1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com 3 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook 4 * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io 5 */ 6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h> 7 #include <linux/kernel.h> 8 #include <linux/types.h> 9 #include <linux/slab.h> 10 #include <linux/bpf.h> 11 #include <linux/btf.h> 12 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> 13 #include <linux/filter.h> 14 #include <net/netlink.h> 15 #include <linux/file.h> 16 #include <linux/vmalloc.h> 17 #include <linux/stringify.h> 18 #include <linux/bsearch.h> 19 #include <linux/sort.h> 20 #include <linux/perf_event.h> 21 #include <linux/ctype.h> 22 #include <linux/error-injection.h> 23 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> 24 #include <linux/btf_ids.h> 25 26 #include "disasm.h" 27 28 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { 29 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \ 30 [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, 31 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) 32 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name) 33 #include <linux/bpf_types.h> 34 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE 35 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE 36 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE 37 }; 38 39 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program 40 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. 41 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. 42 * 43 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. 44 * It rejects the following programs: 45 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns 46 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) 47 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) 48 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps 49 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. 50 * Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the 51 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of 52 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. 53 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k 54 * 55 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction 56 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. 57 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is 58 * copied to R1. 59 * 60 * All registers are 64-bit. 61 * R0 - return register 62 * R1-R5 argument passing registers 63 * R6-R9 callee saved registers 64 * R10 - frame pointer read-only 65 * 66 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context 67 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. 68 * 69 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: 70 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), 71 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), 72 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 73 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize 74 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. 75 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK 76 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). 77 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. 78 * 79 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which 80 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. 81 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) 82 * 83 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register 84 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are 85 * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function. 86 * 87 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' 88 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. 89 * 90 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against 91 * function argument constraints. 92 * 93 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. 94 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be 95 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as 96 * 'pointer to map element key' 97 * 98 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): 99 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, 100 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, 101 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 102 * 103 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' 104 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and 105 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside 106 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. 107 * 108 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: 109 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) 110 * { 111 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; 112 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; 113 * void *value; 114 * 115 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that 116 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on 117 * the stack of eBPF program. 118 * } 119 * 120 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: 121 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR 122 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK 123 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP 124 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), 125 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: 126 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, 127 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes 128 * 129 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, 130 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits 131 * and were initialized prior to this call. 132 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at 133 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets 134 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function 135 * returns ether pointer to map value or NULL. 136 * 137 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' 138 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to 139 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false 140 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). 141 * 142 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 143 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. 144 * 145 * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel 146 * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by 147 * the BPF program: 148 * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET 149 * 150 * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a 151 * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state. 152 * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into 153 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type 154 * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is 155 * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference. 156 * 157 * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as 158 * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as 159 * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function, 160 * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased 161 * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it. 162 */ 163 164 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ 165 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { 166 /* verifer state is 'st' 167 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' 168 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' 169 */ 170 struct bpf_verifier_state st; 171 int insn_idx; 172 int prev_insn_idx; 173 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; 174 /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */ 175 u32 log_pos; 176 }; 177 178 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192 179 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64 180 181 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON (1ULL << 63) 182 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN (1ULL << 62) 183 184 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL 185 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \ 186 POISON_POINTER_DELTA)) 187 #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X) ((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV)) 188 189 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 190 { 191 return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON; 192 } 193 194 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 195 { 196 return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV; 197 } 198 199 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 200 const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv) 201 { 202 BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV); 203 unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux); 204 aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map | 205 (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL); 206 } 207 208 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 209 { 210 return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON; 211 } 212 213 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 214 { 215 return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN); 216 } 217 218 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 219 { 220 return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 221 } 222 223 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state) 224 { 225 bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux); 226 227 aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | 228 (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL); 229 } 230 231 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 232 { 233 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 234 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; 235 } 236 237 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 238 { 239 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 240 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL; 241 } 242 243 static bool bpf_pseudo_func(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 244 { 245 return insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) && 246 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC; 247 } 248 249 struct bpf_call_arg_meta { 250 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 251 bool raw_mode; 252 bool pkt_access; 253 int regno; 254 int access_size; 255 int mem_size; 256 u64 msize_max_value; 257 int ref_obj_id; 258 int func_id; 259 struct btf *btf; 260 u32 btf_id; 261 struct btf *ret_btf; 262 u32 ret_btf_id; 263 u32 subprogno; 264 }; 265 266 struct btf *btf_vmlinux; 267 268 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); 269 270 static const struct bpf_line_info * 271 find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off) 272 { 273 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 274 const struct bpf_prog *prog; 275 u32 i, nr_linfo; 276 277 prog = env->prog; 278 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 279 280 if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len) 281 return NULL; 282 283 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 284 for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++) 285 if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off) 286 break; 287 288 return &linfo[i - 1]; 289 } 290 291 void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const char *fmt, 292 va_list args) 293 { 294 unsigned int n; 295 296 n = vscnprintf(log->kbuf, BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE, fmt, args); 297 298 WARN_ONCE(n >= BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE - 1, 299 "verifier log line truncated - local buffer too short\n"); 300 301 n = min(log->len_total - log->len_used - 1, n); 302 log->kbuf[n] = '\0'; 303 304 if (log->level == BPF_LOG_KERNEL) { 305 pr_err("BPF:%s\n", log->kbuf); 306 return; 307 } 308 if (!copy_to_user(log->ubuf + log->len_used, log->kbuf, n + 1)) 309 log->len_used += n; 310 else 311 log->ubuf = NULL; 312 } 313 314 static void bpf_vlog_reset(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 new_pos) 315 { 316 char zero = 0; 317 318 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) 319 return; 320 321 log->len_used = new_pos; 322 if (put_user(zero, log->ubuf + new_pos)) 323 log->ubuf = NULL; 324 } 325 326 /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier. 327 * bpf_verifier_log_write() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, 328 * so the user can figure out what's wrong with the program 329 */ 330 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 331 const char *fmt, ...) 332 { 333 va_list args; 334 335 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 336 return; 337 338 va_start(args, fmt); 339 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 340 va_end(args); 341 } 342 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_verifier_log_write); 343 344 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...) 345 { 346 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data; 347 va_list args; 348 349 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 350 return; 351 352 va_start(args, fmt); 353 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 354 va_end(args); 355 } 356 357 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_log(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 358 const char *fmt, ...) 359 { 360 va_list args; 361 362 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) 363 return; 364 365 va_start(args, fmt); 366 bpf_verifier_vlog(log, fmt, args); 367 va_end(args); 368 } 369 370 static const char *ltrim(const char *s) 371 { 372 while (isspace(*s)) 373 s++; 374 375 return s; 376 } 377 378 __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 379 u32 insn_off, 380 const char *prefix_fmt, ...) 381 { 382 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 383 384 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 385 return; 386 387 linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off); 388 if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo) 389 return; 390 391 if (prefix_fmt) { 392 va_list args; 393 394 va_start(args, prefix_fmt); 395 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args); 396 va_end(args); 397 } 398 399 verbose(env, "%s\n", 400 ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf, 401 linfo->line_off))); 402 403 env->prev_linfo = linfo; 404 } 405 406 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 407 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 408 struct tnum *range, const char *ctx, 409 const char *reg_name) 410 { 411 char tn_buf[48]; 412 413 verbose(env, "At %s the register %s ", ctx, reg_name); 414 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 415 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 416 verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); 417 } else { 418 verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); 419 } 420 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), *range); 421 verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf); 422 } 423 424 static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 425 { 426 return type == PTR_TO_PACKET || 427 type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META; 428 } 429 430 static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 431 { 432 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 433 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 434 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 435 type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 436 } 437 438 static bool reg_type_not_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) 439 { 440 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 441 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 442 type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 443 type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 444 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; 445 } 446 447 static bool reg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) 448 { 449 return type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL || 450 type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL || 451 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL || 452 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL || 453 type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL || 454 type == PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL || 455 type == PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL || 456 type == PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL; 457 } 458 459 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 460 { 461 return reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 462 map_value_has_spin_lock(reg->map_ptr); 463 } 464 465 static bool reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) 466 { 467 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 468 type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL || 469 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 470 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL || 471 type == PTR_TO_MEM || 472 type == PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL; 473 } 474 475 static bool arg_type_may_be_refcounted(enum bpf_arg_type type) 476 { 477 return type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; 478 } 479 480 static bool arg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_arg_type type) 481 { 482 return type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL || 483 type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL || 484 type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX_OR_NULL || 485 type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL || 486 type == ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL || 487 type == ARG_PTR_TO_STACK_OR_NULL; 488 } 489 490 /* Determine whether the function releases some resources allocated by another 491 * function call. The first reference type argument will be assumed to be 492 * released by release_reference(). 493 */ 494 static bool is_release_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 495 { 496 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_release || 497 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit || 498 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard; 499 } 500 501 static bool may_be_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 502 { 503 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || 504 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || 505 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || 506 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || 507 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve; 508 } 509 510 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 511 const struct bpf_map *map) 512 { 513 enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC; 514 515 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || 516 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || 517 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || 518 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve) 519 return true; 520 521 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 522 (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 523 map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)) 524 return true; 525 526 return false; 527 } 528 529 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 530 { 531 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock || 532 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock || 533 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock || 534 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock || 535 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock || 536 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock || 537 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock; 538 } 539 540 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 541 { 542 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 543 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 544 insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG; 545 } 546 547 /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */ 548 static const char * const reg_type_str[] = { 549 [NOT_INIT] = "?", 550 [SCALAR_VALUE] = "inv", 551 [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx", 552 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr", 553 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value", 554 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = "map_value_or_null", 555 [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp", 556 [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt", 557 [PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta", 558 [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", 559 [PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS] = "flow_keys", 560 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = "sock", 561 [PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL] = "sock_or_null", 562 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = "sock_common", 563 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL] = "sock_common_or_null", 564 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock", 565 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL] = "tcp_sock_or_null", 566 [PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer", 567 [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock", 568 [PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = "ptr_", 569 [PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL] = "ptr_or_null_", 570 [PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = "percpu_ptr_", 571 [PTR_TO_MEM] = "mem", 572 [PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL] = "mem_or_null", 573 [PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF] = "rdonly_buf", 574 [PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL] = "rdonly_buf_or_null", 575 [PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF] = "rdwr_buf", 576 [PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL] = "rdwr_buf_or_null", 577 [PTR_TO_FUNC] = "func", 578 [PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = "map_key", 579 }; 580 581 static char slot_type_char[] = { 582 [STACK_INVALID] = '?', 583 [STACK_SPILL] = 'r', 584 [STACK_MISC] = 'm', 585 [STACK_ZERO] = '0', 586 }; 587 588 static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 589 enum bpf_reg_liveness live) 590 { 591 if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN | REG_LIVE_DONE)) 592 verbose(env, "_"); 593 if (live & REG_LIVE_READ) 594 verbose(env, "r"); 595 if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 596 verbose(env, "w"); 597 if (live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 598 verbose(env, "D"); 599 } 600 601 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 602 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 603 { 604 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 605 606 return cur->frame[reg->frameno]; 607 } 608 609 static const char *kernel_type_name(const struct btf* btf, u32 id) 610 { 611 return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off); 612 } 613 614 static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 615 const struct bpf_func_state *state) 616 { 617 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 618 enum bpf_reg_type t; 619 int i; 620 621 if (state->frameno) 622 verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno); 623 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 624 reg = &state->regs[i]; 625 t = reg->type; 626 if (t == NOT_INIT) 627 continue; 628 verbose(env, " R%d", i); 629 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 630 verbose(env, "=%s", reg_type_str[t]); 631 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 632 verbose(env, "P"); 633 if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && 634 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 635 /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ 636 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 637 } else { 638 if (t == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 639 t == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL || 640 t == PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID) 641 verbose(env, "%s", kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id)); 642 verbose(env, "(id=%d", reg->id); 643 if (reg_type_may_be_refcounted_or_null(t)) 644 verbose(env, ",ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id); 645 if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) 646 verbose(env, ",off=%d", reg->off); 647 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) 648 verbose(env, ",r=%d", reg->range); 649 else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || 650 t == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 651 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 652 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) 653 verbose(env, ",ks=%d,vs=%d", 654 reg->map_ptr->key_size, 655 reg->map_ptr->value_size); 656 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 657 /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but 658 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big 659 * for reg->off 660 */ 661 verbose(env, ",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); 662 } else { 663 if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value && 664 reg->smin_value != S64_MIN) 665 verbose(env, ",smin_value=%lld", 666 (long long)reg->smin_value); 667 if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value && 668 reg->smax_value != S64_MAX) 669 verbose(env, ",smax_value=%lld", 670 (long long)reg->smax_value); 671 if (reg->umin_value != 0) 672 verbose(env, ",umin_value=%llu", 673 (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value); 674 if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX) 675 verbose(env, ",umax_value=%llu", 676 (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value); 677 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 678 char tn_buf[48]; 679 680 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 681 verbose(env, ",var_off=%s", tn_buf); 682 } 683 if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value && 684 reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN) 685 verbose(env, ",s32_min_value=%d", 686 (int)(reg->s32_min_value)); 687 if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value && 688 reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX) 689 verbose(env, ",s32_max_value=%d", 690 (int)(reg->s32_max_value)); 691 if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value && 692 reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN) 693 verbose(env, ",u32_min_value=%d", 694 (int)(reg->u32_min_value)); 695 if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value && 696 reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX) 697 verbose(env, ",u32_max_value=%d", 698 (int)(reg->u32_max_value)); 699 } 700 verbose(env, ")"); 701 } 702 } 703 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 704 char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE + 1]; 705 bool valid = false; 706 int j; 707 708 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 709 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] != STACK_INVALID) 710 valid = true; 711 types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[ 712 state->stack[i].slot_type[j]]; 713 } 714 types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0; 715 if (!valid) 716 continue; 717 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 718 print_liveness(env, state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live); 719 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) { 720 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 721 t = reg->type; 722 verbose(env, "=%s", reg_type_str[t]); 723 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 724 verbose(env, "P"); 725 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 726 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 727 } else { 728 verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf); 729 } 730 } 731 if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) { 732 verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id); 733 for (i = 1; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) 734 if (state->refs[i].id) 735 verbose(env, ",%d", state->refs[i].id); 736 } 737 verbose(env, "\n"); 738 } 739 740 #define COPY_STATE_FN(NAME, COUNT, FIELD, SIZE) \ 741 static int copy_##NAME##_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, \ 742 const struct bpf_func_state *src) \ 743 { \ 744 if (!src->FIELD) \ 745 return 0; \ 746 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dst->COUNT < src->COUNT)) { \ 747 /* internal bug, make state invalid to reject the program */ \ 748 memset(dst, 0, sizeof(*dst)); \ 749 return -EFAULT; \ 750 } \ 751 memcpy(dst->FIELD, src->FIELD, \ 752 sizeof(*src->FIELD) * (src->COUNT / SIZE)); \ 753 return 0; \ 754 } 755 /* copy_reference_state() */ 756 COPY_STATE_FN(reference, acquired_refs, refs, 1) 757 /* copy_stack_state() */ 758 COPY_STATE_FN(stack, allocated_stack, stack, BPF_REG_SIZE) 759 #undef COPY_STATE_FN 760 761 #define REALLOC_STATE_FN(NAME, COUNT, FIELD, SIZE) \ 762 static int realloc_##NAME##_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int size, \ 763 bool copy_old) \ 764 { \ 765 u32 old_size = state->COUNT; \ 766 struct bpf_##NAME##_state *new_##FIELD; \ 767 int slot = size / SIZE; \ 768 \ 769 if (size <= old_size || !size) { \ 770 if (copy_old) \ 771 return 0; \ 772 state->COUNT = slot * SIZE; \ 773 if (!size && old_size) { \ 774 kfree(state->FIELD); \ 775 state->FIELD = NULL; \ 776 } \ 777 return 0; \ 778 } \ 779 new_##FIELD = kmalloc_array(slot, sizeof(struct bpf_##NAME##_state), \ 780 GFP_KERNEL); \ 781 if (!new_##FIELD) \ 782 return -ENOMEM; \ 783 if (copy_old) { \ 784 if (state->FIELD) \ 785 memcpy(new_##FIELD, state->FIELD, \ 786 sizeof(*new_##FIELD) * (old_size / SIZE)); \ 787 memset(new_##FIELD + old_size / SIZE, 0, \ 788 sizeof(*new_##FIELD) * (size - old_size) / SIZE); \ 789 } \ 790 state->COUNT = slot * SIZE; \ 791 kfree(state->FIELD); \ 792 state->FIELD = new_##FIELD; \ 793 return 0; \ 794 } 795 /* realloc_reference_state() */ 796 REALLOC_STATE_FN(reference, acquired_refs, refs, 1) 797 /* realloc_stack_state() */ 798 REALLOC_STATE_FN(stack, allocated_stack, stack, BPF_REG_SIZE) 799 #undef REALLOC_STATE_FN 800 801 /* do_check() starts with zero-sized stack in struct bpf_verifier_state to 802 * make it consume minimal amount of memory. check_stack_write() access from 803 * the program calls into realloc_func_state() to grow the stack size. 804 * Note there is a non-zero 'parent' pointer inside bpf_verifier_state 805 * which realloc_stack_state() copies over. It points to previous 806 * bpf_verifier_state which is never reallocated. 807 */ 808 static int realloc_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int stack_size, 809 int refs_size, bool copy_old) 810 { 811 int err = realloc_reference_state(state, refs_size, copy_old); 812 if (err) 813 return err; 814 return realloc_stack_state(state, stack_size, copy_old); 815 } 816 817 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include 818 * this new pointer reference. 819 * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register 820 * On failure, returns a negative errno. 821 */ 822 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 823 { 824 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 825 int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs; 826 int id, err; 827 828 err = realloc_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1, true); 829 if (err) 830 return err; 831 id = ++env->id_gen; 832 state->refs[new_ofs].id = id; 833 state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx; 834 835 return id; 836 } 837 838 /* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */ 839 static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id) 840 { 841 int i, last_idx; 842 843 last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1; 844 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 845 if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) { 846 if (last_idx && i != last_idx) 847 memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx], 848 sizeof(*state->refs)); 849 memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs)); 850 state->acquired_refs--; 851 return 0; 852 } 853 } 854 return -EINVAL; 855 } 856 857 static int transfer_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, 858 struct bpf_func_state *src) 859 { 860 int err = realloc_reference_state(dst, src->acquired_refs, false); 861 if (err) 862 return err; 863 err = copy_reference_state(dst, src); 864 if (err) 865 return err; 866 return 0; 867 } 868 869 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) 870 { 871 if (!state) 872 return; 873 kfree(state->refs); 874 kfree(state->stack); 875 kfree(state); 876 } 877 878 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 879 { 880 kfree(state->jmp_history); 881 state->jmp_history = NULL; 882 state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; 883 } 884 885 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 886 bool free_self) 887 { 888 int i; 889 890 for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) { 891 free_func_state(state->frame[i]); 892 state->frame[i] = NULL; 893 } 894 clear_jmp_history(state); 895 if (free_self) 896 kfree(state); 897 } 898 899 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space 900 * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack 901 */ 902 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, 903 const struct bpf_func_state *src) 904 { 905 int err; 906 907 err = realloc_func_state(dst, src->allocated_stack, src->acquired_refs, 908 false); 909 if (err) 910 return err; 911 memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, acquired_refs)); 912 err = copy_reference_state(dst, src); 913 if (err) 914 return err; 915 return copy_stack_state(dst, src); 916 } 917 918 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, 919 const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) 920 { 921 struct bpf_func_state *dst; 922 u32 jmp_sz = sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair) * src->jmp_history_cnt; 923 int i, err; 924 925 if (dst_state->jmp_history_cnt < src->jmp_history_cnt) { 926 kfree(dst_state->jmp_history); 927 dst_state->jmp_history = kmalloc(jmp_sz, GFP_USER); 928 if (!dst_state->jmp_history) 929 return -ENOMEM; 930 } 931 memcpy(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, jmp_sz); 932 dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; 933 934 /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */ 935 for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { 936 free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); 937 dst_state->frame[i] = NULL; 938 } 939 dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; 940 dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; 941 dst_state->active_spin_lock = src->active_spin_lock; 942 dst_state->branches = src->branches; 943 dst_state->parent = src->parent; 944 dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; 945 dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; 946 for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { 947 dst = dst_state->frame[i]; 948 if (!dst) { 949 dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL); 950 if (!dst) 951 return -ENOMEM; 952 dst_state->frame[i] = dst; 953 } 954 err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]); 955 if (err) 956 return err; 957 } 958 return 0; 959 } 960 961 static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 962 { 963 while (st) { 964 u32 br = --st->branches; 965 966 /* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here, 967 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: 968 */ 969 WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0, 970 "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n", 971 br); 972 if (br) 973 break; 974 st = st->parent; 975 } 976 } 977 978 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, 979 int *insn_idx, bool pop_log) 980 { 981 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 982 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; 983 int err; 984 985 if (env->head == NULL) 986 return -ENOENT; 987 988 if (cur) { 989 err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st); 990 if (err) 991 return err; 992 } 993 if (pop_log) 994 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos); 995 if (insn_idx) 996 *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; 997 if (prev_insn_idx) 998 *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx; 999 elem = head->next; 1000 free_verifier_state(&head->st, false); 1001 kfree(head); 1002 env->head = elem; 1003 env->stack_size--; 1004 return 0; 1005 } 1006 1007 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1008 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 1009 bool speculative) 1010 { 1011 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1012 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 1013 int err; 1014 1015 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 1016 if (!elem) 1017 goto err; 1018 1019 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 1020 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 1021 elem->next = env->head; 1022 elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used; 1023 env->head = elem; 1024 env->stack_size++; 1025 err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); 1026 if (err) 1027 goto err; 1028 elem->st.speculative |= speculative; 1029 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 1030 verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n", 1031 env->stack_size); 1032 goto err; 1033 } 1034 if (elem->st.parent) { 1035 ++elem->st.parent->branches; 1036 /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here, 1037 * but 1038 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch 1039 * instructions 1040 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create 1041 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current 1042 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state 1043 * which might have large 'branches' count. 1044 */ 1045 } 1046 return &elem->st; 1047 err: 1048 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 1049 env->cur_state = NULL; 1050 /* pop all elements and return */ 1051 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 1052 return NULL; 1053 } 1054 1055 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 1056 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { 1057 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 1058 }; 1059 1060 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1061 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 1062 1063 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */ 1064 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1065 { 1066 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); 1067 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; 1068 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; 1069 reg->umin_value = imm; 1070 reg->umax_value = imm; 1071 1072 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 1073 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 1074 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 1075 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 1076 } 1077 1078 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as 1079 * known to have the value @imm. 1080 */ 1081 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1082 { 1083 /* Clear id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) */ 1084 memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0, 1085 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type)); 1086 ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm); 1087 } 1088 1089 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1090 { 1091 reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm); 1092 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 1093 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 1094 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 1095 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 1096 } 1097 1098 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be 1099 * used only on registers holding a pointer type. 1100 */ 1101 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1102 { 1103 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 1104 } 1105 1106 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1107 { 1108 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 1109 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1110 } 1111 1112 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1113 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1114 { 1115 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1116 verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1117 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 1118 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 1119 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1120 return; 1121 } 1122 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); 1123 } 1124 1125 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1126 { 1127 switch (reg->type) { 1128 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: { 1129 const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 1130 1131 if (map->inner_map_meta) { 1132 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 1133 reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta; 1134 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { 1135 reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 1136 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 1137 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) { 1138 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; 1139 } else { 1140 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 1141 } 1142 break; 1143 } 1144 case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: 1145 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; 1146 break; 1147 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: 1148 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; 1149 break; 1150 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: 1151 reg->type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK; 1152 break; 1153 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL: 1154 reg->type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 1155 break; 1156 case PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL: 1157 reg->type = PTR_TO_MEM; 1158 break; 1159 case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL: 1160 reg->type = PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF; 1161 break; 1162 case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL: 1163 reg->type = PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF; 1164 break; 1165 default: 1166 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown nullable register type"); 1167 } 1168 } 1169 1170 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1171 { 1172 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 1173 } 1174 1175 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1176 { 1177 return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || 1178 reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; 1179 } 1180 1181 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ 1182 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1183 enum bpf_reg_type which) 1184 { 1185 /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. 1186 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its 1187 * origin. 1188 */ 1189 return reg->type == which && 1190 reg->id == 0 && 1191 reg->off == 0 && 1192 tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 1193 } 1194 1195 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ 1196 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1197 { 1198 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 1199 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 1200 reg->umin_value = 0; 1201 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 1202 1203 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 1204 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 1205 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 1206 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 1207 } 1208 1209 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1210 { 1211 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 1212 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 1213 reg->umin_value = 0; 1214 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 1215 } 1216 1217 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1218 { 1219 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 1220 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 1221 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 1222 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 1223 } 1224 1225 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1226 { 1227 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 1228 1229 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 1230 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, 1231 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN)); 1232 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 1233 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, 1234 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX)); 1235 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value); 1236 reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value, 1237 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask)); 1238 } 1239 1240 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1241 { 1242 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 1243 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, 1244 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); 1245 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 1246 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, 1247 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); 1248 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); 1249 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, 1250 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); 1251 } 1252 1253 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1254 { 1255 __update_reg32_bounds(reg); 1256 __update_reg64_bounds(reg); 1257 } 1258 1259 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ 1260 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1261 { 1262 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 1263 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 1264 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 1265 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 1266 */ 1267 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 || reg->s32_max_value < 0) { 1268 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 1269 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 1270 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 1271 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 1272 return; 1273 } 1274 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 1275 * boundary, so we must be careful. 1276 */ 1277 if ((s32)reg->u32_max_value >= 0) { 1278 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 1279 * is positive, hence safe. 1280 */ 1281 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value; 1282 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 1283 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 1284 } else if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value < 0) { 1285 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 1286 * is negative, hence safe. 1287 */ 1288 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 1289 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 1290 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value; 1291 } 1292 } 1293 1294 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1295 { 1296 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 1297 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 1298 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 1299 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 1300 */ 1301 if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) { 1302 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 1303 reg->umin_value); 1304 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 1305 reg->umax_value); 1306 return; 1307 } 1308 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 1309 * boundary, so we must be careful. 1310 */ 1311 if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) { 1312 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 1313 * is positive, hence safe. 1314 */ 1315 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 1316 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 1317 reg->umax_value); 1318 } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) { 1319 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 1320 * is negative, hence safe. 1321 */ 1322 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 1323 reg->umin_value); 1324 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 1325 } 1326 } 1327 1328 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1329 { 1330 __reg32_deduce_bounds(reg); 1331 __reg64_deduce_bounds(reg); 1332 } 1333 1334 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ 1335 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1336 { 1337 struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 1338 tnum_range(reg->umin_value, 1339 reg->umax_value)); 1340 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg->var_off), 1341 tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value, 1342 reg->u32_max_value)); 1343 1344 reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off); 1345 } 1346 1347 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1348 { 1349 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value; 1350 reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value; 1351 /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds 1352 * but must be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds 1353 * and refine later from tnum. 1354 */ 1355 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && reg->s32_max_value >= 0) 1356 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 1357 else 1358 reg->smax_value = U32_MAX; 1359 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0) 1360 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 1361 else 1362 reg->smin_value = 0; 1363 } 1364 1365 static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1366 { 1367 /* special case when 64-bit register has upper 32-bit register 1368 * zeroed. Typically happens after zext or <<32, >>32 sequence 1369 * allowing us to use 32-bit bounds directly, 1370 */ 1371 if (tnum_equals_const(tnum_clear_subreg(reg->var_off), 0)) { 1372 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 1373 } else { 1374 /* Otherwise the best we can do is push lower 32bit known and 1375 * unknown bits into register (var_off set from jmp logic) 1376 * then learn as much as possible from the 64-bit tnum 1377 * known and unknown bits. The previous smin/smax bounds are 1378 * invalid here because of jmp32 compare so mark them unknown 1379 * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation. 1380 */ 1381 __mark_reg64_unbounded(reg); 1382 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1383 } 1384 1385 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 1386 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 1387 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 1388 */ 1389 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 1390 __reg_bound_offset(reg); 1391 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1392 } 1393 1394 static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a) 1395 { 1396 return a > S32_MIN && a < S32_MAX; 1397 } 1398 1399 static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a) 1400 { 1401 if (a > U32_MIN && a < U32_MAX) 1402 return true; 1403 return false; 1404 } 1405 1406 static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1407 { 1408 __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg); 1409 1410 if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value) && __reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) { 1411 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value; 1412 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value; 1413 } 1414 if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umin_value)) 1415 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value; 1416 if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umax_value)) 1417 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value; 1418 1419 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 1420 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 1421 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 1422 */ 1423 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 1424 __reg_bound_offset(reg); 1425 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1426 } 1427 1428 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ 1429 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1430 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1431 { 1432 /* 1433 * Clear type, id, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and 1434 * padding between 'type' and union 1435 */ 1436 memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)); 1437 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1438 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 1439 reg->frameno = 0; 1440 reg->precise = env->subprog_cnt > 1 || !env->bpf_capable; 1441 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 1442 } 1443 1444 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1445 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1446 { 1447 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1448 verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1449 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 1450 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 1451 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1452 return; 1453 } 1454 __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno); 1455 } 1456 1457 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1458 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1459 { 1460 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 1461 reg->type = NOT_INIT; 1462 } 1463 1464 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1465 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1466 { 1467 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1468 verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1469 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 1470 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 1471 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1472 return; 1473 } 1474 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1475 } 1476 1477 static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1478 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 1479 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, 1480 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id) 1481 { 1482 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 1483 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 1484 return; 1485 } 1486 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); 1487 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 1488 regs[regno].btf = btf; 1489 regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; 1490 } 1491 1492 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) 1493 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1494 struct bpf_func_state *state) 1495 { 1496 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 1497 int i; 1498 1499 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 1500 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); 1501 regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 1502 regs[i].parent = NULL; 1503 regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 1504 } 1505 1506 /* frame pointer */ 1507 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; 1508 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); 1509 regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; 1510 } 1511 1512 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) 1513 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1514 struct bpf_func_state *state, 1515 int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno) 1516 { 1517 state->callsite = callsite; 1518 state->frameno = frameno; 1519 state->subprogno = subprogno; 1520 init_reg_state(env, state); 1521 } 1522 1523 enum reg_arg_type { 1524 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ 1525 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ 1526 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ 1527 }; 1528 1529 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b) 1530 { 1531 return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start - 1532 ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start; 1533 } 1534 1535 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 1536 { 1537 struct bpf_subprog_info *p; 1538 1539 p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 1540 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs); 1541 if (!p) 1542 return -ENOENT; 1543 return p - env->subprog_info; 1544 1545 } 1546 1547 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 1548 { 1549 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 1550 int ret; 1551 1552 if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) { 1553 verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n"); 1554 return -EINVAL; 1555 } 1556 ret = find_subprog(env, off); 1557 if (ret >= 0) 1558 return ret; 1559 if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { 1560 verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); 1561 return -E2BIG; 1562 } 1563 /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ 1564 env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; 1565 sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 1566 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); 1567 return env->subprog_cnt - 1; 1568 } 1569 1570 struct bpf_kfunc_desc { 1571 struct btf_func_model func_model; 1572 u32 func_id; 1573 s32 imm; 1574 }; 1575 1576 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256 1577 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab { 1578 struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS]; 1579 u32 nr_descs; 1580 }; 1581 1582 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id(const void *a, const void *b) 1583 { 1584 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 1585 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 1586 1587 /* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */ 1588 return d0->func_id - d1->func_id; 1589 } 1590 1591 static const struct bpf_kfunc_desc * 1592 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id) 1593 { 1594 struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 1595 .func_id = func_id, 1596 }; 1597 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 1598 1599 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 1600 return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 1601 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id); 1602 } 1603 1604 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id) 1605 { 1606 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 1607 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 1608 struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux; 1609 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 1610 const char *func_name; 1611 unsigned long addr; 1612 int err; 1613 1614 prog_aux = env->prog->aux; 1615 tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab; 1616 if (!tab) { 1617 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 1618 verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 1619 return -ENOTSUPP; 1620 } 1621 1622 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) { 1623 verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n"); 1624 return -ENOTSUPP; 1625 } 1626 1627 if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) { 1628 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n"); 1629 return -ENOTSUPP; 1630 } 1631 1632 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) { 1633 verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 1634 return -EINVAL; 1635 } 1636 1637 tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL); 1638 if (!tab) 1639 return -ENOMEM; 1640 prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab; 1641 } 1642 1643 if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id)) 1644 return 0; 1645 1646 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) { 1647 verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n"); 1648 return -E2BIG; 1649 } 1650 1651 func = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, func_id); 1652 if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) { 1653 verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n", 1654 func_id); 1655 return -EINVAL; 1656 } 1657 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, func->type); 1658 if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) { 1659 verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n", 1660 func_id); 1661 return -EINVAL; 1662 } 1663 1664 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, func->name_off); 1665 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name); 1666 if (!addr) { 1667 verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n", 1668 func_name); 1669 return -EINVAL; 1670 } 1671 1672 desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 1673 desc->func_id = func_id; 1674 desc->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(addr) - __bpf_call_base; 1675 err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, btf_vmlinux, 1676 func_proto, func_name, 1677 &desc->func_model); 1678 if (!err) 1679 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 1680 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id, NULL); 1681 return err; 1682 } 1683 1684 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm(const void *a, const void *b) 1685 { 1686 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 1687 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 1688 1689 if (d0->imm > d1->imm) 1690 return 1; 1691 else if (d0->imm < d1->imm) 1692 return -1; 1693 return 0; 1694 } 1695 1696 static void sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(struct bpf_prog *prog) 1697 { 1698 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 1699 1700 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 1701 if (!tab) 1702 return; 1703 1704 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 1705 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm, NULL); 1706 } 1707 1708 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog) 1709 { 1710 return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 1711 } 1712 1713 const struct btf_func_model * 1714 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog, 1715 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 1716 { 1717 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 1718 .imm = insn->imm, 1719 }; 1720 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res; 1721 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 1722 1723 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 1724 res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 1725 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm); 1726 1727 return res ? &res->func_model : NULL; 1728 } 1729 1730 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 1731 { 1732 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 1733 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 1734 int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 1735 1736 /* Add entry function. */ 1737 ret = add_subprog(env, 0); 1738 if (ret) 1739 return ret; 1740 1741 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 1742 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) && 1743 !