf_type *ret; 9646 const char *tname; 9647 u32 tsize; 9648 9649 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 9650 ret = btf_resolve_size(btf_vmlinux, t, &tsize); 9651 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 9652 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 9653 verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 9654 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 9655 return -EINVAL; 9656 } 9657 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM; 9658 aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize; 9659 } else { 9660 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 9661 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 9662 } 9663 return 0; 9664 } 9665 9666 static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map) 9667 { 9668 return (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH && 9669 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && 9670 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS) || 9671 !(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC); 9672 } 9673 9674 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type) 9675 { 9676 switch (type) { 9677 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 9678 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: 9679 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: 9680 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 9681 return true; 9682 default: 9683 return false; 9684 } 9685 } 9686 9687 static bool is_preallocated_map(struct bpf_map *map) 9688 { 9689 if (!check_map_prealloc(map)) 9690 return false; 9691 if (map->inner_map_meta && !check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta)) 9692 return false; 9693 return true; 9694 } 9695 9696 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9697 struct bpf_map *map, 9698 struct bpf_prog *prog) 9699 9700 { 9701 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 9702 /* 9703 * Validate that trace type programs use preallocated hash maps. 9704 * 9705 * For programs attached to PERF events this is mandatory as the 9706 * perf NMI can hit any arbitrary code sequence. 9707 * 9708 * All other trace types using preallocated hash maps are unsafe as 9709 * well because tracepoint or kprobes can be inside locked regions 9710 * of the memory allocator or at a place where a recursion into the 9711 * memory allocator would see inconsistent state. 9712 * 9713 * On RT enabled kernels run-time allocation of all trace type 9714 * programs is strictly prohibited due to lock type constraints. On 9715 * !RT kernels it is allowed for backwards compatibility reasons for 9716 * now, but warnings are emitted so developers are made aware of 9717 * the unsafety and can fix their programs before this is enforced. 9718 */ 9719 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type) && !is_preallocated_map(map)) { 9720 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) { 9721 verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n"); 9722 return -EINVAL; 9723 } 9724 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT)) { 9725 verbose(env, "trace type programs can only use preallocated hash map\n"); 9726 return -EINVAL; 9727 } 9728 WARN_ONCE(1, "trace type BPF program uses run-time allocation\n"); 9729 verbose(env, "trace type programs with run-time allocated hash maps are unsafe. Switch to preallocated hash maps.\n"); 9730 } 9731 9732 if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { 9733 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) { 9734 verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 9735 return -EINVAL; 9736 } 9737 9738 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 9739 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 9740 return -EINVAL; 9741 } 9742 9743 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 9744 verbose(env, "sleepable progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 9745 return -EINVAL; 9746 } 9747 } 9748 9749 if ((bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) && 9750 !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) { 9751 verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n"); 9752 return -EINVAL; 9753 } 9754 9755 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 9756 verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n"); 9757 return -EINVAL; 9758 } 9759 9760 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 9761 switch (map->map_type) { 9762 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH: 9763 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH: 9764 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: 9765 if (!is_preallocated_map(map)) { 9766 verbose(env, 9767 "Sleepable programs can only use preallocated hash maps\n"); 9768 return -EINVAL; 9769 } 9770 break; 9771 default: 9772 verbose(env, 9773 "Sleepable programs can only use array and hash maps\n"); 9774 return -EINVAL; 9775 } 9776 9777 return 0; 9778 } 9779 9780 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map) 9781 { 9782 return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE || 9783 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE); 9784 } 9785 9786 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions: 9787 * 9788 * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer. 9789 * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var. 9790 * 9791 * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id. 9792 */ 9793 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9794 { 9795 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 9796 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 9797 int i, j, err; 9798 9799 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); 9800 if (err) 9801 return err; 9802 9803 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 9804 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 9805 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) { 9806 verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); 9807 return -EINVAL; 9808 } 9809 9810 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 9811 ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM && 9812 BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) { 9813 verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); 9814 return -EINVAL; 9815 } 9816 9817 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { 9818 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 9819 struct bpf_map *map; 9820 struct fd f; 9821 u64 addr; 9822 9823 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || 9824 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || 9825 insn[1].off != 0) { 9826 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 9827 return -EINVAL; 9828 } 9829 9830 if (insn[0].src_reg == 0) 9831 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ 9832 goto next_insn; 9833 9834 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 9835 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 9836 err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux); 9837 if (err) 9838 return err; 9839 goto next_insn; 9840 } 9841 9842 /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is 9843 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn. 9844 */ 9845 if ((insn[0].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD && 9846 insn[0].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE) || 9847 (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD && 9848 insn[1].imm != 0)) { 9849 verbose(env, 9850 "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 9851 return -EINVAL; 9852 } 9853 9854 f = fdget(insn[0].imm); 9855 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 9856 if (IS_ERR(map)) { 9857 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", 9858 insn[0].imm); 9859 return PTR_ERR(map); 9860 } 9861 9862 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); 9863 if (err) { 9864 fdput(f); 9865 return err; 9866 } 9867 9868 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 9869 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) { 9870 addr = (unsigned long)map; 9871 } else { 9872 u32 off = insn[1].imm; 9873 9874 if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 9875 verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off); 9876 fdput(f); 9877 return -EINVAL; 9878 } 9879 9880 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 9881 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 9882 fdput(f); 9883 return -EINVAL; 9884 } 9885 9886 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 9887 if (err) { 9888 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n", 9889 map->value_size, off); 9890 fdput(f); 9891 return err; 9892 } 9893 9894 aux->map_off = off; 9895 addr += off; 9896 } 9897 9898 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 9899 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 9900 9901 /* check whether we recorded this map already */ 9902 for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) { 9903 if (env->used_maps[j] == map) { 9904 aux->map_index = j; 9905 fdput(f); 9906 goto next_insn; 9907 } 9908 } 9909 9910 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { 9911 fdput(f); 9912 return -E2BIG; 9913 } 9914 9915 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, 9916 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it 9917 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded 9918 * and all maps are released in free_used_maps() 9919 */ 9920 bpf_map_inc(map); 9921 9922 aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt; 9923 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; 9924 9925 if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) && 9926 bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) { 9927 verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n"); 9928 fdput(f); 9929 return -EBUSY; 9930 } 9931 9932 fdput(f); 9933 next_insn: 9934 insn++; 9935 i++; 9936 continue; 9937 } 9938 9939 /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */ 9940 if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) { 9941 verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code); 9942 return -EINVAL; 9943 } 9944 } 9945 9946 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid 9947 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. 9948 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. 