1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com 3 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook 4 * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io 5 */ 6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h> 7 #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h> 8 #include <linux/kernel.h> 9 #include <linux/types.h> 10 #include <linux/slab.h> 11 #include <linux/bpf.h> 12 #include <linux/btf.h> 13 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> 14 #include <linux/filter.h> 15 #include <net/netlink.h> 16 #include <linux/file.h> 17 #include <linux/vmalloc.h> 18 #include <linux/stringify.h> 19 #include <linux/bsearch.h> 20 #include <linux/sort.h> 21 #include <linux/perf_event.h> 22 #include <linux/ctype.h> 23 #include <linux/error-injection.h> 24 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> 25 #include <linux/btf_ids.h> 26 #include <linux/poison.h> 27 #include <linux/module.h> 28 #include <linux/cpumask.h> 29 #include <linux/bpf_mem_alloc.h> 30 #include <net/xdp.h> 31 #include <linux/trace_events.h> 32 #include <linux/kallsyms.h> 33 34 #include "disasm.h" 35 36 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { 37 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \ 38 [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, 39 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) 40 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name) 41 #include <linux/bpf_types.h> 42 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE 43 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE 44 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE 45 }; 46 47 enum bpf_features { 48 BPF_FEAT_RDONLY_CAST_TO_VOID = 0, 49 BPF_FEAT_STREAMS = 1, 50 __MAX_BPF_FEAT, 51 }; 52 53 struct bpf_mem_alloc bpf_global_percpu_ma; 54 static bool bpf_global_percpu_ma_set; 55 56 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program 57 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. 58 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. 59 * 60 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. 61 * It rejects the following programs: 62 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns 63 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) 64 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) 65 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps 66 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. 67 * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the 68 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of 69 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. 70 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k 71 * 72 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction 73 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. 74 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is 75 * copied to R1. 76 * 77 * All registers are 64-bit. 78 * R0 - return register 79 * R1-R5 argument passing registers 80 * R6-R9 callee saved registers 81 * R10 - frame pointer read-only 82 * 83 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context 84 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. 85 * 86 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: 87 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), 88 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), 89 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 90 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize 91 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. 92 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK 93 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). 94 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. 95 * 96 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which 97 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. 98 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) 99 * 100 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register 101 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are 102 * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function. 103 * 104 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' 105 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. 106 * 107 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against 108 * function argument constraints. 109 * 110 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. 111 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be 112 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as 113 * 'pointer to map element key' 114 * 115 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): 116 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, 117 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, 118 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 119 * 120 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' 121 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and 122 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside 123 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. 124 * 125 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: 126 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) 127 * { 128 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; 129 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; 130 * void *value; 131 * 132 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that 133 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on 134 * the stack of eBPF program. 135 * } 136 * 137 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: 138 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR 139 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK 140 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP 141 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), 142 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: 143 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, 144 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes 145 * 146 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, 147 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits 148 * and were initialized prior to this call. 149 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at 150 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets 151 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function 152 * returns either pointer to map value or NULL. 153 * 154 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' 155 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to 156 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false 157 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). 158 * 159 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 160 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. 161 * 162 * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel 163 * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by 164 * the BPF program: 165 * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET 166 * 167 * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a 168 * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state. 169 * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into 170 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type 171 * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is 172 * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference. 173 * 174 * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as 175 * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as 176 * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function, 177 * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased 178 * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it. 179 */ 180 181 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ 182 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { 183 /* verifier state is 'st' 184 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' 185 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' 186 */ 187 struct bpf_verifier_state st; 188 int insn_idx; 189 int prev_insn_idx; 190 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; 191 /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */ 192 u32 log_pos; 193 }; 194 195 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192 196 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64 197 198 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON (1ULL << 63) 199 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN (1ULL << 62) 200 201 #define BPF_GLOBAL_PERCPU_MA_MAX_SIZE 512 202 203 #define BPF_PRIV_STACK_MIN_SIZE 64 204 205 static int acquire_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); 206 static int release_reference_nomark(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int ref_obj_id); 207 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id); 208 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 209 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 210 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 211 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 212 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 213 214 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 215 { 216 return aux->map_ptr_state.poison; 217 } 218 219 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 220 { 221 return aux->map_ptr_state.unpriv; 222 } 223 224 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 225 struct bpf_map *map, 226 bool unpriv, bool poison) 227 { 228 unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux); 229 aux->map_ptr_state.unpriv = unpriv; 230 aux->map_ptr_state.poison = poison; 231 aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr = map; 232 } 233 234 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 235 { 236 return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON; 237 } 238 239 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 240 { 241 return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN); 242 } 243 244 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 245 { 246 return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 247 } 248 249 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state) 250 { 251 bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux); 252 253 aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | 254 (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL); 255 } 256 257 static bool bpf_helper_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 258 { 259 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 260 insn->src_reg == 0; 261 } 262 263 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 264 { 265 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 266 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; 267 } 268 269 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 270 { 271 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 272 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL; 273 } 274 275 struct bpf_call_arg_meta { 276 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 277 bool raw_mode; 278 bool pkt_access; 279 u8 release_regno; 280 int regno; 281 int access_size; 282 int mem_size; 283 u64 msize_max_value; 284 int ref_obj_id; 285 int dynptr_id; 286 int map_uid; 287 int func_id; 288 struct btf *btf; 289 u32 btf_id; 290 struct btf *ret_btf; 291 u32 ret_btf_id; 292 u32 subprogno; 293 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 294 s64 const_map_key; 295 }; 296 297 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta { 298 /* In parameters */ 299 struct btf *btf; 300 u32 func_id; 301 u32 kfunc_flags; 302 const struct btf_type *func_proto; 303 const char *func_name; 304 /* Out parameters */ 305 u32 ref_obj_id; 306 u8 release_regno; 307 bool r0_rdonly; 308 u32 ret_btf_id; 309 u64 r0_size; 310 u32 subprogno; 311 struct { 312 u64 value; 313 bool found; 314 } arg_constant; 315 316 /* arg_{btf,btf_id,owning_ref} are used by kfunc-specific handling, 317 * generally to pass info about user-defined local kptr types to later 318 * verification logic 319 * bpf_obj_drop/bpf_percpu_obj_drop 320 * Record the local kptr type to be drop'd 321 * bpf_refcount_acquire (via KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR arg type) 322 * Record the local kptr type to be refcount_incr'd and use 323 * arg_owning_ref to determine whether refcount_acquire should be 324 * fallible 325 */ 326 struct btf *arg_btf; 327 u32 arg_btf_id; 328 bool arg_owning_ref; 329 bool arg_prog; 330 331 struct { 332 struct btf_field *field; 333 } arg_list_head; 334 struct { 335 struct btf_field *field; 336 } arg_rbtree_root; 337 struct { 338 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 339 u32 id; 340 u32 ref_obj_id; 341 } initialized_dynptr; 342 struct { 343 u8 spi; 344 u8 frameno; 345 } iter; 346 struct { 347 struct bpf_map *ptr; 348 int uid; 349 } map; 350 u64 mem_size; 351 }; 352 353 struct btf *btf_vmlinux; 354 355 static const char *btf_type_name(const struct btf *btf, u32 id) 356 { 357 return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off); 358 } 359 360 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); 361 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_percpu_ma_lock); 362 363 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...) 364 { 365 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data; 366 va_list args; 367 368 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 369 return; 370 371 va_start(args, fmt); 372 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 373 va_end(args); 374 } 375 376 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 377 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 378 struct bpf_retval_range range, const char *ctx, 379 const char *reg_name) 380 { 381 bool unknown = true; 382 383 verbose(env, "%s the register %s has", ctx, reg_name); 384 if (reg->smin_value > S64_MIN) { 385 verbose(env, " smin=%lld", reg->smin_value); 386 unknown = false; 387 } 388 if (reg->smax_value < S64_MAX) { 389 verbose(env, " smax=%lld", reg->smax_value); 390 unknown = false; 391 } 392 if (unknown) 393 verbose(env, " unknown scalar value"); 394 verbose(env, " should have been in [%d, %d]\n", range.minval, range.maxval); 395 } 396 397 static bool reg_not_null(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 398 { 399 enum bpf_reg_type type; 400 401 type = reg->type; 402 if (type_may_be_null(type)) 403 return false; 404 405 type = base_type(type); 406 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 407 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 408 type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 409 type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 410 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 411 (type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && is_trusted_reg(reg)) || 412 (type == PTR_TO_MEM && !(reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) || 413 type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 414 } 415 416 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 417 { 418 struct btf_record *rec = NULL; 419 struct btf_struct_meta *meta; 420 421 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 422 rec = reg->map_ptr->record; 423 } else if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 424 meta = btf_find_struct_meta(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 425 if (meta) 426 rec = meta->record; 427 } 428 return rec; 429 } 430 431 static bool subprog_is_global(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 432 { 433 struct bpf_func_info_aux *aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux; 434 435 return aux && aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL; 436 } 437 438 static const char *subprog_name(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 439 { 440 struct bpf_func_info *info; 441 442 if (!env->prog->aux->func_info) 443 return ""; 444 445 info = &env->prog->aux->func_info[subprog]; 446 return btf_type_name(env->prog->aux->btf, info->type_id); 447 } 448 449 static void mark_subprog_exc_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 450 { 451 struct bpf_subprog_info *info = subprog_info(env, subprog); 452 453 info->is_cb = true; 454 info->is_async_cb = true; 455 info->is_exception_cb = true; 456 } 457 458 static bool subprog_is_exc_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 459 { 460 return subprog_info(env, subprog)->is_exception_cb; 461 } 462 463 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 464 { 465 return btf_record_has_field(reg_btf_record(reg), BPF_SPIN_LOCK | BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK); 466 } 467 468 static bool type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type) 469 { 470 return type & MEM_RDONLY; 471 } 472 473 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 474 const struct bpf_map *map) 475 { 476 enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC; 477 478 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || 479 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || 480 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || 481 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve || 482 func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 483 return true; 484 485 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 486 (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 487 map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)) 488 return true; 489 490 return false; 491 } 492 493 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 494 { 495 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock || 496 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock || 497 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock || 498 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock || 499 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock || 500 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_mptcp_sock || 501 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock || 502 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock; 503 } 504 505 static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 506 { 507 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data; 508 } 509 510 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 511 static bool is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 512 static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 513 static bool is_bpf_throw_kfunc(struct bpf_insn *insn); 514 515 static bool is_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 516 static bool is_task_work_add_kfunc(u32 func_id); 517 518 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 519 { 520 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 521 func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma || 522 func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop || 523 func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain; 524 } 525 526 static bool is_async_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 527 { 528 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback; 529 } 530 531 static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 532 { 533 return is_sync_callback_calling_function(func_id) || 534 is_async_callback_calling_function(func_id); 535 } 536 537 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn) 538 { 539 return (bpf_helper_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) || 540 (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)); 541 } 542 543 static bool is_async_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn) 544 { 545 return (bpf_helper_call(insn) && is_async_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) || 546 (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)); 547 } 548 549 static bool is_async_cb_sleepable(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 550 { 551 /* bpf_timer callbacks are never sleepable. */ 552 if (bpf_helper_call(insn) && insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) 553 return false; 554 555 /* bpf_wq and bpf_task_work callbacks are always sleepable. */ 556 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && insn->off == 0 && 557 (is_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl_kfunc(insn->imm) || is_task_work_add_kfunc(insn->imm))) 558 return true; 559 560 verifier_bug(env, "unhandled async callback in is_async_cb_sleepable"); 561 return false; 562 } 563 564 static bool is_may_goto_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn) 565 { 566 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND) && insn->src_reg == BPF_MAY_GOTO; 567 } 568 569 static bool is_may_goto_insn_at(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 570 { 571 return is_may_goto_insn(&env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]); 572 } 573 574 static bool is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 575 { 576 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get || 577 func_id == BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get || 578 func_id == BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get || 579 func_id == BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get; 580 } 581 582 static bool helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 583 const struct bpf_map *map) 584 { 585 int ref_obj_uses = 0; 586 587 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) 588 ref_obj_uses++; 589 if (is_acquire_function(func_id, map)) 590 ref_obj_uses++; 591 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 592 ref_obj_uses++; 593 594 return ref_obj_uses > 1; 595 } 596 597 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 598 { 599 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 600 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 601 insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG; 602 } 603 604 static bool is_atomic_load_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 605 { 606 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 607 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 608 insn->imm == BPF_LOAD_ACQ; 609 } 610 611 static int __get_spi(s32 off) 612 { 613 return (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 614 } 615 616 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 617 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 618 { 619 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 620 621 return cur->frame[reg->frameno]; 622 } 623 624 static bool is_spi_bounds_valid(struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi, int nr_slots) 625 { 626 int allocated_slots = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 627 628 /* We need to check that slots between [spi - nr_slots + 1, spi] are 629 * within [0, allocated_stack). 630 * 631 * Please note that the spi grows downwards. For example, a dynptr 632 * takes the size of two stack slots; the first slot will be at 633 * spi and the second slot will be at spi - 1. 634 */ 635 return spi - nr_slots + 1 >= 0 && spi < allocated_slots; 636 } 637 638 static int stack_slot_obj_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 639 const char *obj_kind, int nr_slots) 640 { 641 int off, spi; 642 643 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 644 verbose(env, "%s has to be at a constant offset\n", obj_kind); 645 return -EINVAL; 646 } 647 648 off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 649 if (off % BPF_REG_SIZE) { 650 verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off); 651 return -EINVAL; 652 } 653 654 spi = __get_spi(off); 655 if (spi + 1 < nr_slots) { 656 verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off); 657 return -EINVAL; 658 } 659 660 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(func(env, reg), spi, nr_slots)) 661 return -ERANGE; 662 return spi; 663 } 664 665 static int dynptr_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 666 { 667 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "dynptr", BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS); 668 } 669 670 static int iter_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 671 { 672 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "iter", nr_slots); 673 } 674 675 static int irq_flag_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 676 { 677 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "irq_flag", 1); 678 } 679 680 static enum bpf_dynptr_type arg_to_dynptr_type(enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 681 { 682 switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) { 683 case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 684 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 685 case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 686 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 687 case DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 688 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 689 case DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 690 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 691 case DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META: 692 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META; 693 case DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE: 694 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE; 695 default: 696 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 697 } 698 } 699 700 static enum bpf_type_flag get_dynptr_type_flag(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 701 { 702 switch (type) { 703 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 704 return DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 705 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 706 return DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 707 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB: 708 return DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 709 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP: 710 return DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 711 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META: 712 return DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META; 713 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE: 714 return DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE; 715 default: 716 return 0; 717 } 718 } 719 720 static bool dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 721 { 722 return type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF || type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE; 723 } 724 725 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 726 enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 727 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id); 728 729 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 730 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 731 732 static void mark_dynptr_stack_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 733 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg1, 734 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg2, 735 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 736 { 737 int id = ++env->id_gen; 738 739 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg1, type, true, id); 740 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg2, type, false, id); 741 } 742 743 static void mark_dynptr_cb_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 744 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 745 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 746 { 747 __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, type, true, ++env->id_gen); 748 } 749 750 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 751 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi); 752 753 static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 754 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx, int clone_ref_obj_id) 755 { 756 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 757 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 758 int spi, i, err; 759 760 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 761 if (spi < 0) 762 return spi; 763 764 /* We cannot assume both spi and spi - 1 belong to the same dynptr, 765 * hence we need to call destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot twice for both, 766 * to ensure that for the following example: 767 * [d1][d1][d2][d2] 768 * spi 3 2 1 0 769 * So marking spi = 2 should lead to destruction of both d1 and d2. In 770 * case they do belong to same dynptr, second call won't see slot_type 771 * as STACK_DYNPTR and will simply skip destruction. 772 */ 773 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 774 if (err) 775 return err; 776 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi - 1); 777 if (err) 778 return err; 779 780 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 781 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 782 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 783 } 784 785 type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 786 if (type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 787 return -EINVAL; 788 789 mark_dynptr_stack_regs(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 790 &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, type); 791 792 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(type)) { 793 /* The id is used to track proper releasing */ 794 int id; 795 796 if (clone_ref_obj_id) 797 id = clone_ref_obj_id; 798 else 799 id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx); 800 801 if (id < 0) 802 return id; 803 804 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 805 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 806 } 807 808 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - 1) | BIT(spi)); 809 810 return 0; 811 } 812 813 static void invalidate_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi) 814 { 815 int i; 816 817 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 818 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 819 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 820 } 821 822 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 823 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 824 825 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - 1) | BIT(spi)); 826 } 827 828 static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 829 { 830 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 831 int spi, ref_obj_id, i; 832 833 /* 834 * This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot 835 * be released by any dynptr helper. Hence, unmark_stack_slots_dynptr 836 * is safe to do directly. 837 */ 838 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 839 verifier_bug(env, "CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be released"); 840 return -EFAULT; 841 } 842 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 843 if (spi < 0) 844 return spi; 845 846 if (!dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) { 847 invalidate_dynptr(env, state, spi); 848 return 0; 849 } 850 851 ref_obj_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 852 853 /* If the dynptr has a ref_obj_id, then we need to invalidate 854 * two things: 855 * 856 * 1) Any dynptrs with a matching ref_obj_id (clones) 857 * 2) Any slices derived from this dynptr. 858 */ 859 860 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 861 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, ref_obj_id)); 862 863 /* Invalidate any dynptr clones */ 864 for (i = 1; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 865 if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id != ref_obj_id) 866 continue; 867 868 /* it should always be the case that if the ref obj id 869 * matches then the stack slot also belongs to a 870 * dynptr 871 */ 872 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) { 873 verifier_bug(env, "misconfigured ref_obj_id"); 874 return -EFAULT; 875 } 876 if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 877 invalidate_dynptr(env, state, i); 878 } 879 880 return 0; 881 } 882 883 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 884 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 885 886 static void mark_reg_invalid(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 887 { 888 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 889 __mark_reg_not_init(env, reg); 890 else 891 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 892 } 893 894 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 895 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi) 896 { 897 struct bpf_func_state *fstate; 898 struct bpf_reg_state *dreg; 899 int i, dynptr_id; 900 901 /* We always ensure that STACK_DYNPTR is never set partially, 902 * hence just checking for slot_type[0] is enough. This is 903 * different for STACK_SPILL, where it may be only set for 904 * 1 byte, so code has to use is_spilled_reg. 905 */ 906 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) 907 return 0; 908 909 /* Reposition spi to first slot */ 910 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 911 spi = spi + 1; 912 913 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) { 914 verbose(env, "cannot overwrite referenced dynptr\n"); 915 return -EINVAL; 916 } 917 918 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 919 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - 1); 920 921 /* Writing partially to one dynptr stack slot destroys both. */ 922 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 923 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 924 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 925 } 926 927 dynptr_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 928 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 929 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, fstate, dreg, ({ 930 /* Dynptr slices are only PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL and PTR_TO_MEM */ 931 if (dreg->type != (PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && dreg->type != PTR_TO_MEM) 932 continue; 933 if (dreg->dynptr_id == dynptr_id) 934 mark_reg_invalid(env, dreg); 935 })); 936 937 /* Do not release reference state, we are destroying dynptr on stack, 938 * not using some helper to release it. Just reset register. 939 */ 940 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 941 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 942 943 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - 1) | BIT(spi)); 944 945 return 0; 946 } 947 948 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 949 { 950 int spi; 951 952 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 953 return false; 954 955 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 956 957 /* -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots) isn't an 958 * error because this just means the stack state hasn't been updated yet. 959 * We will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later. 960 */ 961 if (spi < 0 && spi != -ERANGE) 962 return false; 963 964 /* We don't need to check if the stack slots are marked by previous 965 * dynptr initializations because we allow overwriting existing unreferenced 966 * STACK_DYNPTR slots, see mark_stack_slots_dynptr which calls 967 * destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot to ensure dynptr objects at the slots we are 968 * touching are completely destructed before we reinitialize them for a new 969 * one. For referenced ones, destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot returns an error early 970 * instead of delaying it until the end where the user will get "Unreleased 971 * reference" error. 972 */ 973 return true; 974 } 975 976 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 977 { 978 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 979 int i, spi; 980 981 /* This already represents first slot of initialized bpf_dynptr. 982 * 983 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR already has fixed and var_off as 0 due to 984 * check_func_arg_reg_off's logic, so we don't need to check its 985 * offset and alignment. 986 */ 987 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 988 return true; 989 990 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 991 if (spi < 0) 992 return false; 993 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 994 return false; 995 996 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 997 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR || 998 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR) 999 return false; 1000 } 1001 1002 return true; 1003 } 1004 1005 static bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1006 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 1007 { 1008 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1009 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 1010 int spi; 1011 1012 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR takes any type of dynptr */ 1013 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 1014 return true; 1015 1016 dynptr_type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 1017 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 1018 return reg->dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 1019 } else { 1020 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 1021 if (spi < 0) 1022 return false; 1023 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 1024 } 1025 } 1026 1027 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 1028 1029 static bool in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 1030 1031 static bool is_kfunc_rcu_protected(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta); 1032 1033 static int mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1034 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 1035 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int insn_idx, 1036 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots) 1037 { 1038 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1039 int spi, i, j, id; 1040 1041 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1042 if (spi < 0) 1043 return spi; 1044 1045 id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx); 1046 if (id < 0) 1047 return id; 1048 1049 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1050 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1051 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1052 1053 __mark_reg_known_zero(st); 1054 st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */ 1055 if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(meta)) { 1056 if (in_rcu_cs(env)) 1057 st->type |= MEM_RCU; 1058 else 1059 st->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 1060 } 1061 st->ref_obj_id = i == 0 ? id : 0; 1062 st->iter.btf = btf; 1063 st->iter.btf_id = btf_id; 1064 st->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE; 1065 st->iter.depth = 0; 1066 1067 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1068 slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_ITER; 1069 1070 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - i)); 1071 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 1072 } 1073 1074 return 0; 1075 } 1076 1077 static int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1078 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 1079 { 1080 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1081 int spi, i, j; 1082 1083 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1084 if (spi < 0) 1085 return spi; 1086 1087 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1088 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1089 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1090 1091 if (i == 0) 1092 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, st->ref_obj_id)); 1093 1094 __mark_reg_not_init(env, st); 1095 1096 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1097 slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 1098 1099 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - i)); 1100 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 1101 } 1102 1103 return 0; 1104 } 1105 1106 static bool is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1107 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots) 1108 { 1109 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1110 int spi, i, j; 1111 1112 /* For -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots), we 1113 * will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later, so 1114 * return true for that case. 1115 */ 1116 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1117 if (spi == -ERANGE) 1118 return true; 1119 if (spi < 0) 1120 return false; 1121 1122 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1123 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1124 1125 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1126 if (slot->slot_type[j] == STACK_ITER) 1127 return false; 1128 } 1129 1130 return true; 1131 } 1132 1133 static int is_iter_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1134 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots) 1135 { 1136 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1137 int spi, i, j; 1138 1139 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 1140 if (spi < 0) 1141 return -EINVAL; 1142 1143 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 1144 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i]; 1145 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1146 1147 if (st->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) 1148 return -EPROTO; 1149 /* only main (first) slot has ref_obj_id set */ 1150 if (i == 0 && !st->ref_obj_id) 1151 return -EINVAL; 1152 if (i != 0 && st->ref_obj_id) 1153 return -EINVAL; 1154 if (st->iter.btf != btf || st->iter.btf_id != btf_id) 1155 return -EINVAL; 1156 1157 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 1158 if (slot->slot_type[j] != STACK_ITER) 1159 return -EINVAL; 1160 } 1161 1162 return 0; 1163 } 1164 1165 static int acquire_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); 1166 static int release_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int id); 1167 1168 static int mark_stack_slot_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1169 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 1170 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int insn_idx, 1171 int kfunc_class) 1172 { 1173 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1174 struct bpf_stack_state *slot; 1175 struct bpf_reg_state *st; 1176 int spi, i, id; 1177 1178 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg); 1179 if (spi < 0) 1180 return spi; 1181 1182 id = acquire_irq_state(env, insn_idx); 1183 if (id < 0) 1184 return id; 1185 1186 slot = &state->stack[spi]; 1187 st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1188 1189 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, reg->frameno, BIT(spi)); 1190 __mark_reg_known_zero(st); 1191 st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */ 1192 st->ref_obj_id = id; 1193 st->irq.kfunc_class = kfunc_class; 1194 1195 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 1196 slot->slot_type[i] = STACK_IRQ_FLAG; 1197 1198 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 1199 return 0; 1200 } 1201 1202 static int unmark_stack_slot_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1203 int kfunc_class) 1204 { 1205 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1206 struct bpf_stack_state *slot; 1207 struct bpf_reg_state *st; 1208 int spi, i, err; 1209 1210 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg); 1211 if (spi < 0) 1212 return spi; 1213 1214 slot = &state->stack[spi]; 1215 st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1216 1217 if (st->irq.kfunc_class != kfunc_class) { 1218 const char *flag_kfunc = st->irq.kfunc_class == IRQ_NATIVE_KFUNC ? "native" : "lock"; 1219 const char *used_kfunc = kfunc_class == IRQ_NATIVE_KFUNC ? "native" : "lock"; 1220 1221 verbose(env, "irq flag acquired by %s kfuncs cannot be restored with %s kfuncs\n", 1222 flag_kfunc, used_kfunc); 1223 return -EINVAL; 1224 } 1225 1226 err = release_irq_state(env->cur_state, st->ref_obj_id); 1227 WARN_ON_ONCE(err && err != -EACCES); 1228 if (err) { 1229 int insn_idx = 0; 1230 1231 for (int i = 0; i < env->cur_state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1232 if (env->cur_state->refs[i].id == env->cur_state->active_irq_id) { 1233 insn_idx = env->cur_state->refs[i].insn_idx; 1234 break; 1235 } 1236 } 1237 1238 verbose(env, "cannot restore irq state out of order, expected id=%d acquired at insn_idx=%d\n", 1239 env->cur_state->active_irq_id, insn_idx); 1240 return err; 1241 } 1242 1243 __mark_reg_not_init(env, st); 1244 1245 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, reg->frameno, BIT(spi)); 1246 1247 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 1248 slot->slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 1249 1250 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 1251 return 0; 1252 } 1253 1254 static bool is_irq_flag_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1255 { 1256 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1257 struct bpf_stack_state *slot; 1258 int spi, i; 1259 1260 /* For -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots), we 1261 * will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later, so 1262 * return true for that case. 1263 */ 1264 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg); 1265 if (spi == -ERANGE) 1266 return true; 1267 if (spi < 0) 1268 return false; 1269 1270 slot = &state->stack[spi]; 1271 1272 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 1273 if (slot->slot_type[i] == STACK_IRQ_FLAG) 1274 return false; 1275 return true; 1276 } 1277 1278 static int is_irq_flag_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1279 { 1280 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 1281 struct bpf_stack_state *slot; 1282 struct bpf_reg_state *st; 1283 int spi, i; 1284 1285 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg); 1286 if (spi < 0) 1287 return -EINVAL; 1288 1289 slot = &state->stack[spi]; 1290 st = &slot->spilled_ptr; 1291 1292 if (!st->ref_obj_id) 1293 return -EINVAL; 1294 1295 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 1296 if (slot->slot_type[i] != STACK_IRQ_FLAG) 1297 return -EINVAL; 1298 return 0; 1299 } 1300 1301 /* Check if given stack slot is "special": 1302 * - spilled register state (STACK_SPILL); 1303 * - dynptr state (STACK_DYNPTR); 1304 * - iter state (STACK_ITER). 1305 * - irq flag state (STACK_IRQ_FLAG) 1306 */ 1307 static bool is_stack_slot_special(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1308 { 1309 enum bpf_stack_slot_type type = stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]; 1310 1311 switch (type) { 1312 case STACK_SPILL: 1313 case STACK_DYNPTR: 1314 case STACK_ITER: 1315 case STACK_IRQ_FLAG: 1316 return true; 1317 case STACK_INVALID: 1318 case STACK_MISC: 1319 case STACK_ZERO: 1320 return false; 1321 default: 1322 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown stack slot type %d\n", type); 1323 return true; 1324 } 1325 } 1326 1327 /* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when 1328 * it was spilled to the stack. 1329 */ 1330 static bool is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1331 { 1332 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL; 1333 } 1334 1335 static bool is_spilled_scalar_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1336 { 1337 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL && 1338 stack->spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE; 1339 } 1340 1341 static bool is_spilled_scalar_reg64(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 1342 { 1343 return stack->slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 1344 stack->spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE; 1345 } 1346 1347 /* Mark stack slot as STACK_MISC, unless it is already STACK_INVALID, in which 1348 * case they are equivalent, or it's STACK_ZERO, in which case we preserve 1349 * more precise STACK_ZERO. 1350 * Regardless of allow_ptr_leaks setting (i.e., privileged or unprivileged 1351 * mode), we won't promote STACK_INVALID to STACK_MISC. In privileged case it is 1352 * unnecessary as both are considered equivalent when loading data and pruning, 1353 * in case of unprivileged mode it will be incorrect to allow reads of invalid 1354 * slots. 1355 */ 1356 static void mark_stack_slot_misc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u8 *stype) 1357 { 1358 if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) 1359 return; 1360 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID) 1361 return; 1362 *stype = STACK_MISC; 1363 } 1364 1365 static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype) 1366 { 1367 if (*stype != STACK_INVALID) 1368 *stype = STACK_MISC; 1369 } 1370 1371 /* copy array src of length n * size bytes to dst. dst is reallocated if it's too 1372 * small to hold src. This is different from krealloc since we don't want to preserve 1373 * the contents of dst. 1374 * 1375 * Leaves dst untouched if src is NULL or length is zero. Returns NULL if memory could 1376 * not be allocated. 1377 */ 1378 static void *copy_array(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags) 1379 { 1380 size_t alloc_bytes; 1381 void *orig = dst; 1382 size_t bytes; 1383 1384 if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(src)) 1385 goto out; 1386 1387 if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes))) 1388 return NULL; 1389 1390 alloc_bytes = max(ksize(orig), kmalloc_size_roundup(bytes)); 1391 dst = krealloc(orig, alloc_bytes, flags); 1392 if (!dst) { 1393 kfree(orig); 1394 return NULL; 1395 } 1396 1397 memcpy(dst, src, bytes); 1398 out: 1399 return dst ? dst : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1400 } 1401 1402 /* resize an array from old_n items to new_n items. the array is reallocated if it's too 1403 * small to hold new_n items. new items are zeroed out if the array grows. 1404 * 1405 * Contrary to krealloc_array, does not free arr if new_n is zero. 1406 */ 1407 static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size) 1408 { 1409 size_t alloc_size; 1410 void *new_arr; 1411 1412 if (!new_n || old_n == new_n) 1413 goto out; 1414 1415 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(new_n, size)); 1416 new_arr = krealloc(arr, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 1417 if (!new_arr) { 1418 kfree(arr); 1419 return NULL; 1420 } 1421 arr = new_arr; 1422 1423 if (new_n > old_n) 1424 memset(arr + old_n * size, 0, (new_n - old_n) * size); 1425 1426 out: 1427 return arr ? arr : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1428 } 1429 1430 static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst, const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) 1431 { 1432 dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs, 1433 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 1434 if (!dst->refs) 1435 return -ENOMEM; 1436 1437 dst->acquired_refs = src->acquired_refs; 1438 dst->active_locks = src->active_locks; 1439 dst->active_preempt_locks = src->active_preempt_locks; 1440 dst->active_rcu_locks = src->active_rcu_locks; 1441 dst->active_irq_id = src->active_irq_id; 1442 dst->active_lock_id = src->active_lock_id; 1443 dst->active_lock_ptr = src->active_lock_ptr; 1444 return 0; 1445 } 1446 1447 static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1448 { 1449 size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1450 1451 dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state), 1452 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 1453 if (!dst->stack) 1454 return -ENOMEM; 1455 1456 dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack; 1457 return 0; 1458 } 1459 1460 static int resize_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, size_t n) 1461 { 1462 state->refs = realloc_array(state->refs, state->acquired_refs, n, 1463 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state)); 1464 if (!state->refs) 1465 return -ENOMEM; 1466 1467 state->acquired_refs = n; 1468 return 0; 1469 } 1470 1471 /* Possibly update state->allocated_stack to be at least size bytes. Also 1472 * possibly update the function's high-water mark in its bpf_subprog_info. 1473 */ 1474 static int grow_stack_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, int size) 1475 { 1476 size_t old_n = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, n; 1477 1478 /* The stack size is always a multiple of BPF_REG_SIZE. */ 1479 size = round_up(size, BPF_REG_SIZE); 1480 n = size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1481 1482 if (old_n >= n) 1483 return 0; 1484 1485 state->stack = realloc_array(state->stack, old_n, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state)); 1486 if (!state->stack) 1487 return -ENOMEM; 1488 1489 state->allocated_stack = size; 1490 1491 /* update known max for given subprogram */ 1492 if (env->subprog_info[state->subprogno].stack_depth < size) 1493 env->subprog_info[state->subprogno].stack_depth = size; 1494 1495 return 0; 1496 } 1497 1498 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include 1499 * this new pointer reference. 1500 * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register 1501 * On failure, returns a negative errno. 1502 */ 1503 static struct bpf_reference_state *acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 1504 { 1505 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 1506 int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs; 1507 int err; 1508 1509 err = resize_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1); 1510 if (err) 1511 return NULL; 1512 state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx; 1513 1514 return &state->refs[new_ofs]; 1515 } 1516 1517 static int acquire_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 1518 { 1519 struct bpf_reference_state *s; 1520 1521 s = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 1522 if (!s) 1523 return -ENOMEM; 1524 s->type = REF_TYPE_PTR; 1525 s->id = ++env->id_gen; 1526 return s->id; 1527 } 1528 1529 static int acquire_lock_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, enum ref_state_type type, 1530 int id, void *ptr) 1531 { 1532 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 1533 struct bpf_reference_state *s; 1534 1535 s = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 1536 if (!s) 1537 return -ENOMEM; 1538 s->type = type; 1539 s->id = id; 1540 s->ptr = ptr; 1541 1542 state->active_locks++; 1543 state->active_lock_id = id; 1544 state->active_lock_ptr = ptr; 1545 return 0; 1546 } 1547 1548 static int acquire_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 1549 { 1550 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 1551 struct bpf_reference_state *s; 1552 1553 s = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 1554 if (!s) 1555 return -ENOMEM; 1556 s->type = REF_TYPE_IRQ; 1557 s->id = ++env->id_gen; 1558 1559 state->active_irq_id = s->id; 1560 return s->id; 1561 } 1562 1563 static void release_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int idx) 1564 { 1565 int last_idx; 1566 size_t rem; 1567 1568 /* IRQ state requires the relative ordering of elements remaining the 1569 * same, since it relies on the refs array to behave as a stack, so that 1570 * it can detect out-of-order IRQ restore. Hence use memmove to shift 1571 * the array instead of swapping the final element into the deleted idx. 1572 */ 1573 last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1; 1574 rem = state->acquired_refs - idx - 1; 1575 if (last_idx && idx != last_idx) 1576 memmove(&state->refs[idx], &state->refs[idx + 1], sizeof(*state->refs) * rem); 1577 memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs)); 1578 state->acquired_refs--; 1579 return; 1580 } 1581 1582 static bool find_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int ptr_id) 1583 { 1584 int i; 1585 1586 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) 1587 if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) 1588 return true; 1589 1590 return false; 1591 } 1592 1593 static int release_lock_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int type, int id, void *ptr) 1594 { 1595 void *prev_ptr = NULL; 1596 u32 prev_id = 0; 1597 int i; 1598 1599 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1600 if (state->refs[i].type == type && state->refs[i].id == id && 1601 state->refs[i].ptr == ptr) { 1602 release_reference_state(state, i); 1603 state->active_locks--; 1604 /* Reassign active lock (id, ptr). */ 1605 state->active_lock_id = prev_id; 1606 state->active_lock_ptr = prev_ptr; 1607 return 0; 1608 } 1609 if (state->refs[i].type & REF_TYPE_LOCK_MASK) { 1610 prev_id = state->refs[i].id; 1611 prev_ptr = state->refs[i].ptr; 1612 } 1613 } 1614 return -EINVAL; 1615 } 1616 1617 static int release_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int id) 1618 { 1619 u32 prev_id = 0; 1620 int i; 1621 1622 if (id != state->active_irq_id) 1623 return -EACCES; 1624 1625 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1626 if (state->refs[i].type != REF_TYPE_IRQ) 1627 continue; 1628 if (state->refs[i].id == id) { 1629 release_reference_state(state, i); 1630 state->active_irq_id = prev_id; 1631 return 0; 1632 } else { 1633 prev_id = state->refs[i].id; 1634 } 1635 } 1636 return -EINVAL; 1637 } 1638 1639 static struct bpf_reference_state *find_lock_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, enum ref_state_type type, 1640 int id, void *ptr) 1641 { 1642 int i; 1643 1644 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1645 struct bpf_reference_state *s = &state->refs[i]; 1646 1647 if (!(s->type & type)) 1648 continue; 1649 1650 if (s->id == id && s->ptr == ptr) 1651 return s; 1652 } 1653 return NULL; 1654 } 1655 1656 static void update_peak_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 1657 { 1658 u32 cur_states; 1659 1660 cur_states = env->explored_states_size + env->free_list_size + env->num_backedges; 1661 env->peak_states = max(env->peak_states, cur_states); 1662 } 1663 1664 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) 1665 { 1666 if (!state) 1667 return; 1668 kfree(state->stack); 1669 kfree(state); 1670 } 1671 1672 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 1673 { 1674 kfree(state->jmp_history); 1675 state->jmp_history = NULL; 1676 state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; 1677 } 1678 1679 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 1680 bool free_self) 1681 { 1682 int i; 1683 1684 for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) { 1685 free_func_state(state->frame[i]); 1686 state->frame[i] = NULL; 1687 } 1688 kfree(state->refs); 1689 clear_jmp_history(state); 1690 if (free_self) 1691 kfree(state); 1692 } 1693 1694 /* struct bpf_verifier_state->parent refers to states 1695 * that are in either of env->{expored_states,free_list}. 1696 * In both cases the state is contained in struct bpf_verifier_state_list. 1697 */ 1698 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list *state_parent_as_list(struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1699 { 1700 if (st->parent) 1701 return container_of(st->parent, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, state); 1702 return NULL; 1703 } 1704 1705 static bool incomplete_read_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1706 struct bpf_verifier_state *st); 1707 1708 /* A state can be freed if it is no longer referenced: 1709 * - is in the env->free_list; 1710 * - has no children states; 1711 */ 1712 static void maybe_free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1713 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl) 1714 { 1715 if (!sl->in_free_list 1716 || sl->state.branches != 0 1717 || incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state)) 1718 return; 1719 list_del(&sl->node); 1720 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 1721 kfree(sl); 1722 env->free_list_size--; 1723 } 1724 1725 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space 1726 * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack 1727 */ 1728 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, 1729 const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1730 { 1731 memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, stack)); 1732 return copy_stack_state(dst, src); 1733 } 1734 1735 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, 1736 const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) 1737 { 1738 struct bpf_func_state *dst; 1739 int i, err; 1740 1741 dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, 1742 src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(*dst_state->jmp_history), 1743 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 1744 if (!dst_state->jmp_history) 1745 return -ENOMEM; 1746 dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; 1747 1748 /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them, this is also 1749 * necessary in case of exceptional exits using bpf_throw. 1750 */ 1751 for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { 1752 free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); 1753 dst_state->frame[i] = NULL; 1754 } 1755 err = copy_reference_state(dst_state, src); 1756 if (err) 1757 return err; 1758 dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; 1759 dst_state->in_sleepable = src->in_sleepable; 1760 dst_state->cleaned = src->cleaned; 1761 dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; 1762 dst_state->branches = src->branches; 1763 dst_state->parent = src->parent; 1764 dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; 1765 dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; 1766 dst_state->dfs_depth = src->dfs_depth; 1767 dst_state->callback_unroll_depth = src->callback_unroll_depth; 1768 dst_state->may_goto_depth = src->may_goto_depth; 1769 dst_state->equal_state = src->equal_state; 1770 for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { 1771 dst = dst_state->frame[i]; 1772 if (!dst) { 1773 dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 1774 if (!dst) 1775 return -ENOMEM; 1776 dst_state->frame[i] = dst; 1777 } 1778 err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]); 1779 if (err) 1780 return err; 1781 } 1782 return 0; 1783 } 1784 1785 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 1786 { 1787 return env->prog->len; 1788 } 1789 1790 static struct list_head *explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 1791 { 1792 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1793 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 1794 1795 return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)]; 1796 } 1797 1798 static bool same_callsites(struct bpf_verifier_state *a, struct bpf_verifier_state *b) 1799 { 1800 int fr; 1801 1802 if (a->curframe != b->curframe) 1803 return false; 1804 1805 for (fr = a->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) 1806 if (a->frame[fr]->callsite != b->frame[fr]->callsite) 1807 return false; 1808 1809 return true; 1810 } 1811 1812 /* Return IP for a given frame in a call stack */ 1813 static u32 frame_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, u32 frame) 1814 { 1815 return frame == st->curframe 1816 ? st->insn_idx 1817 : st->frame[frame + 1]->callsite; 1818 } 1819 1820 /* For state @st look for a topmost frame with frame_insn_idx() in some SCC, 1821 * if such frame exists form a corresponding @callchain as an array of 1822 * call sites leading to this frame and SCC id. 1823 * E.g.: 1824 * 1825 * void foo() { A: loop {... SCC#1 ...}; } 1826 * void bar() { B: loop { C: foo(); ... SCC#2 ... } 1827 * D: loop { E: foo(); ... SCC#3 ... } } 1828 * void main() { F: bar(); } 1829 * 1830 * @callchain at (A) would be either (F,SCC#2) or (F,SCC#3) depending 1831 * on @st frame call sites being (F,C,A) or (F,E,A). 1832 */ 1833 static bool compute_scc_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1834 struct bpf_verifier_state *st, 1835 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain) 1836 { 1837 u32 i, scc, insn_idx; 1838 1839 memset(callchain, 0, sizeof(*callchain)); 1840 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 1841 insn_idx = frame_insn_idx(st, i); 1842 scc = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].scc; 1843 if (scc) { 1844 callchain->scc = scc; 1845 break; 1846 } else if (i < st->curframe) { 1847 callchain->callsites[i] = insn_idx; 1848 } else { 1849 return false; 1850 } 1851 } 1852 return true; 1853 } 1854 1855 /* Check if bpf_scc_visit instance for @callchain exists. */ 1856 static struct bpf_scc_visit *scc_visit_lookup(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1857 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain) 1858 { 1859 struct bpf_scc_info *info = env->scc_info[callchain->scc]; 1860 struct bpf_scc_visit *visits = info->visits; 1861 u32 i; 1862 1863 if (!info) 1864 return NULL; 1865 for (i = 0; i < info->num_visits; i++) 1866 if (memcmp(callchain, &visits[i].callchain, sizeof(*callchain)) == 0) 1867 return &visits[i]; 1868 return NULL; 1869 } 1870 1871 /* Allocate a new bpf_scc_visit instance corresponding to @callchain. 1872 * Allocated instances are alive for a duration of the do_check_common() 1873 * call and are freed by free_states(). 1874 */ 1875 static struct bpf_scc_visit *scc_visit_alloc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1876 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain) 1877 { 1878 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; 1879 struct bpf_scc_info *info; 1880 u32 scc, num_visits; 1881 u64 new_sz; 1882 1883 scc = callchain->scc; 1884 info = env->scc_info[scc]; 1885 num_visits = info ? info->num_visits : 0; 1886 new_sz = sizeof(*info) + sizeof(struct bpf_scc_visit) * (num_visits + 1); 1887 info = kvrealloc(env->scc_info[scc], new_sz, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 1888 if (!info) 1889 return NULL; 1890 env->scc_info[scc] = info; 1891 info->num_visits = num_visits + 1; 1892 visit = &info->visits[num_visits]; 1893 memset(visit, 0, sizeof(*visit)); 1894 memcpy(&visit->callchain, callchain, sizeof(*callchain)); 1895 return visit; 1896 } 1897 1898 /* Form a string '(callsite#1,callsite#2,...,scc)' in env->tmp_str_buf */ 1899 static char *format_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain) 1900 { 1901 char *buf = env->tmp_str_buf; 1902 int i, delta = 0; 1903 1904 delta += snprintf(buf + delta, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN - delta, "("); 1905 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(callchain->callsites); i++) { 1906 if (!callchain->callsites[i]) 1907 break; 1908 delta += snprintf(buf + delta, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN - delta, "%u,", 1909 callchain->callsites[i]); 1910 } 1911 delta += snprintf(buf + delta, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN - delta, "%u)", callchain->scc); 1912 return env->tmp_str_buf; 1913 } 1914 1915 /* If callchain for @st exists (@st is in some SCC), ensure that 1916 * bpf_scc_visit instance for this callchain exists. 1917 * If instance does not exist or is empty, assign visit->entry_state to @st. 1918 */ 1919 static int maybe_enter_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1920 { 1921 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf; 1922 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; 1923 1924 if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) 1925 return 0; 1926 visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain); 1927 visit = visit ?: scc_visit_alloc(env, callchain); 1928 if (!visit) 1929 return -ENOMEM; 1930 if (!visit->entry_state) { 1931 visit->entry_state = st; 1932 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 1933 verbose(env, "SCC enter %s\n", format_callchain(env, callchain)); 1934 } 1935 return 0; 1936 } 1937 1938 static int propagate_backedges(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_scc_visit *visit); 1939 1940 /* If callchain for @st exists (@st is in some SCC), make it empty: 1941 * - set visit->entry_state to NULL; 1942 * - flush accumulated backedges. 1943 */ 1944 static int maybe_exit_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1945 { 1946 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf; 1947 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; 1948 1949 if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) 1950 return 0; 1951 visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain); 1952 if (!visit) { 1953 /* 1954 * If path traversal stops inside an SCC, corresponding bpf_scc_visit 1955 * must exist for non-speculative paths. For non-speculative paths 1956 * traversal stops when: 1957 * a. Verification error is found, maybe_exit_scc() is not called. 1958 * b. Top level BPF_EXIT is reached. Top level BPF_EXIT is not a member 1959 * of any SCC. 1960 * c. A checkpoint is reached and matched. Checkpoints are created by 1961 * is_state_visited(), which calls maybe_enter_scc(), which allocates 1962 * bpf_scc_visit instances for checkpoints within SCCs. 1963 * (c) is the only case that can reach this point. 1964 */ 1965 if (!st->speculative) { 1966 verifier_bug(env, "scc exit: no visit info for call chain %s", 1967 format_callchain(env, callchain)); 1968 return -EFAULT; 1969 } 1970 return 0; 1971 } 1972 if (visit->entry_state != st) 1973 return 0; 1974 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 1975 verbose(env, "SCC exit %s\n", format_callchain(env, callchain)); 1976 visit->entry_state = NULL; 1977 env->num_backedges -= visit->num_backedges; 1978 visit->num_backedges = 0; 1979 update_peak_states(env); 1980 return propagate_backedges(env, visit); 1981 } 1982 1983 /* Lookup an bpf_scc_visit instance corresponding to @st callchain 1984 * and add @backedge to visit->backedges. @st callchain must exist. 1985 */ 1986 static int add_scc_backedge(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1987 struct bpf_verifier_state *st, 1988 struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge) 1989 { 1990 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf; 1991 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; 1992 1993 if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) { 1994 verifier_bug(env, "add backedge: no SCC in verification path, insn_idx %d", 1995 st->insn_idx); 1996 return -EFAULT; 1997 } 1998 visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain); 1999 if (!visit) { 2000 verifier_bug(env, "add backedge: no visit info for call chain %s", 2001 format_callchain(env, callchain)); 2002 return -EFAULT; 2003 } 2004 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 2005 verbose(env, "SCC backedge %s\n", format_callchain(env, callchain)); 2006 backedge->next = visit->backedges; 2007 visit->backedges = backedge; 2008 visit->num_backedges++; 2009 env->num_backedges++; 2010 update_peak_states(env); 2011 return 0; 2012 } 2013 2014 /* bpf_reg_state->live marks for registers in a state @st are incomplete, 2015 * if state @st is in some SCC and not all execution paths starting at this 2016 * SCC are fully explored. 2017 */ 2018 static bool incomplete_read_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2019 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 2020 { 2021 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf; 2022 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; 2023 2024 if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) 2025 return false; 2026 visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain); 2027 if (!visit) 2028 return false; 2029 return !!visit->backedges; 2030 } 2031 2032 static void free_backedges(struct bpf_scc_visit *visit) 2033 { 2034 struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge, *next; 2035 2036 for (backedge = visit->backedges; backedge; backedge = next) { 2037 free_verifier_state(&backedge->state, false); 2038 next = backedge->next; 2039 kfree(backedge); 2040 } 2041 visit->backedges = NULL; 2042 } 2043 2044 static int update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 2045 { 2046 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl = NULL, *parent_sl; 2047 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent; 2048 int err; 2049 2050 while (st) { 2051 u32 br = --st->branches; 2052 2053 /* verifier_bug_if(br > 1, ...) technically makes sense here, 2054 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: 2055 */ 2056 verifier_bug_if((int)br < 0, env, "%s:branches_to_explore=%d", __func__, br); 2057 if (br) 2058 break; 2059 err = maybe_exit_scc(env, st); 2060 if (err) 2061 return err; 2062 parent = st->parent; 2063 parent_sl = state_parent_as_list(st); 2064 if (sl) 2065 maybe_free_verifier_state(env, sl); 2066 st = parent; 2067 sl = parent_sl; 2068 } 2069 return 0; 2070 } 2071 2072 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, 2073 int *insn_idx, bool pop_log) 2074 { 2075 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 2076 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; 2077 int err; 2078 2079 if (env->head == NULL) 2080 return -ENOENT; 2081 2082 if (cur) { 2083 err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st); 2084 if (err) 2085 return err; 2086 } 2087 if (pop_log) 2088 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos); 2089 if (insn_idx) 2090 *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; 2091 if (prev_insn_idx) 2092 *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx; 2093 elem = head->next; 2094 free_verifier_state(&head->st, false); 2095 kfree(head); 2096 env->head = elem; 2097 env->stack_size--; 2098 return 0; 2099 } 2100 2101 static bool error_recoverable_with_nospec(int err) 2102 { 2103 /* Should only return true for non-fatal errors that are allowed to 2104 * occur during speculative verification. For these we can insert a 2105 * nospec and the program might still be accepted. Do not include 2106 * something like ENOMEM because it is likely to re-occur for the next 2107 * architectural path once it has been recovered-from in all speculative 2108 * paths. 2109 */ 2110 return err == -EPERM || err == -EACCES || err == -EINVAL; 2111 } 2112 2113 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2114 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 2115 bool speculative) 2116 { 2117 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 2118 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 2119 int err; 2120 2121 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 2122 if (!elem) 2123 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 2124 2125 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 2126 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 2127 elem->next = env->head; 2128 elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 2129 env->head = elem; 2130 env->stack_size++; 2131 err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); 2132 if (err) 2133 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 2134 elem->st.speculative |= speculative; 2135 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 2136 verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n", 2137 env->stack_size); 2138 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); 2139 } 2140 if (elem->st.parent) { 2141 ++elem->st.parent->branches; 2142 /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here, 2143 * but 2144 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch 2145 * instructions 2146 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create 2147 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current 2148 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state 2149 * which might have large 'branches' count. 2150 */ 2151 } 2152 return &elem->st; 2153 } 2154 2155 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 2156 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { 2157 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 2158 }; 2159 2160 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */ 2161 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 2162 { 2163 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); 2164 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; 2165 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; 2166 reg->umin_value = imm; 2167 reg->umax_value = imm; 2168 2169 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 2170 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 2171 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 2172 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 2173 } 2174 2175 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as 2176 * known to have the value @imm. 2177 */ 2178 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 2179 { 2180 /* Clear off and union(map_ptr, range) */ 2181 memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0, 2182 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type)); 2183 reg->id = 0; 2184 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 2185 ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm); 2186 } 2187 2188 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 2189 { 2190 reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm); 2191 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 2192 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 2193 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 2194 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 2195 } 2196 2197 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be 2198 * used only on registers holding a pointer type. 2199 */ 2200 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2201 { 2202 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 2203 } 2204 2205 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2206 { 2207 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 2208 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2209 /* all scalars are assumed imprecise initially (unless unprivileged, 2210 * in which case everything is forced to be precise) 2211 */ 2212 reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; 2213 } 2214 2215 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2216 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2217 { 2218 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2219 verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2220 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 2221 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 2222 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2223 return; 2224 } 2225 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); 2226 } 2227 2228 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 2229 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id) 2230 { 2231 /* reg->type has no meaning for STACK_DYNPTR, but when we set reg for 2232 * callback arguments, it does need to be CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, so simply 2233 * set it unconditionally as it is ignored for STACK_DYNPTR anyway. 2234 */ 2235 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg); 2236 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 2237 /* Give each dynptr a unique id to uniquely associate slices to it. */ 2238 reg->id = dynptr_id; 2239 reg->dynptr.type = type; 2240 reg->dynptr.first_slot = first_slot; 2241 } 2242 2243 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2244 { 2245 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 2246 const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 2247 2248 if (map->inner_map_meta) { 2249 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 2250 reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta; 2251 /* transfer reg's id which is unique for every map_lookup_elem 2252 * as UID of the inner map. 2253 */ 2254 if (btf_record_has_field(map->inner_map_meta->record, 2255 BPF_TIMER | BPF_WORKQUEUE | BPF_TASK_WORK)) { 2256 reg->map_uid = reg->id; 2257 } 2258 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { 2259 reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 2260 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 2261 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) { 2262 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; 2263 } else { 2264 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 2265 } 2266 return; 2267 } 2268 2269 reg->type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 2270 } 2271 2272 static void mark_reg_graph_node(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 2273 struct btf_field_graph_root *ds_head) 2274 { 2275 __mark_reg_known_zero(®s[regno]); 2276 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 2277 regs[regno].btf = ds_head->btf; 2278 regs[regno].btf_id = ds_head->value_btf_id; 2279 regs[regno].off = ds_head->node_offset; 2280 } 2281 2282 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2283 { 2284 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 2285 } 2286 2287 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2288 { 2289 return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || 2290 reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; 2291 } 2292 2293 static bool reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2294 { 2295 return base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && 2296 (reg->type & 2297 (DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB | DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP | DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META)); 2298 } 2299 2300 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ 2301 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 2302 enum bpf_reg_type which) 2303 { 2304 /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. 2305 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its 2306 * origin. 2307 */ 2308 return reg->type == which && 2309 reg->id == 0 && 2310 reg->off == 0 && 2311 tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 2312 } 2313 2314 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ 2315 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2316 { 2317 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2318 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2319 reg->umin_value = 0; 2320 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2321 2322 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 2323 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 2324 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 2325 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 2326 } 2327 2328 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2329 { 2330 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 2331 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 2332 reg->umin_value = 0; 2333 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 2334 } 2335 2336 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2337 { 2338 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 2339 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 2340 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 2341 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 2342 } 2343 2344 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2345 { 2346 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 2347 2348 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 2349 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, 2350 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN)); 2351 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 2352 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, 2353 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX)); 2354 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value); 2355 reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value, 2356 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask)); 2357 } 2358 2359 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2360 { 2361 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 2362 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, 2363 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); 2364 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 2365 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, 2366 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); 2367 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); 2368 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, 2369 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); 2370 } 2371 2372 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2373 { 2374 __update_reg32_bounds(reg); 2375 __update_reg64_bounds(reg); 2376 } 2377 2378 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ 2379 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2380 { 2381 /* If upper 32 bits of u64/s64 range don't change, we can use lower 32 2382 * bits to improve our u32/s32 boundaries. 2383 * 2384 * E.g., the case where we have upper 32 bits as zero ([10, 20] in 2385 * u64) is pretty trivial, it's obvious that in u32 we'll also have 2386 * [10, 20] range. But this property holds for any 64-bit range as 2387 * long as upper 32 bits in that entire range of values stay the same. 2388 * 2389 * E.g., u64 range [0x10000000A, 0x10000000F] ([4294967306, 4294967311] 2390 * in decimal) has the same upper 32 bits throughout all the values in 2391 * that range. As such, lower 32 bits form a valid [0xA, 0xF] ([10, 15]) 2392 * range. 2393 * 2394 * Note also, that [0xA, 0xF] is a valid range both in u32 and in s32, 2395 * following the rules outlined below about u64/s64 correspondence 2396 * (which equally applies to u32 vs s32 correspondence). In general it 2397 * depends on actual hexadecimal values of 32-bit range. They can form 2398 * only valid u32, or only valid s32 ranges in some cases. 2399 * 2400 * So we use all these insights to derive bounds for subregisters here. 2401 */ 2402 if ((reg->umin_value >> 32) == (reg->umax_value >> 32)) { 2403 /* u64 to u32 casting preserves validity of low 32 bits as 2404 * a range, if upper 32 bits are the same 2405 */ 2406 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)reg->umin_value); 2407 reg->u32_max_value = min_t(u32, reg->u32_max_value, (u32)reg->umax_value); 2408 2409 if ((s32)reg->umin_value <= (s32)reg->umax_value) { 2410 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, (s32)reg->umin_value); 2411 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, (s32)reg->umax_value); 2412 } 2413 } 2414 if ((reg->smin_value >> 32) == (reg->smax_value >> 32)) { 2415 /* low 32 bits should form a proper u32 range */ 2416 if ((u32)reg->smin_value <= (u32)reg->smax_value) { 2417 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)reg->smin_value); 2418 reg->u32_max_value = min_t(u32, reg->u32_max_value, (u32)reg->smax_value); 2419 } 2420 /* low 32 bits should form a proper s32 range */ 2421 if ((s32)reg->smin_value <= (s32)reg->smax_value) { 2422 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, (s32)reg->smin_value); 2423 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, (s32)reg->smax_value); 2424 } 2425 } 2426 /* Special case where upper bits form a small sequence of two 2427 * sequential numbers (in 32-bit unsigned space, so 0xffffffff to 2428 * 0x00000000 is also valid), while lower bits form a proper s32 range 2429 * going from negative numbers to positive numbers. E.g., let's say we 2430 * have s64 range [-1, 1] ([0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0000000000000001]). 2431 * Possible s64 values are {-1, 0, 1} ({0xffffffffffffffff, 2432 * 0x0000000000000000, 0x00000000000001}). Ignoring upper 32 bits, 2433 * we still get a valid s32 range [-1, 1] ([0xffffffff, 0x00000001]). 2434 * Note that it doesn't have to be 0xffffffff going to 0x00000000 in 2435 * upper 32 bits. As a random example, s64 range 2436 * [0xfffffff0fffffff0; 0xfffffff100000010], forms a valid s32 range 2437 * [-16, 16] ([0xfffffff0; 0x00000010]) in its 32 bit subregister. 2438 */ 2439 if ((u32)(reg->umin_value >> 32) + 1 == (u32)(reg->umax_value >> 32) && 2440 (s32)reg->umin_value < 0 && (s32)reg->umax_value >= 0) { 2441 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, (s32)reg->umin_value); 2442 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, (s32)reg->umax_value); 2443 } 2444 if ((u32)(reg->smin_value >> 32) + 1 == (u32)(reg->smax_value >> 32) && 2445 (s32)reg->smin_value < 0 && (s32)reg->smax_value >= 0) { 2446 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, (s32)reg->smin_value); 2447 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, (s32)reg->smax_value); 2448 } 2449 /* if u32 range forms a valid s32 range (due to matching sign bit), 2450 * try to learn from that 2451 */ 2452 if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value <= (s32)reg->u32_max_value) { 2453 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 2454 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 2455 } 2456 /* If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 2457 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 2458 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 2459 */ 2460 if ((u32)reg->s32_min_value <= (u32)reg->s32_max_value) { 2461 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 2462 reg->u32_max_value = min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 2463 } 2464 } 2465 2466 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2467 { 2468 /* If u64 range forms a valid s64 range (due to matching sign bit), 2469 * try to learn from that. Let's do a bit of ASCII art to see when 2470 * this is happening. Let's take u64 range first: 2471 * 2472 * 0 0x7fffffffffffffff 0x8000000000000000 U64_MAX 2473 * |-------------------------------|--------------------------------| 2474 * 2475 * Valid u64 range is formed when umin and umax are anywhere in the 2476 * range [0, U64_MAX], and umin <= umax. u64 case is simple and 2477 * straightforward. Let's see how s64 range maps onto the same range 2478 * of values, annotated below the line for comparison: 2479 * 2480 * 0 0x7fffffffffffffff 0x8000000000000000 U64_MAX 2481 * |-------------------------------|--------------------------------| 2482 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 2483 * 2484 * So s64 values basically start in the middle and they are logically 2485 * contiguous to the right of it, wrapping around from -1 to 0, and 2486 * then finishing as S64_MAX (0x7fffffffffffffff) right before 2487 * S64_MIN. We can try drawing the continuity of u64 vs s64 values 2488 * more visually as mapped to sign-agnostic range of hex values. 