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) 1744 continue; 1745 1746 if (!env->bpf_capable) { 1747 verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); 1748 return -EPERM; 1749 } 1750 1751 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 1752 ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 1753 if (ret >= 0) 1754 /* remember subprog */ 1755 insn[1].imm = ret; 1756 } else if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) { 1757 ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 1758 } else { 1759 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm); 1760 } 1761 1762 if (ret < 0) 1763 return ret; 1764 } 1765 1766 /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration 1767 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased. 1768 */ 1769 subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; 1770 1771 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 1772 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 1773 verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); 1774 1775 return 0; 1776 } 1777 1778 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 1779 { 1780 int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0; 1781 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 1782 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 1783 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 1784 1785 /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */ 1786 subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start; 1787 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 1788 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 1789 u8 code = insn[i].code; 1790 1791 if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 1792 insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 1793 insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 1794 subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true; 1795 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD && 1796 (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND)) 1797 subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true; 1798 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) 1799 goto next; 1800 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) 1801 goto next; 1802 off = i + insn[i].off + 1; 1803 if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) { 1804 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off); 1805 return -EINVAL; 1806 } 1807 next: 1808 if (i == subprog_end - 1) { 1809 /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another 1810 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit 1811 * or unconditional jump back 1812 */ 1813 if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && 1814 code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { 1815 verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n"); 1816 return -EINVAL; 1817 } 1818 subprog_start = subprog_end; 1819 cur_subprog++; 1820 if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt) 1821 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 1822 } 1823 } 1824 return 0; 1825 } 1826 1827 /* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all 1828 * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc. 1829 */ 1830 static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1831 const struct bpf_reg_state *state, 1832 struct bpf_reg_state *parent, u8 flag) 1833 { 1834 bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ 1835 int cnt = 0; 1836 1837 while (parent) { 1838 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ 1839 if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 1840 break; 1841 if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 1842 verbose(env, "verifier BUG type %s var_off %lld off %d\n", 1843 reg_type_str[parent->type], 1844 parent->var_off.value, parent->off); 1845 return -EFAULT; 1846 } 1847 /* The first condition is more likely to be true than the 1848 * second, checked it first. 1849 */ 1850 if ((parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ) == flag || 1851 parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ64) 1852 /* The parentage chain never changes and 1853 * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ. 1854 * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and 1855 * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ. 1856 * This case happens when the same register is read 1857 * multiple times without writes into it in-between. 1858 * Also, if parent has the stronger REG_LIVE_READ64 set, 1859 * then no need to set the weak REG_LIVE_READ32. 1860 */ 1861 break; 1862 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ 1863 parent->live |= flag; 1864 /* REG_LIVE_READ64 overrides REG_LIVE_READ32. */ 1865 if (flag == REG_LIVE_READ64) 1866 parent->live &= ~REG_LIVE_READ32; 1867 state = parent; 1868 parent = state->parent; 1869 writes = true; 1870 cnt++; 1871 } 1872 1873 if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt) 1874 env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt; 1875 return 0; 1876 } 1877 1878 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization 1879 * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates 1880 * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE. 1881 */ 1882 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 1883 u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t) 1884 { 1885 u8 code, class, op; 1886 1887 code = insn->code; 1888 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 1889 op = BPF_OP(code); 1890 if (class == BPF_JMP) { 1891 /* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE 1892 * conservatively. 1893 */ 1894 if (op == BPF_EXIT) 1895 return true; 1896 if (op == BPF_CALL) { 1897 /* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking 1898 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we 1899 * don't care the register def because they are anyway 1900 * marked as NOT_INIT already. 1901 */ 1902 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 1903 return false; 1904 /* Helper call will reach here because of arg type 1905 * check, conservatively return TRUE. 1906 */ 1907 if (t == SRC_OP) 1908 return true; 1909 1910 return false; 1911 } 1912 } 1913 1914 if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP || 1915 /* BPF_END always use BPF_ALU class. */ 1916 (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64)) 1917 return true; 1918 1919 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32) 1920 return false; 1921 1922 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 1923 if (t != SRC_OP) 1924 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 1925 /* LDX source must be ptr. */ 1926 return true; 1927 } 1928 1929 if (class == BPF_STX) { 1930 /* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has multiple source 1931 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is 1932 * asking about it. 1933 */ 1934 if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 1935 return true; 1936 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 1937 } 1938 1939 if (class == BPF_LD) { 1940 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code); 1941 1942 /* LD_IMM64 */ 1943 if (mode == BPF_IMM) 1944 return true; 1945 1946 /* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */ 1947 if (t != SRC_OP) 1948 return false; 1949 1950 /* Implicit ctx ptr. */ 1951 if (regno == BPF_REG_6) 1952 return true; 1953 1954 /* Explicit source could be any width. */ 1955 return true; 1956 } 1957 1958 if (class == BPF_ST) 1959 /* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */ 1960 return true; 1961 1962 /* Conservatively return true at default. */ 1963 return true; 1964 } 1965 1966 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */ 1967 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 1968 { 1969 switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) { 1970 case BPF_JMP: 1971 case BPF_JMP32: 1972 case BPF_ST: 1973 return -1; 1974 case BPF_STX: 1975 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 1976 (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)) { 1977 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 1978 return BPF_REG_0; 1979 else 1980 return insn->src_reg; 1981 } else { 1982 return -1; 1983 } 1984 default: 1985 return insn->dst_reg; 1986 } 1987 } 1988 1989 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */ 1990 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 1991 { 1992 int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn); 1993 1994 if (dst_reg == -1) 1995 return false; 1996 1997 return !is_reg64(env, insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP); 1998 } 1999 2000 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2001 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2002 { 2003 s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def; 2004 2005 if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG) 2006 return; 2007 2008 env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true; 2009 /* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */ 2010 reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 2011 } 2012 2013 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 2014 enum reg_arg_type t) 2015 { 2016 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 2017 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 2018 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx; 2019 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs; 2020 bool rw64; 2021 2022 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { 2023 verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); 2024 return -EINVAL; 2025 } 2026 2027 reg = ®s[regno]; 2028 rw64 = is_reg64(env, insn, regno, reg, t); 2029 if (t == SRC_OP) { 2030 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ 2031 if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) { 2032 verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); 2033 return -EACCES; 2034 } 2035 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ 2036 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) 2037 return 0; 2038 2039 if (rw64) 2040 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 2041 2042 return mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, 2043 rw64 ? REG_LIVE_READ64 : REG_LIVE_READ32); 2044 } else { 2045 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ 2046 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { 2047 verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); 2048 return -EACCES; 2049 } 2050 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2051 reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 2052 if (t == DST_OP) 2053 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 2054 } 2055 return 0; 2056 } 2057 2058 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ 2059 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2060 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 2061 { 2062 u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; 2063 struct bpf_idx_pair *p; 2064 2065 cnt++; 2066 p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, cnt * sizeof(*p), GFP_USER); 2067 if (!p) 2068 return -ENOMEM; 2069 p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx; 2070 p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 2071 cur->jmp_history = p; 2072 cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; 2073 return 0; 2074 } 2075 2076 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded 2077 * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. 2078 */ 2079 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, 2080 u32 *history) 2081 { 2082 u32 cnt = *history; 2083 2084 if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { 2085 i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; 2086 (*history)--; 2087 } else { 2088 i--; 2089 } 2090 return i; 2091 } 2092 2093 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn) 2094 { 2095 const struct btf_type *func; 2096 2097 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 2098 return NULL; 2099 2100 func = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, insn->imm); 2101 return btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, func->name_off); 2102 } 2103 2104 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to 2105 * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and 2106 * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. 2107 */ 2108 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, 2109 u32 *reg_mask, u64 *stack_mask) 2110 { 2111 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 2112 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 2113 .cb_print = verbose, 2114 .private_data = env, 2115 }; 2116 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; 2117 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 2118 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 2119 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 2120 u32 dreg = 1u << insn->dst_reg; 2121 u32 sreg = 1u << insn->src_reg; 2122 u32 spi; 2123 2124 if (insn->code == 0) 2125 return 0; 2126 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 2127 verbose(env, "regs=%x stack=%llx before ", *reg_mask, *stack_mask); 2128 verbose(env, "%d: ", idx); 2129 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 2130 } 2131 2132 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 2133 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 2134 return 0; 2135 if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 2136 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2137 /* dreg = sreg 2138 * dreg needs precision after this insn 2139 * sreg needs precision before this insn 2140 */ 2141 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2142 *reg_mask |= sreg; 2143 } else { 2144 /* dreg = K 2145 * dreg needs precision after this insn. 2146 * Corresponding register is already marked 2147 * as precise=true in this verifier state. 2148 * No further markings in parent are necessary 2149 */ 2150 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2151 } 2152 } else { 2153 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2154 /* dreg += sreg 2155 * both dreg and sreg need precision 2156 * before this insn 2157 */ 2158 *reg_mask |= sreg; 2159 } /* else dreg += K 2160 * dreg still needs precision before this insn 2161 */ 2162 } 2163 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 2164 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 2165 return 0; 2166 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2167 2168 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision. 2169 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended. 2170 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated 2171 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. 2172 * No further tracking necessary. 2173 */ 2174 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 2175 return 0; 2176 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) 2177 return 0; 2178 2179 /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. 2180 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be 2181 * tracked with precision 2182 */ 2183 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 2184 if (spi >= 64) { 2185 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 2186 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2187 return -EFAULT; 2188 } 2189 *stack_mask |= 1ull << spi; 2190 } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) { 2191 if (*reg_mask & dreg) 2192 /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg 2193 * to access memory. It means backtracking 2194 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction. 2195 */ 2196 return -ENOTSUPP; 2197 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ 2198 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 2199 return 0; 2200 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) 2201 return 0; 2202 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 2203 if (spi >= 64) { 2204 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 2205 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2206 return -EFAULT; 2207 } 2208 if (!(*stack_mask & (1ull << spi))) 2209 return 0; 2210 *stack_mask &= ~(1ull << spi); 2211 if (class == BPF_STX) 2212 *reg_mask |= sreg; 2213 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 2214 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 2215 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 2216 return -ENOTSUPP; 2217 /* regular helper call sets R0 */ 2218 *reg_mask &= ~1; 2219 if (*reg_mask & 0x3f) { 2220 /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5 2221 * they should have been found already. 2222 */ 2223 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", *reg_mask); 2224 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2225 return -EFAULT; 2226 } 2227 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 2228 return -ENOTSUPP; 2229 } 2230 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 2231 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 2232 return 0; 2233 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2234 /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind. 2235 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision 2236 * into parent is necessary 2237 */ 2238 if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS) 2239 /* to be analyzed */ 2240 return -ENOTSUPP; 2241 } 2242 return 0; 2243 } 2244 2245 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm: 2246 * . at the start all registers have precise=false. 2247 * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns. 2248 * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in: 2249 * . ptr + scalar alu 2250 * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) 2251 * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected 2252 * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and 2253 * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers 2254 * should be precise. 2255 * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) 2256 * are equivalent if both are not precise. 2257 * 2258 * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain, 2259 * since many different registers and stack slots could have been 2260 * used to compute single precise scalar. 2261 * 2262 * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then 2263 * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects 2264 * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper 2265 * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe. 2266 * 2267 * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states. 2268 * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn. 2269 * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later. 2270 * 2271 * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like: 2272 * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) 2273 * r9 -= r8 2274 * r5 = r9 2275 * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7 2276 * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff)) 2277 * r5 += 1 2278 * ... 2279 * call bpf_perf_event_output#25 2280 * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO 2281 * 2282 * and this case: 2283 * r6 = 1 2284 * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0 2285 * r0 += r6 2286 * if r0 == 0 goto 2287 * 2288 * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame. 2289 * 2290 * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started, 2291 * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees 2292 * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to 2293 * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences") 2294 * 2295 * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. 2296 */ 2297 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2298 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 2299 { 2300 struct bpf_func_state *func; 2301 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 2302 int i, j; 2303 2304 /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. 2305 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. 2306 */ 2307 for (; st; st = st->parent) 2308 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 2309 func = st->frame[i]; 2310 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 2311 reg = &func->regs[j]; 2312 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2313 continue; 2314 reg->precise = true; 2315 } 2316 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 2317 if (func->stack[j].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) 2318 continue; 2319 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 2320 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2321 continue; 2322 reg->precise = true; 2323 } 2324 } 2325 } 2326 2327 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 2328 int spi) 2329 { 2330 struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; 2331 int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 2332 int last_idx = env->insn_idx; 2333 struct bpf_func_state *func; 2334 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 2335 u32 reg_mask = regno >= 0 ? 1u << regno : 0; 2336 u64 stack_mask = spi >= 0 ? 1ull << spi : 0; 2337 bool skip_first = true; 2338 bool new_marks = false; 2339 int i, err; 2340 2341 if (!env->bpf_capable) 2342 return 0; 2343 2344 func = st->frame[st->curframe]; 2345 if (regno >= 0) { 2346 reg = &func->regs[regno]; 2347 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2348 WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse"); 2349 return -EFAULT; 2350 } 2351 if (!reg->precise) 2352 new_marks = true; 2353 else 2354 reg_mask = 0; 2355 reg->precise = true; 2356 } 2357 2358 while (spi >= 0) { 2359 if (func->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) { 2360 stack_mask = 0; 2361 break; 2362 } 2363 reg = &func->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 2364 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2365 stack_mask = 0; 2366 break; 2367 } 2368 if (!reg->precise) 2369 new_marks = true; 2370 else 2371 stack_mask = 0; 2372 reg->precise = true; 2373 break; 2374 } 2375 2376 if (!new_marks) 2377 return 0; 2378 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 2379 return 0; 2380 for (;;) { 2381 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 2382 u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; 2383 2384 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 2385 verbose(env, "last_idx %d first_idx %d\n", last_idx, first_idx); 2386 for (i = last_idx;;) { 2387 if (skip_first) { 2388 err = 0; 2389 skip_first = false; 2390 } else { 2391 err = backtrack_insn(env, i, ®_mask, &stack_mask); 2392 } 2393 if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { 2394 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); 2395 return 0; 2396 } else if (err) { 2397 return err; 2398 } 2399 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 2400 /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state. 2401 * Since this state is already marked, just return. 2402 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state. 2403 */ 2404 return 0; 2405 if (i == first_idx) 2406 break; 2407 i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); 2408 if (i >= env->prog->len) { 2409 /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0 2410 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask 2411 * to backtrack. 2412 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where 2413 * particular register was initialized with a constant. 2414 */ 2415 verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i); 2416 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2417 return -EFAULT; 2418 } 2419 } 2420 st = st->parent; 2421 if (!st) 2422 break; 2423 2424 new_marks = false; 2425 func = st->frame[st->curframe]; 2426 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 2427 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 2428 reg = &func->regs[i]; 2429 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2430 reg_mask &= ~(1u << i); 2431 continue; 2432 } 2433 if (!reg->precise) 2434 new_marks = true; 2435 reg->precise = true; 2436 } 2437 2438 bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); 2439 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 2440 if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) { 2441 /* the sequence of instructions: 2442 * 2: (bf) r3 = r10 2443 * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0 2444 * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) 2445 * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked 2446 * as a single block. 2447 * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as 2448 * stack access, so at the end of backtracking 2449 * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask. 2450 * However the parent state may not have accessed 2451 * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space. 2452 * In such case fallback to conservative. 2453 */ 2454 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); 2455 return 0; 2456 } 2457 2458 if (func->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) { 2459 stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); 2460 continue; 2461 } 2462 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 2463 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2464 stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); 2465 continue; 2466 } 2467 if (!reg->precise) 2468 new_marks = true; 2469 reg->precise = true; 2470 } 2471 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 2472 print_verifier_state(env, func); 2473 verbose(env, "parent %s regs=%x stack=%llx marks\n", 2474 new_marks ? "didn't have" : "already had", 2475 reg_mask, stack_mask); 2476 } 2477 2478 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 2479 break; 2480 if (!new_marks) 2481 break; 2482 2483 last_idx = st->last_insn_idx; 2484 first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 2485 } 2486 return 0; 2487 } 2488 2489 static int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 2490 { 2491 return __mark_chain_precision(env, regno, -1); 2492 } 2493 2494 static int mark_chain_precision_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int spi) 2495 { 2496 return __mark_chain_precision(env, -1, spi); 2497 } 2498 2499 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) 2500 { 2501 switch (type) { 2502 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 2503 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: 2504 case PTR_TO_STACK: 2505 case PTR_TO_CTX: 2506 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 2507 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 2508 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 2509 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 2510 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 2511 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 2512 case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: 2513 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 2514 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: 2515 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 2516 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: 2517 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 2518 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 2519 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL: 2520 case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF: 2521 case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL: 2522 case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF: 2523 case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL: 2524 case PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: 2525 case PTR_TO_MEM: 2526 case PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL: 2527 case PTR_TO_FUNC: 2528 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 2529 return true; 2530 default: 2531 return false; 2532 } 2533 } 2534 2535 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ 2536 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2537 { 2538 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 2539 } 2540 2541 static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2542 { 2543 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 2544 } 2545 2546 static bool __is_scalar_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2547 { 2548 return tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off) && 2549 reg->smin_value == S64_MIN && reg->smax_value == S64_MAX && 2550 reg->umin_value == 0 && reg->umax_value == U64_MAX && 2551 reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN && reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX && 2552 reg->u32_min_value == 0 && reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX; 2553 } 2554 2555 static bool register_is_bounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2556 { 2557 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !__is_scalar_unbounded(reg); 2558 } 2559 2560 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, 2561 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2562 { 2563 if (allow_ptr_leaks) 2564 return false; 2565 2566 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; 2567 } 2568 2569 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, 2570 int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2571 { 2572 int i; 2573 2574 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg; 2575 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2576 2577 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 2578 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_SPILL; 2579 } 2580 2581 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers, 2582 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() 2583 */ 2584 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2585 /* stack frame we're writing to */ 2586 struct bpf_func_state *state, 2587 int off, int size, int value_regno, 2588 int insn_idx) 2589 { 2590 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 2591 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; 2592 u32 dst_reg = env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx].dst_reg; 2593 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; 2594 2595 err = realloc_func_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE), 2596 state->acquired_refs, true); 2597 if (err) 2598 return err; 2599 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, 2600 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits 2601 */ 2602 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && 2603 state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 2604 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 2605 verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); 2606 return -EACCES; 2607 } 2608 2609 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 2610 if (value_regno >= 0) 2611 reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 2612 2613 if (reg && size == BPF_REG_SIZE && register_is_bounded(reg) && 2614 !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) { 2615 if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) { 2616 /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit 2617 * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of 2618 * scalar via different register has to be conervative. 2619 * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise 2620 * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant. 2621 */ 2622 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 2623 if (err) 2624 return err; 2625 } 2626 save_register_state(state, spi, reg); 2627 } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { 2628 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ 2629 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 2630 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 2631 verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); 2632 return -EACCES; 2633 } 2634 2635 if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 2636 verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); 2637 return -EINVAL; 2638 } 2639 2640 if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) { 2641 bool sanitize = false; 2642 2643 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 2644 register_is_const(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr)) 2645 sanitize = true; 2646 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 2647 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC) { 2648 sanitize = true; 2649 break; 2650 } 2651 if (sanitize) { 2652 int *poff = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off; 2653 int soff = (-spi - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE; 2654 2655 /* detected reuse of integer stack slot with a pointer 2656 * which means either llvm is reusing stack slot or 2657 * an attacker is trying to exploit CVE-2018-3639 2658 * (speculative store bypass) 2659 * Have to sanitize that slot with preemptive 2660 * store of zero. 2661 */ 2662 if (*poff && *poff != soff) { 2663 /* disallow programs where single insn stores 2664 * into two different stack slots, since verifier 2665 * cannot sanitize them 2666 */ 2667 verbose(env, 2668 "insn %d cannot access two stack slots fp%d and fp%d", 2669 insn_idx, *poff, soff); 2670 return -EINVAL; 2671 } 2672 *poff = soff; 2673 } 2674 } 2675 save_register_state(state, spi, reg); 2676 } else { 2677 u8 type = STACK_MISC; 2678 2679 /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ 2680 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 2681 /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr. */ 2682 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) 2683 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 2684 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_MISC; 2685 2686 /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written 2687 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon 2688 * when stack slots are partially written. 2689 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be 2690 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks 2691 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs 2692 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes 2693 */ 2694 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 2695 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2696 2697 /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ 2698 if (reg && register_is_null(reg)) { 2699 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 2700 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 2701 if (err) 2702 return err; 2703 type = STACK_ZERO; 2704 } 2705 2706 /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ 2707 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 2708 state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = 2709 type; 2710 } 2711 return 0; 2712 } 2713 2714 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is 2715 * known to contain a variable offset. 2716 * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively 2717 * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the 2718 * dynamic range is potentially written to. 2719 * 2720 * 'off' includes 'regno->off'. 2721 * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to 2722 * the stack. 2723 * 2724 * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know 2725 * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for 2726 * future reads cannot be terminated by this write. 2727 * 2728 * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered 2729 * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets 2730 * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to 2731 * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets. 2732 */ 2733 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2734 /* func where register points to */ 2735 struct bpf_func_state *state, 2736 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 2737 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 2738 { 2739 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 2740 int min_off, max_off; 2741 int i, err; 2742 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL; 2743 bool writing_zero = false; 2744 /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any 2745 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO 2746 */ 2747 bool zero_used = false; 2748 2749 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 2750 ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno]; 2751 min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off; 2752 max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size; 2753 if (value_regno >= 0) 2754 value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 2755 if (value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg)) 2756 writing_zero = true; 2757 2758 err = realloc_func_state(state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE), 2759 state->acquired_refs, true); 2760 if (err) 2761 return err; 2762 2763 2764 /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */ 2765 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 2766 u8 new_type, *stype; 2767 int slot, spi; 2768 2769 slot = -i - 1; 2770 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 2771 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 2772 2773 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks 2774 && *stype != NOT_INIT 2775 && *stype != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2776 /* Reject the write if there's are spilled pointers in 2777 * range. If we didn't reject here, the ptr status 2778 * would be erased below (even though not all slots are 2779 * actually overwritten), possibly opening the door to 2780 * leaks. 2781 */ 2782 verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d", 2783 insn_idx, i); 2784 return -EINVAL; 2785 } 2786 2787 /* Erase all spilled pointers. */ 2788 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 2789 2790 /* Update the slot type. */ 2791 new_type = STACK_MISC; 2792 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) { 2793 new_type = STACK_ZERO; 2794 zero_used = true; 2795 } 2796 /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to 2797 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot 2798 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as 2799 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory. 2800 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots 2801 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject 2802 * them, the error would be too confusing. 2803 */ 2804 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) { 2805 verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d", 2806 insn_idx, i); 2807 return -EINVAL; 2808 } 2809 *stype = new_type; 2810 } 2811 if (zero_used) { 2812 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 2813 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 2814 if (err) 2815 return err; 2816 } 2817 return 0; 2818 } 2819 2820 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, 2821 * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the 2822 * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then 2823 * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be 2824 * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must 2825 * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as 2826 * read. 2827 */ 2828 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2829 /* func where src register points to */ 2830 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state, 2831 int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno) 2832 { 2833 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 2834 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 2835 int i, slot, spi; 2836 u8 *stype; 2837 int zeros = 0; 2838 2839 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 2840 slot = -i - 1; 2841 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 2842 stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 2843 if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO) 2844 break; 2845 zeros++; 2846 } 2847 if (zeros == max_off - min_off) { 2848 /* any access_size read into register is zero extended, 2849 * so the whole register == const_zero 2850 */ 2851 __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]); 2852 /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet, 2853 * so mark it precise here, so that later 2854 * backtracking can stop here. 2855 * Backtracking may not need this if this register 2856 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment. 2857 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not 2858 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop 2859 * backtracking. Any register that contributed 2860 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill. 2861 */ 2862 state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true; 2863 } else { 2864 /* have read misc data from the stack */ 2865 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 2866 } 2867 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2868 } 2869 2870 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by 2871 * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a 2872 * spilled reg. 2873 * 2874 * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a 2875 * register. 2876 * 2877 * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds. 2878 */ 2879 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2880 /* func where src register points to */ 2881 struct bpf_func_state *reg_state, 2882 int off, int size, int dst_regno) 2883 { 2884 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 2885 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 2886 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 2887 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 2888 u8 *stype; 2889 2890 stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 2891 reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 2892 2893 if (stype[0] == STACK_SPILL) { 2894 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 2895 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 2896 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 2897 verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); 2898 return -EACCES; 2899 } 2900 if (dst_regno >= 0) { 2901 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 2902 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2903 } 2904 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 2905 return 0; 2906 } 2907 for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 2908 if (stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL) { 2909 verbose(env, "corrupted spill memory\n"); 2910 return -EACCES; 2911 } 2912 } 2913 2914 if (dst_regno >= 0) { 2915 /* restore register state from stack */ 2916 state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg; 2917 /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely 2918 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() 2919 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions 2920 */ 2921 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2922 } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) { 2923 /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether 2924 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE 2925 * (e.g. for XADD). 2926 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that 2927 * with spilled pointers. 2928 */ 2929 verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n", 2930 off); 2931 return -EACCES; 2932 } 2933 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 2934 } else { 2935 u8 type; 2936 2937 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 2938 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 2939 if (type == STACK_MISC) 2940 continue; 2941 if (type == STACK_ZERO) 2942 continue; 2943 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 2944 off, i, size); 2945 return -EACCES; 2946 } 2947 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 2948 if (dst_regno >= 0) 2949 mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno); 2950 } 2951 return 0; 2952 } 2953 2954 enum stack_access_src { 2955 ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */ 2956 ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */ 2957 }; 2958 2959 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2960 int regno, int off, int access_size, 2961 bool zero_size_allowed, 2962 enum stack_access_src type, 2963 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta); 2964 2965 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 2966 { 2967 return cur_regs(env) + regno; 2968 } 2969 2970 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register 2971 * 'dst_regno'. 2972 * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'), 2973 * but not its variable offset. 2974 * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned. 2975 * 2976 * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with 2977 * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when 2978 * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing 2979 * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable 2980 * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used 2981 * instead. 2982 */ 2983 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2984 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno) 2985 { 2986 /* The state of the source register. */ 2987 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 2988 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg); 2989 int err; 2990 int min_off, max_off; 2991 2992 /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted. 2993 */ 2994 err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 2995 false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL); 2996 if (err) 2997 return err; 2998 2999 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 3000 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 3001 mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno); 3002 return 0; 3003 } 3004 3005 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or 3006 * check_stack_read_var_off. 3007 * 3008 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack 3009 * bounds. 3010 * 3011 * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It 3012 * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register. 3013 */ 3014 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3015 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 3016 int dst_regno) 3017 { 3018 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 3019 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3020 int err; 3021 /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */ 3022 bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 3023 3024 /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a 3025 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see 3026 * check_stack_read_fixed_off). 3027 */ 3028 if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) { 3029 char tn_buf[48]; 3030 3031 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3032 verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", 3033 tn_buf, off, size); 3034 return -EACCES; 3035 } 3036 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity 3037 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack 3038 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 3039 */ 3040 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) { 3041 char tn_buf[48]; 3042 3043 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3044 verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 3045 ptr_regno, tn_buf); 3046 return -EACCES; 3047 } 3048 3049 if (!var_off) { 3050 off += reg->var_off.value; 3051 err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 3052 dst_regno); 3053 } else { 3054 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 3055 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this 3056 * branch. 3057 */ 3058 err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 3059 dst_regno); 3060 } 3061 return err; 3062 } 3063 3064 3065 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or 3066 * check_stack_write_var_off. 3067 * 3068 * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack. 3069 * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any). 3070 * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can 3071 * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register. 3072 * 3073 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size. 3074 */ 3075 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3076 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 3077 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 3078 { 3079 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 3080 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3081 int err; 3082 3083 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 3084 off += reg->var_off.value; 3085 err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 3086 value_regno, insn_idx); 3087 } else { 3088 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 3089 * than fixed offset ones. 3090 */ 3091 err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state, 3092 ptr_regno, off, size, 3093 value_regno, insn_idx); 3094 } 3095 return err; 3096 } 3097 3098 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3099 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) 3100 { 3101 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 3102 struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr; 3103 u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map); 3104 3105 if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) { 3106 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3107 map->value_size, off, size); 3108 return -EACCES; 3109 } 3110 3111 if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) { 3112 verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3113 map->value_size, off, size); 3114 return -EACCES; 3115 } 3116 3117 return 0; 3118 } 3119 3120 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */ 3121 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 3122 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 3123 bool zero_size_allowed) 3124 { 3125 bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed); 3126 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3127 3128 if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size) 3129 return 0; 3130 3131 reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 3132 switch (reg->type) { 3133 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 3134 verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3135 mem_size, off, size); 3136 break; 3137 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 3138 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3139 mem_size, off, size); 3140 break; 3141 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 3142 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 3143 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 3144 verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", 3145 off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size); 3146 break; 3147 case PTR_TO_MEM: 3148 default: 3149 verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n", 3150 mem_size, off, size); 3151 } 3152 3153 return -EACCES; 3154 } 3155 3156 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */ 3157 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3158 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 3159 bool zero_size_allowed) 3160 { 3161 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3162 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3163 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 3164 int err; 3165 3166 /* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we 3167 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off 3168 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. 3169 */ 3170 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 3171 print_verifier_state(env, state); 3172 3173 /* The minimum value is only important with signed 3174 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a 3175 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our 3176 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use 3177 * will have a set floor within our range. 3178 */ 3179 if (reg->smin_value < 0 && 3180 (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN || 3181 (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) || 3182 reg->smin_value + off < 0)) { 3183 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 3184 regno); 3185 return -EACCES; 3186 } 3187 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, 3188 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 3189 if (err) { 3190 verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 3191 regno); 3192 return err; 3193 } 3194 3195 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be 3196 * sure we won't do bad things. 3197 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. 3198 */ 3199 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 3200 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n", 3201 regno); 3202 return -EACCES; 3203 } 3204 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, 3205 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 3206 if (err) { 3207 verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 3208 regno); 3209 return err; 3210 } 3211 3212 return 0; 3213 } 3214 3215 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ 3216 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3217 int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed) 3218 { 3219 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3220 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3221 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 3222 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 3223 int err; 3224 3225 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size, 3226 zero_size_allowed); 3227 if (err) 3228 return err; 3229 3230 if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { 3231 u32 lock = map->spin_lock_off; 3232 3233 /* if any part of struct bpf_spin_lock can be touched by 3234 * load/store reject this program. 3235 * To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2) 3236 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2. 3237 */ 3238 if (reg->smin_value + off < lock + sizeof(struct bpf_spin_lock) && 3239 lock < reg->umax_value + off + size) { 3240 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n"); 3241 return -EACCES; 3242 } 3243 } 3244 return err; 3245 } 3246 3247 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff 3248 3249 static enum bpf_prog_type resolve_prog_type(struct bpf_prog *prog) 3250 { 3251 return prog->aux->dst_prog ? prog->aux->dst_prog->type : prog->type; 3252 } 3253 3254 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3255 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 3256 enum bpf_access_type t) 3257 { 3258 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 3259 3260 switch (prog_type) { 3261 /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */ 3262 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: 3263 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: 3264 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL: 3265 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 3266 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 3267 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 3268 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 3269 return false; 3270 fallthrough; 3271 3272 /* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */ 3273 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 3274 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 3275 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 3276 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: 3277 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: 3278 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: 3279 if (meta) 3280 return meta->pkt_access; 3281 3282 env->seen_direct_write = true; 3283 return true; 3284 3285 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 3286 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 3287 env->seen_direct_write = true; 3288 3289 return true; 3290 3291 default: 3292 return false; 3293 } 3294 } 3295 3296 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, 3297 int size, bool zero_size_allowed) 3298 { 3299 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 3300 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 3301 int err; 3302 3303 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any 3304 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed 3305 * offset. 3306 */ 3307 3308 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough 3309 * detail to prove they're safe. 3310 */ 3311 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 3312 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 3313 regno); 3314 return -EACCES; 3315 } 3316 3317 err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL : 3318 __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range, 3319 zero_size_allowed); 3320 if (err) { 3321 verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); 3322 return err; 3323 } 3324 3325 /* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16. 