9949 */ 9950 return 0; 9951 } 9952 9953 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 9954 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9955 { 9956 __bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps, 9957 env->used_map_cnt); 9958 } 9959 9960 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ 9961 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9962 { 9963 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 9964 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 9965 int i; 9966 9967 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) 9968 if (insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) 9969 insn->src_reg = 0; 9970 } 9971 9972 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range 9973 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying 9974 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero 9975 */ 9976 static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9977 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt) 9978 { 9979 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data; 9980 struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi; 9981 u32 prog_len; 9982 int i; 9983 9984 /* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path 9985 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the 9986 * original insn at old prog. 9987 */ 9988 old_data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + off + cnt - 1); 9989 9990 if (cnt == 1) 9991 return 0; 9992 prog_len = new_prog->len; 9993 new_data = vzalloc(array_size(prog_len, 9994 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data))); 9995 if (!new_data) 9996 return -ENOMEM; 9997 memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off); 9998 memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off, 9999 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); 10000 for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) { 10001 new_data[i].seen = env->pass_cnt; 10002 new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i); 10003 } 10004 env->insn_aux_data = new_data; 10005 vfree(old_data); 10006 return 0; 10007 } 10008 10009 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 10010 { 10011 int i; 10012 10013 if (len == 1) 10014 return; 10015 /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */ 10016 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 10017 if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off) 10018 continue; 10019 env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1; 10020 } 10021 } 10022 10023 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 len) 10024 { 10025 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 10026 int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 10027 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc; 10028 10029 for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) { 10030 desc = &tab[i]; 10031 desc->insn_idx += len - 1; 10032 } 10033 } 10034 10035 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 10036 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) 10037 { 10038 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 10039 10040 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); 10041 if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) { 10042 if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE) 10043 verbose(env, 10044 "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n", 10045 env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx); 10046 return NULL; 10047 } 10048 if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog, off, len)) 10049 return NULL; 10050 adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len); 10051 adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, len); 10052 return new_prog; 10053 } 10054 10055 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10056 u32 off, u32 cnt) 10057 { 10058 int i, j; 10059 10060 /* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */ 10061 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 10062 if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off) 10063 break; 10064 /* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */ 10065 for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++) 10066 if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt) 10067 break; 10068 /* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing 10069 * the front of previous prog 10070 */ 10071 if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt) 10072 j--; 10073 10074 if (j > i) { 10075 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 10076 int move; 10077 10078 /* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 10079 move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j; 10080 10081 memmove(env->subprog_info + i, 10082 env->subprog_info + j, 10083 sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move); 10084 env->subprog_cnt -= j - i; 10085 10086 /* remove func_info */ 10087 if (aux->func_info) { 10088 move = aux->func_info_cnt - j; 10089 10090 memmove(aux->func_info + i, 10091 aux->func_info + j, 10092 sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move); 10093 aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i; 10094 /* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites, 10095 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust 10096 */ 10097 } 10098 } else { 10099 /* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */ 10100 if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off) 10101 i++; 10102 } 10103 10104 /* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 10105 for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 10106 env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt; 10107 10108 return 0; 10109 } 10110 10111 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 10112 u32 cnt) 10113 { 10114 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 10115 u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo; 10116 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 10117 10118 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 10119 if (!nr_linfo) 10120 return 0; 10121 10122 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 10123 10124 /* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */ 10125 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) 10126 if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off) 10127 break; 10128 10129 l_off = i; 10130 l_cnt = 0; 10131 for (; i < nr_linfo; i++) 10132 if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt) 10133 l_cnt++; 10134 else 10135 break; 10136 10137 /* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit" 10138 * last removed linfo. prog is already modified, so prog->len == off 10139 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed). 10140 */ 10141 if (prog->len != off && l_cnt && 10142 (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) { 10143 l_cnt--; 10144 linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt; 10145 } 10146 10147 /* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */ 10148 if (l_cnt) { 10149 memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i, 10150 sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i)); 10151 10152 prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt; 10153 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 10154 } 10155 10156 /* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */ 10157 for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++) 10158 linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt; 10159 10160 /* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */ 10161 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 10162 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) { 10163 /* program may have started in the removed region but 10164 * may not be fully removed 10165 */ 10166 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt) 10167 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt; 10168 else 10169 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off; 10170 } 10171 10172 return 0; 10173 } 10174 10175 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt) 10176 { 10177 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 10178 unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len; 10179 int err; 10180 10181 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 10182 bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt); 10183 10184 err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt); 10185 if (err) 10186 return err; 10187 10188 err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 10189 if (err) 10190 return err; 10191 10192 err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 10193 if (err) 10194 return err; 10195 10196 memmove(aux_data + off, aux_data + off + cnt, 10197 sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt)); 10198 10199 return 0; 10200 } 10201 10202 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not 10203 * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can 10204 * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code 10205 * with 'ja -1'. 10206 * 10207 * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the 10208 * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then 10209 * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception 10210 * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead 10211 * code could be located. 10212 */ 10213 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10214 { 10215 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 10216 struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1); 10217 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 10218 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 10219 int i; 10220 10221 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 10222 if (aux_data[i].seen) 10223 continue; 10224 memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap)); 10225 } 10226 } 10227 10228 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code) 10229 { 10230 u8 op; 10231 10232 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32) 10233 return true; 10234 10235 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP) 10236 return false; 10237 10238 op = BPF_OP(code); 10239 return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL; 10240 } 10241 10242 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10243 { 10244 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 10245 struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 10246 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 10247 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 10248 int i; 10249 10250 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 10251 if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code)) 10252 continue; 10253 10254 if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen) 10255 ja.off = insn->off; 10256 else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen) 10257 ja.off = 0; 10258 else 10259 continue; 10260 10261 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 10262 bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja); 10263 10264 memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja)); 