2489 * 2490 * u64 start u64 end 2491 * _______________________________________________________________ 2492 * / \ 2493 * 0 0x7fffffffffffffff 0x8000000000000000 U64_MAX 2494 * |-------------------------------|--------------------------------| 2495 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 2496 * / \ 2497 * >------------------------------ -------------------------------> 2498 * s64 continues... s64 end s64 start s64 "midpoint" 2499 * 2500 * What this means is that, in general, we can't always derive 2501 * something new about u64 from any random s64 range, and vice versa. 2502 * 2503 * But we can do that in two particular cases. One is when entire 2504 * u64/s64 range is *entirely* contained within left half of the above 2505 * diagram or when it is *entirely* contained in the right half. I.e.: 2506 * 2507 * |-------------------------------|--------------------------------| 2508 * ^ ^ ^ ^ 2509 * A B C D 2510 * 2511 * [A, B] and [C, D] are contained entirely in their respective halves 2512 * and form valid contiguous ranges as both u64 and s64 values. [A, B] 2513 * will be non-negative both as u64 and s64 (and in fact it will be 2514 * identical ranges no matter the signedness). [C, D] treated as s64 2515 * will be a range of negative values, while in u64 it will be 2516 * non-negative range of values larger than 0x8000000000000000. 2517 * 2518 * Now, any other range here can't be represented in both u64 and s64 2519 * simultaneously. E.g., [A, C], [A, D], [B, C], [B, D] are valid 2520 * contiguous u64 ranges, but they are discontinuous in s64. [B, C] 2521 * in s64 would be properly presented as [S64_MIN, C] and [B, S64_MAX], 2522 * for example. Similarly, valid s64 range [D, A] (going from negative 2523 * to positive values), would be two separate [D, U64_MAX] and [0, A] 2524 * ranges as u64. Currently reg_state can't represent two segments per 2525 * numeric domain, so in such situations we can only derive maximal 2526 * possible range ([0, U64_MAX] for u64, and [S64_MIN, S64_MAX] for s64). 2527 * 2528 * So we use these facts to derive umin/umax from smin/smax and vice 2529 * versa only if they stay within the same "half". This is equivalent 2530 * to checking sign bit: lower half will have sign bit as zero, upper 2531 * half have sign bit 1. Below in code we simplify this by just 2532 * casting umin/umax as smin/smax and checking if they form valid 2533 * range, and vice versa. Those are equivalent checks. 2534 */ 2535 if ((s64)reg->umin_value <= (s64)reg->umax_value) { 2536 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, reg->umin_value); 2537 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, reg->umax_value); 2538 } 2539 /* If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 2540 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 2541 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 2542 */ 2543 if ((u64)reg->smin_value <= (u64)reg->smax_value) { 2544 reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, reg->umin_value); 2545 reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, reg->umax_value); 2546 } else { 2547 /* If the s64 range crosses the sign boundary, then it's split 2548 * between the beginning and end of the U64 domain. In that 2549 * case, we can derive new bounds if the u64 range overlaps 2550 * with only one end of the s64 range. 2551 * 2552 * In the following example, the u64 range overlaps only with 2553 * positive portion of the s64 range. 2554 * 2555 * 0 U64_MAX 2556 * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] | 2557 * |----------------------------|----------------------------| 2558 * |xxxxx s64 range xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxx| 2559 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 2560 * 2561 * We can thus derive the following new s64 and u64 ranges. 2562 * 2563 * 0 U64_MAX 2564 * | [xxxxxx u64 range xxxxx] | 2565 * |----------------------------|----------------------------| 2566 * | [xxxxxx s64 range xxxxx] | 2567 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 2568 * 2569 * If they overlap in two places, we can't derive anything 2570 * because reg_state can't represent two ranges per numeric 2571 * domain. 2572 * 2573 * 0 U64_MAX 2574 * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] | 2575 * |----------------------------|----------------------------| 2576 * |xxxxx s64 range xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxxxxx| 2577 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 2578 * 2579 * The first condition below corresponds to the first diagram 2580 * above. 2581 */ 2582 if (reg->umax_value < (u64)reg->smin_value) { 2583 reg->smin_value = (s64)reg->umin_value; 2584 reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->umax_value, reg->smax_value); 2585 } else if ((u64)reg->smax_value < reg->umin_value) { 2586 /* This second condition considers the case where the u64 range 2587 * overlaps with the negative portion of the s64 range: 2588 * 2589 * 0 U64_MAX 2590 * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] | 2591 * |----------------------------|----------------------------| 2592 * |xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxxxxxxx s64 range | 2593 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 2594 */ 2595 reg->smax_value = (s64)reg->umax_value; 2596 reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->umin_value, reg->smin_value); 2597 } 2598 } 2599 } 2600 2601 static void __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2602 { 2603 /* Try to tighten 64-bit bounds from 32-bit knowledge, using 32-bit 2604 * values on both sides of 64-bit range in hope to have tighter range. 2605 * E.g., if r1 is [0x1'00000000, 0x3'80000000], and we learn from 2606 * 32-bit signed > 0 operation that s32 bounds are now [1; 0x7fffffff]. 2607 * With this, we can substitute 1 as low 32-bits of _low_ 64-bit bound 2608 * (0x100000000 -> 0x100000001) and 0x7fffffff as low 32-bits of 2609 * _high_ 64-bit bound (0x380000000 -> 0x37fffffff) and arrive at a 2610 * better overall bounds for r1 as [0x1'000000001; 0x3'7fffffff]. 2611 * We just need to make sure that derived bounds we are intersecting 2612 * with are well-formed ranges in respective s64 or u64 domain, just 2613 * like we do with similar kinds of 32-to-64 or 64-to-32 adjustments. 2614 */ 2615 __u64 new_umin, new_umax; 2616 __s64 new_smin, new_smax; 2617 2618 /* u32 -> u64 tightening, it's always well-formed */ 2619 new_umin = (reg->umin_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | reg->u32_min_value; 2620 new_umax = (reg->umax_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | reg->u32_max_value; 2621 reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->umin_value, new_umin); 2622 reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->umax_value, new_umax); 2623 /* u32 -> s64 tightening, u32 range embedded into s64 preserves range validity */ 2624 new_smin = (reg->smin_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | reg->u32_min_value; 2625 new_smax = (reg->smax_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | reg->u32_max_value; 2626 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, new_smin); 2627 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, new_smax); 2628 2629 /* Here we would like to handle a special case after sign extending load, 2630 * when upper bits for a 64-bit range are all 1s or all 0s. 2631 * 2632 * Upper bits are all 1s when register is in a range: 2633 * [0xffff_ffff_0000_0000, 0xffff_ffff_ffff_ffff] 2634 * Upper bits are all 0s when register is in a range: 2635 * [0x0000_0000_0000_0000, 0x0000_0000_ffff_ffff] 2636 * Together this forms are continuous range: 2637 * [0xffff_ffff_0000_0000, 0x0000_0000_ffff_ffff] 2638 * 2639 * Now, suppose that register range is in fact tighter: 2640 * [0xffff_ffff_8000_0000, 0x0000_0000_ffff_ffff] (R) 2641 * Also suppose that it's 32-bit range is positive, 2642 * meaning that lower 32-bits of the full 64-bit register 2643 * are in the range: 2644 * [0x0000_0000, 0x7fff_ffff] (W) 2645 * 2646 * If this happens, then any value in a range: 2647 * [0xffff_ffff_0000_0000, 0xffff_ffff_7fff_ffff] 2648 * is smaller than a lowest bound of the range (R): 2649 * 0xffff_ffff_8000_0000 2650 * which means that upper bits of the full 64-bit register 2651 * can't be all 1s, when lower bits are in range (W). 2652 * 2653 * Note that: 2654 * - 0xffff_ffff_8000_0000 == (s64)S32_MIN 2655 * - 0x0000_0000_7fff_ffff == (s64)S32_MAX 2656 * These relations are used in the conditions below. 2657 */ 2658 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && reg->smin_value >= S32_MIN && reg->smax_value <= S32_MAX) { 2659 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 2660 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 2661 reg->umin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 2662 reg->umax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 2663 reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 2664 tnum_range(reg->smin_value, reg->smax_value)); 2665 } 2666 } 2667 2668 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2669 { 2670 __reg32_deduce_bounds(reg); 2671 __reg64_deduce_bounds(reg); 2672 __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds(reg); 2673 } 2674 2675 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ 2676 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2677 { 2678 struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 2679 tnum_range(reg->umin_value, 2680 reg->umax_value)); 2681 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(var64_off), 2682 tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value, 2683 reg->u32_max_value)); 2684 2685 reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off); 2686 } 2687 2688 static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2689 { 2690 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ 2691 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 2692 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ 2693 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 2694 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 2695 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 2696 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 2697 __reg_bound_offset(reg); 2698 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 2699 * slightly, e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 2700 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 2701 */ 2702 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 2703 } 2704 2705 static int reg_bounds_sanity_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2706 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, const char *ctx) 2707 { 2708 const char *msg; 2709 2710 if (reg->umin_value > reg->umax_value || 2711 reg->smin_value > reg->smax_value || 2712 reg->u32_min_value > reg->u32_max_value || 2713 reg->s32_min_value > reg->s32_max_value) { 2714 msg = "range bounds violation"; 2715 goto out; 2716 } 2717 2718 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 2719 u64 uval = reg->var_off.value; 2720 s64 sval = (s64)uval; 2721 2722 if (reg->umin_value != uval || reg->umax_value != uval || 2723 reg->smin_value != sval || reg->smax_value != sval) { 2724 msg = "const tnum out of sync with range bounds"; 2725 goto out; 2726 } 2727 } 2728 2729 if (tnum_subreg_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 2730 u32 uval32 = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off).value; 2731 s32 sval32 = (s32)uval32; 2732 2733 if (reg->u32_min_value != uval32 || reg->u32_max_value != uval32 || 2734 reg->s32_min_value != sval32 || reg->s32_max_value != sval32) { 2735 msg = "const subreg tnum out of sync with range bounds"; 2736 goto out; 2737 } 2738 } 2739 2740 return 0; 2741 out: 2742 verifier_bug(env, "REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (%s): %s u64=[%#llx, %#llx] " 2743 "s64=[%#llx, %#llx] u32=[%#x, %#x] s32=[%#x, %#x] var_off=(%#llx, %#llx)", 2744 ctx, msg, reg->umin_value, reg->umax_value, 2745 reg->smin_value, reg->smax_value, 2746 reg->u32_min_value, reg->u32_max_value, 2747 reg->s32_min_value, reg->s32_max_value, 2748 reg->var_off.value, reg->var_off.mask); 2749 if (env->test_reg_invariants) 2750 return -EFAULT; 2751 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 2752 return 0; 2753 } 2754 2755 static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a) 2756 { 2757 return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX; 2758 } 2759 2760 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2761 { 2762 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value; 2763 reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value; 2764 2765 /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must 2766 * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later 2767 * from tnum. 2768 */ 2769 if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) && 2770 __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) { 2771 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 2772 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 2773 } else { 2774 reg->smin_value = 0; 2775 reg->smax_value = U32_MAX; 2776 } 2777 } 2778 2779 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ 2780 static void __mark_reg_unknown_imprecise(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2781 { 2782 /* 2783 * Clear type, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and 2784 * padding between 'type' and union 2785 */ 2786 memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)); 2787 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 2788 reg->id = 0; 2789 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 2790 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 2791 reg->frameno = 0; 2792 reg->precise = false; 2793 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 2794 } 2795 2796 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value, 2797 * initialize .precise as true when not bpf capable. 2798 */ 2799 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2800 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2801 { 2802 __mark_reg_unknown_imprecise(reg); 2803 reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; 2804 } 2805 2806 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2807 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2808 { 2809 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2810 verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2811 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 2812 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 2813 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2814 return; 2815 } 2816 __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno); 2817 } 2818 2819 static int __mark_reg_s32_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2820 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 2821 u32 regno, 2822 s32 s32_min, 2823 s32 s32_max) 2824 { 2825 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 2826 2827 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, s32_min); 2828 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, s32_max); 2829 2830 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, s32_min); 2831 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, s32_max); 2832 2833 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 2834 2835 return reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, reg, "s32_range"); 2836 } 2837 2838 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2839 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2840 { 2841 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 2842 reg->type = NOT_INIT; 2843 } 2844 2845 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2846 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 2847 { 2848 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 2849 verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); 2850 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 2851 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 2852 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2853 return; 2854 } 2855 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 2856 } 2857 2858 static int mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2859 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 2860 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, 2861 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, 2862 enum bpf_type_flag flag) 2863 { 2864 switch (reg_type) { 2865 case SCALAR_VALUE: 2866 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 2867 return 0; 2868 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 2869 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); 2870 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag; 2871 regs[regno].btf = btf; 2872 regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; 2873 if (type_may_be_null(flag)) 2874 regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 2875 return 0; 2876 case PTR_TO_MEM: 2877 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); 2878 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_MEM | flag; 2879 regs[regno].mem_size = 0; 2880 return 0; 2881 default: 2882 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected reg_type %d in %s\n", reg_type, __func__); 2883 return -EFAULT; 2884 } 2885 } 2886 2887 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) 2888 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2889 struct bpf_func_state *state) 2890 { 2891 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 2892 int i; 2893 2894 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 2895 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); 2896 regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 2897 } 2898 2899 /* frame pointer */ 2900 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; 2901 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); 2902 regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; 2903 } 2904 2905 static struct bpf_retval_range retval_range(s32 minval, s32 maxval) 2906 { 2907 return (struct bpf_retval_range){ minval, maxval }; 2908 } 2909 2910 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) 2911 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2912 struct bpf_func_state *state, 2913 int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno) 2914 { 2915 state->callsite = callsite; 2916 state->frameno = frameno; 2917 state->subprogno = subprogno; 2918 state->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 0); 2919 init_reg_state(env, state); 2920 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 2921 } 2922 2923 /* Similar to push_stack(), but for async callbacks */ 2924 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2925 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 2926 int subprog, bool is_sleepable) 2927 { 2928 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 2929 struct bpf_func_state *frame; 2930 2931 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 2932 if (!elem) 2933 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 2934 2935 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 2936 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 2937 elem->next = env->head; 2938 elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 2939 env->head = elem; 2940 env->stack_size++; 2941 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 2942 verbose(env, 2943 "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex for async cb.\n", 2944 env->stack_size); 2945 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); 2946 } 2947 /* Unlike push_stack() do not copy_verifier_state(). 2948 * The caller state doesn't matter. 2949 * This is async callback. It starts in a fresh stack. 2950 * Initialize it similar to do_check_common(). 2951 */ 2952 elem->st.branches = 1; 2953 elem->st.in_sleepable = is_sleepable; 2954 frame = kzalloc(sizeof(*frame), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 2955 if (!frame) 2956 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 2957 init_func_state(env, frame, 2958 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 2959 0 /* frameno within this callchain */, 2960 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 2961 elem->st.frame[0] = frame; 2962 return &elem->st; 2963 } 2964 2965 2966 enum reg_arg_type { 2967 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ 2968 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ 2969 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ 2970 }; 2971 2972 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b) 2973 { 2974 return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start - 2975 ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start; 2976 } 2977 2978 /* Find subprogram that contains instruction at 'off' */ 2979 struct bpf_subprog_info *bpf_find_containing_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 2980 { 2981 struct bpf_subprog_info *vals = env->subprog_info; 2982 int l, r, m; 2983 2984 if (off >= env->prog->len || off < 0 || env->subprog_cnt == 0) 2985 return NULL; 2986 2987 l = 0; 2988 r = env->subprog_cnt - 1; 2989 while (l < r) { 2990 m = l + (r - l + 1) / 2; 2991 if (vals[m].start <= off) 2992 l = m; 2993 else 2994 r = m - 1; 2995 } 2996 return &vals[l]; 2997 } 2998 2999 /* Find subprogram that starts exactly at 'off' */ 3000 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 3001 { 3002 struct bpf_subprog_info *p; 3003 3004 p = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, off); 3005 if (!p || p->start != off) 3006 return -ENOENT; 3007 return p - env->subprog_info; 3008 } 3009 3010 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 3011 { 3012 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 3013 int ret; 3014 3015 if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) { 3016 verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n"); 3017 return -EINVAL; 3018 } 3019 ret = find_subprog(env, off); 3020 if (ret >= 0) 3021 return ret; 3022 if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { 3023 verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); 3024 return -E2BIG; 3025 } 3026 /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ 3027 env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; 3028 sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 3029 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); 3030 return env->subprog_cnt - 1; 3031 } 3032 3033 static int bpf_find_exception_callback_insn_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3034 { 3035 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 3036 struct btf *btf = aux->btf; 3037 const struct btf_type *t; 3038 u32 main_btf_id, id; 3039 const char *name; 3040 int ret, i; 3041 3042 /* Non-zero func_info_cnt implies valid btf */ 3043 if (!aux->func_info_cnt) 3044 return 0; 3045 main_btf_id = aux->func_info[0].type_id; 3046 3047 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, main_btf_id); 3048 if (!t) { 3049 verbose(env, "invalid btf id for main subprog in func_info\n"); 3050 return -EINVAL; 3051 } 3052 3053 name = btf_find_decl_tag_value(btf, t, -1, "exception_callback:"); 3054 if (IS_ERR(name)) { 3055 ret = PTR_ERR(name); 3056 /* If there is no tag present, there is no exception callback */ 3057 if (ret == -ENOENT) 3058 ret = 0; 3059 else if (ret == -EEXIST) 3060 verbose(env, "multiple exception callback tags for main subprog\n"); 3061 return ret; 3062 } 3063 3064 ret = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, name, BTF_KIND_FUNC); 3065 if (ret < 0) { 3066 verbose(env, "exception callback '%s' could not be found in BTF\n", name); 3067 return ret; 3068 } 3069 id = ret; 3070 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id); 3071 if (btf_func_linkage(t) != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) { 3072 verbose(env, "exception callback '%s' must have global linkage\n", name); 3073 return -EINVAL; 3074 } 3075 ret = 0; 3076 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) { 3077 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id != id) 3078 continue; 3079 ret = aux->func_info[i].insn_off; 3080 /* Further func_info and subprog checks will also happen 3081 * later, so assume this is the right insn_off for now. 3082 */ 3083 if (!ret) { 3084 verbose(env, "invalid exception callback insn_off in func_info: 0\n"); 3085 ret = -EINVAL; 3086 } 3087 } 3088 if (!ret) { 3089 verbose(env, "exception callback type id not found in func_info\n"); 3090 ret = -EINVAL; 3091 } 3092 return ret; 3093 } 3094 3095 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256 3096 #define MAX_KFUNC_BTFS 256 3097 3098 struct bpf_kfunc_desc { 3099 struct btf_func_model func_model; 3100 u32 func_id; 3101 s32 imm; 3102 u16 offset; 3103 unsigned long addr; 3104 }; 3105 3106 struct bpf_kfunc_btf { 3107 struct btf *btf; 3108 struct module *module; 3109 u16 offset; 3110 }; 3111 3112 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab { 3113 /* Sorted by func_id (BTF ID) and offset (fd_array offset) during 3114 * verification. JITs do lookups by bpf_insn, where func_id may not be 3115 * available, therefore at the end of verification do_misc_fixups() 3116 * sorts this by imm and offset. 3117 */ 3118 struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS]; 3119 u32 nr_descs; 3120 }; 3121 3122 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab { 3123 struct bpf_kfunc_btf descs[MAX_KFUNC_BTFS]; 3124 u32 nr_descs; 3125 }; 3126 3127 static int specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc, 3128 int insn_idx); 3129 3130 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off(const void *a, const void *b) 3131 { 3132 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 3133 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 3134 3135 /* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */ 3136 return d0->func_id - d1->func_id ?: d0->offset - d1->offset; 3137 } 3138 3139 static int kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off(const void *a, const void *b) 3140 { 3141 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d0 = a; 3142 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d1 = b; 3143 3144 return d0->offset - d1->offset; 3145 } 3146 3147 static struct bpf_kfunc_desc * 3148 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, u16 offset) 3149 { 3150 struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 3151 .func_id = func_id, 3152 .offset = offset, 3153 }; 3154 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 3155 3156 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 3157 return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 3158 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off); 3159 } 3160 3161 int bpf_get_kfunc_addr(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, 3162 u16 btf_fd_idx, u8 **func_addr) 3163 { 3164 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 3165 3166 desc = find_kfunc_desc(prog, func_id, btf_fd_idx); 3167 if (!desc) 3168 return -EFAULT; 3169 3170 *func_addr = (u8 *)desc->addr; 3171 return 0; 3172 } 3173 3174 static struct btf *__find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3175 s16 offset) 3176 { 3177 struct bpf_kfunc_btf kf_btf = { .offset = offset }; 3178 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab; 3179 struct bpf_kfunc_btf *b; 3180 struct module *mod; 3181 struct btf *btf; 3182 int btf_fd; 3183 3184 tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 3185 b = bsearch(&kf_btf, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 3186 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off); 3187 if (!b) { 3188 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_BTFS) { 3189 verbose(env, "too many different module BTFs\n"); 3190 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); 3191 } 3192 3193 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 3194 verbose(env, "kfunc offset > 0 without fd_array is invalid\n"); 3195 return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO); 3196 } 3197 3198 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&btf_fd, env->fd_array, 3199 offset * sizeof(btf_fd), 3200 sizeof(btf_fd))) 3201 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); 3202 3203 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 3204 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 3205 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF fd specified\n"); 3206 return btf; 3207 } 3208 3209 if (!btf_is_module(btf)) { 3210 verbose(env, "BTF fd for kfunc is not a module BTF\n"); 3211 btf_put(btf); 3212 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 3213 } 3214 3215 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 3216 if (!mod) { 3217 btf_put(btf); 3218 return ERR_PTR(-ENXIO); 3219 } 3220 3221 b = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 3222 b->btf = btf; 3223 b->module = mod; 3224 b->offset = offset; 3225 3226 /* sort() reorders entries by value, so b may no longer point 3227 * to the right entry after this 3228 */ 3229 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 3230 kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off, NULL); 3231 } else { 3232 btf = b->btf; 3233 } 3234 3235 return btf; 3236 } 3237 3238 void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab) 3239 { 3240 if (!tab) 3241 return; 3242 3243 while (tab->nr_descs--) { 3244 module_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].module); 3245 btf_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].btf); 3246 } 3247 kfree(tab); 3248 } 3249 3250 static struct btf *find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s16 offset) 3251 { 3252 if (offset) { 3253 if (offset < 0) { 3254 /* In the future, this can be allowed to increase limit 3255 * of fd index into fd_array, interpreted as u16. 3256 */ 3257 verbose(env, "negative offset disallowed for kernel module function call\n"); 3258 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 3259 } 3260 3261 return __find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 3262 } 3263 return btf_vmlinux ?: ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); 3264 } 3265 3266 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset) 3267 { 3268 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 3269 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *btf_tab; 3270 struct btf_func_model func_model; 3271 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 3272 struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux; 3273 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 3274 const char *func_name; 3275 struct btf *desc_btf; 3276 unsigned long addr; 3277 int err; 3278 3279 prog_aux = env->prog->aux; 3280 tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab; 3281 btf_tab = prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 3282 if (!tab) { 3283 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 3284 verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 3285 return -ENOTSUPP; 3286 } 3287 3288 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) { 3289 verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n"); 3290 return -ENOTSUPP; 3291 } 3292 3293 if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) { 3294 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n"); 3295 return -ENOTSUPP; 3296 } 3297 3298 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) { 3299 verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 3300 return -EINVAL; 3301 } 3302 3303 tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 3304 if (!tab) 3305 return -ENOMEM; 3306 prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab; 3307 } 3308 3309 /* func_id == 0 is always invalid, but instead of returning an error, be 3310 * conservative and wait until the code elimination pass before returning 3311 * error, so that invalid calls that get pruned out can be in BPF programs 3312 * loaded from userspace. It is also required that offset be untouched 3313 * for such calls. 3314 */ 3315 if (!func_id && !offset) 3316 return 0; 3317 3318 if (!btf_tab && offset) { 3319 btf_tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*btf_tab), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 3320 if (!btf_tab) 3321 return -ENOMEM; 3322 prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab = btf_tab; 3323 } 3324 3325 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 3326 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) { 3327 verbose(env, "failed to find BTF for kernel function\n"); 3328 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 3329 } 3330 3331 if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id, offset)) 3332 return 0; 3333 3334 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) { 3335 verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n"); 3336 return -E2BIG; 3337 } 3338 3339 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 3340 if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) { 3341 verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n", 3342 func_id); 3343 return -EINVAL; 3344 } 3345 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 3346 if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) { 3347 verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n", 3348 func_id); 3349 return -EINVAL; 3350 } 3351 3352 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 3353 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name); 3354 if (!addr) { 3355 verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n", 3356 func_name); 3357 return -EINVAL; 3358 } 3359 3360 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) { 3361 err = bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_check(&env->log, prog_aux); 3362 if (err) 3363 return err; 3364 } 3365 3366 err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, desc_btf, 3367 func_proto, func_name, 3368 &func_model); 3369 if (err) 3370 return err; 3371 3372 desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 3373 desc->func_id = func_id; 3374 desc->offset = offset; 3375 desc->addr = addr; 3376 desc->func_model = func_model; 3377 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 3378 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off, NULL); 3379 return 0; 3380 } 3381 3382 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off(const void *a, const void *b) 3383 { 3384 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 3385 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 3386 3387 if (d0->imm != d1->imm) 3388 return d0->imm < d1->imm ? -1 : 1; 3389 if (d0->offset != d1->offset) 3390 return d0->offset < d1->offset ? -1 : 1; 3391 return 0; 3392 } 3393 3394 static int set_kfunc_desc_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc) 3395 { 3396 unsigned long call_imm; 3397 3398 if (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()) { 3399 call_imm = desc->func_id; 3400 } else { 3401 call_imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr); 3402 /* Check whether the relative offset overflows desc->imm */ 3403 if ((unsigned long)(s32)call_imm != call_imm) { 3404 verbose(env, "address of kernel func_id %u is out of range\n", 3405 desc->func_id); 3406 return -EINVAL; 3407 } 3408 } 3409 desc->imm = call_imm; 3410 return 0; 3411 } 3412 3413 static int sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3414 { 3415 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 3416 int i, err; 3417 3418 tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 3419 if (!tab) 3420 return 0; 3421 3422 for (i = 0; i < tab->nr_descs; i++) { 3423 err = set_kfunc_desc_imm(env, &tab->descs[i]); 3424 if (err) 3425 return err; 3426 } 3427 3428 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 3429 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off, NULL); 3430 return 0; 3431 } 3432 3433 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog) 3434 { 3435 return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 3436 } 3437 3438 const struct btf_func_model * 3439 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog, 3440 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 3441 { 3442 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 3443 .imm = insn->imm, 3444 .offset = insn->off, 3445 }; 3446 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res; 3447 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 3448 3449 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 3450 res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 3451 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off); 3452 3453 return res ? &res->func_model : NULL; 3454 } 3455 3456 static int add_kfunc_in_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3457 struct bpf_insn *insn, int cnt) 3458 { 3459 int i, ret; 3460 3461 for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, insn++) { 3462 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) { 3463 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off); 3464 if (ret < 0) 3465 return ret; 3466 } 3467 } 3468 return 0; 3469 } 3470 3471 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3472 { 3473 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 3474 int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len, ex_cb_insn; 3475 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 3476 3477 /* Add entry function. */ 3478 ret = add_subprog(env, 0); 3479 if (ret) 3480 return ret; 3481 3482 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 3483 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) && 3484 !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) 3485 continue; 3486 3487 if (!env->bpf_capable) { 3488 verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); 3489 return -EPERM; 3490 } 3491 3492 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn) || bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 3493 ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 3494 else 3495 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off); 3496 3497 if (ret < 0) 3498 return ret; 3499 } 3500 3501 ret = bpf_find_exception_callback_insn_off(env); 3502 if (ret < 0) 3503 return ret; 3504 ex_cb_insn = ret; 3505 3506 /* If ex_cb_insn > 0, this means that the main program has a subprog 3507 * marked using BTF decl tag to serve as the exception callback. 3508 */ 3509 if (ex_cb_insn) { 3510 ret = add_subprog(env, ex_cb_insn); 3511 if (ret < 0) 3512 return ret; 3513 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 3514 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != ex_cb_insn) 3515 continue; 3516 env->exception_callback_subprog = i; 3517 mark_subprog_exc_cb(env, i); 3518 break; 3519 } 3520 } 3521 3522 /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration 3523 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased. 3524 */ 3525 subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; 3526 3527 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 3528 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 3529 verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); 3530 3531 return 0; 3532 } 3533 3534 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 3535 { 3536 int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0; 3537 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 3538 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 3539 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 3540 3541 /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */ 3542 subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start; 3543 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 3544 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 3545 u8 code = insn[i].code; 3546 3547 if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 3548 insn[i].src_reg == 0 && 3549 insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 3550 subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true; 3551 subprog[cur_subprog].tail_call_reachable = true; 3552 } 3553 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD && 3554 (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND)) 3555 subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true; 3556 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) 3557 goto next; 3558 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) 3559 goto next; 3560 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT) { 3561 subprog[cur_subprog].exit_idx = i; 3562 goto next; 3563 } 3564 off = i + bpf_jmp_offset(&insn[i]) + 1; 3565 if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) { 3566 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off); 3567 return -EINVAL; 3568 } 3569 next: 3570 if (i == subprog_end - 1) { 3571 /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another 3572 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit 3573 * or unconditional jump back or bpf_throw call 3574 */ 3575 if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && 3576 code != (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA) && 3577 code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { 3578 verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n"); 3579 return -EINVAL; 3580 } 3581 subprog_start = subprog_end; 3582 cur_subprog++; 3583 if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt) 3584 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 3585 } 3586 } 3587 return 0; 3588 } 3589 3590 static int mark_stack_slot_obj_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3591 int spi, int nr_slots) 3592 { 3593 int err, i; 3594 3595 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) { 3596 err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg->frameno, env->insn_idx, BIT(spi - i)); 3597 if (err) 3598 return err; 3599 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i); 3600 } 3601 return 0; 3602 } 3603 3604 static int mark_dynptr_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3605 { 3606 int spi; 3607 3608 /* For CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, it must have already been done by 3609 * check_reg_arg in check_helper_call and mark_btf_func_reg_size in 3610 * check_kfunc_call. 3611 */ 3612 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 3613 return 0; 3614 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 3615 if (spi < 0) 3616 return spi; 3617 /* Caller ensures dynptr is valid and initialized, which means spi is in 3618 * bounds and spi is the first dynptr slot. Simply mark stack slot as 3619 * read. 3620 */ 3621 return mark_stack_slot_obj_read(env, reg, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS); 3622 } 3623 3624 static int mark_iter_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3625 int spi, int nr_slots) 3626 { 3627 return mark_stack_slot_obj_read(env, reg, spi, nr_slots); 3628 } 3629 3630 static int mark_irq_flag_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3631 { 3632 int spi; 3633 3634 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg); 3635 if (spi < 0) 3636 return spi; 3637 return mark_stack_slot_obj_read(env, reg, spi, 1); 3638 } 3639 3640 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization 3641 * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates 3642 * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE. 3643 */ 3644 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_insn *insn, 3645 u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t) 3646 { 3647 u8 code, class, op; 3648 3649 code = insn->code; 3650 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 3651 op = BPF_OP(code); 3652 if (class == BPF_JMP) { 3653 /* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE 3654 * conservatively. 3655 */ 3656 if (op == BPF_EXIT) 3657 return true; 3658 if (op == BPF_CALL) { 3659 /* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking 3660 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we 3661 * don't care the register def because they are anyway 3662 * marked as NOT_INIT already. 3663 */ 3664 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 3665 return false; 3666 /* Helper call will reach here because of arg type 3667 * check, conservatively return TRUE. 3668 */ 3669 if (t == SRC_OP) 3670 return true; 3671 3672 return false; 3673 } 3674 } 3675 3676 if (class == BPF_ALU64 && op == BPF_END && (insn->imm == 16 || insn->imm == 32)) 3677 return false; 3678 3679 if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP || 3680 (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64)) 3681 return true; 3682 3683 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32) 3684 return false; 3685 3686 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 3687 if (t != SRC_OP) 3688 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_MEMSX; 3689 /* LDX source must be ptr. */ 3690 return true; 3691 } 3692 3693 if (class == BPF_STX) { 3694 /* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has one or more source 3695 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is 3696 * asking about it. 3697 */ 3698 if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 3699 return true; 3700 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 3701 } 3702 3703 if (class == BPF_LD) { 3704 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code); 3705 3706 /* LD_IMM64 */ 3707 if (mode == BPF_IMM) 3708 return true; 3709 3710 /* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */ 3711 if (t != SRC_OP) 3712 return false; 3713 3714 /* Implicit ctx ptr. */ 3715 if (regno == BPF_REG_6) 3716 return true; 3717 3718 /* Explicit source could be any width. */ 3719 return true; 3720 } 3721 3722 if (class == BPF_ST) 3723 /* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */ 3724 return true; 3725 3726 /* Conservatively return true at default. */ 3727 return true; 3728 } 3729 3730 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */ 3731 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 3732 { 3733 switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) { 3734 case BPF_JMP: 3735 case BPF_JMP32: 3736 case BPF_ST: 3737 return -1; 3738 case BPF_STX: 3739 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC || 3740 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC) { 3741 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 3742 return BPF_REG_0; 3743 else if (insn->imm == BPF_LOAD_ACQ) 3744 return insn->dst_reg; 3745 else if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) 3746 return insn->src_reg; 3747 } 3748 return -1; 3749 default: 3750 return insn->dst_reg; 3751 } 3752 } 3753 3754 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */ 3755 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_insn *insn) 3756 { 3757 int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn); 3758 3759 if (dst_reg == -1) 3760 return false; 3761 3762 return !is_reg64(insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP); 3763 } 3764 3765 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3766 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3767 { 3768 s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def; 3769 3770 if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG) 3771 return; 3772 3773 env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true; 3774 /* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */ 3775 reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 3776 } 3777 3778 static int __check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 3779 enum reg_arg_type t) 3780 { 3781 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx; 3782 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3783 bool rw64; 3784 3785 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { 3786 verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); 3787 return -EINVAL; 3788 } 3789 3790 mark_reg_scratched(env, regno); 3791 3792 reg = ®s[regno]; 3793 rw64 = is_reg64(insn, regno, reg, t); 3794 if (t == SRC_OP) { 3795 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ 3796 if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) { 3797 verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); 3798 return -EACCES; 3799 } 3800 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ 3801 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) 3802 return 0; 3803 3804 if (rw64) 3805 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 3806 3807 return 0; 3808 } else { 3809 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ 3810 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { 3811 verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); 3812 return -EACCES; 3813 } 3814 reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 3815 if (t == DST_OP) 3816 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 3817 } 3818 return 0; 3819 } 3820 3821 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3822 enum reg_arg_type t) 3823 { 3824 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3825 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3826 3827 return __check_reg_arg(env, state->regs, regno, t); 3828 } 3829 3830 static int insn_stack_access_flags(int frameno, int spi) 3831 { 3832 return INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS | (spi << INSN_F_SPI_SHIFT) | frameno; 3833 } 3834 3835 static int insn_stack_access_spi(int insn_flags) 3836 { 3837 return (insn_flags >> INSN_F_SPI_SHIFT) & INSN_F_SPI_MASK; 3838 } 3839 3840 static int insn_stack_access_frameno(int insn_flags) 3841 { 3842 return insn_flags & INSN_F_FRAMENO_MASK; 3843 } 3844 3845 static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 3846 { 3847 env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true; 3848 } 3849 3850 static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 3851 { 3852 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jmp_point; 3853 } 3854 3855 #define LR_FRAMENO_BITS 3 3856 #define LR_SPI_BITS 6 3857 #define LR_ENTRY_BITS (LR_SPI_BITS + LR_FRAMENO_BITS + 1) 3858 #define LR_SIZE_BITS 4 3859 #define LR_FRAMENO_MASK ((1ull << LR_FRAMENO_BITS) - 1) 3860 #define LR_SPI_MASK ((1ull << LR_SPI_BITS) - 1) 3861 #define LR_SIZE_MASK ((1ull << LR_SIZE_BITS) - 1) 3862 #define LR_SPI_OFF LR_FRAMENO_BITS 3863 #define LR_IS_REG_OFF (LR_SPI_BITS + LR_FRAMENO_BITS) 3864 #define LINKED_REGS_MAX 6 3865 3866 struct linked_reg { 3867 u8 frameno; 3868 union { 3869 u8 spi; 3870 u8 regno; 3871 }; 3872 bool is_reg; 3873 }; 3874 3875 struct linked_regs { 3876 int cnt; 3877 struct linked_reg entries[LINKED_REGS_MAX]; 3878 }; 3879 3880 static struct linked_reg *linked_regs_push(struct linked_regs *s) 3881 { 3882 if (s->cnt < LINKED_REGS_MAX) 3883 return &s->entries[s->cnt++]; 3884 3885 return NULL; 3886 } 3887 3888 /* Use u64 as a vector of 6 10-bit values, use first 4-bits to track 3889 * number of elements currently in stack. 3890 * Pack one history entry for linked registers as 10 bits in the following format: 3891 * - 3-bits frameno 3892 * - 6-bits spi_or_reg 3893 * - 1-bit is_reg 3894 */ 3895 static u64 linked_regs_pack(struct linked_regs *s) 3896 { 3897 u64 val = 0; 3898 int i; 3899 3900 for (i = 0; i < s->cnt; ++i) { 3901 struct linked_reg *e = &s->entries[i]; 3902 u64 tmp = 0; 3903 3904 tmp |= e->frameno; 3905 tmp |= e->spi << LR_SPI_OFF; 3906 tmp |= (e->is_reg ? 1 : 0) << LR_IS_REG_OFF; 3907 3908 val <<= LR_ENTRY_BITS; 3909 val |= tmp; 3910 } 3911 val <<= LR_SIZE_BITS; 3912 val |= s->cnt; 3913 return val; 3914 } 3915 3916 static void linked_regs_unpack(u64 val, struct linked_regs *s) 3917 { 3918 int i; 3919 3920 s->cnt = val & LR_SIZE_MASK; 3921 val >>= LR_SIZE_BITS; 3922 3923 for (i = 0; i < s->cnt; ++i) { 3924 struct linked_reg *e = &s->entries[i]; 3925 3926 e->frameno = val & LR_FRAMENO_MASK; 3927 e->spi = (val >> LR_SPI_OFF) & LR_SPI_MASK; 3928 e->is_reg = (val >> LR_IS_REG_OFF) & 0x1; 3929 val >>= LR_ENTRY_BITS; 3930 } 3931 } 3932 3933 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ 3934 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 3935 int insn_flags, u64 linked_regs) 3936 { 3937 u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; 3938 struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *p; 3939 size_t alloc_size; 3940 3941 /* combine instruction flags if we already recorded this instruction */ 3942 if (env->cur_hist_ent) { 3943 /* atomic instructions push insn_flags twice, for READ and 3944 * WRITE sides, but they should agree on stack slot 3945 */ 3946 verifier_bug_if((env->cur_hist_ent->flags & insn_flags) && 3947 (env->cur_hist_ent->flags & insn_flags) != insn_flags, 3948 env, "insn history: insn_idx %d cur flags %x new flags %x", 3949 env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->flags, insn_flags); 3950 env->cur_hist_ent->flags |= insn_flags; 3951 verifier_bug_if(env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs != 0, env, 3952 "insn history: insn_idx %d linked_regs: %#llx", 3953 env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs); 3954 env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs = linked_regs; 3955 return 0; 3956 } 3957 3958 cnt++; 3959 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(cnt, sizeof(*p))); 3960 p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 3961 if (!p) 3962 return -ENOMEM; 3963 cur->jmp_history = p; 3964 3965 p = &cur->jmp_history[cnt - 1]; 3966 p->idx = env->insn_idx; 3967 p->prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 3968 p->flags = insn_flags; 3969 p->linked_regs = linked_regs; 3970 cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; 3971 env->cur_hist_ent = p; 3972 3973 return 0; 3974 } 3975 3976 static struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *get_jmp_hist_entry(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, 3977 u32 hist_end, int insn_idx) 3978 { 3979 if (hist_end > 0 && st->jmp_history[hist_end - 1].idx == insn_idx) 3980 return &st->jmp_history[hist_end - 1]; 3981 return NULL; 3982 } 3983 3984 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded 3985 * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. 3986 * Return -ENOENT if we exhausted all instructions within given state. 3987 * 3988 * It's legal to have a bit of a looping with the same starting and ending 3989 * insn index within the same state, e.g.: 3->4->5->3, so just because current 3990 * instruction index is the same as state's first_idx doesn't mean we are 3991 * done. If there is still some jump history left, we should keep going. We 3992 * need to take into account that we might have a jump history between given 3993 * state's parent and itself, due to checkpointing. In this case, we'll have 3994 * history entry recording a jump from last instruction of parent state and 3995 * first instruction of given state. 3996 */ 3997 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, 3998 u32 *history) 3999 { 4000 u32 cnt = *history; 4001 4002 if (i == st->first_insn_idx) { 4003 if (cnt == 0) 4004 return -ENOENT; 4005 if (cnt == 1 && st->jmp_history[0].idx == i) 4006 return -ENOENT; 4007 } 4008 4009 if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { 4010 i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; 4011 (*history)--; 4012 } else { 4013 i--; 4014 } 4015 return i; 4016 } 4017 4018 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn) 4019 { 4020 const struct btf_type *func; 4021 struct btf *desc_btf; 4022 4023 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 4024 return NULL; 4025 4026 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(data, insn->off); 4027 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 4028 return "<error>"; 4029 4030 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, insn->imm); 4031 return btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 4032 } 4033 4034 static void verbose_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 4035 { 4036 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 4037 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 4038 .cb_print = verbose, 4039 .private_data = env, 4040 }; 4041 4042 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 4043 } 4044 4045 static inline void bt_init(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 4046 { 4047 bt->frame = frame; 4048 } 4049 4050 static inline void bt_reset(struct backtrack_state *bt) 4051 { 4052 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = bt->env; 4053 4054 memset(bt, 0, sizeof(*bt)); 4055 bt->env = env; 4056 } 4057 4058 static inline u32 bt_empty(struct backtrack_state *bt) 4059 { 4060 u64 mask = 0; 4061 int i; 4062 4063 for (i = 0; i <= bt->frame; i++) 4064 mask |= bt->reg_masks[i] | bt->stack_masks[i]; 4065 4066 return mask == 0; 4067 } 4068 4069 static inline int bt_subprog_enter(struct backtrack_state *bt) 4070 { 4071 if (bt->frame == MAX_CALL_FRAMES - 1) { 4072 verifier_bug(bt->env, "subprog enter from frame %d", bt->frame); 4073 return -EFAULT; 4074 } 4075 bt->frame++; 4076 return 0; 4077 } 4078 4079 static inline int bt_subprog_exit(struct backtrack_state *bt) 4080 { 4081 if (bt->frame == 0) { 4082 verifier_bug(bt->env, "subprog exit from frame 0"); 4083 return -EFAULT; 4084 } 4085 bt->frame--; 4086 return 0; 4087 } 4088 4089 static inline void bt_set_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg) 4090 { 4091 bt->reg_masks[frame] |= 1 << reg; 4092 } 4093 4094 static inline void bt_clear_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg) 4095 { 4096 bt->reg_masks[frame] &= ~(1 << reg); 4097 } 4098 4099 static inline void bt_set_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 4100 { 4101 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg); 4102 } 4103 4104 static inline void bt_clear_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 4105 { 4106 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg); 4107 } 4108 4109 static inline void bt_set_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) 4110 { 4111 bt->stack_masks[frame] |= 1ull << slot; 4112 } 4113 4114 static inline void bt_clear_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) 4115 { 4116 bt->stack_masks[frame] &= ~(1ull << slot); 4117 } 4118 4119 static inline u32 bt_frame_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 4120 { 4121 return bt->reg_masks[frame]; 4122 } 4123 4124 static inline u32 bt_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt) 4125 { 4126 return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame]; 4127 } 4128 4129 static inline u64 bt_frame_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame) 4130 { 4131 return bt->stack_masks[frame]; 4132 } 4133 4134 static inline u64 bt_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt) 4135 { 4136 return bt->stack_masks[bt->frame]; 4137 } 4138 4139 static inline bool bt_is_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg) 4140 { 4141 return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame] & (1 << reg); 4142 } 4143 4144 static inline bool bt_is_frame_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg) 4145 { 4146 return bt->reg_masks[frame] & (1 << reg); 4147 } 4148 4149 static inline bool bt_is_frame_slot_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot) 4150 { 4151 return bt->stack_masks[frame] & (1ull << slot); 4152 } 4153 4154 /* format registers bitmask, e.g., "r0,r2,r4" for 0x15 mask */ 4155 static void fmt_reg_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u32 reg_mask) 4156 { 4157 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 4158 bool first = true; 4159 int i, n; 4160 4161 buf[0] = '\0'; 4162 4163 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 4164 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4165 n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%sr%d", first ? "" : ",", i); 4166 first = false; 4167 buf += n; 4168 buf_sz -= n; 4169 if (buf_sz < 0) 4170 break; 4171 } 4172 } 4173 /* format stack slots bitmask, e.g., "-8,-24,-40" for 0x15 mask */ 4174 void bpf_fmt_stack_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u64 stack_mask) 4175 { 4176 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 4177 bool first = true; 4178 int i, n; 4179 4180 buf[0] = '\0'; 4181 4182 bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); 4183 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 4184 n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%s%d", first ? "" : ",", -(i + 1) * 8); 4185 first = false; 4186 buf += n; 4187 buf_sz -= n; 4188 if (buf_sz < 0) 4189 break; 4190 } 4191 } 4192 4193 /* If any register R in hist->linked_regs is marked as precise in bt, 4194 * do bt_set_frame_{reg,slot}(bt, R) for all registers in hist->linked_regs. 4195 */ 4196 static void bt_sync_linked_regs(struct backtrack_state *bt, struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist) 4197 { 4198 struct linked_regs linked_regs; 4199 bool some_precise = false; 4200 int i; 4201 4202 if (!hist || hist->linked_regs == 0) 4203 return; 4204 4205 linked_regs_unpack(hist->linked_regs, &linked_regs); 4206 for (i = 0; i < linked_regs.cnt; ++i) { 4207 struct linked_reg *e = &linked_regs.entries[i]; 4208 4209 if ((e->is_reg && bt_is_frame_reg_set(bt, e->frameno, e->regno)) || 4210 (!e->is_reg && bt_is_frame_slot_set(bt, e->frameno, e->spi))) { 4211 some_precise = true; 4212 break; 4213 } 4214 } 4215 4216 if (!some_precise) 4217 return; 4218 4219 for (i = 0; i < linked_regs.cnt; ++i) { 4220 struct linked_reg *e = &linked_regs.entries[i]; 4221 4222 if (e->is_reg) 4223 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, e->frameno, e->regno); 4224 else 4225 bt_set_frame_slot(bt, e->frameno, e->spi); 4226 } 4227 } 4228 4229 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to 4230 * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and 4231 * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. 4232 * 4233 * @idx is an index of the instruction we are currently processing; 4234 * @subseq_idx is an index of the subsequent instruction that: 4235 * - *would be* executed next, if jump history is viewed in forward order; 4236 * - *was* processed previously during backtracking. 4237 */ 4238 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, 4239 struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist, struct backtrack_state *bt) 4240 { 4241 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; 4242 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 4243 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 4244 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 4245 u32 dreg = insn->dst_reg; 4246 u32 sreg = insn->src_reg; 4247 u32 spi, i, fr; 4248 4249 if (insn->code == 0) 4250 return 0; 4251 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4252 fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4253 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: regs=%s ", 4254 bt->frame, env->tmp_str_buf); 4255 bpf_fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_stack_mask(bt)); 4256 verbose(env, "stack=%s before ", env->tmp_str_buf); 4257 verbose(env, "%d: ", idx); 4258 verbose_insn(env, insn); 4259 } 4260 4261 /* If there is a history record that some registers gained range at this insn, 4262 * propagate precision marks to those registers, so that bt_is_reg_set() 4263 * accounts for these registers. 4264 */ 4265 bt_sync_linked_regs(bt, hist); 4266 4267 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 4268 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 4269 return 0; 4270 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 4271 /* sreg is reserved and unused 4272 * dreg still need precision before this insn 4273 */ 4274 return 0; 4275 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 4276 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 4277 /* dreg = sreg or dreg = (s8, s16, s32)sreg 4278 * dreg needs precision after this insn 4279 * sreg needs precision before this insn 4280 */ 4281 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 4282 if (sreg != BPF_REG_FP) 4283 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 4284 } else { 4285 /* dreg = K 4286 * dreg needs precision after this insn. 4287 * Corresponding register is already marked 4288 * as precise=true in this verifier state. 4289 * No further markings in parent are necessary 4290 */ 4291 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 4292 } 4293 } else { 4294 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 4295 /* dreg += sreg 4296 * both dreg and sreg need precision 4297 * before this insn 4298 */ 4299 if (sreg != BPF_REG_FP) 4300 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 4301 } /* else dreg += K 4302 * dreg still needs precision before this insn 4303 */ 4304 } 4305 } else if (class == BPF_LDX || is_atomic_load_insn(insn)) { 4306 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 4307 return 0; 4308 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 4309 4310 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision. 4311 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended. 4312 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated 4313 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. 4314 * No further tracking necessary. 4315 */ 4316 if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS)) 4317 return 0; 4318 /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. 4319 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be 4320 * tracked with precision 4321 */ 4322 spi = insn_stack_access_spi(hist->flags); 4323 fr = insn_stack_access_frameno(hist->flags); 4324 bt_set_frame_slot(bt, fr, spi); 4325 } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) { 4326 if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 4327 /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg 4328 * to access memory. It means backtracking 4329 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction. 4330 */ 4331 return -ENOTSUPP; 4332 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ 4333 if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS)) 4334 return 0; 4335 spi = insn_stack_access_spi(hist->flags); 4336 fr = insn_stack_access_frameno(hist->flags); 4337 if (!bt_is_frame_slot_set(bt, fr, spi)) 4338 return 0; 4339 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, spi); 4340 if (class == BPF_STX) 4341 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 4342 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 4343 if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) { 4344 int subprog_insn_idx, subprog; 4345 4346 subprog_insn_idx = idx + insn->imm + 1; 4347 subprog = find_subprog(env, subprog_insn_idx); 4348 if (subprog < 0) 4349 return -EFAULT; 4350 4351 if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) { 4352 /* check that jump history doesn't have any 4353 * extra instructions from subprog; the next 4354 * instruction after call to global subprog 4355 * should be literally next instruction in 4356 * caller program 4357 */ 4358 verifier_bug_if(idx + 1 != subseq_idx, env, 4359 "extra insn from subprog"); 4360 /* r1-r5 are invalidated after subprog call, 4361 * so for global func call it shouldn't be set 4362 * anymore 4363 */ 4364 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 4365 verifier_bug(env, "global subprog unexpected regs %x", 4366 bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4367 return -EFAULT; 4368 } 4369 /* global subprog always sets R0 */ 4370 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 4371 return 0; 4372 } else { 4373 /* static subprog call instruction, which 4374 * means that we are exiting current subprog, 4375 * so only r1-r5 could be still requested as 4376 * precise, r0 and r6-r10 or any stack slot in 4377 * the current frame should be zero by now 4378 */ 4379 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 4380 verifier_bug(env, "static subprog unexpected regs %x", 4381 bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4382 return -EFAULT; 4383 } 4384 /* we are now tracking register spills correctly, 4385 * so any instance of leftover slots is a bug 4386 */ 4387 if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) { 4388 verifier_bug(env, 4389 "static subprog leftover stack slots %llx", 4390 bt_stack_mask(bt)); 4391 return -EFAULT; 4392 } 4393 /* propagate r1-r5 to the caller */ 4394 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 4395 if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, i)) { 4396 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 4397 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame - 1, i); 4398 } 4399 } 4400 if (bt_subprog_exit(bt)) 4401 return -EFAULT; 4402 return 0; 4403 } 4404 } else if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn) && idx != subseq_idx - 1) { 4405 /* exit from callback subprog to callback-calling helper or 4406 * kfunc call. Use idx/subseq_idx check to discern it from 4407 * straight line code backtracking. 4408 * Unlike the subprog call handling above, we shouldn't 4409 * propagate precision of r1-r5 (if any requested), as they are 4410 * not actually arguments passed directly to callback subprogs 4411 */ 4412 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 4413 verifier_bug(env, "callback unexpected regs %x", 4414 bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4415 return -EFAULT; 4416 } 4417 if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) { 4418 verifier_bug(env, "callback leftover stack slots %llx", 4419 bt_stack_mask(bt)); 4420 return -EFAULT; 4421 } 4422 /* clear r1-r5 in callback subprog's mask */ 4423 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 4424 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 4425 if (bt_subprog_exit(bt)) 4426 return -EFAULT; 4427 return 0; 4428 } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 4429 /* kfunc with imm==0 is invalid and fixup_kfunc_call will 4430 * catch this error later. Make backtracking conservative 4431 * with ENOTSUPP. 4432 */ 4433 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && insn->imm == 0) 4434 return -ENOTSUPP; 4435 /* regular helper call sets R0 */ 4436 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 4437 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 4438 /* if backtracking was looking for registers R1-R5 4439 * they should have been found already. 4440 */ 4441 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking call unexpected regs %x", 4442 bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4443 return -EFAULT; 4444 } 4445 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call 4446 && subseq_idx - idx != 1) { 4447 if (bt_subprog_enter(bt)) 4448 return -EFAULT; 4449 } 4450 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 4451 bool r0_precise; 4452 4453 /* Backtracking to a nested function call, 'idx' is a part of 4454 * the inner frame 'subseq_idx' is a part of the outer frame. 4455 * In case of a regular function call, instructions giving 4456 * precision to registers R1-R5 should have been found already. 4457 * In case of a callback, it is ok to have R1-R5 marked for 4458 * backtracking, as these registers are set by the function 4459 * invoking callback. 4460 */ 4461 if (subseq_idx >= 0 && bpf_calls_callback(env, subseq_idx)) 4462 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 4463 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 4464 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 4465 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking exit unexpected regs %x", 4466 bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4467 return -EFAULT; 4468 } 4469 4470 /* BPF_EXIT in subprog or callback always returns 4471 * right after the call instruction, so by checking 4472 * whether the instruction at subseq_idx-1 is subprog 4473 * call or not we can distinguish actual exit from 4474 * *subprog* from exit from *callback*. In the former 4475 * case, we need to propagate r0 precision, if 4476 * necessary. In the former we never do that. 4477 */ 4478 r0_precise = subseq_idx - 1 >= 0 && 4479 bpf_pseudo_call(&env->prog->insnsi[subseq_idx - 1]) && 4480 bt_is_reg_set(bt, BPF_REG_0); 4481 4482 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 4483 if (bt_subprog_enter(bt)) 4484 return -EFAULT; 4485 4486 if (r0_precise) 4487 bt_set_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0); 4488 /* r6-r9 and stack slots will stay set in caller frame 4489 * bitmasks until we return back from callee(s) 4490 */ 4491 return 0; 4492 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 4493 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg) && !bt_is_reg_set(bt, sreg)) 4494 return 0; 4495 /* dreg <cond> sreg 4496 * Both dreg and sreg need precision before 4497 * this insn. If only sreg was marked precise 4498 * before it would be equally necessary to 4499 * propagate it to dreg. 4500 */ 4501 if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_SRC_REG_STACK)) 4502 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); 4503 if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_DST_REG_STACK)) 4504 bt_set_reg(bt, dreg); 4505 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 4506 /* dreg <cond> K 4507 * Only dreg still needs precision before 4508 * this insn, so for the K-based conditional 4509 * there is nothing new to be marked. 4510 */ 4511 } 4512 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 4513 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg)) 4514 return 0; 4515 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg); 4516 /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind. 4517 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision 4518 * into parent is necessary 4519 */ 4520 if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS) 4521 /* to be analyzed */ 4522 return -ENOTSUPP; 4523 } 4524 /* Propagate precision marks to linked registers, to account for 4525 * registers marked as precise in this function. 4526 */ 4527 bt_sync_linked_regs(bt, hist); 4528 return 0; 4529 } 4530 4531 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm: 4532 * . at the start all registers have precise=false. 4533 * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns. 4534 * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in: 4535 * . ptr + scalar alu 4536 * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) 4537 * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected 4538 * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and 4539 * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar registers 4540 * should be precise. 4541 * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) 4542 * are equivalent if both are not precise. 4543 * 4544 * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain, 4545 * since many different registers and stack slots could have been 4546 * used to compute single precise scalar. 4547 * 4548 * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then 4549 * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects 4550 * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper 4551 * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe. 4552 * 4553 * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states. 4554 * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn. 4555 * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later. 4556 * 4557 * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like: 4558 * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) 4559 * r9 -= r8 4560 * r5 = r9 4561 * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7 4562 * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff)) 4563 * r5 += 1 4564 * ... 4565 * call bpf_perf_event_output#25 4566 * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO 4567 * 4568 * and this case: 4569 * r6 = 1 4570 * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0 4571 * r0 += r6 4572 * if r0 == 0 goto 4573 * 4574 * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame. 4575 * 4576 * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started, 4577 * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees 4578 * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to 4579 * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences") 4580 * 4581 * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. 4582 */ 4583 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4584 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 4585 { 4586 struct bpf_func_state *func; 4587 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4588 int i, j; 4589 4590 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4591 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: falling back to forcing all scalars precise\n", 4592 st->curframe); 4593 } 4594 4595 /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. 4596 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. 4597 * We also skip current state and go straight to first parent state, 4598 * because precision markings in current non-checkpointed state are 4599 * not needed. See why in the comment in __mark_chain_precision below. 4600 */ 4601 for (st = st->parent; st; st = st->parent) { 4602 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 4603 func = st->frame[i]; 4604 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 4605 reg = &func->regs[j]; 4606 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise) 4607 continue; 4608 reg->precise = true; 4609 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4610 verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing r%d to be precise\n", 4611 i, j); 4612 } 4613 } 4614 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 4615 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 4616 continue; 4617 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 4618 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise) 4619 continue; 4620 reg->precise = true; 4621 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4622 verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing fp%d to be precise\n", 4623 i, -(j + 1) * 8); 4624 } 4625 } 4626 } 4627 } 4628 } 4629 4630 static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 4631 { 4632 struct bpf_func_state *func; 4633 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4634 int i, j; 4635 4636 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 4637 func = st->frame[i]; 4638 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 4639 reg = &func->regs[j]; 4640 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 4641 continue; 4642 reg->precise = false; 4643 } 4644 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 4645 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 4646 continue; 4647 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 4648 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 4649 continue; 4650 reg->precise = false; 4651 } 4652 } 4653 } 4654 4655 /* 4656 * __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and 4657 * chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0) 4658 * and/or stack slot *spi* (if spi >= 0) are marked as precisely tracked 4659 * SCALARS, as well as any other registers and slots that contribute to 4660 * a tracked state of given registers/stack slots, depending on specific BPF 4661 * assembly instructions (see backtrack_insns() for exact instruction handling 4662 * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to 4663 * traverse entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the 4664 * necessary registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as 4665 * precise. 4666 * 4667 * One important and subtle aspect is that precise marks *do not matter* in 4668 * the currently verified state (current state). It is important to understand 4669 * why this is the case. 4670 * 4671 * First, note that current state is the state that is not yet "checkpointed", 4672 * i.e., it is not yet put into env->explored_states, and it has no children 4673 * states as well. It's ephemeral, and can end up either a) being discarded if 4674 * compatible explored state is found at some point or BPF_EXIT instruction is 4675 * reached or b) checkpointed and put into env->explored_states, branching out 4676 * into one or more children states. 4677 * 4678 * In the former case, precise markings in current state are completely 4679 * ignored by state comparison code (see regsafe() for details). Only 4680 * checkpointed ("old") state precise markings are important, and if old 4681 * state's register/slot is precise, regsafe() assumes current state's 4682 * register/slot as precise and checks value ranges exactly and precisely. If 4683 * states turn out to be compatible, current state's necessary precise 4684 * markings and any required parent states' precise markings are enforced 4685 * after the fact with propagate_precision() logic, after the fact. But it's 4686 * important to realize that in this case, even after marking current state 4687 * registers/slots as precise, we immediately discard current state. So what 4688 * actually matters is any of the precise markings propagated into current 4689 * state's parent states, which are always checkpointed (due to b) case above). 4690 * As such, for scenario a) it doesn't matter if current state has precise 4691 * markings set or not. 4692 * 4693 * Now, for the scenario b), checkpointing and forking into child(ren) 4694 * state(s). Note that before current state gets to checkpointing step, any 4695 * processed instruction always assumes precise SCALAR register/slot 4696 * knowledge: if precise value or range is useful to prune jump branch, BPF 4697 * verifier takes this opportunity enthusiastically. Similarly, when 4698 * register's value is used to calculate offset or memory address, exact 4699 * knowledge of SCALAR range is assumed, checked, and enforced. So, similar to 4700 * what we mentioned above about state comparison ignoring precise markings 4701 * during state comparison, BPF verifier ignores and also assumes precise 4702 * markings *at will* during instruction verification process. But as verifier 4703 * assumes precision, it also propagates any precision dependencies across 4704 * parent states, which are not yet finalized, so can be further restricted 4705 * based on new knowledge gained from restrictions enforced by their children 4706 * states. This is so that once those parent states are finalized, i.e., when 4707 * they have no more active children state, state comparison logic in 4708 * is_state_visited() would enforce strict and precise SCALAR ranges, if 4709 * required for correctness. 4710 * 4711 * To build a bit more intuition, note also that once a state is checkpointed, 4712 * the path we took to get to that state is not important. This is crucial 4713 * property for state pruning. When state is checkpointed and finalized at 4714 * some instruction index, it can be correctly and safely used to "short 4715 * circuit" any *compatible* state that reaches exactly the same instruction 4716 * index. I.e., if we jumped to that instruction from a completely different 4717 * code path than original finalized state was derived from, it doesn't 4718 * matter, current state can be discarded because from that instruction 4719 * forward having a compatible state will ensure we will safely reach the 4720 * exit. States describe preconditions for further exploration, but completely 4721 * forget the history of how we got here. 4722 * 4723 * This also means that even if we needed precise SCALAR range to get to 4724 * finalized state, but from that point forward *that same* SCALAR register is 4725 * never used in a precise context (i.e., it's precise value is not needed for 4726 * correctness), it's correct and safe to mark such register as "imprecise" 4727 * (i.e., precise marking set to false). This is what we rely on when we do 4728 * not set precise marking in current state. If no child state requires 4729 * precision for any given SCALAR register, it's safe to dictate that it can 4730 * be imprecise. If any child state does require this register to be precise, 4731 * we'll mark it precise later retroactively during precise markings 4732 * propagation from child state to parent states. 4733 * 4734 * Skipping precise marking setting in current state is a mild version of 4735 * relying on the above observation. But we can utilize this property even 4736 * more aggressively by proactively forgetting any precise marking in the 4737 * current state (which we inherited from the parent state), right before we 4738 * checkpoint it and branch off into new child state. This is done by 4739 * mark_all_scalars_imprecise() to hopefully get more permissive and generic 4740 * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states. 4741 */ 4742 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4743 struct bpf_verifier_state *starting_state, 4744 int regno, 4745 bool *changed) 4746 { 4747 struct bpf_verifier_state *st = starting_state; 4748 struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt; 4749 int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 4750 int last_idx = starting_state->insn_idx; 4751 int subseq_idx = -1; 4752 struct bpf_func_state *func; 4753 bool tmp, skip_first = true; 4754 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 4755 int i, fr, err; 4756 4757 if (!env->bpf_capable) 4758 return 0; 4759 4760 changed = changed ?: &tmp; 4761 /* set frame number from which we are starting to backtrack */ 4762 bt_init(bt, starting_state->curframe); 4763 4764 /* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack 4765 * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision 4766 * tracking in the current state is unnecessary. 4767 */ 4768 func = st->frame[bt->frame]; 4769 if (regno >= 0) { 4770 reg = &func->regs[regno]; 4771 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4772 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking misuse"); 4773 return -EFAULT; 4774 } 4775 bt_set_reg(bt, regno); 4776 } 4777 4778 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4779 return 0; 4780 4781 for (;;) { 4782 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 4783 u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; 4784 struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist; 4785 4786 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4787 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: last_idx %d first_idx %d subseq_idx %d \n", 4788 bt->frame, last_idx, first_idx, subseq_idx); 4789 } 4790 4791 if (last_idx < 0) { 4792 /* we are at the entry into subprog, which 4793 * is expected for global funcs, but only if 4794 * requested precise registers are R1-R5 4795 * (which are global func's input arguments) 4796 */ 4797 if (st->curframe == 0 && 4798 st->frame[0]->subprogno > 0 && 4799 st->frame[0]->callsite == BPF_MAIN_FUNC && 4800 bt_stack_mask(bt) == 0 && 4801 (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) == 0) { 4802 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4803 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4804 reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i]; 4805 bt_clear_reg(bt, i); 4806 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 4807 reg->precise = true; 4808 *changed = true; 4809 } 4810 } 4811 return 0; 4812 } 4813 4814 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking func entry subprog %d reg_mask %x stack_mask %llx", 4815 st->frame[0]->subprogno, bt_reg_mask(bt), bt_stack_mask(bt)); 4816 return -EFAULT; 4817 } 4818 4819 for (i = last_idx;;) { 4820 if (skip_first) { 4821 err = 0; 4822 skip_first = false; 4823 } else { 4824 hist = get_jmp_hist_entry(st, history, i); 4825 err = backtrack_insn(env, i, subseq_idx, hist, bt); 4826 } 4827 if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { 4828 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, starting_state); 4829 bt_reset(bt); 4830 return 0; 4831 } else if (err) { 4832 return err; 4833 } 4834 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4835 /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state. 4836 * Since this state is already marked, just return. 4837 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state. 4838 */ 4839 return 0; 4840 subseq_idx = i; 4841 i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); 4842 if (i == -ENOENT) 4843 break; 4844 if (i >= env->prog->len) { 4845 /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0 4846 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask 4847 * to backtrack. 4848 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where 4849 * particular register was initialized with a constant. 