3326 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff, 3327 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info 3328 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access. 3329 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32. 3330 */ 3331 env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = 3332 max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset, 3333 off + reg->umax_value + size - 1); 3334 3335 return err; 3336 } 3337 3338 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ 3339 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, 3340 enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, 3341 struct btf **btf, u32 *btf_id) 3342 { 3343 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { 3344 .reg_type = *reg_type, 3345 .log = &env->log, 3346 }; 3347 3348 if (env->ops->is_valid_access && 3349 env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) { 3350 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a 3351 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole 3352 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower 3353 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size 3354 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other 3355 * type of narrower access. 3356 */ 3357 *reg_type = info.reg_type; 3358 3359 if (*reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || *reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) { 3360 *btf = info.btf; 3361 *btf_id = info.btf_id; 3362 } else { 3363 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; 3364 } 3365 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ 3366 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) 3367 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; 3368 return 0; 3369 } 3370 3371 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 3372 return -EACCES; 3373 } 3374 3375 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, 3376 int size) 3377 { 3378 if (size < 0 || off < 0 || 3379 (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) { 3380 verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n", 3381 off, size); 3382 return -EACCES; 3383 } 3384 return 0; 3385 } 3386 3387 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 3388 u32 regno, int off, int size, 3389 enum bpf_access_type t) 3390 { 3391 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 3392 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 3393 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {}; 3394 bool valid; 3395 3396 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 3397 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 3398 regno); 3399 return -EACCES; 3400 } 3401 3402 switch (reg->type) { 3403 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 3404 valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 3405 break; 3406 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 3407 valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 3408 break; 3409 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 3410 valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 3411 break; 3412 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 3413 valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 3414 break; 3415 default: 3416 valid = false; 3417 } 3418 3419 3420 if (valid) { 3421 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = 3422 info.ctx_field_size; 3423 return 0; 3424 } 3425 3426 verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n", 3427 regno, reg_type_str[reg->type], off, size); 3428 3429 return -EACCES; 3430 } 3431 3432 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 3433 { 3434 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno)); 3435 } 3436 3437 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 3438 { 3439 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 3440 3441 return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; 3442 } 3443 3444 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 3445 { 3446 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 3447 3448 return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type); 3449 } 3450 3451 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 3452 { 3453 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 3454 3455 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 3456 } 3457 3458 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 3459 { 3460 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 3461 3462 /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */ 3463 return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS; 3464 } 3465 3466 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3467 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3468 int off, int size, bool strict) 3469 { 3470 struct tnum reg_off; 3471 int ip_align; 3472 3473 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 3474 if (!strict || size == 1) 3475 return 0; 3476 3477 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling 3478 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of 3479 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms 3480 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get 3481 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate 3482 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an 3483 * unconditional IP align value of '2'. 3484 */ 3485 ip_align = 2; 3486 3487 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); 3488 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 3489 char tn_buf[48]; 3490 3491 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3492 verbose(env, 3493 "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", 3494 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 3495 return -EACCES; 3496 } 3497 3498 return 0; 3499 } 3500 3501 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3502 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3503 const char *pointer_desc, 3504 int off, int size, bool strict) 3505 { 3506 struct tnum reg_off; 3507 3508 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 3509 if (!strict || size == 1) 3510 return 0; 3511 3512 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); 3513 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 3514 char tn_buf[48]; 3515 3516 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3517 verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", 3518 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 3519 return -EACCES; 3520 } 3521 3522 return 0; 3523 } 3524 3525 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3526 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, 3527 int size, bool strict_alignment_once) 3528 { 3529 bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once; 3530 const char *pointer_desc = ""; 3531 3532 switch (reg->type) { 3533 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 3534 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 3535 /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits 3536 * right in front, treat it the very same way. 3537 */ 3538 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); 3539 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 3540 pointer_desc = "flow keys "; 3541 break; 3542 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 3543 pointer_desc = "key "; 3544 break; 3545 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 3546 pointer_desc = "value "; 3547 break; 3548 case PTR_TO_CTX: 3549 pointer_desc = "context "; 3550 break; 3551 case PTR_TO_STACK: 3552 pointer_desc = "stack "; 3553 /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off() 3554 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being 3555 * aligned. 3556 */ 3557 strict = true; 3558 break; 3559 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 3560 pointer_desc = "sock "; 3561 break; 3562 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 3563 pointer_desc = "sock_common "; 3564 break; 3565 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 3566 pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; 3567 break; 3568 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 3569 pointer_desc = "xdp_sock "; 3570 break; 3571 default: 3572 break; 3573 } 3574 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, 3575 strict); 3576 } 3577 3578 static int update_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3579 const struct bpf_func_state *func, 3580 int off) 3581 { 3582 u16 stack = env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth; 3583 3584 if (stack >= -off) 3585 return 0; 3586 3587 /* update known max for given subprogram */ 3588 env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth = -off; 3589 return 0; 3590 } 3591 3592 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function 3593 * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. 3594 * Ignore jump and exit insns. 3595 * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm 3596 * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites 3597 */ 3598 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3599 { 3600 int depth = 0, frame = 0, idx = 0, i = 0, subprog_end; 3601 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 3602 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 3603 bool tail_call_reachable = false; 3604 int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 3605 int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 3606 int j; 3607 3608 process_func: 3609 /* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when 3610 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack 3611 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario 3612 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 3613 * 8k). 3614 * 3615 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example: 3616 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128 3617 * subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256 3618 * tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256 3619 * func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320) 3620 * subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64 3621 * subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128 3622 * tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128 3623 * func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416) 3624 * 3625 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid 3626 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above. 3627 */ 3628 if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) { 3629 verbose(env, 3630 "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n", 3631 depth); 3632 return -EACCES; 3633 } 3634 /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity 3635 * of interpreter stack size 3636 */ 3637 depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 3638 if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { 3639 verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n", 3640 frame + 1, depth); 3641 return -EACCES; 3642 } 3643 continue_func: 3644 subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; 3645 for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { 3646 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i)) 3647 continue; 3648 /* remember insn and function to return to */ 3649 ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; 3650 ret_prog[frame] = idx; 3651 3652 /* find the callee */ 3653 i = i + insn[i].imm + 1; 3654 idx = find_subprog(env, i); 3655 if (idx < 0) { 3656 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 3657 i); 3658 return -EFAULT; 3659 } 3660 3661 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) 3662 tail_call_reachable = true; 3663 3664 frame++; 3665 if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 3666 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n", 3667 frame); 3668 return -E2BIG; 3669 } 3670 goto process_func; 3671 } 3672 /* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the 3673 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs; 3674 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the 3675 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls 3676 */ 3677 if (tail_call_reachable) 3678 for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) 3679 subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true; 3680 3681 /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog' 3682 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT 3683 */ 3684 if (frame == 0) 3685 return 0; 3686 depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 3687 frame--; 3688 i = ret_insn[frame]; 3689 idx = ret_prog[frame]; 3690 goto continue_func; 3691 } 3692 3693 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 3694 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3695 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx) 3696 { 3697 int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog; 3698 3699 subprog = find_subprog(env, start); 3700 if (subprog < 0) { 3701 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 3702 start); 3703 return -EFAULT; 3704 } 3705 return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth; 3706 } 3707 #endif 3708 3709 int check_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3710 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) 3711 { 3712 /* Access to ctx or passing it to a helper is only allowed in 3713 * its original, unmodified form. 3714 */ 3715 3716 if (reg->off) { 3717 verbose(env, "dereference of modified ctx ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 3718 regno, reg->off); 3719 return -EACCES; 3720 } 3721 3722 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 3723 char tn_buf[48]; 3724 3725 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3726 verbose(env, "variable ctx access var_off=%s disallowed\n", tn_buf); 3727 return -EACCES; 3728 } 3729 3730 return 0; 3731 } 3732 3733 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3734 const char *buf_info, 3735 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3736 int regno, int off, int size) 3737 { 3738 if (off < 0) { 3739 verbose(env, 3740 "R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n", 3741 regno, buf_info, off, size); 3742 return -EACCES; 3743 } 3744 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 3745 char tn_buf[48]; 3746 3747 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3748 verbose(env, 3749 "R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 3750 regno, off, tn_buf); 3751 return -EACCES; 3752 } 3753 3754 return 0; 3755 } 3756 3757 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3758 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3759 int regno, int off, int size) 3760 { 3761 int err; 3762 3763 err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size); 3764 if (err) 3765 return err; 3766 3767 if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access) 3768 env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size; 3769 3770 return 0; 3771 } 3772 3773 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3774 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3775 int regno, int off, int size, 3776 bool zero_size_allowed, 3777 const char *buf_info, 3778 u32 *max_access) 3779 { 3780 int err; 3781 3782 err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size); 3783 if (err) 3784 return err; 3785 3786 if (off + size > *max_access) 3787 *max_access = off + size; 3788 3789 return 0; 3790 } 3791 3792 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */ 3793 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3794 { 3795 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 3796 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 3797 } 3798 3799 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes) 3800 * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE 3801 */ 3802 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 3803 { 3804 u64 mask; 3805 3806 /* clear high bits in bit representation */ 3807 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size); 3808 3809 /* fix arithmetic bounds */ 3810 mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1; 3811 if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) { 3812 reg->umin_value &= mask; 3813 reg->umax_value &= mask; 3814 } else { 3815 reg->umin_value = 0; 3816 reg->umax_value = mask; 3817 } 3818 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 3819 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 3820 3821 /* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register 3822 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into 3823 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already. 3824 */ 3825 if (size >= 4) 3826 return; 3827 __reg_combine_64_into_32(reg); 3828 } 3829 3830 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map) 3831 { 3832 return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && map->frozen; 3833 } 3834 3835 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val) 3836 { 3837 void *ptr; 3838 u64 addr; 3839 int err; 3840 3841 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 3842 if (err) 3843 return err; 3844 ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off; 3845 3846 switch (size) { 3847 case sizeof(u8): 3848 *val = (u64)*(u8 *)ptr; 3849 break; 3850 case sizeof(u16): 3851 *val = (u64)*(u16 *)ptr; 3852 break; 3853 case sizeof(u32): 3854 *val = (u64)*(u32 *)ptr; 3855 break; 3856 case sizeof(u64): 3857 *val = *(u64 *)ptr; 3858 break; 3859 default: 3860 return -EINVAL; 3861 } 3862 return 0; 3863 } 3864 3865 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3866 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 3867 int regno, int off, int size, 3868 enum bpf_access_type atype, 3869 int value_regno) 3870 { 3871 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 3872 const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 3873 const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off); 3874 u32 btf_id; 3875 int ret; 3876 3877 if (off < 0) { 3878 verbose(env, 3879 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 3880 regno, tname, off); 3881 return -EACCES; 3882 } 3883 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 3884 char tn_buf[48]; 3885 3886 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3887 verbose(env, 3888 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 3889 regno, tname, off, tn_buf); 3890 return -EACCES; 3891 } 3892 3893 if (env->ops->btf_struct_access) { 3894 ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg->btf, t, 3895 off, size, atype, &btf_id); 3896 } else { 3897 if (atype != BPF_READ) { 3898 verbose(env, "only read is supported\n"); 3899 return -EACCES; 3900 } 3901 3902 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg->btf, t, off, size, 3903 atype, &btf_id); 3904 } 3905 3906 if (ret < 0) 3907 return ret; 3908 3909 if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 3910 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id); 3911 3912 return 0; 3913 } 3914 3915 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3916 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 3917 int regno, int off, int size, 3918 enum bpf_access_type atype, 3919 int value_regno) 3920 { 3921 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 3922 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 3923 const struct btf_type *t; 3924 const char *tname; 3925 u32 btf_id; 3926 int ret; 3927 3928 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 3929 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 3930 return -ENOTSUPP; 3931 } 3932 3933 if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) { 3934 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n", 3935 map->map_type); 3936 return -ENOTSUPP; 3937 } 3938 3939 t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id); 3940 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 3941 3942 if (!env->allow_ptr_to_map_access) { 3943 verbose(env, 3944 "%s access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 3945 tname); 3946 return -EPERM; 3947 } 3948 3949 if (off < 0) { 3950 verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 3951 regno, tname, off); 3952 return -EACCES; 3953 } 3954 3955 if (atype != BPF_READ) { 3956 verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname); 3957 return -EACCES; 3958 } 3959 3960 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, btf_vmlinux, t, off, size, atype, &btf_id); 3961 if (ret < 0) 3962 return ret; 3963 3964 if (value_regno >= 0) 3965 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id); 3966 3967 return 0; 3968 } 3969 3970 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The 3971 * maximum valid offset is -1. 3972 * 3973 * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and 3974 * -state->allocated_stack for reads. 3975 */ 3976 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off, 3977 struct bpf_func_state *state, 3978 enum bpf_access_type t) 3979 { 3980 int min_valid_off; 3981 3982 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 3983 min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK; 3984 else 3985 min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack; 3986 3987 if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1) 3988 return -EACCES; 3989 return 0; 3990 } 3991 3992 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack 3993 * bounds. 3994 * 3995 * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any). 3996 */ 3997 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( 3998 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3999 int regno, int off, int access_size, 4000 enum stack_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type) 4001 { 4002 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 4003 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 4004 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 4005 int min_off, max_off; 4006 int err; 4007 char *err_extra; 4008 4009 if (src == ACCESS_HELPER) 4010 /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */ 4011 err_extra = " indirect access to"; 4012 else if (type == BPF_READ) 4013 err_extra = " read from"; 4014 else 4015 err_extra = " write to"; 4016 4017 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 4018 min_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 4019 if (access_size > 0) 4020 max_off = min_off + access_size - 1; 4021 else 4022 max_off = min_off; 4023 } else { 4024 if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || 4025 reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 4026 verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n", 4027 err_extra, regno); 4028 return -EACCES; 4029 } 4030 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 4031 if (access_size > 0) 4032 max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1; 4033 else 4034 max_off = min_off; 4035 } 4036 4037 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type); 4038 if (!err) 4039 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type); 4040 4041 if (err) { 4042 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 4043 verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n", 4044 err_extra, regno, off, access_size); 4045 } else { 4046 char tn_buf[48]; 4047 4048 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4049 verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n", 4050 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size); 4051 } 4052 } 4053 return err; 4054 } 4055 4056 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) 4057 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory 4058 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory 4059 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory 4060 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory 4061 */ 4062 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, 4063 int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, 4064 int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once) 4065 { 4066 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 4067 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 4068 struct bpf_func_state *state; 4069 int size, err = 0; 4070 4071 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); 4072 if (size < 0) 4073 return size; 4074 4075 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ 4076 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once); 4077 if (err) 4078 return err; 4079 4080 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ 4081 off += reg->off; 4082 4083 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { 4084 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 4085 verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno); 4086 return -EACCES; 4087 } 4088 4089 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 4090 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 4091 if (err) 4092 return err; 4093 if (value_regno >= 0) 4094 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4095 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 4096 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 4097 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 4098 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); 4099 return -EACCES; 4100 } 4101 err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t); 4102 if (err) 4103 return err; 4104 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false); 4105 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 4106 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 4107 4108 /* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */ 4109 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && 4110 bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) && 4111 map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 4112 int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value; 4113 u64 val = 0; 4114 4115 err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size, 4116 &val); 4117 if (err) 4118 return err; 4119 4120 regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 4121 __mark_reg_known(®s[value_regno], val); 4122 } else { 4123 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4124 } 4125 } 4126 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MEM) { 4127 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 4128 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 4129 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno); 4130 return -EACCES; 4131 } 4132 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 4133 reg->mem_size, false); 4134 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 4135 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4136 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 4137 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; 4138 struct btf *btf = NULL; 4139 u32 btf_id = 0; 4140 4141 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 4142 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 4143 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); 4144 return -EACCES; 4145 } 4146 4147 err = check_ctx_reg(env, reg, regno); 4148 if (err < 0) 4149 return err; 4150 4151 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type, &btf, &btf_id); 4152 if (err) 4153 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 4154 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 4155 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a 4156 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter 4157 * case, we know the offset is zero. 4158 */ 4159 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 4160 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4161 } else { 4162 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, 4163 value_regno); 4164 if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg_type)) 4165 regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 4166 /* A load of ctx field could have different 4167 * actual load size with the one encoded in the 4168 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not 4169 * a sub-register. 4170 */ 4171 regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 4172 if (reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 4173 reg_type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL) { 4174 regs[value_regno].btf = btf; 4175 regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id; 4176 } 4177 } 4178 regs[value_regno].type = reg_type; 4179 } 4180 4181 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 4182 /* Basic bounds checks. */ 4183 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t); 4184 if (err) 4185 return err; 4186 4187 state = func(env, reg); 4188 err = update_stack_depth(env, state, off); 4189 if (err) 4190 return err; 4191 4192 if (t == BPF_READ) 4193 err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size, 4194 value_regno); 4195 else 4196 err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size, 4197 value_regno, insn_idx); 4198 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { 4199 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { 4200 verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); 4201 return -EACCES; 4202 } 4203 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 4204 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 4205 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", 4206 value_regno); 4207 return -EACCES; 4208 } 4209 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false); 4210 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 4211 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4212 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) { 4213 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 4214 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 4215 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n", 4216 value_regno); 4217 return -EACCES; 4218 } 4219 4220 err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size); 4221 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 4222 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4223 } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) { 4224 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 4225 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 4226 regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]); 4227 return -EACCES; 4228 } 4229 err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); 4230 if (!err && value_regno >= 0) 4231 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4232 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) { 4233 err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size); 4234 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 4235 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4236 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 4237 err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 4238 value_regno); 4239 } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { 4240 err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 4241 value_regno); 4242 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF) { 4243 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 4244 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 4245 regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]); 4246 return -EACCES; 4247 } 4248 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, 4249 "rdonly", 4250 &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access); 4251 if (!err && value_regno >= 0) 4252 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4253 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF) { 4254 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, 4255 "rdwr", 4256 &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access); 4257 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 4258 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 4259 } else { 4260 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 4261 reg_type_str[reg->type]); 4262 return -EACCES; 4263 } 4264 4265 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && 4266 regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 4267 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ 4268 coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size); 4269 } 4270 return err; 4271 } 4272 4273 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn) 4274 { 4275 int load_reg; 4276 int err; 4277 4278 switch (insn->imm) { 4279 case BPF_ADD: 4280 case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH: 4281 case BPF_AND: 4282 case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH: 4283 case BPF_OR: 4284 case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH: 4285 case BPF_XOR: 4286 case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH: 4287 case BPF_XCHG: 4288 case BPF_CMPXCHG: 4289 break; 4290 default: 4291 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", insn->imm); 4292 return -EINVAL; 4293 } 4294 4295 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 4296 verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n"); 4297 return -EINVAL; 4298 } 4299 4300 /* check src1 operand */ 4301 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 4302 if (err) 4303 return err; 4304 4305 /* check src2 operand */ 4306 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 4307 if (err) 4308 return err; 4309 4310 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) { 4311 /* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */ 4312 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); 4313 if (err) 4314 return err; 4315 } 4316 4317 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 4318 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); 4319 return -EACCES; 4320 } 4321 4322 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 4323 is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 4324 is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 4325 is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 4326 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 4327 insn->dst_reg, 4328 reg_type_str[reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type]); 4329 return -EACCES; 4330 } 4331 4332 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) { 4333 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 4334 load_reg = BPF_REG_0; 4335 else 4336 load_reg = insn->src_reg; 4337 4338 /* check and record load of old value */ 4339 err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP); 4340 if (err) 4341 return err; 4342 } else { 4343 /* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't 4344 * actually load it into a register. 4345 */ 4346 load_reg = -1; 4347 } 4348 4349 /* check whether we can read the memory */ 4350 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 4351 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, true); 4352 if (err) 4353 return err; 4354 4355 /* check whether we can write into the same memory */ 4356 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 4357 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true); 4358 if (err) 4359 return err; 4360 4361 return 0; 4362 } 4363 4364 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through 4365 * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending 4366 * on the access type, that all elements of the stack are initialized. 4367 * 4368 * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any). 4369 * 4370 * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the 4371 * read offsets are marked as read. 4372 */ 4373 static int check_stack_range_initialized( 4374 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off, 4375 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 4376 enum stack_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 4377 { 4378 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4379 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 4380 int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi; 4381 char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : ""; 4382 enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type; 4383 /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are 4384 * read-only. 4385 */ 4386 bool clobber = false; 4387 4388 if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { 4389 verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n"); 4390 return -EACCES; 4391 } 4392 4393 if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) { 4394 /* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for 4395 * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra 4396 * checks below. 4397 */ 4398 bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE; 4399 clobber = true; 4400 } else { 4401 bounds_check_type = BPF_READ; 4402 } 4403 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size, 4404 type, bounds_check_type); 4405 if (err) 4406 return err; 4407 4408 4409 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 4410 min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 4411 } else { 4412 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for 4413 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in 4414 * Spectre masking for stack ALU. 4415 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 4416 */ 4417 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 4418 char tn_buf[48]; 4419 4420 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4421 verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 4422 regno, err_extra, tn_buf); 4423 return -EACCES; 4424 } 4425 /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed 4426 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to 4427 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on 4428 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may 4429 * cause uninitialized stack leaking. 4430 */ 4431 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) 4432 meta = NULL; 4433 4434 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 4435 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 4436 } 4437 4438 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 4439 meta->access_size = access_size; 4440 meta->regno = regno; 4441 return 0; 4442 } 4443 4444 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 4445 u8 *stype; 4446 4447 slot = -i - 1; 4448 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 4449 if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) 4450 goto err; 4451 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 4452 if (*stype == STACK_MISC) 4453 goto mark; 4454 if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) { 4455 if (clobber) { 4456 /* helper can write anything into the stack */ 4457 *stype = STACK_MISC; 4458 } 4459 goto mark; 4460 } 4461 4462 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 4463 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 4464 goto mark; 4465 4466 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 4467 (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE || 4468 env->allow_ptr_leaks)) { 4469 if (clobber) { 4470 __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 4471 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 4472 state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC; 4473 } 4474 goto mark; 4475 } 4476 4477 err: 4478 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 4479 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n", 4480 err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size); 4481 } else { 4482 char tn_buf[48]; 4483 4484 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4485 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n", 4486 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size); 4487 } 4488 return -EACCES; 4489 mark: 4490 /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause 4491 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' 4492 */ 4493 mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 4494 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, 4495 REG_LIVE_READ64); 4496 } 4497 return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off); 4498 } 4499 4500 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 4501 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 4502 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 4503 { 4504 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 4505 4506 switch (reg->type) { 4507 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 4508 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 4509 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 4510 zero_size_allowed); 4511 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 4512 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 4513 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 4514 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 4515 if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 4516 meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : 4517 BPF_READ)) 4518 return -EACCES; 4519 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 4520 zero_size_allowed); 4521 case PTR_TO_MEM: 4522 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, 4523 access_size, reg->mem_size, 4524 zero_size_allowed); 4525 case PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF: 4526 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) 4527 return -EACCES; 4528 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, 4529 access_size, zero_size_allowed, 4530 "rdonly", 4531 &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access); 4532 case PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF: 4533 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, 4534 access_size, zero_size_allowed, 4535 "rdwr", 4536 &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access); 4537 case PTR_TO_STACK: 4538 return check_stack_range_initialized( 4539 env, 4540 regno, reg->off, access_size, 4541 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta); 4542 default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */ 4543 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ 4544 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && 4545 register_is_null(reg)) 4546 return 0; 4547 4548 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno, 4549 reg_type_str[reg->type], 4550 reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]); 4551 return -EACCES; 4552 } 4553 } 4554 4555 int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4556 u32 regno, u32 mem_size) 4557 { 4558 if (register_is_null(reg)) 4559 return 0; 4560 4561 if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 4562 /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory 4563 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as 4564 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller. 4565 */ 4566 const struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg = *reg; 4567 int rv; 4568 4569 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 4570 rv = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, NULL); 4571 *reg = saved_reg; 4572 return rv; 4573 } 4574 4575 return check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, NULL); 4576 } 4577 4578 /* Implementation details: 4579 * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL 4580 * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id. 4581 * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE the verifier clears reg->id after 4582 * value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only cares about 4583 * the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care about actual 4584 * address of the map element. 4585 * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps 4586 * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so 4587 * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that 4588 * point to different bpf_spin_locks. 4589 * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid 4590 * dead-locks. 4591 * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than 4592 * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only 4593 * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs. 4594 * cur_state->active_spin_lock remembers which map value element got locked 4595 * and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock. 4596 */ 4597 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 4598 bool is_lock) 4599 { 4600 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 4601 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 4602 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 4603 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 4604 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 4605 4606 if (!is_const) { 4607 verbose(env, 4608 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n", 4609 regno); 4610 return -EINVAL; 4611 } 4612 if (!map->btf) { 4613 verbose(env, 4614 "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_spin_lock\n", 4615 map->name); 4616 return -EINVAL; 4617 } 4618 if (!map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { 4619 if (map->spin_lock_off == -E2BIG) 4620 verbose(env, 4621 "map '%s' has more than one 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n", 4622 map->name); 4623 else if (map->spin_lock_off == -ENOENT) 4624 verbose(env, 4625 "map '%s' doesn't have 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n", 4626 map->name); 4627 else 4628 verbose(env, 4629 "map '%s' is not a struct type or bpf_spin_lock is mangled\n", 4630 map->name); 4631 return -EINVAL; 4632 } 4633 if (map->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { 4634 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock'\n", 4635 val + reg->off); 4636 return -EINVAL; 4637 } 4638 if (is_lock) { 4639 if (cur->active_spin_lock) { 4640 verbose(env, 4641 "Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n"); 4642 return -EINVAL; 4643 } 4644 cur->active_spin_lock = reg->id; 4645 } else { 4646 if (!cur->active_spin_lock) { 4647 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock without taking a lock\n"); 4648 return -EINVAL; 4649 } 4650 if (cur->active_spin_lock != reg->id) { 4651 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock\n"); 4652 return -EINVAL; 4653 } 4654 cur->active_spin_lock = 0; 4655 } 4656 return 0; 4657 } 4658 4659 static bool arg_type_is_mem_ptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) 4660 { 4661 return type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || 4662 type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL || 4663 type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM; 4664 } 4665 4666 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 4667 { 4668 return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || 4669 type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO; 4670 } 4671 4672 static bool arg_type_is_alloc_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 4673 { 4674 return type == ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO; 4675 } 4676 4677 static bool arg_type_is_int_ptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) 4678 { 4679 return type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT || 4680 type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG; 4681 } 4682 4683 static int int_ptr_type_to_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 4684 { 4685 if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT) 4686 return sizeof(u32); 4687 else if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG) 4688 return sizeof(u64); 4689 4690 return -EINVAL; 4691 } 4692 4693 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4694 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 4695 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type) 4696 { 4697 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 4698 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 4699 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n"); 4700 return -EACCES; 4701 } 4702 4703 switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { 4704 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 4705 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 4706 if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 4707 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON; 4708 } else { 4709 verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n"); 4710 return -EINVAL; 4711 } 4712 break; 4713 4714 default: 4715 break; 4716 } 4717 return 0; 4718 } 4719 4720 struct bpf_reg_types { 4721 const enum bpf_reg_type types[10]; 4722 u32 *btf_id; 4723 }; 4724 4725 static const struct bpf_reg_types map_key_value_types = { 4726 .types = { 4727 PTR_TO_STACK, 4728 PTR_TO_PACKET, 4729 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 4730 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 4731 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 4732 }, 4733 }; 4734 4735 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = { 4736 .types = { 4737 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 4738 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 4739 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 4740 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 4741 }, 4742 }; 4743 4744 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 4745 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = { 4746 .types = { 4747 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 4748 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 4749 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 4750 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 4751 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 4752 }, 4753 .btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 4754 }; 4755 #endif 4756 4757 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { 4758 .types = { 4759 PTR_TO_STACK, 4760 PTR_TO_PACKET, 4761 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 4762 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 4763 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 4764 PTR_TO_MEM, 4765 PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF, 4766 PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF, 4767 }, 4768 }; 4769 4770 static const struct bpf_reg_types int_ptr_types = { 4771 .types = { 4772 PTR_TO_STACK, 4773 PTR_TO_PACKET, 4774 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 4775 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 4776 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 4777 }, 4778 }; 4779 4780 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } }; 4781 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } }; 4782 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } }; 4783 static const struct bpf_reg_types alloc_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM } }; 4784 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } }; 4785 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_BTF_ID } }; 4786 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 4787 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID } }; 4788 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } }; 4789 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } }; 4790 4791 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { 4792 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &map_key_value_types, 4793 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = &map_key_value_types, 4794 [ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE] = &map_key_value_types, 4795 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = &map_key_value_types, 4796 [ARG_CONST_SIZE] = &scalar_types, 4797 [ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 4798 [ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 4799 [ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR] = &const_map_ptr_types, 4800 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX] = &context_types, 4801 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX_OR_NULL] = &context_types, 4802 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &sock_types, 4803 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 4804 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_id_sock_common_types, 4805 #endif 4806 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &fullsock_types, 4807 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL] = &fullsock_types, 4808 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = &btf_ptr_types, 4809 [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types, 4810 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types, 4811 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL] = &mem_types, 4812 [ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM] = &mem_types, 4813 [ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM] = &alloc_mem_types, 4814 [ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL] = &alloc_mem_types, 4815 [ARG_PTR_TO_INT] = &int_ptr_types, 4816 [ARG_PTR_TO_LONG] = &int_ptr_types, 4817 [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, 4818 [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types, 4819 [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK_OR_NULL] = &stack_ptr_types, 4820 }; 4821 4822 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 4823 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, 4824 const u32 *arg_btf_id) 4825 { 4826 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 4827 enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type; 4828 const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible; 4829 int i, j; 4830 4831 compatible = compatible_reg_types[arg_type]; 4832 if (!compatible) { 4833 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type); 4834 return -EFAULT; 4835 } 4836 4837 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) { 4838 expected = compatible->types[i]; 4839 if (expected == NOT_INIT) 4840 break; 4841 4842 if (type == expected) 4843 goto found; 4844 } 4845 4846 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str[type]); 4847 for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++) 4848 verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str[compatible->types[j]]); 4849 verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str[compatible->types[j]]); 4850 return -EACCES; 4851 4852 found: 4853 if (type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 4854 if (!arg_btf_id) { 4855 if (!compatible->btf_id) { 4856 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n"); 4857 return -EFAULT; 4858 } 4859 arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id; 4860 } 4861 4862 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 4863 btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)) { 4864 verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n", 4865 regno, kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), 4866 kernel_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)); 4867 return -EACCES; 4868 } 4869 4870 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 4871 verbose(env, "R%d is a pointer to in-kernel struct with non-zero offset\n", 4872 regno); 4873 return -EACCES; 4874 } 4875 } 4876 4877 return 0; 4878 } 4879 4880 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, 4881 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 4882 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 4883 { 4884 u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg; 4885 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 4886 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg]; 4887 enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; 4888 int err = 0; 4889 4890 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) 4891 return 0; 4892 4893 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 4894 if (err) 4895 return err; 4896 4897 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 4898 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 4899 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", 4900 regno); 4901 return -EACCES; 4902 } 4903 return 0; 4904 } 4905 4906 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 4907 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { 4908 verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); 4909 return -EACCES; 4910 } 4911 4912 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 4913 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE || 4914 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { 4915 err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type); 4916 if (err) 4917 return err; 4918 } 4919 4920 if (register_is_null(reg) && arg_type_may_be_null(arg_type)) 4921 /* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip 4922 * type checking. 4923 */ 4924 goto skip_type_check; 4925 4926 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, fn->arg_btf_id[arg]); 4927 if (err) 4928 return err; 4929 4930 if (type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 4931 err = check_ctx_reg(env, reg, regno); 4932 if (err < 0) 4933 return err; 4934 } 4935 4936 skip_type_check: 4937 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 4938 if (meta->ref_obj_id) { 4939 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 4940 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 4941 meta->ref_obj_id); 4942 return -EFAULT; 4943 } 4944 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 4945 } 4946 4947 if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) { 4948 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ 4949 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 4950 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { 4951 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: 4952 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within 4953 * stack limits and initialized 4954 */ 4955 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 4956 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before 4957 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before 4958 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means 4959 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier 4960 */ 4961 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); 4962 return -EACCES; 4963 } 4964 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 4965 meta->map_ptr->key_size, false, 4966 NULL); 4967 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 4968 (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && 4969 !register_is_null(reg)) || 4970 arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE) { 4971 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: 4972 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity 4973 */ 4974 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 4975 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 4976 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); 4977 return -EACCES; 4978 } 4979 meta->raw_mode = (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MAP_VALUE); 4980 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 4981 meta->map_ptr->value_size, false, 4982 meta); 4983 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID) { 4984 if (!reg->btf_id) { 4985 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno); 4986 return -EACCES; 4987 } 4988 meta->ret_btf = reg->btf; 4989 meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 4990 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) { 4991 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) { 4992 if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, true)) 4993 return -EACCES; 4994 } else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 4995 if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, false)) 4996 return -EACCES; 4997 } else { 4998 verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n"); 4999 return -EFAULT; 5000 } 5001 } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC) { 5002 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 5003 } else if (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_type)) { 5004 /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the 5005 * next is_mem_size argument below. 5006 */ 5007 meta->raw_mode = (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM); 5008 } else if (arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_type)) { 5009 bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO); 5010 5011 /* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers 5012 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values. 5013 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine 5014 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register 5015 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors 5016 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an 5017 * int type and negative retvals are allowed. 5018 */ 5019 meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; 5020 5021 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check 5022 * happens using its boundaries. 