10265 } 10266 } 10267 10268 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10269 { 10270 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 10271 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 10272 int i, err; 10273 10274 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 10275 int j; 10276 10277 j = 0; 10278 while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen) 10279 j++; 10280 if (!j) 10281 continue; 10282 10283 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j); 10284 if (err) 10285 return err; 10286 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 10287 } 10288 10289 return 0; 10290 } 10291 10292 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10293 { 10294 const struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 10295 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 10296 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 10297 int i, err; 10298 10299 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 10300 if (memcmp(&insn[i], &ja, sizeof(ja))) 10301 continue; 10302 10303 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1); 10304 if (err) 10305 return err; 10306 insn_cnt--; 10307 i--; 10308 } 10309 10310 return 0; 10311 } 10312 10313 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10314 const union bpf_attr *attr) 10315 { 10316 struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4]; 10317 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 10318 int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len; 10319 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 10320 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 10321 bool rnd_hi32; 10322 10323 rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32; 10324 zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0); 10325 rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 10326 rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); 10327 rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX); 10328 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { 10329 int adj_idx = i + delta; 10330 struct bpf_insn insn; 10331 10332 insn = insns[adj_idx]; 10333 if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) { 10334 u8 code, class; 10335 u32 imm_rnd; 10336 10337 if (!rnd_hi32) 10338 continue; 10339 10340 code = insn.code; 10341 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 10342 if (insn_no_def(&insn)) 10343 continue; 10344 10345 /* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for 10346 * BPF_STX which has been ruled out in above 10347 * check, it is safe to pass NULL here. 10348 */ 10349 if (is_reg64(env, &insn, insn.dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) { 10350 if (class == BPF_LD && 10351 BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM) 10352 i++; 10353 continue; 10354 } 10355 10356 /* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */ 10357 if (class == BPF_LDX && 10358 aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX) 10359 continue; 10360 10361 imm_rnd = get_random_int(); 10362 rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn; 10363 rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd; 10364 rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = insn.dst_reg; 10365 patch = rnd_hi32_patch; 10366 patch_len = 4; 10367 goto apply_patch_buffer; 10368 } 10369 10370 if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext()) 10371 continue; 10372 10373 zext_patch[0] = insn; 10374 zext_patch[1].dst_reg = insn.dst_reg; 10375 zext_patch[1].src_reg = insn.dst_reg; 10376 patch = zext_patch; 10377 patch_len = 2; 10378 apply_patch_buffer: 10379 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len); 10380 if (!new_prog) 10381 return -ENOMEM; 10382 env->prog = new_prog; 10383 insns = new_prog->insnsi; 10384 aux = env->insn_aux_data; 10385 delta += patch_len - 1; 10386 } 10387 10388 return 0; 10389 } 10390 10391 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a 10392 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure: 10393 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff 10394 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock 10395 */ 10396 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10397 { 10398 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops; 10399 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0; 10400 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 10401 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn; 10402 u32 target_size, size_default, off; 10403 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 10404 enum bpf_access_type type; 10405 bool is_narrower_load; 10406 10407 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { 10408 if (!ops->gen_prologue) { 10409 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 10410 return -EINVAL; 10411 } 10412 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, 10413 env->prog); 10414 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 10415 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 10416 return -EINVAL; 10417 } else if (cnt) { 10418 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 10419 if (!new_prog) 10420 return -ENOMEM; 10421 10422 env->prog = new_prog; 10423 delta += cnt - 1; 10424 } 10425 } 10426 10427 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 10428 return 0; 10429 10430 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; 10431 10432 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 10433 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; 10434 10435 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 10436 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 10437 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 10438 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) 10439 type = BPF_READ; 10440 else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 10441 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 10442 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 10443 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) 10444 type = BPF_WRITE; 10445 else 10446 continue; 10447 10448 if (type == BPF_WRITE && 10449 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off) { 10450 struct bpf_insn patch[] = { 10451 /* Sanitize suspicious stack slot with zero. 10452 * There are no memory dependencies for this store, 10453 * since it's only using frame pointer and immediate 10454 * constant of zero 10455 */ 10456 BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, 10457 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off, 10458 0), 10459 /* the original STX instruction will immediately 10460 * overwrite the same stack slot with appropriate value 10461 */ 10462 *insn, 10463 }; 10464 10465 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch); 10466 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt); 10467 if (!new_prog) 10468 return -ENOMEM; 10469 10470 delta += cnt - 1; 10471 env->prog = new_prog; 10472 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 10473 continue; 10474 } 10475 10476 switch (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { 10477 case PTR_TO_CTX: 10478 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) 10479 continue; 10480 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access; 10481 break; 10482 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 10483 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 10484 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; 10485 break; 10486 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 10487 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 10488 break; 10489 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 10490 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 10491 break; 10492 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 10493 if (type == BPF_READ) { 10494 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | 10495 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 10496 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 10497 } else if (resolve_prog_type(env->prog) != BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 10498 verbose(env, "Writes through BTF pointers are not allowed\n"); 10499 return -EINVAL; 10500 } 10501 continue; 10502 default: 10503 continue; 10504 } 10505 10506 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; 10507 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); 10508 10509 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, 10510 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific 10511 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, 10512 * we will apply proper mask to the result. 10513 */ 10514 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; 10515 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size); 10516 off = insn->off; 10517 if (is_narrower_load) { 10518 u8 size_code; 10519 10520 if (type == BPF_WRITE) { 10521 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); 10522 return -EINVAL; 10523 } 10524 10525 size_code = BPF_H; 10526 if (ctx_field_size == 4) 10527 size_code = BPF_W; 10528 else if (ctx_field_size == 8) 10529 size_code = BPF_DW; 10530 10531 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); 10532 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; 10533 } 10534 10535 target_size = 0; 10536 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, 10537 &target_size); 10538 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || 10539 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { 10540 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 10541 return -EINVAL; 10542 } 10543 10544 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { 10545 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( 10546 off, size, size_default) * 8; 10547 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { 10548 if (shift) 10549 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, 10550 insn->dst_reg, 10551 shift); 10552 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 10553 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 10554 } else { 10555 if (shift) 10556 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, 10557 insn->dst_reg, 10558 shift); 10559 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 10560 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1); 10561 } 10562 } 10563 10564 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 10565 if (!new_prog) 10566 return -ENOMEM; 10567 10568 delta += cnt - 1; 10569 10570 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 10571 env->prog = new_prog; 10572 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 10573 } 10574 10575 return 0; 10576 } 10577 10578 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10579 { 10580 