4850 */ 4851 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking idx %d", i); 4852 return -EFAULT; 4853 } 4854 } 4855 st = st->parent; 4856 if (!st) 4857 break; 4858 4859 for (fr = bt->frame; fr >= 0; fr--) { 4860 func = st->frame[fr]; 4861 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 4862 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 4863 reg = &func->regs[i]; 4864 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 4865 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 4866 continue; 4867 } 4868 if (reg->precise) { 4869 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); 4870 } else { 4871 reg->precise = true; 4872 *changed = true; 4873 } 4874 } 4875 4876 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 4877 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 4878 if (verifier_bug_if(i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, 4879 env, "stack slot %d, total slots %d", 4880 i, func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE)) 4881 return -EFAULT; 4882 4883 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) { 4884 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 4885 continue; 4886 } 4887 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 4888 if (reg->precise) { 4889 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); 4890 } else { 4891 reg->precise = true; 4892 *changed = true; 4893 } 4894 } 4895 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 4896 fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, 4897 bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); 4898 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: parent state regs=%s ", 4899 fr, env->tmp_str_buf); 4900 bpf_fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, 4901 bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); 4902 verbose(env, "stack=%s: ", env->tmp_str_buf); 4903 print_verifier_state(env, st, fr, true); 4904 } 4905 } 4906 4907 if (bt_empty(bt)) 4908 return 0; 4909 4910 subseq_idx = first_idx; 4911 last_idx = st->last_insn_idx; 4912 first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 4913 } 4914 4915 /* if we still have requested precise regs or slots, we missed 4916 * something (e.g., stack access through non-r10 register), so 4917 * fallback to marking all precise 4918 */ 4919 if (!bt_empty(bt)) { 4920 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, starting_state); 4921 bt_reset(bt); 4922 } 4923 4924 return 0; 4925 } 4926 4927 int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4928 { 4929 return __mark_chain_precision(env, env->cur_state, regno, NULL); 4930 } 4931 4932 /* mark_chain_precision_batch() assumes that env->bt is set in the caller to 4933 * desired reg and stack masks across all relevant frames 4934 */ 4935 static int mark_chain_precision_batch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4936 struct bpf_verifier_state *starting_state) 4937 { 4938 return __mark_chain_precision(env, starting_state, -1, NULL); 4939 } 4940 4941 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) 4942 { 4943 switch (base_type(type)) { 4944 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 4945 case PTR_TO_STACK: 4946 case PTR_TO_CTX: 4947 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 4948 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 4949 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 4950 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 4951 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 4952 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 4953 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 4954 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 4955 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 4956 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 4957 case PTR_TO_BUF: 4958 case PTR_TO_MEM: 4959 case PTR_TO_FUNC: 4960 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 4961 case PTR_TO_ARENA: 4962 return true; 4963 default: 4964 return false; 4965 } 4966 } 4967 4968 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ 4969 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4970 { 4971 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 4972 } 4973 4974 /* check if register is a constant scalar value */ 4975 static bool is_reg_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, bool subreg32) 4976 { 4977 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 4978 tnum_is_const(subreg32 ? tnum_subreg(reg->var_off) : reg->var_off); 4979 } 4980 4981 /* assuming is_reg_const() is true, return constant value of a register */ 4982 static u64 reg_const_value(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, bool subreg32) 4983 { 4984 return subreg32 ? tnum_subreg(reg->var_off).value : reg->var_off.value; 4985 } 4986 4987 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, 4988 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4989 { 4990 if (allow_ptr_leaks) 4991 return false; 4992 4993 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; 4994 } 4995 4996 static void assign_scalar_id_before_mov(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4997 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 4998 { 4999 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 5000 return; 5001 5002 if (src_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) { 5003 /* 5004 * The verifier is processing rX = rY insn and 5005 * rY->id has special linked register already. 5006 * Cleared it, since multiple rX += const are not supported. 5007 */ 5008 src_reg->id = 0; 5009 src_reg->off = 0; 5010 } 5011 5012 if (!src_reg->id && !tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) 5013 /* Ensure that src_reg has a valid ID that will be copied to 5014 * dst_reg and then will be used by sync_linked_regs() to 5015 * propagate min/max range. 5016 */ 5017 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 5018 } 5019 5020 /* Copy src state preserving dst->parent and dst->live fields */ 5021 static void copy_register_state(struct bpf_reg_state *dst, const struct bpf_reg_state *src) 5022 { 5023 *dst = *src; 5024 } 5025 5026 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5027 struct bpf_func_state *state, 5028 int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5029 int size) 5030 { 5031 int i; 5032 5033 copy_register_state(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, reg); 5034 5035 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > BPF_REG_SIZE - size; i--) 5036 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1] = STACK_SPILL; 5037 5038 /* size < 8 bytes spill */ 5039 for (; i; i--) 5040 mark_stack_slot_misc(env, &state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1]); 5041 } 5042 5043 static bool is_bpf_st_mem(struct bpf_insn *insn) 5044 { 5045 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ST && BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM; 5046 } 5047 5048 static int get_reg_width(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 5049 { 5050 return fls64(reg->umax_value); 5051 } 5052 5053 /* See comment for mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call() */ 5054 static void check_fastcall_stack_contract(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5055 struct bpf_func_state *state, int insn_idx, int off) 5056 { 5057 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = &env->subprog_info[state->subprogno]; 5058 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 5059 int i; 5060 5061 if (subprog->fastcall_stack_off <= off || aux[insn_idx].fastcall_pattern) 5062 return; 5063 /* access to the region [max_stack_depth .. fastcall_stack_off) 5064 * from something that is not a part of the fastcall pattern, 5065 * disable fastcall rewrites for current subprogram by setting 5066 * fastcall_stack_off to a value smaller than any possible offset. 5067 */ 5068 subprog->fastcall_stack_off = S16_MIN; 5069 /* reset fastcall aux flags within subprogram, 5070 * happens at most once per subprogram 5071 */ 5072 for (i = subprog->start; i < (subprog + 1)->start; ++i) { 5073 aux[i].fastcall_spills_num = 0; 5074 aux[i].fastcall_pattern = 0; 5075 } 5076 } 5077 5078 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers, 5079 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() 5080 */ 5081 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5082 /* stack frame we're writing to */ 5083 struct bpf_func_state *state, 5084 int off, int size, int value_regno, 5085 int insn_idx) 5086 { 5087 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 5088 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; 5089 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 5090 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; 5091 int insn_flags = insn_stack_access_flags(state->frameno, spi); 5092 5093 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, 5094 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits 5095 */ 5096 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && 5097 is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 5098 !is_spilled_scalar_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 5099 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 5100 verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); 5101 return -EACCES; 5102 } 5103 5104 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 5105 if (value_regno >= 0) 5106 reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 5107 if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) { 5108 bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type); 5109 5110 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 5111 u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]; 5112 5113 if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) { 5114 sanitize = true; 5115 break; 5116 } 5117 } 5118 5119 if (sanitize) 5120 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].nospec_result = true; 5121 } 5122 5123 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 5124 if (err) 5125 return err; 5126 5127 if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_REG_SIZE) { 5128 /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written 5129 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon 5130 * when stack slots are partially written. 5131 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be 5132 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks 5133 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs 5134 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes 5135 */ 5136 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi)); 5137 } 5138 5139 check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, insn_idx, off); 5140 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 5141 if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && env->bpf_capable) { 5142 bool reg_value_fits; 5143 5144 reg_value_fits = get_reg_width(reg) <= BITS_PER_BYTE * size; 5145 /* Make sure that reg had an ID to build a relation on spill. */ 5146 if (reg_value_fits) 5147 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, reg); 5148 save_register_state(env, state, spi, reg, size); 5149 /* Break the relation on a narrowing spill. */ 5150 if (!reg_value_fits) 5151 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = 0; 5152 } else if (!reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && 5153 env->bpf_capable) { 5154 struct bpf_reg_state *tmp_reg = &env->fake_reg[0]; 5155 5156 memset(tmp_reg, 0, sizeof(*tmp_reg)); 5157 __mark_reg_known(tmp_reg, insn->imm); 5158 tmp_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 5159 save_register_state(env, state, spi, tmp_reg, size); 5160 } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { 5161 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ 5162 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 5163 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 5164 verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); 5165 return -EACCES; 5166 } 5167 if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 5168 verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); 5169 return -EINVAL; 5170 } 5171 save_register_state(env, state, spi, reg, size); 5172 } else { 5173 u8 type = STACK_MISC; 5174 5175 /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ 5176 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 5177 /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr/dynptr/iter. */ 5178 if (is_stack_slot_special(&state->stack[spi])) 5179 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 5180 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]); 5181 5182 /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ 5183 if ((reg && register_is_null(reg)) || 5184 (!reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) { 5185 /* STACK_ZERO case happened because register spill 5186 * wasn't properly aligned at the stack slot boundary, 5187 * so it's not a register spill anymore; force 5188 * originating register to be precise to make 5189 * STACK_ZERO correct for subsequent states 5190 */ 5191 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 5192 if (err) 5193 return err; 5194 type = STACK_ZERO; 5195 } 5196 5197 /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ 5198 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 5199 state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = type; 5200 insn_flags = 0; /* not a register spill */ 5201 } 5202 5203 if (insn_flags) 5204 return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0); 5205 return 0; 5206 } 5207 5208 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is 5209 * known to contain a variable offset. 5210 * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively 5211 * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the 5212 * dynamic range is potentially written to. 5213 * 5214 * 'off' includes 'regno->off'. 5215 * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to 5216 * the stack. 5217 * 5218 * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know 5219 * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for 5220 * future reads cannot be terminated by this write. 5221 * 5222 * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered 5223 * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets 5224 * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to 5225 * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets. 5226 */ 5227 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5228 /* func where register points to */ 5229 struct bpf_func_state *state, 5230 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 5231 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 5232 { 5233 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 5234 int min_off, max_off; 5235 int i, err; 5236 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL; 5237 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 5238 bool writing_zero = false; 5239 /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any 5240 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO 5241 */ 5242 bool zero_used = false; 5243 5244 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 5245 ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno]; 5246 min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off; 5247 max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size; 5248 if (value_regno >= 0) 5249 value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 5250 if ((value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg)) || 5251 (!value_reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) 5252 writing_zero = true; 5253 5254 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 5255 int spi; 5256 5257 spi = __get_spi(i); 5258 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); 5259 if (err) 5260 return err; 5261 } 5262 5263 check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, insn_idx, min_off); 5264 /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */ 5265 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 5266 u8 new_type, *stype; 5267 int slot, spi; 5268 5269 slot = -i - 1; 5270 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 5271 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 5272 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 5273 5274 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) { 5275 /* Reject the write if range we may write to has not 5276 * been initialized beforehand. If we didn't reject 5277 * here, the ptr status would be erased below (even 5278 * though not all slots are actually overwritten), 5279 * possibly opening the door to leaks. 5280 * 5281 * We do however catch STACK_INVALID case below, and 5282 * only allow reading possibly uninitialized memory 5283 * later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to 5284 * that slot. 5285 */ 5286 verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d", 5287 insn_idx, i); 5288 return -EINVAL; 5289 } 5290 5291 /* If writing_zero and the spi slot contains a spill of value 0, 5292 * maintain the spill type. 5293 */ 5294 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_SPILL && 5295 is_spilled_scalar_reg(&state->stack[spi])) { 5296 struct bpf_reg_state *spill_reg = &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 5297 5298 if (tnum_is_const(spill_reg->var_off) && spill_reg->var_off.value == 0) { 5299 zero_used = true; 5300 continue; 5301 } 5302 } 5303 5304 /* Erase all other spilled pointers. */ 5305 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 5306 5307 /* Update the slot type. */ 5308 new_type = STACK_MISC; 5309 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) { 5310 new_type = STACK_ZERO; 5311 zero_used = true; 5312 } 5313 /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to 5314 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot 5315 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as 5316 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory. 5317 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots 5318 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject 5319 * them, the error would be too confusing. 5320 */ 5321 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) { 5322 verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d", 5323 insn_idx, i); 5324 return -EINVAL; 5325 } 5326 *stype = new_type; 5327 } 5328 if (zero_used) { 5329 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 5330 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 5331 if (err) 5332 return err; 5333 } 5334 return 0; 5335 } 5336 5337 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, 5338 * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the 5339 * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then 5340 * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be 5341 * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must 5342 * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as 5343 * read. 5344 */ 5345 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5346 /* func where src register points to */ 5347 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state, 5348 int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno) 5349 { 5350 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5351 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5352 int i, slot, spi; 5353 u8 *stype; 5354 int zeros = 0; 5355 5356 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 5357 slot = -i - 1; 5358 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 5359 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 5360 stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 5361 if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO) 5362 break; 5363 zeros++; 5364 } 5365 if (zeros == max_off - min_off) { 5366 /* Any access_size read into register is zero extended, 5367 * so the whole register == const_zero. 5368 */ 5369 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, &state->regs[dst_regno]); 5370 } else { 5371 /* have read misc data from the stack */ 5372 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 5373 } 5374 } 5375 5376 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by 5377 * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a 5378 * spilled reg. 5379 * 5380 * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a 5381 * register. 5382 * 5383 * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds. 5384 */ 5385 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5386 /* func where src register points to */ 5387 struct bpf_func_state *reg_state, 5388 int off, int size, int dst_regno) 5389 { 5390 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5391 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5392 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 5393 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 5394 u8 *stype, type; 5395 int insn_flags = insn_stack_access_flags(reg_state->frameno, spi); 5396 int err; 5397 5398 stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 5399 reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 5400 5401 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 5402 check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, env->insn_idx, off); 5403 err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg_state->frameno, env->insn_idx, BIT(spi)); 5404 if (err) 5405 return err; 5406 5407 if (is_spilled_reg(®_state->stack[spi])) { 5408 u8 spill_size = 1; 5409 5410 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--) 5411 spill_size++; 5412 5413 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE || spill_size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 5414 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 5415 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 5416 verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); 5417 return -EACCES; 5418 } 5419 5420 if (dst_regno < 0) 5421 return 0; 5422 5423 if (size <= spill_size && 5424 bpf_stack_narrow_access_ok(off, size, spill_size)) { 5425 /* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the 5426 * subreg_def for this insn. Save it first. 5427 */ 5428 s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def; 5429 5430 copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg); 5431 state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def; 5432 5433 /* Break the relation on a narrowing fill. 5434 * coerce_reg_to_size will adjust the boundaries. 5435 */ 5436 if (get_reg_width(reg) > size * BITS_PER_BYTE) 5437 state->regs[dst_regno].id = 0; 5438 } else { 5439 int spill_cnt = 0, zero_cnt = 0; 5440 5441 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 5442 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 5443 if (type == STACK_SPILL) { 5444 spill_cnt++; 5445 continue; 5446 } 5447 if (type == STACK_MISC) 5448 continue; 5449 if (type == STACK_ZERO) { 5450 zero_cnt++; 5451 continue; 5452 } 5453 if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack) 5454 continue; 5455 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 5456 off, i, size); 5457 return -EACCES; 5458 } 5459 5460 if (spill_cnt == size && 5461 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && reg->var_off.value == 0) { 5462 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, &state->regs[dst_regno]); 5463 /* this IS register fill, so keep insn_flags */ 5464 } else if (zero_cnt == size) { 5465 /* similarly to mark_reg_stack_read(), preserve zeroes */ 5466 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, &state->regs[dst_regno]); 5467 insn_flags = 0; /* not restoring original register state */ 5468 } else { 5469 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 5470 insn_flags = 0; /* not restoring original register state */ 5471 } 5472 } 5473 } else if (dst_regno >= 0) { 5474 /* restore register state from stack */ 5475 copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg); 5476 /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely 5477 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() 5478 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions 5479 */ 5480 } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) { 5481 /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether 5482 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE 5483 * (e.g. for XADD). 5484 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that 5485 * with spilled pointers. 5486 */ 5487 verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n", 5488 off); 5489 return -EACCES; 5490 } 5491 } else { 5492 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 5493 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 5494 if (type == STACK_MISC) 5495 continue; 5496 if (type == STACK_ZERO) 5497 continue; 5498 if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack) 5499 continue; 5500 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 5501 off, i, size); 5502 return -EACCES; 5503 } 5504 if (dst_regno >= 0) 5505 mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno); 5506 insn_flags = 0; /* we are not restoring spilled register */ 5507 } 5508 if (insn_flags) 5509 return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0); 5510 return 0; 5511 } 5512 5513 enum bpf_access_src { 5514 ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */ 5515 ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */ 5516 }; 5517 5518 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5519 int regno, int off, int access_size, 5520 bool zero_size_allowed, 5521 enum bpf_access_type type, 5522 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta); 5523 5524 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 5525 { 5526 return cur_regs(env) + regno; 5527 } 5528 5529 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register 5530 * 'dst_regno'. 5531 * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'), 5532 * but not its variable offset. 5533 * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned. 5534 * 5535 * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with 5536 * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when 5537 * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing 5538 * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable 5539 * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used 5540 * instead. 5541 */ 5542 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5543 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno) 5544 { 5545 /* The state of the source register. */ 5546 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 5547 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg); 5548 int err; 5549 int min_off, max_off; 5550 5551 /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted. 5552 */ 5553 err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 5554 false, BPF_READ, NULL); 5555 if (err) 5556 return err; 5557 5558 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 5559 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 5560 mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno); 5561 check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, ptr_state, env->insn_idx, min_off); 5562 return 0; 5563 } 5564 5565 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or 5566 * check_stack_read_var_off. 5567 * 5568 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack 5569 * bounds. 5570 * 5571 * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It 5572 * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register. 5573 */ 5574 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5575 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 5576 int dst_regno) 5577 { 5578 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 5579 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 5580 int err; 5581 /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */ 5582 bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 5583 5584 /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a 5585 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see 5586 * check_stack_read_fixed_off). 5587 */ 5588 if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) { 5589 char tn_buf[48]; 5590 5591 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5592 verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", 5593 tn_buf, off, size); 5594 return -EACCES; 5595 } 5596 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity 5597 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack 5598 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). The check in 5599 * check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic() called by 5600 * adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() prevents users from creating stack pointers 5601 * with variable offsets, therefore no check is required here. Further, 5602 * just checking it here would be insufficient as speculative stack 5603 * writes could still lead to unsafe speculative behaviour. 5604 */ 5605 if (!var_off) { 5606 off += reg->var_off.value; 5607 err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 5608 dst_regno); 5609 } else { 5610 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 5611 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this 5612 * branch. 5613 */ 5614 err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 5615 dst_regno); 5616 } 5617 return err; 5618 } 5619 5620 5621 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or 5622 * check_stack_write_var_off. 5623 * 5624 * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack. 5625 * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any). 5626 * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can 5627 * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register. 5628 * 5629 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size. 5630 */ 5631 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5632 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 5633 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 5634 { 5635 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 5636 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 5637 int err; 5638 5639 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5640 off += reg->var_off.value; 5641 err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 5642 value_regno, insn_idx); 5643 } else { 5644 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 5645 * than fixed offset ones. 5646 */ 5647 err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state, 5648 ptr_regno, off, size, 5649 value_regno, insn_idx); 5650 } 5651 return err; 5652 } 5653 5654 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5655 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) 5656 { 5657 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 5658 struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr; 5659 u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map); 5660 5661 if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) { 5662 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5663 map->value_size, off, size); 5664 return -EACCES; 5665 } 5666 5667 if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) { 5668 verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5669 map->value_size, off, size); 5670 return -EACCES; 5671 } 5672 5673 return 0; 5674 } 5675 5676 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */ 5677 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5678 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 5679 bool zero_size_allowed) 5680 { 5681 bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed); 5682 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 5683 5684 if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size) 5685 return 0; 5686 5687 reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 5688 switch (reg->type) { 5689 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 5690 verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5691 mem_size, off, size); 5692 break; 5693 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 5694 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5695 mem_size, off, size); 5696 break; 5697 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 5698 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 5699 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 5700 verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", 5701 off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size); 5702 break; 5703 case PTR_TO_MEM: 5704 default: 5705 verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n", 5706 mem_size, off, size); 5707 } 5708 5709 return -EACCES; 5710 } 5711 5712 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */ 5713 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5714 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 5715 bool zero_size_allowed) 5716 { 5717 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 5718 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 5719 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 5720 int err; 5721 5722 /* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we 5723 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off 5724 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. 5725 * 5726 * The minimum value is only important with signed 5727 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a 5728 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our 5729 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use 5730 * will have a set floor within our range. 5731 */ 5732 if (reg->smin_value < 0 && 5733 (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN || 5734 (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) || 5735 reg->smin_value + off < 0)) { 5736 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 5737 regno); 5738 return -EACCES; 5739 } 5740 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, 5741 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 5742 if (err) { 5743 verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 5744 regno); 5745 return err; 5746 } 5747 5748 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be 5749 * sure we won't do bad things. 5750 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. 5751 */ 5752 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 5753 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n", 5754 regno); 5755 return -EACCES; 5756 } 5757 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, 5758 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 5759 if (err) { 5760 verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 5761 regno); 5762 return err; 5763 } 5764 5765 return 0; 5766 } 5767 5768 static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5769 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 5770 bool fixed_off_ok) 5771 { 5772 /* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper 5773 * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form. 5774 */ 5775 5776 if (reg->off < 0) { 5777 verbose(env, "negative offset %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 5778 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 5779 return -EACCES; 5780 } 5781 5782 if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) { 5783 verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 5784 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 5785 return -EACCES; 5786 } 5787 5788 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 5789 char tn_buf[48]; 5790 5791 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5792 verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n", 5793 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf); 5794 return -EACCES; 5795 } 5796 5797 return 0; 5798 } 5799 5800 static int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5801 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) 5802 { 5803 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 5804 } 5805 5806 static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5807 struct btf_field *kptr_field, 5808 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno) 5809 { 5810 const char *targ_name = btf_type_name(kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id); 5811 int perm_flags; 5812 const char *reg_name = ""; 5813 5814 if (btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 5815 perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED | MEM_RCU; 5816 5817 /* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */ 5818 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 5819 perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 5820 } else { 5821 perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_ALLOC; 5822 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU) 5823 perm_flags |= MEM_PERCPU; 5824 } 5825 5826 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags)) 5827 goto bad_type; 5828 5829 /* We need to verify reg->type and reg->btf, before accessing reg->btf */ 5830 reg_name = btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 5831 5832 /* For ref_ptr case, release function check should ensure we get one 5833 * referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and that its fixed offset is 0. For the 5834 * normal store of unreferenced kptr, we must ensure var_off is zero. 5835 * Since ref_ptr cannot be accessed directly by BPF insns, checks for 5836 * reg->off and reg->ref_obj_id are not needed here. 5837 */ 5838 if (__check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true)) 5839 return -EACCES; 5840 5841 /* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux, module or prog BTF, and 5842 * we also need to take into account the reg->off. 5843 * 5844 * We want to support cases like: 5845 * 5846 * struct foo { 5847 * struct bar br; 5848 * struct baz bz; 5849 * }; 5850 * 5851 * struct foo *v; 5852 * v = func(); // PTR_TO_BTF_ID 5853 * val->foo = v; // reg->off is zero, btf and btf_id match type 5854 * val->bar = &v->br; // reg->off is still zero, but we need to retry with 5855 * // first member type of struct after comparison fails 5856 * val->baz = &v->bz; // reg->off is non-zero, so struct needs to be walked 5857 * // to match type 5858 * 5859 * In the kptr_ref case, check_func_arg_reg_off already ensures reg->off 5860 * is zero. We must also ensure that btf_struct_ids_match does not walk 5861 * the struct to match type against first member of struct, i.e. reject 5862 * second case from above. Hence, when type is BPF_KPTR_REF, we set 5863 * strict mode to true for type match. 5864 */ 5865 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 5866 kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 5867 kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_UNREF)) 5868 goto bad_type; 5869 return 0; 5870 bad_type: 5871 verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno, 5872 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name); 5873 verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name); 5874 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 5875 verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED), 5876 targ_name); 5877 else 5878 verbose(env, "\n"); 5879 return -EINVAL; 5880 } 5881 5882 static bool in_sleepable(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5883 { 5884 return env->cur_state->in_sleepable; 5885 } 5886 5887 /* The non-sleepable programs and sleepable programs with explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() 5888 * can dereference RCU protected pointers and result is PTR_TRUSTED. 5889 */ 5890 static bool in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 5891 { 5892 return env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks || 5893 env->cur_state->active_locks || 5894 !in_sleepable(env); 5895 } 5896 5897 /* Once GCC supports btf_type_tag the following mechanism will be replaced with tag check */ 5898 BTF_SET_START(rcu_protected_types) 5899 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 5900 BTF_ID(struct, prog_test_ref_kfunc) 5901 #endif 5902 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS 5903 BTF_ID(struct, cgroup) 5904 #endif 5905 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT 5906 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_cpumask) 5907 #endif 5908 BTF_ID(struct, task_struct) 5909 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO 5910 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_crypto_ctx) 5911 #endif 5912 BTF_SET_END(rcu_protected_types) 5913 5914 static bool rcu_protected_object(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id) 5915 { 5916 if (!btf_is_kernel(btf)) 5917 return true; 5918 return btf_id_set_contains(&rcu_protected_types, btf_id); 5919 } 5920 5921 static struct btf_record *kptr_pointee_btf_record(struct btf_field *kptr_field) 5922 { 5923 struct btf_struct_meta *meta; 5924 5925 if (btf_is_kernel(kptr_field->kptr.btf)) 5926 return NULL; 5927 5928 meta = btf_find_struct_meta(kptr_field->kptr.btf, 5929 kptr_field->kptr.btf_id); 5930 5931 return meta ? meta->record : NULL; 5932 } 5933 5934 static bool rcu_safe_kptr(const struct btf_field *field) 5935 { 5936 const struct btf_field_kptr *kptr = &field->kptr; 5937 5938 return field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU || 5939 (field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF && rcu_protected_object(kptr->btf, kptr->btf_id)); 5940 } 5941 5942 static u32 btf_ld_kptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct btf_field *kptr_field) 5943 { 5944 struct btf_record *rec; 5945 u32 ret; 5946 5947 ret = PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 5948 if (rcu_safe_kptr(kptr_field) && in_rcu_cs(env)) { 5949 ret |= MEM_RCU; 5950 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU) 5951 ret |= MEM_PERCPU; 5952 else if (!btf_is_kernel(kptr_field->kptr.btf)) 5953 ret |= MEM_ALLOC; 5954 5955 rec = kptr_pointee_btf_record(kptr_field); 5956 if (rec && btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_GRAPH_NODE)) 5957 ret |= NON_OWN_REF; 5958 } else { 5959 ret |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 5960 } 5961 5962 return ret; 5963 } 5964 5965 static int mark_uptr_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5966 struct btf_field *field) 5967 { 5968 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 5969 const struct btf_type *t; 5970 5971 t = btf_type_by_id(field->kptr.btf, field->kptr.btf_id); 5972 mark_reg_known_zero(env, cur_regs(env), regno); 5973 reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5974 reg->type = PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 5975 reg->mem_size = t->size; 5976 reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 5977 5978 return 0; 5979 } 5980 5981 static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 5982 int value_regno, int insn_idx, 5983 struct btf_field *kptr_field) 5984 { 5985 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 5986 int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 5987 struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg; 5988 int ret; 5989 5990 /* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller: 5991 * - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr 5992 * - size of access (must be BPF_DW) 5993 * - tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) 5994 * - kptr_field->offset == off + reg->var_off.value 5995 */ 5996 /* Only BPF_[LDX,STX,ST] | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW is supported */ 5997 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { 5998 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_MEM instruction mode\n"); 5999 return -EACCES; 6000 } 6001 6002 /* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as 6003 * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr. 6004 */ 6005 if (class != BPF_LDX && 6006 (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF || kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU)) { 6007 verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n"); 6008 return -EACCES; 6009 } 6010 if (class != BPF_LDX && kptr_field->type == BPF_UPTR) { 6011 verbose(env, "store to uptr disallowed\n"); 6012 return -EACCES; 6013 } 6014 6015 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 6016 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_UPTR) 6017 return mark_uptr_ld_reg(env, value_regno, kptr_field); 6018 6019 /* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer 6020 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type. 6021 */ 6022 ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 6023 kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 6024 btf_ld_kptr_type(env, kptr_field)); 6025 if (ret < 0) 6026 return ret; 6027 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 6028 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 6029 if (!register_is_null(val_reg) && 6030 map_kptr_match_type(env, kptr_field, val_reg, value_regno)) 6031 return -EACCES; 6032 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 6033 if (insn->imm) { 6034 verbose(env, "BPF_ST imm must be 0 when storing to kptr at off=%u\n", 6035 kptr_field->offset); 6036 return -EACCES; 6037 } 6038 } else { 6039 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_LDX/BPF_STX/BPF_ST\n"); 6040 return -EACCES; 6041 } 6042 return 0; 6043 } 6044 6045 /* 6046 * Return the size of the memory region accessible from a pointer to map value. 6047 * For INSN_ARRAY maps whole bpf_insn_array->ips array is accessible. 6048 */ 6049 static u32 map_mem_size(const struct bpf_map *map) 6050 { 6051 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) 6052 return map->max_entries * sizeof(long); 6053 6054 return map->value_size; 6055 } 6056 6057 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ 6058 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 6059 int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed, 6060 enum bpf_access_src src) 6061 { 6062 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 6063 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 6064 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 6065 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 6066 u32 mem_size = map_mem_size(map); 6067 struct btf_record *rec; 6068 int err, i; 6069 6070 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 6071 if (err) 6072 return err; 6073 6074 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record)) 6075 return 0; 6076 rec = map->record; 6077 for (i = 0; i < rec->cnt; i++) { 6078 struct btf_field *field = &rec->fields[i]; 6079 u32 p = field->offset; 6080 6081 /* If any part of a field can be touched by load/store, reject 6082 * this program. To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2), 6083 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2. 6084 */ 6085 if (reg->smin_value + off < p + field->size && 6086 p < reg->umax_value + off + size) { 6087 switch (field->type) { 6088 case BPF_KPTR_UNREF: 6089 case BPF_KPTR_REF: 6090 case BPF_KPTR_PERCPU: 6091 case BPF_UPTR: 6092 if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) { 6093 verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n", 6094 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 6095 return -EACCES; 6096 } 6097 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6098 verbose(env, "%s access cannot have variable offset\n", 6099 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 6100 return -EACCES; 6101 } 6102 if (p != off + reg->var_off.value) { 6103 verbose(env, "%s access misaligned expected=%u off=%llu\n", 6104 btf_field_type_name(field->type), 6105 p, off + reg->var_off.value); 6106 return -EACCES; 6107 } 6108 if (size != bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_DW)) { 6109 verbose(env, "%s access size must be BPF_DW\n", 6110 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 6111 return -EACCES; 6112 } 6113 break; 6114 default: 6115 verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n", 6116 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 6117 return -EACCES; 6118 } 6119 } 6120 } 6121 return 0; 6122 } 6123 6124 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff 6125 6126 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6127 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 6128 enum bpf_access_type t) 6129 { 6130 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 6131 6132 switch (prog_type) { 6133 /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */ 6134 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: 6135 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: 6136 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL: 6137 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 6138 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 6139 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 6140 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 6141 return false; 6142 fallthrough; 6143 6144 /* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */ 6145 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 6146 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 6147 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 6148 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: 6149 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: 6150 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: 6151 if (meta) 6152 return meta->pkt_access; 6153 6154 env->seen_direct_write = true; 6155 return true; 6156 6157 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 6158 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 6159 env->seen_direct_write = true; 6160 6161 return true; 6162 6163 default: 6164 return false; 6165 } 6166 } 6167 6168 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, 6169 int size, bool zero_size_allowed) 6170 { 6171 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 6172 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 6173 int err; 6174 6175 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any 6176 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed 6177 * offset. 6178 */ 6179 6180 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough 6181 * detail to prove they're safe. 6182 */ 6183 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 6184 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 6185 regno); 6186 return -EACCES; 6187 } 6188 6189 err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL : 6190 __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range, 6191 zero_size_allowed); 6192 if (err) { 6193 verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); 6194 return err; 6195 } 6196 6197 /* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16. 6198 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff, 6199 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info 6200 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access. 6201 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32. 6202 */ 6203 env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = 6204 max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset, 6205 off + reg->umax_value + size - 1); 6206 6207 return err; 6208 } 6209 6210 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ 6211 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, 6212 enum bpf_access_type t, struct bpf_insn_access_aux *info) 6213 { 6214 if (env->ops->is_valid_access && 6215 env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, info)) { 6216 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a 6217 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole 6218 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower 6219 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size 6220 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other 6221 * type of narrower access. 6222 */ 6223 if (base_type(info->reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 6224 if (info->ref_obj_id && 6225 !find_reference_state(env->cur_state, info->ref_obj_id)) { 6226 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d. Reference may already be released\n", 6227 off); 6228 return -EACCES; 6229 } 6230 } else { 6231 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info->ctx_field_size; 6232 } 6233 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ 6234 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) 6235 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; 6236 return 0; 6237 } 6238 6239 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 6240 return -EACCES; 6241 } 6242 6243 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, 6244 int size) 6245 { 6246 if (size < 0 || off < 0 || 6247 (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) { 6248 verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n", 6249 off, size); 6250 return -EACCES; 6251 } 6252 return 0; 6253 } 6254 6255 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 6256 u32 regno, int off, int size, 6257 enum bpf_access_type t) 6258 { 6259 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 6260 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 6261 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {}; 6262 bool valid; 6263 6264 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 6265 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 6266 regno); 6267 return -EACCES; 6268 } 6269 6270 switch (reg->type) { 6271 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 6272 valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 6273 break; 6274 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 6275 valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 6276 break; 6277 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 6278 valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 6279 break; 6280 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 6281 valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 6282 break; 6283 default: 6284 valid = false; 6285 } 6286 6287 6288 if (valid) { 6289 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = 6290 info.ctx_field_size; 6291 return 0; 6292 } 6293 6294 verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n", 6295 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type), off, size); 6296 6297 return -EACCES; 6298 } 6299 6300 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 6301 { 6302 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno)); 6303 } 6304 6305 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 6306 { 6307 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6308 6309 return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; 6310 } 6311 6312 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 6313 { 6314 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6315 6316 return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type); 6317 } 6318 6319 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 6320 { 6321 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6322 6323 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 6324 } 6325 6326 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 6327 { 6328 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6329 6330 /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */ 6331 return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS; 6332 } 6333 6334 static bool is_arena_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 6335 { 6336 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 6337 6338 return reg->type == PTR_TO_ARENA; 6339 } 6340 6341 /* Return false if @regno contains a pointer whose type isn't supported for 6342 * atomic instruction @insn. 6343 */ 6344 static bool atomic_ptr_type_ok(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 6345 struct bpf_insn *insn) 6346 { 6347 if (is_ctx_reg(env, regno)) 6348 return false; 6349 if (is_pkt_reg(env, regno)) 6350 return false; 6351 if (is_flow_key_reg(env, regno)) 6352 return false; 6353 if (is_sk_reg(env, regno)) 6354 return false; 6355 if (is_arena_reg(env, regno)) 6356 return bpf_jit_supports_insn(insn, true); 6357 6358 return true; 6359 } 6360 6361 static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = { 6362 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 6363 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK], 6364 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 6365 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_TCP], 6366 #endif 6367 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = btf_bpf_map_id, 6368 }; 6369 6370 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 6371 { 6372 /* A referenced register is always trusted. */ 6373 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 6374 return true; 6375 6376 /* Types listed in the reg2btf_ids are always trusted */ 6377 if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)] && 6378 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type)) 6379 return true; 6380 6381 /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the 6382 * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the 6383 * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in 6384 * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are 6385 * not. 6386 * 6387 * Eventually, we should make PTR_TRUSTED the single source of truth 6388 * for whether a register is trusted. 6389 */ 6390 return type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS && 6391 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type); 6392 } 6393 6394 static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 6395 { 6396 return reg->type & MEM_RCU; 6397 } 6398 6399 static void clear_trusted_flags(enum bpf_type_flag *flag) 6400 { 6401 *flag &= ~(BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS | MEM_RCU); 6402 } 6403 6404 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6405 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6406 int off, int size, bool strict) 6407 { 6408 struct tnum reg_off; 6409 int ip_align; 6410 6411 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 6412 if (!strict || size == 1) 6413 return 0; 6414 6415 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling 6416 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of 6417 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms 6418 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get 6419 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate 6420 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an 6421 * unconditional IP align value of '2'. 6422 */ 6423 ip_align = 2; 6424 6425 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); 6426 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 6427 char tn_buf[48]; 6428 6429 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6430 verbose(env, 6431 "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", 6432 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 6433 return -EACCES; 6434 } 6435 6436 return 0; 6437 } 6438 6439 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6440 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6441 const char *pointer_desc, 6442 int off, int size, bool strict) 6443 { 6444 struct tnum reg_off; 6445 6446 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 6447 if (!strict || size == 1) 6448 return 0; 6449 6450 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); 6451 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 6452 char tn_buf[48]; 6453 6454 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6455 verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", 6456 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 6457 return -EACCES; 6458 } 6459 6460 return 0; 6461 } 6462 6463 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6464 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, 6465 int size, bool strict_alignment_once) 6466 { 6467 bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once; 6468 const char *pointer_desc = ""; 6469 6470 switch (reg->type) { 6471 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 6472 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 6473 /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits 6474 * right in front, treat it the very same way. 6475 */ 6476 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); 6477 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 6478 pointer_desc = "flow keys "; 6479 break; 6480 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 6481 pointer_desc = "key "; 6482 break; 6483 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 6484 pointer_desc = "value "; 6485 break; 6486 case PTR_TO_CTX: 6487 pointer_desc = "context "; 6488 break; 6489 case PTR_TO_STACK: 6490 pointer_desc = "stack "; 6491 /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off() 6492 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being 6493 * aligned. 6494 */ 6495 strict = true; 6496 break; 6497 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 6498 pointer_desc = "sock "; 6499 break; 6500 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 6501 pointer_desc = "sock_common "; 6502 break; 6503 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 6504 pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; 6505 break; 6506 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 6507 pointer_desc = "xdp_sock "; 6508 break; 6509 case PTR_TO_ARENA: 6510 return 0; 6511 default: 6512 break; 6513 } 6514 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, 6515 strict); 6516 } 6517 6518 static enum priv_stack_mode bpf_enable_priv_stack(struct bpf_prog *prog) 6519 { 6520 if (!bpf_jit_supports_private_stack()) 6521 return NO_PRIV_STACK; 6522 6523 /* bpf_prog_check_recur() checks all prog types that use bpf trampoline 6524 * while kprobe/tp/perf_event/raw_tp don't use trampoline hence checked 6525 * explicitly. 6526 */ 6527 switch (prog->type) { 6528 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 6529 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: 6530 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: 6531 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 6532 return PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE; 6533 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 6534 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 6535 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: 6536 if (prog->aux->priv_stack_requested || bpf_prog_check_recur(prog)) 6537 return PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE; 6538 fallthrough; 6539 default: 6540 break; 6541 } 6542 6543 return NO_PRIV_STACK; 6544 } 6545 6546 static int round_up_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int stack_depth) 6547 { 6548 if (env->prog->jit_requested) 6549 return round_up(stack_depth, 16); 6550 6551 /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity 6552 * of interpreter stack size 6553 */ 6554 return round_up(max_t(u32, stack_depth, 1), 32); 6555 } 6556 6557 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function 6558 * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. 6559 * Ignore jump and exit insns. 6560 * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm 6561 * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites 6562 */ 6563 static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, 6564 bool priv_stack_supported) 6565 { 6566 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 6567 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 6568 int depth = 0, frame = 0, i, subprog_end, subprog_depth; 6569 bool tail_call_reachable = false; 6570 int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 6571 int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 6572 int j; 6573 6574 i = subprog[idx].start; 6575 if (!priv_stack_supported) 6576 subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode = NO_PRIV_STACK; 6577 process_func: 6578 /* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when 6579 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack 6580 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario 6581 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 6582 * 8k). 6583 * 6584 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example: 6585 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128 6586 * subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256 6587 * tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256 6588 * func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320) 6589 * subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64 6590 * subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128 6591 * tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128 6592 * func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416) 6593 * 6594 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid 6595 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above. 6596 */ 6597 if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) { 6598 verbose(env, 6599 "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n", 6600 depth); 6601 return -EACCES; 6602 } 6603 6604 subprog_depth = round_up_stack_depth(env, subprog[idx].stack_depth); 6605 if (priv_stack_supported) { 6606 /* Request private stack support only if the subprog stack 6607 * depth is no less than BPF_PRIV_STACK_MIN_SIZE. This is to 6608 * avoid jit penalty if the stack usage is small. 6609 */ 6610 if (subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_UNKNOWN && 6611 subprog_depth >= BPF_PRIV_STACK_MIN_SIZE) 6612 subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode = PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE; 6613 } 6614 6615 if (subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE) { 6616 if (subprog_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { 6617 verbose(env, "stack size of subprog %d is %d. Too large\n", 6618 idx, subprog_depth); 6619 return -EACCES; 6620 } 6621 } else { 6622 depth += subprog_depth; 6623 if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { 6624 verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n", 6625 frame + 1, depth); 6626 return -EACCES; 6627 } 6628 } 6629 continue_func: 6630 subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; 6631 for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { 6632 int next_insn, sidx; 6633 6634 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn + i) && !insn[i].off) { 6635 bool err = false; 6636 6637 if (!is_bpf_throw_kfunc(insn + i)) 6638 continue; 6639 if (subprog[idx].is_cb) 6640 err = true; 6641 for (int c = 0; c < frame && !err; c++) { 6642 if (subprog[ret_prog[c]].is_cb) { 6643 err = true; 6644 break; 6645 } 6646 } 6647 if (!err) 6648 continue; 6649 verbose(env, 6650 "bpf_throw kfunc (insn %d) cannot be called from callback subprog %d\n", 6651 i, idx); 6652 return -EINVAL; 6653 } 6654 6655 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i)) 6656 continue; 6657 /* remember insn and function to return to */ 6658 ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; 6659 ret_prog[frame] = idx; 6660 6661 /* find the callee */ 6662 next_insn = i + insn[i].imm + 1; 6663 sidx = find_subprog(env, next_insn); 6664 if (verifier_bug_if(sidx < 0, env, "callee not found at insn %d", next_insn)) 6665 return -EFAULT; 6666 if (subprog[sidx].is_async_cb) { 6667 if (subprog[sidx].has_tail_call) { 6668 verifier_bug(env, "subprog has tail_call and async cb"); 6669 return -EFAULT; 6670 } 6671 /* async callbacks don't increase bpf prog stack size unless called directly */ 6672 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i)) 6673 continue; 6674 if (subprog[sidx].is_exception_cb) { 6675 verbose(env, "insn %d cannot call exception cb directly", i); 6676 return -EINVAL; 6677 } 6678 } 6679 i = next_insn; 6680 idx = sidx; 6681 if (!priv_stack_supported) 6682 subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode = NO_PRIV_STACK; 6683 6684 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) 6685 tail_call_reachable = true; 6686 6687 frame++; 6688 if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 6689 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n", 6690 frame); 6691 return -E2BIG; 6692 } 6693 goto process_func; 6694 } 6695 /* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the 6696 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs; 6697 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the 6698 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls 6699 */ 6700 if (tail_call_reachable) 6701 for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) { 6702 if (subprog[ret_prog[j]].is_exception_cb) { 6703 verbose(env, "cannot tail call within exception cb\n"); 6704 return -EINVAL; 6705 } 6706 subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true; 6707 } 6708 if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable) 6709 env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true; 6710 6711 /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog' 6712 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT 6713 */ 6714 if (frame == 0) 6715 return 0; 6716 if (subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode != PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE) 6717 depth -= round_up_stack_depth(env, subprog[idx].stack_depth); 6718 frame--; 6719 i = ret_insn[frame]; 6720 idx = ret_prog[frame]; 6721 goto continue_func; 6722 } 6723 6724 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 6725 { 6726 enum priv_stack_mode priv_stack_mode = PRIV_STACK_UNKNOWN; 6727 struct bpf_subprog_info *si = env->subprog_info; 6728 bool priv_stack_supported; 6729 int ret; 6730 6731 for (int i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 6732 if (si[i].has_tail_call) { 6733 priv_stack_mode = NO_PRIV_STACK; 6734 break; 6735 } 6736 } 6737 6738 if (priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_UNKNOWN) 6739 priv_stack_mode = bpf_enable_priv_stack(env->prog); 6740 6741 /* All async_cb subprogs use normal kernel stack. If a particular 6742 * subprog appears in both main prog and async_cb subtree, that 6743 * subprog will use normal kernel stack to avoid potential nesting. 6744 * The reverse subprog traversal ensures when main prog subtree is 6745 * checked, the subprogs appearing in async_cb subtrees are already 6746 * marked as using normal kernel stack, so stack size checking can 6747 * be done properly. 6748 */ 6749 for (int i = env->subprog_cnt - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 6750 if (!i || si[i].is_async_cb) { 6751 priv_stack_supported = !i && priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE; 6752 ret = check_max_stack_depth_subprog(env, i, priv_stack_supported); 6753 if (ret < 0) 6754 return ret; 6755 } 6756 } 6757 6758 for (int i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 6759 if (si[i].priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE) { 6760 env->prog->aux->jits_use_priv_stack = true; 6761 break; 6762 } 6763 } 6764 6765 return 0; 6766 } 6767 6768 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 6769 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6770 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx) 6771 { 6772 int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog; 6773 6774 subprog = find_subprog(env, start); 6775 if (verifier_bug_if(subprog < 0, env, "get stack depth: no program at insn %d", start)) 6776 return -EFAULT; 6777 return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth; 6778 } 6779 #endif 6780 6781 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6782 const char *buf_info, 6783 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6784 int regno, int off, int size) 6785 { 6786 if (off < 0) { 6787 verbose(env, 6788 "R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n", 6789 regno, buf_info, off, size); 6790 return -EACCES; 6791 } 6792 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 6793 char tn_buf[48]; 6794 6795 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 6796 verbose(env, 6797 "R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 6798 regno, off, tn_buf); 6799 return -EACCES; 6800 } 6801 6802 return 0; 6803 } 6804 6805 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6806 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6807 int regno, int off, int size) 6808 { 6809 int err; 6810 6811 err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size); 6812 if (err) 6813 return err; 6814 6815 if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access) 6816 env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size; 6817 6818 return 0; 6819 } 6820 6821 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6822 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 6823 int regno, int off, int size, 6824 bool zero_size_allowed, 6825 u32 *max_access) 6826 { 6827 const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr"; 6828 int err; 6829 6830 err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size); 6831 if (err) 6832 return err; 6833 6834 if (off + size > *max_access) 6835 *max_access = off + size; 6836 6837 return 0; 6838 } 6839 6840 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */ 6841 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 6842 { 6843 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 6844 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 6845 } 6846 6847 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes) 6848 * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE 6849 */ 6850 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6851 { 6852 u64 mask; 6853 6854 /* clear high bits in bit representation */ 6855 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size); 6856 6857 /* fix arithmetic bounds */ 6858 mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1; 6859 if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) { 6860 reg->umin_value &= mask; 6861 reg->umax_value &= mask; 6862 } else { 6863 reg->umin_value = 0; 6864 reg->umax_value = mask; 6865 } 6866 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 6867 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 6868 6869 /* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register 6870 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into 6871 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already. 6872 */ 6873 if (size < 4) 6874 __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg); 6875 6876 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 6877 } 6878 6879 static void set_sext64_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6880 { 6881 if (size == 1) { 6882 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S8_MIN; 6883 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S8_MAX; 6884 } else if (size == 2) { 6885 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S16_MIN; 6886 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S16_MAX; 6887 } else { 6888 /* size == 4 */ 6889 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 6890 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 6891 } 6892 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value = 0; 6893 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 6894 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 6895 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 6896 } 6897 6898 static void coerce_reg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6899 { 6900 s64 init_s64_max, init_s64_min, s64_max, s64_min, u64_cval; 6901 u64 top_smax_value, top_smin_value; 6902 u64 num_bits = size * 8; 6903 6904 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6905 u64_cval = reg->var_off.value; 6906 if (size == 1) 6907 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s8)u64_cval); 6908 else if (size == 2) 6909 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s16)u64_cval); 6910 else 6911 /* size == 4 */ 6912 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s32)u64_cval); 6913 6914 u64_cval = reg->var_off.value; 6915 reg->smax_value = reg->smin_value = u64_cval; 6916 reg->umax_value = reg->umin_value = u64_cval; 6917 reg->s32_max_value = reg->s32_min_value = u64_cval; 6918 reg->u32_max_value = reg->u32_min_value = u64_cval; 6919 return; 6920 } 6921 6922 top_smax_value = ((u64)reg->smax_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6923 top_smin_value = ((u64)reg->smin_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6924 6925 if (top_smax_value != top_smin_value) 6926 goto out; 6927 6928 /* find the s64_min and s64_min after sign extension */ 6929 if (size == 1) { 6930 init_s64_max = (s8)reg->smax_value; 6931 init_s64_min = (s8)reg->smin_value; 6932 } else if (size == 2) { 6933 init_s64_max = (s16)reg->smax_value; 6934 init_s64_min = (s16)reg->smin_value; 6935 } else { 6936 init_s64_max = (s32)reg->smax_value; 6937 init_s64_min = (s32)reg->smin_value; 6938 } 6939 6940 s64_max = max(init_s64_max, init_s64_min); 6941 s64_min = min(init_s64_max, init_s64_min); 6942 6943 /* both of s64_max/s64_min positive or negative */ 6944 if ((s64_max >= 0) == (s64_min >= 0)) { 6945 reg->s32_min_value = reg->smin_value = s64_min; 6946 reg->s32_max_value = reg->smax_value = s64_max; 6947 reg->u32_min_value = reg->umin_value = s64_min; 6948 reg->u32_max_value = reg->umax_value = s64_max; 6949 reg->var_off = tnum_range(s64_min, s64_max); 6950 return; 6951 } 6952 6953 out: 6954 set_sext64_default_val(reg, size); 6955 } 6956 6957 static void set_sext32_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6958 { 6959 if (size == 1) { 6960 reg->s32_min_value = S8_MIN; 6961 reg->s32_max_value = S8_MAX; 6962 } else { 6963 /* size == 2 */ 6964 reg->s32_min_value = S16_MIN; 6965 reg->s32_max_value = S16_MAX; 6966 } 6967 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 6968 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 6969 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_unknown); 6970 } 6971 6972 static void coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 6973 { 6974 s32 init_s32_max, init_s32_min, s32_max, s32_min, u32_val; 6975 u32 top_smax_value, top_smin_value; 6976 u32 num_bits = size * 8; 6977 6978 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6979 u32_val = reg->var_off.value; 6980 if (size == 1) 6981 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s8)u32_val); 6982 else 6983 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s16)u32_val); 6984 6985 u32_val = reg->var_off.value; 6986 reg->s32_min_value = reg->s32_max_value = u32_val; 6987 reg->u32_min_value = reg->u32_max_value = u32_val; 6988 return; 6989 } 6990 6991 top_smax_value = ((u32)reg->s32_max_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6992 top_smin_value = ((u32)reg->s32_min_value >> num_bits) << num_bits; 6993 6994 if (top_smax_value != top_smin_value) 6995 goto out; 6996 6997 /* find the s32_min and s32_min after sign extension */ 6998 if (size == 1) { 6999 init_s32_max = (s8)reg->s32_max_value; 7000 init_s32_min = (s8)reg->s32_min_value; 7001 } else { 7002 /* size == 2 */ 7003 init_s32_max = (s16)reg->s32_max_value; 7004 init_s32_min = (s16)reg->s32_min_value; 7005 } 7006 s32_max = max(init_s32_max, init_s32_min); 7007 s32_min = min(init_s32_max, init_s32_min); 7008 7009 if ((s32_min >= 0) == (s32_max >= 0)) { 7010 reg->s32_min_value = s32_min; 7011 reg->s32_max_value = s32_max; 7012 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)s32_min; 7013 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)s32_max; 7014 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_range(s32_min, s32_max)); 7015 return; 7016 } 7017 7018 out: 7019 set_sext32_default_val(reg, size); 7020 } 7021 7022 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map) 7023 { 7024 /* A map is considered read-only if the following condition are true: 7025 * 7026 * 1) BPF program side cannot change any of the map content. The 7027 * BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG flag is throughout the lifetime of a map 7028 * and was set at map creation time. 7029 * 2) The map value(s) have been initialized from user space by a 7030 * loader and then "frozen", such that no new map update/delete 7031 * operations from syscall side are possible for the rest of 7032 * the map's lifetime from that point onwards. 7033 * 3) Any parallel/pending map update/delete operations from syscall 7034 * side have been completed. Only after that point, it's safe to 7035 * assume that map value(s) are immutable. 7036 */ 7037 return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 7038 READ_ONCE(map->frozen) && 7039 !bpf_map_write_active(map); 7040 } 7041 7042 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val, 7043 bool is_ldsx) 7044 { 7045 void *ptr; 7046 u64 addr; 7047 int err; 7048 7049 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 7050 if (err) 7051 return err; 7052 ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off; 7053 7054 switch (size) { 7055 case sizeof(u8): 7056 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s8 *)ptr : (u64)*(u8 *)ptr; 7057 break; 7058 case sizeof(u16): 7059 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s16 *)ptr : (u64)*(u16 *)ptr; 7060 break; 7061 case sizeof(u32): 7062 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s32 *)ptr : (u64)*(u32 *)ptr; 7063 break; 7064 case sizeof(u64): 7065 *val = *(u64 *)ptr; 7066 break; 7067 default: 7068 return -EINVAL; 7069 } 7070 return 0; 7071 } 7072 7073 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu) 7074 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu_or_null) 7075 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted) 7076 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted_or_null) 7077 7078 /* 7079 * Allow list few fields as RCU trusted or full trusted. 7080 * This logic doesn't allow mix tagging and will be removed once GCC supports 7081 * btf_type_tag. 7082 */ 7083 7084 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and never NULL */ 7085 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct) { 7086 const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr; 7087 struct css_set __rcu *cgroups; 7088 struct task_struct __rcu *real_parent; 7089 struct task_struct *group_leader; 7090 }; 7091 7092 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup) { 7093 /* cgrp->kn is always accessible as documented in kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c */ 7094 struct kernfs_node *kn; 7095 }; 7096 7097 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set) { 7098 struct cgroup *dfl_cgrp; 7099 }; 7100 7101 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup_subsys_state) { 7102 struct cgroup *cgroup; 7103 }; 7104 7105 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and can be NULL */ 7106 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct) { 7107 struct file __rcu *exe_file; 7108 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG 7109 struct task_struct __rcu *owner; 7110 #endif 7111 }; 7112 7113 /* skb->sk, req->sk are not RCU protected, but we mark them as such 7114 * because bpf prog accessible sockets are SOCK_RCU_FREE. 7115 */ 7116 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff) { 7117 struct sock *sk; 7118 }; 7119 7120 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock) { 7121 struct sock *sk; 7122 }; 7123 7124 /* full trusted: these fields are trusted even outside of RCU CS and never NULL */ 7125 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta) { 7126 struct seq_file *seq; 7127 }; 7128 7129 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task) { 7130 struct bpf_iter_meta *meta; 7131 struct task_struct *task; 7132 }; 7133 7134 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm) { 7135 struct file *file; 7136 }; 7137 7138 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file) { 7139 struct inode *f_inode; 7140 }; 7141 7142 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry) { 7143 struct inode *d_inode; 7144 }; 7145 7146 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket) { 7147 struct sock *sk; 7148 }; 7149 7150 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct) { 7151 struct mm_struct *vm_mm; 7152 struct file *vm_file; 7153 }; 7154 7155 static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7156 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 7157 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 7158 { 7159 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct)); 7160 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup)); 7161 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set)); 7162 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup_subsys_state)); 7163 7164 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu"); 7165 } 7166 7167 static bool type_is_rcu_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7168 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 7169 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 7170 { 7171 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct)); 7172 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff)); 7173 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock)); 7174 7175 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu_or_null"); 7176 } 7177 7178 static bool type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7179 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 7180 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 7181 { 7182 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta)); 7183 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task)); 7184 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm)); 7185 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file)); 7186 7187 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_trusted"); 7188 } 7189 7190 static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7191 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 7192 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) 7193 { 7194 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket)); 7195 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry)); 7196 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct)); 7197 7198 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, 7199 "__safe_trusted_or_null"); 7200 } 7201 7202 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7203 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 7204 int regno, int off, int size, 7205 enum bpf_access_type atype, 7206 int value_regno) 7207 { 7208 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 7209 const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 7210 const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off); 7211 const char *field_name = NULL; 7212 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 7213 u32 btf_id = 0; 7214 int ret; 7215 7216 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 7217 verbose(env, 7218 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 7219 tname); 7220 return -EPERM; 7221 } 7222 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 7223 verbose(env, 7224 "Cannot access kernel 'struct %s' from non-GPL compatible program\n", 7225 tname); 7226 return -EINVAL; 7227 } 7228 if (off < 0) { 7229 verbose(env, 7230 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 7231 regno, tname, off); 7232 return -EACCES; 7233 } 7234 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 7235 char tn_buf[48]; 7236 7237 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 7238 verbose(env, 7239 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 7240 regno, tname, off, tn_buf); 7241 return -EACCES; 7242 } 7243 7244 if (reg->type & MEM_USER) { 7245 verbose(env, 7246 "R%d is ptr_%s access user memory: off=%d\n", 7247 regno, tname, off); 7248 return -EACCES; 7249 } 7250 7251 if (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU) { 7252 verbose(env, 7253 "R%d is ptr_%s access percpu memory: off=%d\n", 7254 regno, tname, off); 7255 return -EACCES; 7256 } 7257 7258 if (env->ops->btf_struct_access && !type_is_alloc(reg->type) && atype == BPF_WRITE) { 7259 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 7260 verifier_bug(env, "reg->btf must be kernel btf"); 7261 return -EFAULT; 7262 } 7263 ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size); 7264 } else { 7265 /* Writes are permitted with default btf_struct_access for 7266 * program allocated objects (which always have ref_obj_id > 0), 7267 * but not for untrusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC. 7268 */ 7269 if (atype != BPF_READ && !type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 7270 verbose(env, "only read is supported\n"); 7271 return -EACCES; 7272 } 7273 7274 if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) && 7275 !(reg->type & MEM_RCU) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 7276 verifier_bug(env, "ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero"); 7277 return -EFAULT; 7278 } 7279 7280 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, &field_name); 7281 } 7282 7283 if (ret < 0) 7284 return ret; 7285 7286 if (ret != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 7287 /* just mark; */ 7288 7289 } else if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED) { 7290 /* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it 7291 * also inherit the untrusted flag. 7292 */ 7293 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED; 7294 7295 } else if (is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg)) { 7296 /* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is no 7297 * longer trusted, unless the field being accessed has explicitly been 7298 * marked as inheriting its parent's state of trust (either full or RCU). 7299 * For example: 7300 * 'cgroups' pointer is untrusted if task->cgroups dereference 7301 * happened in a sleepable program outside of bpf_rcu_read_lock() 7302 * section. In a non-sleepable program it's trusted while in RCU CS (aka MEM_RCU). 