5023 */ 5024 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 5025 /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw 5026 * mode so that the program is required to 5027 * initialize all the memory that the helper could 5028 * just partially fill up. 5029 */ 5030 meta = NULL; 5031 5032 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 5033 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", 5034 regno); 5035 return -EACCES; 5036 } 5037 5038 if (reg->umin_value == 0) { 5039 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0, 5040 zero_size_allowed, 5041 meta); 5042 if (err) 5043 return err; 5044 } 5045 5046 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { 5047 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", 5048 regno); 5049 return -EACCES; 5050 } 5051 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 5052 reg->umax_value, 5053 zero_size_allowed, meta); 5054 if (!err) 5055 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 5056 } else if (arg_type_is_alloc_size(arg_type)) { 5057 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5058 verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n", 5059 regno); 5060 return -EACCES; 5061 } 5062 meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; 5063 } else if (arg_type_is_int_ptr(arg_type)) { 5064 int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type); 5065 5066 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, false, meta); 5067 if (err) 5068 return err; 5069 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, size, true); 5070 } 5071 5072 return err; 5073 } 5074 5075 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) 5076 { 5077 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; 5078 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 5079 5080 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem) 5081 return false; 5082 5083 /* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these 5084 * contexts, so updating is safe. 5085 */ 5086 switch (type) { 5087 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 5088 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER) 5089 return true; 5090 break; 5091 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 5092 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 5093 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 5094 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 5095 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 5096 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 5097 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 5098 return true; 5099 default: 5100 break; 5101 } 5102 5103 verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n"); 5104 return false; 5105 } 5106 5107 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5108 { 5109 return env->prog->jit_requested && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64); 5110 } 5111 5112 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5113 struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) 5114 { 5115 if (!map) 5116 return 0; 5117 5118 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ 5119 switch (map->map_type) { 5120 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: 5121 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 5122 goto error; 5123 break; 5124 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: 5125 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && 5126 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output && 5127 func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output && 5128 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value && 5129 func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output) 5130 goto error; 5131 break; 5132 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 5133 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output && 5134 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve && 5135 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit && 5136 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard && 5137 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query) 5138 goto error; 5139 break; 5140 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: 5141 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) 5142 goto error; 5143 break; 5144 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: 5145 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && 5146 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) 5147 goto error; 5148 break; 5149 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE: 5150 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE: 5151 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage) 5152 goto error; 5153 break; 5154 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: 5155 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH: 5156 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 5157 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 5158 goto error; 5159 break; 5160 /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases 5161 * appear. 5162 */ 5163 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: 5164 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) 5165 goto error; 5166 break; 5167 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: 5168 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 5169 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 5170 goto error; 5171 break; 5172 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 5173 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 5174 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 5175 goto error; 5176 break; 5177 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 5178 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && 5179 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && 5180 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 5181 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && 5182 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 5183 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 5184 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 5185 goto error; 5186 break; 5187 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 5188 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && 5189 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && 5190 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 5191 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && 5192 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 5193 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 5194 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 5195 goto error; 5196 break; 5197 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: 5198 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) 5199 goto error; 5200 break; 5201 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: 5202 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: 5203 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 5204 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 5205 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 5206 goto error; 5207 break; 5208 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 5209 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get && 5210 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete) 5211 goto error; 5212 break; 5213 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 5214 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get && 5215 func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete) 5216 goto error; 5217 break; 5218 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 5219 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get && 5220 func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete) 5221 goto error; 5222 break; 5223 default: 5224 break; 5225 } 5226 5227 /* ... and second from the function itself. */ 5228 switch (func_id) { 5229 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 5230 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) 5231 goto error; 5232 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) { 5233 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 5234 return -EINVAL; 5235 } 5236 break; 5237 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: 5238 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: 5239 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: 5240 case BPF_FUNC_skb_output: 5241 case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output: 5242 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) 5243 goto error; 5244 break; 5245 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: 5246 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) 5247 goto error; 5248 break; 5249 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: 5250 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: 5251 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) 5252 goto error; 5253 break; 5254 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 5255 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP && 5256 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH && 5257 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP && 5258 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) 5259 goto error; 5260 break; 5261 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: 5262 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map: 5263 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: 5264 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) 5265 goto error; 5266 break; 5267 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash: 5268 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash: 5269 case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update: 5270 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 5271 goto error; 5272 break; 5273 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 5274 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE && 5275 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE) 5276 goto error; 5277 break; 5278 case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport: 5279 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY && 5280 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP && 5281 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 5282 goto error; 5283 break; 5284 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 5285 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 5286 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 5287 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 5288 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) 5289 goto error; 5290 break; 5291 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get: 5292 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete: 5293 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE) 5294 goto error; 5295 break; 5296 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get: 5297 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete: 5298 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) 5299 goto error; 5300 break; 5301 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get: 5302 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete: 5303 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE) 5304 goto error; 5305 break; 5306 default: 5307 break; 5308 } 5309 5310 return 0; 5311 error: 5312 verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", 5313 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 5314 return -EINVAL; 5315 } 5316 5317 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 5318 { 5319 int count = 0; 5320 5321 if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 5322 count++; 5323 if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 5324 count++; 5325 if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 5326 count++; 5327 if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 5328 count++; 5329 if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 5330 count++; 5331 5332 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, 5333 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have 5334 * right now. 5335 */ 5336 return count <= 1; 5337 } 5338 5339 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(enum bpf_arg_type arg_curr, 5340 enum bpf_arg_type arg_next) 5341 { 5342 return (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_curr) && 5343 !arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_next)) || 5344 (!arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_curr) && 5345 arg_type_is_mem_size(arg_next)); 5346 } 5347 5348 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 5349 { 5350 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' 5351 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need 5352 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy 5353 * helper function specification. 5354 */ 5355 if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) || 5356 arg_type_is_mem_ptr(fn->arg5_type) || 5357 check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg1_type, fn->arg2_type) || 5358 check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg2_type, fn->arg3_type) || 5359 check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg3_type, fn->arg4_type) || 5360 check_args_pair_invalid(fn->arg4_type, fn->arg5_type)) 5361 return false; 5362 5363 return true; 5364 } 5365 5366 static bool check_refcount_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) 5367 { 5368 int count = 0; 5369 5370 if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg1_type)) 5371 count++; 5372 if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg2_type)) 5373 count++; 5374 if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg3_type)) 5375 count++; 5376 if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg4_type)) 5377 count++; 5378 if (arg_type_may_be_refcounted(fn->arg5_type)) 5379 count++; 5380 5381 /* A reference acquiring function cannot acquire 5382 * another refcounted ptr. 5383 */ 5384 if (may_be_acquire_function(func_id) && count) 5385 return false; 5386 5387 /* We only support one arg being unreferenced at the moment, 5388 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now. 5389 */ 5390 return count <= 1; 5391 } 5392 5393 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 5394 { 5395 int i; 5396 5397 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) { 5398 if (fn->arg_type[i] == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && !fn->arg_btf_id[i]) 5399 return false; 5400 5401 if (fn->arg_type[i] != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i]) 5402 return false; 5403 } 5404 5405 return true; 5406 } 5407 5408 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) 5409 { 5410 return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) && 5411 check_arg_pair_ok(fn) && 5412 check_btf_id_ok(fn) && 5413 check_refcount_ok(fn, func_id) ? 0 : -EINVAL; 5414 } 5415 5416 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] 5417 * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. 5418 */ 5419 static void __clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5420 struct bpf_func_state *state) 5421 { 5422 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 5423 int i; 5424 5425 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 5426 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(®s[i])) 5427 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 5428 5429 bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) { 5430 if (!reg) 5431 continue; 5432 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg)) 5433 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 5434 } 5435 } 5436 5437 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5438 { 5439 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5440 int i; 5441 5442 for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) 5443 __clear_all_pkt_pointers(env, vstate->frame[i]); 5444 } 5445 5446 enum { 5447 AT_PKT_END = -1, 5448 BEYOND_PKT_END = -2, 5449 }; 5450 5451 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open) 5452 { 5453 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5454 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn]; 5455 5456 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET) 5457 /* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */ 5458 return; 5459 5460 /* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end. 5461 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown. 5462 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end 5463 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end 5464 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end 5465 */ 5466 if (range_open) 5467 reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END; 5468 else 5469 reg->range = AT_PKT_END; 5470 } 5471 5472 static void release_reg_references(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5473 struct bpf_func_state *state, 5474 int ref_obj_id) 5475 { 5476 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 5477 int i; 5478 5479 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 5480 if (regs[i].ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) 5481 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 5482 5483 bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) { 5484 if (!reg) 5485 continue; 5486 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) 5487 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 5488 } 5489 } 5490 5491 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel 5492 * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference. 5493 */ 5494 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5495 int ref_obj_id) 5496 { 5497 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5498 int err; 5499 int i; 5500 5501 err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id); 5502 if (err) 5503 return err; 5504 5505 for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) 5506 release_reg_references(env, vstate->frame[i], ref_obj_id); 5507 5508 return 0; 5509 } 5510 5511 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5512 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 5513 { 5514 int i; 5515 5516 /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ 5517 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 5518 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 5519 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 5520 } 5521 } 5522 5523 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5524 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 5525 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 5526 int insn_idx); 5527 5528 static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 5529 int *insn_idx, int subprog, 5530 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) 5531 { 5532 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 5533 struct bpf_func_info_aux *func_info_aux; 5534 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 5535 int err; 5536 bool is_global = false; 5537 5538 if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 5539 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n", 5540 state->curframe + 2); 5541 return -E2BIG; 5542 } 5543 5544 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 5545 if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { 5546 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n", 5547 state->curframe + 1); 5548 return -EFAULT; 5549 } 5550 5551 func_info_aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux; 5552 if (func_info_aux) 5553 is_global = func_info_aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL; 5554 err = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, caller->regs); 5555 if (err == -EFAULT) 5556 return err; 5557 if (is_global) { 5558 if (err) { 5559 verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n", 5560 subprog); 5561 return err; 5562 } else { 5563 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 5564 verbose(env, 5565 "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", 5566 subprog); 5567 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 5568 5569 /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ 5570 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 5571 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 5572 5573 /* continue with next insn after call */ 5574 return 0; 5575 } 5576 } 5577 5578 callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); 5579 if (!callee) 5580 return -ENOMEM; 5581 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; 5582 5583 /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write 5584 * into its own stack before reading from it. 5585 * callee can read/write into caller's stack 5586 */ 5587 init_func_state(env, callee, 5588 /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ 5589 *insn_idx /* callsite */, 5590 state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, 5591 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 5592 5593 /* Transfer references to the callee */ 5594 err = transfer_reference_state(callee, caller); 5595 if (err) 5596 return err; 5597 5598 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); 5599 if (err) 5600 return err; 5601 5602 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 5603 5604 /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ 5605 state->curframe++; 5606 5607 /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ 5608 *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1; 5609 5610 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 5611 verbose(env, "caller:\n"); 5612 print_verifier_state(env, caller); 5613 verbose(env, "callee:\n"); 5614 print_verifier_state(env, callee); 5615 } 5616 return 0; 5617 } 5618 5619 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5620 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 5621 struct bpf_func_state *callee) 5622 { 5623 /* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, 5624 * void *callback_ctx, u64 flags); 5625 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 5626 * void *callback_ctx); 5627 */ 5628 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 5629 5630 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 5631 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 5632 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 5633 5634 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 5635 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 5636 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 5637 5638 /* pointer to stack or null */ 5639 callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 5640 5641 /* unused */ 5642 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 5643 return 0; 5644 } 5645 5646 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5647 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 5648 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx) 5649 { 5650 int i; 5651 5652 /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent 5653 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain 5654 */ 5655 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 5656 callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; 5657 return 0; 5658 } 5659 5660 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 5661 int *insn_idx) 5662 { 5663 int subprog, target_insn; 5664 5665 target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; 5666 subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); 5667 if (subprog < 0) { 5668 verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 5669 target_insn); 5670 return -EFAULT; 5671 } 5672 5673 return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state); 5674 } 5675 5676 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5677 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 5678 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 5679 int insn_idx) 5680 { 5681 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 5682 struct bpf_map *map; 5683 int err; 5684 5685 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(insn_aux)) { 5686 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 5687 return -EINVAL; 5688 } 5689 5690 map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state); 5691 if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args || 5692 !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) { 5693 verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n"); 5694 return -ENOTSUPP; 5695 } 5696 5697 err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee); 5698 if (err) 5699 return err; 5700 5701 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 5702 return 0; 5703 } 5704 5705 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) 5706 { 5707 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 5708 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 5709 struct bpf_reg_state *r0; 5710 int err; 5711 5712 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 5713 r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]; 5714 if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 5715 /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer 5716 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller, 5717 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack 5718 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits, 5719 * but let's be conservative 5720 */ 5721 verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n"); 5722 return -EINVAL; 5723 } 5724 5725 state->curframe--; 5726 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 5727 if (callee->in_callback_fn) { 5728 /* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */ 5729 struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); 5730 5731 if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 5732 verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n"); 5733 return -EACCES; 5734 } 5735 if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) { 5736 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0"); 5737 return -EINVAL; 5738 } 5739 } else { 5740 /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ 5741 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; 5742 } 5743 5744 /* Transfer references to the caller */ 5745 err = transfer_reference_state(caller, callee); 5746 if (err) 5747 return err; 5748 5749 *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; 5750 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 5751 verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); 5752 print_verifier_state(env, callee); 5753 verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); 5754 print_verifier_state(env, caller); 5755 } 5756 /* clear everything in the callee */ 5757 free_func_state(callee); 5758 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; 5759 return 0; 5760 } 5761 5762 static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, 5763 int func_id, 5764 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5765 { 5766 struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; 5767 5768 if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER || 5769 (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack && 5770 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str && 5771 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str && 5772 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str)) 5773 return; 5774 5775 ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; 5776 ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value; 5777 ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 5778 ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 5779 __reg_deduce_bounds(ret_reg); 5780 __reg_bound_offset(ret_reg); 5781 __update_reg_bounds(ret_reg); 5782 } 5783 5784 static int 5785 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 5786 int func_id, int insn_idx) 5787 { 5788 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 5789 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 5790 5791 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 5792 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 5793 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 5794 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 5795 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem && 5796 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 5797 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 5798 func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem && 5799 func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) 5800 return 0; 5801 5802 if (map == NULL) { 5803 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 5804 return -EINVAL; 5805 } 5806 5807 /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions 5808 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the 5809 * state of the map from program side. 5810 */ 5811 if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 5812 (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 5813 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 5814 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 5815 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) { 5816 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n"); 5817 return -EACCES; 5818 } 5819 5820 if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state)) 5821 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, 5822 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 5823 else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr) 5824 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON, 5825 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 5826 return 0; 5827 } 5828 5829 static int 5830 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 5831 int func_id, int insn_idx) 5832 { 5833 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 5834 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg; 5835 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 5836 struct tnum range; 5837 u64 val; 5838 int err; 5839 5840 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 5841 return 0; 5842 if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { 5843 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 5844 return -EINVAL; 5845 } 5846 5847 range = tnum_range(0, map->max_entries - 1); 5848 reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 5849 5850 if (!register_is_const(reg) || !tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { 5851 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 5852 return 0; 5853 } 5854 5855 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); 5856 if (err) 5857 return err; 5858 5859 val = reg->var_off.value; 5860 if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) 5861 bpf_map_key_store(aux, val); 5862 else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 5863 bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val) 5864 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 5865 return 0; 5866 } 5867 5868 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5869 { 5870 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 5871 int i; 5872 5873 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 5874 verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n", 5875 state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx); 5876 } 5877 return state->acquired_refs ? -EINVAL : 0; 5878 } 5879 5880 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 5881 int *insn_idx_p) 5882 { 5883 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; 5884 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 5885 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 5886 int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 5887 bool changes_data; 5888 int i, err, func_id; 5889 5890 /* find function prototype */ 5891 func_id = insn->imm; 5892 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { 5893 verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 5894 func_id); 5895 return -EINVAL; 5896 } 5897 5898 if (env->ops->get_func_proto) 5899 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog); 5900 if (!fn) { 5901 verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 5902 func_id); 5903 return -EINVAL; 5904 } 5905 5906 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ 5907 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { 5908 verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 5909 return -EINVAL; 5910 } 5911 5912 if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) { 5913 verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n"); 5914 return -EINVAL; 5915 } 5916 5917 /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ 5918 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func); 5919 if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 5920 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n", 5921 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 5922 return -EINVAL; 5923 } 5924 5925 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 5926 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; 5927 5928 err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id); 5929 if (err) { 5930 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 5931 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 5932 return err; 5933 } 5934 5935 meta.func_id = func_id; 5936 /* check args */ 5937 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { 5938 err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn); 5939 if (err) 5940 return err; 5941 } 5942 5943 err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 5944 if (err) 5945 return err; 5946 5947 err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 5948 if (err) 5949 return err; 5950 5951 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset 5952 * is inferred from register state. 5953 */ 5954 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { 5955 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, 5956 BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 5957 if (err) 5958 return err; 5959 } 5960 5961 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 5962 err = check_reference_leak(env); 5963 if (err) { 5964 verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n"); 5965 return err; 5966 } 5967 } else if (is_release_function(func_id)) { 5968 err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id); 5969 if (err) { 5970 verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 5971 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 5972 return err; 5973 } 5974 } 5975 5976 regs = cur_regs(env); 5977 5978 /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0, 5979 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error. 5980 */ 5981 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage && 5982 !register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) { 5983 verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n"); 5984 return -EINVAL; 5985 } 5986 5987 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem) { 5988 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 5989 set_map_elem_callback_state); 5990 if (err < 0) 5991 return -EINVAL; 5992 } 5993 5994 /* reset caller saved regs */ 5995 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 5996 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 5997 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 5998 } 5999 6000 /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */ 6001 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 6002 6003 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ 6004 if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) { 6005 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ 6006 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 6007 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) { 6008 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; 6009 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL || 6010 fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 6011 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ 6012 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 6013 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() 6014 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access 6015 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() 6016 */ 6017 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { 6018 verbose(env, 6019 "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 6020 return -EINVAL; 6021 } 6022 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; 6023 if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 6024 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 6025 if (map_value_has_spin_lock(meta.map_ptr)) 6026 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 6027 } else { 6028 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL; 6029 } 6030 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) { 6031 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 6032 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL; 6033 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL) { 6034 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 6035 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL; 6036 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL) { 6037 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 6038 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL; 6039 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL) { 6040 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 6041 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL; 6042 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size; 6043 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID_OR_NULL || 6044 fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID) { 6045 const struct btf_type *t; 6046 6047 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 6048 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL); 6049 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 6050 u32 tsize; 6051 const struct btf_type *ret; 6052 const char *tname; 6053 6054 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 6055 ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize); 6056 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 6057 tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off); 6058 verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 6059 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 6060 return -EINVAL; 6061 } 6062 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = 6063 fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID ? 6064 PTR_TO_MEM : PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL; 6065 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize; 6066 } else { 6067 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = 6068 fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID ? 6069 PTR_TO_BTF_ID : PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL; 6070 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf; 6071 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 6072 } 6073 } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL || 6074 fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 6075 int ret_btf_id; 6076 6077 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 6078 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID ? 6079 PTR_TO_BTF_ID : 6080 PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL; 6081 ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id; 6082 if (ret_btf_id == 0) { 6083 verbose(env, "invalid return type %d of func %s#%d\n", 6084 fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 6085 return -EINVAL; 6086 } 6087 /* current BPF helper definitions are only coming from 6088 * built-in code with type IDs from vmlinux BTF 6089 */ 6090 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = btf_vmlinux; 6091 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 6092 } else { 6093 verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n", 6094 fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 6095 return -EINVAL; 6096 } 6097 6098 if (reg_type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type)) 6099 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 6100 6101 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) { 6102 /* For release_reference() */ 6103 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 6104 } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 6105 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 6106 6107 if (id < 0) 6108 return id; 6109 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */ 6110 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 6111 /* For release_reference() */ 6112 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 6113 } 6114 6115 do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); 6116 6117 err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); 6118 if (err) 6119 return err; 6120 6121 if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack || 6122 func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) && 6123 !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) { 6124 const char *err_str; 6125 6126 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 6127 err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); 6128 err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n"; 6129 #else 6130 err = -ENOTSUPP; 6131 err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n"; 6132 #endif 6133 if (err) { 6134 verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 6135 return err; 6136 } 6137 6138 env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true; 6139 } 6140 6141 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack) 6142 env->prog->call_get_stack = true; 6143 6144 if (changes_data) 6145 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 6146 return 0; 6147 } 6148 6149 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by 6150 * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument. 6151 */ 6152 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 6153 size_t reg_size) 6154 { 6155 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 6156 6157 if (regno == BPF_REG_0) { 6158 /* Function return value */ 6159 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 6160 reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ? 6161 DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 6162 } else { 6163 /* Function argument */ 6164 if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) { 6165 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 6166 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 6167 } else { 6168 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ32); 6169 } 6170 } 6171 } 6172 6173 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 6174 { 6175 const struct btf_type *t, *func, *func_proto, *ptr_type; 6176 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 6177 const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name; 6178 u32 i, nargs, func_id, ptr_type_id; 6179 const struct btf_param *args; 6180 int err; 6181 6182 func_id = insn->imm; 6183 func = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, func_id); 6184 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, func->name_off); 6185 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, func->type); 6186 6187 if (!env->ops->check_kfunc_call || 6188 !env->ops->check_kfunc_call(func_id)) { 6189 verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n", 6190 func_name); 6191 return -EACCES; 6192 } 6193 6194 /* Check the arguments */ 6195 err = btf_check_kfunc_arg_match(env, btf_vmlinux, func_id, regs); 6196 if (err) 6197 return err; 6198 6199 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) 6200 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 6201 6202 /* Check return type */ 6203 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf_vmlinux, func_proto->type, NULL); 6204 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 6205 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 6206 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size); 6207 } else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 6208 ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf_vmlinux, t->type, 6209 &ptr_type_id); 6210 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) { 6211 ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, 6212 ptr_type->name_off); 6213 verbose(env, "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 6214 func_name, btf_type_str(ptr_type), 6215 ptr_type_name); 6216 return -EINVAL; 6217 } 6218 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 6219 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = btf_vmlinux; 6220 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 6221 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id; 6222 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *)); 6223 } /* else { add_kfunc_call() ensures it is btf_type_is_void(t) } */ 6224 6225 nargs = btf_type_vlen(func_proto); 6226 args = (const struct btf_param *)(func_proto + 1); 6227 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 6228 u32 regno = i + 1; 6229 6230 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf_vmlinux, args[i].type, NULL); 6231 if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 6232 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *)); 6233 else 6234 /* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */ 6235 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size); 6236 } 6237 6238 return 0; 6239 } 6240 6241 static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 6242 { 6243 /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 6244 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b); 6245 6246 if (b < 0) 6247 return res > a; 6248 return res < a; 6249 } 6250 6251 static bool signed_add32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 6252 { 6253 /* Do the add in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 6254 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a + (u32)b); 6255 6256 if (b < 0) 6257 return res > a; 6258 return res < a; 6259 } 6260 6261 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 6262 { 6263 /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 6264 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b); 6265 6266 if (b < 0) 6267 return res < a; 6268 return res > a; 6269 } 6270 6271 static bool signed_sub32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 6272 { 6273 /* Do the sub in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 6274 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a - (u32)b); 6275 6276 if (b < 0) 6277 return res < a; 6278 return res > a; 6279 } 6280 6281 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6282 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6283 enum bpf_reg_type type) 6284 { 6285 bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 6286 s64 val = reg->var_off.value; 6287 s64 smin = reg->smin_value; 6288 6289 if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { 6290 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", 6291 reg_type_str[type], val); 6292 return false; 6293 } 6294 6295 if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 6296 verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", 6297 reg_type_str[type], reg->off); 6298 return false; 6299 } 6300 6301 if (smin == S64_MIN) { 6302 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", 6303 reg_type_str[type]); 6304 return false; 6305 } 6306 6307 if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 6308 verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", 6309 smin, reg_type_str[type]); 6310 return false; 6311 } 6312 6313 return true; 6314 } 6315 6316 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 6317 { 6318 return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; 6319 } 6320 6321 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 6322 u32 *ptr_limit, u8 opcode, bool off_is_neg) 6323 { 6324 bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || 6325 (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); 6326 u32 off, max; 6327 6328 switch (ptr_reg->type) { 6329 case PTR_TO_STACK: 6330 /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the 6331 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. 6332 */ 6333 max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; 6334 /* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in 6335 * unprivileged mode so it's not handled here. 6336 */ 6337 off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value; 6338 if (mask_to_left) 6339 *ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off; 6340 else 6341 *ptr_limit = -off - 1; 6342 return *ptr_limit >= max ? -ERANGE : 0; 6343 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 6344 max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size; 6345 if (mask_to_left) { 6346 *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off; 6347 } else { 6348 off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off; 6349 *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1; 6350 } 6351 return *ptr_limit >= max ? -ERANGE : 0; 6352 default: 6353 return -EINVAL; 6354 } 6355 } 6356 6357 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6358 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 6359 { 6360 return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K; 6361 } 6362 6363 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 6364 u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit) 6365 { 6366 /* If we arrived here from different branches with different 6367 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work. 6368 */ 6369 if (aux->alu_state && 6370 (aux->alu_state != alu_state || 6371 aux->alu_limit != alu_limit)) 6372 return -EACCES; 6373 6374 /* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */ 6375 aux->alu_state = alu_state; 6376 aux->alu_limit = alu_limit; 6377 return 0; 6378 } 6379 6380 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6381 struct bpf_insn *insn) 6382 { 6383 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 6384 6385 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 6386 return 0; 6387 6388 return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0); 6389 } 6390 6391 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6392 struct bpf_insn *insn, 6393 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 6394 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6395 bool off_is_neg) 6396 { 6397 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 6398 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 6399 bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; 6400 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 6401 u32 alu_state, alu_limit; 6402 struct bpf_reg_state tmp; 6403 bool ret; 6404 int err; 6405 6406 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 6407 return 0; 6408 6409 /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative 6410 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care 6411 * to explore bad access from here. 6412 */ 6413 if (vstate->speculative) 6414 goto do_sim; 6415 6416 alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; 6417 alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? 6418 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; 6419 6420 err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg); 6421 if (err < 0) 6422 return err; 6423 6424 err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); 6425 if (err < 0) 6426 return err; 6427 do_sim: 6428 /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under 6429 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of 6430 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off 6431 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there 6432 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example, 6433 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction 6434 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore 6435 * bad access. 6436 */ 6437 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) { 6438 tmp = *dst_reg; 6439 *dst_reg = *ptr_reg; 6440 } 6441 ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true); 6442 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret) 6443 *dst_reg = tmp; 6444 return !ret ? -EFAULT : 0; 6445 } 6446 6447 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't 6448 * have a variable offset. 6449 * 6450 * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it 6451 * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also 6452 * retrieve_ptr_limit(). 6453 * 6454 * 6455 * 'off' includes 'reg->off'. 6456 */ 6457 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( 6458 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6459 int regno, 6460 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6461 int off) 6462 { 6463 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6464 char tn_buf[48]; 6465 6466 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6467 verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n", 6468 regno, tn_buf, off); 6469 return -EACCES; 6470 } 6471 6472 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { 6473 verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " 6474 "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off); 6475 return -EACCES; 6476 } 6477 6478 return 0; 6479 } 6480 6481 6482 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. 6483 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. 6484 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a 6485 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. 6486 */ 6487 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6488 struct bpf_insn *insn, 6489 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 6490 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) 6491 { 6492 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 6493 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 6494 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg; 6495 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 6496 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, 6497 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; 6498 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, 6499 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; 6500 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; 6501 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 6502 int ret; 6503 6504 dst_reg = ®s[dst]; 6505 6506 if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 6507 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 6508 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from 6509 * e.g. dead branches. 6510 */ 6511 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 6512 return 0; 6513 } 6514 6515 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { 6516 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ 6517 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 6518 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 6519 return 0; 6520 } 6521 6522 verbose(env, 6523 "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 6524 dst); 6525 return -EACCES; 6526 } 6527 6528 switch (ptr_reg->type) { 6529 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: 6530 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n", 6531 dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]); 6532 return -EACCES; 6533 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 6534 /* smin_val represents the known value */ 6535 if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) 6536 break; 6537 fallthrough; 6538 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 6539 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 6540 case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: 6541 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 6542 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: 6543 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 6544 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: 6545 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 6546 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", 6547 dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]); 6548 return -EACCES; 6549 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 6550 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) { 6551 verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n", 6552 off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src); 6553 return -EACCES; 6554 } 6555 fallthrough; 6556 default: 6557 break; 6558 } 6559 6560 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. 6561 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. 6562 */ 6563 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; 6564 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 6565 6566 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || 6567 !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 6568 return -EINVAL; 6569 6570 /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ 6571 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 6572 6573 switch (opcode) { 6574 case BPF_ADD: 6575 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val < 0); 6576 if (ret < 0) { 6577 verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types\n", dst); 6578 return ret; 6579 } 6580 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow 6581 * the s32 'off' field 6582 */ 6583 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == 6584 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { 6585 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ 6586 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 6587 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 6588 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 6589 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 6590 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 6591 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; 6592 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 6593 break; 6594 } 6595 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off 6596 * == 0, since it's a scalar. 6597 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive 6598 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' 6599 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. 6600 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets 6601 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset 6602 * from ptr_reg. 6603 */ 6604 if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) || 6605 signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) { 6606 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 6607 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 6608 } else { 6609 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val; 6610 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val; 6611 } 6612 if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr || 6613 umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) { 6614 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 6615 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 6616 } else { 6617 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val; 6618 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val; 6619 } 6620 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 6621 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 6622 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 6623 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 6624 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 6625 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 6626 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 6627 } 6628 break; 6629 case BPF_SUB: 6630 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val < 0); 6631 if (ret < 0) { 6632 verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types\n", dst); 6633 return ret; 6634 } 6635 if (dst_reg == off_reg) { 6636 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ 6637 verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", 6638 dst); 6639 return -EACCES; 6640 } 6641 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to 6642 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not 6643 * be able to deal with it. 6644 */ 6645 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 6646 verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", 6647 dst); 6648 return -EACCES; 6649 } 6650 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == 6651 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { 6652 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ 6653 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 6654 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 6655 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 6656 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 6657 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 6658 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 6659 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; 6660 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 6661 break; 6662 } 6663 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known 6664 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. 