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp; 10581 int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog; 10582 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 10583 struct bpf_insn *insn; 10584 void *old_bpf_func; 10585 int err, num_exentries; 10586 10587 if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) 10588 return 0; 10589 10590 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 10591 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || 10592 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 10593 continue; 10594 /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but 10595 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is 10596 * propagated in any case. 10597 */ 10598 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 10599 if (subprog < 0) { 10600 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 10601 i + insn->imm + 1); 10602 return -EFAULT; 10603 } 10604 /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of 10605 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs 10606 */ 10607 insn->off = subprog; 10608 /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback 10609 * to interpreter will be needed 10610 */ 10611 env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; 10612 /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ 10613 insn->imm = 1; 10614 } 10615 10616 err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog); 10617 if (err) 10618 goto out_undo_insn; 10619 10620 err = -ENOMEM; 10621 func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL); 10622 if (!func) 10623 goto out_undo_insn; 10624 10625 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 10626 subprog_start = subprog_end; 10627 subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start; 10628 10629 len = subprog_end - subprog_start; 10630 /* BPF_PROG_RUN doesn't call subprogs directly, 10631 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs. 10632 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id 10633 * func[i]->aux->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL 10634 */ 10635 func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER); 10636 if (!func[i]) 10637 goto out_free; 10638 memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start], 10639 len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); 10640 func[i]->type = prog->type; 10641 func[i]->len = len; 10642 if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i])) 10643 goto out_free; 10644 func[i]->is_func = 1; 10645 func[i]->aux->func_idx = i; 10646 /* the btf and func_info will be freed only at prog->aux */ 10647 func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf; 10648 func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info; 10649 10650 for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { 10651 u32 insn_idx = prog->aux->poke_tab[j].insn_idx; 10652 int ret; 10653 10654 if (!(insn_idx >= subprog_start && 10655 insn_idx <= subprog_end)) 10656 continue; 10657 10658 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(func[i], 10659 &prog->aux->poke_tab[j]); 10660 if (ret < 0) { 10661 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); 10662 goto out_free; 10663 } 10664 10665 func[i]->insnsi[insn_idx - subprog_start].imm = ret + 1; 10666 10667 map_ptr = func[i]->aux->poke_tab[ret].tail_call.map; 10668 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, func[i]->aux); 10669 if (ret < 0) { 10670 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); 10671 goto out_free; 10672 } 10673 } 10674 10675 /* Use bpf_prog_F_tag to indicate functions in stack traces. 10676 * Long term would need debug info to populate names 10677 */ 10678 func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F'; 10679 func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 10680 func[i]->jit_requested = 1; 10681 func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 10682 func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 10683 func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo; 10684 func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx; 10685 num_exentries = 0; 10686 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 10687 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 10688 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 10689 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM) 10690 num_exentries++; 10691 } 10692 func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries; 10693 func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable; 10694 func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 10695 if (!func[i]->jited) { 10696 err = -ENOTSUPP; 10697 goto out_free; 10698 } 10699 cond_resched(); 10700 } 10701 10702 /* Untrack main program's aux structs so that during map_poke_run() 10703 * we will not stumble upon the unfilled poke descriptors; each 10704 * of the main program's poke descs got distributed across subprogs 10705 * and got tracked onto map, so we are sure that none of them will 10706 * be missed after the operation below 10707 */ 10708 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 10709 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 10710 10711 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux); 10712 } 10713 10714 /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed 10715 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and 10716 * run last pass of JIT 10717 */ 10718 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 10719 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 10720 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 10721 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || 10722 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 10723 continue; 10724 subprog = insn->off; 10725 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(func[subprog]->bpf_func) - 10726 __bpf_call_base; 10727 } 10728 10729 /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses 10730 * of the JITed images for each function in the program 10731 * 10732 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field 10733 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start 10734 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base 10735 * 10736 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee 10737 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of 10738 * the call instruction, as an index for this list 10739 */ 10740 func[i]->aux->func = func; 10741 func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 10742 } 10743 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 10744 old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func; 10745 tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 10746 if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) { 10747 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 10748 err = -ENOTSUPP; 10749 goto out_free; 10750 } 10751 cond_resched(); 10752 } 10753 10754 /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and 10755 * populate kallsysm 10756 */ 10757 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 10758 bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]); 10759 bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]); 10760 } 10761 10762 /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main 10763 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can 10764 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. 10765 */ 10766 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 10767 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || 10768 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 10769 continue; 10770 insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 10771 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); 10772 insn->imm = subprog; 10773 } 10774 10775 prog->jited = 1; 10776 prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func; 10777 prog->aux->func = func; 10778 prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 10779 bpf_prog_free_unused_jited_linfo(prog); 10780 return 0; 10781 out_free: 10782 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 10783 if (!func[i]) 10784 continue; 10785 10786 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { 10787 map_ptr = func[i]->aux->poke_tab[j].tail_call.map; 10788 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, func[i]->aux); 10789 } 10790 bpf_jit_free(func[i]); 10791 } 10792 kfree(func); 10793 out_undo_insn: 10794 /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ 10795 prog->jit_requested = 0; 10796 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 10797 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || 10798 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 10799 continue; 10800 insn->off = 0; 10801 insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 10802 } 10803 bpf_prog_free_jited_linfo(prog); 10804 return err; 10805 } 10806 10807 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10808 { 10809 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 10810 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 10811 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 10812 int i, depth; 10813 #endif 10814 int err = 0; 10815 10816 if (env->prog->jit_requested && 10817 !