7303 * Note bpf_rcu_read_unlock() converts MEM_RCU pointers to PTR_UNTRUSTED. 7304 * 7305 * A regular RCU-protected pointer with __rcu tag can also be deemed 7306 * trusted if we are in an RCU CS. Such pointer can be NULL. 7307 */ 7308 if (type_is_trusted(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 7309 flag |= PTR_TRUSTED; 7310 } else if (type_is_trusted_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 7311 flag |= PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 7312 } else if (in_rcu_cs(env) && !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 7313 if (type_is_rcu(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 7314 /* ignore __rcu tag and mark it MEM_RCU */ 7315 flag |= MEM_RCU; 7316 } else if (flag & MEM_RCU || 7317 type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { 7318 /* __rcu tagged pointers can be NULL */ 7319 flag |= MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 7320 7321 /* We always trust them */ 7322 if (type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id) && 7323 flag & PTR_UNTRUSTED) 7324 flag &= ~PTR_UNTRUSTED; 7325 } else if (flag & (MEM_PERCPU | MEM_USER)) { 7326 /* keep as-is */ 7327 } else { 7328 /* walking unknown pointers yields old deprecated PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 7329 clear_trusted_flags(&flag); 7330 } 7331 } else { 7332 /* 7333 * If not in RCU CS or MEM_RCU pointer can be NULL then 7334 * aggressively mark as untrusted otherwise such 7335 * pointers will be plain PTR_TO_BTF_ID without flags 7336 * and will be allowed to be passed into helpers for 7337 * compat reasons. 7338 */ 7339 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED; 7340 } 7341 } else { 7342 /* Old compat. Deprecated */ 7343 clear_trusted_flags(&flag); 7344 } 7345 7346 if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 7347 ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag); 7348 if (ret < 0) 7349 return ret; 7350 } 7351 7352 return 0; 7353 } 7354 7355 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7356 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 7357 int regno, int off, int size, 7358 enum bpf_access_type atype, 7359 int value_regno) 7360 { 7361 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 7362 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 7363 struct bpf_reg_state map_reg; 7364 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 7365 const struct btf_type *t; 7366 const char *tname; 7367 u32 btf_id; 7368 int ret; 7369 7370 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 7371 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 7372 return -ENOTSUPP; 7373 } 7374 7375 if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) { 7376 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n", 7377 map->map_type); 7378 return -ENOTSUPP; 7379 } 7380 7381 t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id); 7382 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 7383 7384 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 7385 verbose(env, 7386 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 7387 tname); 7388 return -EPERM; 7389 } 7390 7391 if (off < 0) { 7392 verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 7393 regno, tname, off); 7394 return -EACCES; 7395 } 7396 7397 if (atype != BPF_READ) { 7398 verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname); 7399 return -EACCES; 7400 } 7401 7402 /* Simulate access to a PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 7403 memset(&map_reg, 0, sizeof(map_reg)); 7404 ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 7405 btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0); 7406 if (ret < 0) 7407 return ret; 7408 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, &map_reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, NULL); 7409 if (ret < 0) 7410 return ret; 7411 7412 if (value_regno >= 0) { 7413 ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag); 7414 if (ret < 0) 7415 return ret; 7416 } 7417 7418 return 0; 7419 } 7420 7421 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The 7422 * maximum valid offset is -1. 7423 * 7424 * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and 7425 * -state->allocated_stack for reads. 7426 */ 7427 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7428 s64 off, 7429 struct bpf_func_state *state, 7430 enum bpf_access_type t) 7431 { 7432 int min_valid_off; 7433 7434 if (t == BPF_WRITE || env->allow_uninit_stack) 7435 min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK; 7436 else 7437 min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack; 7438 7439 if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1) 7440 return -EACCES; 7441 return 0; 7442 } 7443 7444 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack 7445 * bounds. 7446 * 7447 * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any). 7448 */ 7449 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( 7450 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7451 int regno, int off, int access_size, 7452 enum bpf_access_type type) 7453 { 7454 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7455 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 7456 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 7457 s64 min_off, max_off; 7458 int err; 7459 char *err_extra; 7460 7461 if (type == BPF_READ) 7462 err_extra = " read from"; 7463 else 7464 err_extra = " write to"; 7465 7466 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 7467 min_off = (s64)reg->var_off.value + off; 7468 max_off = min_off + access_size; 7469 } else { 7470 if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || 7471 reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 7472 verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n", 7473 err_extra, regno); 7474 return -EACCES; 7475 } 7476 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 7477 max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size; 7478 } 7479 7480 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(env, min_off, state, type); 7481 if (!err && max_off > 0) 7482 err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */ 7483 if (!err && access_size < 0) 7484 /* access_size should not be negative (or overflow an int); others checks 7485 * along the way should have prevented such an access. 7486 */ 7487 err = -EFAULT; /* invalid negative access size; integer overflow? */ 7488 7489 if (err) { 7490 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 7491 verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n", 7492 err_extra, regno, off, access_size); 7493 } else { 7494 char tn_buf[48]; 7495 7496 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 7497 verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", 7498 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, off, access_size); 7499 } 7500 return err; 7501 } 7502 7503 /* Note that there is no stack access with offset zero, so the needed stack 7504 * size is -min_off, not -min_off+1. 7505 */ 7506 return grow_stack_state(env, state, -min_off /* size */); 7507 } 7508 7509 static bool get_func_retval_range(struct bpf_prog *prog, 7510 struct bpf_retval_range *range) 7511 { 7512 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 7513 prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_MAC && 7514 !bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(prog, range)) { 7515 return true; 7516 } 7517 return false; 7518 } 7519 7520 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) 7521 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory 7522 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory 7523 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory 7524 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory 7525 */ 7526 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, 7527 int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, 7528 int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once, bool is_ldsx) 7529 { 7530 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7531 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 7532 bool insn_array = reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 7533 reg->map_ptr->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY; 7534 int size, err = 0; 7535 7536 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); 7537 if (size < 0) 7538 return size; 7539 7540 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ 7541 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once || insn_array); 7542 if (err) 7543 return err; 7544 7545 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ 7546 off += reg->off; 7547 7548 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { 7549 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 7550 verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno); 7551 return -EACCES; 7552 } 7553 7554 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 7555 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 7556 if (err) 7557 return err; 7558 if (value_regno >= 0) 7559 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7560 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 7561 struct btf_field *kptr_field = NULL; 7562 7563 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 7564 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 7565 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); 7566 return -EACCES; 7567 } 7568 if (t == BPF_WRITE && insn_array) { 7569 verbose(env, "writes into insn_array not allowed\n"); 7570 return -EACCES; 7571 } 7572 7573 err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t); 7574 if (err) 7575 return err; 7576 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false, ACCESS_DIRECT); 7577 if (err) 7578 return err; 7579 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 7580 kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record, 7581 off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR | BPF_UPTR); 7582 if (kptr_field) { 7583 err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field); 7584 } else if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 7585 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 7586 7587 /* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */ 7588 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && 7589 bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) && 7590 map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 7591 int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value; 7592 u64 val = 0; 7593 7594 err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size, 7595 &val, is_ldsx); 7596 if (err) 7597 return err; 7598 7599 regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 7600 __mark_reg_known(®s[value_regno], val); 7601 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) { 7602 if (bpf_size != BPF_DW) { 7603 verbose(env, "Invalid read of %d bytes from insn_array\n", 7604 size); 7605 return -EACCES; 7606 } 7607 copy_register_state(®s[value_regno], reg); 7608 regs[value_regno].type = PTR_TO_INSN; 7609 } else { 7610 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7611 } 7612 } 7613 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 7614 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 7615 bool rdonly_untrusted = rdonly_mem && (reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED); 7616 7617 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 7618 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 7619 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7620 return -EACCES; 7621 } 7622 7623 if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) { 7624 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 7625 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7626 return -EACCES; 7627 } 7628 7629 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 7630 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 7631 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno); 7632 return -EACCES; 7633 } 7634 7635 /* 7636 * Accesses to untrusted PTR_TO_MEM are done through probe 7637 * instructions, hence no need to check bounds in that case. 7638 */ 7639 if (!rdonly_untrusted) 7640 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 7641 reg->mem_size, false); 7642 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem)) 7643 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7644 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 7645 struct bpf_retval_range range; 7646 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { 7647 .reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE, 7648 .is_ldsx = is_ldsx, 7649 .log = &env->log, 7650 }; 7651 7652 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 7653 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 7654 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); 7655 return -EACCES; 7656 } 7657 7658 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno); 7659 if (err < 0) 7660 return err; 7661 7662 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, &info); 7663 if (err) 7664 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 7665 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 7666 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a 7667 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter 7668 * case, we know the offset is zero. 7669 */ 7670 if (info.reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 7671 if (info.is_retval && get_func_retval_range(env->prog, &range)) { 7672 err = __mark_reg_s32_range(env, regs, value_regno, 7673 range.minval, range.maxval); 7674 if (err) 7675 return err; 7676 } else { 7677 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7678 } 7679 } else { 7680 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, 7681 value_regno); 7682 if (type_may_be_null(info.reg_type)) 7683 regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 7684 /* A load of ctx field could have different 7685 * actual load size with the one encoded in the 7686 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not 7687 * a sub-register. 7688 */ 7689 regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 7690 if (base_type(info.reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 7691 regs[value_regno].btf = info.btf; 7692 regs[value_regno].btf_id = info.btf_id; 7693 regs[value_regno].ref_obj_id = info.ref_obj_id; 7694 } 7695 } 7696 regs[value_regno].type = info.reg_type; 7697 } 7698 7699 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 7700 /* Basic bounds checks. */ 7701 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, t); 7702 if (err) 7703 return err; 7704 7705 if (t == BPF_READ) 7706 err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size, 7707 value_regno); 7708 else 7709 err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size, 7710 value_regno, insn_idx); 7711 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { 7712 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { 7713 verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); 7714 return -EACCES; 7715 } 7716 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 7717 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 7718 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", 7719 value_regno); 7720 return -EACCES; 7721 } 7722 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false); 7723 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 7724 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7725 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) { 7726 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 7727 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 7728 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n", 7729 value_regno); 7730 return -EACCES; 7731 } 7732 7733 err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size); 7734 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 7735 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7736 } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) { 7737 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 7738 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 7739 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7740 return -EACCES; 7741 } 7742 err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); 7743 if (!err && value_regno >= 0) 7744 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7745 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) { 7746 err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size); 7747 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 7748 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7749 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 7750 !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 7751 err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 7752 value_regno); 7753 } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { 7754 err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 7755 value_regno); 7756 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BUF) { 7757 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 7758 u32 *max_access; 7759 7760 if (rdonly_mem) { 7761 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 7762 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 7763 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7764 return -EACCES; 7765 } 7766 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 7767 } else { 7768 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 7769 } 7770 7771 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, 7772 max_access); 7773 7774 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (rdonly_mem || t == BPF_READ)) 7775 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7776 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_ARENA) { 7777 if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 7778 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 7779 } else { 7780 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 7781 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 7782 return -EACCES; 7783 } 7784 7785 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && 7786 regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 7787 if (!is_ldsx) 7788 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ 7789 coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size); 7790 else 7791 coerce_reg_to_size_sx(®s[value_regno], size); 7792 } 7793 return err; 7794 } 7795 7796 static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type, 7797 bool allow_trust_mismatch); 7798 7799 static int check_load_mem(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 7800 bool strict_alignment_once, bool is_ldsx, 7801 bool allow_trust_mismatch, const char *ctx) 7802 { 7803 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7804 enum bpf_reg_type src_reg_type; 7805 int err; 7806 7807 /* check src operand */ 7808 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 7809 if (err) 7810 return err; 7811 7812 /* check dst operand */ 7813 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 7814 if (err) 7815 return err; 7816 7817 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; 7818 7819 /* Check if (src_reg + off) is readable. The state of dst_reg will be 7820 * updated by this call. 7821 */ 7822 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off, 7823 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, 7824 strict_alignment_once, is_ldsx); 7825 err = err ?: save_aux_ptr_type(env, src_reg_type, 7826 allow_trust_mismatch); 7827 err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, ®s[insn->dst_reg], ctx); 7828 7829 return err; 7830 } 7831 7832 static int check_store_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 7833 bool strict_alignment_once) 7834 { 7835 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7836 enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; 7837 int err; 7838 7839 /* check src1 operand */ 7840 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 7841 if (err) 7842 return err; 7843 7844 /* check src2 operand */ 7845 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 7846 if (err) 7847 return err; 7848 7849 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 7850 7851 /* Check if (dst_reg + off) is writeable. */ 7852 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 7853 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, 7854 strict_alignment_once, false); 7855 err = err ?: save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); 7856 7857 return err; 7858 } 7859 7860 static int check_atomic_rmw(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7861 struct bpf_insn *insn) 7862 { 7863 int load_reg; 7864 int err; 7865 7866 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 7867 verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n"); 7868 return -EINVAL; 7869 } 7870 7871 /* check src1 operand */ 7872 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 7873 if (err) 7874 return err; 7875 7876 /* check src2 operand */ 7877 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 7878 if (err) 7879 return err; 7880 7881 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) { 7882 /* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */ 7883 const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0; 7884 7885 err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP); 7886 if (err) 7887 return err; 7888 7889 if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) { 7890 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg); 7891 return -EACCES; 7892 } 7893 } 7894 7895 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 7896 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); 7897 return -EACCES; 7898 } 7899 7900 if (!atomic_ptr_type_ok(env, insn->dst_reg, insn)) { 7901 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 7902 insn->dst_reg, 7903 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 7904 return -EACCES; 7905 } 7906 7907 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) { 7908 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 7909 load_reg = BPF_REG_0; 7910 else 7911 load_reg = insn->src_reg; 7912 7913 /* check and record load of old value */ 7914 err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP); 7915 if (err) 7916 return err; 7917 } else { 7918 /* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't 7919 * actually load it into a register. 7920 */ 7921 load_reg = -1; 7922 } 7923 7924 /* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch 7925 * case to simulate the register fill. 7926 */ 7927 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 7928 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true, false); 7929 if (!err && load_reg >= 0) 7930 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 7931 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 7932 BPF_READ, load_reg, true, false); 7933 if (err) 7934 return err; 7935 7936 if (is_arena_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 7937 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, PTR_TO_ARENA, false); 7938 if (err) 7939 return err; 7940 } 7941 /* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */ 7942 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 7943 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true, false); 7944 if (err) 7945 return err; 7946 return 0; 7947 } 7948 7949 static int check_atomic_load(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7950 struct bpf_insn *insn) 7951 { 7952 int err; 7953 7954 err = check_load_mem(env, insn, true, false, false, "atomic_load"); 7955 if (err) 7956 return err; 7957 7958 if (!atomic_ptr_type_ok(env, insn->src_reg, insn)) { 7959 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC loads from R%d %s is not allowed\n", 7960 insn->src_reg, 7961 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->src_reg)->type)); 7962 return -EACCES; 7963 } 7964 7965 return 0; 7966 } 7967 7968 static int check_atomic_store(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7969 struct bpf_insn *insn) 7970 { 7971 int err; 7972 7973 err = check_store_reg(env, insn, true); 7974 if (err) 7975 return err; 7976 7977 if (!atomic_ptr_type_ok(env, insn->dst_reg, insn)) { 7978 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 7979 insn->dst_reg, 7980 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 7981 return -EACCES; 7982 } 7983 7984 return 0; 7985 } 7986 7987 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 7988 { 7989 switch (insn->imm) { 7990 case BPF_ADD: 7991 case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH: 7992 case BPF_AND: 7993 case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH: 7994 case BPF_OR: 7995 case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH: 7996 case BPF_XOR: 7997 case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH: 7998 case BPF_XCHG: 7999 case BPF_CMPXCHG: 8000 return check_atomic_rmw(env, insn); 8001 case BPF_LOAD_ACQ: 8002 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW && BITS_PER_LONG != 64) { 8003 verbose(env, 8004 "64-bit load-acquires are only supported on 64-bit arches\n"); 8005 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 8006 } 8007 return check_atomic_load(env, insn); 8008 case BPF_STORE_REL: 8009 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW && BITS_PER_LONG != 64) { 8010 verbose(env, 8011 "64-bit store-releases are only supported on 64-bit arches\n"); 8012 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 8013 } 8014 return check_atomic_store(env, insn); 8015 default: 8016 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", 8017 insn->imm); 8018 return -EINVAL; 8019 } 8020 } 8021 8022 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through 8023 * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending 8024 * on the access type and privileges, that all elements of the stack are 8025 * initialized. 8026 * 8027 * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any). 8028 * 8029 * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the 8030 * read offsets are marked as read. 8031 */ 8032 static int check_stack_range_initialized( 8033 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off, 8034 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 8035 enum bpf_access_type type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 8036 { 8037 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 8038 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 8039 int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi; 8040 /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are 8041 * read-only. 8042 */ 8043 bool clobber = false; 8044 8045 if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { 8046 verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n"); 8047 return -EACCES; 8048 } 8049 8050 if (type == BPF_WRITE) 8051 clobber = true; 8052 8053 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size, type); 8054 if (err) 8055 return err; 8056 8057 8058 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8059 min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 8060 } else { 8061 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for 8062 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in 8063 * Spectre masking for stack ALU. 8064 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 8065 */ 8066 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 8067 char tn_buf[48]; 8068 8069 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 8070 verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 8071 regno, tn_buf); 8072 return -EACCES; 8073 } 8074 /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed 8075 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to 8076 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on 8077 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may 8078 * cause uninitialized stack leaking. 8079 */ 8080 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) 8081 meta = NULL; 8082 8083 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 8084 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 8085 } 8086 8087 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 8088 /* Ensure we won't be overwriting dynptrs when simulating byte 8089 * by byte access in check_helper_call using meta.access_size. 8090 * This would be a problem if we have a helper in the future 8091 * which takes: 8092 * 8093 * helper(uninit_mem, len, dynptr) 8094 * 8095 * Now, uninint_mem may overlap with dynptr pointer. Hence, it 8096 * may end up writing to dynptr itself when touching memory from 8097 * arg 1. This can be relaxed on a case by case basis for known 8098 * safe cases, but reject due to the possibilitiy of aliasing by 8099 * default. 8100 */ 8101 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 8102 int stack_off = -i - 1; 8103 8104 spi = __get_spi(i); 8105 /* raw_mode may write past allocated_stack */ 8106 if (state->allocated_stack <= stack_off) 8107 continue; 8108 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[stack_off % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_DYNPTR) { 8109 verbose(env, "potential write to dynptr at off=%d disallowed\n", i); 8110 return -EACCES; 8111 } 8112 } 8113 meta->access_size = access_size; 8114 meta->regno = regno; 8115 return 0; 8116 } 8117 8118 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 8119 u8 *stype; 8120 8121 slot = -i - 1; 8122 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 8123 if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) { 8124 verbose(env, "allocated_stack too small\n"); 8125 return -EFAULT; 8126 } 8127 8128 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 8129 if (*stype == STACK_MISC) 8130 goto mark; 8131 if ((*stype == STACK_ZERO) || 8132 (*stype == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)) { 8133 if (clobber) { 8134 /* helper can write anything into the stack */ 8135 *stype = STACK_MISC; 8136 } 8137 goto mark; 8138 } 8139 8140 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 8141 (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE || 8142 env->allow_ptr_leaks)) { 8143 if (clobber) { 8144 __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 8145 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 8146 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]); 8147 } 8148 goto mark; 8149 } 8150 8151 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8152 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n", 8153 regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size); 8154 } else { 8155 char tn_buf[48]; 8156 8157 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 8158 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n", 8159 regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size); 8160 } 8161 return -EACCES; 8162 mark: 8163 /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause 8164 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' 8165 */ 8166 err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg->frameno, env->insn_idx, BIT(spi)); 8167 if (err) 8168 return err; 8169 /* We do not call bpf_mark_stack_write(), as we can not 8170 * be sure that whether stack slot is written to or not. Hence, 8171 * we must still conservatively propagate reads upwards even if 8172 * helper may write to the entire memory range. 8173 */ 8174 } 8175 return 0; 8176 } 8177 8178 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 8179 int access_size, enum bpf_access_type access_type, 8180 bool zero_size_allowed, 8181 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 8182 { 8183 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8184 u32 *max_access; 8185 8186 switch (base_type(reg->type)) { 8187 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 8188 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 8189 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 8190 zero_size_allowed); 8191 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 8192 if (access_type == BPF_WRITE) { 8193 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 8194 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8195 return -EACCES; 8196 } 8197 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 8198 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 8199 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 8200 if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, access_type)) 8201 return -EACCES; 8202 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 8203 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER); 8204 case PTR_TO_MEM: 8205 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 8206 if (access_type == BPF_WRITE) { 8207 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 8208 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8209 return -EACCES; 8210 } 8211 } 8212 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, 8213 access_size, reg->mem_size, 8214 zero_size_allowed); 8215 case PTR_TO_BUF: 8216 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 8217 if (access_type == BPF_WRITE) { 8218 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 8219 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8220 return -EACCES; 8221 } 8222 8223 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 8224 } else { 8225 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 8226 } 8227 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, 8228 access_size, zero_size_allowed, 8229 max_access); 8230 case PTR_TO_STACK: 8231 return check_stack_range_initialized( 8232 env, 8233 regno, reg->off, access_size, 8234 zero_size_allowed, access_type, meta); 8235 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 8236 return check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, reg->off, 8237 access_size, BPF_READ, -1); 8238 case PTR_TO_CTX: 8239 /* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context, 8240 * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we 8241 * can not statically check its size. 8242 * Dynamically check it now. 8243 */ 8244 if (!env->ops->convert_ctx_access) { 8245 int offset = access_size - 1; 8246 8247 /* Allow zero-byte read from PTR_TO_CTX */ 8248 if (access_size == 0) 8249 return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; 8250 8251 return check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, offset, BPF_B, 8252 access_type, -1, false, false); 8253 } 8254 8255 fallthrough; 8256 default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */ 8257 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ 8258 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && 8259 register_is_null(reg)) 8260 return 0; 8261 8262 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s ", regno, 8263 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 8264 verbose(env, "expected=%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_STACK)); 8265 return -EACCES; 8266 } 8267 } 8268 8269 /* verify arguments to helpers or kfuncs consisting of a pointer and an access 8270 * size. 8271 * 8272 * @regno is the register containing the access size. regno-1 is the register 8273 * containing the pointer. 8274 */ 8275 static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8276 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 8277 enum bpf_access_type access_type, 8278 bool zero_size_allowed, 8279 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 8280 { 8281 int err; 8282 8283 /* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers 8284 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values. 8285 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine 8286 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register 8287 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors 8288 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an 8289 * int type and negative retvals are allowed. 8290 */ 8291 meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; 8292 8293 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check happens using 8294 * its boundaries. For unprivileged variable accesses, disable 8295 * raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all 8296 * the memory that the helper could just partially fill up. 8297 */ 8298 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 8299 meta = NULL; 8300 8301 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 8302 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", 8303 regno); 8304 return -EACCES; 8305 } 8306 8307 if (reg->umin_value == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { 8308 verbose(env, "R%d invalid zero-sized read: u64=[%lld,%lld]\n", 8309 regno, reg->umin_value, reg->umax_value); 8310 return -EACCES; 8311 } 8312 8313 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { 8314 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", 8315 regno); 8316 return -EACCES; 8317 } 8318 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, reg->umax_value, 8319 access_type, zero_size_allowed, meta); 8320 if (!err) 8321 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 8322 return err; 8323 } 8324 8325 static int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 8326 u32 regno, u32 mem_size) 8327 { 8328 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type); 8329 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 8330 int err; 8331 8332 if (register_is_null(reg)) 8333 return 0; 8334 8335 /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory 8336 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as 8337 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller. 8338 */ 8339 if (may_be_null) { 8340 saved_reg = *reg; 8341 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 8342 } 8343 8344 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, BPF_READ, true, NULL); 8345 err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, BPF_WRITE, true, NULL); 8346 8347 if (may_be_null) 8348 *reg = saved_reg; 8349 8350 return err; 8351 } 8352 8353 static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 8354 u32 regno) 8355 { 8356 struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1]; 8357 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type); 8358 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 8359 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 8360 int err; 8361 8362 WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5); 8363 8364 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 8365 8366 if (may_be_null) { 8367 saved_reg = *mem_reg; 8368 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg); 8369 } 8370 8371 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, BPF_READ, true, &meta); 8372 err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, BPF_WRITE, true, &meta); 8373 8374 if (may_be_null) 8375 *mem_reg = saved_reg; 8376 8377 return err; 8378 } 8379 8380 enum { 8381 PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK = (1 << 0), 8382 PROCESS_RES_LOCK = (1 << 1), 8383 PROCESS_LOCK_IRQ = (1 << 2), 8384 }; 8385 8386 /* Implementation details: 8387 * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL. 8388 * bpf_obj_new returns PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL. 8389 * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id. 8390 * Two separate bpf_obj_new will also have different reg->id. 8391 * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, the verifier 8392 * clears reg->id after value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only 8393 * cares about the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care 8394 * about actual address of the map element. 8395 * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps 8396 * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so 8397 * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that 8398 * point to different bpf_spin_locks. Likewise for pointers to allocated objects 8399 * returned from bpf_obj_new. 8400 * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid 8401 * dead-locks. 8402 * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than 8403 * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only 8404 * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs. 8405 * env->cur_state->active_locks remembers which map value element or allocated 8406 * object got locked and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock. 8407 */ 8408 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int flags) 8409 { 8410 bool is_lock = flags & PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK, is_res_lock = flags & PROCESS_RES_LOCK; 8411 const char *lock_str = is_res_lock ? "bpf_res_spin" : "bpf_spin"; 8412 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8413 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 8414 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 8415 bool is_irq = flags & PROCESS_LOCK_IRQ; 8416 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 8417 struct bpf_map *map = NULL; 8418 struct btf *btf = NULL; 8419 struct btf_record *rec; 8420 u32 spin_lock_off; 8421 int err; 8422 8423 if (!is_const) { 8424 verbose(env, 8425 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s_lock has to be at the constant offset\n", 8426 regno, lock_str); 8427 return -EINVAL; 8428 } 8429 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 8430 map = reg->map_ptr; 8431 if (!map->btf) { 8432 verbose(env, 8433 "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use %s_lock\n", 8434 map->name, lock_str); 8435 return -EINVAL; 8436 } 8437 } else { 8438 btf = reg->btf; 8439 } 8440 8441 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 8442 if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, is_res_lock ? BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK : BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 8443 verbose(env, "%s '%s' has no valid %s_lock\n", map ? "map" : "local", 8444 map ? map->name : "kptr", lock_str); 8445 return -EINVAL; 8446 } 8447 spin_lock_off = is_res_lock ? rec->res_spin_lock_off : rec->spin_lock_off; 8448 if (spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { 8449 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct %s_lock' that is at %d\n", 8450 val + reg->off, lock_str, spin_lock_off); 8451 return -EINVAL; 8452 } 8453 if (is_lock) { 8454 void *ptr; 8455 int type; 8456 8457 if (map) 8458 ptr = map; 8459 else 8460 ptr = btf; 8461 8462 if (!is_res_lock && cur->active_locks) { 8463 if (find_lock_state(env->cur_state, REF_TYPE_LOCK, 0, NULL)) { 8464 verbose(env, 8465 "Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n"); 8466 return -EINVAL; 8467 } 8468 } else if (is_res_lock && cur->active_locks) { 8469 if (find_lock_state(env->cur_state, REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK | REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK_IRQ, reg->id, ptr)) { 8470 verbose(env, "Acquiring the same lock again, AA deadlock detected\n"); 8471 return -EINVAL; 8472 } 8473 } 8474 8475 if (is_res_lock && is_irq) 8476 type = REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK_IRQ; 8477 else if (is_res_lock) 8478 type = REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK; 8479 else 8480 type = REF_TYPE_LOCK; 8481 err = acquire_lock_state(env, env->insn_idx, type, reg->id, ptr); 8482 if (err < 0) { 8483 verbose(env, "Failed to acquire lock state\n"); 8484 return err; 8485 } 8486 } else { 8487 void *ptr; 8488 int type; 8489 8490 if (map) 8491 ptr = map; 8492 else 8493 ptr = btf; 8494 8495 if (!cur->active_locks) { 8496 verbose(env, "%s_unlock without taking a lock\n", lock_str); 8497 return -EINVAL; 8498 } 8499 8500 if (is_res_lock && is_irq) 8501 type = REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK_IRQ; 8502 else if (is_res_lock) 8503 type = REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK; 8504 else 8505 type = REF_TYPE_LOCK; 8506 if (!find_lock_state(cur, type, reg->id, ptr)) { 8507 verbose(env, "%s_unlock of different lock\n", lock_str); 8508 return -EINVAL; 8509 } 8510 if (reg->id != cur->active_lock_id || ptr != cur->active_lock_ptr) { 8511 verbose(env, "%s_unlock cannot be out of order\n", lock_str); 8512 return -EINVAL; 8513 } 8514 if (release_lock_state(cur, type, reg->id, ptr)) { 8515 verbose(env, "%s_unlock of different lock\n", lock_str); 8516 return -EINVAL; 8517 } 8518 8519 invalidate_non_owning_refs(env); 8520 } 8521 return 0; 8522 } 8523 8524 /* Check if @regno is a pointer to a specific field in a map value */ 8525 static int check_map_field_pointer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 8526 enum btf_field_type field_type) 8527 { 8528 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8529 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 8530 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 8531 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 8532 const char *struct_name = btf_field_type_name(field_type); 8533 int field_off = -1; 8534 8535 if (!is_const) { 8536 verbose(env, 8537 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n", 8538 regno, struct_name); 8539 return -EINVAL; 8540 } 8541 if (!map->btf) { 8542 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use %s\n", map->name, 8543 struct_name); 8544 return -EINVAL; 8545 } 8546 if (!btf_record_has_field(map->record, field_type)) { 8547 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid %s\n", map->name, struct_name); 8548 return -EINVAL; 8549 } 8550 switch (field_type) { 8551 case BPF_TIMER: 8552 field_off = map->record->timer_off; 8553 break; 8554 case BPF_TASK_WORK: 8555 field_off = map->record->task_work_off; 8556 break; 8557 case BPF_WORKQUEUE: 8558 field_off = map->record->wq_off; 8559 break; 8560 default: 8561 verifier_bug(env, "unsupported BTF field type: %s\n", struct_name); 8562 return -EINVAL; 8563 } 8564 if (field_off != val + reg->off) { 8565 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct %s' that is at %d\n", 8566 val + reg->off, struct_name, field_off); 8567 return -EINVAL; 8568 } 8569 return 0; 8570 } 8571 8572 static int process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 8573 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 8574 { 8575 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8576 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 8577 int err; 8578 8579 err = check_map_field_pointer(env, regno, BPF_TIMER); 8580 if (err) 8581 return err; 8582 8583 if (meta->map_ptr) { 8584 verifier_bug(env, "Two map pointers in a timer helper"); 8585 return -EFAULT; 8586 } 8587 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT)) { 8588 verbose(env, "bpf_timer cannot be used for PREEMPT_RT.\n"); 8589 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 8590 } 8591 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 8592 meta->map_ptr = map; 8593 return 0; 8594 } 8595 8596 static int process_wq_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 8597 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8598 { 8599 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8600 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 8601 int err; 8602 8603 err = check_map_field_pointer(env, regno, BPF_WORKQUEUE); 8604 if (err) 8605 return err; 8606 8607 if (meta->map.ptr) { 8608 verifier_bug(env, "Two map pointers in a bpf_wq helper"); 8609 return -EFAULT; 8610 } 8611 8612 meta->map.uid = reg->map_uid; 8613 meta->map.ptr = map; 8614 return 0; 8615 } 8616 8617 static int process_task_work_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 8618 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8619 { 8620 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8621 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 8622 int err; 8623 8624 err = check_map_field_pointer(env, regno, BPF_TASK_WORK); 8625 if (err) 8626 return err; 8627 8628 if (meta->map.ptr) { 8629 verifier_bug(env, "Two map pointers in a bpf_task_work helper"); 8630 return -EFAULT; 8631 } 8632 meta->map.uid = reg->map_uid; 8633 meta->map.ptr = map; 8634 return 0; 8635 } 8636 8637 static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 8638 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 8639 { 8640 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8641 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 8642 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 8643 struct btf_record *rec; 8644 u32 kptr_off; 8645 8646 if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 8647 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 8648 } else { /* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE */ 8649 map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 8650 if (!map_ptr->btf) { 8651 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_kptr_xchg\n", 8652 map_ptr->name); 8653 return -EINVAL; 8654 } 8655 rec = map_ptr->record; 8656 meta->map_ptr = map_ptr; 8657 } 8658 8659 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8660 verbose(env, 8661 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. kptr has to be at the constant offset\n", 8662 regno); 8663 return -EINVAL; 8664 } 8665 8666 if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_KPTR)) { 8667 verbose(env, "R%d has no valid kptr\n", regno); 8668 return -EINVAL; 8669 } 8670 8671 kptr_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 8672 kptr_field = btf_record_find(rec, kptr_off, BPF_KPTR); 8673 if (!kptr_field) { 8674 verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off); 8675 return -EACCES; 8676 } 8677 if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF && kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_PERCPU) { 8678 verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off); 8679 return -EACCES; 8680 } 8681 meta->kptr_field = kptr_field; 8682 return 0; 8683 } 8684 8685 /* There are two register types representing a bpf_dynptr, one is PTR_TO_STACK 8686 * which points to a stack slot, and the other is CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR. 8687 * 8688 * In both cases we deal with the first 8 bytes, but need to mark the next 8 8689 * bytes as STACK_DYNPTR in case of PTR_TO_STACK. In case of 8690 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, we are guaranteed to get the beginning of the object. 8691 * 8692 * Mutability of bpf_dynptr is at two levels, one is at the level of struct 8693 * bpf_dynptr itself, i.e. whether the helper is receiving a pointer to struct 8694 * bpf_dynptr or pointer to const struct bpf_dynptr. In the former case, it can 8695 * mutate the view of the dynptr and also possibly destroy it. In the latter 8696 * case, it cannot mutate the bpf_dynptr itself but it can still mutate the 8697 * memory that dynptr points to. 8698 * 8699 * The verifier will keep track both levels of mutation (bpf_dynptr's in 8700 * reg->type and the memory's in reg->dynptr.type), but there is no support for 8701 * readonly dynptr view yet, hence only the first case is tracked and checked. 8702 * 8703 * This is consistent with how C applies the const modifier to a struct object, 8704 * where the pointer itself inside bpf_dynptr becomes const but not what it 8705 * points to. 8706 * 8707 * Helpers which do not mutate the bpf_dynptr set MEM_RDONLY in their argument 8708 * type, and declare it as 'const struct bpf_dynptr *' in their prototype. 8709 */ 8710 static int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx, 8711 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int clone_ref_obj_id) 8712 { 8713 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8714 int err; 8715 8716 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK && reg->type != CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 8717 verbose(env, 8718 "arg#%d expected pointer to stack or const struct bpf_dynptr\n", 8719 regno - 1); 8720 return -EINVAL; 8721 } 8722 8723 /* MEM_UNINIT and MEM_RDONLY are exclusive, when applied to an 8724 * ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (or ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_*): 8725 */ 8726 if ((arg_type & (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) == (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) { 8727 verifier_bug(env, "misconfigured dynptr helper type flags"); 8728 return -EFAULT; 8729 } 8730 8731 /* MEM_UNINIT - Points to memory that is an appropriate candidate for 8732 * constructing a mutable bpf_dynptr object. 8733 * 8734 * Currently, this is only possible with PTR_TO_STACK 8735 * pointing to a region of at least 16 bytes which doesn't 8736 * contain an existing bpf_dynptr. 8737 * 8738 * MEM_RDONLY - Points to a initialized bpf_dynptr that will not be 8739 * mutated or destroyed. However, the memory it points to 8740 * may be mutated. 8741 * 8742 * None - Points to a initialized dynptr that can be mutated and 8743 * destroyed, including mutation of the memory it points 8744 * to. 8745 */ 8746 if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) { 8747 int i; 8748 8749 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) { 8750 verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n"); 8751 return -EINVAL; 8752 } 8753 8754 /* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */ 8755 for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) { 8756 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno, 8757 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 8758 if (err) 8759 return err; 8760 } 8761 8762 err = mark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, reg, arg_type, insn_idx, clone_ref_obj_id); 8763 } else /* MEM_RDONLY and None case from above */ { 8764 /* For the reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK case, bpf_dynptr is never const */ 8765 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR && !(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { 8766 verbose(env, "cannot pass pointer to const bpf_dynptr, the helper mutates it\n"); 8767 return -EINVAL; 8768 } 8769 8770 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) { 8771 verbose(env, 8772 "Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #%d\n", 8773 regno - 1); 8774 return -EINVAL; 8775 } 8776 8777 /* Fold modifiers (in this case, MEM_RDONLY) when checking expected type */ 8778 if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, arg_type & ~MEM_RDONLY)) { 8779 verbose(env, 8780 "Expected a dynptr of type %s as arg #%d\n", 8781 dynptr_type_str(arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type)), regno - 1); 8782 return -EINVAL; 8783 } 8784 8785 err = mark_dynptr_read(env, reg); 8786 } 8787 return err; 8788 } 8789 8790 static u32 iter_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int spi) 8791 { 8792 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 8793 8794 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 8795 } 8796 8797 static bool is_iter_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8798 { 8799 return meta->kfunc_flags & (KF_ITER_NEW | KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_ITER_DESTROY); 8800 } 8801 8802 static bool is_iter_new_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8803 { 8804 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEW; 8805 } 8806 8807 static bool is_iter_next_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8808 { 8809 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEXT; 8810 } 8811 8812 static bool is_iter_destroy_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8813 { 8814 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_DESTROY; 8815 } 8816 8817 static bool is_kfunc_arg_iter(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg_idx, 8818 const struct btf_param *arg) 8819 { 8820 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() guarantees that first argument of any iter 8821 * kfunc is iter state pointer 8822 */ 8823 if (is_iter_kfunc(meta)) 8824 return arg_idx == 0; 8825 8826 /* iter passed as an argument to a generic kfunc */ 8827 return btf_param_match_suffix(meta->btf, arg, "__iter"); 8828 } 8829 8830 static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx, 8831 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8832 { 8833 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 8834 const struct btf_type *t; 8835 int spi, err, i, nr_slots, btf_id; 8836 8837 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) { 8838 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to an iterator on stack\n", regno - 1); 8839 return -EINVAL; 8840 } 8841 8842 /* For iter_{new,next,destroy} functions, btf_check_iter_kfuncs() 8843 * ensures struct convention, so we wouldn't need to do any BTF 8844 * validation here. But given iter state can be passed as a parameter 8845 * to any kfunc, if arg has "__iter" suffix, we need to be a bit more 8846 * conservative here. 8847 */ 8848 btf_id = btf_check_iter_arg(meta->btf, meta->func_proto, regno - 1); 8849 if (btf_id < 0) { 8850 verbose(env, "expected valid iter pointer as arg #%d\n", regno - 1); 8851 return -EINVAL; 8852 } 8853 t = btf_type_by_id(meta->btf, btf_id); 8854 nr_slots = t->size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 8855 8856 if (is_iter_new_kfunc(meta)) { 8857 /* bpf_iter_<type>_new() expects pointer to uninit iter state */ 8858 if (!is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg, nr_slots)) { 8859 verbose(env, "expected uninitialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n", 8860 iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno - 1); 8861 return -EINVAL; 8862 } 8863 8864 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots * 8; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { 8865 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno, 8866 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 8867 if (err) 8868 return err; 8869 } 8870 8871 err = mark_stack_slots_iter(env, meta, reg, insn_idx, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots); 8872 if (err) 8873 return err; 8874 } else { 8875 /* iter_next() or iter_destroy(), as well as any kfunc 8876 * accepting iter argument, expect initialized iter state 8877 */ 8878 err = is_iter_reg_valid_init(env, reg, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots); 8879 switch (err) { 8880 case 0: 8881 break; 8882 case -EINVAL: 8883 verbose(env, "expected an initialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n", 8884 iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno - 1); 8885 return err; 8886 case -EPROTO: 8887 verbose(env, "expected an RCU CS when using %s\n", meta->func_name); 8888 return err; 8889 default: 8890 return err; 8891 } 8892 8893 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots); 8894 if (spi < 0) 8895 return spi; 8896 8897 err = mark_iter_read(env, reg, spi, nr_slots); 8898 if (err) 8899 return err; 8900 8901 /* remember meta->iter info for process_iter_next_call() */ 8902 meta->iter.spi = spi; 8903 meta->iter.frameno = reg->frameno; 8904 meta->ref_obj_id = iter_ref_obj_id(env, reg, spi); 8905 8906 if (is_iter_destroy_kfunc(meta)) { 8907 err = unmark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, nr_slots); 8908 if (err) 8909 return err; 8910 } 8911 } 8912 8913 return 0; 8914 } 8915 8916 /* Look for a previous loop entry at insn_idx: nearest parent state 8917 * stopped at insn_idx with callsites matching those in cur->frame. 8918 */ 8919 static struct bpf_verifier_state *find_prev_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8920 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 8921 int insn_idx) 8922 { 8923 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 8924 struct bpf_verifier_state *st; 8925 struct list_head *pos, *head; 8926 8927 /* Explored states are pushed in stack order, most recent states come first */ 8928 head = explored_state(env, insn_idx); 8929 list_for_each(pos, head) { 8930 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); 8931 /* If st->branches != 0 state is a part of current DFS verification path, 8932 * hence cur & st for a loop. 8933 */ 8934 st = &sl->state; 8935 if (st->insn_idx == insn_idx && st->branches && same_callsites(st, cur) && 8936 st->dfs_depth < cur->dfs_depth) 8937 return st; 8938 } 8939 8940 return NULL; 8941 } 8942 8943 static void reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env); 8944 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 8945 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 8946 struct bpf_idmap *idmap); 8947 8948 static void maybe_widen_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8949 struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 8950 struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 8951 { 8952 if (rold->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 8953 return; 8954 if (rold->type != rcur->type) 8955 return; 8956 if (rold->precise || rcur->precise || regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap)) 8957 return; 8958 __mark_reg_unknown(env, rcur); 8959 } 8960 8961 static int widen_imprecise_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8962 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 8963 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 8964 { 8965 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 8966 int i, fr, num_slots; 8967 8968 reset_idmap_scratch(env); 8969 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 8970 fold = old->frame[fr]; 8971 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 8972 8973 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 8974 maybe_widen_reg(env, 8975 &fold->regs[i], 8976 &fcur->regs[i], 8977 &env->idmap_scratch); 8978 8979 num_slots = min(fold->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, 8980 fcur->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE); 8981 for (i = 0; i < num_slots; i++) { 8982 if (!is_spilled_reg(&fold->stack[i]) || 8983 !is_spilled_reg(&fcur->stack[i])) 8984 continue; 8985 8986 maybe_widen_reg(env, 8987 &fold->stack[i].spilled_ptr, 8988 &fcur->stack[i].spilled_ptr, 8989 &env->idmap_scratch); 8990 } 8991 } 8992 return 0; 8993 } 8994 8995 static struct bpf_reg_state *get_iter_from_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st, 8996 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8997 { 8998 int iter_frameno = meta->iter.frameno; 8999 int iter_spi = meta->iter.spi; 9000 9001 return &cur_st->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr; 9002 } 9003 9004 /* process_iter_next_call() is called when verifier gets to iterator's next 9005 * "method" (e.g., bpf_iter_num_next() for numbers iterator) call. We'll refer 9006 * to it as just "iter_next()" in comments below. 9007 * 9008 * BPF verifier relies on a crucial contract for any iter_next() 9009 * implementation: it should *eventually* return NULL, and once that happens 9010 * it should keep returning NULL. That is, once iterator exhausts elements to 9011 * iterate, it should never reset or spuriously return new elements. 9012 * 9013 * With the assumption of such contract, process_iter_next_call() simulates 9014 * a fork in the verifier state to validate loop logic correctness and safety 9015 * without having to simulate infinite amount of iterations. 9016 * 9017 * In current state, we first assume that iter_next() returned NULL and 9018 * iterator state is set to DRAINED (BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED). In such 9019 * conditions we should not form an infinite loop and should eventually reach 9020 * exit. 9021 * 9022 * Besides that, we also fork current state and enqueue it for later 9023 * verification. In a forked state we keep iterator state as ACTIVE 9024 * (BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) and assume non-NULL return from iter_next(). We 9025 * also bump iteration depth to prevent erroneous infinite loop detection 9026 * later on (see iter_active_depths_differ() comment for details). In this 9027 * state we assume that we'll eventually loop back to another iter_next() 9028 * calls (it could be in exactly same location or in some other instruction, 9029 * it doesn't matter, we don't make any unnecessary assumptions about this, 9030 * everything revolves around iterator state in a stack slot, not which 9031 * instruction is calling iter_next()). When that happens, we either will come 9032 * to iter_next() with equivalent state and can conclude that next iteration 9033 * will proceed in exactly the same way as we just verified, so it's safe to 9034 * assume that loop converges. If not, we'll go on another iteration 9035 * simulation with a different input state, until all possible starting states 9036 * are validated or we reach maximum number of instructions limit. 9037 * 9038 * This way, we will either exhaustively discover all possible input states 9039 * that iterator loop can start with and eventually will converge, or we'll 9040 * effectively regress into bounded loop simulation logic and either reach 9041 * maximum number of instructions if loop is not provably convergent, or there 9042 * is some statically known limit on number of iterations (e.g., if there is 9043 * an explicit `if n > 100 then break;` statement somewhere in the loop). 9044 * 9045 * Iteration convergence logic in is_state_visited() relies on exact 9046 * states comparison, which ignores read and precision marks. 9047 * This is necessary because read and precision marks are not finalized 9048 * while in the loop. Exact comparison might preclude convergence for 9049 * simple programs like below: 9050 * 9051 * i = 0; 9052 * while(iter_next(&it)) 9053 * i++; 9054 * 9055 * At each iteration step i++ would produce a new distinct state and 9056 * eventually instruction processing limit would be reached. 9057 * 9058 * To avoid such behavior speculatively forget (widen) range for 9059 * imprecise scalar registers, if those registers were not precise at the 9060 * end of the previous iteration and do not match exactly. 9061 * 9062 * This is a conservative heuristic that allows to verify wide range of programs, 9063 * however it precludes verification of programs that conjure an 9064 * imprecise value on the first loop iteration and use it as precise on a second. 9065 * For example, the following safe program would fail to verify: 9066 * 9067 * struct bpf_num_iter it; 9068 * int arr[10]; 9069 * int i = 0, a = 0; 9070 * bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10); 9071 * while (bpf_iter_num_next(&it)) { 9072 * if (a == 0) { 9073 * a = 1; 9074 * i = 7; // Because i changed verifier would forget 9075 * // it's range on second loop entry. 9076 * } else { 9077 * arr[i] = 42; // This would fail to verify. 9078 * } 9079 * } 9080 * bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); 9081 */ 9082 static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 9083 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 9084 { 9085 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st, *prev_st; 9086 struct bpf_func_state *cur_fr = cur_st->frame[cur_st->curframe], *queued_fr; 9087 struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter, *queued_iter; 9088 9089 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(struct bpf_iter); 9090 9091 cur_iter = get_iter_from_state(cur_st, meta); 9092 9093 if (cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE && 9094 cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED) { 9095 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected iterator state %d (%s)", 9096 cur_iter->iter.state, iter_state_str(cur_iter->iter.state)); 9097 return -EFAULT; 9098 } 9099 9100 if (cur_iter->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) { 9101 /* Because iter_next() call is a checkpoint is_state_visitied() 9102 * should guarantee parent state with same call sites and insn_idx. 9103 */ 9104 if (!cur_st->parent || cur_st->parent->insn_idx != insn_idx || 9105 !same_callsites(cur_st->parent, cur_st)) { 9106 verifier_bug(env, "bad parent state for iter next call"); 9107 return -EFAULT; 9108 } 9109 /* Note cur_st->parent in the call below, it is necessary to skip 9110 * checkpoint created for cur_st by is_state_visited() 9111 * right at this instruction. 9112 */ 9113 prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, cur_st->parent, insn_idx); 9114 /* branch out active iter state */ 9115 queued_st = push_stack(env, insn_idx + 1, insn_idx, false); 9116 if (IS_ERR(queued_st)) 9117 return PTR_ERR(queued_st); 9118 9119 queued_iter = get_iter_from_state(queued_st, meta); 9120 queued_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE; 9121 queued_iter->iter.depth++; 9122 if (prev_st) 9123 widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st); 9124 9125 queued_fr = queued_st->frame[queued_st->curframe]; 9126 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&queued_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 9127 } 9128 9129 /* switch to DRAINED state, but keep the depth unchanged */ 9130 /* mark current iter state as drained and assume returned NULL */ 9131 cur_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED; 9132 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, &cur_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 9133 9134 return 0; 9135 } 9136 9137 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 9138 { 9139 return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || 9140 type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO; 9141 } 9142 9143 static bool arg_type_is_raw_mem(enum bpf_arg_type type) 9144 { 9145 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM && 9146 type & MEM_UNINIT; 9147 } 9148 9149 static bool arg_type_is_release(enum bpf_arg_type type) 9150 { 9151 return type & OBJ_RELEASE; 9152 } 9153 9154 static bool arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) 9155 { 9156 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 9157 } 9158 9159 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9160 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 9161 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type) 9162 { 9163 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 9164 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 9165 verifier_bug(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type"); 9166 return -EFAULT; 9167 } 9168 9169 switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { 9170 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 9171 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 9172 if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 9173 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON; 9174 } else { 9175 verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n"); 9176 return -EINVAL; 9177 } 9178 break; 9179 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 9180 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem) 9181 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 9182 break; 9183 default: 9184 break; 9185 } 9186 return 0; 9187 } 9188 9189 struct bpf_reg_types { 9190 const enum bpf_reg_type types[10]; 9191 u32 *btf_id; 9192 }; 9193 9194 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = { 9195 .types = { 9196 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 9197 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 9198 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 9199 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 9200 }, 9201 }; 9202 9203 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 9204 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = { 9205 .types = { 9206 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 9207 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 9208 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 9209 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 9210 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 9211 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 9212 }, 9213 .btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 9214 }; 9215 #endif 9216 9217 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { 9218 .types = { 9219 PTR_TO_STACK, 9220 PTR_TO_PACKET, 9221 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 9222 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 9223 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 9224 PTR_TO_MEM, 9225 PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF, 9226 PTR_TO_BUF, 9227 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 9228 }, 9229 }; 9230 9231 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { 9232 .types = { 9233 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 9234 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, 9235 } 9236 }; 9237 9238 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } }; 9239 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } }; 9240 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } }; 9241 static const struct bpf_reg_types ringbuf_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF } }; 9242 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } }; 9243 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { 9244 .types = { 9245 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 9246 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 9247 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU, 9248 }, 9249 }; 9250 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { 9251 .types = { 9252 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU, 9253 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_RCU, 9254 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED, 9255 } 9256 }; 9257 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } }; 9258 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } }; 9259 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 9260 static const struct bpf_reg_types timer_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 9261 static const struct bpf_reg_types kptr_xchg_dest_types = { 9262 .types = { 9263 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 9264 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC 9265 } 9266 }; 9267 static const struct bpf_reg_types dynptr_types = { 9268 .types = { 9269 PTR_TO_STACK, 9270 CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 9271 } 9272 }; 9273 9274 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { 9275 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &mem_types, 9276 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = &mem_types, 9277 [ARG_CONST_SIZE] = &scalar_types, 9278 [ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 9279 [ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 9280 [ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR] = &const_map_ptr_types, 9281 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX] = &context_types, 9282 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &sock_types, 9283 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 9284 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_id_sock_common_types, 9285 #endif 9286 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &fullsock_types, 9287 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = &btf_ptr_types, 9288 [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types, 9289 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types, 9290 [ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM] = &ringbuf_mem_types, 9291 [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, 9292 [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types, 9293 [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK] = &stack_ptr_types, 9294 [ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR] = &const_str_ptr_types, 9295 [ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER] = &timer_types, 9296 [ARG_KPTR_XCHG_DEST] = &kptr_xchg_dest_types, 9297 [ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = &dynptr_types, 9298 }; 9299 9300 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 9301 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, 9302 const u32 *arg_btf_id, 9303 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 9304 { 9305 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 9306 enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type; 9307 const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible; 9308 int i, j; 9309 9310 compatible = compatible_reg_types[base_type(arg_type)]; 9311 if (!compatible) { 9312 verifier_bug(env, "unsupported arg type %d", arg_type); 9313 return -EFAULT; 9314 } 9315 9316 /* ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY, 9317 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM and NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY 9318 * 9319 * Same for MAYBE_NULL: 9320 * 9321 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL, 9322 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM but NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL 9323 * 9324 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM that is tagged with a dynptr type. 9325 * 9326 * Therefore we fold these flags depending on the arg_type before comparison. 9327 */ 9328 if (arg_type & MEM_RDONLY) 9329 type &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 9330 if (arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) 9331 type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 9332 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 9333 type &= ~DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK; 9334 9335 /* Local kptr types are allowed as the source argument of bpf_kptr_xchg */ 9336 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && type_is_alloc(type) && regno == BPF_REG_2) { 9337 type &= ~MEM_ALLOC; 9338 type &= ~MEM_PERCPU; 9339 } 9340 9341 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) { 9342 expected = compatible->types[i]; 9343 if (expected == NOT_INIT) 9344 break; 9345 9346 if (type == expected) 9347 goto found; 9348 } 9349 9350 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 9351 for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++) 9352 verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 9353 verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 9354 return -EACCES; 9355 9356 found: 9357 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 9358 return 0; 9359 9360 if (compatible == &mem_types) { 9361 if (!(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { 9362 verbose(env, 9363 "%s() may write into memory pointed by R%d type=%s\n", 9364 func_id_name(meta->func_id), 9365 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 9366 return -EACCES; 9367 } 9368 return 0; 9369 } 9370 9371 switch ((int)reg->type) { 9372 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 9373 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 9374 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL: 9375 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: 9376 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL: 9377 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU: 9378 { 9379 /* For bpf_sk_release, it needs to match against first member 9380 * 'struct sock_common', hence make an exception for it. This 9381 * allows bpf_sk_release to work for multiple socket types. 9382 */ 9383 bool strict_type_match = arg_type_is_release(arg_type) && 9384 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_release; 9385 9386 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && 9387 (!type_may_be_null(arg_type) || arg_type_is_release(arg_type))) { 9388 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper arg%d\n", regno); 9389 return -EACCES; 9390 } 9391 9392 if (!arg_btf_id) { 9393 if (!compatible->btf_id) { 9394 verifier_bug(env, "missing arg compatible BTF ID"); 9395 return -EFAULT; 9396 } 9397 arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id; 9398 } 9399 9400 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 9401 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) 9402 return -EACCES; 9403 } else { 9404 if (arg_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 9405 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 9406 verbose(env, "R%d has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON type\n", 9407 regno); 9408 return -EACCES; 9409 } 9410 9411 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 9412 btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id, 9413 strict_type_match)) { 9414 verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n", 9415 regno, btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), 9416 btf_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)); 9417 return -EACCES; 9418 } 9419 } 9420 break; 9421 } 9422 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 9423 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_ALLOC: 9424 if (meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_lock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock && 9425 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 9426 verifier_bug(env, "unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC"); 9427 return -EFAULT; 9428 } 9429 /* Check if local kptr in src arg matches kptr in dst arg */ 9430 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && regno == BPF_REG_2) { 9431 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) 9432 return -EACCES; 9433 } 9434 break; 9435 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU: 9436 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_RCU: 9437 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED: 9438 /* Handled by helper specific checks */ 9439 break; 9440 default: 9441 verifier_bug(env, "invalid PTR_TO_BTF_ID register for type match"); 9442 return -EFAULT; 9443 } 9444 return 0; 9445 } 9446 9447 static struct btf_field * 9448 reg_find_field_offset(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, s32 off, u32 fields) 9449 { 9450 struct btf_field *field; 9451 struct btf_record *rec; 9452 9453 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 9454 if (!rec) 9455 return NULL; 9456 9457 field = btf_record_find(rec, off, fields); 9458 if (!field) 9459 return NULL; 9460 9461 return field; 9462 } 9463 9464 static int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9465 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 9466 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 9467 { 9468 u32 type = reg->type; 9469 9470 /* When referenced register is passed to release function, its fixed 9471 * offset must be 0. 9472 * 9473 * We will check arg_type_is_release reg has ref_obj_id when storing 9474 * meta->release_regno. 9475 */ 9476 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 9477 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR with OBJ_RELEASE is a bit special, as it 9478 * may not directly point to the object being released, but to 9479 * dynptr pointing to such object, which might be at some offset 9480 * on the stack. In that case, we simply to fallback to the 9481 * default handling. 9482 */ 9483 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && type == PTR_TO_STACK) 9484 return 0; 9485 9486 /* Doing check_ptr_off_reg check for the offset will catch this 9487 * because fixed_off_ok is false, but checking here allows us 9488 * to give the user a better error message. 9489 */ 9490 if (reg->off) { 9491 verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func or trusted arg to kfunc\n", 9492 regno); 9493 return -EINVAL; 9494 } 9495 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 9496 } 9497 9498 switch (type) { 9499 /* Pointer types where both fixed and variable offset is explicitly allowed: */ 9500 case PTR_TO_STACK: 9501 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 9502 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 9503 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 9504 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 9505 case PTR_TO_MEM: 9506 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY: 9507 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF: 9508 case PTR_TO_BUF: 9509 case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY: 9510 case PTR_TO_ARENA: 9511 case SCALAR_VALUE: 9512 return 0; 9513 /* All the rest must be rejected, except PTR_TO_BTF_ID which allows 9514 * fixed offset. 9515 */ 9516 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 9517 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 9518 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 9519 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: 9520 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF: 9521 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF | MEM_RCU: 9522 /* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function, 9523 * its fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset 9524 * can be non-zero. This was already checked above. So pass 9525 * fixed_off_ok as true to allow fixed offset for all other 9526 * cases. var_off always must be 0 for PTR_TO_BTF_ID, hence we 9527 * still need to do checks instead of returning. 9528 */ 9529 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true); 9530 default: 9531 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 9532 } 9533 } 9534 9535 static struct bpf_reg_state *get_dynptr_arg_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9536 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, 9537 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 9538 { 9539 struct bpf_reg_state *state = NULL; 9540 int i; 9541 9542 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) 9543 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[i])) { 9544 if (state) { 9545 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple dynptr args\n"); 9546 return NULL; 9547 } 9548 state = ®s[BPF_REG_1 + i]; 9549 } 9550 9551 if (!state) 9552 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr arg found\n"); 9553 9554 return state; 9555 } 9556 9557 static int dynptr_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 9558 { 9559 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 9560 int spi; 9561 9562 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 9563 return reg->id; 9564 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 9565 if (spi < 0) 9566 return spi; 9567 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id; 9568 } 9569 9570 static int dynptr_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 9571 { 9572 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 9573 int spi; 9574 9575 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 9576 return reg->ref_obj_id; 9577 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 9578 if (spi < 0) 9579 return spi; 9580 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 9581 } 9582 9583 static enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_get_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9584 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 9585 { 9586 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 9587 int spi; 9588 9589 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 9590 return reg->dynptr.type; 9591 9592 spi = __get_spi(reg->off); 9593 if (spi < 0) { 9594 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: invalid spi when querying dynptr type\n"); 9595 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 9596 } 9597 9598 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type; 9599 } 9600 9601 static int check_reg_const_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9602 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno) 9603 { 9604 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 9605 int err; 9606 int map_off; 9607 u64 map_addr; 9608 char *str_ptr; 9609 9610 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) 9611 return -EINVAL; 9612 9613 if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) { 9614 verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno); 9615 return -EACCES; 9616 } 9617 9618 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 9619 verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno); 9620 return -EACCES; 9621 } 9622 9623 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 9624 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 9625 return -EACCES; 9626 } 9627 9628 err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, 9629 map->value_size - reg->off, false, 9630 ACCESS_HELPER); 9631 if (err) 9632 return err; 9633 9634 map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 9635 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off); 9636 if (err) { 9637 verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n"); 9638 return err; 9639 } 9640 9641 str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr); 9642 if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) { 9643 verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n"); 9644 return -EINVAL; 9645 } 9646 return 0; 9647 } 9648 9649 /* Returns constant key value in `value` if possible, else negative error */ 9650 static int get_constant_map_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9651 struct bpf_reg_state *key, 9652 u32 key_size, 9653 s64 *value) 9654 { 9655 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, key); 9656 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 9657 int slot, spi, off; 9658 int spill_size = 0; 9659 int zero_size = 0; 9660 int stack_off; 9661 int i, err; 9662 u8 *stype; 9663 9664 if (!env->bpf_capable) 9665 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 9666 if (key->type != PTR_TO_STACK) 9667 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 9668 if (!tnum_is_const(key->var_off)) 9669 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 9670 9671 stack_off = key->off + key->var_off.value; 9672 slot = -stack_off - 1; 9673 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 9674 off = slot % BPF_REG_SIZE; 9675 stype = state->stack[spi].slot_type; 9676 9677 /* First handle precisely tracked STACK_ZERO */ 9678 for (i = off; i >= 0 && stype[i] == STACK_ZERO; i--) 9679 zero_size++; 9680 if (zero_size >= key_size) { 9681 *value = 0; 9682 return 0; 9683 } 9684 9685 /* Check that stack contains a scalar spill of expected size */ 9686 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&state->stack[spi])) 9687 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 9688 for (i = off; i >= 0 && stype[i] == STACK_SPILL; i--) 9689 spill_size++; 9690 if (spill_size != key_size) 9691 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 9692 9693 reg = &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 9694 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 9695 /* Stack value not statically known */ 9696 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 9697 9698 /* We are relying on a constant value. So mark as precise 9699 * to prevent pruning on it. 9700 */ 9701 bt_set_frame_slot(&env->bt, key->frameno, spi); 9702 err = mark_chain_precision_batch(env, env->cur_state); 9703 if (err < 0) 9704 return err; 9705 9706 *value = reg->var_off.value; 9707 return 0; 9708 } 9709 9710 static bool can_elide_value_nullness(enum bpf_map_type type); 9711 9712 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, 9713 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 9714 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, 9715 int insn_idx) 9716 { 9717 u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg; 9718 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 9719 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg]; 9720 enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; 9721 u32 *arg_btf_id = NULL; 9722 u32 key_size; 9723 int err = 0; 9724 9725 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) 9726 return 0; 9727 9728 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 9729 if (err) 9730 return err; 9731 9732 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 9733 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 9734 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", 9735 regno); 9736 return -EACCES; 9737 } 9738 return 0; 9739 } 9740 9741 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 9742 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { 9743 verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); 9744 return -EACCES; 9745 } 9746 9747 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 9748 err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type); 9749 if (err) 9750 return err; 9751 } 9752 9753 if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg_type)) 9754 /* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip 9755 * type checking. 