6665 */ 6666 if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) || 6667 signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) { 6668 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 6669 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 6670 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 6671 } else { 6672 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val; 6673 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val; 6674 } 6675 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { 6676 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 6677 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 6678 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 6679 } else { 6680 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 6681 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; 6682 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; 6683 } 6684 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 6685 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 6686 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 6687 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 6688 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 6689 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 6690 if (smin_val < 0) 6691 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 6692 } 6693 break; 6694 case BPF_AND: 6695 case BPF_OR: 6696 case BPF_XOR: 6697 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */ 6698 verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", 6699 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 6700 return -EACCES; 6701 default: 6702 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ 6703 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", 6704 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 6705 return -EACCES; 6706 } 6707 6708 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 6709 return -EINVAL; 6710 6711 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 6712 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); 6713 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); 6714 6715 /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds 6716 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. 6717 */ 6718 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 6719 if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 6720 check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) { 6721 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " 6722 "prohibited for !root\n", dst); 6723 return -EACCES; 6724 } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK && 6725 check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( 6726 env, dst, dst_reg, dst_reg->off + 6727 dst_reg->var_off.value)) { 6728 return -EACCES; 6729 } 6730 } 6731 6732 return 0; 6733 } 6734 6735 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6736 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6737 { 6738 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 6739 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 6740 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 6741 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 6742 6743 if (signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smin_val) || 6744 signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smax_val)) { 6745 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 6746 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 6747 } else { 6748 dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val; 6749 dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val; 6750 } 6751 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val || 6752 dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 6753 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 6754 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 6755 } else { 6756 dst_reg->u32_min_value += umin_val; 6757 dst_reg->u32_max_value += umax_val; 6758 } 6759 } 6760 6761 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6762 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6763 { 6764 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 6765 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 6766 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 6767 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 6768 6769 if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) || 6770 signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) { 6771 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 6772 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 6773 } else { 6774 dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val; 6775 dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val; 6776 } 6777 if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val || 6778 dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 6779 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 6780 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 6781 } else { 6782 dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val; 6783 dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val; 6784 } 6785 } 6786 6787 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6788 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6789 { 6790 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 6791 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 6792 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 6793 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 6794 6795 if (signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smax_val) || 6796 signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smin_val)) { 6797 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 6798 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 6799 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 6800 } else { 6801 dst_reg->s32_min_value -= smax_val; 6802 dst_reg->s32_max_value -= smin_val; 6803 } 6804 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) { 6805 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 6806 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 6807 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 6808 } else { 6809 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 6810 dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val; 6811 dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val; 6812 } 6813 } 6814 6815 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6816 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6817 { 6818 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 6819 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 6820 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 6821 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 6822 6823 if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) || 6824 signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) { 6825 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 6826 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 6827 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 6828 } else { 6829 dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val; 6830 dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val; 6831 } 6832 if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { 6833 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 6834 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 6835 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 6836 } else { 6837 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 6838 dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val; 6839 dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val; 6840 } 6841 } 6842 6843 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6844 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6845 { 6846 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 6847 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 6848 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 6849 6850 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) { 6851 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 6852 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 6853 return; 6854 } 6855 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 6856 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX). 6857 */ 6858 if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) { 6859 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 6860 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 6861 return; 6862 } 6863 dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val; 6864 dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val; 6865 if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) { 6866 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 6867 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 6868 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 6869 } else { 6870 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 6871 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 6872 } 6873 } 6874 6875 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6876 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6877 { 6878 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 6879 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 6880 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 6881 6882 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) { 6883 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 6884 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 6885 return; 6886 } 6887 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 6888 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX). 6889 */ 6890 if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) { 6891 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 6892 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 6893 return; 6894 } 6895 dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val; 6896 dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val; 6897 if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) { 6898 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 6899 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 6900 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 6901 } else { 6902 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 6903 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 6904 } 6905 } 6906 6907 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6908 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6909 { 6910 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 6911 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 6912 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 6913 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 6914 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 6915 6916 /* Assuming scalar64_min_max_and will be called so its safe 6917 * to skip updating register for known 32-bit case. 6918 */ 6919 if (src_known && dst_known) 6920 return; 6921 6922 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 6923 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 6924 */ 6925 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 6926 dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val); 6927 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 6928 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 6929 * ain't nobody got time for that. 6930 */ 6931 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 6932 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 6933 } else { 6934 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 6935 * cast result into s64. 6936 */ 6937 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 6938 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 6939 } 6940 6941 } 6942 6943 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6944 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6945 { 6946 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 6947 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 6948 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 6949 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 6950 6951 if (src_known && dst_known) { 6952 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 6953 return; 6954 } 6955 6956 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 6957 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 6958 */ 6959 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 6960 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); 6961 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 6962 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 6963 * ain't nobody got time for that. 6964 */ 6965 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 6966 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 6967 } else { 6968 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 6969 * cast result into s64. 6970 */ 6971 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 6972 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 6973 } 6974 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 6975 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 6976 } 6977 6978 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 6979 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 6980 { 6981 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 6982 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 6983 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 6984 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 6985 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 6986 6987 /* Assuming scalar64_min_max_or will be called so it is safe 6988 * to skip updating register for known case. 6989 */ 6990 if (src_known && dst_known) 6991 return; 6992 6993 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 6994 * maximum of the operands' minima 6995 */ 6996 dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val); 6997 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 6998 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 6999 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 7000 * ain't nobody got time for that. 7001 */ 7002 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 7003 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 7004 } else { 7005 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 7006 * cast result into s64. 7007 */ 7008 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 7009 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 7010 } 7011 } 7012 7013 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7014 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 7015 { 7016 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 7017 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 7018 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 7019 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 7020 7021 if (src_known && dst_known) { 7022 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 7023 return; 7024 } 7025 7026 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 7027 * maximum of the operands' minima 7028 */ 7029 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); 7030 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 7031 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 7032 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 7033 * ain't nobody got time for that. 7034 */ 7035 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 7036 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 7037 } else { 7038 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 7039 * cast result into s64. 7040 */ 7041 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 7042 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 7043 } 7044 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 7045 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 7046 } 7047 7048 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7049 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 7050 { 7051 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 7052 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 7053 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 7054 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 7055 7056 /* Assuming scalar64_min_max_xor will be called so it is safe 7057 * to skip updating register for known case. 7058 */ 7059 if (src_known && dst_known) 7060 return; 7061 7062 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */ 7063 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 7064 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 7065 7066 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 7067 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 7068 * so safe to cast u32 result into s32. 7069 */ 7070 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 7071 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 7072 } else { 7073 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 7074 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 7075 } 7076 } 7077 7078 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7079 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 7080 { 7081 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 7082 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 7083 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 7084 7085 if (src_known && dst_known) { 7086 /* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */ 7087 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 7088 return; 7089 } 7090 7091 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */ 7092 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 7093 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 7094 7095 if (dst_reg->smin_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 7096 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 7097 * so safe to cast u64 result into s64. 7098 */ 7099 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 7100 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 7101 } else { 7102 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 7103 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 7104 } 7105 7106 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 7107 } 7108 7109 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7110 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 7111 { 7112 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick 7113 * up from var_off) 7114 */ 7115 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 7116 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 7117 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 7118 if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) { 7119 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 7120 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 7121 } else { 7122 dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val; 7123 dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val; 7124 } 7125 } 7126 7127 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7128 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 7129 { 7130 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 7131 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 7132 /* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */ 7133 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 7134 7135 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 7136 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val)); 7137 /* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so 7138 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and 7139 * if some path skips this step we are still safe. 7140 */ 7141 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 7142 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 7143 } 7144 7145 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7146 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 7147 { 7148 /* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign 7149 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are 7150 * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track 7151 * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except 7152 * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this 7153 * later to shifts of any length. 7154 */ 7155 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0) 7156 dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32; 7157 else 7158 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 7159 7160 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0) 7161 dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32; 7162 else 7163 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 7164 7165 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 7166 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { 7167 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 7168 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 7169 } else { 7170 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; 7171 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; 7172 } 7173 } 7174 7175 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7176 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 7177 { 7178 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 7179 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 7180 7181 /* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */ 7182 __scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 7183 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 7184 7185 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 7186 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 7187 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 7188 } 7189 7190 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7191 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 7192 { 7193 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 7194 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 7195 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 7196 7197 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 7198 * be negative, then either: 7199 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 7200 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 7201 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 7202 * signed bounds 7203 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 7204 * about the result 7205 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 7206 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 7207 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 7208 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 7209 * var_off of the result. 7210 */ 7211 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 7212 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 7213 7214 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val); 7215 dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val; 7216 dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val; 7217 7218 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 7219 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 7220 } 7221 7222 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7223 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 7224 { 7225 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 7226 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 7227 7228 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 7229 * be negative, then either: 7230 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 7231 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 7232 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 7233 * signed bounds 7234 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 7235 * about the result 7236 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 7237 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 7238 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 7239 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 7240 * var_off of the result. 7241 */ 7242 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 7243 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 7244 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 7245 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; 7246 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; 7247 7248 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 7249 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded 7250 * so we can recalculate later from tnum. 7251 */ 7252 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 7253 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 7254 } 7255 7256 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7257 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 7258 { 7259 u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 7260 7261 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and 7262 * umax_val is equal to umin_val. 7263 */ 7264 dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val); 7265 dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val); 7266 7267 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32); 7268 7269 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 7270 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 7271 */ 7272 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 7273 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 7274 7275 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 7276 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 7277 } 7278 7279 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7280 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 7281 { 7282 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 7283 7284 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal 7285 * to umin_val. 7286 */ 7287 dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val; 7288 dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val; 7289 7290 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64); 7291 7292 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 7293 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 7294 */ 7295 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 7296 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 7297 7298 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 7299 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out 7300 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum. 7301 */ 7302 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 7303 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 7304 } 7305 7306 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual 7307 * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts 7308 * need extra checks in the 32-bit case. 7309 */ 7310 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7311 struct bpf_insn *insn, 7312 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7313 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) 7314 { 7315 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7316 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 7317 bool src_known; 7318 s64 smin_val, smax_val; 7319 u64 umin_val, umax_val; 7320 s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val; 7321 u32 u32_min_val, u32_max_val; 7322 u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32; 7323 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 7324 int ret; 7325 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); 7326 7327 smin_val = src_reg.smin_value; 7328 smax_val = src_reg.smax_value; 7329 umin_val = src_reg.umin_value; 7330 umax_val = src_reg.umax_value; 7331 7332 s32_min_val = src_reg.s32_min_value; 7333 s32_max_val = src_reg.s32_max_value; 7334 u32_min_val = src_reg.u32_min_value; 7335 u32_max_val = src_reg.u32_max_value; 7336 7337 if (alu32) { 7338 src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 7339 if ((src_known && 7340 (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) || 7341 s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) { 7342 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 7343 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 7344 */ 7345 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 7346 return 0; 7347 } 7348 } else { 7349 src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 7350 if ((src_known && 7351 (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 7352 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 7353 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 7354 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 7355 */ 7356 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 7357 return 0; 7358 } 7359 } 7360 7361 if (!src_known && 7362 opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) { 7363 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 7364 return 0; 7365 } 7366 7367 /* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops. 7368 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both 7369 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the 7370 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32 7371 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD, 7372 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to 7373 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops. 7374 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of 7375 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy 7376 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may 7377 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark 7378 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting 7379 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds. 7380 */ 7381 switch (opcode) { 7382 case BPF_ADD: 7383 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); 7384 if (ret < 0) { 7385 verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different pointers or scalars\n", dst); 7386 return ret; 7387 } 7388 scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7389 scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7390 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 7391 break; 7392 case BPF_SUB: 7393 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); 7394 if (ret < 0) { 7395 verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different pointers or scalars\n", dst); 7396 return ret; 7397 } 7398 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7399 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7400 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 7401 break; 7402 case BPF_MUL: 7403 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 7404 scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7405 scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7406 break; 7407 case BPF_AND: 7408 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 7409 scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7410 scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7411 break; 7412 case BPF_OR: 7413 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 7414 scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7415 scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7416 break; 7417 case BPF_XOR: 7418 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 7419 scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7420 scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7421 break; 7422 case BPF_LSH: 7423 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 7424 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 7425 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 7426 */ 7427 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 7428 break; 7429 } 7430 if (alu32) 7431 scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7432 else 7433 scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7434 break; 7435 case BPF_RSH: 7436 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 7437 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 7438 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 7439 */ 7440 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 7441 break; 7442 } 7443 if (alu32) 7444 scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7445 else 7446 scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7447 break; 7448 case BPF_ARSH: 7449 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 7450 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 7451 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 7452 */ 7453 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 7454 break; 7455 } 7456 if (alu32) 7457 scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7458 else 7459 scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 7460 break; 7461 default: 7462 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 7463 break; 7464 } 7465 7466 /* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */ 7467 if (alu32) 7468 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 7469 7470 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 7471 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); 7472 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); 7473 return 0; 7474 } 7475 7476 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max 7477 * and var_off. 7478 */ 7479 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7480 struct bpf_insn *insn) 7481 { 7482 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 7483 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 7484 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; 7485 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; 7486 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 7487 int err; 7488 7489 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 7490 src_reg = NULL; 7491 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 7492 ptr_reg = dst_reg; 7493 else 7494 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be 7495 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars() 7496 */ 7497 dst_reg->id = 0; 7498 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 7499 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 7500 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 7501 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 7502 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields 7503 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except 7504 * pointer subtraction 7505 */ 7506 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 7507 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 7508 return 0; 7509 } 7510 verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", 7511 insn->dst_reg, 7512 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 7513 return -EACCES; 7514 } else { 7515 /* scalar += pointer 7516 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our 7517 * src/dest handling in computing the range 7518 */ 7519 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 7520 if (err) 7521 return err; 7522 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 7523 src_reg, dst_reg); 7524 } 7525 } else if (ptr_reg) { 7526 /* pointer += scalar */ 7527 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 7528 if (err) 7529 return err; 7530 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 7531 dst_reg, src_reg); 7532 } 7533 } else { 7534 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only 7535 * need to be able to read from this state. 7536 */ 7537 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 7538 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); 7539 src_reg = &off_reg; 7540 if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */ 7541 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 7542 ptr_reg, src_reg); 7543 } 7544 7545 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ 7546 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { 7547 print_verifier_state(env, state); 7548 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); 7549 return -EINVAL; 7550 } 7551 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { 7552 print_verifier_state(env, state); 7553 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); 7554 return -EINVAL; 7555 } 7556 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); 7557 } 7558 7559 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ 7560 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 7561 { 7562 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7563 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 7564 int err; 7565 7566 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 7567 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { 7568 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 || 7569 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 7570 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { 7571 verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); 7572 return -EINVAL; 7573 } 7574 } else { 7575 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 7576 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || 7577 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 7578 verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); 7579 return -EINVAL; 7580 } 7581 } 7582 7583 /* check src operand */ 7584 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 7585 if (err) 7586 return err; 7587 7588 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 7589 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 7590 insn->dst_reg); 7591 return -EACCES; 7592 } 7593 7594 /* check dest operand */ 7595 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 7596 if (err) 7597 return err; 7598 7599 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 7600 7601 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 7602 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 7603 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 7604 return -EINVAL; 7605 } 7606 7607 /* check src operand */ 7608 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 7609 if (err) 7610 return err; 7611 } else { 7612 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 7613 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 7614 return -EINVAL; 7615 } 7616 } 7617 7618 /* check dest operand, mark as required later */ 7619 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 7620 if (err) 7621 return err; 7622 7623 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 7624 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg; 7625 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg; 7626 7627 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 7628 /* case: R1 = R2 7629 * copy register state to dest reg 7630 */ 7631 if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id) 7632 /* Assign src and dst registers the same ID 7633 * that will be used by find_equal_scalars() 7634 * to propagate min/max range. 7635 */ 7636 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 7637 *dst_reg = *src_reg; 7638 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 7639 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 7640 } else { 7641 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ 7642 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 7643 verbose(env, 7644 "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", 7645 insn->src_reg); 7646 return -EACCES; 7647 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 7648 *dst_reg = *src_reg; 7649 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise 7650 * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly 7651 * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars() 7652 */ 7653 dst_reg->id = 0; 7654 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 7655 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 7656 } else { 7657 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, 7658 insn->dst_reg); 7659 } 7660 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 7661 } 7662 } else { 7663 /* case: R = imm 7664 * remember the value we stored into this reg 7665 */ 7666 /* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */ 7667 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 7668 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 7669 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 7670 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 7671 insn->imm); 7672 } else { 7673 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 7674 (u32)insn->imm); 7675 } 7676 } 7677 7678 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { 7679 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); 7680 return -EINVAL; 7681 7682 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ 7683 7684 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 7685 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 7686 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 7687 return -EINVAL; 7688 } 7689 /* check src1 operand */ 7690 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 7691 if (err) 7692 return err; 7693 } else { 7694 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 7695 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 7696 return -EINVAL; 7697 } 7698 } 7699 7700 /* check src2 operand */ 7701 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 7702 if (err) 7703 return err; 7704 7705 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && 7706 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { 7707 verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); 7708 return -EINVAL; 7709 } 7710 7711 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || 7712 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 7713 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; 7714 7715 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { 7716 verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); 7717 return -EINVAL; 7718 } 7719 } 7720 7721 /* check dest operand */ 7722 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 7723 if (err) 7724 return err; 7725 7726 return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); 7727 } 7728 7729 return 0; 7730 } 7731 7732 static void __find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_func_state *state, 7733 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7734 enum bpf_reg_type type, int new_range) 7735 { 7736 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 7737 int i; 7738 7739 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 7740 reg = &state->regs[i]; 7741 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 7742 /* keep the maximum range already checked */ 7743 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); 7744 } 7745 7746 bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) { 7747 if (!reg) 7748 continue; 7749 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 7750 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); 7751 } 7752 } 7753 7754 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 7755 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 7756 enum bpf_reg_type type, 7757 bool range_right_open) 7758 { 7759 int new_range, i; 7760 7761 if (dst_reg->off < 0 || 7762 (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open)) 7763 /* This doesn't give us any range */ 7764 return; 7765 7766 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || 7767 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) 7768 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less 7769 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. 7770 */ 7771 return; 7772 7773 new_range = dst_reg->off; 7774 if (range_right_open) 7775 new_range--; 7776 7777 /* Examples for register markings: 7778 * 7779 * pkt_data in dst register: 7780 * 7781 * r2 = r3; 7782 * r2 += 8; 7783 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> 7784 * <access okay> 7785 * 7786 * r2 = r3; 7787 * r2 += 8; 7788 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> 7789 * <handle exception> 7790 * 7791 * Where: 7792 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg 7793 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 7794 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 7795 * 7796 * pkt_data in src register: 7797 * 7798 * r2 = r3; 7799 * r2 += 8; 7800 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> 7801 * <handle exception> 7802 * 7803 * r2 = r3; 7804 * r2 += 8; 7805 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> 7806 * <access okay> 7807 * 7808 * Where: 7809 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg 7810 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 7811 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 7812 * 7813 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) 7814 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) 7815 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on 7816 * the check. 7817 */ 7818 7819 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we 7820 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big 7821 * the range won't allow anything. 7822 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. 7823 */ 7824 for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) 7825 __find_good_pkt_pointers(vstate->frame[i], dst_reg, type, 7826 new_range); 7827 } 7828 7829 static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode) 7830 { 7831 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 7832 s32 sval = (s32)val; 7833 7834 switch (opcode) { 7835 case BPF_JEQ: 7836 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 7837 return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 7838 break; 7839 case BPF_JNE: 7840 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 7841 return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 7842 break; 7843 case BPF_JSET: 7844 if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val) 7845 return 1; 7846 if (!((subreg.mask | subreg.value) & val)) 7847 return 0; 7848 break; 7849 case BPF_JGT: 7850 if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 7851 return 1; 7852 else if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 7853 return 0; 7854 break; 7855 case BPF_JSGT: 7856 if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 7857 return 1; 7858 else if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 7859 return 0; 7860 break; 7861 case BPF_JLT: 7862 if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 7863 return 1; 7864 else if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 7865 return 0; 7866 break; 7867 case BPF_JSLT: 7868 if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 7869 return 1; 7870 else if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 7871 return 0; 7872 break; 7873 case BPF_JGE: 7874 if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 7875 return 1; 7876 else if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 7877 return 0; 7878 break; 7879 case BPF_JSGE: 7880 if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 7881 return 1; 7882 else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 7883 return 0; 7884 break; 7885 case BPF_JLE: 7886 if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 7887 return 1; 7888 else if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 7889 return 0; 7890 break; 7891 case BPF_JSLE: 7892 if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 7893 return 1; 7894 else if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 7895 return 0; 7896 break; 7897 } 7898 7899 return -1; 7900 } 7901 7902 7903 static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode) 7904 { 7905 s64 sval = (s64)val; 7906 7907 switch (opcode) { 7908 case BPF_JEQ: 7909 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 7910 return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 7911 break; 7912 case BPF_JNE: 7913 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 7914 return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 7915 break; 7916 case BPF_JSET: 7917 if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val) 7918 return 1; 7919 if (!((reg->var_off.mask | reg->var_off.value) & val)) 7920 return 0; 7921 break; 7922 case BPF_JGT: 7923 if (reg->umin_value > val) 7924 return 1; 7925 else if (reg->umax_value <= val) 7926 return 0; 7927 break; 7928 case BPF_JSGT: 7929 if (reg->smin_value > sval) 7930 return 1; 7931 else if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 7932 return 0; 7933 break; 7934 case BPF_JLT: 7935 if (reg->umax_value < val) 7936 return 1; 7937 else if (reg->umin_value >= val) 7938 return 0; 7939 break; 7940 case BPF_JSLT: 7941 if (reg->smax_value < sval) 7942 return 1; 7943 else if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 7944 return 0; 7945 break; 7946 case BPF_JGE: 7947 if (reg->umin_value >= val) 7948 return 1; 7949 else if (reg->umax_value < val) 7950 return 0; 7951 break; 7952 case BPF_JSGE: 7953 if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 7954 return 1; 7955 else if (reg->smax_value < sval) 7956 return 0; 7957 break; 7958 case BPF_JLE: 7959 if (reg->umax_value <= val) 7960 return 1; 7961 else if (reg->umin_value > val) 7962 return 0; 7963 break; 7964 case BPF_JSLE: 7965 if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 7966 return 1; 7967 else if (reg->smin_value > sval) 7968 return 0; 7969 break; 7970 } 7971 7972 return -1; 7973 } 7974 7975 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;" 7976 * and return: 7977 * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed 7978 * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn 7979 * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value 7980 * range [0,10] 7981 */ 7982 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode, 7983 bool is_jmp32) 7984 { 7985 if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg)) { 7986 if (!reg_type_not_null(reg->type)) 7987 return -1; 7988 7989 /* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can 7990 * use this to direct branch taken. 7991 */ 7992 if (val != 0) 7993 return -1; 7994 7995 switch (opcode) { 7996 case BPF_JEQ: 7997 return 0; 7998 case BPF_JNE: 7999 return 1; 8000 default: 8001 return -1; 8002 } 8003 } 8004 8005 if (is_jmp32) 8006 return is_branch32_taken(reg, val, opcode); 8007 return is_branch64_taken(reg, val, opcode); 8008 } 8009 8010 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode) 8011 { 8012 /* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */ 8013 static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = { 8014 /* these stay the same */ 8015 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ, 8016 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE, 8017 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET, 8018 /* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */ 8019 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = BPF_JLE, 8020 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = BPF_JLT, 8021 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = BPF_JGE, 8022 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = BPF_JGT, 8023 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE, 8024 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT, 8025 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE, 8026 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT 8027 }; 8028 return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4]; 8029 } 8030 8031 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 8032 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 8033 u8 opcode) 8034 { 8035 struct bpf_reg_state *pkt; 8036 8037 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 8038 pkt = dst_reg; 8039 } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 8040 pkt = src_reg; 8041 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 8042 } else { 8043 return -1; 8044 } 8045 8046 if (pkt->range >= 0) 8047 return -1; 8048 8049 switch (opcode) { 8050 case BPF_JLE: 8051 /* pkt <= pkt_end */ 8052 fallthrough; 8053 case BPF_JGT: 8054 /* pkt > pkt_end */ 8055 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END) 8056 /* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */ 8057 return opcode == BPF_JGT; 8058 break; 8059 case BPF_JLT: 8060 /* pkt < pkt_end */ 8061 fallthrough; 8062 case BPF_JGE: 8063 /* pkt >= pkt_end */ 8064 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END) 8065 return opcode == BPF_JGE; 8066 break; 8067 } 8068 return -1; 8069 } 8070 8071 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the 8072 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're 8073 * simply doing a BPF_K check. 8074 * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values. 8075 */ 8076 static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 8077 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 8078 u64 val, u32 val32, 8079 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 8080 { 8081 struct tnum false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 8082 struct tnum false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 8083 struct tnum true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 8084 struct tnum true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 8085 s64 sval = (s64)val; 8086 s32 sval32 = (s32)val32; 8087 8088 /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its 8089 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into 8090 * the same object, but we don't bother with that. 8091 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we 8092 * only need to check one of them for pointerness. 8093 */ 8094 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) 8095 return; 8096 8097 switch (opcode) { 8098 case BPF_JEQ: 8099 case BPF_JNE: 8100 { 8101 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = 8102 opcode == BPF_JEQ ? true_reg : false_reg; 8103 8104 /* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence. 8105 * r1 = r2; 8106 * if (r1 == 42) goto label; 8107 * ... 8108 * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42. 8109 * 8110 * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID. 8111 */ 8112 if (is_jmp32) 8113 __mark_reg32_known(reg, val32); 8114 else 8115 ___mark_reg_known(reg, val); 8116 break; 8117 } 8118 case BPF_JSET: 8119 if (is_jmp32) { 8120 false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32)); 8121 if (is_power_of_2(val32)) 8122 true_32off = tnum_or(true_32off, 8123 tnum_const(val32)); 8124 } else { 8125 false_64off = tnum_and(false_64off, tnum_const(~val)); 8126 if (is_power_of_2(val)) 8127 true_64off = tnum_or(true_64off, 8128 tnum_const(val)); 8129 } 8130 break; 8131 case BPF_JGE: 8132 case BPF_JGT: 8133 { 8134 if (is_jmp32) { 8135 u32 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 : val32 - 1; 8136 u32 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 + 1 : val32; 8137 8138 false_reg->u32_max_value = min(false_reg->u32_max_value, 8139 false_umax); 8140 true_reg->u32_min_value = max(true_reg->u32_min_value, 8141 true_umin); 8142 } else { 8143 u64 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val : val - 1; 8144 u64 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val + 1 : val; 8145 8146 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, false_umax); 8147 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, true_umin); 8148 } 8149 break; 8150 } 8151 case BPF_JSGE: 8152 case BPF_JSGT: 8153 { 8154 if (is_jmp32) { 8155 s32 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 : sval32 - 1; 8156 s32 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 + 1 : sval32; 8157 8158 false_reg->s32_max_value = min(false_reg->s32_max_value, false_smax); 8159 true_reg->s32_min_value = max(true_reg->s32_min_value, true_smin); 8160 } else { 8161 s64 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval : sval - 1; 8162 s64 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval + 1 : sval; 8163 8164 false_reg->smax_value = min(false_reg->smax_value, false_smax); 8165 true_reg->smin_value = max(true_reg->smin_value, true_smin); 8166 } 8167 break; 8168 } 8169 case BPF_JLE: 8170 case BPF_JLT: 8171 { 8172 if (is_jmp32) { 8173 u32 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 : val32 + 1; 8174 u32 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 - 1 : val32; 8175 8176 false_reg->u32_min_value = max(false_reg->u32_min_value, 8177 false_umin); 8178 true_reg->u32_max_value = min(true_reg->u32_max_value, 8179 true_umax); 8180 } else { 8181 u64 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val : val + 1; 8182 u64 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val - 1 : val; 8183 8184 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, false_umin); 8185 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, true_umax); 8186 } 8187 break; 8188 } 8189 case BPF_JSLE: 8190 case BPF_JSLT: 8191 { 8192 if (is_jmp32) { 8193 s32 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 : sval32 + 1; 8194 s32 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 - 1 : sval32; 8195 8196 false_reg->s32_min_value = max(false_reg->s32_min_value, false_smin); 8197 true_reg->s32_max_value = min(true_reg->s32_max_value, true_smax); 8198 } else { 8199 s64 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval : sval + 1; 8200 s64 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval - 1 : sval; 8201 8202 false_reg->smin_value = max(false_reg->smin_value, false_smin); 8203 true_reg->smax_value = min(true_reg->smax_value, true_smax); 8204 } 8205 break; 8206 } 8207 default: 8208 return; 8209 } 8210 8211 if (is_jmp32) { 8212 false_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(false_64off), 8213 tnum_subreg(false_32off)); 8214 true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(true_64off), 8215 tnum_subreg(true_32off)); 8216 __reg_combine_32_into_64(false_reg); 8217 __reg_combine_32_into_64(true_reg); 8218 } else { 8219 false_reg->var_off = false_64off; 8220 true_reg->var_off = true_64off; 8221 __reg_combine_64_into_32(false_reg); 8222 __reg_combine_64_into_32(true_reg); 8223 } 8224 } 8225 8226 /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is 8227 * the variable reg. 8228 */ 8229 static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 8230 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 8231 u64 val, u32 val32, 8232 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 8233 { 8234 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 8235 /* This uses zero as "not present in table"; luckily the zero opcode, 8236 * BPF_JA, can't get here. 8237 */ 8238 if (opcode) 8239 reg_set_min_max(true_reg, false_reg, val, val32, opcode, is_jmp32); 8240 } 8241 8242 /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */ 8243 static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 8244 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 8245 { 8246 src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value, 8247 dst_reg->umin_value); 8248 src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value, 8249 dst_reg->umax_value); 8250 src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value, 8251 dst_reg->smin_value); 8252 src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value, 8253 dst_reg->smax_value); 8254 src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off, 8255 dst_reg->var_off); 8256 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ 8257 __update_reg_bounds(src_reg); 8258 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 8259 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ 8260 __reg_deduce_bounds(src_reg); 8261 __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); 8262 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 8263 __reg_bound_offset(src_reg); 8264 __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); 8265 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 8266 * slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 8267 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 8268 */ 8269 __update_reg_bounds(src_reg); 8270 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 8271 } 8272 8273 static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src, 8274 struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst, 8275 struct bpf_reg_state *false_src, 8276 struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst, 8277 u8 opcode) 8278 { 8279 switch (opcode) { 8280 case BPF_JEQ: 8281 __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst); 8282 break; 8283 case BPF_JNE: 8284 __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst); 8285 break; 8286 } 8287 } 8288 8289 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, 8290 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id, 8291 bool is_null) 8292 { 8293 if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id && 8294 !