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 10818 err = jit_subprogs(env); 10819 if (err == 0) 10820 return 0; 10821 if (err == -EFAULT) 10822 return err; 10823 } 10824 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 10825 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) { 10826 /* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls 10827 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 10828 */ 10829 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 10830 return -EINVAL; 10831 } 10832 for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 10833 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) || 10834 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 10835 continue; 10836 depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); 10837 if (depth < 0) 10838 return depth; 10839 bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth); 10840 } 10841 err = 0; 10842 #endif 10843 return err; 10844 } 10845 10846 /* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions 10847 * and inline eligible helpers as explicit sequence of BPF instructions 10848 * 10849 * this function is called after eBPF program passed verification 10850 */ 10851 static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10852 { 10853 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 10854 bool expect_blinding = bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(prog); 10855 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 10856 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 10857 const int insn_cnt = prog->len; 10858 const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; 10859 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 10860 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; 10861 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 10862 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 10863 int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0; 10864 10865 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 10866 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 10867 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || 10868 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 10869 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { 10870 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; 10871 struct bpf_insn mask_and_div[] = { 10872 BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->src_reg, insn->src_reg), 10873 /* Rx div 0 -> 0 */ 10874 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, insn->src_reg, 0, 2), 10875 BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 10876 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 10877 *insn, 10878 }; 10879 struct bpf_insn mask_and_mod[] = { 10880 BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->src_reg, insn->src_reg), 10881 /* Rx mod 0 -> Rx */ 10882 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, insn->src_reg, 0, 1), 10883 *insn, 10884 }; 10885 struct bpf_insn *patchlet; 10886 10887 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || 10888 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { 10889 patchlet = mask_and_div + (is64 ? 1 : 0); 10890 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(mask_and_div) - (is64 ? 1 : 0); 10891 } else { 10892 patchlet = mask_and_mod + (is64 ? 1 : 0); 10893 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(mask_and_mod) - (is64 ? 1 : 0); 10894 } 10895 10896 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt); 10897 if (!new_prog) 10898 return -ENOMEM; 10899 10900 delta += cnt - 1; 10901 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 10902 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 10903 continue; 10904 } 10905 10906 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && 10907 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || 10908 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { 10909 cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); 10910 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 10911 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 10912 return -EINVAL; 10913 } 10914 10915 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 10916 if (!new_prog) 10917 return -ENOMEM; 10918 10919 delta += cnt - 1; 10920 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 10921 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 10922 continue; 10923 } 10924 10925 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) || 10926 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) { 10927 const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X; 10928 const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X; 10929 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; 10930 struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; 10931 bool issrc, isneg; 10932 u32 off_reg; 10933 10934 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 10935 if (!aux->alu_state || 10936 aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER) 10937 continue; 10938 10939 isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE; 10940 issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) == 10941 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC; 10942 10943 off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg; 10944 if (isneg) 10945 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 10946 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit - 1); 10947 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 10948 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 10949 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 10950 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63); 10951 if (issrc) { 10952 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, 10953 off_reg); 10954 insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX; 10955 } else { 10956 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, off_reg, 10957 BPF_REG_AX); 10958 } 10959 if (isneg) 10960 insn->code = insn->code == code_add ? 10961 code_sub : code_add; 10962 *patch++ = *insn; 10963 if (issrc && isneg) 10964 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 10965 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 10966 10967 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 10968 if (!new_prog) 10969 return -ENOMEM; 10970 10971 delta += cnt - 1; 10972 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 10973 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 10974 continue; 10975 } 10976 10977 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 10978 continue; 10979 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 10980 continue; 10981 10982 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) 10983 prog->dst_needed = 1; 10984 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) 10985 bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); 10986 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return) 10987 prog->kprobe_override = 1; 10988 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 10989 /* If we tail call into other programs, we 10990 * cannot make any assumptions since they can 10991 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in 10992 * the program array. 10993 */ 10994 prog->cb_access = 1; 10995 if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) 10996 prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; 10997 prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF; 10998 10999 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid 11000 * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal 11001 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler 11002 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet 11003 */ 11004 insn->imm = 0; 11005 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; 11006 11007 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 11008 if (env->bpf_capable && !expect_blinding && 11009 prog->jit_requested && 11010 !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 11011 !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) && 11012 !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) { 11013 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = { 11014 .reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL, 11015 .tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state), 11016 .tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux), 11017 .insn_idx = i + delta, 11018 }; 11019 11020 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc); 11021 if (ret < 0) { 11022 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); 11023 return ret; 11024 } 11025 11026 insn->imm = ret + 1; 11027 continue; 11028 } 11029 11030 if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) 11031 continue; 11032 11033 /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call 11034 * emit two extra insns: 11035 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out; 11036 * index &= array->index_mask; 11037 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation 11038 */ 11039 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) { 11040 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 11041 return -EINVAL; 11042 } 11043 11044 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 11045 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, 11046 map_ptr->max_entries, 2); 11047 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 11048 container_of(map_ptr, 11049 struct bpf_array, 11050 map)->index_mask); 11051 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 11052 cnt = 3; 11053 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 11054 if (!new_prog) 11055 return -ENOMEM; 11056 11057 delta += cnt - 1; 11058 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 11059 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 11060 continue; 11061 } 11062 11063 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup 11064 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit 11065 * only. 11066 */ 11067 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 11068 (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || 11069 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 11070 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 11071 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 11072 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem || 11073 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem)) { 11074 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 11075 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) 11076 goto patch_call_imm; 11077 11078 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 11079 ops = map_ptr->ops; 11080 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 11081 ops->map_gen_lookup) { 11082 cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); 11083 if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP) 11084 goto patch_map_ops_generic; 11085 if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 11086 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 11087 return -EINVAL; 11088 } 11089 11090 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, 11091 insn_buf, cnt); 11092 if (!new_prog) 11093 return -ENOMEM; 11094 11095 delta += cnt - 1; 11096 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 11097 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 11098 continue; 11099 } 11100 11101 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, 11102 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 11103 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem, 11104 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 11105 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem, 11106 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 11107 u64 flags))NULL)); 11108 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem, 11109 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value, 11110 u64 flags))NULL)); 11111 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem, 11112 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 11113 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem, 11114 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 11115 patch_map_ops_generic: 11116 switch (insn->imm) { 11117 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: 