9756 */ 9757 goto skip_type_check; 9758 9759 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 9760 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 9761 base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 9762 arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg]; 9763 9764 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta); 9765 if (err) 9766 return err; 9767 9768 err = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 9769 if (err) 9770 return err; 9771 9772 skip_type_check: 9773 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 9774 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) { 9775 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 9776 int spi; 9777 9778 /* Only dynptr created on stack can be released, thus 9779 * the get_spi and stack state checks for spilled_ptr 9780 * should only be done before process_dynptr_func for 9781 * PTR_TO_STACK. 9782 */ 9783 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 9784 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg); 9785 if (spi < 0 || !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id) { 9786 verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno); 9787 return -EINVAL; 9788 } 9789 } else { 9790 verbose(env, "cannot release unowned const bpf_dynptr\n"); 9791 return -EINVAL; 9792 } 9793 } else if (!reg->ref_obj_id && !register_is_null(reg)) { 9794 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced when passed to release function\n", 9795 regno); 9796 return -EINVAL; 9797 } 9798 if (meta->release_regno) { 9799 verifier_bug(env, "more than one release argument"); 9800 return -EFAULT; 9801 } 9802 meta->release_regno = regno; 9803 } 9804 9805 if (reg->ref_obj_id && base_type(arg_type) != ARG_KPTR_XCHG_DEST) { 9806 if (meta->ref_obj_id) { 9807 verbose(env, "more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u", 9808 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 9809 meta->ref_obj_id); 9810 return -EACCES; 9811 } 9812 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 9813 } 9814 9815 switch (base_type(arg_type)) { 9816 case ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR: 9817 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ 9818 if (meta->map_ptr) { 9819 /* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject: 9820 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1) 9821 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2) 9822 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) { 9823 * timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1); 9824 * if (timer) 9825 * // mismatch would have been allowed 9826 * bpf_timer_init(timer, inner_map2); 9827 * } 9828 * 9829 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps. 9830 */ 9831 if (meta->map_ptr != reg->map_ptr || 9832 meta->map_uid != reg->map_uid) { 9833 verbose(env, 9834 "timer pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n", 9835 meta->map_uid, reg->map_uid); 9836 return -EINVAL; 9837 } 9838 } 9839 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 9840 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 9841 break; 9842 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 9843 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: 9844 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within 9845 * stack limits and initialized 9846 */ 9847 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 9848 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before 9849 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before 9850 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means 9851 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier 9852 */ 9853 verifier_bug(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key"); 9854 return -EFAULT; 9855 } 9856 key_size = meta->map_ptr->key_size; 9857 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, key_size, BPF_READ, false, NULL); 9858 if (err) 9859 return err; 9860 if (can_elide_value_nullness(meta->map_ptr->map_type)) { 9861 err = get_constant_map_key(env, reg, key_size, &meta->const_map_key); 9862 if (err < 0) { 9863 meta->const_map_key = -1; 9864 if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP) 9865 err = 0; 9866 else 9867 return err; 9868 } 9869 } 9870 break; 9871 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 9872 if (type_may_be_null(arg_type) && register_is_null(reg)) 9873 return 0; 9874 9875 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: 9876 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity 9877 */ 9878 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 9879 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 9880 verifier_bug(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value"); 9881 return -EFAULT; 9882 } 9883 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 9884 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, meta->map_ptr->value_size, 9885 arg_type & MEM_WRITE ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ, 9886 false, meta); 9887 break; 9888 case ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: 9889 if (!reg->btf_id) { 9890 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno); 9891 return -EACCES; 9892 } 9893 meta->ret_btf = reg->btf; 9894 meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 9895 break; 9896 case ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK: 9897 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 9898 verbose(env, "can't spin_{lock,unlock} in rbtree cb\n"); 9899 return -EACCES; 9900 } 9901 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) { 9902 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK); 9903 if (err) 9904 return err; 9905 } else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 9906 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, 0); 9907 if (err) 9908 return err; 9909 } else { 9910 verifier_bug(env, "spin lock arg on unexpected helper"); 9911 return -EFAULT; 9912 } 9913 break; 9914 case ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER: 9915 err = process_timer_func(env, regno, meta); 9916 if (err) 9917 return err; 9918 break; 9919 case ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC: 9920 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 9921 break; 9922 case ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 9923 /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the 9924 * next is_mem_size argument below. 9925 */ 9926 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 9927 if (arg_type & MEM_FIXED_SIZE) { 9928 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, fn->arg_size[arg], 9929 arg_type & MEM_WRITE ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ, 9930 false, meta); 9931 if (err) 9932 return err; 9933 if (arg_type & MEM_ALIGNED) 9934 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, fn->arg_size[arg], true); 9935 } 9936 break; 9937 case ARG_CONST_SIZE: 9938 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, 9939 fn->arg_type[arg - 1] & MEM_WRITE ? 9940 BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ, 9941 false, meta); 9942 break; 9943 case ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 9944 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, 9945 fn->arg_type[arg - 1] & MEM_WRITE ? 9946 BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ, 9947 true, meta); 9948 break; 9949 case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 9950 err = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, arg_type, 0); 9951 if (err) 9952 return err; 9953 break; 9954 case ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 9955 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 9956 verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n", 9957 regno); 9958 return -EACCES; 9959 } 9960 meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; 9961 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 9962 if (err) 9963 return err; 9964 break; 9965 case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: 9966 { 9967 err = check_reg_const_str(env, reg, regno); 9968 if (err) 9969 return err; 9970 break; 9971 } 9972 case ARG_KPTR_XCHG_DEST: 9973 err = process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta); 9974 if (err) 9975 return err; 9976 break; 9977 } 9978 9979 return err; 9980 } 9981 9982 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) 9983 { 9984 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; 9985 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 9986 9987 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 9988 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem) 9989 return false; 9990 9991 /* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these 9992 * contexts, so updating is safe. 9993 */ 9994 switch (type) { 9995 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 9996 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER) 9997 return true; 9998 break; 9999 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 10000 /* map_update allowed only via dedicated helpers with event type checks */ 10001 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem) 10002 return true; 10003 break; 10004 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 10005 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 10006 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 10007 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 10008 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 10009 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 10010 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 10011 return true; 10012 default: 10013 break; 10014 } 10015 10016 verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n"); 10017 return false; 10018 } 10019 10020 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10021 { 10022 return env->prog->jit_requested && 10023 bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(); 10024 } 10025 10026 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10027 struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) 10028 { 10029 if (!map) 10030 return 0; 10031 10032 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ 10033 switch (map->map_type) { 10034 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: 10035 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 10036 goto error; 10037 break; 10038 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: 10039 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && 10040 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output && 10041 func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output && 10042 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value && 10043 func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output) 10044 goto error; 10045 break; 10046 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 10047 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output && 10048 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve && 10049 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query && 10050 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr && 10051 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr && 10052 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr) 10053 goto error; 10054 break; 10055 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 10056 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain) 10057 goto error; 10058 break; 10059 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: 10060 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) 10061 goto error; 10062 break; 10063 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: 10064 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && 10065 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) 10066 goto error; 10067 break; 10068 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE: 10069 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE: 10070 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage) 10071 goto error; 10072 break; 10073 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: 10074 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH: 10075 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 10076 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 10077 goto error; 10078 break; 10079 /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases 10080 * appear. 10081 */ 10082 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: 10083 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) 10084 goto error; 10085 break; 10086 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: 10087 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 10088 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 10089 goto error; 10090 break; 10091 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 10092 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 10093 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 10094 goto error; 10095 break; 10096 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 10097 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && 10098 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && 10099 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && 10100 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 10101 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 10102 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 10103 goto error; 10104 break; 10105 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 10106 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && 10107 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && 10108 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && 10109 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 10110 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 10111 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 10112 goto error; 10113 break; 10114 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: 10115 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) 10116 goto error; 10117 break; 10118 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: 10119 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: 10120 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 10121 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 10122 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 10123 goto error; 10124 break; 10125 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 10126 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get && 10127 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete && 10128 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 10129 goto error; 10130 break; 10131 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 10132 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get && 10133 func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete && 10134 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 10135 goto error; 10136 break; 10137 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 10138 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get && 10139 func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete && 10140 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 10141 goto error; 10142 break; 10143 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 10144 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get && 10145 func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete && 10146 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 10147 goto error; 10148 break; 10149 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 10150 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 10151 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 10152 goto error; 10153 break; 10154 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY: 10155 goto error; 10156 default: 10157 break; 10158 } 10159 10160 /* ... and second from the function itself. */ 10161 switch (func_id) { 10162 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 10163 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) 10164 goto error; 10165 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) { 10166 verbose(env, "mixing of tail_calls and bpf-to-bpf calls is not supported\n"); 10167 return -EINVAL; 10168 } 10169 break; 10170 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: 10171 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: 10172 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: 10173 case BPF_FUNC_skb_output: 10174 case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output: 10175 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) 10176 goto error; 10177 break; 10178 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output: 10179 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve: 10180 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query: 10181 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr: 10182 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr: 10183 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr: 10184 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF) 10185 goto error; 10186 break; 10187 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 10188 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF) 10189 goto error; 10190 break; 10191 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: 10192 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) 10193 goto error; 10194 break; 10195 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: 10196 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: 10197 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) 10198 goto error; 10199 break; 10200 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 10201 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP && 10202 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH && 10203 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP && 10204 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) 10205 goto error; 10206 break; 10207 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: 10208 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map: 10209 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: 10210 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) 10211 goto error; 10212 break; 10213 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash: 10214 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash: 10215 case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update: 10216 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 10217 goto error; 10218 break; 10219 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 10220 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE && 10221 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE) 10222 goto error; 10223 break; 10224 case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport: 10225 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY && 10226 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP && 10227 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 10228 goto error; 10229 break; 10230 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 10231 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 10232 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) 10233 goto error; 10234 break; 10235 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 10236 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 10237 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 10238 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK && 10239 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER) 10240 goto error; 10241 break; 10242 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 10243 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY && 10244 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && 10245 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH) 10246 goto error; 10247 break; 10248 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get: 10249 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete: 10250 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE) 10251 goto error; 10252 break; 10253 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get: 10254 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete: 10255 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) 10256 goto error; 10257 break; 10258 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get: 10259 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete: 10260 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE) 10261 goto error; 10262 break; 10263 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get: 10264 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete: 10265 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE) 10266 goto error; 10267 break; 10268 default: 10269 break; 10270 } 10271 10272 return 0; 10273 error: 10274 verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", 10275 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 10276 return -EINVAL; 10277 } 10278 10279 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 10280 { 10281 int count = 0; 10282 10283 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg1_type)) 10284 count++; 10285 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg2_type)) 10286 count++; 10287 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg3_type)) 10288 count++; 10289 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg4_type)) 10290 count++; 10291 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg5_type)) 10292 count++; 10293 10294 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, 10295 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have 10296 * right now. 10297 */ 10298 return count <= 1; 10299 } 10300 10301 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int arg) 10302 { 10303 bool is_fixed = fn->arg_type[arg] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE; 10304 bool has_size = fn->arg_size[arg] != 0; 10305 bool is_next_size = false; 10306 10307 if (arg + 1 < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type)) 10308 is_next_size = arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg_type[arg + 1]); 10309 10310 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[arg]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 10311 return is_next_size; 10312 10313 return has_size == is_next_size || is_next_size == is_fixed; 10314 } 10315 10316 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 10317 { 10318 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' 10319 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need 10320 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy 10321 * helper function specification. 10322 */ 10323 if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) || 10324 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 0) || 10325 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 1) || 10326 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 2) || 10327 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 3) || 10328 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 4)) 10329 return false; 10330 10331 return true; 10332 } 10333 10334 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 10335 { 10336 int i; 10337 10338 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) { 10339 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 10340 return !!fn->arg_btf_id[i]; 10341 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 10342 return fn->arg_btf_id[i] == BPF_PTR_POISON; 10343 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i] && 10344 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 10345 (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || 10346 !(fn->arg_type[i] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE))) 10347 return false; 10348 } 10349 10350 return true; 10351 } 10352 10353 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) 10354 { 10355 return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) && 10356 check_arg_pair_ok(fn) && 10357 check_btf_id_ok(fn) ? 0 : -EINVAL; 10358 } 10359 10360 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] 10361 * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. 10362 * 10363 * This also applies to dynptr slices belonging to skb and xdp dynptrs, 10364 * since these slices point to packet data. 10365 */ 10366 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10367 { 10368 struct bpf_func_state *state; 10369 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10370 10371 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 10372 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg) || reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(reg)) 10373 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 10374 })); 10375 } 10376 10377 enum { 10378 AT_PKT_END = -1, 10379 BEYOND_PKT_END = -2, 10380 }; 10381 10382 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open) 10383 { 10384 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 10385 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn]; 10386 10387 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET) 10388 /* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */ 10389 return; 10390 10391 /* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end. 10392 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown. 10393 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end 10394 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end 10395 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end 10396 */ 10397 if (range_open) 10398 reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END; 10399 else 10400 reg->range = AT_PKT_END; 10401 } 10402 10403 static int release_reference_nomark(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int ref_obj_id) 10404 { 10405 int i; 10406 10407 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 10408 if (state->refs[i].type != REF_TYPE_PTR) 10409 continue; 10410 if (state->refs[i].id == ref_obj_id) { 10411 release_reference_state(state, i); 10412 return 0; 10413 } 10414 } 10415 return -EINVAL; 10416 } 10417 10418 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel 10419 * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference. 10420 * 10421 * This is the release function corresponding to acquire_reference(). Idempotent. 10422 */ 10423 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id) 10424 { 10425 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 10426 struct bpf_func_state *state; 10427 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10428 int err; 10429 10430 err = release_reference_nomark(vstate, ref_obj_id); 10431 if (err) 10432 return err; 10433 10434 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 10435 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) 10436 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 10437 })); 10438 10439 return 0; 10440 } 10441 10442 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 10443 { 10444 struct bpf_func_state *unused; 10445 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10446 10447 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({ 10448 if (type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 10449 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 10450 })); 10451 } 10452 10453 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10454 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 10455 { 10456 int i; 10457 10458 /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ 10459 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 10460 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 10461 __check_reg_arg(env, regs, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 10462 } 10463 } 10464 10465 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10466 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10467 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10468 int insn_idx); 10469 10470 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10471 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10472 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx); 10473 10474 static int setup_func_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, int callsite, 10475 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb, 10476 struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 10477 { 10478 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 10479 int err; 10480 10481 if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 10482 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n", 10483 state->curframe + 2); 10484 return -E2BIG; 10485 } 10486 10487 if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { 10488 verifier_bug(env, "Frame %d already allocated", state->curframe + 1); 10489 return -EFAULT; 10490 } 10491 10492 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 10493 callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 10494 if (!callee) 10495 return -ENOMEM; 10496 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; 10497 10498 /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write 10499 * into its own stack before reading from it. 10500 * callee can read/write into caller's stack 10501 */ 10502 init_func_state(env, callee, 10503 /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ 10504 callsite, 10505 state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, 10506 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 10507 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, callsite); 10508 if (err) 10509 goto err_out; 10510 10511 /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ 10512 state->curframe++; 10513 10514 return 0; 10515 10516 err_out: 10517 free_func_state(callee); 10518 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; 10519 return err; 10520 } 10521 10522 static int btf_check_func_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, 10523 const struct btf *btf, 10524 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 10525 { 10526 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub = subprog_info(env, subprog); 10527 struct bpf_verifier_log *log = &env->log; 10528 u32 i; 10529 int ret; 10530 10531 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog); 10532 if (ret) 10533 return ret; 10534 10535 /* check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the 10536 * verifier sees. 10537 */ 10538 for (i = 0; i < sub->arg_cnt; i++) { 10539 u32 regno = i + 1; 10540 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 10541 struct bpf_subprog_arg_info *arg = &sub->args[i]; 10542 10543 if (arg->arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 10544 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 10545 bpf_log(log, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno); 10546 return -EINVAL; 10547 } 10548 } else if (arg->arg_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) { 10549 /* 10550 * Anything is allowed for untrusted arguments, as these are 10551 * read-only and probe read instructions would protect against 10552 * invalid memory access. 10553 */ 10554 } else if (arg->arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 10555 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, ARG_DONTCARE); 10556 if (ret < 0) 10557 return ret; 10558 /* If function expects ctx type in BTF check that caller 10559 * is passing PTR_TO_CTX. 10560 */ 10561 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 10562 bpf_log(log, "arg#%d expects pointer to ctx\n", i); 10563 return -EINVAL; 10564 } 10565 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) { 10566 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, ARG_DONTCARE); 10567 if (ret < 0) 10568 return ret; 10569 if (check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, arg->mem_size)) 10570 return -EINVAL; 10571 if (!(arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && (reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL)) { 10572 bpf_log(log, "arg#%d is expected to be non-NULL\n", i); 10573 return -EINVAL; 10574 } 10575 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_ARENA) { 10576 /* 10577 * Can pass any value and the kernel won't crash, but 10578 * only PTR_TO_ARENA or SCALAR make sense. Everything 10579 * else is a bug in the bpf program. Point it out to 10580 * the user at the verification time instead of 10581 * run-time debug nightmare. 10582 */ 10583 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_ARENA && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 10584 bpf_log(log, "R%d is not a pointer to arena or scalar.\n", regno); 10585 return -EINVAL; 10586 } 10587 } else if (arg->arg_type == (ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY)) { 10588 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR); 10589 if (ret) 10590 return ret; 10591 10592 ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, -1, arg->arg_type, 0); 10593 if (ret) 10594 return ret; 10595 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 10596 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 10597 int err; 10598 10599 if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg->arg_type)) 10600 continue; 10601 10602 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); /* leave func_id as zero */ 10603 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg->arg_type, &arg->btf_id, &meta); 10604 err = err ?: check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg->arg_type); 10605 if (err) 10606 return err; 10607 } else { 10608 verifier_bug(env, "unrecognized arg#%d type %d", i, arg->arg_type); 10609 return -EFAULT; 10610 } 10611 } 10612 10613 return 0; 10614 } 10615 10616 /* Compare BTF of a function call with given bpf_reg_state. 10617 * Returns: 10618 * EFAULT - there is a verifier bug. Abort verification. 10619 * EINVAL - there is a type mismatch or BTF is not available. 10620 * 0 - BTF matches with what bpf_reg_state expects. 10621 * Only PTR_TO_CTX and SCALAR_VALUE states are recognized. 10622 */ 10623 static int btf_check_subprog_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, 10624 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 10625 { 10626 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 10627 struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf; 10628 u32 btf_id; 10629 int err; 10630 10631 if (!prog->aux->func_info) 10632 return -EINVAL; 10633 10634 btf_id = prog->aux->func_info[subprog].type_id; 10635 if (!btf_id) 10636 return -EFAULT; 10637 10638 if (prog->aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable) 10639 return -EINVAL; 10640 10641 err = btf_check_func_arg_match(env, subprog, btf, regs); 10642 /* Compiler optimizations can remove arguments from static functions 10643 * or mismatched type can be passed into a global function. 10644 * In such cases mark the function as unreliable from BTF point of view. 10645 */ 10646 if (err) 10647 prog->aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable = true; 10648 return err; 10649 } 10650 10651 static int push_callback_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 10652 int insn_idx, int subprog, 10653 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) 10654 { 10655 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *callback_state; 10656 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 10657 int err; 10658 10659 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 10660 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); 10661 if (err == -EFAULT) 10662 return err; 10663 10664 /* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are 10665 * interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as 10666 * callbacks 10667 */ 10668 env->subprog_info[subprog].is_cb = true; 10669 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && 10670 !is_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)) { 10671 verifier_bug(env, "kfunc %s#%d not marked as callback-calling", 10672 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 10673 return -EFAULT; 10674 } else if (!bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && 10675 !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { /* helper */ 10676 verifier_bug(env, "helper %s#%d not marked as callback-calling", 10677 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 10678 return -EFAULT; 10679 } 10680 10681 if (is_async_callback_calling_insn(insn)) { 10682 struct bpf_verifier_state *async_cb; 10683 10684 /* there is no real recursion here. timer and workqueue callbacks are async */ 10685 env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true; 10686 async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, 10687 insn_idx, subprog, 10688 is_async_cb_sleepable(env, insn)); 10689 if (IS_ERR(async_cb)) 10690 return PTR_ERR(async_cb); 10691 callee = async_cb->frame[0]; 10692 callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1; 10693 10694 /* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */ 10695 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, insn_idx); 10696 if (err) 10697 return err; 10698 10699 return 0; 10700 } 10701 10702 /* for callback functions enqueue entry to callback and 10703 * proceed with next instruction within current frame. 10704 */ 10705 callback_state = push_stack(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, insn_idx, false); 10706 if (IS_ERR(callback_state)) 10707 return PTR_ERR(callback_state); 10708 10709 err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, insn_idx, set_callee_state_cb, 10710 callback_state); 10711 if (err) 10712 return err; 10713 10714 callback_state->callback_unroll_depth++; 10715 callback_state->frame[callback_state->curframe - 1]->callback_depth++; 10716 caller->callback_depth = 0; 10717 return 0; 10718 } 10719 10720 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 10721 int *insn_idx) 10722 { 10723 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 10724 struct bpf_func_state *caller; 10725 int err, subprog, target_insn; 10726 10727 target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; 10728 subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); 10729 if (verifier_bug_if(subprog < 0, env, "target of func call at insn %d is not a program", 10730 target_insn)) 10731 return -EFAULT; 10732 10733 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 10734 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); 10735 if (err == -EFAULT) 10736 return err; 10737 if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) { 10738 const char *sub_name = subprog_name(env, subprog); 10739 10740 if (env->cur_state->active_locks) { 10741 verbose(env, "global function calls are not allowed while holding a lock,\n" 10742 "use static function instead\n"); 10743 return -EINVAL; 10744 } 10745 10746 if (env->subprog_info[subprog].might_sleep && 10747 (env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks || env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks || 10748 env->cur_state->active_irq_id || !in_sleepable(env))) { 10749 verbose(env, "global functions that may sleep are not allowed in non-sleepable context,\n" 10750 "i.e., in a RCU/IRQ/preempt-disabled section, or in\n" 10751 "a non-sleepable BPF program context\n"); 10752 return -EINVAL; 10753 } 10754 10755 if (err) { 10756 verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d ('%s')\n", 10757 subprog, sub_name); 10758 return err; 10759 } 10760 10761 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 10762 verbose(env, "Func#%d ('%s') is global and assumed valid.\n", 10763 subprog, sub_name); 10764 if (env->subprog_info[subprog].changes_pkt_data) 10765 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 10766 /* mark global subprog for verifying after main prog */ 10767 subprog_aux(env, subprog)->called = true; 10768 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 10769 10770 /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ 10771 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 10772 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 10773 10774 /* continue with next insn after call */ 10775 return 0; 10776 } 10777 10778 /* for regular function entry setup new frame and continue 10779 * from that frame. 10780 */ 10781 err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, *insn_idx, set_callee_state, state); 10782 if (err) 10783 return err; 10784 10785 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 10786 10787 /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ 10788 *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1; 10789 10790 bpf_reset_live_stack_callchain(env); 10791 10792 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 10793 verbose(env, "caller:\n"); 10794 print_verifier_state(env, state, caller->frameno, true); 10795 verbose(env, "callee:\n"); 10796 print_verifier_state(env, state, state->curframe, true); 10797 } 10798 10799 return 0; 10800 } 10801 10802 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10803 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10804 struct bpf_func_state *callee) 10805 { 10806 /* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, 10807 * void *callback_ctx, u64 flags); 10808 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 10809 * void *callback_ctx); 10810 */ 10811 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 10812 10813 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 10814 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 10815 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 10816 10817 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 10818 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 10819 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 10820 10821 /* pointer to stack or null */ 10822 callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 10823 10824 /* unused */ 10825 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 10826 return 0; 10827 } 10828 10829 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10830 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10831 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx) 10832 { 10833 int i; 10834 10835 /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent 10836 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain 10837 */ 10838 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 10839 callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; 10840 return 0; 10841 } 10842 10843 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10844 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10845 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10846 int insn_idx) 10847 { 10848 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 10849 struct bpf_map *map; 10850 int err; 10851 10852 /* valid map_ptr and poison value does not matter */ 10853 map = insn_aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr; 10854 if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args || 10855 !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) { 10856 verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n"); 10857 return -ENOTSUPP; 10858 } 10859 10860 err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee); 10861 if (err) 10862 return err; 10863 10864 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 10865 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1); 10866 return 0; 10867 } 10868 10869 static int set_loop_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10870 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10871 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10872 int insn_idx) 10873 { 10874 /* bpf_loop(u32 nr_loops, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, 10875 * u64 flags); 10876 * callback_fn(u64 index, void *callback_ctx); 10877 */ 10878 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 10879 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 10880 10881 /* unused */ 10882 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 10883 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 10884 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 10885 10886 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 10887 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1); 10888 return 0; 10889 } 10890 10891 static int set_timer_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10892 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10893 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10894 int insn_idx) 10895 { 10896 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 10897 10898 /* bpf_timer_set_callback(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn); 10899 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value); 10900 */ 10901 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 10902 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 10903 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr; 10904 10905 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 10906 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 10907 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr; 10908 10909 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 10910 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 10911 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr; 10912 10913 /* unused */ 10914 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 10915 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 10916 callee->in_async_callback_fn = true; 10917 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 0); 10918 return 0; 10919 } 10920 10921 static int set_find_vma_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10922 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10923 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10924 int insn_idx) 10925 { 10926 /* bpf_find_vma(struct task_struct *task, u64 addr, 10927 * void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags) 10928 * (callback_fn)(struct task_struct *task, 10929 * struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *callback_ctx); 10930 */ 10931 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 10932 10933 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 10934 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 10935 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf = btf_vmlinux; 10936 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_VMA]; 10937 10938 /* pointer to stack or null */ 10939 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_4]; 10940 10941 /* unused */ 10942 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 10943 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 10944 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 10945 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1); 10946 return 0; 10947 } 10948 10949 static int set_user_ringbuf_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10950 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10951 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10952 int insn_idx) 10953 { 10954 /* bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void 10955 * callback_ctx, u64 flags); 10956 * callback_fn(const struct bpf_dynptr_t* dynptr, void *callback_ctx); 10957 */ 10958 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 10959 mark_dynptr_cb_reg(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1], BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL); 10960 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 10961 10962 /* unused */ 10963 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 10964 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 10965 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 10966 10967 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 10968 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1); 10969 return 0; 10970 } 10971 10972 static int set_rbtree_add_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10973 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 10974 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 10975 int insn_idx) 10976 { 10977 /* void bpf_rbtree_add_impl(struct bpf_rb_root *root, struct bpf_rb_node *node, 10978 * bool (less)(struct bpf_rb_node *a, const struct bpf_rb_node *b)); 10979 * 10980 * 'struct bpf_rb_node *node' arg to bpf_rbtree_add_impl is the same PTR_TO_BTF_ID w/ offset 10981 * that 'less' callback args will be receiving. However, 'node' arg was release_reference'd 10982 * by this point, so look at 'root' 10983 */ 10984 struct btf_field *field; 10985 10986 field = reg_find_field_offset(&caller->regs[BPF_REG_1], caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].off, 10987 BPF_RB_ROOT); 10988 if (!field || !field->graph_root.value_btf_id) 10989 return -EFAULT; 10990 10991 mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_1, &field->graph_root); 10992 ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 10993 mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_2, &field->graph_root); 10994 ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 10995 10996 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 10997 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 10998 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 10999 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 11000 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1); 11001 return 0; 11002 } 11003 11004 static int set_task_work_schedule_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11005 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 11006 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 11007 int insn_idx) 11008 { 11009 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr; 11010 11011 /* 11012 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value); 11013 */ 11014 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 11015 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 11016 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr; 11017 11018 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 11019 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 11020 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr; 11021 11022 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 11023 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 11024 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr; 11025 11026 /* unused */ 11027 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 11028 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 11029 callee->in_async_callback_fn = true; 11030 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(S32_MIN, S32_MAX); 11031 return 0; 11032 } 11033 11034 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id); 11035 11036 /* Are we currently verifying the callback for a rbtree helper that must 11037 * be called with lock held? If so, no need to complain about unreleased 11038 * lock 11039 */ 11040 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11041 { 11042 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 11043 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 11044 struct bpf_func_state *callee; 11045 int kfunc_btf_id; 11046 11047 if (!state->curframe) 11048 return false; 11049 11050 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 11051 11052 if (!callee->in_callback_fn) 11053 return false; 11054 11055 kfunc_btf_id = insn[callee->callsite].imm; 11056 return is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 11057 } 11058 11059 static bool retval_range_within(struct bpf_retval_range range, const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 11060 bool return_32bit) 11061 { 11062 if (return_32bit) 11063 return range.minval <= reg->s32_min_value && reg->s32_max_value <= range.maxval; 11064 else 11065 return range.minval <= reg->smin_value && reg->smax_value <= range.maxval; 11066 } 11067 11068 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) 11069 { 11070 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *prev_st; 11071 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 11072 struct bpf_reg_state *r0; 11073 bool in_callback_fn; 11074 int err; 11075 11076 err = bpf_update_live_stack(env); 11077 if (err) 11078 return err; 11079 11080 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 11081 r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]; 11082 if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 11083 /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer 11084 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller, 11085 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack 11086 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits, 11087 * but let's be conservative 11088 */ 11089 verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n"); 11090 return -EINVAL; 11091 } 11092 11093 caller = state->frame[state->curframe - 1]; 11094 if (callee->in_callback_fn) { 11095 if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 11096 verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n"); 11097 return -EACCES; 11098 } 11099 11100 /* we are going to rely on register's precise value */ 11101 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_0); 11102 if (err) 11103 return err; 11104 11105 /* enforce R0 return value range, and bpf_callback_t returns 64bit */ 11106 if (!retval_range_within(callee->callback_ret_range, r0, false)) { 11107 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, callee->callback_ret_range, 11108 "At callback return", "R0"); 11109 return -EINVAL; 11110 } 11111 if (!bpf_calls_callback(env, callee->callsite)) { 11112 verifier_bug(env, "in callback at %d, callsite %d !calls_callback", 11113 *insn_idx, callee->callsite); 11114 return -EFAULT; 11115 } 11116 } else { 11117 /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ 11118 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; 11119 } 11120 11121 /* for callbacks like bpf_loop or bpf_for_each_map_elem go back to callsite, 11122 * there function call logic would reschedule callback visit. If iteration 11123 * converges is_state_visited() would prune that visit eventually. 11124 */ 11125 in_callback_fn = callee->in_callback_fn; 11126 if (in_callback_fn) 11127 *insn_idx = callee->callsite; 11128 else 11129 *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; 11130 11131 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 11132 verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); 11133 print_verifier_state(env, state, callee->frameno, true); 11134 verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); 11135 print_verifier_state(env, state, caller->frameno, true); 11136 } 11137 /* clear everything in the callee. In case of exceptional exits using 11138 * bpf_throw, this will be done by copy_verifier_state for extra frames. */ 11139 free_func_state(callee); 11140 state->frame[state->curframe--] = NULL; 11141 11142 /* for callbacks widen imprecise scalars to make programs like below verify: 11143 * 11144 * struct ctx { int i; } 11145 * void cb(int idx, struct ctx *ctx) { ctx->i++; ... } 11146 * ... 11147 * struct ctx = { .i = 0; } 11148 * bpf_loop(100, cb, &ctx, 0); 11149 * 11150 * This is similar to what is done in process_iter_next_call() for open 11151 * coded iterators. 11152 */ 11153 prev_st = in_callback_fn ? find_prev_entry(env, state, *insn_idx) : NULL; 11154 if (prev_st) { 11155 err = widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, state); 11156 if (err) 11157 return err; 11158 } 11159 return 0; 11160 } 11161 11162 static int do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11163 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, 11164 int func_id, 11165 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 11166 { 11167 struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; 11168 11169 if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER) 11170 return 0; 11171 11172 switch (func_id) { 11173 case BPF_FUNC_get_stack: 11174 case BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack: 11175 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str: 11176 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str: 11177 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str: 11178 ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; 11179 ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value; 11180 ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 11181 ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 11182 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg); 11183 break; 11184 case BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id: 11185 ret_reg->umax_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 11186 ret_reg->u32_max_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 11187 ret_reg->smax_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 11188 ret_reg->s32_max_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1; 11189 ret_reg->umin_value = 0; 11190 ret_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 11191 ret_reg->smin_value = 0; 11192 ret_reg->s32_min_value = 0; 11193 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg); 11194 break; 11195 } 11196 11197 return reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, ret_reg, "retval"); 11198 } 11199 11200 static int 11201 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 11202 int func_id, int insn_idx) 11203 { 11204 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 11205 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 11206 11207 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 11208 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 11209 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 11210 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 11211 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem && 11212 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 11213 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 11214 func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem && 11215 func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 11216 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem) 11217 return 0; 11218 11219 if (map == NULL) { 11220 verifier_bug(env, "expected map for helper call"); 11221 return -EFAULT; 11222 } 11223 11224 /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions 11225 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the 11226 * state of the map from program side. 11227 */ 11228 if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 11229 (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 11230 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 11231 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 11232 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) { 11233 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n"); 11234 return -EACCES; 11235 } 11236 11237 if (!aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr) 11238 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, 11239 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1, false); 11240 else if (aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr != meta->map_ptr) 11241 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, 11242 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1, true); 11243 return 0; 11244 } 11245 11246 static int 11247 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 11248 int func_id, int insn_idx) 11249 { 11250 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 11251 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg; 11252 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 11253 u64 val, max; 11254 int err; 11255 11256 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 11257 return 0; 11258 if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { 11259 verbose(env, "expected prog array map for tail call"); 11260 return -EINVAL; 11261 } 11262 11263 reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 11264 val = reg->var_off.value; 11265 max = map->max_entries; 11266 11267 if (!(is_reg_const(reg, false) && val < max)) { 11268 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 11269 return 0; 11270 } 11271 11272 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); 11273 if (err) 11274 return err; 11275 if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) 11276 bpf_map_key_store(aux, val); 11277 else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 11278 bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val) 11279 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 11280 return 0; 11281 } 11282 11283 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool exception_exit) 11284 { 11285 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 11286 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 11287 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, BPF_REG_0); 11288 bool refs_lingering = false; 11289 int i; 11290 11291 if (!exception_exit && cur_func(env)->frameno) 11292 return 0; 11293 11294 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 11295 if (state->refs[i].type != REF_TYPE_PTR) 11296 continue; 11297 /* Allow struct_ops programs to return a referenced kptr back to 11298 * kernel. Type checks are performed later in check_return_code. 11299 */ 11300 if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS && !exception_exit && 11301 reg->ref_obj_id == state->refs[i].id) 11302 continue; 11303 verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n", 11304 state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx); 11305 refs_lingering = true; 11306 } 11307 return refs_lingering ? -EINVAL : 0; 11308 } 11309 11310 static int check_resource_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool exception_exit, bool check_lock, const char *prefix) 11311 { 11312 int err; 11313 11314 if (check_lock && env->cur_state->active_locks) { 11315 verbose(env, "%s cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n", prefix); 11316 return -EINVAL; 11317 } 11318 11319 err = check_reference_leak(env, exception_exit); 11320 if (err) { 11321 verbose(env, "%s would lead to reference leak\n", prefix); 11322 return err; 11323 } 11324 11325 if (check_lock && env->cur_state->active_irq_id) { 11326 verbose(env, "%s cannot be used inside bpf_local_irq_save-ed region\n", prefix); 11327 return -EINVAL; 11328 } 11329 11330 if (check_lock && env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks) { 11331 verbose(env, "%s cannot be used inside bpf_rcu_read_lock-ed region\n", prefix); 11332 return -EINVAL; 11333 } 11334 11335 if (check_lock && env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks) { 11336 verbose(env, "%s cannot be used inside bpf_preempt_disable-ed region\n", prefix); 11337 return -EINVAL; 11338 } 11339 11340 return 0; 11341 } 11342 11343 static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11344 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 11345 { 11346 struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 11347 struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_5]; 11348 struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr; 11349 struct bpf_bprintf_data data = {}; 11350 int err, fmt_map_off, num_args; 11351 u64 fmt_addr; 11352 char *fmt; 11353 11354 /* data must be an array of u64 */ 11355 if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8) 11356 return -EINVAL; 11357 num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8; 11358 11359 /* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const 11360 * and map_direct_value_addr is set. 11361 */ 11362 fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value; 11363 err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr, 11364 fmt_map_off); 11365 if (err) { 11366 verbose(env, "failed to retrieve map value address\n"); 11367 return -EFAULT; 11368 } 11369 fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off; 11370 11371 /* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we 11372 * can focus on validating the format specifiers. 11373 */ 11374 err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, num_args, &data); 11375 if (err < 0) 11376 verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n"); 11377 11378 return err; 11379 } 11380 11381 static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11382 { 11383 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 11384 int func_id = BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip; 11385 11386 if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 11387 if (!bpf_prog_has_trampoline(env->prog)) { 11388 verbose(env, "func %s#%d supported only for fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs\n", 11389 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11390 return -ENOTSUPP; 11391 } 11392 return 0; 11393 } else if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) { 11394 return 0; 11395 } 11396 11397 verbose(env, "func %s#%d not supported for program type %d\n", 11398 func_id_name(func_id), func_id, type); 11399 return -ENOTSUPP; 11400 } 11401 11402 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11403 { 11404 return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; 11405 } 11406 11407 static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11408 { 11409 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 11410 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_4]; 11411 bool reg_is_null = register_is_null(reg); 11412 11413 if (reg_is_null) 11414 mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4); 11415 11416 return reg_is_null; 11417 } 11418 11419 static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno) 11420 { 11421 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *state = &cur_aux(env)->loop_inline_state; 11422 11423 if (!state->initialized) { 11424 state->initialized = 1; 11425 state->fit_for_inline = loop_flag_is_zero(env); 11426 state->callback_subprogno = subprogno; 11427 return; 11428 } 11429 11430 if (!state->fit_for_inline) 11431 return; 11432 11433 state->fit_for_inline = (loop_flag_is_zero(env) && 11434 state->callback_subprogno == subprogno); 11435 } 11436 11437 /* Returns whether or not the given map type can potentially elide 11438 * lookup return value nullness check. This is possible if the key 11439 * is statically known. 11440 */ 11441 static bool can_elide_value_nullness(enum bpf_map_type type) 11442 { 11443 switch (type) { 11444 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: 11445 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY: 11446 return true; 11447 default: 11448 return false; 11449 } 11450 } 11451 11452 static int get_helper_proto(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, 11453 const struct bpf_func_proto **ptr) 11454 { 11455 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) 11456 return -ERANGE; 11457 11458 if (!env->ops->get_func_proto) 11459 return -EINVAL; 11460 11461 *ptr = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog); 11462 return *ptr && (*ptr)->func ? 0 : -EINVAL; 11463 } 11464 11465 /* Check if we're in a sleepable context. */ 11466 static inline bool in_sleepable_context(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 11467 { 11468 return !env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks && 11469 !env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks && 11470 !env->cur_state->active_irq_id && 11471 in_sleepable(env); 11472 } 11473 11474 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 11475 int *insn_idx_p) 11476 { 11477 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 11478 bool returns_cpu_specific_alloc_ptr = false; 11479 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; 11480 enum bpf_return_type ret_type; 11481 enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag; 11482 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 11483 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 11484 int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 11485 bool changes_data; 11486 int i, err, func_id; 11487 11488 /* find function prototype */ 11489 func_id = insn->imm; 11490 err = get_helper_proto(env, insn->imm, &fn); 11491 if (err == -ERANGE) { 11492 verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11493 return -EINVAL; 11494 } 11495 11496 if (err) { 11497 verbose(env, "program of this type cannot use helper %s#%d\n", 11498 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11499 return err; 11500 } 11501 11502 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ 11503 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { 11504 verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 11505 return -EINVAL; 11506 } 11507 11508 if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) { 11509 verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n"); 11510 return -EINVAL; 11511 } 11512 11513 if (!in_sleepable(env) && fn->might_sleep) { 11514 verbose(env, "helper call might sleep in a non-sleepable prog\n"); 11515 return -EINVAL; 11516 } 11517 11518 /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ 11519 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(func_id); 11520 if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 11521 verifier_bug(env, "func %s#%d: r1 != ctx", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11522 return -EFAULT; 11523 } 11524 11525 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 11526 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; 11527 11528 err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id); 11529 if (err) { 11530 verifier_bug(env, "incorrect func proto %s#%d", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11531 return err; 11532 } 11533 11534 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks) { 11535 if (fn->might_sleep) { 11536 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in rcu_read_lock region\n", 11537 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11538 return -EINVAL; 11539 } 11540 } 11541 11542 if (env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks) { 11543 if (fn->might_sleep) { 11544 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in non-preemptible region\n", 11545 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11546 return -EINVAL; 11547 } 11548 } 11549 11550 if (env->cur_state->active_irq_id) { 11551 if (fn->might_sleep) { 11552 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in IRQ-disabled region\n", 11553 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11554 return -EINVAL; 11555 } 11556 } 11557 11558 /* Track non-sleepable context for helpers. */ 11559 if (!in_sleepable_context(env)) 11560 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].non_sleepable = true; 11561 11562 meta.func_id = func_id; 11563 /* check args */ 11564 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { 11565 err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn, insn_idx); 11566 if (err) 11567 return err; 11568 } 11569 11570 err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 11571 if (err) 11572 return err; 11573 11574 err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 11575 if (err) 11576 return err; 11577 11578 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset 11579 * is inferred from register state. 11580 */ 11581 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { 11582 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, 11583 BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 11584 if (err) 11585 return err; 11586 } 11587 11588 regs = cur_regs(env); 11589 11590 if (meta.release_regno) { 11591 err = -EINVAL; 11592 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1])) { 11593 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.release_regno]); 11594 } else if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && meta.ref_obj_id) { 11595 u32 ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 11596 bool in_rcu = in_rcu_cs(env); 11597 struct bpf_func_state *state; 11598 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11599 11600 err = release_reference_nomark(env->cur_state, ref_obj_id); 11601 if (!err) { 11602 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 11603 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) { 11604 if (in_rcu && (reg->type & MEM_ALLOC) && (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU)) { 11605 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 11606 reg->type &= ~MEM_ALLOC; 11607 reg->type |= MEM_RCU; 11608 } else { 11609 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg); 11610 } 11611 } 11612 })); 11613 } 11614 } else if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 11615 err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id); 11616 } else if (register_is_null(®s[meta.release_regno])) { 11617 /* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be 11618 * released is NULL, which must be > R0. 11619 */ 11620 err = 0; 11621 } 11622 if (err) { 11623 verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 11624 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11625 return err; 11626 } 11627 } 11628 11629 switch (func_id) { 11630 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 11631 err = check_resource_leak(env, false, true, "tail_call"); 11632 if (err) 11633 return err; 11634 break; 11635 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 11636 /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0, 11637 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error. 11638 */ 11639 if (!register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) { 11640 verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n"); 11641 return -EINVAL; 11642 } 11643 break; 11644 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 11645 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 11646 set_map_elem_callback_state); 11647 break; 11648 case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback: 11649 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 11650 set_timer_callback_state); 11651 break; 11652 case BPF_FUNC_find_vma: 11653 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 11654 set_find_vma_callback_state); 11655 break; 11656 case BPF_FUNC_snprintf: 11657 err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs); 11658 break; 11659 case BPF_FUNC_loop: 11660 update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno); 11661 /* Verifier relies on R1 value to determine if bpf_loop() iteration 11662 * is finished, thus mark it precise. 11663 */ 11664 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_1); 11665 if (err) 11666 return err; 11667 if (cur_func(env)->callback_depth < regs[BPF_REG_1].umax_value) { 11668 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 11669 set_loop_callback_state); 11670 } else { 11671 cur_func(env)->callback_depth = 0; 11672 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 11673 verbose(env, "frame%d bpf_loop iteration limit reached\n", 11674 env->cur_state->curframe); 11675 } 11676 break; 11677 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem: 11678 if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 11679 verbose(env, "Unsupported reg type %s for bpf_dynptr_from_mem data\n", 11680 reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type)); 11681 return -EACCES; 11682 } 11683 break; 11684 case BPF_FUNC_set_retval: 11685 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 11686 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 11687 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 11688 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 11689 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 11690 */ 11691 verbose(env, "BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 11692 return -EINVAL; 11693 } 11694 } 11695 break; 11696 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data: 11697 { 11698 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11699 int id, ref_obj_id; 11700 11701 reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs); 11702 if (!reg) 11703 return -EFAULT; 11704 11705 11706 if (meta.dynptr_id) { 11707 verifier_bug(env, "meta.dynptr_id already set"); 11708 return -EFAULT; 11709 } 11710 if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 11711 verifier_bug(env, "meta.ref_obj_id already set"); 11712 return -EFAULT; 11713 } 11714 11715 id = dynptr_id(env, reg); 11716 if (id < 0) { 11717 verifier_bug(env, "failed to obtain dynptr id"); 11718 return id; 11719 } 11720 11721 ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); 11722 if (ref_obj_id < 0) { 11723 verifier_bug(env, "failed to obtain dynptr ref_obj_id"); 11724 return ref_obj_id; 11725 } 11726 11727 meta.dynptr_id = id; 11728 meta.ref_obj_id = ref_obj_id; 11729 11730 break; 11731 } 11732 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_write: 11733 { 11734 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 11735 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11736 11737 reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs); 11738 if (!reg) 11739 return -EFAULT; 11740 11741 dynptr_type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg); 11742 if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 11743 return -EFAULT; 11744 11745 if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB || 11746 dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META) 11747 /* this will trigger clear_all_pkt_pointers(), which will 11748 * invalidate all dynptr slices associated with the skb 11749 */ 11750 changes_data = true; 11751 11752 break; 11753 } 11754 case BPF_FUNC_per_cpu_ptr: 11755 case BPF_FUNC_this_cpu_ptr: 11756 { 11757 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_1]; 11758 const struct btf_type *type; 11759 11760 if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { 11761 type = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 11762 if (!type || !btf_type_is_struct(type)) { 11763 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf/btf_id in R1\n"); 11764 return -EFAULT; 11765 } 11766 returns_cpu_specific_alloc_ptr = true; 11767 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].call_with_percpu_alloc_ptr = true; 11768 } 11769 break; 11770 } 11771 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 11772 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 11773 set_user_ringbuf_callback_state); 11774 break; 11775 } 11776 11777 if (err) 11778 return err; 11779 11780 /* reset caller saved regs */ 11781 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 11782 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 11783 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 11784 } 11785 11786 /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */ 11787 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 11788 11789 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ 11790 ret_type = fn->ret_type; 11791 ret_flag = type_flag(ret_type); 11792 11793 switch (base_type(ret_type)) { 11794 case RET_INTEGER: 11795 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ 11796 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11797 break; 11798 case RET_VOID: 11799 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; 11800 break; 11801 case RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 11802 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ 11803 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11804 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() 11805 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access 11806 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() 11807 */ 11808 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { 11809 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected null map_ptr"); 11810 return -EFAULT; 11811 } 11812 11813 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 11814 can_elide_value_nullness(meta.map_ptr->map_type) && 11815 meta.const_map_key >= 0 && 11816 meta.const_map_key < meta.map_ptr->max_entries) 11817 ret_flag &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 11818 11819 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; 11820 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map_uid; 11821 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag; 11822 if (!type_may_be_null(ret_flag) && 11823 btf_record_has_field(meta.map_ptr->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK | BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK)) { 11824 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 11825 } 11826 break; 11827 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET: 11828 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11829 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET | ret_flag; 11830 break; 11831 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 11832 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11833 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | ret_flag; 11834 break; 11835 case RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 11836 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11837 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | ret_flag; 11838 break; 11839 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM: 11840 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11841 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 11842 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size; 11843 break; 11844 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID: 11845 { 11846 const struct btf_type *t; 11847 11848 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11849 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL); 11850 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 11851 u32 tsize; 11852 const struct btf_type *ret; 11853 const char *tname; 11854 11855 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 11856 ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize); 11857 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 11858 tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off); 11859 verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 11860 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 11861 return -EINVAL; 11862 } 11863 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 11864 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize; 11865 } else { 11866 if (returns_cpu_specific_alloc_ptr) { 11867 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | MEM_RCU; 11868 } else { 11869 /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it 11870 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise 11871 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in 11872 * check_mem_access(). 11873 */ 11874 ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 11875 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 11876 } 11877 11878 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf; 11879 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 11880 } 11881 break; 11882 } 11883 case RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 11884 { 11885 struct btf *ret_btf; 11886 int ret_btf_id; 11887 11888 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11889 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 11890 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 11891 ret_btf = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf; 11892 ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf_id; 11893 if (!btf_is_kernel(ret_btf)) { 11894 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_ALLOC; 11895 if (meta.kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU) 11896 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_PERCPU; 11897 } 11898 } else { 11899 if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 11900 verifier_bug(env, "func %s has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON return type", 11901 func_id_name(func_id)); 11902 return -EFAULT; 11903 } 11904 ret_btf = btf_vmlinux; 11905 ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id; 11906 } 11907 if (ret_btf_id == 0) { 11908 verbose(env, "invalid return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 11909 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), 11910 func_id); 11911 return -EINVAL; 11912 } 11913 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 11914 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 11915 break; 11916 } 11917 default: 11918 verbose(env, "unknown return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 11919 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11920 return -EINVAL; 11921 } 11922 11923 if (type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type)) 11924 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 11925 11926 if (helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 11927 verifier_bug(env, "func %s#%d sets ref_obj_id more than once", 11928 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11929 return -EFAULT; 11930 } 11931 11932 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 11933 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta.dynptr_id; 11934 11935 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id) || is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) { 11936 /* For release_reference() */ 11937 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 11938 } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 11939 int id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx); 11940 11941 if (id < 0) 11942 return id; 11943 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */ 11944 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 11945 /* For release_reference() */ 11946 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 11947 } 11948 11949 err = do_refine_retval_range(env, regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); 11950 if (err) 11951 return err; 11952 11953 err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); 11954 if (err) 11955 return err; 11956 11957 if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack || 11958 func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) && 11959 !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) { 11960 const char *err_str; 11961 11962 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 11963 err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); 11964 err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n"; 11965 #else 11966 err = -ENOTSUPP; 11967 err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n"; 11968 #endif 11969 if (err) { 11970 verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 11971 return err; 11972 } 11973 11974 env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true; 11975 } 11976 11977 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack) 11978 env->prog->call_get_stack = true; 11979 11980 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 11981 if (check_get_func_ip(env)) 11982 return -ENOTSUPP; 11983 env->prog->call_get_func_ip = true; 11984 } 11985 11986 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 11987 if (env->cur_state->curframe) { 11988 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 11989 11990 mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0); 11991 branch = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, false); 11992 if (IS_ERR(branch)) 11993 return PTR_ERR(branch); 11994 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 11995 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 11996 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); 11997 if (err) 11998 return err; 11999 env->insn_idx--; 12000 } else { 12001 changes_data = false; 12002 } 12003 } 12004 12005 if (changes_data) 12006 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 12007 return 0; 12008 } 12009 12010 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by 12011 * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument. 