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id)) { 8295 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should 8296 * have been known-zero, because we don't allow pointer 8297 * arithmetic on pointers that might be NULL. 8298 */ 8299 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || 8300 !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0) || 8301 reg->off)) { 8302 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg); 8303 reg->off = 0; 8304 } 8305 if (is_null) { 8306 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 8307 /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point 8308 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it, 8309 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect. 8310 */ 8311 reg->id = 0; 8312 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 8313 8314 return; 8315 } 8316 8317 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 8318 8319 if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) { 8320 /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset 8321 * in release_reg_references(). 8322 * 8323 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other 8324 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset. 8325 */ 8326 reg->id = 0; 8327 } 8328 } 8329 } 8330 8331 static void __mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_func_state *state, u32 id, 8332 bool is_null) 8333 { 8334 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 8335 int i; 8336 8337 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 8338 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, &state->regs[i], id, is_null); 8339 8340 bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) { 8341 if (!reg) 8342 continue; 8343 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null); 8344 } 8345 } 8346 8347 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually 8348 * be folded together at some point. 8349 */ 8350 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno, 8351 bool is_null) 8352 { 8353 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 8354 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 8355 u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id; 8356 u32 id = regs[regno].id; 8357 int i; 8358 8359 if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null) 8360 /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch. 8361 * No one could have freed the reference state before 8362 * doing the NULL check. 8363 */ 8364 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id)); 8365 8366 for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) 8367 __mark_ptr_or_null_regs(vstate->frame[i], id, is_null); 8368 } 8369 8370 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn, 8371 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 8372 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 8373 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch, 8374 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch) 8375 { 8376 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X) 8377 return false; 8378 8379 /* Pointers are always 64-bit. */ 8380 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32) 8381 return false; 8382 8383 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 8384 case BPF_JGT: 8385 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 8386 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 8387 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 8388 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 8389 /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */ 8390 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 8391 dst_reg->type, false); 8392 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 8393 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 8394 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 8395 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 8396 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 8397 /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 8398 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 8399 src_reg->type, true); 8400 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 8401 } else { 8402 return false; 8403 } 8404 break; 8405 case BPF_JLT: 8406 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 8407 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 8408 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 8409 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 8410 /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */ 8411 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 8412 dst_reg->type, true); 8413 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 8414 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 8415 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 8416 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 8417 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 8418 /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 8419 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 8420 src_reg->type, false); 8421 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 8422 } else { 8423 return false; 8424 } 8425 break; 8426 case BPF_JGE: 8427 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 8428 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 8429 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 8430 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 8431 /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */ 8432 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 8433 dst_reg->type, true); 8434 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 8435 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 8436 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 8437 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 8438 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 8439 /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */ 8440 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 8441 src_reg->type, false); 8442 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 8443 } else { 8444 return false; 8445 } 8446 break; 8447 case BPF_JLE: 8448 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 8449 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 8450 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 8451 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 8452 /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */ 8453 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 8454 dst_reg->type, false); 8455 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 8456 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 8457 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 8458 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 8459 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 8460 /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */ 8461 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 8462 src_reg->type, true); 8463 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 8464 } else { 8465 return false; 8466 } 8467 break; 8468 default: 8469 return false; 8470 } 8471 8472 return true; 8473 } 8474 8475 static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 8476 struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg) 8477 { 8478 struct bpf_func_state *state; 8479 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 8480 int i, j; 8481 8482 for (i = 0; i <= vstate->curframe; i++) { 8483 state = vstate->frame[i]; 8484 for (j = 0; j < MAX_BPF_REG; j++) { 8485 reg = &state->regs[j]; 8486 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) 8487 *reg = *known_reg; 8488 } 8489 8490 bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(j, state, reg) { 8491 if (!reg) 8492 continue; 8493 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) 8494 *reg = *known_reg; 8495 } 8496 } 8497 } 8498 8499 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8500 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) 8501 { 8502 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; 8503 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; 8504 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; 8505 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL; 8506 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 8507 bool is_jmp32; 8508 int pred = -1; 8509 int err; 8510 8511 /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ 8512 if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) { 8513 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode); 8514 return -EINVAL; 8515 } 8516 8517 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 8518 if (insn->imm != 0) { 8519 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 8520 return -EINVAL; 8521 } 8522 8523 /* check src1 operand */ 8524 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 8525 if (err) 8526 return err; 8527 8528 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 8529 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 8530 insn->src_reg); 8531 return -EACCES; 8532 } 8533 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 8534 } else { 8535 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 8536 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 8537 return -EINVAL; 8538 } 8539 } 8540 8541 /* check src2 operand */ 8542 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 8543 if (err) 8544 return err; 8545 8546 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 8547 is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32; 8548 8549 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 8550 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, is_jmp32); 8551 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 8552 is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))) { 8553 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 8554 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 8555 opcode, 8556 is_jmp32); 8557 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 8558 !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) { 8559 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 8560 src_reg->var_off.value, 8561 opcode, 8562 is_jmp32); 8563 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && 8564 reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg) && 8565 !is_jmp32) { 8566 pred = is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode); 8567 } 8568 8569 if (pred >= 0) { 8570 /* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because 8571 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison. 8572 */ 8573 if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg)) 8574 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 8575 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err && 8576 !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg)) 8577 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 8578 if (err) 8579 return err; 8580 } 8581 if (pred == 1) { 8582 /* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through */ 8583 *insn_idx += insn->off; 8584 return 0; 8585 } else if (pred == 0) { 8586 /* only follow fall-through branch, since 8587 * that's where the program will go 8588 */ 8589 return 0; 8590 } 8591 8592 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, 8593 false); 8594 if (!other_branch) 8595 return -EFAULT; 8596 other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs; 8597 8598 /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust 8599 * our min/max values for our dst register. 8600 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same 8601 * object, I suppose, but we don't support that right now), because 8602 * otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't 8603 * comparable. 8604 */ 8605 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 8606 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 8607 8608 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 8609 src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 8610 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) || 8611 (is_jmp32 && 8612 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off)))) 8613 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 8614 dst_reg, 8615 src_reg->var_off.value, 8616 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 8617 opcode, is_jmp32); 8618 else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off) || 8619 (is_jmp32 && 8620 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off)))) 8621 reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 8622 src_reg, 8623 dst_reg->var_off.value, 8624 tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value, 8625 opcode, is_jmp32); 8626 else if (!is_jmp32 && 8627 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)) 8628 /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */ 8629 reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 8630 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 8631 src_reg, dst_reg, opcode); 8632 if (src_reg->id && 8633 !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) { 8634 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg); 8635 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 8636 } 8637 8638 } 8639 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 8640 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 8641 dst_reg, insn->imm, (u32)insn->imm, 8642 opcode, is_jmp32); 8643 } 8644 8645 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id && 8646 !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) { 8647 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg); 8648 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 8649 } 8650 8651 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem(). 8652 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison 8653 * which will never be JMP32. 8654 */ 8655 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && 8656 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && 8657 reg_type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) { 8658 /* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either 8659 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. 8660 */ 8661 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, 8662 opcode == BPF_JNE); 8663 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, 8664 opcode == BPF_JEQ); 8665 } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg], 8666 this_branch, other_branch) && 8667 is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 8668 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 8669 insn->dst_reg); 8670 return -EACCES; 8671 } 8672 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 8673 print_verifier_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); 8674 return 0; 8675 } 8676 8677 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 8678 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 8679 { 8680 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 8681 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 8682 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; 8683 struct bpf_map *map; 8684 int err; 8685 8686 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 8687 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); 8688 return -EINVAL; 8689 } 8690 if (insn->off != 0) { 8691 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); 8692 return -EINVAL; 8693 } 8694 8695 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 8696 if (err) 8697 return err; 8698 8699 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 8700 if (insn->src_reg == 0) { 8701 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; 8702 8703 dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 8704 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); 8705 return 0; 8706 } 8707 8708 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 8709 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 8710 8711 dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type; 8712 switch (dst_reg->type) { 8713 case PTR_TO_MEM: 8714 dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size; 8715 break; 8716 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 8717 case PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: 8718 dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf; 8719 dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id; 8720 break; 8721 default: 8722 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 8723 return -EFAULT; 8724 } 8725 return 0; 8726 } 8727 8728 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 8729 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 8730 u32 subprogno = insn[1].imm; 8731 8732 if (!aux->func_info) { 8733 verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n"); 8734 return -EINVAL; 8735 } 8736 if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) { 8737 verbose(env, "callback function not static\n"); 8738 return -EINVAL; 8739 } 8740 8741 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 8742 dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno; 8743 return 0; 8744 } 8745 8746 map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; 8747 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 8748 dst_reg->map_ptr = map; 8749 8750 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE) { 8751 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 8752 dst_reg->off = aux->map_off; 8753 if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) 8754 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 8755 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) { 8756 dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 8757 } else { 8758 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 8759 return -EINVAL; 8760 } 8761 8762 return 0; 8763 } 8764 8765 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) 8766 { 8767 switch (type) { 8768 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 8769 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 8770 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 8771 return true; 8772 default: 8773 return false; 8774 } 8775 } 8776 8777 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: 8778 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb 8779 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, 8780 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 8781 * 8782 * Implicit input: 8783 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX 8784 * 8785 * Explicit input: 8786 * SRC == any register 8787 * IMM == 32-bit immediate 8788 * 8789 * Output: 8790 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness 8791 */ 8792 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 8793 { 8794 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 8795 static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6; 8796 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 8797 int i, err; 8798 8799 if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) { 8800 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); 8801 return -EINVAL; 8802 } 8803 8804 if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { 8805 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 8806 return -EINVAL; 8807 } 8808 8809 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 8810 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || 8811 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { 8812 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); 8813 return -EINVAL; 8814 } 8815 8816 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ 8817 err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP); 8818 if (err) 8819 return err; 8820 8821 /* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as 8822 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to 8823 * reference leak. 8824 */ 8825 err = check_reference_leak(env); 8826 if (err) { 8827 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n"); 8828 return err; 8829 } 8830 8831 if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock) { 8832 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n"); 8833 return -EINVAL; 8834 } 8835 8836 if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 8837 verbose(env, 8838 "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); 8839 return -EINVAL; 8840 } 8841 8842 if (mode == BPF_IND) { 8843 /* check explicit source operand */ 8844 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 8845 if (err) 8846 return err; 8847 } 8848 8849 err = check_ctx_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); 8850 if (err < 0) 8851 return err; 8852 8853 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ 8854 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 8855 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 8856 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 8857 } 8858 8859 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains 8860 * the value fetched from the packet. 8861 * Already marked as written above. 8862 */ 8863 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8864 /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ 8865 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 8866 return 0; 8867 } 8868 8869 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 8870 { 8871 struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown; 8872 const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 8873 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 8874 struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); 8875 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 8876 int err; 8877 const bool is_subprog = env->cur_state->frame[0]->subprogno; 8878 8879 /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ 8880 if (!is_subprog && 8881 (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS || 8882 prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) && 8883 !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 8884 return 0; 8885 8886 /* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used 8887 * to return the value from eBPF program. 8888 * Make sure that it's readable at this time 8889 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote 8890 * something into it earlier 8891 */ 8892 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); 8893 if (err) 8894 return err; 8895 8896 if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) { 8897 verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); 8898 return -EACCES; 8899 } 8900 8901 reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0; 8902 if (is_subprog) { 8903 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 8904 verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n", 8905 reg_type_str[reg->type]); 8906 return -EINVAL; 8907 } 8908 return 0; 8909 } 8910 8911 switch (prog_type) { 8912 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: 8913 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || 8914 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG || 8915 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME || 8916 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME || 8917 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME || 8918 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME) 8919 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 8920 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND || 8921 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND) 8922 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 8923 break; 8924 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 8925 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) { 8926 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 8927 enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3); 8928 } 8929 break; 8930 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: 8931 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 8932 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: 8933 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: 8934 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 8935 break; 8936 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 8937 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id) 8938 return 0; 8939 range = tnum_const(0); 8940 break; 8941 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 8942 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { 8943 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 8944 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 8945 range = tnum_const(0); 8946 break; 8947 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 8948 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 8949 return 0; 8950 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 8951 break; 8952 default: 8953 return -ENOTSUPP; 8954 } 8955 break; 8956 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 8957 range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS); 8958 break; 8959 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: 8960 /* freplace program can return anything as its return value 8961 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program. 8962 */ 8963 default: 8964 return 0; 8965 } 8966 8967 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 8968 verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 8969 reg_type_str[reg->type]); 8970 return -EINVAL; 8971 } 8972 8973 if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { 8974 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "program exit", "R0"); 8975 return -EINVAL; 8976 } 8977 8978 if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) && 8979 tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off)) 8980 env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1; 8981 return 0; 8982 } 8983 8984 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code 8985 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): 8986 * 2 label v as discovered 8987 * 3 let S be a stack 8988 * 4 S.push(v) 8989 * 5 while S is not empty 8990 * 6 t <- S.pop() 8991 * 7 if t is what we're looking for: 8992 * 8 return t 8993 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do 8994 * 10 if edge e is already labelled 8995 * 11 continue with the next edge 8996 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) 8997 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored 8998 * 14 label e as tree-edge 8999 * 15 label w as discovered 9000 * 16 S.push(w) 9001 * 17 continue at 5 9002 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered 9003 * 19 label e as back-edge 9004 * 20 else 9005 * 21 // vertex w is explored 9006 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge 9007 * 23 label t as explored 9008 * 24 S.pop() 9009 * 9010 * convention: 9011 * 0x10 - discovered 9012 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled 9013 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled 9014 * 0x20 - explored 9015 */ 9016 9017 enum { 9018 DISCOVERED = 0x10, 9019 EXPLORED = 0x20, 9020 FALLTHROUGH = 1, 9021 BRANCH = 2, 9022 }; 9023 9024 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9025 { 9026 return env->prog->len; 9027 } 9028 9029 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state( 9030 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9031 int idx) 9032 { 9033 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 9034 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 9035 9036 return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)]; 9037 } 9038 9039 static void init_explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 9040 { 9041 env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true; 9042 } 9043 9044 enum { 9045 DONE_EXPLORING = 0, 9046 KEEP_EXPLORING = 1, 9047 }; 9048 9049 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: 9050 * t - index of current instruction 9051 * w - next instruction 9052 * e - edge 9053 */ 9054 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9055 bool loop_ok) 9056 { 9057 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; 9058 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; 9059 9060 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) 9061 return DONE_EXPLORING; 9062 9063 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) 9064 return DONE_EXPLORING; 9065 9066 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 9067 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 9068 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 9069 return -EINVAL; 9070 } 9071 9072 if (e == BRANCH) 9073 /* mark branch target for state pruning */ 9074 init_explored_state(env, w); 9075 9076 if (insn_state[w] == 0) { 9077 /* tree-edge */ 9078 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 9079 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; 9080 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 9081 return -E2BIG; 9082 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; 9083 return KEEP_EXPLORING; 9084 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { 9085 if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable) 9086 return DONE_EXPLORING; 9087 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 9088 verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); 9089 verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 9090 return -EINVAL; 9091 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { 9092 /* forward- or cross-edge */ 9093 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 9094 } else { 9095 verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); 9096 return -EFAULT; 9097 } 9098 return DONE_EXPLORING; 9099 } 9100 9101 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, 9102 struct bpf_insn *insns, 9103 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9104 bool visit_callee) 9105 { 9106 int ret; 9107 9108 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); 9109 if (ret) 9110 return ret; 9111 9112 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) 9113 init_explored_state(env, t + 1); 9114 if (visit_callee) { 9115 init_explored_state(env, t); 9116 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, 9117 env, false); 9118 } 9119 return ret; 9120 } 9121 9122 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following: 9123 * < 0 - an error occurred 9124 * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored 9125 * KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored 9126 */ 9127 static int visit_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9128 { 9129 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 9130 int ret; 9131 9132 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t)) 9133 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env, true); 9134 9135 /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */ 9136 if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP && 9137 BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP32) 9138 return push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); 9139 9140 switch (BPF_OP(insns[t].code)) { 9141 case BPF_EXIT: 9142 return DONE_EXPLORING; 9143 9144 case BPF_CALL: 9145 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env, 9146 insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL); 9147 9148 case BPF_JA: 9149 if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) 9150 return -EINVAL; 9151 9152 /* unconditional jump with single edge */ 9153 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, 9154 true); 9155 if (ret) 9156 return ret; 9157 9158 /* unconditional jmp is not a good pruning point, 9159 * but it's marked, since backtracking needs 9160 * to record jmp history in is_state_visited(). 9161 */ 9162 init_explored_state(env, t + insns[t].off + 1); 9163 /* tell verifier to check for equivalent states 9164 * after every call and jump 9165 */ 9166 if (t + 1 < insn_cnt) 9167 init_explored_state(env, t + 1); 9168 9169 return ret; 9170 9171 default: 9172 /* conditional jump with two edges */ 9173 init_explored_state(env, t); 9174 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true); 9175 if (ret) 9176 return ret; 9177 9178 return push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env, true); 9179 } 9180 } 9181 9182 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program 9183 * loop == back-edge in directed graph 9184 */ 9185 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9186 { 9187 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 9188 int *insn_stack, *insn_state; 9189 int ret = 0; 9190 int i; 9191 9192 insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 9193 if (!insn_state) 9194 return -ENOMEM; 9195 9196 insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 9197 if (!insn_stack) { 9198 kvfree(insn_state); 9199 return -ENOMEM; 9200 } 9201 9202 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ 9203 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ 9204 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; 9205 9206 while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) { 9207 int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; 9208 9209 ret = visit_insn(t, insn_cnt, env); 9210 switch (ret) { 9211 case DONE_EXPLORING: 9212 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; 9213 env->cfg.cur_stack--; 9214 break; 9215 case KEEP_EXPLORING: 9216 break; 9217 default: 9218 if (ret > 0) { 9219 verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n"); 9220 ret = -EFAULT; 9221 } 9222 goto err_free; 9223 } 9224 } 9225 9226 if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) { 9227 verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); 9228 ret = -EFAULT; 9229 goto err_free; 9230 } 9231 9232 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 9233 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { 9234 verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); 9235 ret = -EINVAL; 9236 goto err_free; 9237 } 9238 } 9239 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ 9240 9241 err_free: 9242 kvfree(insn_state); 9243 kvfree(insn_stack); 9244 env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL; 9245 return ret; 9246 } 9247 9248 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9249 { 9250 int i; 9251 9252 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 9253 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 9254 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 9255 return -EINVAL; 9256 } 9257 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 9258 verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 9259 return -EINVAL; 9260 } 9261 } 9262 return 0; 9263 } 9264 9265 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */ 9266 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8 9267 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252 9268 9269 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9270 const union bpf_attr *attr, 9271 union bpf_attr __user *uattr) 9272 { 9273 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type; 9274 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size; 9275 u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info); 9276 struct bpf_func_info *krecord; 9277 struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL; 9278 struct bpf_prog *prog; 9279 const struct btf *btf; 9280 void __user *urecord; 9281 u32 prev_offset = 0; 9282 bool scalar_return; 9283 int ret = -ENOMEM; 9284 9285 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; 9286 if (!nfuncs) { 9287 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 9288 return -EINVAL; 9289 return 0; 9290 } 9291 9292 if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) { 9293 verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n"); 9294 return -EINVAL; 9295 } 9296 9297 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; 9298 if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE || 9299 urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE || 9300 urec_size % sizeof(u32)) { 9301 verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size); 9302 return -EINVAL; 9303 } 9304 9305 prog = env->prog; 9306 btf = prog->aux->btf; 9307 9308 urecord = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->func_info); 9309 min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size); 9310 9311 krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 9312 if (!krecord) 9313 return -ENOMEM; 9314 info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 9315 if (!info_aux) 9316 goto err_free; 9317 9318 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { 9319 ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size); 9320 if (ret) { 9321 if (ret == -E2BIG) { 9322 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info"); 9323 /* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero 9324 * out the rest of the record. 9325 */ 9326 if (put_user(min_size, &uattr->func_info_rec_size)) 9327 ret = -EFAULT; 9328 } 9329 goto err_free; 9330 } 9331 9332 if (copy_from_user(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) { 9333 ret = -EFAULT; 9334 goto err_free; 9335 } 9336 9337 /* check insn_off */ 9338 ret = -EINVAL; 9339 if (i == 0) { 9340 if (krecord[i].insn_off) { 9341 verbose(env, 9342 "nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record", 9343 krecord[i].insn_off); 9344 goto err_free; 9345 } 9346 } else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) { 9347 verbose(env, 9348 "same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)", 9349 krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset); 9350 goto err_free; 9351 } 9352 9353 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) { 9354 verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n"); 9355 goto err_free; 9356 } 9357 9358 /* check type_id */ 9359 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); 9360 if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) { 9361 verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info", 9362 krecord[i].type_id); 9363 goto err_free; 9364 } 9365 info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info); 9366 9367 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); 9368 if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto))) 9369 /* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */ 9370 goto err_free; 9371 ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 9372 scalar_return = 9373 btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_type_is_enum(ret_type); 9374 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 9375 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 9376 goto err_free; 9377 } 9378 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 9379 verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 9380 goto err_free; 9381 } 9382 9383 prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off; 9384 urecord += urec_size; 9385 } 9386 9387 prog->aux->func_info = krecord; 9388 prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs; 9389 prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux; 9390 return 0; 9391 9392 err_free: 9393 kvfree(krecord); 9394 kfree(info_aux); 9395 return ret; 9396 } 9397 9398 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9399 { 9400 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 9401 int i; 9402 9403 if (!aux->func_info) 9404 return; 9405 9406 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 9407 aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start; 9408 } 9409 9410 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE (offsetof(struct bpf_line_info, line_col) + \ 9411 sizeof(((struct bpf_line_info *)(0))->line_col)) 9412 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 9413 9414 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9415 const union bpf_attr *attr, 9416 union bpf_attr __user *uattr) 9417 { 9418 u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0; 9419 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub; 9420 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 9421 struct bpf_prog *prog; 9422 const struct btf *btf; 9423 void __user *ulinfo; 9424 int err; 9425 9426 nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt; 9427 if (!nr_linfo) 9428 return 0; 9429 9430 rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size; 9431 if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE || 9432 rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE || 9433 rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1)) 9434 return -EINVAL; 9435 9436 /* Need to zero it in case the userspace may 9437 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object. 9438 */ 9439 linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info), 9440 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 9441 if (!linfo) 9442 return -ENOMEM; 9443 9444 prog = env->prog; 9445 btf = prog->aux->btf; 9446 9447 s = 0; 9448 sub = env->subprog_info; 9449 ulinfo = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->line_info); 9450 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info); 9451 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 9452 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) { 9453 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size); 9454 if (err) { 9455 if (err == -E2BIG) { 9456 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info"); 9457 if (put_user(expected_size, 9458 &uattr->line_info_rec_size)) 9459 err = -EFAULT; 9460 } 9461 goto err_free; 9462 } 9463 9464 if (copy_from_user(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) { 9465 err = -EFAULT; 9466 goto err_free; 9467 } 9468 9469 /* 9470 * Check insn_off to ensure 9471 * 1) strictly increasing AND 9472 * 2) bounded by prog->len 9473 * 9474 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into 9475 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case 9476 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the 9477 * first sub also and the first sub must have 9478 * subprog_info[0].start == 0. 9479 */ 9480 if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) || 9481 linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) { 9482 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n", 9483 i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset, 9484 prog->len); 9485 err = -EINVAL; 9486 goto err_free; 9487 } 9488 9489 if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) { 9490 verbose(env, 9491 "Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n", 9492 i); 9493 err = -EINVAL; 9494 goto err_free; 9495 } 9496 9497 if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) || 9498 !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) { 9499 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i); 9500 err = -EINVAL; 9501 goto err_free; 9502 } 9503 9504 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 9505 if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) { 9506 sub[s].linfo_idx = i; 9507 s++; 9508 } else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) { 9509 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s); 9510 err = -EINVAL; 9511 goto err_free; 9512 } 9513 } 9514 9515 prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off; 9516 ulinfo += rec_size; 9517 } 9518 9519 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 9520 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n", 9521 env->subprog_cnt - s, s); 9522 err = -EINVAL; 9523 goto err_free; 9524 } 9525 9526 prog->aux->linfo = linfo; 9527 prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo; 9528 9529 return 0; 9530 9531 err_free: 9532 kvfree(linfo); 9533 return err; 9534 } 9535 9536 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9537 const union bpf_attr *attr, 9538 union bpf_attr __user *uattr) 9539 { 9540 struct btf *btf; 9541 int err; 9542 9543 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { 9544 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 9545 return -EINVAL; 9546 return 0; 9547 } 9548 9549 btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd); 9550 if (IS_ERR(btf)) 9551 return PTR_ERR(btf); 9552 if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) { 9553 btf_put(btf); 9554 return -EACCES; 9555 } 9556 env->prog->aux->btf = btf; 9557 9558 err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr); 9559 if (err) 9560 return err; 9561 9562 err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr); 9563 if (err) 9564 return err; 9565 9566 return 0; 9567 } 9568 9569 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ 9570 static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old, 9571 struct bpf_reg_state *cur) 9572 { 9573 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && 9574 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && 9575 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && 9576 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value && 9577 old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value && 9578 old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value && 9579 old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value && 9580 old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value; 9581 } 9582 9583 /* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */ 9584 #define ID_MAP_SIZE (MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) 9585 struct idpair { 9586 u32 old; 9587 u32 cur; 9588 }; 9589 9590 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have 9591 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from 9592 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. 9593 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent 9594 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But 9595 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about 9596 * that. 9597 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If 9598 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. 9599 */ 9600 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct idpair *idmap) 9601 { 9602 unsigned int i; 9603 9604 for (i = 0; i < ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { 9605 if (!idmap[i].old) { 9606 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ 9607 idmap[i].old = old_id; 9608 idmap[i].cur = cur_id; 9609 return true; 9610 } 9611 if (idmap[i].old == old_id) 9612 return idmap[i].cur == cur_id; 9613 } 9614 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ 9615 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 9616 return false; 9617 } 9618 9619 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9620 struct bpf_func_state *st) 9621 { 9622 enum bpf_reg_liveness live; 9623 int i, j; 9624 9625 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 9626 live = st->regs[i].live; 9627 /* liveness must not touch this register anymore */ 9628 st->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 9629 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 9630 /* since the register is unused, clear its state 9631 * to make further comparison simpler 9632 */ 9633 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]); 9634 } 9635 9636 for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 9637 live = st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live; 9638 /* liveness must not touch this stack slot anymore */ 9639 st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 9640 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 9641 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr); 9642 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 9643 st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 9644 } 9645 } 9646 } 9647 9648 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9649 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 9650 { 9651 int i; 9652 9653 if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 9654 /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ 9655 return; 9656 9657 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) 9658 clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]); 9659 } 9660 9661 /* the parentage chains form a tree. 9662 * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and 9663 * pushed into state stack for future exploration. 9664 * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states 9665 * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already, 9666 * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when 9667 * the verifier explores other branches. 9668 * Example: 9669 * 1: r0 = 1 9670 * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1 9671 * 3: r0 = 2 9672 * 4: exit 9673 * when the verifier reaches exit insn the register r0 in the state list of 9674 * insn 2 will be seen as !REG_LIVE_READ. Then the verifier pops the other_branch 9675 * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. At the insn 4 it will walk the 9676 * parentage chain from insn 4 into insn 2 and will mark r0 as REG_LIVE_READ. 9677 * 9678 * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring 9679 * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second 9680 * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and 9681 * their final liveness markes are already propagated. 9682 * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited() 9683 * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states 9684 * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state' 9685 * will not be used. 9686 * This function also clears the registers and stack for states that !READ 9687 * to simplify state merging. 9688 * 9689 * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee 9690 * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare 9691 * the callsites 9692 */ 9693 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, 9694 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 9695 { 9696 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 9697 int i; 9698 9699 sl = *explored_state(env, insn); 9700 while (sl) { 9701 if (sl->state.branches) 9702 goto next; 9703 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || 9704 sl->state.curframe != cur->curframe) 9705 goto next; 9706 for (i = 0; i <= cur->curframe; i++) 9707 if (sl->state.frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 9708 goto next; 9709 clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state); 9710 next: 9711 sl = sl->next; 9712 } 9713 } 9714 9715 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ 9716 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 9717 struct idpair *idmap) 9718 { 9719 bool equal; 9720 9721 if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 9722 /* explored state didn't use this */ 9723 return true; 9724 9725 equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0; 9726 9727 if (rold->type == PTR_TO_STACK) 9728 /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to 9729 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar 9730 */ 9731 return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; 9732 9733 if (equal) 9734 return true; 9735 9736 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) 9737 /* explored state can't have used this */ 9738 return true; 9739 if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT) 9740 return false; 9741 switch (rold->type) { 9742 case SCALAR_VALUE: 9743 if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 9744 if (!rold->precise && !rcur->precise) 9745 return true; 9746 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 9747 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 9748 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 9749 } else { 9750 /* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar. 9751 * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to 9752 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak 9753 * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in 9754 * special cases if root is calling us, but it's 9755 * probably not worth the hassle. 9756 */ 9757 return false; 9758 } 9759 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 9760 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 9761 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and 9762 * everything else matches, we are OK. 9763 * 'id' is not compared, since it's only used for maps with 9764 * bpf_spin_lock inside map element and in such cases if 9765 * the rest of the prog is valid for one map element then 9766 * it's valid for all map elements regardless of the key 9767 * used in bpf_map_lookup() 9768 */ 9769 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 9770 range_within(rold, rcur) && 9771 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 9772 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL: 9773 /* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a 9774 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map. 9775 * However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL- 9776 * checked, doing so could have affected others with the same 9777 * id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when 9778 * we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. 9779 */ 9780 if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) 9781 return false; 9782 if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id))) 9783 return false; 9784 /* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */ 9785 return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 9786 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 9787 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 9788 if (rcur->type != rold->type) 9789 return false; 9790 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr 9791 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are 9792 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, 9793 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or 9794 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. 9795 */ 9796 if (rold->range > rcur->range) 9797 return false; 9798 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; 9799 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. 9800 */ 9801 if (rold->off != rcur->off) 9802 return false; 9803 /* id relations must be preserved */ 9804 if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) 9805 return false; 9806 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 9807 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 9808 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 9809 case PTR_TO_CTX: 9810 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 9811 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 9812 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 9813 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 9814 case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: 9815 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 9816 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: 9817 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 9818 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: 9819 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 9820 /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above 9821 * would have accepted 9822 */ 9823 default: 9824 /* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */ 9825 return false; 9826 } 9827 9828 /* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */ 9829 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 9830 return false; 9831 } 9832 9833 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, 9834 struct bpf_func_state *cur, 9835 struct idpair *idmap) 9836 { 9837 int i, spi; 9838 9839 /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional 9840 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state 9841 * didn't use them 9842 */ 9843 for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) { 9844 spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; 9845 9846 if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 9847 i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; 9848 /* explored state didn't use this */ 9849 continue; 9850 } 9851 9852 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) 9853 continue; 9854 9855 /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack 9856 * and these slots were used 9857 */ 9858 if (i >= cur->allocated_stack) 9859 return false; 9860 9861 /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack 9862 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack. 9863 * The opposite is not true 9864 */ 9865 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC && 9866 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) 9867 continue; 9868 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 9869 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) 9870 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in 9871 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC -> 9872 * this verifier states are not equivalent, 9873 * return false to continue verification of this path 9874 */ 9875 return false; 9876 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE) 9877 continue; 9878 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) 9879 continue; 9880 if (!regsafe(&old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 9881 &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 9882 idmap)) 9883 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing 9884 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types 9885 * are the same as well. 9886 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored 9887 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} 9888 * but current path has stored: 9889 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} 9890 * such verifier states are not equivalent. 9891 * return false to continue verification of this path 9892 */ 9893 return false; 9894 } 9895 return true; 9896 } 9897 9898 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur) 9899 { 9900 if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs) 9901 return false; 9902 return !memcmp(old->refs, cur->refs, 9903 sizeof(*old->refs) * old->acquired_refs); 9904 } 9905 9906 /* compare two verifier states 9907 * 9908 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since 9909 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them 9910 * 9911 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of 9912 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has 9913 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution 9914 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already 9915 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. 9916 * 9917 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative 9918 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. 9919 * Example: 9920 * explored current 9921 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) 9922 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) 9923 * 9924 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more 9925 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means 9926 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too 9927 * 9928 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid 9929 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that 9930 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely 9931 */ 9932 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_func_state *old, 9933 struct bpf_func_state *cur) 9934 { 9935 struct idpair *idmap; 9936 bool ret = false; 9937 int i; 9938 9939 idmap = kcalloc(ID_MAP_SIZE, sizeof(struct idpair), GFP_KERNEL); 9940 /* If we failed to allocate the idmap, just say it's not safe */ 9941 if (!idmap) 9942 return false; 9943 9944 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 9945 if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], idmap)) 9946 goto out_free; 9947 } 9948 9949 if (!stacksafe(old, cur, idmap)) 9950 goto out_free; 9951 9952 if (!refsafe(old, cur)) 9953 goto out_free; 9954 ret = true; 9955 out_free: 9956 kfree(idmap); 9957 return ret; 9958 } 9959 9960 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9961 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 9962 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 9963 { 9964 int i; 9965 9966 if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) 9967 return false; 9968 9969 /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation 9970 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. 9971 */ 9972 if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative) 9973 return false; 9974 9975 if (old->active_spin_lock != cur->active_spin_lock) 9976 return false; 9977 9978 /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same 9979 * and all frame states need to be equivalent 9980 */ 9981 for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { 9982 if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 9983 return false; 9984 if (!func_states_equal(old->frame[i], cur->frame[i])) 9985 return false; 9986 } 9987 return true; 9988 } 9989 9990 /* Return 0 if no propagation happened. Return negative error code if error 9991 * happened. Otherwise, return the propagated bit. 9992 */ 9993 static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9994 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 9995 struct bpf_reg_state *parent_reg) 9996 { 9997 u8 parent_flag = parent_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 9998 u8 flag = reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 9999 int err; 10000 10001 /* When comes here, read flags of PARENT_REG or REG could be any of 10002 * REG_LIVE_READ64, REG_LIVE_READ32, REG_LIVE_NONE. There is no need 10003 * of propagation if PARENT_REG has strongest REG_LIVE_READ64. 