11118 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_lookup_elem) - 11119 __bpf_call_base; 11120 continue; 11121 case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: 11122 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_update_elem) - 11123 __bpf_call_base; 11124 continue; 11125 case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: 11126 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_delete_elem) - 11127 __bpf_call_base; 11128 continue; 11129 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 11130 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_push_elem) - 11131 __bpf_call_base; 11132 continue; 11133 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 11134 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_pop_elem) - 11135 __bpf_call_base; 11136 continue; 11137 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 11138 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_peek_elem) - 11139 __bpf_call_base; 11140 continue; 11141 } 11142 11143 goto patch_call_imm; 11144 } 11145 11146 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 11147 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) { 11148 struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = { 11149 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 11150 (unsigned long)&jiffies), 11151 }; 11152 11153 insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0]; 11154 insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1]; 11155 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 11156 BPF_REG_0, 0); 11157 cnt = 3; 11158 11159 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 11160 cnt); 11161 if (!new_prog) 11162 return -ENOMEM; 11163 11164 delta += cnt - 1; 11165 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 11166 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 11167 continue; 11168 } 11169 11170 patch_call_imm: 11171 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); 11172 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed 11173 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions 11174 */ 11175 if (!fn->func) { 11176 verbose(env, 11177 "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 11178 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 11179 return -EFAULT; 11180 } 11181 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; 11182 } 11183 11184 /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */ 11185 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 11186 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 11187 if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || 11188 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || 11189 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { 11190 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 11191 return -EINVAL; 11192 } 11193 11194 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); 11195 if (ret < 0) { 11196 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); 11197 return ret; 11198 } 11199 } 11200 11201 return 0; 11202 } 11203 11204 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11205 { 11206 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln; 11207 int i; 11208 11209 sl = env->free_list; 11210 while (sl) { 11211 sln = sl->next; 11212 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 11213 kfree(sl); 11214 sl = sln; 11215 } 11216 env->free_list = NULL; 11217 11218 if (!env->explored_states) 11219 return; 11220 11221 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) { 11222 sl = env->explored_states[i]; 11223 11224 while (sl) { 11225 sln = sl->next; 11226 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 11227 kfree(sl); 11228 sl = sln; 11229 } 11230 env->explored_states[i] = NULL; 11231 } 11232 } 11233 11234 /* The verifier is using insn_aux_data[] to store temporary data during 11235 * verification and to store information for passes that run after the 11236 * verification like dead code sanitization. do_check_common() for subprogram N 11237 * may analyze many other subprograms. sanitize_insn_aux_data() clears all 11238 * temporary data after do_check_common() finds that subprogram N cannot be 11239 * verified independently. pass_cnt counts the number of times 11240 * do_check_common() was run and insn->aux->seen tells the pass number 11241 * insn_aux_data was touched. These variables are compared to clear temporary 11242 * data from failed pass. For testing and experiments do_check_common() can be 11243 * run multiple times even when prior attempt to verify is unsuccessful. 11244 */ 11245 static void sanitize_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11246 { 11247 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 11248 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 11249 int i, class; 11250 11251 for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) { 11252 class = BPF_CLASS(insn[i].code); 11253 if (class != BPF_LDX && class != BPF_STX) 11254 continue; 11255 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 11256 if (aux->seen != env->pass_cnt) 11257 continue; 11258 memset(aux, 0, offsetof(typeof(*aux), orig_idx)); 11259 } 11260 } 11261 11262 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 11263 { 11264 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 11265 struct bpf_verifier_state *state; 11266 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 11267 int ret, i; 11268 11269 env->prev_linfo = NULL; 11270 env->pass_cnt++; 11271 11272 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL); 11273 if (!state) 11274 return -ENOMEM; 11275 state->curframe = 0; 11276 state->speculative = false; 11277 state->branches = 1; 11278 state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL); 11279 if (!state->frame[0]) { 11280 kfree(state); 11281 return -ENOMEM; 11282 } 11283 env->cur_state = state; 11284 init_func_state(env, state->frame[0], 11285 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 11286 0 /* frameno */, 11287 subprog); 11288 11289 regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs; 11290 if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 11291 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs); 11292 if (ret) 11293 goto out; 11294 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 11295 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_CTX) 11296 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 11297 else if (regs[i].type == SCALAR_VALUE) 11298 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 11299 } 11300 } else { 11301 /* 1st arg to a function */ 11302 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; 11303 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); 11304 ret = btf_check_func_arg_match(env, subprog, regs); 11305 if (ret == -EFAULT) 11306 /* unlikely verifier bug. abort. 11307 * ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for 11308 * main() function due to backward compatibility. 11309 * Like socket filter program may be written as: 11310 * int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) 11311 * and never dereference that ctx in the program. 11312 * 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket 11313 * filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'. 11314 */ 11315 goto out; 11316 } 11317 11318 ret = do_check(env); 11319 out: 11320 /* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside 11321 * do_check() under memory pressure. 11322 */ 11323 if (env->cur_state) { 11324 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 11325 env->cur_state = NULL; 11326 } 11327 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 11328 if (!ret && pop_log) 11329 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); 11330 free_states(env); 11331 if (ret) 11332 /* clean aux data in case subprog was rejected */ 11333 sanitize_insn_aux_data(env); 11334 return ret; 11335 } 11336 11337 /* Verify all global functions in a BPF program one by one based on their BTF. 11338 * All global functions must pass verification. Otherwise the whole program is rejected. 11339 * Consider: 11340 * int bar(int); 11341 * int foo(int f) 11342 * { 11343 * return bar(f); 11344 * } 11345 * int bar(int b) 11346 * { 11347 * ... 11348 * } 11349 * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it 11350 * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar() 11351 * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified 11352 * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value. 11353 */ 11354 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11355 { 11356 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 11357 int i, ret; 11358 11359 if (!aux->func_info) 11360 return 0; 11361 11362 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 11363 if (aux->func_info_aux[i].linkage != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) 11364 continue; 11365 env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start; 11366 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0); 11367 ret = do_check_common(env, i); 11368 if (ret) { 11369 return ret; 11370 } else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 11371 verbose(env, 11372 "Func#%d is safe for any args that match its prototype\n", 11373 i); 11374 } 11375 } 11376 return 0; 11377 } 11378 11379 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11380 { 11381 int ret; 11382 11383 env->insn_idx = 0; 11384 ret = do_check_common(env, 0); 11385 if (!ret) 11386 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 11387 return ret; 11388 } 11389 11390 11391 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11392 { 11393 int i; 11394 11395 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) { 11396 verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n", 11397 div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000)); 11398 verbose(env, "stack depth "); 11399 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 11400 u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 11401 11402 verbose(env, "%d", depth); 11403 if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) 11404 verbose(env, "+"); 11405 } 11406 verbose(env, "\n"); 11407 } 11408 verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d " 11409 "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n", 11410 env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS, 11411 env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states, 11412 env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk); 11413 } 11414 11415 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11416 { 11417 const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto; 11418 const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops; 11419 const struct btf_member *member; 11420 