12012 */ 12013 static void __mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 12014 u32 regno, size_t reg_size) 12015 { 12016 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 12017 12018 if (regno == BPF_REG_0) { 12019 /* Function return value */ 12020 reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ? 12021 DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 12022 } else if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) { 12023 /* Function argument */ 12024 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 12025 } 12026 } 12027 12028 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 12029 size_t reg_size) 12030 { 12031 return __mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, cur_regs(env), regno, reg_size); 12032 } 12033 12034 static bool is_kfunc_acquire(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12035 { 12036 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ACQUIRE; 12037 } 12038 12039 static bool is_kfunc_release(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12040 { 12041 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RELEASE; 12042 } 12043 12044 static bool is_kfunc_trusted_args(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12045 { 12046 return (meta->kfunc_flags & KF_TRUSTED_ARGS) || is_kfunc_release(meta); 12047 } 12048 12049 static bool is_kfunc_sleepable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12050 { 12051 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_SLEEPABLE; 12052 } 12053 12054 static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12055 { 12056 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE; 12057 } 12058 12059 static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12060 { 12061 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU; 12062 } 12063 12064 static bool is_kfunc_rcu_protected(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12065 { 12066 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU_PROTECTED; 12067 } 12068 12069 static bool is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 12070 const struct btf_param *arg, 12071 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 12072 { 12073 const struct btf_type *t; 12074 12075 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 12076 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 12077 return false; 12078 12079 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__sz"); 12080 } 12081 12082 static bool is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 12083 const struct btf_param *arg, 12084 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 12085 { 12086 const struct btf_type *t; 12087 12088 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 12089 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 12090 return false; 12091 12092 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__szk"); 12093 } 12094 12095 static bool is_kfunc_arg_optional(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12096 { 12097 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__opt"); 12098 } 12099 12100 static bool is_kfunc_arg_constant(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12101 { 12102 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__k"); 12103 } 12104 12105 static bool is_kfunc_arg_ignore(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12106 { 12107 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__ign"); 12108 } 12109 12110 static bool is_kfunc_arg_map(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12111 { 12112 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__map"); 12113 } 12114 12115 static bool is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12116 { 12117 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__alloc"); 12118 } 12119 12120 static bool is_kfunc_arg_uninit(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12121 { 12122 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__uninit"); 12123 } 12124 12125 static bool is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12126 { 12127 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__refcounted_kptr"); 12128 } 12129 12130 static bool is_kfunc_arg_nullable(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12131 { 12132 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__nullable"); 12133 } 12134 12135 static bool is_kfunc_arg_const_str(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12136 { 12137 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__str"); 12138 } 12139 12140 static bool is_kfunc_arg_irq_flag(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12141 { 12142 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__irq_flag"); 12143 } 12144 12145 static bool is_kfunc_arg_prog(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12146 { 12147 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__prog"); 12148 } 12149 12150 static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf *btf, 12151 const struct btf_param *arg, 12152 const char *name) 12153 { 12154 int len, target_len = strlen(name); 12155 const char *param_name; 12156 12157 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 12158 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 12159 return false; 12160 len = strlen(param_name); 12161 if (len != target_len) 12162 return false; 12163 if (strcmp(param_name, name)) 12164 return false; 12165 12166 return true; 12167 } 12168 12169 enum { 12170 KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID, 12171 KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID, 12172 KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID, 12173 KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID, 12174 KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID, 12175 KF_ARG_WORKQUEUE_ID, 12176 KF_ARG_RES_SPIN_LOCK_ID, 12177 KF_ARG_TASK_WORK_ID, 12178 }; 12179 12180 BTF_ID_LIST(kf_arg_btf_ids) 12181 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_dynptr) 12182 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_head) 12183 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_node) 12184 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_root) 12185 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_node) 12186 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_wq) 12187 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_res_spin_lock) 12188 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_task_work) 12189 12190 static bool __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(const struct btf *btf, 12191 const struct btf_param *arg, int type) 12192 { 12193 const struct btf_type *t; 12194 u32 res_id; 12195 12196 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 12197 if (!t) 12198 return false; 12199 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 12200 return false; 12201 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &res_id); 12202 if (!t) 12203 return false; 12204 return btf_types_are_same(btf, res_id, btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[type]); 12205 } 12206 12207 static bool is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12208 { 12209 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID); 12210 } 12211 12212 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_head(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12213 { 12214 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID); 12215 } 12216 12217 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12218 { 12219 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID); 12220 } 12221 12222 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12223 { 12224 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID); 12225 } 12226 12227 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12228 { 12229 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID); 12230 } 12231 12232 static bool is_kfunc_arg_wq(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12233 { 12234 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_WORKQUEUE_ID); 12235 } 12236 12237 static bool is_kfunc_arg_task_work(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12238 { 12239 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_TASK_WORK_ID); 12240 } 12241 12242 static bool is_kfunc_arg_res_spin_lock(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 12243 { 12244 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RES_SPIN_LOCK_ID); 12245 } 12246 12247 static bool is_rbtree_node_type(const struct btf_type *t) 12248 { 12249 return t == btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID]); 12250 } 12251 12252 static bool is_list_node_type(const struct btf_type *t) 12253 { 12254 return t == btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID]); 12255 } 12256 12257 static bool is_kfunc_arg_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct btf *btf, 12258 const struct btf_param *arg) 12259 { 12260 const struct btf_type *t; 12261 12262 t = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf, arg->type, NULL); 12263 if (!t) 12264 return false; 12265 12266 return true; 12267 } 12268 12269 /* Returns true if struct is composed of scalars, 4 levels of nesting allowed */ 12270 static bool __btf_type_is_scalar_struct(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12271 const struct btf *btf, 12272 const struct btf_type *t, int rec) 12273 { 12274 const struct btf_type *member_type; 12275 const struct btf_member *member; 12276 u32 i; 12277 12278 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) 12279 return false; 12280 12281 for_each_member(i, t, member) { 12282 const struct btf_array *array; 12283 12284 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, member->type, NULL); 12285 if (btf_type_is_struct(member_type)) { 12286 if (rec >= 3) { 12287 verbose(env, "max struct nesting depth exceeded\n"); 12288 return false; 12289 } 12290 if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, btf, member_type, rec + 1)) 12291 return false; 12292 continue; 12293 } 12294 if (btf_type_is_array(member_type)) { 12295 array = btf_array(member_type); 12296 if (!array->nelems) 12297 return false; 12298 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, array->type, NULL); 12299 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 12300 return false; 12301 continue; 12302 } 12303 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 12304 return false; 12305 } 12306 return true; 12307 } 12308 12309 enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type { 12310 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, 12311 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID, /* Allocated object */ 12312 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR, /* Refcounted local kptr */ 12313 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 12314 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER, 12315 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD, 12316 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE, 12317 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID, /* Also covers reg2btf_ids conversions */ 12318 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, 12319 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE, /* Size derived from next argument, skip it */ 12320 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK, 12321 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT, 12322 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE, 12323 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL, 12324 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR, 12325 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MAP, 12326 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE, 12327 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_IRQ_FLAG, 12328 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK, 12329 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TASK_WORK, 12330 }; 12331 12332 enum special_kfunc_type { 12333 KF_bpf_obj_new_impl, 12334 KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl, 12335 KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl, 12336 KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl, 12337 KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl, 12338 KF_bpf_list_pop_front, 12339 KF_bpf_list_pop_back, 12340 KF_bpf_list_front, 12341 KF_bpf_list_back, 12342 KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx, 12343 KF_bpf_rdonly_cast, 12344 KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock, 12345 KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock, 12346 KF_bpf_rbtree_remove, 12347 KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl, 12348 KF_bpf_rbtree_first, 12349 KF_bpf_rbtree_root, 12350 KF_bpf_rbtree_left, 12351 KF_bpf_rbtree_right, 12352 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb, 12353 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp, 12354 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb_meta, 12355 KF_bpf_xdp_pull_data, 12356 KF_bpf_dynptr_slice, 12357 KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr, 12358 KF_bpf_dynptr_clone, 12359 KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl, 12360 KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl, 12361 KF_bpf_throw, 12362 KF_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl, 12363 KF_bpf_preempt_disable, 12364 KF_bpf_preempt_enable, 12365 KF_bpf_iter_css_task_new, 12366 KF_bpf_session_cookie, 12367 KF_bpf_get_kmem_cache, 12368 KF_bpf_local_irq_save, 12369 KF_bpf_local_irq_restore, 12370 KF_bpf_iter_num_new, 12371 KF_bpf_iter_num_next, 12372 KF_bpf_iter_num_destroy, 12373 KF_bpf_set_dentry_xattr, 12374 KF_bpf_remove_dentry_xattr, 12375 KF_bpf_res_spin_lock, 12376 KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock, 12377 KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave, 12378 KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore, 12379 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_file, 12380 KF_bpf_dynptr_file_discard, 12381 KF___bpf_trap, 12382 KF_bpf_task_work_schedule_signal_impl, 12383 KF_bpf_task_work_schedule_resume_impl, 12384 }; 12385 12386 BTF_ID_LIST(special_kfunc_list) 12387 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 12388 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 12389 BTF_ID(func, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl) 12390 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front_impl) 12391 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back_impl) 12392 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 12393 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 12394 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_front) 12395 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_back) 12396 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 12397 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 12398 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_lock) 12399 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_unlock) 12400 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_remove) 12401 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_add_impl) 12402 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_first) 12403 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_root) 12404 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_left) 12405 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_right) 12406 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 12407 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb) 12408 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp) 12409 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb_meta) 12410 BTF_ID(func, bpf_xdp_pull_data) 12411 #else 12412 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12413 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12414 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12415 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12416 #endif 12417 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice) 12418 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr) 12419 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone) 12420 BTF_ID(func, bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl) 12421 BTF_ID(func, bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl) 12422 BTF_ID(func, bpf_throw) 12423 BTF_ID(func, bpf_wq_set_callback_impl) 12424 BTF_ID(func, bpf_preempt_disable) 12425 BTF_ID(func, bpf_preempt_enable) 12426 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS 12427 BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_css_task_new) 12428 #else 12429 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12430 #endif 12431 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_EVENTS 12432 BTF_ID(func, bpf_session_cookie) 12433 #else 12434 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12435 #endif 12436 BTF_ID(func, bpf_get_kmem_cache) 12437 BTF_ID(func, bpf_local_irq_save) 12438 BTF_ID(func, bpf_local_irq_restore) 12439 BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_num_new) 12440 BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_num_next) 12441 BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_num_destroy) 12442 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM 12443 BTF_ID(func, bpf_set_dentry_xattr) 12444 BTF_ID(func, bpf_remove_dentry_xattr) 12445 #else 12446 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12447 BTF_ID_UNUSED 12448 #endif 12449 BTF_ID(func, bpf_res_spin_lock) 12450 BTF_ID(func, bpf_res_spin_unlock) 12451 BTF_ID(func, bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave) 12452 BTF_ID(func, bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore) 12453 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_file) 12454 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_file_discard) 12455 BTF_ID(func, __bpf_trap) 12456 BTF_ID(func, bpf_task_work_schedule_signal_impl) 12457 BTF_ID(func, bpf_task_work_schedule_resume_impl) 12458 12459 static bool is_task_work_add_kfunc(u32 func_id) 12460 { 12461 return func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_task_work_schedule_signal_impl] || 12462 func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_task_work_schedule_resume_impl]; 12463 } 12464 12465 static bool is_kfunc_ret_null(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12466 { 12467 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] && 12468 meta->arg_owning_ref) { 12469 return false; 12470 } 12471 12472 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RET_NULL; 12473 } 12474 12475 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12476 { 12477 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock]; 12478 } 12479 12480 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12481 { 12482 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock]; 12483 } 12484 12485 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_disable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12486 { 12487 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_preempt_disable]; 12488 } 12489 12490 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_enable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12491 { 12492 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_preempt_enable]; 12493 } 12494 12495 static bool is_kfunc_pkt_changing(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12496 { 12497 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_xdp_pull_data]; 12498 } 12499 12500 static enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type 12501 get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12502 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 12503 const struct btf_type *t, const struct btf_type *ref_t, 12504 const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args, 12505 int argno, int nargs) 12506 { 12507 u32 regno = argno + 1; 12508 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 12509 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 12510 bool arg_mem_size = false; 12511 12512 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) 12513 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 12514 12515 /* In this function, we verify the kfunc's BTF as per the argument type, 12516 * leaving the rest of the verification with respect to the register 12517 * type to our caller. When a set of conditions hold in the BTF type of 12518 * arguments, we resolve it to a known kfunc_ptr_arg_type. 12519 */ 12520 if (btf_is_prog_ctx_type(&env->log, meta->btf, t, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), argno)) 12521 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 12522 12523 if (is_kfunc_arg_nullable(meta->btf, &args[argno]) && register_is_null(reg)) 12524 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL; 12525 12526 if (is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12527 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID; 12528 12529 if (is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12530 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR; 12531 12532 if (is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12533 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 12534 12535 if (is_kfunc_arg_iter(meta, argno, &args[argno])) 12536 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER; 12537 12538 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_head(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12539 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD; 12540 12541 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12542 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE; 12543 12544 if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12545 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT; 12546 12547 if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12548 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE; 12549 12550 if (is_kfunc_arg_const_str(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12551 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR; 12552 12553 if (is_kfunc_arg_map(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12554 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MAP; 12555 12556 if (is_kfunc_arg_wq(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12557 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE; 12558 12559 if (is_kfunc_arg_task_work(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12560 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TASK_WORK; 12561 12562 if (is_kfunc_arg_irq_flag(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12563 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_IRQ_FLAG; 12564 12565 if (is_kfunc_arg_res_spin_lock(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12566 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK; 12567 12568 if ((base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])) { 12569 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) { 12570 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 12571 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 12572 return -EINVAL; 12573 } 12574 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 12575 } 12576 12577 if (is_kfunc_arg_callback(env, meta->btf, &args[argno])) 12578 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK; 12579 12580 if (argno + 1 < nargs && 12581 (is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1]) || 12582 is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1]))) 12583 arg_mem_size = true; 12584 12585 /* This is the catch all argument type of register types supported by 12586 * check_helper_mem_access. However, we only allow when argument type is 12587 * pointer to scalar, or struct composed (recursively) of scalars. When 12588 * arg_mem_size is true, the pointer can be void *. 12589 */ 12590 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(ref_t) && !__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, meta->btf, ref_t, 0) && 12591 (arg_mem_size ? !btf_type_is_void(ref_t) : 1)) { 12592 verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s must point to %sscalar, or struct with scalar\n", 12593 argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, arg_mem_size ? "void, " : ""); 12594 return -EINVAL; 12595 } 12596 return arg_mem_size ? KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE : KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM; 12597 } 12598 12599 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12600 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 12601 const struct btf_type *ref_t, 12602 const char *ref_tname, u32 ref_id, 12603 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 12604 int argno) 12605 { 12606 const struct btf_type *reg_ref_t; 12607 bool strict_type_match = false; 12608 const struct btf *reg_btf; 12609 const char *reg_ref_tname; 12610 bool taking_projection; 12611 bool struct_same; 12612 u32 reg_ref_id; 12613 12614 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 12615 reg_btf = reg->btf; 12616 reg_ref_id = reg->btf_id; 12617 } else { 12618 reg_btf = btf_vmlinux; 12619 reg_ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]; 12620 } 12621 12622 /* Enforce strict type matching for calls to kfuncs that are acquiring 12623 * or releasing a reference, or are no-cast aliases. We do _not_ 12624 * enforce strict matching for plain KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs by default, 12625 * as we want to enable BPF programs to pass types that are bitwise 12626 * equivalent without forcing them to explicitly cast with something 12627 * like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx(). 12628 * 12629 * For example, say we had a type like the following: 12630 * 12631 * struct bpf_cpumask { 12632 * cpumask_t cpumask; 12633 * refcount_t usage; 12634 * }; 12635 * 12636 * Note that as specified in <linux/cpumask.h>, cpumask_t is typedef'ed 12637 * to a struct cpumask, so it would be safe to pass a struct 12638 * bpf_cpumask * to a kfunc expecting a struct cpumask *. 12639 * 12640 * The philosophy here is similar to how we allow scalars of different 12641 * types to be passed to kfuncs as long as the size is the same. The 12642 * only difference here is that we're simply allowing 12643 * btf_struct_ids_match() to walk the struct at the 0th offset, and 12644 * resolve types. 12645 */ 12646 if ((is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) || 12647 btf_type_ids_nocast_alias(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, meta->btf, ref_id)) 12648 strict_type_match = true; 12649 12650 WARN_ON_ONCE(is_kfunc_release(meta) && 12651 (reg->off || !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || 12652 reg->var_off.value)); 12653 12654 reg_ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(reg_btf, reg_ref_id, ®_ref_id); 12655 reg_ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg_btf, reg_ref_t->name_off); 12656 struct_same = btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, reg->off, meta->btf, ref_id, strict_type_match); 12657 /* If kfunc is accepting a projection type (ie. __sk_buff), it cannot 12658 * actually use it -- it must cast to the underlying type. So we allow 12659 * caller to pass in the underlying type. 12660 */ 12661 taking_projection = btf_is_projection_of(ref_tname, reg_ref_tname); 12662 if (!taking_projection && !struct_same) { 12663 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s but R%d has a pointer to %s %s\n", 12664 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, argno + 1, 12665 btf_type_str(reg_ref_t), reg_ref_tname); 12666 return -EINVAL; 12667 } 12668 return 0; 12669 } 12670 12671 static int process_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 12672 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 12673 { 12674 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 12675 int err, kfunc_class = IRQ_NATIVE_KFUNC; 12676 bool irq_save; 12677 12678 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_local_irq_save] || 12679 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave]) { 12680 irq_save = true; 12681 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave]) 12682 kfunc_class = IRQ_LOCK_KFUNC; 12683 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_local_irq_restore] || 12684 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore]) { 12685 irq_save = false; 12686 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore]) 12687 kfunc_class = IRQ_LOCK_KFUNC; 12688 } else { 12689 verifier_bug(env, "unknown irq flags kfunc"); 12690 return -EFAULT; 12691 } 12692 12693 if (irq_save) { 12694 if (!is_irq_flag_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) { 12695 verbose(env, "expected uninitialized irq flag as arg#%d\n", regno - 1); 12696 return -EINVAL; 12697 } 12698 12699 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, 0, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 12700 if (err) 12701 return err; 12702 12703 err = mark_stack_slot_irq_flag(env, meta, reg, env->insn_idx, kfunc_class); 12704 if (err) 12705 return err; 12706 } else { 12707 err = is_irq_flag_reg_valid_init(env, reg); 12708 if (err) { 12709 verbose(env, "expected an initialized irq flag as arg#%d\n", regno - 1); 12710 return err; 12711 } 12712 12713 err = mark_irq_flag_read(env, reg); 12714 if (err) 12715 return err; 12716 12717 err = unmark_stack_slot_irq_flag(env, reg, kfunc_class); 12718 if (err) 12719 return err; 12720 } 12721 return 0; 12722 } 12723 12724 12725 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 12726 { 12727 struct btf_record *rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 12728 12729 if (!env->cur_state->active_locks) { 12730 verifier_bug(env, "%s w/o active lock", __func__); 12731 return -EFAULT; 12732 } 12733 12734 if (type_flag(reg->type) & NON_OWN_REF) { 12735 verifier_bug(env, "NON_OWN_REF already set"); 12736 return -EFAULT; 12737 } 12738 12739 reg->type |= NON_OWN_REF; 12740 if (rec->refcount_off >= 0) 12741 reg->type |= MEM_RCU; 12742 12743 return 0; 12744 } 12745 12746 static int ref_convert_owning_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 ref_obj_id) 12747 { 12748 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 12749 struct bpf_func_state *unused; 12750 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 12751 int i; 12752 12753 if (!ref_obj_id) { 12754 verifier_bug(env, "ref_obj_id is zero for owning -> non-owning conversion"); 12755 return -EFAULT; 12756 } 12757 12758 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 12759 if (state->refs[i].id != ref_obj_id) 12760 continue; 12761 12762 /* Clear ref_obj_id here so release_reference doesn't clobber 12763 * the whole reg 12764 */ 12765 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({ 12766 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) { 12767 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 12768 ref_set_non_owning(env, reg); 12769 } 12770 })); 12771 return 0; 12772 } 12773 12774 verifier_bug(env, "ref state missing for ref_obj_id"); 12775 return -EFAULT; 12776 } 12777 12778 /* Implementation details: 12779 * 12780 * Each register points to some region of memory, which we define as an 12781 * allocation. Each allocation may embed a bpf_spin_lock which protects any 12782 * special BPF objects (bpf_list_head, bpf_rb_root, etc.) part of the same 12783 * allocation. The lock and the data it protects are colocated in the same 12784 * memory region. 12785 * 12786 * Hence, everytime a register holds a pointer value pointing to such 12787 * allocation, the verifier preserves a unique reg->id for it. 12788 * 12789 * The verifier remembers the lock 'ptr' and the lock 'id' whenever 12790 * bpf_spin_lock is called. 12791 * 12792 * To enable this, lock state in the verifier captures two values: 12793 * active_lock.ptr = Register's type specific pointer 12794 * active_lock.id = A unique ID for each register pointer value 12795 * 12796 * Currently, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC are the two 12797 * supported register types. 12798 * 12799 * The active_lock.ptr in case of map values is the reg->map_ptr, and in case of 12800 * allocated objects is the reg->btf pointer. 12801 * 12802 * The active_lock.id is non-unique for maps supporting direct_value_addr, as we 12803 * can establish the provenance of the map value statically for each distinct 12804 * lookup into such maps. They always contain a single map value hence unique 12805 * IDs for each pseudo load pessimizes the algorithm and rejects valid programs. 12806 * 12807 * So, in case of global variables, they use array maps with max_entries = 1, 12808 * hence their active_lock.ptr becomes map_ptr and id = 0 (since they all point 12809 * into the same map value as max_entries is 1, as described above). 12810 * 12811 * In case of inner map lookups, the inner map pointer has same map_ptr as the 12812 * outer map pointer (in verifier context), but each lookup into an inner map 12813 * assigns a fresh reg->id to the lookup, so while lookups into distinct inner 12814 * maps from the same outer map share the same map_ptr as active_lock.ptr, they 12815 * will get different reg->id assigned to each lookup, hence different 12816 * active_lock.id. 12817 * 12818 * In case of allocated objects, active_lock.ptr is the reg->btf, and the 12819 * reg->id is a unique ID preserved after the NULL pointer check on the pointer 12820 * returned from bpf_obj_new. Each allocation receives a new reg->id. 12821 */ 12822 static int check_reg_allocation_locked(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 12823 { 12824 struct bpf_reference_state *s; 12825 void *ptr; 12826 u32 id; 12827 12828 switch ((int)reg->type) { 12829 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 12830 ptr = reg->map_ptr; 12831 break; 12832 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 12833 ptr = reg->btf; 12834 break; 12835 default: 12836 verifier_bug(env, "unknown reg type for lock check"); 12837 return -EFAULT; 12838 } 12839 id = reg->id; 12840 12841 if (!env->cur_state->active_locks) 12842 return -EINVAL; 12843 s = find_lock_state(env->cur_state, REF_TYPE_LOCK_MASK, id, ptr); 12844 if (!s) { 12845 verbose(env, "held lock and object are not in the same allocation\n"); 12846 return -EINVAL; 12847 } 12848 return 0; 12849 } 12850 12851 static bool is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12852 { 12853 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 12854 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 12855 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 12856 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back] || 12857 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_front] || 12858 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_back]; 12859 } 12860 12861 static bool is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12862 { 12863 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl] || 12864 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 12865 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first] || 12866 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_root] || 12867 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_left] || 12868 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_right]; 12869 } 12870 12871 static bool is_bpf_iter_num_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12872 { 12873 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_num_new] || 12874 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_num_next] || 12875 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_num_destroy]; 12876 } 12877 12878 static bool is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12879 { 12880 return is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(btf_id) || is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id) || 12881 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]; 12882 } 12883 12884 static bool is_bpf_res_spin_lock_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12885 { 12886 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] || 12887 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock] || 12888 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave] || 12889 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore]; 12890 } 12891 12892 static bool kfunc_spin_allowed(u32 btf_id) 12893 { 12894 return is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(btf_id) || is_bpf_iter_num_api_kfunc(btf_id) || 12895 is_bpf_res_spin_lock_kfunc(btf_id); 12896 } 12897 12898 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12899 { 12900 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]; 12901 } 12902 12903 static bool is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12904 { 12905 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl] || 12906 is_task_work_add_kfunc(btf_id); 12907 } 12908 12909 static bool is_bpf_throw_kfunc(struct bpf_insn *insn) 12910 { 12911 return bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && insn->off == 0 && 12912 insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_throw]; 12913 } 12914 12915 static bool is_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12916 { 12917 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl]; 12918 } 12919 12920 static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12921 { 12922 return is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(btf_id) || 12923 is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(btf_id); 12924 } 12925 12926 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 12927 { 12928 return is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id); 12929 } 12930 12931 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12932 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 12933 u32 kfunc_btf_id) 12934 { 12935 bool ret; 12936 12937 switch (head_field_type) { 12938 case BPF_LIST_HEAD: 12939 ret = is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 12940 break; 12941 case BPF_RB_ROOT: 12942 ret = is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id); 12943 break; 12944 default: 12945 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph root argument type %s\n", 12946 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type)); 12947 return false; 12948 } 12949 12950 if (!ret) 12951 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s head arg for unknown kfunc\n", 12952 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type)); 12953 return ret; 12954 } 12955 12956 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12957 enum btf_field_type node_field_type, 12958 u32 kfunc_btf_id) 12959 { 12960 bool ret; 12961 12962 switch (node_field_type) { 12963 case BPF_LIST_NODE: 12964 ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 12965 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl]); 12966 break; 12967 case BPF_RB_NODE: 12968 ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] || 12969 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl] || 12970 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_left] || 12971 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_right]); 12972 break; 12973 default: 12974 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph node argument type %s\n", 12975 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type)); 12976 return false; 12977 } 12978 12979 if (!ret) 12980 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s node arg for unknown kfunc\n", 12981 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type)); 12982 return ret; 12983 } 12984 12985 static int 12986 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12987 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 12988 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 12989 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 12990 struct btf_field **head_field) 12991 { 12992 const char *head_type_name; 12993 struct btf_field *field; 12994 struct btf_record *rec; 12995 u32 head_off; 12996 12997 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) { 12998 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call"); 12999 return -EFAULT; 13000 } 13001 13002 if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(env, head_field_type, meta->func_id)) 13003 return -EFAULT; 13004 13005 head_type_name = btf_field_type_name(head_field_type); 13006 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 13007 verbose(env, 13008 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n", 13009 regno, head_type_name); 13010 return -EINVAL; 13011 } 13012 13013 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 13014 head_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 13015 field = btf_record_find(rec, head_off, head_field_type); 13016 if (!field) { 13017 verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", head_type_name, head_off); 13018 return -EINVAL; 13019 } 13020 13021 /* All functions require bpf_list_head to be protected using a bpf_spin_lock */ 13022 if (check_reg_allocation_locked(env, reg)) { 13023 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock at off=%d must be held for %s\n", 13024 rec->spin_lock_off, head_type_name); 13025 return -EINVAL; 13026 } 13027 13028 if (*head_field) { 13029 verifier_bug(env, "repeating %s arg", head_type_name); 13030 return -EFAULT; 13031 } 13032 *head_field = field; 13033 return 0; 13034 } 13035 13036 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13037 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 13038 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 13039 { 13040 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_LIST_HEAD, 13041 &meta->arg_list_head.field); 13042 } 13043 13044 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13045 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 13046 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 13047 { 13048 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_RB_ROOT, 13049 &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field); 13050 } 13051 13052 static int 13053 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13054 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 13055 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 13056 enum btf_field_type head_field_type, 13057 enum btf_field_type node_field_type, 13058 struct btf_field **node_field) 13059 { 13060 const char *node_type_name; 13061 const struct btf_type *et, *t; 13062 struct btf_field *field; 13063 u32 node_off; 13064 13065 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) { 13066 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call"); 13067 return -EFAULT; 13068 } 13069 13070 if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(env, node_field_type, meta->func_id)) 13071 return -EFAULT; 13072 13073 node_type_name = btf_field_type_name(node_field_type); 13074 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 13075 verbose(env, 13076 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n", 13077 regno, node_type_name); 13078 return -EINVAL; 13079 } 13080 13081 node_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 13082 field = reg_find_field_offset(reg, node_off, node_field_type); 13083 if (!field) { 13084 verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", node_type_name, node_off); 13085 return -EINVAL; 13086 } 13087 13088 field = *node_field; 13089 13090 et = btf_type_by_id(field->graph_root.btf, field->graph_root.value_btf_id); 13091 t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 13092 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, 0, field->graph_root.btf, 13093 field->graph_root.value_btf_id, true)) { 13094 verbose(env, "operation on %s expects arg#1 %s at offset=%d " 13095 "in struct %s, but arg is at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 13096 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type), 13097 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type), 13098 field->graph_root.node_offset, 13099 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off), 13100 node_off, btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off)); 13101 return -EINVAL; 13102 } 13103 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 13104 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 13105 13106 if (node_off != field->graph_root.node_offset) { 13107 verbose(env, "arg#1 offset=%d, but expected %s at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 13108 node_off, btf_field_type_name(node_field_type), 13109 field->graph_root.node_offset, 13110 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off)); 13111 return -EINVAL; 13112 } 13113 13114 return 0; 13115 } 13116 13117 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13118 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 13119 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 13120 { 13121 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta, 13122 BPF_LIST_HEAD, BPF_LIST_NODE, 13123 &meta->arg_list_head.field); 13124 } 13125 13126 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13127 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 13128 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 13129 { 13130 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta, 13131 BPF_RB_ROOT, BPF_RB_NODE, 13132 &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field); 13133 } 13134 13135 /* 13136 * css_task iter allowlist is needed to avoid dead locking on css_set_lock. 13137 * LSM hooks and iters (both sleepable and non-sleepable) are safe. 13138 * Any sleepable progs are also safe since bpf_check_attach_target() enforce 13139 * them can only be attached to some specific hook points. 13140 */ 13141 static bool check_css_task_iter_allowlist(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 13142 { 13143 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 13144 13145 switch (prog_type) { 13146 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 13147 return true; 13148 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 13149 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) 13150 return true; 13151 fallthrough; 13152 default: 13153 return in_sleepable(env); 13154 } 13155 } 13156 13157 static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 13158 int insn_idx) 13159 { 13160 const char *func_name = meta->func_name, *ref_tname; 13161 const struct btf *btf = meta->btf; 13162 const struct btf_param *args; 13163 struct btf_record *rec; 13164 u32 i, nargs; 13165 int ret; 13166 13167 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta->func_proto + 1); 13168 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta->func_proto); 13169 if (nargs > MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) { 13170 verbose(env, "Function %s has %d > %d args\n", func_name, nargs, 13171 MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS); 13172 return -EINVAL; 13173 } 13174 13175 /* Check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the 13176 * verifier sees. 13177 */ 13178 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 13179 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[i + 1]; 13180 const struct btf_type *t, *ref_t, *resolve_ret; 13181 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = ARG_DONTCARE; 13182 u32 regno = i + 1, ref_id, type_size; 13183 bool is_ret_buf_sz = false; 13184 int kf_arg_type; 13185 13186 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, args[i].type, NULL); 13187 13188 if (is_kfunc_arg_ignore(btf, &args[i])) 13189 continue; 13190 13191 if (is_kfunc_arg_prog(btf, &args[i])) { 13192 /* Used to reject repeated use of __prog. */ 13193 if (meta->arg_prog) { 13194 verifier_bug(env, "Only 1 prog->aux argument supported per-kfunc"); 13195 return -EFAULT; 13196 } 13197 meta->arg_prog = true; 13198 cur_aux(env)->arg_prog = regno; 13199 continue; 13200 } 13201 13202 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 13203 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 13204 verbose(env, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno); 13205 return -EINVAL; 13206 } 13207 13208 if (is_kfunc_arg_constant(meta->btf, &args[i])) { 13209 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 13210 verifier_bug(env, "only one constant argument permitted"); 13211 return -EFAULT; 13212 } 13213 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 13214 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno); 13215 return -EINVAL; 13216 } 13217 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 13218 if (ret < 0) 13219 return ret; 13220 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 13221 meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value; 13222 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdonly_buf_size")) { 13223 meta->r0_rdonly = true; 13224 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 13225 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdwr_buf_size")) { 13226 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 13227 } 13228 13229 if (is_ret_buf_sz) { 13230 if (meta->r0_size) { 13231 verbose(env, "2 or more rdonly/rdwr_buf_size parameters for kfunc"); 13232 return -EINVAL; 13233 } 13234 13235 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 13236 verbose(env, "R%d is not a const\n", regno); 13237 return -EINVAL; 13238 } 13239 13240 meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value; 13241 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 13242 if (ret) 13243 return ret; 13244 } 13245 continue; 13246 } 13247 13248 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 13249 verbose(env, "Unrecognized arg#%d type %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 13250 return -EINVAL; 13251 } 13252 13253 if ((is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) || is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) && 13254 (register_is_null(reg) || type_may_be_null(reg->type)) && 13255 !is_kfunc_arg_nullable(meta->btf, &args[i])) { 13256 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg%d\n", i); 13257 return -EACCES; 13258 } 13259 13260 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 13261 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) { 13262 verifier_bug(env, "more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u", 13263 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 13264 meta->ref_obj_id); 13265 return -EFAULT; 13266 } 13267 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 13268 if (is_kfunc_release(meta)) 13269 meta->release_regno = regno; 13270 } 13271 13272 ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &ref_id); 13273 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off); 13274 13275 kf_arg_type = get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(env, meta, t, ref_t, ref_tname, args, i, nargs); 13276 if (kf_arg_type < 0) 13277 return kf_arg_type; 13278 13279 switch (kf_arg_type) { 13280 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL: 13281 continue; 13282 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MAP: 13283 if (!reg->map_ptr) { 13284 verbose(env, "pointer in R%d isn't map pointer\n", regno); 13285 return -EINVAL; 13286 } 13287 if (meta->map.ptr && (reg->map_ptr->record->wq_off >= 0 || 13288 reg->map_ptr->record->task_work_off >= 0)) { 13289 /* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject: 13290 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1) 13291 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2) 13292 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) { 13293 * wq = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1); 13294 * if (wq) 13295 * // mismatch would have been allowed 13296 * bpf_wq_init(wq, inner_map2); 13297 * } 13298 * 13299 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps. 13300 */ 13301 if (meta->map.ptr != reg->map_ptr || 13302 meta->map.uid != reg->map_uid) { 13303 if (reg->map_ptr->record->task_work_off >= 0) { 13304 verbose(env, 13305 "bpf_task_work pointer in R2 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R3 map_uid=%d\n", 13306 meta->map.uid, reg->map_uid); 13307 return -EINVAL; 13308 } 13309 verbose(env, 13310 "workqueue pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n", 13311 meta->map.uid, reg->map_uid); 13312 return -EINVAL; 13313 } 13314 } 13315 meta->map.ptr = reg->map_ptr; 13316 meta->map.uid = reg->map_uid; 13317 fallthrough; 13318 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 13319 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 13320 if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && !is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) 13321 break; 13322 13323 if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) { 13324 if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) { 13325 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); 13326 return -EINVAL; 13327 } 13328 if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) { 13329 verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno); 13330 return -EINVAL; 13331 } 13332 } 13333 fallthrough; 13334 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 13335 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 13336 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER: 13337 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 13338 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 13339 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT: 13340 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE: 13341 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 13342 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 13343 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK: 13344 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR: 13345 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: 13346 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE: 13347 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TASK_WORK: 13348 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_IRQ_FLAG: 13349 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK: 13350 break; 13351 default: 13352 verifier_bug(env, "unknown kfunc arg type %d", kf_arg_type); 13353 return -EFAULT; 13354 } 13355 13356 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) 13357 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 13358 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 13359 if (ret < 0) 13360 return ret; 13361 13362 switch (kf_arg_type) { 13363 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 13364 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 13365 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to ctx, but got %s\n", 13366 i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 13367 return -EINVAL; 13368 } 13369 13370 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 13371 ret = get_kern_ctx_btf_id(&env->log, resolve_prog_type(env->prog)); 13372 if (ret < 0) 13373 return -EINVAL; 13374 meta->ret_btf_id = ret; 13375 } 13376 break; 13377 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 13378 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 13379 if (meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 13380 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected for bpf_obj_drop_impl()\n", i); 13381 return -EINVAL; 13382 } 13383 } else if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | MEM_PERCPU)) { 13384 if (meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl]) { 13385 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected for bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl()\n", i); 13386 return -EINVAL; 13387 } 13388 } else { 13389 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 13390 return -EINVAL; 13391 } 13392 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 13393 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 13394 return -EINVAL; 13395 } 13396 if (meta->btf == btf_vmlinux) { 13397 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 13398 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 13399 } 13400 break; 13401 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 13402 { 13403 enum bpf_arg_type dynptr_arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 13404 int clone_ref_obj_id = 0; 13405 13406 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 13407 dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_RDONLY; 13408 13409 if (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, &args[i])) 13410 dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT; 13411 13412 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) { 13413 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB; 13414 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp]) { 13415 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP; 13416 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb_meta]) { 13417 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META; 13418 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_file]) { 13419 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE; 13420 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_file_discard]) { 13421 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE; 13422 meta->release_regno = regno; 13423 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_clone] && 13424 (dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) { 13425 enum bpf_dynptr_type parent_type = meta->initialized_dynptr.type; 13426 13427 if (parent_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) { 13428 verifier_bug(env, "no dynptr type for parent of clone"); 13429 return -EFAULT; 13430 } 13431 13432 dynptr_arg_type |= (unsigned int)get_dynptr_type_flag(parent_type); 13433 clone_ref_obj_id = meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id; 13434 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(parent_type) && !clone_ref_obj_id) { 13435 verifier_bug(env, "missing ref obj id for parent of clone"); 13436 return -EFAULT; 13437 } 13438 } 13439 13440 ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, dynptr_arg_type, clone_ref_obj_id); 13441 if (ret < 0) 13442 return ret; 13443 13444 if (!(dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) { 13445 int id = dynptr_id(env, reg); 13446 13447 if (id < 0) { 13448 verifier_bug(env, "failed to obtain dynptr id"); 13449 return id; 13450 } 13451 meta->initialized_dynptr.id = id; 13452 meta->initialized_dynptr.type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg); 13453 meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); 13454 } 13455 13456 break; 13457 } 13458 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER: 13459 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_css_task_new]) { 13460 if (!check_css_task_iter_allowlist(env)) { 13461 verbose(env, "css_task_iter is only allowed in bpf_lsm, bpf_iter and sleepable progs\n"); 13462 return -EINVAL; 13463 } 13464 } 13465 ret = process_iter_arg(env, regno, insn_idx, meta); 13466 if (ret < 0) 13467 return ret; 13468 break; 13469 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 13470 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 13471 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 13472 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 13473 return -EINVAL; 13474 } 13475 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 13476 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 13477 return -EINVAL; 13478 } 13479 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(env, reg, regno, meta); 13480 if (ret < 0) 13481 return ret; 13482 break; 13483 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT: 13484 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 13485 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 13486 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 13487 return -EINVAL; 13488 } 13489 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 13490 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 13491 return -EINVAL; 13492 } 13493 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(env, reg, regno, meta); 13494 if (ret < 0) 13495 return ret; 13496 break; 13497 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 13498 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 13499 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 13500 return -EINVAL; 13501 } 13502 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 13503 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 13504 return -EINVAL; 13505 } 13506 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 13507 if (ret < 0) 13508 return ret; 13509 break; 13510 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE: 13511 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 13512 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 13513 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 13514 return -EINVAL; 13515 } 13516 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 13517 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 13518 return -EINVAL; 13519 } 13520 } else { 13521 if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 13522 verbose(env, "%s can only take non-owning or refcounted bpf_rb_node pointer\n", func_name); 13523 return -EINVAL; 13524 } 13525 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) { 13526 verbose(env, "%s not allowed in rbtree cb\n", func_name); 13527 return -EINVAL; 13528 } 13529 } 13530 13531 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 13532 if (ret < 0) 13533 return ret; 13534 break; 13535 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MAP: 13536 /* If argument has '__map' suffix expect 'struct bpf_map *' */ 13537 ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[CONST_PTR_TO_MAP]; 13538 ref_t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, ref_id); 13539 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off); 13540 fallthrough; 13541 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 13542 /* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */ 13543 if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 13544 (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) && 13545 !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) { 13546 verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 13547 verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n", 13548 reg_type_str(env, base_type(reg->type) | 13549 (type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS))); 13550 return -EINVAL; 13551 } 13552 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, ref_id, meta, i); 13553 if (ret < 0) 13554 return ret; 13555 break; 13556 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 13557 resolve_ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, ref_t, &type_size); 13558 if (IS_ERR(resolve_ret)) { 13559 verbose(env, "arg#%d reference type('%s %s') size cannot be determined: %ld\n", 13560 i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, PTR_ERR(resolve_ret)); 13561 return -EINVAL; 13562 } 13563 ret = check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, type_size); 13564 if (ret < 0) 13565 return ret; 13566 break; 13567 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 13568 { 13569 struct bpf_reg_state *buff_reg = ®s[regno]; 13570 const struct btf_param *buff_arg = &args[i]; 13571 struct bpf_reg_state *size_reg = ®s[regno + 1]; 13572 const struct btf_param *size_arg = &args[i + 1]; 13573 13574 if (!register_is_null(buff_reg) || !is_kfunc_arg_optional(meta->btf, buff_arg)) { 13575 ret = check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(env, size_reg, regno + 1); 13576 if (ret < 0) { 13577 verbose(env, "arg#%d arg#%d memory, len pair leads to invalid memory access\n", i, i + 1); 13578 return ret; 13579 } 13580 } 13581 13582 if (is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, size_arg, size_reg)) { 13583 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 13584 verifier_bug(env, "only one constant argument permitted"); 13585 return -EFAULT; 13586 } 13587 if (!tnum_is_const(size_reg->var_off)) { 13588 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno + 1); 13589 return -EINVAL; 13590 } 13591 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 13592 meta->arg_constant.value = size_reg->var_off.value; 13593 } 13594 13595 /* Skip next '__sz' or '__szk' argument */ 13596 i++; 13597 break; 13598 } 13599 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK: 13600 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_FUNC) { 13601 verbose(env, "arg%d expected pointer to func\n", i); 13602 return -EINVAL; 13603 } 13604 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 13605 break; 13606 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR: 13607 if (!type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 13608 verbose(env, "arg#%d is neither owning or non-owning ref\n", i); 13609 return -EINVAL; 13610 } 13611 if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) 13612 meta->arg_owning_ref = true; 13613 13614 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 13615 if (!rec) { 13616 verifier_bug(env, "Couldn't find btf_record"); 13617 return -EFAULT; 13618 } 13619 13620 if (rec->refcount_off < 0) { 13621 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a type with bpf_refcount field\n", i); 13622 return -EINVAL; 13623 } 13624 13625 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf; 13626 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 13627 break; 13628 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: 13629 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 13630 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a const string\n", i); 13631 return -EINVAL; 13632 } 13633 ret = check_reg_const_str(env, reg, regno); 13634 if (ret) 13635 return ret; 13636 break; 13637 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE: 13638 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 13639 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a map value\n", i); 13640 return -EINVAL; 13641 } 13642 ret = process_wq_func(env, regno, meta); 13643 if (ret < 0) 13644 return ret; 13645 break; 13646 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TASK_WORK: 13647 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 13648 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a map value\n", i); 13649 return -EINVAL; 13650 } 13651 ret = process_task_work_func(env, regno, meta); 13652 if (ret < 0) 13653 return ret; 13654 break; 13655 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_IRQ_FLAG: 13656 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) { 13657 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to an irq flag on stack\n", i); 13658 return -EINVAL; 13659 } 13660 ret = process_irq_flag(env, regno, meta); 13661 if (ret < 0) 13662 return ret; 13663 break; 13664 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK: 13665 { 13666 int flags = PROCESS_RES_LOCK; 13667 13668 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 13669 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to map value or allocated object\n", i); 13670 return -EINVAL; 13671 } 13672 13673 if (!is_bpf_res_spin_lock_kfunc(meta->func_id)) 13674 return -EFAULT; 13675 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] || 13676 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave]) 13677 flags |= PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK; 13678 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave] || 13679 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore]) 13680 flags |= PROCESS_LOCK_IRQ; 13681 ret = process_spin_lock(env, regno, flags); 13682 if (ret < 0) 13683 return ret; 13684 break; 13685 } 13686 } 13687 } 13688 13689 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && !meta->release_regno) { 13690 verbose(env, "release kernel function %s expects refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n", 13691 func_name); 13692 return -EINVAL; 13693 } 13694 13695 return 0; 13696 } 13697 13698 static int fetch_kfunc_meta(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13699 struct bpf_insn *insn, 13700 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 13701 const char **kfunc_name) 13702 { 13703 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 13704 u32 func_id, *kfunc_flags; 13705 const char *func_name; 13706 struct btf *desc_btf; 13707 13708 if (kfunc_name) 13709 *kfunc_name = NULL; 13710 13711 if (!insn->imm) 13712 return -EINVAL; 13713 13714 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, insn->off); 13715 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 13716 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 13717 13718 func_id = insn->imm; 13719 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 13720 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 13721 if (kfunc_name) 13722 *kfunc_name = func_name; 13723 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 13724 13725 kfunc_flags = btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(desc_btf, func_id, env->prog); 13726 if (!kfunc_flags) { 13727 return -EACCES; 13728 } 13729 13730 memset(meta, 0, sizeof(*meta)); 13731 meta->btf = desc_btf; 13732 meta->func_id = func_id; 13733 meta->kfunc_flags = *kfunc_flags; 13734 meta->func_proto = func_proto; 13735 meta->func_name = func_name; 13736 13737 return 0; 13738 } 13739 13740 /* check special kfuncs and return: 13741 * 1 - not fall-through to 'else' branch, continue verification 13742 * 0 - fall-through to 'else' branch 13743 * < 0 - not fall-through to 'else' branch, return error 13744 */ 13745 static int check_special_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 13746 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux, 13747 const struct btf_type *ptr_type, struct btf *desc_btf) 13748 { 13749 const struct btf_type *ret_t; 13750 int err = 0; 13751 13752 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) 13753 return 0; 13754 13755 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] || 13756 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) { 13757 struct btf_struct_meta *struct_meta; 13758 struct btf *ret_btf; 13759 u32 ret_btf_id; 13760 13761 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] && !bpf_global_ma_set) 13762 return -ENOMEM; 13763 13764 if (((u64)(u32)meta->arg_constant.value) != meta->arg_constant.value) { 13765 verbose(env, "local type ID argument must be in range [0, U32_MAX]\n"); 13766 return -EINVAL; 13767 } 13768 13769 ret_btf = env->prog->aux->btf; 13770 ret_btf_id = meta->arg_constant.value; 13771 13772 /* This may be NULL due to user not supplying a BTF */ 13773 if (!ret_btf) { 13774 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new/bpf_percpu_obj_new requires prog BTF\n"); 13775 return -EINVAL; 13776 } 13777 13778 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 13779 if (!ret_t || !__btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 13780 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new/bpf_percpu_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 13781 return -EINVAL; 13782 } 13783 13784 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) { 13785 if (ret_t->size > BPF_GLOBAL_PERCPU_MA_MAX_SIZE) { 13786 verbose(env, "bpf_percpu_obj_new type size (%d) is greater than %d\n", 13787 ret_t->size, BPF_GLOBAL_PERCPU_MA_MAX_SIZE); 13788 return -EINVAL; 13789 } 13790 13791 if (!bpf_global_percpu_ma_set) { 13792 mutex_lock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock); 13793 if (!bpf_global_percpu_ma_set) { 13794 /* Charge memory allocated with bpf_global_percpu_ma to 13795 * root memcg. The obj_cgroup for root memcg is NULL. 13796 */ 13797 err = bpf_mem_alloc_percpu_init(&bpf_global_percpu_ma, NULL); 13798 if (!err) 13799 bpf_global_percpu_ma_set = true; 13800 } 13801 mutex_unlock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock); 13802 if (err) 13803 return err; 13804 } 13805 13806 mutex_lock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock); 13807 err = bpf_mem_alloc_percpu_unit_init(&bpf_global_percpu_ma, ret_t->size); 13808 mutex_unlock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock); 13809 if (err) 13810 return err; 13811 } 13812 13813 struct_meta = btf_find_struct_meta(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 13814 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) { 13815 if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, ret_btf, ret_t, 0)) { 13816 verbose(env, "bpf_percpu_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct of scalars\n"); 13817 return -EINVAL; 13818 } 13819 13820 if (struct_meta) { 13821 verbose(env, "bpf_percpu_obj_new type ID argument must not contain special fields\n"); 13822 return -EINVAL; 13823 } 13824 } 13825 13826 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13827 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 13828 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 13829 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 13830 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) 13831 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_PERCPU; 13832 13833 insn_aux->obj_new_size = ret_t->size; 13834 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = struct_meta; 13835 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) { 13836 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13837 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 13838 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta->arg_btf; 13839 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta->arg_btf_id; 13840 13841 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 13842 btf_find_struct_meta(meta->arg_btf, 13843 meta->arg_btf_id); 13844 } else if (is_list_node_type(ptr_type)) { 13845 struct btf_field *field = meta->arg_list_head.field; 13846 13847 mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root); 13848 } else if (is_rbtree_node_type(ptr_type)) { 13849 struct btf_field *field = meta->arg_rbtree_root.field; 13850 13851 mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root); 13852 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 13853 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13854 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED; 13855 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 13856 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta->ret_btf_id; 13857 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 13858 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, meta->arg_constant.value); 13859 if (!ret_t) { 13860 verbose(env, "Unknown type ID %lld passed to kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast\n", 13861 meta->arg_constant.value); 13862 return -EINVAL; 13863 } else if (btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 13864 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13865 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 13866 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 13867 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta->arg_constant.value; 13868 } else if (btf_type_is_void(ret_t)) { 13869 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13870 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 13871 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = 0; 13872 } else { 13873 verbose(env, 13874 "kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast type ID argument must be of a struct or void\n"); 13875 return -EINVAL; 13876 } 13877 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice] || 13878 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr]) { 13879 enum bpf_type_flag type_flag = get_dynptr_type_flag(meta->initialized_dynptr.type); 13880 13881 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13882 13883 if (!meta->arg_constant.found) { 13884 verifier_bug(env, "bpf_dynptr_slice(_rdwr) no constant size"); 13885 return -EFAULT; 13886 } 13887 13888 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta->arg_constant.value; 13889 13890 /* PTR_MAYBE_NULL will be added when is_kfunc_ret_null is checked */ 13891 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | type_flag; 13892 13893 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice]) { 13894 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 13895 } else { 13896 /* this will set env->seen_direct_write to true */ 13897 if (!may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE)) { 13898 verbose(env, "the prog does not allow writes to packet data\n"); 13899 return -EINVAL; 13900 } 13901 } 13902 13903 if (!meta->initialized_dynptr.id) { 13904 verifier_bug(env, "no dynptr id"); 13905 return -EFAULT; 13906 } 13907 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta->initialized_dynptr.id; 13908 13909 /* we don't need to set BPF_REG_0's ref obj id 13910 * because packet slices are not refcounted (see 13911 * dynptr_type_refcounted) 13912 */ 13913 } else { 13914 return 0; 13915 } 13916 13917 return 1; 13918 } 13919 13920 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, const char *reg_name); 13921 13922 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 13923 int *insn_idx_p) 13924 { 13925 bool sleepable, rcu_lock, rcu_unlock, preempt_disable, preempt_enable; 13926 u32 i, nargs, ptr_type_id, release_ref_obj_id; 13927 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 13928 const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name; 13929 const struct btf_type *t, *ptr_type; 13930 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 13931 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux; 13932 int err, insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 13933 const struct btf_param *args; 13934 struct btf *desc_btf; 13935 13936 /* skip for now, but return error when we find this in fixup_kfunc_call */ 13937 if (!insn->imm) 13938 return 0; 13939 13940 err = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, insn, &meta, &func_name); 13941 if (err == -EACCES && func_name) 13942 verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n", func_name); 13943 if (err) 13944 return err; 13945 desc_btf = meta.btf; 13946 insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 13947 13948 insn_aux->is_iter_next = is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta); 13949 13950 if (!insn->off && 13951 (insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] || 13952 insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave])) { 13953 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 13954 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 13955 13956 branch = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, false); 13957 if (IS_ERR(branch)) { 13958 verbose(env, "failed to push state for failed lock acquisition\n"); 13959 return PTR_ERR(branch); 13960 } 13961 13962 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs; 13963 13964 /* Clear r0-r5 registers in forked state */ 13965 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) 13966 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 13967 13968 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 13969 err = __mark_reg_s32_range(env, regs, BPF_REG_0, -MAX_ERRNO, -1); 13970 if (err) { 13971 verbose(env, "failed to mark s32 range for retval in forked state for lock\n"); 13972 return err; 13973 } 13974 __mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regs, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(u32)); 13975 } else if (!insn->off && insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF___bpf_trap]) { 13976 verbose(env, "unexpected __bpf_trap() due to uninitialized variable?\n"); 13977 return -EFAULT; 13978 } 13979 13980 if (is_kfunc_destructive(&meta) && !capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) { 13981 verbose(env, "destructive kfunc calls require CAP_SYS_BOOT capability\n"); 13982 return -EACCES; 13983 } 13984 13985 sleepable = is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta); 13986 if (sleepable && !in_sleepable(env)) { 13987 verbose(env, "program must be sleepable to call sleepable kfunc %s\n", func_name); 13988 return -EACCES; 13989 } 13990 13991 /* Track non-sleepable context for kfuncs, same as for helpers. */ 13992 if (!in_sleepable_context(env)) 13993 insn_aux->non_sleepable = true; 13994 13995 /* Check the arguments */ 13996 err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta, insn_idx); 13997 if (err < 0) 13998 return err; 13999 14000 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 14001 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 14002 set_rbtree_add_callback_state); 14003 if (err) { 14004 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n", 14005 func_name, meta.func_id); 14006 return err; 14007 } 14008 } 14009 14010 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_session_cookie]) { 14011 meta.r0_size = sizeof(u64); 14012 meta.r0_rdonly = false; 14013 } 14014 14015 if (is_bpf_wq_set_callback_impl_kfunc(meta.func_id)) { 14016 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 14017 set_timer_callback_state); 14018 if (err) { 14019 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n", 14020 func_name, meta.func_id); 14021 return err; 14022 } 14023 } 14024 14025 if (is_task_work_add_kfunc(meta.func_id)) { 14026 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, 14027 set_task_work_schedule_callback_state); 14028 if (err) { 14029 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n", 14030 func_name, meta.func_id); 14031 return err; 14032 } 14033 } 14034 14035 rcu_lock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(&meta); 14036 rcu_unlock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(&meta); 14037 14038 preempt_disable = is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_disable(&meta); 14039 preempt_enable = is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_enable(&meta); 14040 14041 if (rcu_lock) { 14042 env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks++; 14043 } else if (rcu_unlock) { 14044 struct bpf_func_state *state; 14045 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 14046 u32 clear_mask = (1 << STACK_SPILL) | (1 << STACK_ITER); 14047 14048 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks == 0) { 14049 verbose(env, "unmatched rcu read unlock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 14050 return -EINVAL; 14051 } 14052 if (--env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks == 0) { 14053 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate_mask(env->cur_state, state, reg, clear_mask, ({ 14054 if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { 14055 reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL); 14056 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 14057 } 14058 })); 14059 } 14060 } else if (sleepable && env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks) { 14061 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within rcu_read_lock region\n", func_name); 14062 return -EACCES; 14063 } 14064 14065 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env) && (rcu_lock || rcu_unlock)) { 14066 verbose(env, "Calling bpf_rcu_read_{lock,unlock} in unnecessary rbtree callback\n"); 14067 return -EACCES; 14068 } 14069 14070 if (env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks) { 14071 if (preempt_disable) { 14072 env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks++; 14073 } else if (preempt_enable) { 14074 env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks--; 14075 } else if (sleepable) { 14076 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within non-preemptible region\n", func_name); 14077 return -EACCES; 14078 } 14079 } else if (preempt_disable) { 14080 env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks++; 14081 } else if (preempt_enable) { 14082 verbose(env, "unmatched attempt to enable preemption (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 14083 return -EINVAL; 14084 } 14085 14086 if (env->cur_state->active_irq_id && sleepable) { 14087 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within IRQ-disabled region\n", func_name); 14088 return -EACCES; 14089 } 14090 14091 if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(&meta) && !in_rcu_cs(env)) { 14092 verbose(env, "kernel func %s requires RCU critical section protection\n", func_name); 14093 return -EACCES; 14094 } 14095 14096 /* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted 14097 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now. 14098 */ 14099 if (meta.release_regno) { 14100 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[meta.release_regno]; 14101 14102 if (meta.initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id) { 14103 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, reg); 14104 } else { 14105 err = release_reference(env, reg->ref_obj_id); 14106 if (err) 14107 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 14108 func_name, meta.func_id); 14109 } 14110 if (err) 14111 return err; 14112 } 14113 14114 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 14115 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 14116 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 14117 release_ref_obj_id = regs[BPF_REG_2].ref_obj_id; 14118 insn_aux->insert_off = regs[BPF_REG_2].off; 14119 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, meta.arg_btf_id); 14120 err = ref_convert_owning_non_owning(env, release_ref_obj_id); 14121 if (err) { 14122 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d conversion of owning ref to non-owning failed\n", 14123 func_name, meta.func_id); 14124 return err; 14125 } 14126 14127 err = release_reference(env, release_ref_obj_id); 14128 if (err) { 14129 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 14130 func_name, meta.func_id); 14131 return err; 14132 } 14133 } 14134 14135 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_throw]) { 14136 if (!bpf_jit_supports_exceptions()) { 14137 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kfunc %s#%d\n", 14138 func_name, meta.func_id); 14139 return -ENOTSUPP; 14140 } 14141 env->seen_exception = true; 14142 14143 /* In the case of the default callback, the cookie value passed 14144 * to bpf_throw becomes the return value of the program. 14145 */ 14146 if (!env->exception_callback_subprog) { 14147 err = check_return_code(env, BPF_REG_1, "R1"); 14148 if (err < 0) 14149 return err; 14150 } 14151 } 14152 14153 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) 14154 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 14155 14156 /* Check return type */ 14157 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, meta.func_proto->type, NULL); 14158 14159 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta) && !btf_type_is_struct_ptr(meta.btf, t)) { 14160 /* Only exception is bpf_obj_new_impl */ 14161 if (meta.btf != btf_vmlinux || 14162 (meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] && 14163 meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl] && 14164 meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl])) { 14165 verbose(env, "acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n"); 14166 return -EINVAL; 14167 } 14168 } 14169 14170 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 14171 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 14172 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] || 14173 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave])) 14174 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, ®s[BPF_REG_0]); 14175 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size); 14176 } else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 14177 ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t->type, &ptr_type_id); 14178 err = check_special_kfunc(env, &meta, regs, insn_aux, ptr_type, desc_btf); 14179 if (err) { 14180 if (err < 0) 14181 return err; 14182 } else if (btf_type_is_void(ptr_type)) { 14183 /* kfunc returning 'void *' is equivalent to returning scalar */ 14184 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 14185 } else if (!__btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) { 14186 if (!meta.r0_size) { 14187 __u32 sz; 14188 14189 if (!IS_ERR(btf_resolve_size(desc_btf, ptr_type, &sz))) { 14190 meta.r0_size = sz; 14191 meta.r0_rdonly = true; 14192 } 14193 } 14194 if (!meta.r0_size) { 14195 ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, 14196 ptr_type->name_off); 14197 verbose(env, 14198 "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 14199 func_name, 14200 btf_type_str(ptr_type), 14201 ptr_type_name); 14202 return -EINVAL; 14203 } 14204 14205 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 14206 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM; 14207 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size; 14208 14209 if (meta.r0_rdonly) 14210 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 14211 14212 /* Ensures we don't access the memory after a release_reference() */ 14213 if (meta.ref_obj_id) 14214 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 14215 14216 if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(&meta)) 14217 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RCU; 14218 } else { 14219 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 14220 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 14221 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 14222 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id; 14223 14224 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_get_kmem_cache]) 14225 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 14226 else if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(&meta)) 14227 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RCU; 14228 14229 if (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 14230 struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter; 14231 14232 cur_iter = get_iter_from_state(env->cur_state, &meta); 14233 14234 if (cur_iter->type & MEM_RCU) /* KF_RCU_PROTECTED */ 14235 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RCU; 14236 else 14237 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_TRUSTED; 14238 } 14239 } 14240 14241 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) { 14242 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 14243 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg, see 93c230e3f5bd6 */ 14244 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 14245 } 14246 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *)); 14247 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta)) { 14248 int id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx); 14249 14250 if (id < 0) 14251 return id; 14252 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) 14253 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 14254 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 14255 } else if (is_rbtree_node_type(ptr_type) || is_list_node_type(ptr_type)) { 14256 ref_set_non_owning(env, ®s[BPF_REG_0]); 14257 } 14258 14259 if (reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(®s[BPF_REG_0]) && !regs[BPF_REG_0].id) 14260 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 14261 } else if (btf_type_is_void(t)) { 14262 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux) { 14263 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl] || 14264 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl]) { 14265 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = 14266 btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, 14267 meta.arg_btf_id); 14268 } 14269 } 14270 } 14271 14272 if (is_kfunc_pkt_changing(&meta)) 14273 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 14274 14275 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta.func_proto); 14276 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta.func_proto + 1); 14277 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 14278 u32 regno = i + 1; 14279 14280 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, args[i].type, NULL); 14281 if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 14282 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *)); 14283 else 14284 /* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */ 14285 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size); 14286 } 14287 14288 if (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 14289 err = process_iter_next_call(env, insn_idx, &meta); 14290 if (err) 14291 return err; 14292 } 14293 14294 return 0; 14295 } 14296 14297 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14298 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 14299 enum bpf_reg_type type) 14300 { 14301 bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 14302 s64 val = reg->var_off.value; 14303 s64 smin = reg->smin_value; 14304 14305 if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { 14306 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", 14307 reg_type_str(env, type), val); 14308 return false; 14309 } 14310 14311 if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 14312 verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", 14313 reg_type_str(env, type), reg->off); 14314 return false; 14315 } 14316 14317 if (smin == S64_MIN) { 14318 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", 14319 reg_type_str(env, type)); 14320 return false; 14321 } 14322 14323 if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 14324 verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", 14325 smin, reg_type_str(env, type)); 14326 return false; 14327 } 14328 14329 return true; 14330 } 14331 14332 enum { 14333 REASON_BOUNDS = -1, 14334 REASON_TYPE = -2, 14335 REASON_PATHS = -3, 14336 REASON_LIMIT = -4, 14337 REASON_STACK = -5, 14338 }; 14339 14340 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 14341 u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left) 14342 { 14343 u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; 14344 14345 switch (ptr_reg->type) { 14346 case PTR_TO_STACK: 14347 /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the 14348 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar 14349 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is 14350 * currently prohibited for unprivileged. 14351 */ 14352 max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; 14353 ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off); 14354 break; 14355 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 14356 max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size; 14357 ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ? 14358 ptr_reg->smin_value : 14359 ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off; 14360 break; 14361 default: 14362 return REASON_TYPE; 14363 } 14364 14365 if (ptr_limit >= max) 14366 return REASON_LIMIT; 14367 *alu_limit = ptr_limit; 14368 return 0; 14369 } 14370 14371 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14372 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 14373 { 14374 return env->bypass_spec_v1 || 14375 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K || 14376 cur_aux(env)->nospec; 14377 } 14378 14379 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 14380 u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit) 14381 { 14382 /* If we arrived here from different branches with different 14383 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work. 14384 */ 14385 if (aux->alu_state && 14386 (aux->alu_state != alu_state || 14387 aux->alu_limit != alu_limit)) 14388 return REASON_PATHS; 14389 14390 /* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */ 14391 aux->alu_state = alu_state; 14392 aux->alu_limit = alu_limit; 14393 return 0; 14394 } 14395 14396 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14397 struct bpf_insn *insn) 14398 { 14399 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 14400 14401 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 14402 return 0; 14403 14404 return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0); 14405 } 14406 14407 static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode) 14408 { 14409 return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB; 14410 } 14411 14412 struct bpf_sanitize_info { 14413 struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux; 14414 bool mask_to_left; 14415 }; 14416 14417 static int sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14418 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 14419 u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx) 14420 { 14421 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 14422 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 14423 14424 branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true); 14425 if (!IS_ERR(branch) && insn) { 14426 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs; 14427 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 14428 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 14429 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 14430 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 14431 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg); 14432 } 14433 } 14434 return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(branch); 14435 } 14436 14437 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14438 struct bpf_insn *insn, 14439 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 14440 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 14441 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14442 struct bpf_sanitize_info *info, 14443 const bool commit_window) 14444 { 14445 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux; 14446 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 14447 bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 14448 bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; 14449 bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; 14450 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 14451 u32 alu_state, alu_limit; 14452 struct bpf_reg_state tmp; 14453 int err; 14454 14455 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 14456 return 0; 14457 14458 /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative 14459 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care 14460 * to explore bad access from here. 14461 */ 14462 if (vstate->speculative) 14463 goto do_sim; 14464 14465 if (!commit_window) { 14466 if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) && 14467 (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0)) 14468 return REASON_BOUNDS; 14469 14470 info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || 14471 (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); 14472 } 14473 14474 err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left); 14475 if (err < 0) 14476 return err; 14477 14478 if (commit_window) { 14479 /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on 14480 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation. 14481 */ 14482 alu_state = info->aux.alu_state; 14483 alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit); 14484 } else { 14485 alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; 14486 alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0; 14487 alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? 14488 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; 14489 14490 /* Limit pruning on unknown scalars to enable deep search for 14491 * potential masking differences from other program paths. 14492 */ 14493 if (!off_is_imm) 14494 env->explore_alu_limits = true; 14495 } 14496 14497 err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); 14498 if (err < 0) 14499 return err; 14500 do_sim: 14501 /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already 14502 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification 14503 * stack. 14504 * 14505 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based 14506 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as 14507 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either). 14508 */ 14509 if (commit_window || off_is_imm) 14510 return 0; 14511 14512 /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under 14513 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of 14514 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off 14515 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there 14516 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example, 14517 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction 14518 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore 14519 * bad access. 14520 */ 14521 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) { 14522 tmp = *dst_reg; 14523 copy_register_state(dst_reg, ptr_reg); 14524 } 14525 err = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx); 14526 if (err < 0) 14527 return REASON_STACK; 14528 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) 14529 *dst_reg = tmp; 14530 return 0; 14531 } 14532 14533 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14534 { 14535 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 14536 14537 /* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the 14538 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in 14539 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still 14540 * rewrite/sanitize them. 14541 */ 14542 if (!vstate->speculative) 14543 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; 14544 } 14545 14546 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14547 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason, 14548 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 14549 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 14550 { 14551 static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root"; 14552 const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub"; 14553 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; 14554 14555 switch (reason) { 14556 case REASON_BOUNDS: 14557 verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n", 14558 off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err); 14559 break; 14560 case REASON_TYPE: 14561 verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n", 14562 off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err); 14563 break; 14564 case REASON_PATHS: 14565 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n", 14566 dst, op, err); 14567 break; 14568 case REASON_LIMIT: 14569 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n", 14570 dst, op, err); 14571 break; 14572 case REASON_STACK: 14573 verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n", 14574 dst, err); 14575 return -ENOMEM; 14576 default: 14577 verifier_bug(env, "unknown reason (%d)", reason); 14578 break; 14579 } 14580 14581 return -EACCES; 14582 } 14583 14584 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't 14585 * have a variable offset. 14586 * 14587 * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it 14588 * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also 14589 * retrieve_ptr_limit(). 14590 * 14591 * 14592 * 'off' includes 'reg->off'. 14593 */ 14594 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( 14595 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14596 int regno, 14597 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 14598 int off) 14599 { 14600 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 14601 char tn_buf[48]; 14602 14603 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 14604 verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n", 14605 regno, tn_buf, off); 14606 return -EACCES; 14607 } 14608 14609 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { 14610 verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " 14611 "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off); 14612 return -EACCES; 14613 } 14614 14615 return 0; 14616 } 14617 14618 static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14619 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 14620 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 14621 { 14622 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 14623 14624 /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds 14625 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. 14626 */ 14627 if (env->bypass_spec_v1) 14628 return 0; 14629 14630 switch (dst_reg->type) { 14631 case PTR_TO_STACK: 14632 if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg, 14633 dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value)) 14634 return -EACCES; 14635 break; 14636 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 14637 if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false, ACCESS_HELPER)) { 14638 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " 14639 "prohibited for !root\n", dst); 14640 return -EACCES; 14641 } 14642 break; 14643 default: 14644 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 14645 } 14646 14647 return 0; 14648 } 14649 14650 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. 14651 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. 14652 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a 14653 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. 14654 */ 14655 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14656 struct bpf_insn *insn, 14657 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 14658 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) 14659 { 14660 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 14661 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 14662 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg; 14663 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 14664 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, 14665 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; 14666 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, 14667 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; 14668 struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {}; 14669 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 14670 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 14671 int ret, bounds_ret; 14672 14673 dst_reg = ®s[dst]; 14674 14675 if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 14676 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 14677 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from 14678 * e.g. dead branches. 14679 */ 14680 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 14681 return 0; 14682 } 14683 14684 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { 14685 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ 14686 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 14687 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 14688 return 0; 14689 } 14690 14691 verbose(env, 14692 "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 14693 dst); 14694 return -EACCES; 14695 } 14696 14697 if (ptr_reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 14698 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n", 14699 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 14700 return -EACCES; 14701 } 14702 14703 /* 14704 * Accesses to untrusted PTR_TO_MEM are done through probe 14705 * instructions, hence no need to track offsets. 14706 */ 14707 if (base_type(ptr_reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && (ptr_reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) 14708 return 0; 14709 14710 switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) { 14711 case PTR_TO_CTX: 14712 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 14713 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 14714 case PTR_TO_STACK: 14715 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 14716 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 14717 case PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER: 14718 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 14719 case PTR_TO_MEM: 14720 case PTR_TO_BUF: 14721 case PTR_TO_FUNC: 14722 case CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 14723 break; 14724 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 14725 if (known) 14726 break; 14727 fallthrough; 14728 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 14729 /* smin_val represents the known value */ 14730 if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) 14731 break; 14732 fallthrough; 14733 default: 14734 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", 14735 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 14736 return -EACCES; 14737 } 14738 14739 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. 14740 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. 14741 */ 14742 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; 14743 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 14744 14745 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || 14746 !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 14747 return -EINVAL; 14748 14749 /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ 14750 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 14751 14752 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 14753 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 14754 &info, false); 14755 if (ret < 0) 14756 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 14757 } 14758 14759 switch (opcode) { 14760 case BPF_ADD: 14761 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow 14762 * the s32 'off' field 14763 */ 14764 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == 14765 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { 14766 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ 14767 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 14768 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 14769 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 14770 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 14771 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 14772 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; 14773 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 14774 break; 14775 } 14776 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off 14777 * == 0, since it's a scalar. 14778 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive 14779 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' 14780 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. 14781 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets 14782 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset 14783 * from ptr_reg. 14784 */ 14785 if (check_add_overflow(smin_ptr, smin_val, &dst_reg->smin_value) || 14786 check_add_overflow(smax_ptr, smax_val, &dst_reg->smax_value)) { 14787 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 14788 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 14789 } 14790 if (check_add_overflow(umin_ptr, umin_val, &dst_reg->umin_value) || 14791 check_add_overflow(umax_ptr, umax_val, &dst_reg->umax_value)) { 14792 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 14793 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 14794 } 14795 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 14796 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 14797 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 14798 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 14799 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 14800 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 14801 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 14802 } 14803 break; 14804 case BPF_SUB: 14805 if (dst_reg == off_reg) { 14806 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ 14807 verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", 14808 dst); 14809 return -EACCES; 14810 } 14811 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to 14812 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not 14813 * be able to deal with it. 14814 */ 14815 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 14816 verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", 14817 dst); 14818 return -EACCES; 14819 } 14820 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == 14821 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { 14822 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ 14823 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 14824 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 14825 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 14826 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 14827 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 14828 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 14829 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; 14830 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 14831 break; 14832 } 14833 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known 14834 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. 14835 */ 14836 if (check_sub_overflow(smin_ptr, smax_val, &dst_reg->smin_value) || 14837 check_sub_overflow(smax_ptr, smin_val, &dst_reg->smax_value)) { 14838 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 14839 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 14840 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 14841 } 14842 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { 14843 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 14844 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 14845 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 14846 } else { 14847 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 14848 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; 14849 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; 14850 } 14851 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 14852 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 14853 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 14854 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 14855 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 14856 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 14857 if (smin_val < 0) 14858 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 14859 } 14860 break; 14861 case BPF_AND: 14862 case BPF_OR: 14863 case BPF_XOR: 14864 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */ 14865 verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", 14866 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 14867 return -EACCES; 14868 default: 14869 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ 14870 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", 14871 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 14872 return -EACCES; 14873 } 14874 14875 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 14876 return -EINVAL; 14877 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 14878 bounds_ret = sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg); 14879 if (bounds_ret == -EACCES) 14880 return bounds_ret; 14881 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 14882 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 14883 &info, true); 14884 if (verifier_bug_if(!can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn) 14885 && !env->cur_state->speculative 14886 && bounds_ret 14887 && !ret, 14888 env, "Pointer type unsupported by sanitize_check_bounds() not rejected by retrieve_ptr_limit() as required")) { 14889 return -EFAULT; 14890 } 14891 if (ret < 0) 14892 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 14893 } 14894 14895 return 0; 14896 } 14897 14898 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14899 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 14900 { 14901 s32 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->s32_min_value; 14902 s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value; 14903 u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value; 14904 u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value; 14905 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 14906 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 14907 bool min_overflow, max_overflow; 14908 14909 if (check_add_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_min_value, dst_smin) || 14910 check_add_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_max_value, dst_smax)) { 14911 *dst_smin = S32_MIN; 14912 *dst_smax = S32_MAX; 14913 } 14914 14915 /* If either all additions overflow or no additions overflow, then 14916 * it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin + src_umin, dst_umax = 14917 * dst_umax + src_umax. Otherwise (some additions overflow), set 14918 * the output bounds to unbounded. 14919 */ 14920 min_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umin, umin_val, dst_umin); 14921 max_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umax, umax_val, dst_umax); 14922 14923 if (!min_overflow && max_overflow) { 14924 *dst_umin = 0; 14925 *dst_umax = U32_MAX; 14926 } 14927 } 14928 14929 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14930 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 14931 { 14932 s64 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->smin_value; 14933 s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value; 14934 u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value; 14935 u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value; 14936 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 14937 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 14938 bool min_overflow, max_overflow; 14939 14940 if (check_add_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smin_value, dst_smin) || 14941 check_add_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smax_value, dst_smax)) { 14942 *dst_smin = S64_MIN; 14943 *dst_smax = S64_MAX; 14944 } 14945 14946 /* If either all additions overflow or no additions overflow, then 14947 * it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin + src_umin, dst_umax = 14948 * dst_umax + src_umax. Otherwise (some additions overflow), set 14949 * the output bounds to unbounded. 14950 */ 14951 min_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umin, umin_val, dst_umin); 14952 max_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umax, umax_val, dst_umax); 14953 14954 if (!min_overflow && max_overflow) { 14955 *dst_umin = 0; 14956 *dst_umax = U64_MAX; 14957 } 14958 } 14959 14960 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14961 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 14962 { 14963 s32 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->s32_min_value; 14964 s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value; 14965 u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value; 14966 u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value; 14967 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 14968 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 14969 bool min_underflow, max_underflow; 14970 14971 if (check_sub_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_max_value, dst_smin) || 14972 check_sub_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_min_value, dst_smax)) { 14973 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 14974 *dst_smin = S32_MIN; 14975 *dst_smax = S32_MAX; 14976 } 14977 14978 /* If either all subtractions underflow or no subtractions 14979 * underflow, it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin - src_umax, 14980 * dst_umax = dst_umax - src_umin. Otherwise (some subtractions 14981 * underflow), set the output bounds to unbounded. 14982 */ 14983 min_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umin, umax_val, dst_umin); 14984 max_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umax, umin_val, dst_umax); 14985 14986 if (min_underflow && !max_underflow) { 14987 *dst_umin = 0; 14988 *dst_umax = U32_MAX; 14989 } 14990 } 14991 14992 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 14993 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 14994 { 14995 s64 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->smin_value; 14996 s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value; 14997 u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value; 14998 u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value; 14999 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 15000 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 15001 bool min_underflow, max_underflow; 15002 15003 if (check_sub_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smax_value, dst_smin) || 15004 check_sub_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smin_value, dst_smax)) { 15005 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 15006 *dst_smin = S64_MIN; 15007 *dst_smax = S64_MAX; 15008 } 15009 15010 /* If either all subtractions underflow or no subtractions 15011 * underflow, it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin - src_umax, 15012 * dst_umax = dst_umax - src_umin. Otherwise (some subtractions 15013 * underflow), set the output bounds to unbounded. 15014 */ 15015 min_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umin, umax_val, dst_umin); 15016 max_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umax, umin_val, dst_umax); 15017 15018 if (min_underflow && !max_underflow) { 15019 *dst_umin = 0; 15020 *dst_umax = U64_MAX; 15021 } 15022 } 15023 15024 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15025 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15026 { 15027 s32 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->s32_min_value; 15028 s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value; 15029 u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value; 15030 u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value; 15031 s32 tmp_prod[4]; 15032 15033 if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_umax, src_reg->u32_max_value, dst_umax) || 15034 check_mul_overflow(*dst_umin, src_reg->u32_min_value, dst_umin)) { 15035 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 15036 *dst_umin = 0; 15037 *dst_umax = U32_MAX; 15038 } 15039 if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_min_value, &tmp_prod[0]) || 15040 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_max_value, &tmp_prod[1]) || 15041 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_min_value, &tmp_prod[2]) || 15042 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_max_value, &tmp_prod[3])) { 15043 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 15044 *dst_smin = S32_MIN; 15045 *dst_smax = S32_MAX; 15046 } else { 15047 *dst_smin = min_array(tmp_prod, 4); 15048 *dst_smax = max_array(tmp_prod, 4); 15049 } 15050 } 15051 15052 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15053 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15054 { 15055 s64 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->smin_value; 15056 s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value; 15057 u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value; 15058 u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value; 15059 s64 tmp_prod[4]; 15060 15061 if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_umax, src_reg->umax_value, dst_umax) || 15062 check_mul_overflow(*dst_umin, src_reg->umin_value, dst_umin)) { 15063 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 15064 *dst_umin = 0; 15065 *dst_umax = U64_MAX; 15066 } 15067 if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smin_value, &tmp_prod[0]) || 15068 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smax_value, &tmp_prod[1]) || 15069 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smin_value, &tmp_prod[2]) || 15070 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smax_value, &tmp_prod[3])) { 15071 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 15072 *dst_smin = S64_MIN; 15073 *dst_smax = S64_MAX; 15074 } else { 15075 *dst_smin = min_array(tmp_prod, 4); 15076 *dst_smax = max_array(tmp_prod, 4); 15077 } 15078 } 15079 15080 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15081 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15082 { 15083 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 15084 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 15085 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 15086 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 15087 15088 if (src_known && dst_known) { 15089 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 15090 return; 15091 } 15092 15093 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 15094 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 15095 */ 15096 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 15097 dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val); 15098 15099 /* Safe to set s32 bounds by casting u32 result into s32 when u32 15100 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s32 bounds to unbounded. 15101 */ 15102 if ((s32)dst_reg->u32_min_value <= (s32)dst_reg->u32_max_value) { 15103 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 15104 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 15105 } else { 15106 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 15107 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 15108 } 15109 } 15110 15111 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15112 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15113 { 15114 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 15115 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 15116 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 15117 15118 if (src_known && dst_known) { 15119 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 15120 return; 15121 } 15122 15123 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 15124 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 15125 */ 15126 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 15127 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); 15128 15129 /* Safe to set s64 bounds by casting u64 result into s64 when u64 15130 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s64 bounds to unbounded. 15131 */ 15132 if ((s64)dst_reg->umin_value <= (s64)dst_reg->umax_value) { 15133 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 15134 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 15135 } else { 15136 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 15137 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 15138 } 15139 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 15140 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 15141 } 15142 15143 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15144 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15145 { 15146 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 15147 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 15148 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 15149 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 15150 15151 if (src_known && dst_known) { 15152 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 15153 return; 15154 } 15155 15156 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 15157 * maximum of the operands' minima 15158 */ 15159 dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val); 15160 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 15161 15162 /* Safe to set s32 bounds by casting u32 result into s32 when u32 15163 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s32 bounds to unbounded. 15164 */ 15165 if ((s32)dst_reg->u32_min_value <= (s32)dst_reg->u32_max_value) { 15166 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 15167 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 15168 } else { 15169 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 15170 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 15171 } 15172 } 15173 15174 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15175 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15176 { 15177 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 15178 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 15179 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 15180 15181 if (src_known && dst_known) { 15182 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 15183 return; 15184 } 15185 15186 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 15187 * maximum of the operands' minima 15188 */ 15189 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); 15190 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 15191 15192 /* Safe to set s64 bounds by casting u64 result into s64 when u64 15193 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s64 bounds to unbounded. 15194 */ 15195 if ((s64)dst_reg->umin_value <= (s64)dst_reg->umax_value) { 15196 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 15197 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 15198 } else { 15199 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 15200 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 15201 } 15202 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 15203 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 15204 } 15205 15206 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15207 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15208 { 15209 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 15210 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 15211 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 15212 15213 if (src_known && dst_known) { 15214 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 15215 return; 15216 } 15217 15218 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */ 15219 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 15220 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 15221 15222 /* Safe to set s32 bounds by casting u32 result into s32 when u32 15223 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s32 bounds to unbounded. 15224 */ 15225 if ((s32)dst_reg->u32_min_value <= (s32)dst_reg->u32_max_value) { 15226 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 15227 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 15228 } else { 15229 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 15230 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 15231 } 15232 } 15233 15234 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15235 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15236 { 15237 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 15238 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 15239 15240 if (src_known && dst_known) { 15241 /* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */ 15242 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 15243 return; 15244 } 15245 15246 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */ 15247 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 15248 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 15249 15250 /* Safe to set s64 bounds by casting u64 result into s64 when u64 15251 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s64 bounds to unbounded. 15252 */ 15253 if ((s64)dst_reg->umin_value <= (s64)dst_reg->umax_value) { 15254 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 15255 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 15256 } else { 15257 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 15258 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 15259 } 15260 15261 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 15262 } 15263 15264 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15265 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 15266 { 15267 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick 15268 * up from var_off) 15269 */ 15270 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 15271 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 15272 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 15273 if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) { 15274 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 15275 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 15276 } else { 15277 dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val; 15278 dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val; 15279 } 15280 } 15281 15282 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15283 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15284 { 15285 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 15286 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 15287 /* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */ 15288 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 15289 15290 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 15291 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val)); 15292 /* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so 15293 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and 15294 * if some path skips this step we are still safe. 15295 */ 15296 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 15297 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 15298 } 15299 15300 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15301 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 15302 { 15303 /* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign 15304 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are 15305 * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track 15306 * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except 15307 * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this 15308 * later to shifts of any length. 15309 */ 15310 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0) 15311 dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32; 15312 else 15313 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 15314 15315 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0) 15316 dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32; 15317 else 15318 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 15319 15320 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 15321 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { 15322 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 15323 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 15324 } else { 15325 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; 15326 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; 15327 } 15328 } 15329 15330 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15331 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15332 { 15333 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 15334 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 15335 15336 /* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */ 15337 __scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 15338 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 15339 15340 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 15341 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 15342 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 15343 } 15344 15345 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15346 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15347 { 15348 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 15349 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 15350 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 15351 15352 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 15353 * be negative, then either: 15354 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 15355 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 15356 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 15357 * signed bounds 15358 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 15359 * about the result 15360 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 15361 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 15362 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 15363 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 15364 * var_off of the result. 15365 */ 15366 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 15367 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 15368 15369 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val); 15370 dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val; 15371 dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val; 15372 15373 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 15374 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 15375 } 15376 15377 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15378 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15379 { 15380 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 15381 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 15382 15383 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 15384 * be negative, then either: 15385 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 15386 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 15387 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 15388 * signed bounds 15389 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 15390 * about the result 15391 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 15392 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 15393 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 15394 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 15395 * var_off of the result. 15396 */ 15397 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 15398 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 15399 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 15400 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; 15401 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; 15402 15403 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 15404 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded 15405 * so we can recalculate later from tnum. 15406 */ 15407 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 15408 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 15409 } 15410 15411 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15412 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15413 { 15414 u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 15415 15416 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and 15417 * umax_val is equal to umin_val. 15418 */ 15419 dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val); 15420 dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val); 15421 15422 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32); 15423 15424 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 15425 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 15426 */ 15427 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 15428 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 15429 15430 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 15431 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 15432 } 15433 15434 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15435 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15436 { 15437 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 15438 15439 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal 15440 * to umin_val. 15441 */ 15442 dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val; 15443 dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val; 15444 15445 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64); 15446 15447 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 15448 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 15449 */ 15450 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 15451 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 15452 15453 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 15454 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out 15455 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum. 15456 */ 15457 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 15458 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 15459 } 15460 15461 static bool is_safe_to_compute_dst_reg_range(struct bpf_insn *insn, 15462 const struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 15463 { 15464 bool src_is_const = false; 15465 u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32; 15466 15467 if (insn_bitness == 32) { 15468 if (tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off) 15469 && src_reg->s32_min_value == src_reg->s32_max_value 15470 && src_reg->u32_min_value == src_reg->u32_max_value) 15471 src_is_const = true; 15472 } else { 15473 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) 15474 && src_reg->smin_value == src_reg->smax_value 15475 && src_reg->umin_value == src_reg->umax_value) 15476 src_is_const = true; 15477 } 15478 15479 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 15480 case BPF_ADD: 15481 case BPF_SUB: 15482 case BPF_NEG: 15483 case BPF_AND: 15484 case BPF_XOR: 15485 case BPF_OR: 15486 case BPF_MUL: 15487 return true; 15488 15489 /* Shift operators range is only computable if shift dimension operand 15490 * is a constant. Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. This 15491 * includes shifts by a negative number. 15492 */ 15493 case BPF_LSH: 15494 case BPF_RSH: 15495 case BPF_ARSH: 15496 return (src_is_const && src_reg->umax_value < insn_bitness); 15497 default: 15498 return false; 15499 } 15500 } 15501 15502 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual 15503 * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts 15504 * need extra checks in the 32-bit case. 15505 */ 15506 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15507 struct bpf_insn *insn, 15508 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15509 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) 15510 { 15511 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 15512 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); 15513 int ret; 15514 15515 if (!is_safe_to_compute_dst_reg_range(insn, &src_reg)) { 15516 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 15517 return 0; 15518 } 15519 15520 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 15521 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); 15522 if (ret < 0) 15523 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL); 15524 } 15525 15526 /* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops. 15527 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both 15528 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the 15529 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32 15530 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD, 15531 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to 15532 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops. 15533 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of 15534 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy 15535 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may 15536 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark 15537 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting 15538 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds. 15539 */ 15540 switch (opcode) { 15541 case BPF_ADD: 15542 scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15543 scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15544 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 15545 break; 15546 case BPF_SUB: 15547 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15548 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15549 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 15550 break; 15551 case BPF_NEG: 15552 env->fake_reg[0] = *dst_reg; 15553 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, 0); 15554 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[0]); 15555 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[0]); 15556 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_neg(env->fake_reg[0].var_off); 15557 break; 15558 case BPF_MUL: 15559 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 15560 scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15561 scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15562 break; 15563 case BPF_AND: 15564 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 15565 scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15566 scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15567 break; 15568 case BPF_OR: 15569 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 15570 scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15571 scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15572 break; 15573 case BPF_XOR: 15574 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 15575 scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15576 scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15577 break; 15578 case BPF_LSH: 15579 if (alu32) 15580 scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15581 else 15582 scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15583 break; 15584 case BPF_RSH: 15585 if (alu32) 15586 scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15587 else 15588 scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15589 break; 15590 case BPF_ARSH: 15591 if (alu32) 15592 scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15593 else 15594 scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 15595 break; 15596 default: 15597 break; 15598 } 15599 15600 /* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */ 15601 if (alu32) 15602 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 15603 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 15604 return 0; 15605 } 15606 15607 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max 15608 * and var_off. 15609 */ 15610 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 15611 struct bpf_insn *insn) 15612 { 15613 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 15614 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 15615 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; 15616 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; 15617 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); 15618 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 15619 int err; 15620 15621 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 15622 src_reg = NULL; 15623 15624 if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_ARENA) { 15625 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 15626 15627 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) 15628 /* 15629 * 32-bit operations zero upper bits automatically. 15630 * 64-bit operations need to be converted to 32. 15631 */ 15632 aux->needs_zext = true; 15633 15634 /* Any arithmetic operations are allowed on arena pointers */ 15635 return 0; 15636 } 15637 15638 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 15639 ptr_reg = dst_reg; 15640 15641 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 15642 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 15643 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 15644 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 15645 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields 15646 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except 15647 * pointer subtraction 15648 */ 15649 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 15650 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 15651 return 0; 15652 } 15653 verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", 15654 insn->dst_reg, 15655 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 15656 return -EACCES; 15657 } else { 15658 /* scalar += pointer 15659 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our 15660 * src/dest handling in computing the range 15661 */ 15662 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 15663 if (err) 15664 return err; 15665 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 15666 src_reg, dst_reg); 15667 } 15668 } else if (ptr_reg) { 15669 /* pointer += scalar */ 15670 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 15671 if (err) 15672 return err; 15673 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 15674 dst_reg, src_reg); 15675 } else if (dst_reg->precise) { 15676 /* if dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well */ 15677 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 15678 if (err) 15679 return err; 15680 } 15681 } else { 15682 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only 15683 * need to be able to read from this state. 15684 */ 15685 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 15686 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); 15687 src_reg = &off_reg; 15688 if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */ 15689 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 15690 ptr_reg, src_reg); 15691 } 15692 15693 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ 15694 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { 15695 print_verifier_state(env, vstate, vstate->curframe, true); 15696 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); 15697 return -EFAULT; 15698 } 15699 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { 15700 print_verifier_state(env, vstate, vstate->curframe, true); 15701 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); 15702 return -EFAULT; 15703 } 15704 err = adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); 15705 if (err) 15706 return err; 15707 /* 15708 * Compilers can generate the code 15709 * r1 = r2 15710 * r1 += 0x1 15711 * if r2 < 1000 goto ... 15712 * use r1 in memory access 15713 * So for 64-bit alu remember constant delta between r2 and r1 and 15714 * update r1 after 'if' condition. 15715 */ 15716 if (env->bpf_capable && 15717 BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD && !alu32 && 15718 dst_reg->id && is_reg_const(src_reg, false)) { 15719 u64 val = reg_const_value(src_reg, false); 15720 15721 if ((dst_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) || 15722 /* prevent overflow in sync_linked_regs() later */ 15723 val > (u32)S32_MAX) { 15724 /* 15725 * If the register already went through rX += val 15726 * we cannot accumulate another val into rx->off. 15727 */ 15728 dst_reg->off = 0; 15729 dst_reg->id = 0; 15730 } else { 15731 dst_reg->id |= BPF_ADD_CONST; 15732 dst_reg->off = val; 15733 } 15734 } else { 15735 /* 15736 * Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be 15737 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by sync_linked_regs() 15738 */ 15739 dst_reg->id = 0; 15740 } 15741 return 0; 15742 } 15743 15744 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ 15745 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 15746 { 15747 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 15748 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 15749 int err; 15750 15751 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 15752 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { 15753 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 15754 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 15755 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { 15756 verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); 15757 return -EINVAL; 15758 } 15759 } else { 15760 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 15761 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || 15762 (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 && 15763 BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_TO_LE)) { 15764 verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); 15765 return -EINVAL; 15766 } 15767 } 15768 15769 /* check src operand */ 15770 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 15771 if (err) 15772 return err; 15773 15774 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 15775 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 15776 insn->dst_reg); 15777 return -EACCES; 15778 } 15779 15780 /* check dest operand */ 15781 if (opcode == BPF_NEG && 15782 regs[insn->dst_reg].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 15783 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 15784 err = err ?: adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, 15785 ®s[insn->dst_reg], 15786 regs[insn->dst_reg]); 15787 } else { 15788 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 15789 } 15790 if (err) 15791 return err; 15792 15793 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 15794 15795 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 15796 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU) { 15797 if ((insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 8 && insn->off != 16) || 15798 insn->imm) { 15799 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 15800 return -EINVAL; 15801 } 15802 } else if (insn->off == BPF_ADDR_SPACE_CAST) { 15803 if (insn->imm != 1 && insn->imm != 1u << 16) { 15804 verbose(env, "addr_space_cast insn can only convert between address space 1 and 0\n"); 15805 return -EINVAL; 15806 } 15807 if (!env->prog->aux->arena) { 15808 verbose(env, "addr_space_cast insn can only be used in a program that has an associated arena\n"); 15809 return -EINVAL; 15810 } 15811 } else { 15812 if ((insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 8 && insn->off != 16 && 15813 insn->off != 32) || insn->imm) { 15814 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 15815 return -EINVAL; 15816 } 15817 } 15818 15819 /* check src operand */ 15820 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 15821 if (err) 15822 return err; 15823 } else { 15824 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 15825 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 15826 return -EINVAL; 15827 } 15828 } 15829 15830 /* check dest operand, mark as required later */ 15831 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 15832 if (err) 15833 return err; 15834 15835 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 15836 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg; 15837 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg; 15838 15839 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 15840 if (insn->imm) { 15841 /* off == BPF_ADDR_SPACE_CAST */ 15842 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 15843 if (insn->imm == 1) { /* cast from as(1) to as(0) */ 15844 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_ARENA; 15845 /* PTR_TO_ARENA is 32-bit */ 15846 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 15847 } 15848 } else if (insn->off == 0) { 15849 /* case: R1 = R2 15850 * copy register state to dest reg 15851 */ 15852 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, src_reg); 15853 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 15854 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 15855 } else { 15856 /* case: R1 = (s8, s16 s32)R2 */ 15857 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 15858 verbose(env, 15859 "R%d sign-extension part of pointer\n", 15860 insn->src_reg); 15861 return -EACCES; 15862 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 15863 bool no_sext; 15864 15865 no_sext = src_reg->umax_value < (1ULL << (insn->off - 1)); 15866 if (no_sext) 15867 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, src_reg); 15868 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 15869 if (!no_sext) 15870 dst_reg->id = 0; 15871 coerce_reg_to_size_sx(dst_reg, insn->off >> 3); 15872 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 15873 } else { 15874 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 15875 } 15876 } 15877 } else { 15878 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ 15879 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 15880 verbose(env, 15881 "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", 15882 insn->src_reg); 15883 return -EACCES; 15884 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 15885 if (insn->off == 0) { 15886 bool is_src_reg_u32 = get_reg_width(src_reg) <= 32; 15887 15888 if (is_src_reg_u32) 15889 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, src_reg); 15890 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 15891 /* Make sure ID is cleared if src_reg is not in u32 15892 * range otherwise dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly 15893 * propagated into src_reg by sync_linked_regs() 15894 */ 15895 if (!is_src_reg_u32) 15896 dst_reg->id = 0; 15897 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 15898 } else { 15899 /* case: W1 = (s8, s16)W2 */ 15900 bool no_sext = src_reg->umax_value < (1ULL << (insn->off - 1)); 15901 15902 if (no_sext) 15903 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, src_reg); 15904 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); 15905 if (!no_sext) 15906 dst_reg->id = 0; 15907 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 15908 coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(dst_reg, insn->off >> 3); 15909 } 15910 } else { 15911 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, 15912 insn->dst_reg); 15913 } 15914 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 15915 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 15916 } 15917 } else { 15918 /* case: R = imm 15919 * remember the value we stored into this reg 15920 */ 15921 /* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */ 15922 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 15923 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 15924 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 15925 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 15926 insn->imm); 15927 } else { 15928 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 15929 (u32)insn->imm); 15930 } 15931 } 15932 15933 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { 15934 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); 15935 return -EINVAL; 15936 15937 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ 15938 15939 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 15940 if (insn->imm != 0 || (insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 1) || 15941 (insn->off == 1 && opcode != BPF_MOD && opcode != BPF_DIV)) { 15942 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 15943 return -EINVAL; 15944 } 15945 /* check src1 operand */ 15946 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 15947 if (err) 15948 return err; 15949 } else { 15950 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || (insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 1) || 15951 (insn->off == 1 && opcode != BPF_MOD && opcode != BPF_DIV)) { 15952 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 15953 return -EINVAL; 15954 } 15955 } 15956 15957 /* check src2 operand */ 15958 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 15959 if (err) 15960 return err; 15961 15962 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && 15963 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { 15964 verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); 15965 return -EINVAL; 15966 } 15967 15968 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || 15969 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 15970 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; 15971 15972 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { 15973 verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); 15974 return -EINVAL; 15975 } 15976 } 15977 15978 /* check dest operand */ 15979 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 15980 err = err ?: adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); 15981 if (err) 15982 return err; 15983 } 15984 15985 return reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, ®s[insn->dst_reg], "alu"); 15986 } 15987 15988 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 15989 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 15990 enum bpf_reg_type type, 15991 bool range_right_open) 15992 { 15993 struct bpf_func_state *state; 15994 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 15995 int new_range; 15996 15997 if (dst_reg->off < 0 || 15998 (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open)) 15999 /* This doesn't give us any range */ 16000 return; 16001 16002 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || 16003 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) 16004 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less 16005 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. 16006 */ 16007 return; 16008 16009 new_range = dst_reg->off; 16010 if (range_right_open) 16011 new_range++; 16012 16013 /* Examples for register markings: 16014 * 16015 * pkt_data in dst register: 16016 * 16017 * r2 = r3; 16018 * r2 += 8; 16019 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> 16020 * <access okay> 16021 * 16022 * r2 = r3; 16023 * r2 += 8; 16024 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> 16025 * <handle exception> 16026 * 16027 * Where: 16028 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg 16029 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 16030 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 16031 * 16032 * pkt_data in src register: 16033 * 16034 * r2 = r3; 16035 * r2 += 8; 16036 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> 16037 * <handle exception> 16038 * 16039 * r2 = r3; 16040 * r2 += 8; 16041 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> 16042 * <access okay> 16043 * 16044 * Where: 16045 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg 16046 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 16047 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 16048 * 16049 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) 16050 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) 16051 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on 16052 * the check. 16053 */ 16054 16055 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we 16056 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big 16057 * the range won't allow anything. 16058 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. 16059 */ 16060 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 16061 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 16062 /* keep the maximum range already checked */ 16063 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); 16064 })); 16065 } 16066 16067 /* 16068 * <reg1> <op> <reg2>, currently assuming reg2 is a constant 16069 */ 16070 static int is_scalar_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state *reg2, 16071 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 16072 { 16073 struct tnum t1 = is_jmp32 ? tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off) : reg1->var_off; 16074 struct tnum t2 = is_jmp32 ? tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off) : reg2->var_off; 16075 u64 umin1 = is_jmp32 ? (u64)reg1->u32_min_value : reg1->umin_value; 16076 u64 umax1 = is_jmp32 ? (u64)reg1->u32_max_value : reg1->umax_value; 16077 s64 smin1 = is_jmp32 ? (s64)reg1->s32_min_value : reg1->smin_value; 16078 s64 smax1 = is_jmp32 ? (s64)reg1->s32_max_value : reg1->smax_value; 16079 u64 umin2 = is_jmp32 ? (u64)reg2->u32_min_value : reg2->umin_value; 16080 u64 umax2 = is_jmp32 ? (u64)reg2->u32_max_value : reg2->umax_value; 16081 s64 smin2 = is_jmp32 ? (s64)reg2->s32_min_value : reg2->smin_value; 16082 s64 smax2 = is_jmp32 ? (s64)reg2->s32_max_value : reg2->smax_value; 16083 16084 if (reg1 == reg2) { 16085 switch (opcode) { 16086 case BPF_JGE: 16087 case BPF_JLE: 16088 case BPF_JSGE: 16089 case BPF_JSLE: 16090 case BPF_JEQ: 16091 return 1; 16092 case BPF_JGT: 16093 case BPF_JLT: 16094 case BPF_JSGT: 16095 case BPF_JSLT: 16096 case BPF_JNE: 16097 return 0; 16098 case BPF_JSET: 16099 if (tnum_is_const(t1)) 16100 return t1.value != 0; 16101 else 16102 return (smin1 <= 0 && smax1 >= 0) ? -1 : 1; 16103 default: 16104 return -1; 16105 } 16106 } 16107 16108 switch (opcode) { 16109 case BPF_JEQ: 16110 /* constants, umin/umax and smin/smax checks would be 16111 * redundant in this case because they all should match 16112 */ 16113 if (tnum_is_const(t1) && tnum_is_const(t2)) 16114 return t1.value == t2.value; 16115 if (!tnum_overlap(t1, t2)) 16116 return 0; 16117 /* non-overlapping ranges */ 16118 if (umin1 > umax2 || umax1 < umin2) 16119 return 0; 16120 if (smin1 > smax2 || smax1 < smin2) 16121 return 0; 16122 if (!is_jmp32) { 16123 /* if 64-bit ranges are inconclusive, see if we can 16124 * utilize 32-bit subrange knowledge to eliminate 16125 * branches that can't be taken a priori 16126 */ 16127 if (reg1->u32_min_value > reg2->u32_max_value || 16128 reg1->u32_max_value < reg2->u32_min_value) 16129 return 0; 16130 if (reg1->s32_min_value > reg2->s32_max_value || 16131 reg1->s32_max_value < reg2->s32_min_value) 16132 return 0; 16133 } 16134 break; 16135 case BPF_JNE: 16136 /* constants, umin/umax and smin/smax checks would be 16137 * redundant in this case because they all should match 16138 */ 16139 if (tnum_is_const(t1) && tnum_is_const(t2)) 16140 return t1.value != t2.value; 16141 if (!tnum_overlap(t1, t2)) 16142 return 1; 16143 /* non-overlapping ranges */ 16144 if (umin1 > umax2 || umax1 < umin2) 16145 return 1; 16146 if (smin1 > smax2 || smax1 < smin2) 16147 return 1; 16148 if (!is_jmp32) { 16149 /* if 64-bit ranges are inconclusive, see if we can 16150 * utilize 32-bit subrange knowledge to eliminate 16151 * branches that can't be taken a priori 16152 */ 16153 if (reg1->u32_min_value > reg2->u32_max_value || 16154 reg1->u32_max_value < reg2->u32_min_value) 16155 return 1; 16156 if (reg1->s32_min_value > reg2->s32_max_value || 16157 reg1->s32_max_value < reg2->s32_min_value) 16158 return 1; 16159 } 16160 break; 16161 case BPF_JSET: 16162 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) { 16163 swap(reg1, reg2); 16164 swap(t1, t2); 16165 } 16166 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16167 return -1; 16168 if ((~t1.mask & t1.value) & t2.value) 16169 return 1; 16170 if (!((t1.mask | t1.value) & t2.value)) 16171 return 0; 16172 break; 16173 case BPF_JGT: 16174 if (umin1 > umax2) 16175 return 1; 16176 else if (umax1 <= umin2) 16177 return 0; 16178 break; 16179 case BPF_JSGT: 16180 if (smin1 > smax2) 16181 return 1; 16182 else if (smax1 <= smin2) 16183 return 0; 16184 break; 16185 case BPF_JLT: 16186 if (umax1 < umin2) 16187 return 1; 16188 else if (umin1 >= umax2) 16189 return 0; 16190 break; 16191 case BPF_JSLT: 16192 if (smax1 < smin2) 16193 return 1; 16194 else if (smin1 >= smax2) 16195 return 0; 16196 break; 16197 case BPF_JGE: 16198 if (umin1 >= umax2) 16199 return 1; 16200 else if (umax1 < umin2) 16201 return 0; 16202 break; 16203 case BPF_JSGE: 16204 if (smin1 >= smax2) 16205 return 1; 16206 else if (smax1 < smin2) 16207 return 0; 16208 break; 16209 case BPF_JLE: 16210 if (umax1 <= umin2) 16211 return 1; 16212 else if (umin1 > umax2) 16213 return 0; 16214 break; 16215 case BPF_JSLE: 16216 if (smax1 <= smin2) 16217 return 1; 16218 else if (smin1 > smax2) 16219 return 0; 16220 break; 16221 } 16222 16223 return -1; 16224 } 16225 16226 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode) 16227 { 16228 /* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */ 16229 static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = { 16230 /* these stay the same */ 16231 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ, 16232 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE, 16233 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET, 16234 /* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */ 16235 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = BPF_JLE, 16236 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = BPF_JLT, 16237 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = BPF_JGE, 16238 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = BPF_JGT, 16239 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE, 16240 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT, 16241 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE, 16242 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT 16243 }; 16244 return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4]; 16245 } 16246 16247 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 16248 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 16249 u8 opcode) 16250 { 16251 struct bpf_reg_state *pkt; 16252 16253 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 16254 pkt = dst_reg; 16255 } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 16256 pkt = src_reg; 16257 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 16258 } else { 16259 return -1; 16260 } 16261 16262 if (pkt->range >= 0) 16263 return -1; 16264 16265 switch (opcode) { 16266 case BPF_JLE: 16267 /* pkt <= pkt_end */ 16268 fallthrough; 16269 case BPF_JGT: 16270 /* pkt > pkt_end */ 16271 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END) 16272 /* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */ 16273 return opcode == BPF_JGT; 16274 break; 16275 case BPF_JLT: 16276 /* pkt < pkt_end */ 16277 fallthrough; 16278 case BPF_JGE: 16279 /* pkt >= pkt_end */ 16280 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END) 16281 return opcode == BPF_JGE; 16282 break; 16283 } 16284 return -1; 16285 } 16286 16287 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (<reg1> opcode <reg2>) goto target;" 16288 * and return: 16289 * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed 16290 * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn 16291 * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg1 < 5)" is unknown when register value 16292 * range [0,10] 16293 */ 16294 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state *reg2, 16295 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 16296 { 16297 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg1) && reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg2) && !is_jmp32) 16298 return is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(reg1, reg2, opcode); 16299 16300 if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg1) || __is_pointer_value(false, reg2)) { 16301 u64 val; 16302 16303 /* arrange that reg2 is a scalar, and reg1 is a pointer */ 16304 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) { 16305 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 16306 swap(reg1, reg2); 16307 } 16308 /* and ensure that reg2 is a constant */ 16309 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16310 return -1; 16311 16312 if (!reg_not_null(reg1)) 16313 return -1; 16314 16315 /* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can 16316 * use this to direct branch taken. 16317 */ 16318 val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32); 16319 if (val != 0) 16320 return -1; 16321 16322 switch (opcode) { 16323 case BPF_JEQ: 16324 return 0; 16325 case BPF_JNE: 16326 return 1; 16327 default: 16328 return -1; 16329 } 16330 } 16331 16332 /* now deal with two scalars, but not necessarily constants */ 16333 return is_scalar_branch_taken(reg1, reg2, opcode, is_jmp32); 16334 } 16335 16336 /* Opcode that corresponds to a *false* branch condition. 16337 * E.g., if r1 < r2, then reverse (false) condition is r1 >= r2 16338 */ 16339 static u8 rev_opcode(u8 opcode) 16340 { 16341 switch (opcode) { 16342 case BPF_JEQ: return BPF_JNE; 16343 case BPF_JNE: return BPF_JEQ; 16344 /* JSET doesn't have it's reverse opcode in BPF, so add 16345 * BPF_X flag to denote the reverse of that operation 16346 */ 16347 case BPF_JSET: return BPF_JSET | BPF_X; 16348 case BPF_JSET | BPF_X: return BPF_JSET; 16349 case BPF_JGE: return BPF_JLT; 16350 case BPF_JGT: return BPF_JLE; 16351 case BPF_JLE: return BPF_JGT; 16352 case BPF_JLT: return BPF_JGE; 16353 case BPF_JSGE: return BPF_JSLT; 16354 case BPF_JSGT: return BPF_JSLE; 16355 case BPF_JSLE: return BPF_JSGT; 16356 case BPF_JSLT: return BPF_JSGE; 16357 default: return 0; 16358 } 16359 } 16360 16361 /* Refine range knowledge for <reg1> <op> <reg>2 conditional operation. */ 16362 static void regs_refine_cond_op(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state *reg2, 16363 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 16364 { 16365 struct tnum t; 16366 u64 val; 16367 16368 /* In case of GE/GT/SGE/JST, reuse LE/LT/SLE/SLT logic from below */ 16369 switch (opcode) { 16370 case BPF_JGE: 16371 case BPF_JGT: 16372 case BPF_JSGE: 16373 case BPF_JSGT: 16374 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 16375 swap(reg1, reg2); 16376 break; 16377 default: 16378 break; 16379 } 16380 16381 switch (opcode) { 16382 case BPF_JEQ: 16383 if (is_jmp32) { 16384 reg1->u32_min_value = max(reg1->u32_min_value, reg2->u32_min_value); 16385 reg1->u32_max_value = min(reg1->u32_max_value, reg2->u32_max_value); 16386 reg1->s32_min_value = max(reg1->s32_min_value, reg2->s32_min_value); 16387 reg1->s32_max_value = min(reg1->s32_max_value, reg2->s32_max_value); 16388 reg2->u32_min_value = reg1->u32_min_value; 16389 reg2->u32_max_value = reg1->u32_max_value; 16390 reg2->s32_min_value = reg1->s32_min_value; 16391 reg2->s32_max_value = reg1->s32_max_value; 16392 16393 t = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off)); 16394 reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t); 16395 reg2->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg2->var_off, t); 16396 } else { 16397 reg1->umin_value = max(reg1->umin_value, reg2->umin_value); 16398 reg1->umax_value = min(reg1->umax_value, reg2->umax_value); 16399 reg1->smin_value = max(reg1->smin_value, reg2->smin_value); 16400 reg1->smax_value = min(reg1->smax_value, reg2->smax_value); 16401 reg2->umin_value = reg1->umin_value; 16402 reg2->umax_value = reg1->umax_value; 16403 reg2->smin_value = reg1->smin_value; 16404 reg2->smax_value = reg1->smax_value; 16405 16406 reg1->var_off = tnum_intersect(reg1->var_off, reg2->var_off); 16407 reg2->var_off = reg1->var_off; 16408 } 16409 break; 16410 case BPF_JNE: 16411 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16412 swap(reg1, reg2); 16413 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16414 break; 16415 16416 /* try to recompute the bound of reg1 if reg2 is a const and 16417 * is exactly the edge of reg1. 16418 */ 16419 val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32); 16420 if (is_jmp32) { 16421 /* u32_min_value is not equal to 0xffffffff at this point, 16422 * because otherwise u32_max_value is 0xffffffff as well, 16423 * in such a case both reg1 and reg2 would be constants, 16424 * jump would be predicted and reg_set_min_max() won't 16425 * be called. 16426 * 16427 * Same reasoning works for all {u,s}{min,max}{32,64} cases 16428 * below. 16429 */ 16430 if (reg1->u32_min_value == (u32)val) 16431 reg1->u32_min_value++; 16432 if (reg1->u32_max_value == (u32)val) 16433 reg1->u32_max_value--; 16434 if (reg1->s32_min_value == (s32)val) 16435 reg1->s32_min_value++; 16436 if (reg1->s32_max_value == (s32)val) 16437 reg1->s32_max_value--; 16438 } else { 16439 if (reg1->umin_value == (u64)val) 16440 reg1->umin_value++; 16441 if (reg1->umax_value == (u64)val) 16442 reg1->umax_value--; 16443 if (reg1->smin_value == (s64)val) 16444 reg1->smin_value++; 16445 if (reg1->smax_value == (s64)val) 16446 reg1->smax_value--; 16447 } 16448 break; 16449 case BPF_JSET: 16450 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16451 swap(reg1, reg2); 16452 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16453 break; 16454 val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32); 16455 /* BPF_JSET (i.e., TRUE branch, *not* BPF_JSET | BPF_X) 16456 * requires single bit to learn something useful. E.g., if we 16457 * know that `r1 & 0x3` is true, then which bits (0, 1, or both) 16458 * are actually set? We can learn something definite only if 16459 * it's a single-bit value to begin with. 16460 * 16461 * BPF_JSET | BPF_X (i.e., negation of BPF_JSET) doesn't have 16462 * this restriction. I.e., !(r1 & 0x3) means neither bit 0 nor 16463 * bit 1 is set, which we can readily use in adjustments. 16464 */ 16465 if (!is_power_of_2(val)) 16466 break; 16467 if (is_jmp32) { 16468 t = tnum_or(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_const(val)); 16469 reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t); 16470 } else { 16471 reg1->var_off = tnum_or(reg1->var_off, tnum_const(val)); 16472 } 16473 break; 16474 case BPF_JSET | BPF_X: /* reverse of BPF_JSET, see rev_opcode() */ 16475 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16476 swap(reg1, reg2); 16477 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) 16478 break; 16479 val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32); 16480 /* Forget the ranges before narrowing tnums, to avoid invariant 16481 * violations if we're on a dead branch. 16482 */ 16483 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg1); 16484 if (is_jmp32) { 16485 t = tnum_and(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_const(~val)); 16486 reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t); 16487 } else { 16488 reg1->var_off = tnum_and(reg1->var_off, tnum_const(~val)); 16489 } 16490 break; 16491 case BPF_JLE: 16492 if (is_jmp32) { 16493 reg1->u32_max_value = min(reg1->u32_max_value, reg2->u32_max_value); 16494 reg2->u32_min_value = max(reg1->u32_min_value, reg2->u32_min_value); 16495 } else { 16496 reg1->umax_value = min(reg1->umax_value, reg2->umax_value); 16497 reg2->umin_value = max(reg1->umin_value, reg2->umin_value); 16498 } 16499 break; 16500 case BPF_JLT: 16501 if (is_jmp32) { 16502 reg1->u32_max_value = min(reg1->u32_max_value, reg2->u32_max_value - 1); 16503 reg2->u32_min_value = max(reg1->u32_min_value + 1, reg2->u32_min_value); 16504 } else { 16505 reg1->umax_value = min(reg1->umax_value, reg2->umax_value - 1); 16506 reg2->umin_value = max(reg1->umin_value + 1, reg2->umin_value); 16507 } 16508 break; 16509 case BPF_JSLE: 16510 if (is_jmp32) { 16511 reg1->s32_max_value = min(reg1->s32_max_value, reg2->s32_max_value); 16512 reg2->s32_min_value = max(reg1->s32_min_value, reg2->s32_min_value); 16513 } else { 16514 reg1->smax_value = min(reg1->smax_value, reg2->smax_value); 16515 reg2->smin_value = max(reg1->smin_value, reg2->smin_value); 16516 } 16517 break; 16518 case BPF_JSLT: 16519 if (is_jmp32) { 16520 reg1->s32_max_value = min(reg1->s32_max_value, reg2->s32_max_value - 1); 16521 reg2->s32_min_value = max(reg1->s32_min_value + 1, reg2->s32_min_value); 16522 } else { 16523 reg1->smax_value = min(reg1->smax_value, reg2->smax_value - 1); 16524 reg2->smin_value = max(reg1->smin_value + 1, reg2->smin_value); 16525 } 16526 break; 16527 default: 16528 return; 16529 } 16530 } 16531 16532 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg and 16533 * src_reg are both SCALAR_VALUE registers (or we are simply doing a BPF_K 16534 * check, in which case we have a fake SCALAR_VALUE representing insn->imm). 