10004 */ 10005 if (parent_flag == REG_LIVE_READ64 || 10006 /* Or if there is no read flag from REG. */ 10007 !flag || 10008 /* Or if the read flag from REG is the same as PARENT_REG. */ 10009 parent_flag == flag) 10010 return 0; 10011 10012 err = mark_reg_read(env, reg, parent_reg, flag); 10013 if (err) 10014 return err; 10015 10016 return flag; 10017 } 10018 10019 /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the 10020 * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at an 10021 * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line 10022 * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless 10023 * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison 10024 * in mark_reg_read() is for. 10025 */ 10026 static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10027 const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 10028 struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent) 10029 { 10030 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg; 10031 struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent; 10032 int i, frame, err = 0; 10033 10034 if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) { 10035 WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n", 10036 vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe); 10037 return -EFAULT; 10038 } 10039 /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */ 10040 BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG); 10041 for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) { 10042 parent = vparent->frame[frame]; 10043 state = vstate->frame[frame]; 10044 parent_reg = parent->regs; 10045 state_reg = state->regs; 10046 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */ 10047 for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 10048 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, &state_reg[i], 10049 &parent_reg[i]); 10050 if (err < 0) 10051 return err; 10052 if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64) 10053 mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]); 10054 } 10055 10056 /* Propagate stack slots. */ 10057 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE && 10058 i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 10059 parent_reg = &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 10060 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 10061 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg, 10062 parent_reg); 10063 if (err < 0) 10064 return err; 10065 } 10066 } 10067 return 0; 10068 } 10069 10070 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and 10071 * propagate them into the current state 10072 */ 10073 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10074 const struct bpf_verifier_state *old) 10075 { 10076 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; 10077 struct bpf_func_state *state; 10078 int i, err = 0; 10079 10080 state = old->frame[old->curframe]; 10081 state_reg = state->regs; 10082 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { 10083 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 10084 !state_reg->precise) 10085 continue; 10086 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 10087 verbose(env, "propagating r%d\n", i); 10088 err = mark_chain_precision(env, i); 10089 if (err < 0) 10090 return err; 10091 } 10092 10093 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 10094 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_SPILL) 10095 continue; 10096 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 10097 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 10098 !state_reg->precise) 10099 continue; 10100 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 10101 verbose(env, "propagating fp%d\n", 10102 (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 10103 err = mark_chain_precision_stack(env, i); 10104 if (err < 0) 10105 return err; 10106 } 10107 return 0; 10108 } 10109 10110 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 10111 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 10112 { 10113 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 10114 int i, fr = cur->curframe; 10115 10116 if (old->curframe != fr) 10117 return false; 10118 10119 fold = old->frame[fr]; 10120 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 10121 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 10122 if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i], 10123 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent))) 10124 return false; 10125 return true; 10126 } 10127 10128 10129 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 10130 { 10131 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; 10132 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev; 10133 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new; 10134 int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0; 10135 bool add_new_state = env->test_state_freq ? true : false; 10136 10137 cur->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 10138 if (!env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point) 10139 /* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not 10140 * be doing state search here 10141 */ 10142 return 0; 10143 10144 /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions 10145 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 10146 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen 10147 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions. 10148 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric. 10149 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier 10150 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup. 10151 */ 10152 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 && 10153 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8) 10154 add_new_state = true; 10155 10156 pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx); 10157 sl = *pprev; 10158 10159 clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur); 10160 10161 while (sl) { 10162 states_cnt++; 10163 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx) 10164 goto next; 10165 if (sl->state.branches) { 10166 if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && 10167 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { 10168 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 10169 verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); 10170 return -EINVAL; 10171 } 10172 /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state 10173 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct 10174 * states and may not help future pruning. 10175 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that 10176 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly. 10177 * The most abusive loop will be: 10178 * r1 += 1 10179 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2 10180 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states. 10181 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states 10182 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning. 10183 */ 10184 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 && 10185 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100) 10186 add_new_state = false; 10187 goto miss; 10188 } 10189 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { 10190 sl->hit_cnt++; 10191 /* reached equivalent register/stack state, 10192 * prune the search. 10193 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us. 10194 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they 10195 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation 10196 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our 10197 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but 10198 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning 10199 * this state and will pop a new one. 10200 */ 10201 err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur); 10202 10203 /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and 10204 * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks) 10205 * the precision needs to be propagated back in 10206 * the current state. 10207 */ 10208 err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur); 10209 err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state); 10210 if (err) 10211 return err; 10212 return 1; 10213 } 10214 miss: 10215 /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count. 10216 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state 10217 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have 10218 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning 10219 * and some at the end) to help pruning. 10220 */ 10221 if (add_new_state) 10222 sl->miss_cnt++; 10223 /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial 10224 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view. 10225 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time, 10226 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed. 10227 */ 10228 if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) { 10229 /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to 10230 * speed up verification 10231 */ 10232 *pprev = sl->next; 10233 if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 10234 u32 br = sl->state.branches; 10235 10236 WARN_ONCE(br, 10237 "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n", 10238 br); 10239 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 10240 kfree(sl); 10241 env->peak_states--; 10242 } else { 10243 /* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may 10244 * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to 10245 * be freed at the end of verification 10246 */ 10247 sl->next = env->free_list; 10248 env->free_list = sl; 10249 } 10250 sl = *pprev; 10251 continue; 10252 } 10253 next: 10254 pprev = &sl->next; 10255 sl = *pprev; 10256 } 10257 10258 if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) 10259 env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; 10260 10261 if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) 10262 return push_jmp_history(env, cur); 10263 10264 if (!add_new_state) 10265 return push_jmp_history(env, cur); 10266 10267 /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one. 10268 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, 10269 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) 10270 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be 10271 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) 10272 * again on the way to bpf_exit. 10273 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state 10274 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. 10275 */ 10276 new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); 10277 if (!new_sl) 10278 return -ENOMEM; 10279 env->total_states++; 10280 env->peak_states++; 10281 env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; 10282 env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; 10283 10284 /* add new state to the head of linked list */ 10285 new = &new_sl->state; 10286 err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); 10287 if (err) { 10288 free_verifier_state(new, false); 10289 kfree(new_sl); 10290 return err; 10291 } 10292 new->insn_idx = insn_idx; 10293 WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1, 10294 "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx); 10295 10296 cur->parent = new; 10297 cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; 10298 clear_jmp_history(cur); 10299 new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx); 10300 *explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl; 10301 /* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all 10302 * registers connected. Only r6 - r9 of the callers are alive (pushed 10303 * to the stack implicitly by JITs) so in callers' frames connect just 10304 * r6 - r9 as an optimization. Callers will have r1 - r5 connected to 10305 * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes 10306 * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway. 10307 */ 10308 /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes 10309 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. 10310 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark 10311 * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only 10312 * explored_states can get read marks.) 10313 */ 10314 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 10315 for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 10316 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i]; 10317 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 10318 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 10319 } 10320 10321 /* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */ 10322 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 10323 struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j]; 10324 struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j]; 10325 10326 for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 10327 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 10328 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent = 10329 &newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 10330 } 10331 } 10332 return 0; 10333 } 10334 10335 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */ 10336 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) 10337 { 10338 switch (type) { 10339 case PTR_TO_CTX: 10340 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 10341 case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: 10342 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 10343 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: 10344 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 10345 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: 10346 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 10347 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 10348 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL: 10349 return false; 10350 default: 10351 return true; 10352 } 10353 } 10354 10355 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we 10356 * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok 10357 * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch: 10358 * 10359 * R1 = sock_ptr 10360 * goto X; 10361 * ... 10362 * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr; 10363 * goto X; 10364 * ... 10365 * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0); 10366 */ 10367 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) 10368 { 10369 return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) || 10370 !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); 10371 } 10372 10373 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10374 { 10375 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 10376 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 10377 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 10378 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 10379 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 10380 bool do_print_state = false; 10381 int prev_insn_idx = -1; 10382 10383 for (;;) { 10384 struct bpf_insn *insn; 10385 u8 class; 10386 int err; 10387 10388 env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 10389 if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { 10390 verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", 10391 env->insn_idx, insn_cnt); 10392 return -EFAULT; 10393 } 10394 10395 insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; 10396 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 10397 10398 if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { 10399 verbose(env, 10400 "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", 10401 env->insn_processed); 10402 return -E2BIG; 10403 } 10404 10405 err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx); 10406 if (err < 0) 10407 return err; 10408 if (err == 1) { 10409 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ 10410 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 10411 if (do_print_state) 10412 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n", 10413 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 10414 env->cur_state->speculative ? 10415 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 10416 else 10417 verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx); 10418 } 10419 goto process_bpf_exit; 10420 } 10421 10422 if (signal_pending(current)) 10423 return -EAGAIN; 10424 10425 if (need_resched()) 10426 cond_resched(); 10427 10428 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 || 10429 (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL && do_print_state)) { 10430 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 10431 verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx); 10432 else 10433 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:", 10434 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 10435 env->cur_state->speculative ? 10436 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 10437 print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]); 10438 do_print_state = false; 10439 } 10440 10441 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 10442 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 10443 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 10444 .cb_print = verbose, 10445 .private_data = env, 10446 }; 10447 10448 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 10449 verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx); 10450 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 10451 } 10452 10453 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 10454 err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx, 10455 env->prev_insn_idx); 10456 if (err) 10457 return err; 10458 } 10459 10460 regs = cur_regs(env); 10461 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; 10462 prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; 10463 10464 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 10465 err = check_alu_op(env, insn); 10466 if (err) 10467 return err; 10468 10469 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 10470 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type; 10471 10472 /* check for reserved fields is already done */ 10473 10474 /* check src operand */ 10475 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 10476 if (err) 10477 return err; 10478 10479 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 10480 if (err) 10481 return err; 10482 10483 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; 10484 10485 /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable, 10486 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func 10487 */ 10488 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, 10489 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 10490 BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false); 10491 if (err) 10492 return err; 10493 10494 prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 10495 10496 if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) { 10497 /* saw a valid insn 10498 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) 10499 * save type to validate intersecting paths 10500 */ 10501 *prev_src_type = src_reg_type; 10502 10503 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(src_reg_type, *prev_src_type)) { 10504 /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn 10505 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) 10506 * with different pointer types: 10507 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and 10508 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. 10509 * Reject it. 10510 */ 10511 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 10512 return -EINVAL; 10513 } 10514 10515 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 10516 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type; 10517 10518 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { 10519 err = check_atomic(env, env->insn_idx, insn); 10520 if (err) 10521 return err; 10522 env->insn_idx++; 10523 continue; 10524 } 10525 10526 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) { 10527 verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); 10528 return -EINVAL; 10529 } 10530 10531 /* check src1 operand */ 10532 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 10533 if (err) 10534 return err; 10535 /* check src2 operand */ 10536 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 10537 if (err) 10538 return err; 10539 10540 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 10541 10542 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 10543 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 10544 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 10545 BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false); 10546 if (err) 10547 return err; 10548 10549 prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 10550 10551 if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) { 10552 *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type; 10553 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(dst_reg_type, *prev_dst_type)) { 10554 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 10555 return -EINVAL; 10556 } 10557 10558 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 10559 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || 10560 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 10561 verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); 10562 return -EINVAL; 10563 } 10564 /* check src operand */ 10565 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 10566 if (err) 10567 return err; 10568 10569 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 10570 verbose(env, "BPF_ST stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 10571 insn->dst_reg, 10572 reg_type_str[reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type]); 10573 return -EACCES; 10574 } 10575 10576 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 10577 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 10578 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 10579 BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 10580 if (err) 10581 return err; 10582 10583 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 10584 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 10585 10586 env->jmps_processed++; 10587 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 10588 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 10589 insn->off != 0 || 10590 (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && 10591 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && 10592 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) || 10593 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 10594 class == BPF_JMP32) { 10595 verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); 10596 return -EINVAL; 10597 } 10598 10599 if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock && 10600 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL || 10601 insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock)) { 10602 verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); 10603 return -EINVAL; 10604 } 10605 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 10606 err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 10607 else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 10608 err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn); 10609 else 10610 err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 10611 if (err) 10612 return err; 10613 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 10614 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 10615 insn->imm != 0 || 10616 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 10617 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 10618 class == BPF_JMP32) { 10619 verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); 10620 return -EINVAL; 10621 } 10622 10623 env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; 10624 continue; 10625 10626 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 10627 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 10628 insn->imm != 0 || 10629 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 10630 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 10631 class == BPF_JMP32) { 10632 verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); 10633 return -EINVAL; 10634 } 10635 10636 if (env->cur_state->active_spin_lock) { 10637 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n"); 10638 return -EINVAL; 10639 } 10640 10641 if (state->curframe) { 10642 /* exit from nested function */ 10643 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); 10644 if (err) 10645 return err; 10646 do_print_state = true; 10647 continue; 10648 } 10649 10650 err = check_reference_leak(env); 10651 if (err) 10652 return err; 10653 10654 err = check_return_code(env); 10655 if (err) 10656 return err; 10657 process_bpf_exit: 10658 update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); 10659 err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, 10660 &env->insn_idx, pop_log); 10661 if (err < 0) { 10662 if (err != -ENOENT) 10663 return err; 10664 break; 10665 } else { 10666 do_print_state = true; 10667 continue; 10668 } 10669 } else { 10670 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 10671 if (err) 10672 return err; 10673 } 10674 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 10675 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 10676 10677 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { 10678 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); 10679 if (err) 10680 return err; 10681 10682 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { 10683 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); 10684 if (err) 10685 return err; 10686 10687 env->insn_idx++; 10688 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; 10689 } else { 10690 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); 10691 return -EINVAL; 10692 } 10693 } else { 10694 verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); 10695 return -EINVAL; 10696 } 10697 10698 env->insn_idx++; 10699 } 10700 10701 return 0; 10702 } 10703 10704 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf) 10705 { 10706 const struct btf_type *t; 10707 const char *tname; 10708 int i, n; 10709 10710 /* 10711 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu" 10712 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF 10713 * types to look at only module's own BTF types. 10714 */ 10715 n = btf_nr_types(btf); 10716 if (btf_is_module(btf)) 10717 i = btf_nr_types(btf_vmlinux); 10718 else 10719 i = 1; 10720 10721 for(; i < n; i++) { 10722 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i); 10723 if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC) 10724 continue; 10725 10726 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 10727 if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu")) 10728 return i; 10729 } 10730 10731 return -ENOENT; 10732 } 10733 10734 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */ 10735 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10736 struct bpf_insn *insn, 10737 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 10738 { 10739 const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi; 10740 const struct btf_type *datasec; 10741 struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod; 10742 const struct btf_type *t; 10743 const char *sym_name; 10744 bool percpu = false; 10745 u32 type, id = insn->imm; 10746 struct btf *btf; 10747 s32 datasec_id; 10748 u64 addr; 10749 int i, btf_fd, err; 10750 10751 btf_fd = insn[1].imm; 10752 if (btf_fd) { 10753 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 10754 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 10755 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n"); 10756 return -EINVAL; 10757 } 10758 } else { 10759 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 10760 verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n"); 10761 return -EINVAL; 10762 } 10763 btf = btf_vmlinux; 10764 btf_get(btf); 10765 } 10766 10767 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id); 10768 if (!t) { 10769 verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id); 10770 err = -ENOENT; 10771 goto err_put; 10772 } 10773 10774 if (!btf_type_is_var(t)) { 10775 verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR.\n", id); 10776 err = -EINVAL; 10777 goto err_put; 10778 } 10779 10780 sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 10781 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name); 10782 if (!addr) { 10783 verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n", 10784 sym_name); 10785 err = -ENOENT; 10786 goto err_put; 10787 } 10788 10789 datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf); 10790 if (datasec_id > 0) { 10791 datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id); 10792 for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) { 10793 if (vsi->type == id) { 10794 percpu = true; 10795 break; 10796 } 10797 } 10798 } 10799 10800 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 10801 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 10802 10803 type = t->type; 10804 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL); 10805 if (percpu) { 10806 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID; 10807 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 10808 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 10809 } else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 10810 const struct btf_type *ret; 10811 const char *tname; 10812 u32 tsize; 10813 10814 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 10815 ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize); 10816 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 10817 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 10818 verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 10819 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 10820 err = -EINVAL; 10821 goto err_put; 10822 } 10823 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM; 10824 aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize; 10825 } else { 10826 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 10827 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 10828 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 10829 } 10830 10831 /* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */ 10832 for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) { 10833 if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) { 10834 btf_put(btf); 10835 return 0; 10836 } 10837 } 10838 10839 if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) { 10840 err = -E2BIG; 10841 goto err_put; 10842 } 10843 10844 btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt]; 10845 btf_mod->btf = btf; 10846 btf_mod->module = NULL; 10847 10848 /* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */ 10849 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 10850 btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf); 10851 if (!btf_mod->module) { 10852 err = -ENXIO; 10853 goto err_put; 10854 } 10855 } 10856 10857 env->used_btf_cnt++; 10858 10859 return 0; 10860 err_put: 10861 btf_put(btf); 10862 return err; 10863 } 10864 10865 static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map) 10866 { 10867 return (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH && 10868 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && 10869 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS) || 10870 !(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC); 10871 } 10872 10873 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type) 10874 { 10875 switch (type) { 10876 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 10877 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: 10878 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: 10879 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 10880 return true; 10881 default: 10882 return false; 10883 } 10884 } 10885 10886 static bool is_preallocated_map(struct bpf_map *map) 10887 { 10888 if (!check_map_prealloc(map)) 10889 return false; 10890 if (map->inner_map_meta && !check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta)) 10891 return false; 10892 return true; 10893 } 10894 10895 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10896 struct bpf_map *map, 10897 struct bpf_prog *prog) 10898 10899 { 10900 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 10901 /* 10902 * Validate that trace type programs use preallocated hash maps. 10903 * 10904 * For programs attached to PERF events this is mandatory as the 10905 * perf NMI can hit any arbitrary code sequence. 10906 * 10907 * All other trace types using preallocated hash maps are unsafe as 10908 * well because tracepoint or kprobes can be inside locked regions 10909 * of the memory allocator or at a place where a recursion into the 10910 * memory allocator would see inconsistent state. 10911 * 10912 * On RT enabled kernels run-time allocation of all trace type 10913 * programs is strictly prohibited due to lock type constraints. On 10914 * !RT kernels it is allowed for backwards compatibility reasons for 10915 * now, but warnings are emitted so developers are made aware of 10916 * the unsafety and can fix their programs before this is enforced. 10917 */ 10918 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type) && !is_preallocated_map(map)) { 10919 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) { 10920 verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n"); 10921 return -EINVAL; 10922 } 10923 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT)) { 10924 verbose(env, "trace type programs can only use preallocated hash map\n"); 10925 return -EINVAL; 10926 } 10927 WARN_ONCE(1, "trace type BPF program uses run-time allocation\n"); 10928 verbose(env, "trace type programs with run-time allocated hash maps are unsafe. Switch to preallocated hash maps.\n"); 10929 } 10930 10931 if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) { 10932 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) { 10933 verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 10934 return -EINVAL; 10935 } 10936 10937 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 10938 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 10939 return -EINVAL; 10940 } 10941 10942 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 10943 verbose(env, "sleepable progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 10944 return -EINVAL; 10945 } 10946 } 10947 10948 if ((bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) && 10949 !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) { 10950 verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n"); 10951 return -EINVAL; 10952 } 10953 10954 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 10955 verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n"); 10956 return -EINVAL; 10957 } 10958 10959 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 10960 switch (map->map_type) { 10961 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH: 10962 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH: 10963 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: 10964 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH: 10965 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY: 10966 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH: 10967 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 10968 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 10969 if (!is_preallocated_map(map)) { 10970 verbose(env, 10971 "Sleepable programs can only use preallocated maps\n"); 10972 return -EINVAL; 10973 } 10974 break; 10975 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 10976 break; 10977 default: 10978 verbose(env, 10979 "Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, and ringbuf maps\n"); 10980 return -EINVAL; 10981 } 10982 10983 return 0; 10984 } 10985 10986 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map) 10987 { 10988 return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE || 10989 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE); 10990 } 10991 10992 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions: 10993 * 10994 * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer. 10995 * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var. 10996 * 10997 * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id. 10998 */ 10999 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11000 { 11001 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 11002 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 11003 int i, j, err; 11004 11005 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); 11006 if (err) 11007 return err; 11008 11009 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 11010 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 11011 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) { 11012 verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); 11013 return -EINVAL; 11014 } 11015 11016 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { 11017 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 11018 struct bpf_map *map; 11019 struct fd f; 11020 u64 addr; 11021 11022 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || 11023 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || 11024 insn[1].off != 0) { 11025 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 11026 return -EINVAL; 11027 } 11028 11029 if (insn[0].src_reg == 0) 11030 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ 11031 goto next_insn; 11032 11033 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 11034 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 11035 err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux); 11036 if (err) 11037 return err; 11038 goto next_insn; 11039 } 11040 11041 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 11042 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 11043 aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 11044 goto next_insn; 11045 } 11046 11047 /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is 11048 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn. 11049 */ 11050 if ((insn[0].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD && 11051 insn[0].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE) || 11052 (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD && 11053 insn[1].imm != 0)) { 11054 verbose(env, 11055 "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 11056 return -EINVAL; 11057 } 11058 11059 f = fdget(insn[0].imm); 11060 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 11061 if (IS_ERR(map)) { 11062 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", 11063 insn[0].imm); 11064 return PTR_ERR(map); 11065 } 11066 11067 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); 11068 if (err) { 11069 fdput(f); 11070 return err; 11071 } 11072 11073 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 11074 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) { 11075 addr = (unsigned long)map; 11076 } else { 11077 u32 off = insn[1].imm; 11078 11079 if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 11080 verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off); 11081 fdput(f); 11082 return -EINVAL; 11083 } 11084 11085 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 11086 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 11087 fdput(f); 11088 return -EINVAL; 11089 } 11090 11091 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 11092 if (err) { 11093 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n", 11094 map->value_size, off); 11095 fdput(f); 11096 return err; 11097 } 11098 11099 aux->map_off = off; 11100 addr += off; 11101 } 11102 11103 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 11104 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 11105 11106 /* check whether we recorded this map already */ 11107 for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) { 11108 if (env->used_maps[j] == map) { 11109 aux->map_index = j; 11110 fdput(f); 11111 goto next_insn; 11112 } 11113 } 11114 11115 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { 11116 fdput(f); 11117 return -E2BIG; 11118 } 11119 11120 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, 11121 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it 11122 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded 11123 * and all maps are released in free_used_maps() 11124 */ 11125 bpf_map_inc(map); 11126 11127 aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt; 11128 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; 11129 11130 if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) && 11131 bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) { 11132 verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n"); 11133 fdput(f); 11134 return -EBUSY; 11135 } 11136 11137 fdput(f); 11138 next_insn: 11139 insn++; 11140 i++; 11141 continue; 11142 } 11143 11144 /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */ 11145 if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) { 11146 verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code); 11147 return -EINVAL; 11148 } 11149 } 11150 11151 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid 11152 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. 11153 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. 11154 */ 11155 return 0; 11156 } 11157 11158 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 11159 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11160 { 11161 __bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps, 11162 env->used_map_cnt); 11163 } 11164 11165 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 11166 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11167 { 11168 __bpf_free_used_btfs(env->prog->aux, env->used_btfs, 11169 env->used_btf_cnt); 11170 } 11171 11172 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ 11173 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11174 { 11175 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 11176 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 11177 int i; 11178 11179 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 11180 if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) 11181 continue; 11182 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) 11183 continue; 11184 insn->src_reg = 0; 11185 } 11186 } 11187 11188 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range 11189 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying 11190 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero 11191 */ 11192 static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11193 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt) 11194 { 11195 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data; 11196 struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi; 11197 u32 prog_len; 11198 int i; 11199 11200 /* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path 11201 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the 11202 * original insn at old prog. 11203 */ 11204 old_data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + off + cnt - 1); 11205 11206 if (cnt == 1) 11207 return 0; 11208 prog_len = new_prog->len; 11209 new_data = vzalloc(array_size(prog_len, 11210 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data))); 11211 if (!new_data) 11212 return -ENOMEM; 11213 memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off); 11214 memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off, 11215 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); 11216 for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) { 11217 new_data[i].seen = env->pass_cnt; 11218 new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i); 11219 } 11220 env->insn_aux_data = new_data; 11221 vfree(old_data); 11222 return 0; 11223 } 11224 11225 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 11226 { 11227 int i; 11228 11229 if (len == 1) 11230 return; 11231 /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */ 11232 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 11233 if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off) 11234 continue; 11235 env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1; 11236 } 11237 } 11238 11239 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 len) 11240 { 11241 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 11242 int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 11243 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc; 11244 11245 for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) { 11246 desc = &tab[i]; 11247 desc->insn_idx += len - 1; 11248 } 11249 } 11250 11251 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 11252 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) 11253 { 11254 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 11255 11256 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); 11257 if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) { 11258 if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE) 11259 verbose(env, 11260 "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n", 11261 env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx); 11262 return NULL; 11263 } 11264 if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog, off, len)) 11265 return NULL; 11266 adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len); 11267 adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, len); 11268 return new_prog; 11269 } 11270 11271 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11272 u32 off, u32 cnt) 11273 { 11274 int i, j; 11275 11276 /* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */ 11277 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 11278 if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off) 11279 break; 11280 /* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */ 11281 for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++) 11282 if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt) 11283 break; 11284 /* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing 11285 * the front of previous prog 11286 */ 11287 if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt) 11288 j--; 11289 11290 if (j > i) { 11291 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 11292 int move; 11293 11294 /* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 11295 move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j; 11296 11297 memmove(env->subprog_info + i, 11298 env->subprog_info + j, 11299 sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move); 11300 env->subprog_cnt -= j - i; 11301 11302 /* remove func_info */ 11303 if (aux->func_info) { 11304 move = aux->func_info_cnt - j; 11305 11306 memmove(aux->func_info + i, 11307 aux->func_info + j, 11308 sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move); 11309 aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i; 11310 /* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites, 11311 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust 11312 */ 11313 } 11314 } else { 11315 /* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */ 11316 if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off) 11317 i++; 11318 } 11319 11320 /* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 11321 for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 11322 env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt; 11323 11324 return 0; 11325 } 11326 11327 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 11328 u32 cnt) 11329 { 11330 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 11331 u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo; 11332 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 11333 11334 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 11335 if (!nr_linfo) 11336 return 0; 11337 11338 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 11339 11340 /* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */ 11341 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) 11342 if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off) 11343 break; 11344 11345 l_off = i; 11346 l_cnt = 0; 11347 for (; i < nr_linfo; i++) 11348 if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt) 11349 l_cnt++; 11350 else 11351 break; 11352 11353 /* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit" 11354 * last removed linfo. prog is already modified, so prog->len == off 11355 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed). 11356 */ 11357 if (prog->len != off && l_cnt && 11358 (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) { 11359 l_cnt--; 11360 linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt; 11361 } 11362 11363 /* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */ 11364 if (l_cnt) { 11365 memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i, 11366 sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i)); 11367 11368 prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt; 11369 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 11370 } 11371 11372 /* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */ 11373 for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++) 11374 linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt; 11375 11376 /* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */ 11377 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 11378 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) { 11379 /* program may have started in the removed region but 11380 * may not be fully removed 11381 */ 11382 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt) 11383 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt; 11384 else 11385 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off; 11386 } 11387 11388 return 0; 11389 } 11390 11391 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt) 11392 { 11393 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 11394 unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len; 11395 int err; 11396 11397 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 11398 bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt); 11399 11400 err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt); 11401 if (err) 11402 return err; 11403 11404 err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 11405 if (err) 11406 return err; 11407 11408 err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 11409 if (err) 11410 return err; 11411 11412 memmove(aux_data + off, aux_data + off + cnt, 11413 sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt)); 11414 11415 return 0; 11416 } 11417 11418 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not 11419 * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can 11420 * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code 11421 * with 'ja -1'. 11422 * 11423 * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the 11424 * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then 11425 * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception 11426 * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead 11427 * code could be located. 11428 */ 11429 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11430 { 11431 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 11432 struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1); 11433 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 11434 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 11435 int i; 11436 11437 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 11438 if (aux_data[i].seen) 11439 continue; 11440 memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap)); 11441 } 11442 } 11443 11444 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code) 11445 { 11446 u8 op; 11447 11448 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32) 11449 return true; 11450 11451 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP) 11452 return false; 11453 11454 op = BPF_OP(code); 11455 return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL; 11456 } 11457 11458 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11459 { 11460 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 11461 struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 11462 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 11463 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 11464 int i; 11465 11466 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 11467 if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code)) 11468 continue; 11469 11470 if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen) 11471 ja.off = insn->off; 11472 else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen) 11473 ja.off = 0; 11474 else 11475 continue; 11476 11477 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 11478 bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja); 11479 11480 memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja)); 11481 } 11482 } 11483 11484 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11485 { 11486 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 11487 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 11488 int i, err; 11489 11490 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 11491 int j; 11492 11493 j = 0; 11494 while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen) 11495 j++; 11496 if (!j) 11497 continue; 11498 11499 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j); 11500 if (err) 11501 return err; 11502 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 11503 } 11504 11505 return 0; 11506 } 11507 11508 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11509 { 11510 const struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 11511 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 11512 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 11513 int i, err; 11514 11515 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 11516 if (memcmp(&insn[i], &ja, sizeof(ja))) 11517 continue; 11518 11519 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1); 11520 if (err) 11521 return err; 11522 insn_cnt--; 11523 i--; 11524 } 11525 11526 return 0; 11527 } 11528 11529 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11530 const union bpf_attr *attr) 11531 { 11532 struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4]; 11533 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 11534 int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len; 11535 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 11536 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 11537 bool rnd_hi32; 11538 11539 rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32; 11540 zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0); 11541 rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 11542 rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); 11543 rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX); 11544 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { 11545 int adj_idx = i + delta; 11546 struct bpf_insn insn; 11547 int load_reg; 11548 11549 insn = insns[adj_idx]; 11550 load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn); 11551 if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) { 11552 u8 code, class; 11553 u32 imm_rnd; 11554 11555 if (!rnd_hi32) 11556 continue; 11557 11558 code = insn.code; 11559 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 11560 if (load_reg == -1) 11561 continue; 11562 11563 /* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for 11564 * BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL 11565 * here. 11566 */ 11567 if (is_reg64(env, &insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) { 11568 if (class == BPF_LD && 11569 BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM) 11570 i++; 11571 continue; 11572 } 11573 11574 /* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */ 11575 if (class == BPF_LDX && 11576 aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX) 11577 continue; 11578 11579 imm_rnd = get_random_int(); 11580 rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn; 11581 rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd; 11582 rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg; 11583 patch = rnd_hi32_patch; 11584 patch_len = 4; 11585 goto apply_patch_buffer; 11586 } 11587 11588 /* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested 11589 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG. 11590 * 11591 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into 11592 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs' 11593 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the 11594 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is 11595 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the 11596 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext. 11597 */ 11598 if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn)) 11599 continue; 11600 11601 if (WARN_ON(load_reg == -1)) { 11602 verbose(env, "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined\n"); 11603 return -EFAULT; 11604 } 11605 11606 zext_patch[0] = insn; 11607 zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg; 11608 zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg; 11609 patch = zext_patch; 11610 patch_len = 2; 11611 apply_patch_buffer: 11612 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len); 11613 if (!new_prog) 11614 return -ENOMEM; 11615 env->prog = new_prog; 11616 insns = new_prog->insnsi; 11617 aux = env->insn_aux_data; 11618 delta += patch_len - 1; 11619 } 11620 11621 return 0; 11622 } 11623 11624 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a 11625 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure: 11626 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff 11627 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock 11628 */ 11629 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11630 { 11631 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops; 11632 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0; 11633 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 11634 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn; 11635 u32 target_size, size_default, off; 11636 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 11637 enum bpf_access_type type; 11638 bool is_narrower_load; 11639 11640 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { 11641 if (!ops->gen_prologue) { 11642 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 11643 return -EINVAL; 11644 } 11645 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, 11646 env->prog); 11647 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 11648 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 11649 return -EINVAL; 11650 } else if (cnt) { 11651 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 11652 if (!new_prog) 11653 return -ENOMEM; 11654 11655 env->prog = new_prog; 11656 delta += cnt - 1; 11657 } 11658 } 11659 11660 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 11661 return 0; 11662 11663 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; 11664 11665 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 11666 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; 11667 11668 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 11669 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 11670 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 11671 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) 11672 type = BPF_READ; 11673 else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 11674 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 11675 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 11676 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) 11677 type = BPF_WRITE; 11678 else 11679 continue; 11680 11681 if (type == BPF_WRITE && 11682 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off) { 11683 struct bpf_insn patch[] = { 11684 /* Sanitize suspicious stack slot with zero. 11685 * There are no memory dependencies for this store, 11686 * since it's only using frame pointer and immediate 11687 * constant of zero 11688 */ 11689 BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, 11690 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off, 11691 0), 11692 /* the original STX instruction will immediately 11693 * overwrite the same stack slot with appropriate value 11694 */ 11695 *insn, 11696 }; 11697 11698 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch); 11699 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt); 11700 if (!new_prog) 11701 return -ENOMEM; 11702 11703 delta += cnt - 1; 11704 env->prog = new_prog; 11705 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 11706 continue; 11707 } 11708 11709 switch (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { 11710 case PTR_TO_CTX: 11711 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) 11712 continue; 11713 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access; 11714 break; 11715 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 11716 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 11717 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; 11718 break; 11719 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 11720 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 11721 break; 11722 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 11723 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 11724 break; 11725 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 11726 if (type == BPF_READ) { 11727 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | 11728 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 11729 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 11730 } else if (resolve_prog_type(env->prog) != BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 11731 verbose(env, "Writes through BTF pointers are not allowed\n"); 11732 return -EINVAL; 11733 } 11734 continue; 11735 default: 11736 continue; 11737 } 11738 11739 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; 11740 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); 11741 11742 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, 11743 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific 11744 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, 11745 * we will apply proper mask to the result. 