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 11421 u32 btf_id, member_idx; 11422 const char *mname; 11423 11424 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 11425 st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf_id); 11426 if (!st_ops) { 11427 verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n", 11428 btf_id); 11429 return -ENOTSUPP; 11430 } 11431 11432 t = st_ops->type; 11433 member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type; 11434 if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) { 11435 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n", 11436 member_idx, st_ops->name); 11437 return -EINVAL; 11438 } 11439 11440 member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx]; 11441 mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, member->name_off); 11442 func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf_vmlinux, member->type, 11443 NULL); 11444 if (!func_proto) { 11445 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n", 11446 mname, member_idx, st_ops->name); 11447 return -EINVAL; 11448 } 11449 11450 if (st_ops->check_member) { 11451 int err = st_ops->check_member(t, member); 11452 11453 if (err) { 11454 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", 11455 mname, st_ops->name); 11456 return err; 11457 } 11458 } 11459 11460 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto; 11461 prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname; 11462 env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops; 11463 11464 return 0; 11465 } 11466 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" 11467 11468 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name) 11469 { 11470 if (within_error_injection_list(addr) || 11471 !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) 11472 return 0; 11473 11474 return -EINVAL; 11475 } 11476 11477 /* non exhaustive list of sleepable bpf_lsm_*() functions */ 11478 BTF_SET_START(btf_sleepable_lsm_hooks) 11479 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM 11480 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bprm_committed_creds) 11481 #else 11482 BTF_ID_UNUSED 11483 #endif 11484 BTF_SET_END(btf_sleepable_lsm_hooks) 11485 11486 static int check_sleepable_lsm_hook(u32 btf_id) 11487 { 11488 return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_sleepable_lsm_hooks, btf_id); 11489 } 11490 11491 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on 11492 * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list 11493 */ 11494 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 11495 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context. 11496 * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view. 11497 */ 11498 BTF_ID(func, __add_to_page_cache_locked) 11499 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page) 11500 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab) 11501 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 11502 11503 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id) 11504 { 11505 return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); 11506 } 11507 11508 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 11509 const struct bpf_prog *prog, 11510 const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, 11511 u32 btf_id, 11512 struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info) 11513 { 11514 bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT; 11515 const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_"; 11516 int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i; 11517 const struct btf_type *t; 11518 bool conservative = true; 11519 const char *tname; 11520 struct btf *btf; 11521 long addr = 0; 11522 11523 if (!btf_id) { 11524 bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n"); 11525 return -EINVAL; 11526 } 11527 btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : btf_vmlinux; 11528 if (!btf) { 11529 bpf_log(log, 11530 "FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n"); 11531 return -EINVAL; 11532 } 11533 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id); 11534 if (!t) { 11535 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id); 11536 return -EINVAL; 11537 } 11538 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 11539 if (!tname) { 11540 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id); 11541 return -EINVAL; 11542 } 11543 if (tgt_prog) { 11544 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux; 11545 11546 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) 11547 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) { 11548 subprog = i; 11549 break; 11550 } 11551 if (subprog == -1) { 11552 bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname); 11553 return -EINVAL; 11554 } 11555 conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable; 11556 if (prog_extension) { 11557 if (conservative) { 11558 bpf_log(log, 11559 "Cannot replace static functions\n"); 11560 return -EINVAL; 11561 } 11562 if (!prog->jit_requested) { 11563 bpf_log(log, 11564 "Extension programs should be JITed\n"); 11565 return -EINVAL; 11566 } 11567 } 11568 if (!tgt_prog->jited) { 11569 bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n"); 11570 return -EINVAL; 11571 } 11572 if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) { 11573 /* Cannot fentry/fexit another fentry/fexit program. 11574 * Cannot attach program extension to another extension. 11575 * It's ok to attach fentry/fexit to extension program. 11576 */ 11577 bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n"); 11578 return -EINVAL; 11579 } 11580 if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 11581 prog_extension && 11582 (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY || 11583 tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) { 11584 /* Program extensions can extend all program types 11585 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following. 11586 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance 11587 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program 11588 * type except themselves. When extension program is 11589 * replacing XDP function it is necessary to allow 11590 * performance analysis of all functions. Both original 11591 * XDP program and its program extension. Hence 11592 * attaching fentry/fexit to BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is 11593 * allowed. If extending of fentry/fexit was allowed it 11594 * would be possible to create long call chain 11595 * fentry->extension->fentry->extension beyond 11596 * reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry is not 11597 * allowed. 11598 */ 11599 bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n"); 11600 return -EINVAL; 11601 } 11602 } else { 11603 if (prog_extension) { 11604 bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n"); 11605 return -EINVAL; 11606 } 11607 } 11608 11609 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 11610 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 11611 if (tgt_prog) { 11612 bpf_log(log, 11613 "Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n"); 11614 return -EINVAL; 11615 } 11616 if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) { 11617 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n", 11618 btf_id); 11619 return -EINVAL; 11620 } 11621 if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) { 11622 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n", 11623 btf_id, tname); 11624 return -EINVAL; 11625 } 11626 tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1; 11627 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 11628 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 11629 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 11630 return -EINVAL; 11631 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 11632 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 11633 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 11634 return -EINVAL; 11635 11636 break; 11637 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 11638 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 11639 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 11640 btf_id); 11641 return -EINVAL; 11642 } 11643 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 11644 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 11645 return -EINVAL; 11646 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 11647 if (ret) 11648 return ret; 11649 break; 11650 default: 11651 if (!prog_extension) 11652 return -EINVAL; 11653 fallthrough; 11654 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 11655 case BPF_LSM_MAC: 11656 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 11657 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 11658 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 11659 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 11660 btf_id); 11661 return -EINVAL; 11662 } 11663 if (prog_extension && 11664 btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t)) 11665 return -EINVAL; 11666 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 11667 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 11668 return -EINVAL; 11669 11670 if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) && 11671 (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type || 11672 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type)) 11673 return -EINVAL; 11674 11675 if (tgt_prog && conservative) 11676 t = NULL; 11677 11678 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 11679 if (ret < 0) 11680 return ret; 11681 11682 if (tgt_prog) { 11683 if (subprog == 0) 11684 addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func; 11685 else 11686 addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func; 11687 } else { 11688 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname); 11689 if (!addr) { 11690 bpf_log(log, 11691 "The address of function %s cannot be found\n", 11692 tname); 11693 return -ENOENT; 11694 } 11695 } 11696 11697 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 11698 ret = -EINVAL; 11699 switch (prog->type) { 11700 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 11701 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable only if they are 11702 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. 11703 */ 11704 if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) && 11705 within_error_injection_list(addr)) 11706 ret = 0; 11707 break; 11708 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 11709 /* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs. 11710 * Only some of them are sleepable. 