11746 */ 11747 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; 11748 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size); 11749 off = insn->off; 11750 if (is_narrower_load) { 11751 u8 size_code; 11752 11753 if (type == BPF_WRITE) { 11754 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); 11755 return -EINVAL; 11756 } 11757 11758 size_code = BPF_H; 11759 if (ctx_field_size == 4) 11760 size_code = BPF_W; 11761 else if (ctx_field_size == 8) 11762 size_code = BPF_DW; 11763 11764 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); 11765 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; 11766 } 11767 11768 target_size = 0; 11769 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, 11770 &target_size); 11771 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || 11772 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { 11773 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 11774 return -EINVAL; 11775 } 11776 11777 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { 11778 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( 11779 off, size, size_default) * 8; 11780 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { 11781 if (shift) 11782 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, 11783 insn->dst_reg, 11784 shift); 11785 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 11786 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 11787 } else { 11788 if (shift) 11789 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, 11790 insn->dst_reg, 11791 shift); 11792 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 11793 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1); 11794 } 11795 } 11796 11797 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 11798 if (!new_prog) 11799 return -ENOMEM; 11800 11801 delta += cnt - 1; 11802 11803 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 11804 env->prog = new_prog; 11805 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 11806 } 11807 11808 return 0; 11809 } 11810 11811 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11812 { 11813 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp; 11814 int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog; 11815 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 11816 struct bpf_insn *insn; 11817 void *old_bpf_func; 11818 int err, num_exentries; 11819 11820 if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) 11821 return 0; 11822 11823 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 11824 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 11825 env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; 11826 /* subprog is encoded in insn[1].imm */ 11827 continue; 11828 } 11829 11830 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 11831 continue; 11832 /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but 11833 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is 11834 * propagated in any case. 11835 */ 11836 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 11837 if (subprog < 0) { 11838 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 11839 i + insn->imm + 1); 11840 return -EFAULT; 11841 } 11842 /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of 11843 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs 11844 */ 11845 insn->off = subprog; 11846 /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback 11847 * to interpreter will be needed 11848 */ 11849 env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; 11850 /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ 11851 insn->imm = 1; 11852 } 11853 11854 err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog); 11855 if (err) 11856 goto out_undo_insn; 11857 11858 err = -ENOMEM; 11859 func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL); 11860 if (!func) 11861 goto out_undo_insn; 11862 11863 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 11864 subprog_start = subprog_end; 11865 subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start; 11866 11867 len = subprog_end - subprog_start; 11868 /* BPF_PROG_RUN doesn't call subprogs directly, 11869 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs. 11870 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id 11871 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL 11872 */ 11873 func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER); 11874 if (!func[i]) 11875 goto out_free; 11876 memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start], 11877 len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); 11878 func[i]->type = prog->type; 11879 func[i]->len = len; 11880 if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i])) 11881 goto out_free; 11882 func[i]->is_func = 1; 11883 func[i]->aux->func_idx = i; 11884 /* the btf and func_info will be freed only at prog->aux */ 11885 func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf; 11886 func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info; 11887 11888 for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { 11889 u32 insn_idx = prog->aux->poke_tab[j].insn_idx; 11890 int ret; 11891 11892 if (!(insn_idx >= subprog_start && 11893 insn_idx <= subprog_end)) 11894 continue; 11895 11896 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(func[i], 11897 &prog->aux->poke_tab[j]); 11898 if (ret < 0) { 11899 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); 11900 goto out_free; 11901 } 11902 11903 func[i]->insnsi[insn_idx - subprog_start].imm = ret + 1; 11904 11905 map_ptr = func[i]->aux->poke_tab[ret].tail_call.map; 11906 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, func[i]->aux); 11907 if (ret < 0) { 11908 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); 11909 goto out_free; 11910 } 11911 } 11912 11913 /* Use bpf_prog_F_tag to indicate functions in stack traces. 11914 * Long term would need debug info to populate names 11915 */ 11916 func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F'; 11917 func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 11918 func[i]->jit_requested = 1; 11919 func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 11920 func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 11921 func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 11922 func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo; 11923 func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx; 11924 num_exentries = 0; 11925 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 11926 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 11927 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 11928 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM) 11929 num_exentries++; 11930 } 11931 func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries; 11932 func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable; 11933 func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 11934 if (!func[i]->jited) { 11935 err = -ENOTSUPP; 11936 goto out_free; 11937 } 11938 cond_resched(); 11939 } 11940 11941 /* Untrack main program's aux structs so that during map_poke_run() 11942 * we will not stumble upon the unfilled poke descriptors; each 11943 * of the main program's poke descs got distributed across subprogs 11944 * and got tracked onto map, so we are sure that none of them will 11945 * be missed after the operation below 11946 */ 11947 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 11948 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 11949 11950 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux); 11951 } 11952 11953 /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed 11954 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and 11955 * run last pass of JIT 11956 */ 11957 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 11958 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 11959 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 11960 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 11961 subprog = insn[1].imm; 11962 insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func; 11963 insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32; 11964 continue; 11965 } 11966 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 11967 continue; 11968 subprog = insn->off; 11969 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(func[subprog]->bpf_func) - 11970 __bpf_call_base; 11971 } 11972 11973 /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses 11974 * of the JITed images for each function in the program 11975 * 11976 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field 11977 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start 11978 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base 11979 * 11980 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee 11981 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of 11982 * the call instruction, as an index for this list 11983 */ 11984 func[i]->aux->func = func; 11985 func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 11986 } 11987 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 11988 old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func; 11989 tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 11990 if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) { 11991 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 11992 err = -ENOTSUPP; 11993 goto out_free; 11994 } 11995 cond_resched(); 11996 } 11997 11998 /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and 11999 * populate kallsysm 12000 */ 12001 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 12002 bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]); 12003 bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]); 12004 } 12005 12006 /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main 12007 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can 12008 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. 12009 */ 12010 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 12011 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 12012 insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 12013 insn[1].imm = find_subprog(env, i + insn[0].imm + 1); 12014 continue; 12015 } 12016 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 12017 continue; 12018 insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 12019 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); 12020 insn->imm = subprog; 12021 } 12022 12023 prog->jited = 1; 12024 prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func; 12025 prog->aux->func = func; 12026 prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 12027 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 12028 return 0; 12029 out_free: 12030 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 12031 if (!func[i]) 12032 continue; 12033 12034 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { 12035 map_ptr = func[i]->aux->poke_tab[j].tail_call.map; 12036 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, func[i]->aux); 12037 } 12038 bpf_jit_free(func[i]); 12039 } 12040 kfree(func); 12041 out_undo_insn: 12042 /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ 12043 prog->jit_requested = 0; 12044 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 12045 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 12046 continue; 12047 insn->off = 0; 12048 insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 12049 } 12050 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 12051 return err; 12052 } 12053 12054 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12055 { 12056 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 12057 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 12058 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 12059 bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog); 12060 int i, depth; 12061 #endif 12062 int err = 0; 12063 12064 if (env->prog->jit_requested && 12065 !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 12066 err = jit_subprogs(env); 12067 if (err == 0) 12068 return 0; 12069 if (err == -EFAULT) 12070 return err; 12071 } 12072 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 12073 if (has_kfunc_call) { 12074 verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 12075 return -EINVAL; 12076 } 12077 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) { 12078 /* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls 12079 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 12080 */ 12081 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 12082 return -EINVAL; 12083 } 12084 for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 12085 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 12086 /* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls 12087 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 12088 */ 12089 verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 12090 return -EINVAL; 12091 } 12092 12093 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 12094 continue; 12095 depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); 12096 if (depth < 0) 12097 return depth; 12098 bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth); 12099 } 12100 err = 0; 12101 #endif 12102 return err; 12103 } 12104 12105 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12106 struct bpf_insn *insn) 12107 { 12108 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 12109 12110 /* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with 12111 * an address (relative to __bpf_base_call). 12112 */ 12113 desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm); 12114 if (!desc) { 12115 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u\n", 12116 insn->imm); 12117 return -EFAULT; 12118 } 12119 12120 insn->imm = desc->imm; 12121 12122 return 0; 12123 } 12124 12125 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass. 12126 * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations. 12127 */ 12128 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12129 { 12130 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 12131 bool expect_blinding = bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(prog); 12132 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 12133 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 12134 const int insn_cnt = prog->len; 12135 const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; 12136 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 12137 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; 12138 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 12139 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 12140 int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0; 12141 12142 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 12143 /* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */ 12144 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 12145 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || 12146 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 12147 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { 12148 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; 12149 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; 12150 struct bpf_insn *patchlet; 12151 struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = { 12152 /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */ 12153 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 12154 BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 12155 0, 2, 0), 12156 BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 12157 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 12158 *insn, 12159 }; 12160 struct bpf_insn chk_and_mod[] = { 12161 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ 12162 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 12163 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 12164 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0), 12165 *insn, 12166 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 12167 BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 12168 }; 12169 12170 patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod; 12171 cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) : 12172 ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0); 12173 12174 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt); 12175 if (!new_prog) 12176 return -ENOMEM; 12177 12178 delta += cnt - 1; 12179 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 12180 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 12181 continue; 12182 } 12183 12184 /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */ 12185 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && 12186 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || 12187 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { 12188 cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); 12189 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 12190 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 12191 return -EINVAL; 12192 } 12193 12194 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 12195 if (!new_prog) 12196 return -ENOMEM; 12197 12198 delta += cnt - 1; 12199 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 12200 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 12201 continue; 12202 } 12203 12204 /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */ 12205 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) || 12206 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) { 12207 const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X; 12208 const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X; 12209 struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; 12210 bool issrc, isneg; 12211 u32 off_reg; 12212 12213 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 12214 if (!aux->alu_state || 12215 aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER) 12216 continue; 12217 12218 isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE; 12219 issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) == 12220 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC; 12221 12222 off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg; 12223 if (isneg) 12224 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 12225 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 12226 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 12227 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 12228 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 12229 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63); 12230 if (issrc) { 12231 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, 12232 off_reg); 12233 insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX; 12234 } else { 12235 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, off_reg, 12236 BPF_REG_AX); 12237 } 12238 if (isneg) 12239 insn->code = insn->code == code_add ? 12240 code_sub : code_add; 12241 *patch++ = *insn; 12242 if (issrc && isneg) 12243 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 12244 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 12245 12246 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 12247 if (!new_prog) 12248 return -ENOMEM; 12249 12250 delta += cnt - 1; 12251 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 12252 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 12253 continue; 12254 } 12255 12256 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 12257 continue; 12258 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 12259 continue; 12260 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 12261 ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn); 12262 if (ret) 12263 return ret; 12264 continue; 12265 } 12266 12267 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) 12268 prog->dst_needed = 1; 12269 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) 12270 bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); 12271 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return) 12272 prog->kprobe_override = 1; 12273 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 12274 /* If we tail call into other programs, we 12275 * cannot make any assumptions since they can 12276 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in 12277 * the program array. 12278 */ 12279 prog->cb_access = 1; 12280 if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) 12281 prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; 12282 prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF; 12283 12284 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid 12285 * conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal 12286 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler 12287 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet 12288 */ 12289 insn->imm = 0; 12290 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; 12291 12292 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 12293 if (env->bpf_capable && !expect_blinding && 12294 prog->jit_requested && 12295 !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 12296 !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) && 12297 !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) { 12298 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = { 12299 .reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL, 12300 .tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state), 12301 .tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux), 12302 .insn_idx = i + delta, 12303 }; 12304 12305 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc); 12306 if (ret < 0) { 12307 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); 12308 return ret; 12309 } 12310 12311 insn->imm = ret + 1; 12312 continue; 12313 } 12314 12315 if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) 12316 continue; 12317 12318 /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call 12319 * emit two extra insns: 12320 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out; 12321 * index &= array->index_mask; 12322 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation 12323 */ 12324 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) { 12325 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 12326 return -EINVAL; 12327 } 12328 12329 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 12330 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, 12331 map_ptr->max_entries, 2); 12332 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 12333 container_of(map_ptr, 12334 struct bpf_array, 12335 map)->index_mask); 12336 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 12337 cnt = 3; 12338 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 12339 if (!new_prog) 12340 return -ENOMEM; 12341 12342 delta += cnt - 1; 12343 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 12344 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 12345 continue; 12346 } 12347 12348 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup 12349 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit 12350 * only. 12351 */ 12352 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 12353 (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || 12354 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 12355 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 12356 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 12357 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem || 12358 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem || 12359 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)) { 12360 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 12361 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) 12362 goto patch_call_imm; 12363 12364 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 12365 ops = map_ptr->ops; 12366 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 12367 ops->map_gen_lookup) { 12368 cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); 12369 if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP) 12370 goto patch_map_ops_generic; 12371 if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 12372 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 12373 return -EINVAL; 12374 } 12375 12376 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, 12377 insn_buf, cnt); 12378 if (!new_prog) 12379 return -ENOMEM; 12380 12381 delta += cnt - 1; 12382 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 12383 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 12384 continue; 12385 } 12386 12387 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, 12388 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 12389 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem, 12390 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 12391 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem, 12392 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 12393 u64 flags))NULL)); 12394 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem, 12395 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value, 12396 u64 flags))NULL)); 12397 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem, 12398 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 12399 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem, 12400 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 12401 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect, 12402 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u32 ifindex, u64 flags))NULL)); 12403 12404 patch_map_ops_generic: 12405 switch (insn->imm) { 12406 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: 12407 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_lookup_elem) - 12408 __bpf_call_base; 12409 continue; 12410 case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: 12411 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_update_elem) - 12412 __bpf_call_base; 12413 continue; 12414 case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: 12415 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_delete_elem) - 12416 __bpf_call_base; 12417 continue; 12418 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 12419 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_push_elem) - 12420 __bpf_call_base; 12421 continue; 12422 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 12423 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_pop_elem) - 12424 __bpf_call_base; 12425 continue; 12426 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 12427 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_peek_elem) - 12428 __bpf_call_base; 12429 continue; 12430 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 12431 insn->imm = BPF_CAST_CALL(ops->map_redirect) - 12432 __bpf_call_base; 12433 continue; 12434 } 12435 12436 goto patch_call_imm; 12437 } 12438 12439 /* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */ 12440 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 12441 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) { 12442 struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = { 12443 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 12444 (unsigned long)&jiffies), 12445 }; 12446 12447 insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0]; 12448 insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1]; 12449 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 12450 BPF_REG_0, 0); 12451 cnt = 3; 12452 12453 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 12454 cnt); 12455 if (!new_prog) 12456 return -ENOMEM; 12457 12458 delta += cnt - 1; 12459 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 12460 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 12461 continue; 12462 } 12463 12464 patch_call_imm: 12465 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); 12466 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed 12467 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions 12468 */ 12469 if (!fn->func) { 12470 verbose(env, 12471 "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 12472 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 12473 return -EFAULT; 12474 } 12475 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; 12476 } 12477 12478 /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */ 12479 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 12480 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 12481 if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || 12482 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || 12483 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { 12484 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 12485 return -EINVAL; 12486 } 12487 12488 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); 12489 if (ret < 0) { 12490 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); 12491 return ret; 12492 } 12493 } 12494 12495 sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(env->prog); 12496 12497 return 0; 12498 } 12499 12500 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12501 { 12502 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln; 12503 int i; 12504 12505 sl = env->free_list; 12506 while (sl) { 12507 sln = sl->next; 12508 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 12509 kfree(sl); 12510 sl = sln; 12511 } 12512 env->free_list = NULL; 12513 12514 if (!env->explored_states) 12515 return; 12516 12517 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) { 12518 sl = env->explored_states[i]; 12519 12520 while (sl) { 12521 sln = sl->next; 12522 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 12523 kfree(sl); 12524 sl = sln; 12525 } 12526 env->explored_states[i] = NULL; 12527 } 12528 } 12529 12530 /* The verifier is using insn_aux_data[] to store temporary data during 12531 * verification and to store information for passes that run after the 12532 * verification like dead code sanitization. do_check_common() for subprogram N 12533 * may analyze many other subprograms. sanitize_insn_aux_data() clears all 12534 * temporary data after do_check_common() finds that subprogram N cannot be 12535 * verified independently. pass_cnt counts the number of times 12536 * do_check_common() was run and insn->aux->seen tells the pass number 12537 * insn_aux_data was touched. These variables are compared to clear temporary 12538 * data from failed pass. For testing and experiments do_check_common() can be 12539 * run multiple times even when prior attempt to verify is unsuccessful. 12540 */ 12541 static void sanitize_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12542 { 12543 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 12544 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 12545 int i, class; 12546 12547 for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) { 12548 class = BPF_CLASS(insn[i].code); 12549 if (class != BPF_LDX && class != BPF_STX) 12550 continue; 12551 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 12552 if (aux->seen != env->pass_cnt) 12553 continue; 12554 memset(aux, 0, offsetof(typeof(*aux), orig_idx)); 12555 } 12556 } 12557 12558 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 12559 { 12560 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 12561 struct bpf_verifier_state *state; 12562 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 12563 int ret, i; 12564 12565 env->prev_linfo = NULL; 12566 env->pass_cnt++; 12567 12568 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL); 12569 if (!state) 12570 return -ENOMEM; 12571 state->curframe = 0; 12572 state->speculative = false; 12573 state->branches = 1; 12574 state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL); 12575 if (!state->frame[0]) { 12576 kfree(state); 12577 return -ENOMEM; 12578 } 12579 env->cur_state = state; 12580 init_func_state(env, state->frame[0], 12581 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 12582 0 /* frameno */, 12583 subprog); 12584 12585 regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs; 12586 if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 12587 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs); 12588 if (ret) 12589 goto out; 12590 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 12591 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_CTX) 12592 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 12593 else if (regs[i].type == SCALAR_VALUE) 12594 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 12595 else if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL) { 12596 const u32 mem_size = regs[i].mem_size; 12597 12598 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 12599 regs[i].mem_size = mem_size; 12600 regs[i].id = ++env->id_gen; 12601 } 12602 } 12603 } else { 12604 /* 1st arg to a function */ 12605 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; 12606 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); 12607 ret = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, regs); 12608 if (ret == -EFAULT) 12609 /* unlikely verifier bug. abort. 12610 * ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for 12611 * main() function due to backward compatibility. 12612 * Like socket filter program may be written as: 12613 * int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) 12614 * and never dereference that ctx in the program. 12615 * 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket 12616 * filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'. 12617 */ 12618 goto out; 12619 } 12620 12621 ret = do_check(env); 12622 out: 12623 /* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside 12624 * do_check() under memory pressure. 12625 */ 12626 if (env->cur_state) { 12627 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 12628 env->cur_state = NULL; 12629 } 12630 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 12631 if (!ret && pop_log) 12632 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); 12633 free_states(env); 12634 if (ret) 12635 /* clean aux data in case subprog was rejected */ 12636 sanitize_insn_aux_data(env); 12637 return ret; 12638 } 12639 12640 /* Verify all global functions in a BPF program one by one based on their BTF. 12641 * All global functions must pass verification. Otherwise the whole program is rejected. 12642 * Consider: 12643 * int bar(int); 12644 * int foo(int f) 12645 * { 12646 * return bar(f); 12647 * } 12648 * int bar(int b) 12649 * { 12650 * ... 12651 * } 12652 * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it 12653 * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar() 12654 * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified 12655 * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value. 12656 */ 12657 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12658 { 12659 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 12660 int i, ret; 12661 12662 if (!aux->func_info) 12663 return 0; 12664 12665 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 12666 if (aux->func_info_aux[i].linkage != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) 12667 continue; 12668 env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start; 12669 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0); 12670 ret = do_check_common(env, i); 12671 if (ret) { 12672 return ret; 12673 } else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 12674 verbose(env, 12675 "Func#%d is safe for any args that match its prototype\n", 12676 i); 12677 } 12678 } 12679 return 0; 12680 } 12681 12682 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12683 { 12684 int ret; 12685 12686 env->insn_idx = 0; 12687 ret = do_check_common(env, 0); 12688 if (!ret) 12689 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 12690 return ret; 12691 } 12692 12693 12694 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12695 { 12696 int i; 12697 12698 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) { 12699 verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n", 12700 div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000)); 12701 verbose(env, "stack depth "); 12702 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 12703 u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 12704 12705 verbose(env, "%d", depth); 12706 if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) 12707 verbose(env, "+"); 12708 } 12709 verbose(env, "\n"); 12710 } 12711 verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d " 12712 "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n", 12713 env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS, 12714 env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states, 12715 env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk); 12716 } 12717 12718 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12719 { 12720 const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto; 12721 const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops; 12722 const struct btf_member *member; 12723 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 12724 u32 btf_id, member_idx; 12725 const char *mname; 12726 12727 if (!prog->gpl_compatible) { 12728 verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n"); 12729 return -EINVAL; 12730 } 12731 12732 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 12733 st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf_id); 12734 if (!st_ops) { 12735 verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n", 12736 btf_id); 12737 return -ENOTSUPP; 12738 } 12739 12740 t = st_ops->type; 12741 member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type; 12742 if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) { 12743 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n", 12744 member_idx, st_ops->name); 12745 return -EINVAL; 12746 } 12747 12748 member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx]; 12749 mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, member->name_off); 12750 func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf_vmlinux, member->type, 12751 NULL); 12752 if (!func_proto) { 12753 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n", 12754 mname, member_idx, st_ops->name); 12755 return -EINVAL; 12756 } 12757 12758 if (st_ops->check_member) { 12759 int err = st_ops->check_member(t, member); 12760 12761 if (err) { 12762 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", 12763 mname, st_ops->name); 12764 return err; 12765 } 12766 } 12767 12768 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto; 12769 prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname; 12770 env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops; 12771 12772 return 0; 12773 } 12774 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" 12775 12776 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name) 12777 { 12778 if (within_error_injection_list(addr) || 12779 !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) 12780 return 0; 12781 12782 return -EINVAL; 12783 } 12784 12785 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on 12786 * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list 12787 */ 12788 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 12789 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context. 12790 * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view. 12791 */ 12792 BTF_ID(func, __add_to_page_cache_locked) 12793 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page) 12794 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab) 12795 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 12796 12797 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id) 12798 { 12799 return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); 12800 } 12801 12802 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 12803 const struct bpf_prog *prog, 12804 const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, 12805 u32 btf_id, 12806 struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info) 12807 { 12808 bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT; 12809 const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_"; 12810 int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i; 12811 const struct btf_type *t; 12812 bool conservative = true; 12813 const char *tname; 12814 struct btf *btf; 12815 long addr = 0; 12816 12817 if (!btf_id) { 12818 bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n"); 12819 return -EINVAL; 12820 } 12821 btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf; 12822 if (!btf) { 12823 bpf_log(log, 12824 "FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n"); 12825 return -EINVAL; 12826 } 12827 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id); 12828 if (!t) { 12829 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id); 12830 return -EINVAL; 12831 } 12832 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 12833 if (!tname) { 12834 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id); 12835 return -EINVAL; 12836 } 12837 if (tgt_prog) { 12838 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux; 12839 12840 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) 12841 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) { 12842 subprog = i; 12843 break; 12844 } 12845 if (subprog == -1) { 12846 bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname); 12847 return -EINVAL; 12848 } 12849 conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable; 12850 if (prog_extension) { 12851 if (conservative) { 12852 bpf_log(log, 12853 "Cannot replace static functions\n"); 12854 return -EINVAL; 12855 } 12856 if (!prog->jit_requested) { 12857 bpf_log(log, 12858 "Extension programs should be JITed\n"); 12859 return -EINVAL; 12860 } 12861 } 12862 if (!tgt_prog->jited) { 12863 bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n"); 12864 return -EINVAL; 12865 } 12866 if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) { 12867 /* Cannot fentry/fexit another fentry/fexit program. 12868 * Cannot attach program extension to another extension. 12869 * It's ok to attach fentry/fexit to extension program. 12870 */ 12871 bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n"); 12872 return -EINVAL; 12873 } 12874 if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 12875 prog_extension && 12876 (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY || 12877 tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) { 12878 /* Program extensions can extend all program types 12879 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following. 12880 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance 12881 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program 12882 * type except themselves. When extension program is 12883 * replacing XDP function it is necessary to allow 12884 * performance analysis of all functions. Both original 12885 * XDP program and its program extension. Hence 12886 * attaching fentry/fexit to BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is 12887 * allowed. If extending of fentry/fexit was allowed it 12888 * would be possible to create long call chain 12889 * fentry->extension->fentry->extension beyond 12890 * reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry is not 12891 * allowed. 12892 */ 12893 bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n"); 12894 return -EINVAL; 12895 } 12896 } else { 12897 if (prog_extension) { 12898 bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n"); 12899 return -EINVAL; 12900 } 12901 } 12902 12903 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 12904 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 12905 if (tgt_prog) { 12906 bpf_log(log, 12907 "Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n"); 12908 return -EINVAL; 12909 } 12910 if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) { 12911 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n", 12912 btf_id); 12913 return -EINVAL; 12914 } 12915 if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) { 12916 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n", 12917 btf_id, tname); 12918 return -EINVAL; 12919 } 12920 tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1; 12921 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 12922 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 12923 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 12924 return -EINVAL; 12925 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 12926 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 12927 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 12928 return -EINVAL; 12929 12930 break; 12931 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 12932 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 12933 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 12934 btf_id); 12935 return -EINVAL; 12936 } 12937 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 12938 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 12939 return -EINVAL; 12940 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 12941 if (ret) 12942 return ret; 12943 break; 12944 default: 12945 if (!prog_extension) 12946 return -EINVAL; 12947 fallthrough; 12948 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 12949 case BPF_LSM_MAC: 12950 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 12951 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 12952 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 12953 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 12954 btf_id); 12955 return -EINVAL; 12956 } 12957 if (prog_extension && 12958 btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t)) 12959 return -EINVAL; 12960 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 12961 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 12962 return -EINVAL; 12963 12964 if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) && 12965 (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type || 12966 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type)) 12967 return -EINVAL; 12968 12969 if (tgt_prog && conservative) 12970 t = NULL; 12971 12972 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 12973 if (ret < 0) 12974 return ret; 12975 12976 if (tgt_prog) { 12977 if (subprog == 0) 12978 addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func; 12979 else 12980 addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func; 12981 } else { 12982 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname); 12983 if (!addr) { 12984 bpf_log(log, 12985 "The address of function %s cannot be found\n", 12986 tname); 12987 return -ENOENT; 12988 } 12989 } 12990 12991 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 12992 ret = -EINVAL; 12993 switch (prog->type) { 12994 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 12995 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable only if they are 12996 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. 12997 */ 12998 if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) && 12999 within_error_injection_list(addr)) 13000 ret = 0; 13001 break; 13002 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 13003 /* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs. 13004 * Only some of them are sleepable. 13005 */ 13006 if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id)) 13007 ret = 0; 13008 break; 13009 default: 13010 break; 13011 } 13012 if (ret) { 13013 bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname); 13014 return ret; 13015 } 13016 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 13017 if (tgt_prog) { 13018 bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n"); 13019 return -EINVAL; 13020 } 13021 ret = check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname); 13022 if (ret) { 13023 bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname); 13024 return ret; 13025 } 13026 } 13027 13028 break; 13029 } 13030 tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr; 13031 tgt_info->tgt_name = tname; 13032 tgt_info->tgt_type = t; 13033 return 0; 13034 } 13035 13036 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 13037 { 13038 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 13039 struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog; 13040 struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {}; 13041 u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 13042 struct bpf_trampoline *tr; 13043 int ret; 13044 u64 key; 13045 13046 if (prog->aux->sleepable && prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 13047 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { 13048 verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret and lsm programs can be sleepable\n"); 13049 return -EINVAL; 13050 } 13051 13052 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) 13053 return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env); 13054 13055 if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 13056 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 13057 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 13058 return 0; 13059 13060 ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info); 13061 if (ret) 13062 return ret; 13063 13064 if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 13065 /* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to 13066 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the 13067 * verification 13068 */ 13069 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type]; 13070 prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 13071 } 13072 13073 /* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */ 13074 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type; 13075 prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name; 13076 13077 if (tgt_prog) { 13078 prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type; 13079 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 13080 } 13081 13082 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) { 13083 prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true; 13084 return 0; 13085 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) { 13086 if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog)) 13087 return -EINVAL; 13088 return 0; 13089 } 13090 13091 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { 13092 ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog); 13093 if (ret < 0) 13094 return ret; 13095 } 13096 13097 key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id); 13098 tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info); 13099 if (!tr) 13100 return -ENOMEM; 13101 13102 prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr; 13103 return 0; 13104 } 13105 13106 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) 13107 { 13108 if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { 13109 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 13110 if (!btf_vmlinux) 13111 btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); 13112 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 13113 } 13114 return btf_vmlinux; 13115 } 13116 13117 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, 13118 union bpf_attr __user *uattr) 13119 { 13120 u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); 13121 struct bpf_verifier_env *env; 13122 struct bpf_verifier_log *log; 13123 int i, len, ret = -EINVAL; 13124 bool is_priv; 13125 13126 /* no program is valid */ 13127 if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) 13128 return -EINVAL; 13129 13130 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, 13131 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called 13132 */ 13133 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); 13134 if (!env) 13135 return -ENOMEM; 13136 log = &env->log; 13137 13138 len = (*prog)->len; 13139 env->insn_aux_data = 13140 vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len)); 13141 ret = -ENOMEM; 13142 if (!env->insn_aux_data) 13143 goto err_free_env; 13144 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 13145 env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i; 13146 env->prog = *prog; 13147 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; 13148 is_priv = bpf_capable(); 13149 13150 bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); 13151 13152 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ 13153 if (!is_priv) 13154 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 13155 13156 if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) { 13157 /* user requested verbose verifier output 13158 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace 13159 */ 13160 log->level = attr->log_level; 13161 log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf; 13162 log->len_total = attr->log_size; 13163 13164 ret = -EINVAL; 13165 /* log attributes have to be sane */ 13166 if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 2 || 13167 !log->level || !log->ubuf || log->level & ~BPF_LOG_MASK) 13168 goto err_unlock; 13169 } 13170 13171 if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) { 13172 /* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */ 13173 verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n"); 13174 ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux); 13175 goto skip_full_check; 13176 } 13177 13178 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); 13179 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) 13180 env->strict_alignment = true; 13181 if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) 13182 env->strict_alignment = false; 13183 13184 env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(); 13185 env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(); 13186 env->allow_ptr_to_map_access = bpf_allow_ptr_to_map_access(); 13187 env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(); 13188 env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(); 13189 env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable(); 13190 13191 if (is_priv) 13192 env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ; 13193 13194 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 13195 ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog); 13196 if (ret) 13197 goto skip_full_check; 13198 } 13199 13200 env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env), 13201 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), 13202 GFP_USER); 13203 ret = -ENOMEM; 13204 if (!env->explored_states) 13205 goto skip_full_check; 13206 13207 ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env); 13208 if (ret < 0) 13209 goto skip_full_check; 13210 13211 ret = check_subprogs(env); 13212 if (ret < 0) 13213 goto skip_full_check; 13214 13215 ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr); 13216 if (ret < 0) 13217 goto skip_full_check; 13218 13219 ret = check_attach_btf_id(env); 13220 if (ret) 13221 goto skip_full_check; 13222 13223 ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env); 13224 if (ret < 0) 13225 goto skip_full_check; 13226 13227 ret = check_cfg(env); 13228 if (ret < 0) 13229 goto skip_full_check; 13230 13231 ret = do_check_subprogs(env); 13232 ret = ret ?: do_check_main(env); 13233 13234 if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 13235 ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env); 13236 13237 skip_full_check: 13238 kvfree(env->explored_states); 13239 13240 if (ret == 0) 13241 ret = check_max_stack_depth(env); 13242 13243 /* instruction rewrites happen after this point */ 13244 if (is_priv) { 13245 if (ret == 0) 13246 opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env); 13247 if (ret == 0) 13248 ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env); 13249 if (ret == 0) 13250 ret = opt_remove_nops(env); 13251 } else { 13252 if (ret == 0) 13253 sanitize_dead_code(env); 13254 } 13255 13256 if (ret == 0) 13257 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ 13258 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); 13259 13260 if (ret == 0) 13261 ret = do_misc_fixups(env); 13262 13263 /* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched 13264 * insns could be handled correctly. 13265 */ 13266 if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 13267 ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr); 13268 env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret 13269 : false; 13270 } 13271 13272 if (ret == 0) 13273 ret = fixup_call_args(env); 13274 13275 env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time; 13276 print_verification_stats(env); 13277 13278 if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) 13279 ret = -ENOSPC; 13280 if (log->level && !log->ubuf) { 13281 ret = -EFAULT; 13282 goto err_release_maps; 13283 } 13284 13285 if (ret) 13286 goto err_release_maps; 13287 13288 if (env->used_map_cnt) { 13289 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ 13290 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, 13291 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), 13292 GFP_KERNEL); 13293 13294 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { 13295 ret = -ENOMEM; 13296 goto err_release_maps; 13297 } 13298 13299 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, 13300 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); 13301 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 13302 } 13303 if (env->used_btf_cnt) { 13304 /* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */ 13305 env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt, 13306 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]), 13307 GFP_KERNEL); 13308 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) { 13309 ret = -ENOMEM; 13310 goto err_release_maps; 13311 } 13312 13313 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs, 13314 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt); 13315 env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt; 13316 } 13317 if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) { 13318 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic 13319 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions 13320 */ 13321 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); 13322 } 13323 13324 adjust_btf_func(env); 13325 13326 err_release_maps: 13327 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) 13328 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release 13329 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them. 13330 */ 13331 release_maps(env); 13332 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) 13333 release_btfs(env); 13334 13335 /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets 13336 for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning 13337 */ 13338 if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 13339 env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0; 13340 13341 *prog = env->prog; 13342 err_unlock: 13343 if (!is_priv) 13344 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 13345 vfree(env->insn_aux_data); 13346 err_free_env: 13347 kfree(env); 13348 return ret; 13349 } 13350