11711 */ 11712 if (check_sleepable_lsm_hook(btf_id)) 11713 ret = 0; 11714 break; 11715 default: 11716 break; 11717 } 11718 if (ret) { 11719 bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname); 11720 return ret; 11721 } 11722 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 11723 if (tgt_prog) { 11724 bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n"); 11725 return -EINVAL; 11726 } 11727 ret = check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname); 11728 if (ret) { 11729 bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname); 11730 return ret; 11731 } 11732 } 11733 11734 break; 11735 } 11736 tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr; 11737 tgt_info->tgt_name = tname; 11738 tgt_info->tgt_type = t; 11739 return 0; 11740 } 11741 11742 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11743 { 11744 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 11745 struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog; 11746 struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {}; 11747 u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 11748 struct bpf_trampoline *tr; 11749 int ret; 11750 u64 key; 11751 11752 if (prog->aux->sleepable && prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 11753 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { 11754 verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret and lsm programs can be sleepable\n"); 11755 return -EINVAL; 11756 } 11757 11758 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) 11759 return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env); 11760 11761 if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 11762 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 11763 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 11764 return 0; 11765 11766 ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info); 11767 if (ret) 11768 return ret; 11769 11770 if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 11771 /* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to 11772 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the 11773 * verification 11774 */ 11775 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type]; 11776 prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 11777 } 11778 11779 /* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */ 11780 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type; 11781 prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name; 11782 11783 if (tgt_prog) { 11784 prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type; 11785 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 11786 } 11787 11788 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) { 11789 prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true; 11790 return 0; 11791 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) { 11792 if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog)) 11793 return -EINVAL; 11794 return 0; 11795 } 11796 11797 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { 11798 ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog); 11799 if (ret < 0) 11800 return ret; 11801 } 11802 11803 key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, btf_id); 11804 tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info); 11805 if (!tr) 11806 return -ENOMEM; 11807 11808 prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr; 11809 return 0; 11810 } 11811 11812 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) 11813 { 11814 if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { 11815 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 11816 if (!btf_vmlinux) 11817 btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); 11818 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 11819 } 11820 return btf_vmlinux; 11821 } 11822 11823 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, 11824 union bpf_attr __user *uattr) 11825 { 11826 u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); 11827 struct bpf_verifier_env *env; 11828 struct bpf_verifier_log *log; 11829 int i, len, ret = -EINVAL; 11830 bool is_priv; 11831 11832 /* no program is valid */ 11833 if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) 11834 return -EINVAL; 11835 11836 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, 11837 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called 11838 */ 11839 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); 11840 if (!env) 11841 return -ENOMEM; 11842 log = &env->log; 11843 11844 len = (*prog)->len; 11845 env->insn_aux_data = 11846 vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len)); 11847 ret = -ENOMEM; 11848 if (!env->insn_aux_data) 11849 goto err_free_env; 11850 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 11851 env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i; 11852 env->prog = *prog; 11853 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; 11854 is_priv = bpf_capable(); 11855 11856 bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); 11857 11858 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ 11859 if (!is_priv) 11860 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 11861 11862 if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) { 11863 /* user requested verbose verifier output 11864 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace 11865 */ 11866 log->level = attr->log_level; 11867 log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf; 11868 log->len_total = attr->log_size; 11869 11870 ret = -EINVAL; 11871 /* log attributes have to be sane */ 11872 if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 2 || 11873 !log->level || !log->ubuf || log->level & ~BPF_LOG_MASK) 11874 goto err_unlock; 11875 } 11876 11877 if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) { 11878 /* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */ 11879 verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n"); 11880 ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux); 11881 goto skip_full_check; 11882 } 11883 11884 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); 11885 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) 11886 env->strict_alignment = true; 11887 if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) 11888 env->strict_alignment = false; 11889 11890 env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(); 11891 env->allow_ptr_to_map_access = bpf_allow_ptr_to_map_access(); 11892 env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(); 11893 env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(); 11894 env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable(); 11895 11896 if (is_priv) 11897 env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ; 11898 11899 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 11900 ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog); 11901 if (ret) 11902 goto skip_full_check; 11903 } 11904 11905 env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env), 11906 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), 11907 GFP_USER); 11908 ret = -ENOMEM; 11909 if (!env->explored_states) 11910 goto skip_full_check; 11911 11912 ret = check_subprogs(env); 11913 if (ret < 0) 11914 goto skip_full_check; 11915 11916 ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr); 11917 if (ret < 0) 11918 goto skip_full_check; 11919 11920 ret = check_attach_btf_id(env); 11921 if (ret) 11922 goto skip_full_check; 11923 11924 ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env); 11925 if (ret < 0) 11926 goto skip_full_check; 11927 11928 ret = check_cfg(env); 11929 if (ret < 0) 11930 goto skip_full_check; 11931 11932 ret = do_check_subprogs(env); 11933 ret = ret ?: do_check_main(env); 11934 11935 if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 11936 ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env); 11937 11938 skip_full_check: 11939 kvfree(env->explored_states); 11940 11941 if (ret == 0) 11942 ret = check_max_stack_depth(env); 11943 11944 /* instruction rewrites happen after this point */ 11945 if (is_priv) { 11946 if (ret == 0) 11947 opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env); 11948 if (ret == 0) 11949 ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env); 11950 if (ret == 0) 11951 ret = opt_remove_nops(env); 11952 } else { 11953 if (ret == 0) 11954 sanitize_dead_code(env); 11955 } 11956 11957 if (ret == 0) 11958 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ 11959 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); 11960 11961 if (ret == 0) 11962 ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env); 11963 11964 /* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched 11965 * insns could be handled correctly. 11966 */ 11967 if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 11968 ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr); 11969 env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret 11970 : false; 11971 } 11972 11973 if (ret == 0) 11974 ret = fixup_call_args(env); 11975 11976 env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time; 11977 print_verification_stats(env); 11978 11979 if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) 11980 ret = -ENOSPC; 11981 if (log->level && !log->ubuf) { 11982 ret = -EFAULT; 11983 goto err_release_maps; 11984 } 11985 11986 if (ret == 0 && env->used_map_cnt) { 11987 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ 11988 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, 11989 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), 11990 GFP_KERNEL); 11991 11992 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { 11993 ret = -ENOMEM; 11994 goto err_release_maps; 11995 } 11996 11997 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, 11998 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); 11999 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 12000 12001 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic 12002 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions 12003 */ 12004 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); 12005 } 12006 12007 if (ret == 0) 12008 adjust_btf_func(env); 12009 12010 err_release_maps: 12011 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) 12012 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release 12013 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them. 12014 */ 12015 release_maps(env); 12016 12017 /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets 12018 for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning 12019 */ 12020 if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 12021 env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0; 12022 12023 *prog = env->prog; 12024 err_unlock: 12025 if (!is_priv) 12026 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 12027 vfree(env->insn_aux_data); 12028 err_free_env: 12029 kfree(env); 12030 return ret; 12031 } 12032