16535 * Technically we can do similar adjustments for pointers to the same object, 16536 * but we don't support that right now. 16537 */ 16538 static int reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16539 struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg1, 16540 struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg2, 16541 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg1, 16542 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg2, 16543 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 16544 { 16545 int err; 16546 16547 /* If either register is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its 16548 * variable offset from the compare (unless they were a pointer into 16549 * the same object, but we don't bother with that). 16550 */ 16551 if (false_reg1->type != SCALAR_VALUE || false_reg2->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 16552 return 0; 16553 16554 /* We compute branch direction for same SCALAR_VALUE registers in 16555 * is_scalar_branch_taken(). For unknown branch directions (e.g., BPF_JSET) 16556 * on the same registers, we don't need to adjust the min/max values. 16557 */ 16558 if (false_reg1 == false_reg2) 16559 return 0; 16560 16561 /* fallthrough (FALSE) branch */ 16562 regs_refine_cond_op(false_reg1, false_reg2, rev_opcode(opcode), is_jmp32); 16563 reg_bounds_sync(false_reg1); 16564 reg_bounds_sync(false_reg2); 16565 16566 /* jump (TRUE) branch */ 16567 regs_refine_cond_op(true_reg1, true_reg2, opcode, is_jmp32); 16568 reg_bounds_sync(true_reg1); 16569 reg_bounds_sync(true_reg2); 16570 16571 err = reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, true_reg1, "true_reg1"); 16572 err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, true_reg2, "true_reg2"); 16573 err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, false_reg1, "false_reg1"); 16574 err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, false_reg2, "false_reg2"); 16575 return err; 16576 } 16577 16578 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, 16579 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id, 16580 bool is_null) 16581 { 16582 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id && 16583 (is_rcu_reg(reg) || !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id))) { 16584 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been 16585 * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on 16586 * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't 16587 * convert the register. 16588 * 16589 * But in some cases, some helpers that return local kptrs 16590 * advance offset for the returned pointer. In those cases, it 16591 * is fine to expect to see reg->off. 16592 */ 16593 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0))) 16594 return; 16595 if (!(type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type) || type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) && 16596 WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->off)) 16597 return; 16598 16599 if (is_null) { 16600 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 16601 /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point 16602 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it, 16603 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect. 16604 */ 16605 reg->id = 0; 16606 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 16607 16608 return; 16609 } 16610 16611 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 16612 16613 if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) { 16614 /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset 16615 * in release_reference(). 16616 * 16617 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other 16618 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset. 16619 */ 16620 reg->id = 0; 16621 } 16622 } 16623 } 16624 16625 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually 16626 * be folded together at some point. 16627 */ 16628 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno, 16629 bool is_null) 16630 { 16631 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 16632 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 16633 u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id; 16634 u32 id = regs[regno].id; 16635 16636 if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null) 16637 /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch. 16638 * No one could have freed the reference state before 16639 * doing the NULL check. 16640 */ 16641 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_nomark(vstate, id)); 16642 16643 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 16644 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null); 16645 })); 16646 } 16647 16648 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn, 16649 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 16650 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 16651 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch, 16652 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch) 16653 { 16654 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X) 16655 return false; 16656 16657 /* Pointers are always 64-bit. */ 16658 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32) 16659 return false; 16660 16661 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 16662 case BPF_JGT: 16663 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 16664 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 16665 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 16666 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 16667 /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */ 16668 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 16669 dst_reg->type, false); 16670 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 16671 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 16672 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 16673 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 16674 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 16675 /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 16676 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 16677 src_reg->type, true); 16678 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 16679 } else { 16680 return false; 16681 } 16682 break; 16683 case BPF_JLT: 16684 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 16685 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 16686 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 16687 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 16688 /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */ 16689 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 16690 dst_reg->type, true); 16691 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 16692 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 16693 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 16694 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 16695 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 16696 /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 16697 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 16698 src_reg->type, false); 16699 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 16700 } else { 16701 return false; 16702 } 16703 break; 16704 case BPF_JGE: 16705 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 16706 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 16707 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 16708 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 16709 /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */ 16710 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 16711 dst_reg->type, true); 16712 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 16713 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 16714 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 16715 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 16716 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 16717 /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */ 16718 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 16719 src_reg->type, false); 16720 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 16721 } else { 16722 return false; 16723 } 16724 break; 16725 case BPF_JLE: 16726 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 16727 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 16728 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 16729 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 16730 /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */ 16731 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 16732 dst_reg->type, false); 16733 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 16734 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 16735 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 16736 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 16737 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 16738 /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */ 16739 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 16740 src_reg->type, true); 16741 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 16742 } else { 16743 return false; 16744 } 16745 break; 16746 default: 16747 return false; 16748 } 16749 16750 return true; 16751 } 16752 16753 static void __collect_linked_regs(struct linked_regs *reg_set, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 16754 u32 id, u32 frameno, u32 spi_or_reg, bool is_reg) 16755 { 16756 struct linked_reg *e; 16757 16758 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || (reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST) != id) 16759 return; 16760 16761 e = linked_regs_push(reg_set); 16762 if (e) { 16763 e->frameno = frameno; 16764 e->is_reg = is_reg; 16765 e->regno = spi_or_reg; 16766 } else { 16767 reg->id = 0; 16768 } 16769 } 16770 16771 /* For all R being scalar registers or spilled scalar registers 16772 * in verifier state, save R in linked_regs if R->id == id. 16773 * If there are too many Rs sharing same id, reset id for leftover Rs. 16774 */ 16775 static void collect_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 id, 16776 struct linked_regs *linked_regs) 16777 { 16778 struct bpf_func_state *func; 16779 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 16780 int i, j; 16781 16782 id = id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST; 16783 for (i = vstate->curframe; i >= 0; i--) { 16784 func = vstate->frame[i]; 16785 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 16786 reg = &func->regs[j]; 16787 __collect_linked_regs(linked_regs, reg, id, i, j, true); 16788 } 16789 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 16790 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 16791 continue; 16792 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 16793 __collect_linked_regs(linked_regs, reg, id, i, j, false); 16794 } 16795 } 16796 } 16797 16798 /* For all R in linked_regs, copy known_reg range into R 16799 * if R->id == known_reg->id. 16800 */ 16801 static void sync_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg, 16802 struct linked_regs *linked_regs) 16803 { 16804 struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg; 16805 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 16806 struct linked_reg *e; 16807 int i; 16808 16809 for (i = 0; i < linked_regs->cnt; ++i) { 16810 e = &linked_regs->entries[i]; 16811 reg = e->is_reg ? &vstate->frame[e->frameno]->regs[e->regno] 16812 : &vstate->frame[e->frameno]->stack[e->spi].spilled_ptr; 16813 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg == known_reg) 16814 continue; 16815 if ((reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST) != (known_reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST)) 16816 continue; 16817 if ((!(reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) && !(known_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST)) || 16818 reg->off == known_reg->off) { 16819 s32 saved_subreg_def = reg->subreg_def; 16820 16821 copy_register_state(reg, known_reg); 16822 reg->subreg_def = saved_subreg_def; 16823 } else { 16824 s32 saved_subreg_def = reg->subreg_def; 16825 s32 saved_off = reg->off; 16826 16827 fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 16828 __mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, (s32)reg->off - (s32)known_reg->off); 16829 16830 /* reg = known_reg; reg += delta */ 16831 copy_register_state(reg, known_reg); 16832 /* 16833 * Must preserve off, id and add_const flag, 16834 * otherwise another sync_linked_regs() will be incorrect. 16835 */ 16836 reg->off = saved_off; 16837 reg->subreg_def = saved_subreg_def; 16838 16839 scalar32_min_max_add(reg, &fake_reg); 16840 scalar_min_max_add(reg, &fake_reg); 16841 reg->var_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, fake_reg.var_off); 16842 } 16843 } 16844 } 16845 16846 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16847 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) 16848 { 16849 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; 16850 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; 16851 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; 16852 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL; 16853 struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs; 16854 struct linked_regs linked_regs = {}; 16855 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 16856 int insn_flags = 0; 16857 bool is_jmp32; 16858 int pred = -1; 16859 int err; 16860 16861 /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ 16862 if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JCOND) { 16863 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode); 16864 return -EINVAL; 16865 } 16866 16867 if (opcode == BPF_JCOND) { 16868 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st, *prev_st; 16869 int idx = *insn_idx; 16870 16871 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND) || 16872 insn->src_reg != BPF_MAY_GOTO || 16873 insn->dst_reg || insn->imm) { 16874 verbose(env, "invalid may_goto imm %d\n", insn->imm); 16875 return -EINVAL; 16876 } 16877 prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, cur_st->parent, idx); 16878 16879 /* branch out 'fallthrough' insn as a new state to explore */ 16880 queued_st = push_stack(env, idx + 1, idx, false); 16881 if (IS_ERR(queued_st)) 16882 return PTR_ERR(queued_st); 16883 16884 queued_st->may_goto_depth++; 16885 if (prev_st) 16886 widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st); 16887 *insn_idx += insn->off; 16888 return 0; 16889 } 16890 16891 /* check src2 operand */ 16892 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 16893 if (err) 16894 return err; 16895 16896 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 16897 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 16898 if (insn->imm != 0) { 16899 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 16900 return -EINVAL; 16901 } 16902 16903 /* check src1 operand */ 16904 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 16905 if (err) 16906 return err; 16907 16908 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 16909 if (!(reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg)) && 16910 is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 16911 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 16912 insn->src_reg); 16913 return -EACCES; 16914 } 16915 16916 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) 16917 insn_flags |= INSN_F_SRC_REG_STACK; 16918 if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) 16919 insn_flags |= INSN_F_DST_REG_STACK; 16920 } else { 16921 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 16922 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 16923 return -EINVAL; 16924 } 16925 src_reg = &env->fake_reg[0]; 16926 memset(src_reg, 0, sizeof(*src_reg)); 16927 src_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 16928 __mark_reg_known(src_reg, insn->imm); 16929 16930 if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) 16931 insn_flags |= INSN_F_DST_REG_STACK; 16932 } 16933 16934 if (insn_flags) { 16935 err = push_jmp_history(env, this_branch, insn_flags, 0); 16936 if (err) 16937 return err; 16938 } 16939 16940 is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32; 16941 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode, is_jmp32); 16942 if (pred >= 0) { 16943 /* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because 16944 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison. 16945 */ 16946 if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg)) 16947 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 16948 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err && 16949 !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg)) 16950 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 16951 if (err) 16952 return err; 16953 } 16954 16955 if (pred == 1) { 16956 /* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push 16957 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative 16958 * execution. 16959 */ 16960 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 16961 err = sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1, *insn_idx); 16962 if (err < 0) 16963 return err; 16964 } 16965 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 16966 print_insn_state(env, this_branch, this_branch->curframe); 16967 *insn_idx += insn->off; 16968 return 0; 16969 } else if (pred == 0) { 16970 /* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the 16971 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for 16972 * simulation under speculative execution. 16973 */ 16974 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 16975 err = sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, 16976 *insn_idx); 16977 if (err < 0) 16978 return err; 16979 } 16980 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 16981 print_insn_state(env, this_branch, this_branch->curframe); 16982 return 0; 16983 } 16984 16985 /* Push scalar registers sharing same ID to jump history, 16986 * do this before creating 'other_branch', so that both 16987 * 'this_branch' and 'other_branch' share this history 16988 * if parent state is created. 16989 */ 16990 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && src_reg->id) 16991 collect_linked_regs(this_branch, src_reg->id, &linked_regs); 16992 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id) 16993 collect_linked_regs(this_branch, dst_reg->id, &linked_regs); 16994 if (linked_regs.cnt > 1) { 16995 err = push_jmp_history(env, this_branch, 0, linked_regs_pack(&linked_regs)); 16996 if (err) 16997 return err; 16998 } 16999 17000 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, false); 17001 if (IS_ERR(other_branch)) 17002 return PTR_ERR(other_branch); 17003 other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs; 17004 17005 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 17006 err = reg_set_min_max(env, 17007 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 17008 &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 17009 dst_reg, src_reg, opcode, is_jmp32); 17010 } else /* BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K */ { 17011 /* reg_set_min_max() can mangle the fake_reg. Make a copy 17012 * so that these are two different memory locations. The 17013 * src_reg is not used beyond here in context of K. 17014 */ 17015 memcpy(&env->fake_reg[1], &env->fake_reg[0], 17016 sizeof(env->fake_reg[0])); 17017 err = reg_set_min_max(env, 17018 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 17019 &env->fake_reg[0], 17020 dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[1], 17021 opcode, is_jmp32); 17022 } 17023 if (err) 17024 return err; 17025 17026 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && 17027 src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && src_reg->id && 17028 !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) { 17029 sync_linked_regs(this_branch, src_reg, &linked_regs); 17030 sync_linked_regs(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], &linked_regs); 17031 } 17032 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id && 17033 !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) { 17034 sync_linked_regs(this_branch, dst_reg, &linked_regs); 17035 sync_linked_regs(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], &linked_regs); 17036 } 17037 17038 /* if one pointer register is compared to another pointer 17039 * register check if PTR_MAYBE_NULL could be lifted. 17040 * E.g. register A - maybe null 17041 * register B - not null 17042 * for JNE A, B, ... - A is not null in the false branch; 17043 * for JEQ A, B, ... - A is not null in the true branch. 17044 * 17045 * Since PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to a kernel struct that does 17046 * not need to be null checked by the BPF program, i.e., 17047 * could be null even without PTR_MAYBE_NULL marking, so 17048 * only propagate nullness when neither reg is that type. 17049 */ 17050 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && 17051 __is_pointer_value(false, src_reg) && __is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg) && 17052 type_may_be_null(src_reg->type) != type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type) && 17053 base_type(src_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 17054 base_type(dst_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 17055 eq_branch_regs = NULL; 17056 switch (opcode) { 17057 case BPF_JEQ: 17058 eq_branch_regs = other_branch_regs; 17059 break; 17060 case BPF_JNE: 17061 eq_branch_regs = regs; 17062 break; 17063 default: 17064 /* do nothing */ 17065 break; 17066 } 17067 if (eq_branch_regs) { 17068 if (type_may_be_null(src_reg->type)) 17069 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 17070 else 17071 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 17072 } 17073 } 17074 17075 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem(). 17076 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison 17077 * which will never be JMP32. 17078 */ 17079 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && 17080 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && 17081 type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) { 17082 /* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either 17083 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. 17084 */ 17085 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, 17086 opcode == BPF_JNE); 17087 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, 17088 opcode == BPF_JEQ); 17089 } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg], 17090 this_branch, other_branch) && 17091 is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 17092 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 17093 insn->dst_reg); 17094 return -EACCES; 17095 } 17096 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 17097 print_insn_state(env, this_branch, this_branch->curframe); 17098 return 0; 17099 } 17100 17101 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 17102 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 17103 { 17104 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 17105 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 17106 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; 17107 struct bpf_map *map; 17108 int err; 17109 17110 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 17111 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); 17112 return -EINVAL; 17113 } 17114 if (insn->off != 0) { 17115 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); 17116 return -EINVAL; 17117 } 17118 17119 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 17120 if (err) 17121 return err; 17122 17123 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 17124 if (insn->src_reg == 0) { 17125 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; 17126 17127 dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 17128 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); 17129 return 0; 17130 } 17131 17132 /* All special src_reg cases are listed below. From this point onwards 17133 * we either succeed and assign a corresponding dst_reg->type after 17134 * zeroing the offset, or fail and reject the program. 17135 */ 17136 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 17137 17138 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 17139 dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type; 17140 switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) { 17141 case PTR_TO_MEM: 17142 dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size; 17143 break; 17144 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 17145 dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf; 17146 dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id; 17147 break; 17148 default: 17149 verifier_bug(env, "pseudo btf id: unexpected dst reg type"); 17150 return -EFAULT; 17151 } 17152 return 0; 17153 } 17154 17155 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 17156 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 17157 u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env, 17158 env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1); 17159 17160 if (!aux->func_info) { 17161 verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n"); 17162 return -EINVAL; 17163 } 17164 if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) { 17165 verbose(env, "callback function not static\n"); 17166 return -EINVAL; 17167 } 17168 17169 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 17170 dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno; 17171 return 0; 17172 } 17173 17174 map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; 17175 dst_reg->map_ptr = map; 17176 17177 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE || 17178 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) { 17179 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA) { 17180 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 17181 return 0; 17182 } 17183 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 17184 dst_reg->off = aux->map_off; 17185 WARN_ON_ONCE(map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY && 17186 map->max_entries != 1); 17187 /* We want reg->id to be same (0) as map_value is not distinct */ 17188 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 17189 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 17190 dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 17191 } else { 17192 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected src reg value for ldimm64"); 17193 return -EFAULT; 17194 } 17195 17196 return 0; 17197 } 17198 17199 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) 17200 { 17201 switch (type) { 17202 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 17203 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 17204 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 17205 return true; 17206 default: 17207 return false; 17208 } 17209 } 17210 17211 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: 17212 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb 17213 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, 17214 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 17215 * 17216 * Implicit input: 17217 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX 17218 * 17219 * Explicit input: 17220 * SRC == any register 17221 * IMM == 32-bit immediate 17222 * 17223 * Output: 17224 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness 17225 */ 17226 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 17227 { 17228 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 17229 static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6; 17230 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 17231 int i, err; 17232 17233 if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) { 17234 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); 17235 return -EINVAL; 17236 } 17237 17238 if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { 17239 verifier_bug(env, "gen_ld_abs is null"); 17240 return -EFAULT; 17241 } 17242 17243 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 17244 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || 17245 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { 17246 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); 17247 return -EINVAL; 17248 } 17249 17250 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ 17251 err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP); 17252 if (err) 17253 return err; 17254 17255 /* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as 17256 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to 17257 * reference leak. 17258 */ 17259 err = check_resource_leak(env, false, true, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND]"); 17260 if (err) 17261 return err; 17262 17263 if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 17264 verbose(env, 17265 "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); 17266 return -EINVAL; 17267 } 17268 17269 if (mode == BPF_IND) { 17270 /* check explicit source operand */ 17271 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 17272 if (err) 17273 return err; 17274 } 17275 17276 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); 17277 if (err < 0) 17278 return err; 17279 17280 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ 17281 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 17282 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 17283 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 17284 } 17285 17286 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains 17287 * the value fetched from the packet. 17288 * Already marked as written above. 17289 */ 17290 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 17291 /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ 17292 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 17293 return 0; 17294 } 17295 17296 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, const char *reg_name) 17297 { 17298 const char *exit_ctx = "At program exit"; 17299 struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown; 17300 const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 17301 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 17302 struct bpf_retval_range range = retval_range(0, 1); 17303 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 17304 int err; 17305 struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0]; 17306 const bool is_subprog = frame->subprogno; 17307 bool return_32bit = false; 17308 const struct btf_type *reg_type, *ret_type = NULL; 17309 17310 /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ 17311 if (!is_subprog || frame->in_exception_callback_fn) { 17312 switch (prog_type) { 17313 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 17314 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) 17315 /* See below, can be 0 or 0-1 depending on hook. */ 17316 break; 17317 if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 17318 return 0; 17319 break; 17320 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: 17321 if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 17322 return 0; 17323 17324 if (frame->in_exception_callback_fn) 17325 break; 17326 17327 /* Allow a struct_ops program to return a referenced kptr if it 17328 * matches the operator's return type and is in its unmodified 17329 * form. A scalar zero (i.e., a null pointer) is also allowed. 17330 */ 17331 reg_type = reg->btf ? btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id) : NULL; 17332 ret_type = btf_type_resolve_ptr(prog->aux->attach_btf, 17333 prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type, 17334 NULL); 17335 if (ret_type && ret_type == reg_type && reg->ref_obj_id) 17336 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 17337 break; 17338 default: 17339 break; 17340 } 17341 } 17342 17343 /* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used 17344 * to return the value from eBPF program. 17345 * Make sure that it's readable at this time 17346 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote 17347 * something into it earlier 17348 */ 17349 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 17350 if (err) 17351 return err; 17352 17353 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 17354 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr as return value\n", regno); 17355 return -EACCES; 17356 } 17357 17358 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn) { 17359 exit_ctx = "At async callback return"; 17360 range = frame->callback_ret_range; 17361 goto enforce_retval; 17362 } 17363 17364 if (is_subprog && !frame->in_exception_callback_fn) { 17365 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 17366 verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R%d is not a scalar value (%s)\n", 17367 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 17368 return -EINVAL; 17369 } 17370 return 0; 17371 } 17372 17373 switch (prog_type) { 17374 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: 17375 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || 17376 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG || 17377 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_RECVMSG || 17378 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME || 17379 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME || 17380 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME || 17381 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME || 17382 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME || 17383 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME) 17384 range = retval_range(1, 1); 17385 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND || 17386 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND) 17387 range = retval_range(0, 3); 17388 break; 17389 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 17390 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) { 17391 range = retval_range(0, 3); 17392 enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3); 17393 } 17394 break; 17395 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: 17396 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 17397 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: 17398 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: 17399 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 17400 break; 17401 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 17402 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id) 17403 return 0; 17404 range = retval_range(0, 0); 17405 break; 17406 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 17407 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { 17408 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 17409 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 17410 range = retval_range(0, 0); 17411 break; 17412 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 17413 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 17414 return 0; 17415 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 17416 break; 17417 default: 17418 return -ENOTSUPP; 17419 } 17420 break; 17421 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 17422 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { 17423 case BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_SESSION: 17424 case BPF_TRACE_UPROBE_SESSION: 17425 range = retval_range(0, 1); 17426 break; 17427 default: 17428 return 0; 17429 } 17430 break; 17431 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 17432 range = retval_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS); 17433 break; 17434 17435 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 17436 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 17437 /* no range found, any return value is allowed */ 17438 if (!get_func_retval_range(env->prog, &range)) 17439 return 0; 17440 /* no restricted range, any return value is allowed */ 17441 if (range.minval == S32_MIN && range.maxval == S32_MAX) 17442 return 0; 17443 return_32bit = true; 17444 } else if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 17445 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 17446 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 17447 */ 17448 range = retval_range(1, 1); 17449 } 17450 break; 17451 17452 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_NETFILTER: 17453 range = retval_range(NF_DROP, NF_ACCEPT); 17454 break; 17455 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: 17456 if (!ret_type) 17457 return 0; 17458 range = retval_range(0, 0); 17459 break; 17460 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: 17461 /* freplace program can return anything as its return value 17462 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program. 17463 */ 17464 default: 17465 return 0; 17466 } 17467 17468 enforce_retval: 17469 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 17470 verbose(env, "%s the register R%d is not a known value (%s)\n", 17471 exit_ctx, regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 17472 return -EINVAL; 17473 } 17474 17475 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 17476 if (err) 17477 return err; 17478 17479 if (!retval_range_within(range, reg, return_32bit)) { 17480 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, range, exit_ctx, reg_name); 17481 if (!is_subprog && 17482 prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP && 17483 prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 17484 !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 17485 verbose(env, "Note, BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 17486 return -EINVAL; 17487 } 17488 17489 if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) && 17490 tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off)) 17491 env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1; 17492 return 0; 17493 } 17494 17495 static void mark_subprog_changes_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 17496 { 17497 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog; 17498 17499 subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, off); 17500 subprog->changes_pkt_data = true; 17501 } 17502 17503 static void mark_subprog_might_sleep(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 17504 { 17505 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog; 17506 17507 subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, off); 17508 subprog->might_sleep = true; 17509 } 17510 17511 /* 't' is an index of a call-site. 17512 * 'w' is a callee entry point. 17513 * Eventually this function would be called when env->cfg.insn_state[w] == EXPLORED. 17514 * Rely on DFS traversal order and absence of recursive calls to guarantee that 17515 * callee's change_pkt_data marks would be correct at that moment. 17516 */ 17517 static void merge_callee_effects(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int t, int w) 17518 { 17519 struct bpf_subprog_info *caller, *callee; 17520 17521 caller = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, t); 17522 callee = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, w); 17523 caller->changes_pkt_data |= callee->changes_pkt_data; 17524 caller->might_sleep |= callee->might_sleep; 17525 } 17526 17527 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code 17528 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): 17529 * 2 label v as discovered 17530 * 3 let S be a stack 17531 * 4 S.push(v) 17532 * 5 while S is not empty 17533 * 6 t <- S.peek() 17534 * 7 if t is what we're looking for: 17535 * 8 return t 17536 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do 17537 * 10 if edge e is already labelled 17538 * 11 continue with the next edge 17539 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) 17540 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored 17541 * 14 label e as tree-edge 17542 * 15 label w as discovered 17543 * 16 S.push(w) 17544 * 17 continue at 5 17545 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered 17546 * 19 label e as back-edge 17547 * 20 else 17548 * 21 // vertex w is explored 17549 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge 17550 * 23 label t as explored 17551 * 24 S.pop() 17552 * 17553 * convention: 17554 * 0x10 - discovered 17555 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled 17556 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled 17557 * 0x20 - explored 17558 */ 17559 17560 enum { 17561 DISCOVERED = 0x10, 17562 EXPLORED = 0x20, 17563 FALLTHROUGH = 1, 17564 BRANCH = 2, 17565 }; 17566 17567 static void mark_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 17568 { 17569 env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true; 17570 } 17571 17572 static bool is_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 17573 { 17574 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point; 17575 } 17576 17577 static void mark_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 17578 { 17579 env->insn_aux_data[idx].force_checkpoint = true; 17580 } 17581 17582 static bool is_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 17583 { 17584 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].force_checkpoint; 17585 } 17586 17587 static void mark_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 17588 { 17589 env->insn_aux_data[idx].calls_callback = true; 17590 } 17591 17592 bool bpf_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 17593 { 17594 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].calls_callback; 17595 } 17596 17597 enum { 17598 DONE_EXPLORING = 0, 17599 KEEP_EXPLORING = 1, 17600 }; 17601 17602 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: 17603 * t - index of current instruction 17604 * w - next instruction 17605 * e - edge 17606 */ 17607 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17608 { 17609 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; 17610 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; 17611 17612 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) 17613 return DONE_EXPLORING; 17614 17615 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) 17616 return DONE_EXPLORING; 17617 17618 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 17619 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 17620 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 17621 return -EINVAL; 17622 } 17623 17624 if (e == BRANCH) { 17625 /* mark branch target for state pruning */ 17626 mark_prune_point(env, w); 17627 mark_jmp_point(env, w); 17628 } 17629 17630 if (insn_state[w] == 0) { 17631 /* tree-edge */ 17632 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 17633 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; 17634 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 17635 return -E2BIG; 17636 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; 17637 return KEEP_EXPLORING; 17638 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { 17639 if (env->bpf_capable) 17640 return DONE_EXPLORING; 17641 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 17642 verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); 17643 verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 17644 return -EINVAL; 17645 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { 17646 /* forward- or cross-edge */ 17647 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 17648 } else { 17649 verifier_bug(env, "insn state internal bug"); 17650 return -EFAULT; 17651 } 17652 return DONE_EXPLORING; 17653 } 17654 17655 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, struct bpf_insn *insns, 17656 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17657 bool visit_callee) 17658 { 17659 int ret, insn_sz; 17660 int w; 17661 17662 insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[t]) ? 2 : 1; 17663 ret = push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env); 17664 if (ret) 17665 return ret; 17666 17667 mark_prune_point(env, t + insn_sz); 17668 /* when we exit from subprog, we need to record non-linear history */ 17669 mark_jmp_point(env, t + insn_sz); 17670 17671 if (visit_callee) { 17672 w = t + insns[t].imm + 1; 17673 mark_prune_point(env, t); 17674 merge_callee_effects(env, t, w); 17675 ret = push_insn(t, w, BRANCH, env); 17676 } 17677 return ret; 17678 } 17679 17680 /* Bitmask with 1s for all caller saved registers */ 17681 #define ALL_CALLER_SAVED_REGS ((1u << CALLER_SAVED_REGS) - 1) 17682 17683 /* True if do_misc_fixups() replaces calls to helper number 'imm', 17684 * replacement patch is presumed to follow bpf_fastcall contract 17685 * (see mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call() below). 17686 */ 17687 static bool verifier_inlines_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s32 imm) 17688 { 17689 switch (imm) { 17690 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 17691 case BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id: 17692 return env->prog->jit_requested && bpf_jit_supports_percpu_insn(); 17693 #endif 17694 default: 17695 return false; 17696 } 17697 } 17698 17699 struct call_summary { 17700 u8 num_params; 17701 bool is_void; 17702 bool fastcall; 17703 }; 17704 17705 /* If @call is a kfunc or helper call, fills @cs and returns true, 17706 * otherwise returns false. 17707 */ 17708 static bool get_call_summary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *call, 17709 struct call_summary *cs) 17710 { 17711 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 17712 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 17713 int i; 17714 17715 if (bpf_helper_call(call)) { 17716 17717 if (get_helper_proto(env, call->imm, &fn) < 0) 17718 /* error would be reported later */ 17719 return false; 17720 cs->fastcall = fn->allow_fastcall && 17721 (verifier_inlines_helper_call(env, call->imm) || 17722 bpf_jit_inlines_helper_call(call->imm)); 17723 cs->is_void = fn->ret_type == RET_VOID; 17724 cs->num_params = 0; 17725 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); ++i) { 17726 if (fn->arg_type[i] == ARG_DONTCARE) 17727 break; 17728 cs->num_params++; 17729 } 17730 return true; 17731 } 17732 17733 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(call)) { 17734 int err; 17735 17736 err = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, call, &meta, NULL); 17737 if (err < 0) 17738 /* error would be reported later */ 17739 return false; 17740 cs->num_params = btf_type_vlen(meta.func_proto); 17741 cs->fastcall = meta.kfunc_flags & KF_FASTCALL; 17742 cs->is_void = btf_type_is_void(btf_type_by_id(meta.btf, meta.func_proto->type)); 17743 return true; 17744 } 17745 17746 return false; 17747 } 17748 17749 /* LLVM define a bpf_fastcall function attribute. 17750 * This attribute means that function scratches only some of 17751 * the caller saved registers defined by ABI. 17752 * For BPF the set of such registers could be defined as follows: 17753 * - R0 is scratched only if function is non-void; 17754 * - R1-R5 are scratched only if corresponding parameter type is defined 17755 * in the function prototype. 17756 * 17757 * The contract between kernel and clang allows to simultaneously use 17758 * such functions and maintain backwards compatibility with old 17759 * kernels that don't understand bpf_fastcall calls: 17760 * 17761 * - for bpf_fastcall calls clang allocates registers as-if relevant r0-r5 17762 * registers are not scratched by the call; 17763 * 17764 * - as a post-processing step, clang visits each bpf_fastcall call and adds 17765 * spill/fill for every live r0-r5; 17766 * 17767 * - stack offsets used for the spill/fill are allocated as lowest 17768 * stack offsets in whole function and are not used for any other 17769 * purposes; 17770 * 17771 * - when kernel loads a program, it looks for such patterns 17772 * (bpf_fastcall function surrounded by spills/fills) and checks if 17773 * spill/fill stack offsets are used exclusively in fastcall patterns; 17774 * 17775 * - if so, and if verifier or current JIT inlines the call to the 17776 * bpf_fastcall function (e.g. a helper call), kernel removes unnecessary 17777 * spill/fill pairs; 17778 * 17779 * - when old kernel loads a program, presence of spill/fill pairs 17780 * keeps BPF program valid, albeit slightly less efficient. 17781 * 17782 * For example: 17783 * 17784 * r1 = 1; 17785 * r2 = 2; 17786 * *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1; r1 = 1; 17787 * *(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r2; r2 = 2; 17788 * call %[to_be_inlined] --> call %[to_be_inlined] 17789 * r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 16); r0 = r1; 17790 * r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 += r2; 17791 * r0 = r1; exit; 17792 * r0 += r2; 17793 * exit; 17794 * 17795 * The purpose of mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call is to: 17796 * - look for such patterns; 17797 * - mark spill and fill instructions in env->insn_aux_data[*].fastcall_pattern; 17798 * - mark set env->insn_aux_data[*].fastcall_spills_num for call instruction; 17799 * - update env->subprog_info[*]->fastcall_stack_off to find an offset 17800 * at which bpf_fastcall spill/fill stack slots start; 17801 * - update env->subprog_info[*]->keep_fastcall_stack. 17802 * 17803 * The .fastcall_pattern and .fastcall_stack_off are used by 17804 * check_fastcall_stack_contract() to check if every stack access to 17805 * fastcall spill/fill stack slot originates from spill/fill 17806 * instructions, members of fastcall patterns. 17807 * 17808 * If such condition holds true for a subprogram, fastcall patterns could 17809 * be rewritten by remove_fastcall_spills_fills(). 17810 * Otherwise bpf_fastcall patterns are not changed in the subprogram 17811 * (code, presumably, generated by an older clang version). 17812 * 17813 * For example, it is *not* safe to remove spill/fill below: 17814 * 17815 * r1 = 1; 17816 * *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1; r1 = 1; 17817 * call %[to_be_inlined] --> call %[to_be_inlined] 17818 * r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); <---- wrong !!! 17819 * r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 += r1; 17820 * r0 += r1; exit; 17821 * exit; 17822 */ 17823 static void mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 17824 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog, 17825 int insn_idx, s16 lowest_off) 17826 { 17827 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi, *stx, *ldx; 17828 struct bpf_insn *call = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 17829 u32 clobbered_regs_mask; 17830 struct call_summary cs; 17831 u32 expected_regs_mask; 17832 s16 off; 17833 int i; 17834 17835 if (!get_call_summary(env, call, &cs)) 17836 return; 17837 17838 /* A bitmask specifying which caller saved registers are clobbered 17839 * by a call to a helper/kfunc *as if* this helper/kfunc follows 17840 * bpf_fastcall contract: 17841 * - includes R0 if function is non-void; 17842 * - includes R1-R5 if corresponding parameter has is described 17843 * in the function prototype. 17844 */ 17845 clobbered_regs_mask = GENMASK(cs.num_params, cs.is_void ? 1 : 0); 17846 /* e.g. if helper call clobbers r{0,1}, expect r{2,3,4,5} in the pattern */ 17847 expected_regs_mask = ~clobbered_regs_mask & ALL_CALLER_SAVED_REGS; 17848 17849 /* match pairs of form: 17850 * 17851 * *(u64 *)(r10 - Y) = rX (where Y % 8 == 0) 17852 * ... 17853 * call %[to_be_inlined] 17854 * ... 17855 * rX = *(u64 *)(r10 - Y) 17856 */ 17857 for (i = 1, off = lowest_off; i <= ARRAY_SIZE(caller_saved); ++i, off += BPF_REG_SIZE) { 17858 if (insn_idx - i < 0 || insn_idx + i >= env->prog->len) 17859 break; 17860 stx = &insns[insn_idx - i]; 17861 ldx = &insns[insn_idx + i]; 17862 /* must be a stack spill/fill pair */ 17863 if (stx->code != (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 17864 ldx->code != (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 17865 stx->dst_reg != BPF_REG_10 || 17866 ldx->src_reg != BPF_REG_10) 17867 break; 17868 /* must be a spill/fill for the same reg */ 17869 if (stx->src_reg != ldx->dst_reg) 17870 break; 17871 /* must be one of the previously unseen registers */ 17872 if ((BIT(stx->src_reg) & expected_regs_mask) == 0) 17873 break; 17874 /* must be a spill/fill for the same expected offset, 17875 * no need to check offset alignment, BPF_DW stack access 17876 * is always 8-byte aligned. 17877 */ 17878 if (stx->off != off || ldx->off != off) 17879 break; 17880 expected_regs_mask &= ~BIT(stx->src_reg); 17881 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx - i].fastcall_pattern = 1; 17882 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx + i].fastcall_pattern = 1; 17883 } 17884 if (i == 1) 17885 return; 17886 17887 /* Conditionally set 'fastcall_spills_num' to allow forward 17888 * compatibility when more helper functions are marked as 17889 * bpf_fastcall at compile time than current kernel supports, e.g: 17890 * 17891 * 1: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1 17892 * 2: call A ;; assume A is bpf_fastcall for current kernel 17893 * 3: r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) 17894 * 4: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1 17895 * 5: call B ;; assume B is not bpf_fastcall for current kernel 17896 * 6: r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) 17897 * 17898 * There is no need to block bpf_fastcall rewrite for such program. 17899 * Set 'fastcall_pattern' for both calls to keep check_fastcall_stack_contract() happy, 17900 * don't set 'fastcall_spills_num' for call B so that remove_fastcall_spills_fills() 17901 * does not remove spill/fill pair {4,6}. 17902 */ 17903 if (cs.fastcall) 17904 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].fastcall_spills_num = i - 1; 17905 else 17906 subprog->keep_fastcall_stack = 1; 17907 subprog->fastcall_stack_off = min(subprog->fastcall_stack_off, off); 17908 } 17909 17910 static int mark_fastcall_patterns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 17911 { 17912 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 17913 struct bpf_insn *insn; 17914 s16 lowest_off; 17915 int s, i; 17916 17917 for (s = 0; s < env->subprog_cnt; ++s, ++subprog) { 17918 /* find lowest stack spill offset used in this subprog */ 17919 lowest_off = 0; 17920 for (i = subprog->start; i < (subprog + 1)->start; ++i) { 17921 insn = env->prog->insnsi + i; 17922 if (insn->code != (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 17923 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_10) 17924 continue; 17925 lowest_off = min(lowest_off, insn->off); 17926 } 17927 /* use this offset to find fastcall patterns */ 17928 for (i = subprog->start; i < (subprog + 1)->start; ++i) { 17929 insn = env->prog->insnsi + i; 17930 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 17931 continue; 17932 mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call(env, subprog, i, lowest_off); 17933 } 17934 } 17935 return 0; 17936 } 17937 17938 static struct bpf_iarray *iarray_realloc(struct bpf_iarray *old, size_t n_elem) 17939 { 17940 size_t new_size = sizeof(struct bpf_iarray) + n_elem * sizeof(old->items[0]); 17941 struct bpf_iarray *new; 17942 17943 new = kvrealloc(old, new_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 17944 if (!new) { 17945 /* this is what callers always want, so simplify the call site */ 17946 kvfree(old); 17947 return NULL; 17948 } 17949 17950 new->cnt = n_elem; 17951 return new; 17952 } 17953 17954 static int copy_insn_array(struct bpf_map *map, u32 start, u32 end, u32 *items) 17955 { 17956 struct bpf_insn_array_value *value; 17957 u32 i; 17958 17959 for (i = start; i <= end; i++) { 17960 value = map->ops->map_lookup_elem(map, &i); 17961 /* 17962 * map_lookup_elem of an array map will never return an error, 17963 * but not checking it makes some static analysers to worry 17964 */ 17965 if (IS_ERR(value)) 17966 return PTR_ERR(value); 17967 else if (!value) 17968 return -EINVAL; 17969 items[i - start] = value->xlated_off; 17970 } 17971 return 0; 17972 } 17973 17974 static int cmp_ptr_to_u32(const void *a, const void *b) 17975 { 17976 return *(u32 *)a - *(u32 *)b; 17977 } 17978 17979 static int sort_insn_array_uniq(u32 *items, int cnt) 17980 { 17981 int unique = 1; 17982 int i; 17983 17984 sort(items, cnt, sizeof(items[0]), cmp_ptr_to_u32, NULL); 17985 17986 for (i = 1; i < cnt; i++) 17987 if (items[i] != items[unique - 1]) 17988 items[unique++] = items[i]; 17989 17990 return unique; 17991 } 17992 17993 /* 17994 * sort_unique({map[start], ..., map[end]}) into off 17995 */ 17996 static int copy_insn_array_uniq(struct bpf_map *map, u32 start, u32 end, u32 *off) 17997 { 17998 u32 n = end - start + 1; 17999 int err; 18000 18001 err = copy_insn_array(map, start, end, off); 18002 if (err) 18003 return err; 18004 18005 return sort_insn_array_uniq(off, n); 18006 } 18007 18008 /* 18009 * Copy all unique offsets from the map 18010 */ 18011 static struct bpf_iarray *jt_from_map(struct bpf_map *map) 18012 { 18013 struct bpf_iarray *jt; 18014 int err; 18015 int n; 18016 18017 jt = iarray_realloc(NULL, map->max_entries); 18018 if (!jt) 18019 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 18020 18021 n = copy_insn_array_uniq(map, 0, map->max_entries - 1, jt->items); 18022 if (n < 0) { 18023 err = n; 18024 goto err_free; 18025 } 18026 if (n == 0) { 18027 err = -EINVAL; 18028 goto err_free; 18029 } 18030 jt->cnt = n; 18031 return jt; 18032 18033 err_free: 18034 kvfree(jt); 18035 return ERR_PTR(err); 18036 } 18037 18038 /* 18039 * Find and collect all maps which fit in the subprog. Return the result as one 18040 * combined jump table in jt->items (allocated with kvcalloc) 18041 */ 18042 static struct bpf_iarray *jt_from_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18043 int subprog_start, int subprog_end) 18044 { 18045 struct bpf_iarray *jt = NULL; 18046 struct bpf_map *map; 18047 struct bpf_iarray *jt_cur; 18048 int i; 18049 18050 for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++) { 18051 /* 18052 * TODO (when needed): collect only jump tables, not static keys 18053 * or maps for indirect calls 18054 */ 18055 map = env->insn_array_maps[i]; 18056 18057 jt_cur = jt_from_map(map); 18058 if (IS_ERR(jt_cur)) { 18059 kvfree(jt); 18060 return jt_cur; 18061 } 18062 18063 /* 18064 * This is enough to check one element. The full table is 18065 * checked to fit inside the subprog later in create_jt() 18066 */ 18067 if (jt_cur->items[0] >= subprog_start && jt_cur->items[0] < subprog_end) { 18068 u32 old_cnt = jt ? jt->cnt : 0; 18069 jt = iarray_realloc(jt, old_cnt + jt_cur->cnt); 18070 if (!jt) { 18071 kvfree(jt_cur); 18072 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 18073 } 18074 memcpy(jt->items + old_cnt, jt_cur->items, jt_cur->cnt << 2); 18075 } 18076 18077 kvfree(jt_cur); 18078 } 18079 18080 if (!jt) { 18081 verbose(env, "no jump tables found for subprog starting at %u\n", subprog_start); 18082 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 18083 } 18084 18085 jt->cnt = sort_insn_array_uniq(jt->items, jt->cnt); 18086 return jt; 18087 } 18088 18089 static struct bpf_iarray * 18090 create_jt(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18091 { 18092 static struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog; 18093 int subprog_start, subprog_end; 18094 struct bpf_iarray *jt; 18095 int i; 18096 18097 subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, t); 18098 subprog_start = subprog->start; 18099 subprog_end = (subprog + 1)->start; 18100 jt = jt_from_subprog(env, subprog_start, subprog_end); 18101 if (IS_ERR(jt)) 18102 return jt; 18103 18104 /* Check that the every element of the jump table fits within the given subprogram */ 18105 for (i = 0; i < jt->cnt; i++) { 18106 if (jt->items[i] < subprog_start || jt->items[i] >= subprog_end) { 18107 verbose(env, "jump table for insn %d points outside of the subprog [%u,%u]\n", 18108 t, subprog_start, subprog_end); 18109 kvfree(jt); 18110 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 18111 } 18112 } 18113 18114 return jt; 18115 } 18116 18117 /* "conditional jump with N edges" */ 18118 static int visit_gotox_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18119 { 18120 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; 18121 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; 18122 bool keep_exploring = false; 18123 struct bpf_iarray *jt; 18124 int i, w; 18125 18126 jt = env->insn_aux_data[t].jt; 18127 if (!jt) { 18128 jt = create_jt(t, env); 18129 if (IS_ERR(jt)) 18130 return PTR_ERR(jt); 18131 18132 env->insn_aux_data[t].jt = jt; 18133 } 18134 18135 mark_prune_point(env, t); 18136 for (i = 0; i < jt->cnt; i++) { 18137 w = jt->items[i]; 18138 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 18139 verbose(env, "indirect jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 18140 return -EINVAL; 18141 } 18142 18143 mark_jmp_point(env, w); 18144 18145 /* EXPLORED || DISCOVERED */ 18146 if (insn_state[w]) 18147 continue; 18148 18149 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 18150 return -E2BIG; 18151 18152 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; 18153 insn_state[w] |= DISCOVERED; 18154 keep_exploring = true; 18155 } 18156 18157 return keep_exploring ? KEEP_EXPLORING : DONE_EXPLORING; 18158 } 18159 18160 static int visit_tailcall_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int t) 18161 { 18162 static struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog; 18163 struct bpf_iarray *jt; 18164 18165 if (env->insn_aux_data[t].jt) 18166 return 0; 18167 18168 jt = iarray_realloc(NULL, 2); 18169 if (!jt) 18170 return -ENOMEM; 18171 18172 subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, t); 18173 jt->items[0] = t + 1; 18174 jt->items[1] = subprog->exit_idx; 18175 env->insn_aux_data[t].jt = jt; 18176 return 0; 18177 } 18178 18179 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following: 18180 * < 0 - an error occurred 18181 * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored 18182 * KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored 18183 */ 18184 static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18185 { 18186 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi, *insn = &insns[t]; 18187 int ret, off, insn_sz; 18188 18189 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) 18190 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, true); 18191 18192 /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */ 18193 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP && 18194 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP32) { 18195 insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(insn) ? 2 : 1; 18196 return push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env); 18197 } 18198 18199 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 18200 case BPF_EXIT: 18201 return DONE_EXPLORING; 18202 18203 case BPF_CALL: 18204 if (is_async_callback_calling_insn(insn)) 18205 /* Mark this call insn as a prune point to trigger 18206 * is_state_visited() check before call itself is 18207 * processed by __check_func_call(). Otherwise new 18208 * async state will be pushed for further exploration. 18209 */ 18210 mark_prune_point(env, t); 18211 /* For functions that invoke callbacks it is not known how many times 18212 * callback would be called. Verifier models callback calling functions 18213 * by repeatedly visiting callback bodies and returning to origin call 18214 * instruction. 18215 * In order to stop such iteration verifier needs to identify when a 18216 * state identical some state from a previous iteration is reached. 18217 * Check below forces creation of checkpoint before callback calling 18218 * instruction to allow search for such identical states. 18219 */ 18220 if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn)) { 18221 mark_calls_callback(env, t); 18222 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); 18223 mark_prune_point(env, t); 18224 mark_jmp_point(env, t); 18225 } 18226 if (bpf_helper_call(insn)) { 18227 const struct bpf_func_proto *fp; 18228 18229 ret = get_helper_proto(env, insn->imm, &fp); 18230 /* If called in a non-sleepable context program will be 18231 * rejected anyway, so we should end up with precise 18232 * sleepable marks on subprogs, except for dead code 18233 * elimination. 18234 */ 18235 if (ret == 0 && fp->might_sleep) 18236 mark_subprog_might_sleep(env, t); 18237 if (bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(insn->imm)) 18238 mark_subprog_changes_pkt_data(env, t); 18239 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 18240 visit_tailcall_insn(env, t); 18241 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 18242 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 18243 18244 ret = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, insn, &meta, NULL); 18245 if (ret == 0 && is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) { 18246 mark_prune_point(env, t); 18247 /* Checking and saving state checkpoints at iter_next() call 18248 * is crucial for fast convergence of open-coded iterator loop 18249 * logic, so we need to force it. If we don't do that, 18250 * is_state_visited() might skip saving a checkpoint, causing 18251 * unnecessarily long sequence of not checkpointed 18252 * instructions and jumps, leading to exhaustion of jump 18253 * history buffer, and potentially other undesired outcomes. 18254 * It is expected that with correct open-coded iterators 18255 * convergence will happen quickly, so we don't run a risk of 18256 * exhausting memory. 18257 */ 18258 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); 18259 } 18260 /* Same as helpers, if called in a non-sleepable context 18261 * program will be rejected anyway, so we should end up 18262 * with precise sleepable marks on subprogs, except for 18263 * dead code elimination. 18264 */ 18265 if (ret == 0 && is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta)) 18266 mark_subprog_might_sleep(env, t); 18267 if (ret == 0 && is_kfunc_pkt_changing(&meta)) 18268 mark_subprog_changes_pkt_data(env, t); 18269 } 18270 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL); 18271 18272 case BPF_JA: 18273 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) 18274 return visit_gotox_insn(t, env); 18275 18276 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP) 18277 off = insn->off; 18278 else 18279 off = insn->imm; 18280 18281 /* unconditional jump with single edge */ 18282 ret = push_insn(t, t + off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); 18283 if (ret) 18284 return ret; 18285 18286 mark_prune_point(env, t + off + 1); 18287 mark_jmp_point(env, t + off + 1); 18288 18289 return ret; 18290 18291 default: 18292 /* conditional jump with two edges */ 18293 mark_prune_point(env, t); 18294 if (is_may_goto_insn(insn)) 18295 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); 18296 18297 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env); 18298 if (ret) 18299 return ret; 18300 18301 return push_insn(t, t + insn->off + 1, BRANCH, env); 18302 } 18303 } 18304 18305 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program 18306 * loop == back-edge in directed graph 18307 */ 18308 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18309 { 18310 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 18311 int *insn_stack, *insn_state; 18312 int ex_insn_beg, i, ret = 0; 18313 18314 insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 18315 if (!insn_state) 18316 return -ENOMEM; 18317 18318 insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 18319 if (!insn_stack) { 18320 kvfree(insn_state); 18321 return -ENOMEM; 18322 } 18323 18324 ex_insn_beg = env->exception_callback_subprog 18325 ? env->subprog_info[env->exception_callback_subprog].start 18326 : 0; 18327 18328 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ 18329 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ 18330 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; 18331 18332 walk_cfg: 18333 while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) { 18334 int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; 18335 18336 ret = visit_insn(t, env); 18337 switch (ret) { 18338 case DONE_EXPLORING: 18339 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; 18340 env->cfg.cur_stack--; 18341 break; 18342 case KEEP_EXPLORING: 18343 break; 18344 default: 18345 if (ret > 0) { 18346 verifier_bug(env, "visit_insn internal bug"); 18347 ret = -EFAULT; 18348 } 18349 goto err_free; 18350 } 18351 } 18352 18353 if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) { 18354 verifier_bug(env, "pop stack internal bug"); 18355 ret = -EFAULT; 18356 goto err_free; 18357 } 18358 18359 if (ex_insn_beg && insn_state[ex_insn_beg] != EXPLORED) { 18360 insn_state[ex_insn_beg] = DISCOVERED; 18361 insn_stack[0] = ex_insn_beg; 18362 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; 18363 goto walk_cfg; 18364 } 18365 18366 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 18367 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[i]; 18368 18369 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { 18370 verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); 18371 ret = -EINVAL; 18372 goto err_free; 18373 } 18374 if (bpf_is_ldimm64(insn)) { 18375 if (insn_state[i + 1] != 0) { 18376 verbose(env, "jump into the middle of ldimm64 insn %d\n", i); 18377 ret = -EINVAL; 18378 goto err_free; 18379 } 18380 i++; /* skip second half of ldimm64 */ 18381 } 18382 } 18383 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ 18384 env->prog->aux->changes_pkt_data = env->subprog_info[0].changes_pkt_data; 18385 env->prog->aux->might_sleep = env->subprog_info[0].might_sleep; 18386 18387 err_free: 18388 kvfree(insn_state); 18389 kvfree(insn_stack); 18390 env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL; 18391 return ret; 18392 } 18393 18394 /* 18395 * For each subprogram 'i' fill array env->cfg.insn_subprogram sub-range 18396 * [env->subprog_info[i].postorder_start, env->subprog_info[i+1].postorder_start) 18397 * with indices of 'i' instructions in postorder. 18398 */ 18399 static int compute_postorder(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18400 { 18401 u32 cur_postorder, i, top, stack_sz, s; 18402 int *stack = NULL, *postorder = NULL, *state = NULL; 18403 struct bpf_iarray *succ; 18404 18405 postorder = kvcalloc(env->prog->len, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 18406 state = kvcalloc(env->prog->len, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 18407 stack = kvcalloc(env->prog->len, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 18408 if (!postorder || !state || !stack) { 18409 kvfree(postorder); 18410 kvfree(state); 18411 kvfree(stack); 18412 return -ENOMEM; 18413 } 18414 cur_postorder = 0; 18415 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18416 env->subprog_info[i].postorder_start = cur_postorder; 18417 stack[0] = env->subprog_info[i].start; 18418 stack_sz = 1; 18419 do { 18420 top = stack[stack_sz - 1]; 18421 state[top] |= DISCOVERED; 18422 if (state[top] & EXPLORED) { 18423 postorder[cur_postorder++] = top; 18424 stack_sz--; 18425 continue; 18426 } 18427 succ = bpf_insn_successors(env, top); 18428 for (s = 0; s < succ->cnt; ++s) { 18429 if (!state[succ->items[s]]) { 18430 stack[stack_sz++] = succ->items[s]; 18431 state[succ->items[s]] |= DISCOVERED; 18432 } 18433 } 18434 state[top] |= EXPLORED; 18435 } while (stack_sz); 18436 } 18437 env->subprog_info[i].postorder_start = cur_postorder; 18438 env->cfg.insn_postorder = postorder; 18439 env->cfg.cur_postorder = cur_postorder; 18440 kvfree(stack); 18441 kvfree(state); 18442 return 0; 18443 } 18444 18445 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18446 { 18447 int i; 18448 18449 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 18450 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 18451 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 18452 return -EINVAL; 18453 } 18454 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 18455 verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 18456 return -EINVAL; 18457 } 18458 } 18459 return 0; 18460 } 18461 18462 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */ 18463 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8 18464 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252 18465 18466 static int check_btf_func_early(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18467 const union bpf_attr *attr, 18468 bpfptr_t uattr) 18469 { 18470 u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info); 18471 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto; 18472 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size; 18473 struct bpf_func_info *krecord; 18474 struct bpf_prog *prog; 18475 const struct btf *btf; 18476 u32 prev_offset = 0; 18477 bpfptr_t urecord; 18478 int ret = -ENOMEM; 18479 18480 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; 18481 if (!nfuncs) { 18482 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 18483 return -EINVAL; 18484 return 0; 18485 } 18486 18487 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; 18488 if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE || 18489 urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE || 18490 urec_size % sizeof(u32)) { 18491 verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size); 18492 return -EINVAL; 18493 } 18494 18495 prog = env->prog; 18496 btf = prog->aux->btf; 18497 18498 urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); 18499 min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size); 18500 18501 krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN); 18502 if (!krecord) 18503 return -ENOMEM; 18504 18505 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { 18506 ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size); 18507 if (ret) { 18508 if (ret == -E2BIG) { 18509 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info"); 18510 /* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero 18511 * out the rest of the record. 18512 */ 18513 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 18514 offsetof(union bpf_attr, func_info_rec_size), 18515 &min_size, sizeof(min_size))) 18516 ret = -EFAULT; 18517 } 18518 goto err_free; 18519 } 18520 18521 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) { 18522 ret = -EFAULT; 18523 goto err_free; 18524 } 18525 18526 /* check insn_off */ 18527 ret = -EINVAL; 18528 if (i == 0) { 18529 if (krecord[i].insn_off) { 18530 verbose(env, 18531 "nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record", 18532 krecord[i].insn_off); 18533 goto err_free; 18534 } 18535 } else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) { 18536 verbose(env, 18537 "same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)", 18538 krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset); 18539 goto err_free; 18540 } 18541 18542 /* check type_id */ 18543 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); 18544 if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) { 18545 verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info", 18546 krecord[i].type_id); 18547 goto err_free; 18548 } 18549 18550 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); 18551 if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto))) 18552 /* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */ 18553 goto err_free; 18554 18555 prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off; 18556 bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size); 18557 } 18558 18559 prog->aux->func_info = krecord; 18560 prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs; 18561 return 0; 18562 18563 err_free: 18564 kvfree(krecord); 18565 return ret; 18566 } 18567 18568 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18569 const union bpf_attr *attr, 18570 bpfptr_t uattr) 18571 { 18572 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type; 18573 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size; 18574 struct bpf_func_info *krecord; 18575 struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL; 18576 struct bpf_prog *prog; 18577 const struct btf *btf; 18578 bpfptr_t urecord; 18579 bool scalar_return; 18580 int ret = -ENOMEM; 18581 18582 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; 18583 if (!nfuncs) { 18584 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 18585 return -EINVAL; 18586 return 0; 18587 } 18588 if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) { 18589 verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n"); 18590 return -EINVAL; 18591 } 18592 18593 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; 18594 18595 prog = env->prog; 18596 btf = prog->aux->btf; 18597 18598 urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); 18599 18600 krecord = prog->aux->func_info; 18601 info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN); 18602 if (!info_aux) 18603 return -ENOMEM; 18604 18605 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { 18606 /* check insn_off */ 18607 ret = -EINVAL; 18608 18609 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) { 18610 verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n"); 18611 goto err_free; 18612 } 18613 18614 /* Already checked type_id */ 18615 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); 18616 info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info); 18617 /* Already checked func_proto */ 18618 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); 18619 18620 ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 18621 scalar_return = 18622 btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_is_any_enum(ret_type); 18623 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 18624 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 18625 goto err_free; 18626 } 18627 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 18628 verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 18629 goto err_free; 18630 } 18631 18632 bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size); 18633 } 18634 18635 prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux; 18636 return 0; 18637 18638 err_free: 18639 kfree(info_aux); 18640 return ret; 18641 } 18642 18643 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 18644 { 18645 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 18646 int i; 18647 18648 if (!aux->func_info) 18649 return; 18650 18651 /* func_info is not available for hidden subprogs */ 18652 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt - env->hidden_subprog_cnt; i++) 18653 aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start; 18654 } 18655 18656 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE offsetofend(struct bpf_line_info, line_col) 18657 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 18658 18659 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18660 const union bpf_attr *attr, 18661 bpfptr_t uattr) 18662 { 18663 u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0; 18664 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub; 18665 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 18666 struct bpf_prog *prog; 18667 const struct btf *btf; 18668 bpfptr_t ulinfo; 18669 int err; 18670 18671 nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt; 18672 if (!nr_linfo) 18673 return 0; 18674 if (nr_linfo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_line_info)) 18675 return -EINVAL; 18676 18677 rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size; 18678 if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE || 18679 rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE || 18680 rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1)) 18681 return -EINVAL; 18682 18683 /* Need to zero it in case the userspace may 18684 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object. 18685 */ 18686 linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info), 18687 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN); 18688 if (!linfo) 18689 return -ENOMEM; 18690 18691 prog = env->prog; 18692 btf = prog->aux->btf; 18693 18694 s = 0; 18695 sub = env->subprog_info; 18696 ulinfo = make_bpfptr(attr->line_info, uattr.is_kernel); 18697 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info); 18698 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 18699 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) { 18700 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size); 18701 if (err) { 18702 if (err == -E2BIG) { 18703 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info"); 18704 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 18705 offsetof(union bpf_attr, line_info_rec_size), 18706 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 18707 err = -EFAULT; 18708 } 18709 goto err_free; 18710 } 18711 18712 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) { 18713 err = -EFAULT; 18714 goto err_free; 18715 } 18716 18717 /* 18718 * Check insn_off to ensure 18719 * 1) strictly increasing AND 18720 * 2) bounded by prog->len 18721 * 18722 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into 18723 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case 18724 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the 18725 * first sub also and the first sub must have 18726 * subprog_info[0].start == 0. 18727 */ 18728 if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) || 18729 linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) { 18730 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n", 18731 i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset, 18732 prog->len); 18733 err = -EINVAL; 18734 goto err_free; 18735 } 18736 18737 if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) { 18738 verbose(env, 18739 "Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n", 18740 i); 18741 err = -EINVAL; 18742 goto err_free; 18743 } 18744 18745 if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) || 18746 !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) { 18747 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i); 18748 err = -EINVAL; 18749 goto err_free; 18750 } 18751 18752 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 18753 if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) { 18754 sub[s].linfo_idx = i; 18755 s++; 18756 } else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) { 18757 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s); 18758 err = -EINVAL; 18759 goto err_free; 18760 } 18761 } 18762 18763 prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off; 18764 bpfptr_add(&ulinfo, rec_size); 18765 } 18766 18767 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 18768 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n", 18769 env->subprog_cnt - s, s); 18770 err = -EINVAL; 18771 goto err_free; 18772 } 18773 18774 prog->aux->linfo = linfo; 18775 prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo; 18776 18777 return 0; 18778 18779 err_free: 18780 kvfree(linfo); 18781 return err; 18782 } 18783 18784 #define MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo) 18785 #define MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 18786 18787 static int check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18788 const union bpf_attr *attr, 18789 bpfptr_t uattr) 18790 { 18791 u32 i, nr_core_relo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size; 18792 struct bpf_core_relo core_relo = {}; 18793 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 18794 const struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf; 18795 struct bpf_core_ctx ctx = { 18796 .log = &env->log, 18797 .btf = btf, 18798 }; 18799 bpfptr_t u_core_relo; 18800 int err; 18801 18802 nr_core_relo = attr->core_relo_cnt; 18803 if (!nr_core_relo) 18804 return 0; 18805 if (nr_core_relo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo)) 18806 return -EINVAL; 18807 18808 rec_size = attr->core_relo_rec_size; 18809 if (rec_size < MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 18810 rec_size > MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 18811 rec_size % sizeof(u32)) 18812 return -EINVAL; 18813 18814 u_core_relo = make_bpfptr(attr->core_relos, uattr.is_kernel); 18815 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo); 18816 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 18817 18818 /* Unlike func_info and line_info, copy and apply each CO-RE 18819 * relocation record one at a time. 18820 */ 18821 for (i = 0; i < nr_core_relo; i++) { 18822 /* future proofing when sizeof(bpf_core_relo) changes */ 18823 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(u_core_relo, expected_size, rec_size); 18824 if (err) { 18825 if (err == -E2BIG) { 18826 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in core_relo"); 18827 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 18828 offsetof(union bpf_attr, core_relo_rec_size), 18829 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 18830 err = -EFAULT; 18831 } 18832 break; 18833 } 18834 18835 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&core_relo, u_core_relo, ncopy)) { 18836 err = -EFAULT; 18837 break; 18838 } 18839 18840 if (core_relo.insn_off % 8 || core_relo.insn_off / 8 >= prog->len) { 18841 verbose(env, "Invalid core_relo[%u].insn_off:%u prog->len:%u\n", 18842 i, core_relo.insn_off, prog->len); 18843 err = -EINVAL; 18844 break; 18845 } 18846 18847 err = bpf_core_apply(&ctx, &core_relo, i, 18848 &prog->insnsi[core_relo.insn_off / 8]); 18849 if (err) 18850 break; 18851 bpfptr_add(&u_core_relo, rec_size); 18852 } 18853 return err; 18854 } 18855 18856 static int check_btf_info_early(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18857 const union bpf_attr *attr, 18858 bpfptr_t uattr) 18859 { 18860 struct btf *btf; 18861 int err; 18862 18863 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { 18864 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 18865 return -EINVAL; 18866 return 0; 18867 } 18868 18869 btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd); 18870 if (IS_ERR(btf)) 18871 return PTR_ERR(btf); 18872 if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) { 18873 btf_put(btf); 18874 return -EACCES; 18875 } 18876 env->prog->aux->btf = btf; 18877 18878 err = check_btf_func_early(env, attr, uattr); 18879 if (err) 18880 return err; 18881 return 0; 18882 } 18883 18884 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18885 const union bpf_attr *attr, 18886 bpfptr_t uattr) 18887 { 18888 int err; 18889 18890 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { 18891 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 18892 return -EINVAL; 18893 return 0; 18894 } 18895 18896 err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr); 18897 if (err) 18898 return err; 18899 18900 err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr); 18901 if (err) 18902 return err; 18903 18904 err = check_core_relo(env, attr, uattr); 18905 if (err) 18906 return err; 18907 18908 return 0; 18909 } 18910 18911 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ 18912 static bool range_within(const struct bpf_reg_state *old, 18913 const struct bpf_reg_state *cur) 18914 { 18915 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && 18916 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && 18917 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && 18918 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value && 18919 old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value && 18920 old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value && 18921 old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value && 18922 old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value; 18923 } 18924 18925 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have 18926 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from 18927 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. 18928 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent 18929 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But 18930 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about 18931 * that. 18932 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If 18933 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. 18934 */ 18935 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 18936 { 18937 struct bpf_id_pair *map = idmap->map; 18938 unsigned int i; 18939 18940 /* either both IDs should be set or both should be zero */ 18941 if (!!old_id != !!cur_id) 18942 return false; 18943 18944 if (old_id == 0) /* cur_id == 0 as well */ 18945 return true; 18946 18947 for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { 18948 if (!map[i].old) { 18949 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ 18950 map[i].old = old_id; 18951 map[i].cur = cur_id; 18952 return true; 18953 } 18954 if (map[i].old == old_id) 18955 return map[i].cur == cur_id; 18956 if (map[i].cur == cur_id) 18957 return false; 18958 } 18959 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ 18960 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 18961 return false; 18962 } 18963 18964 /* Similar to check_ids(), but allocate a unique temporary ID 18965 * for 'old_id' or 'cur_id' of zero. 18966 * This makes pairs like '0 vs unique ID', 'unique ID vs 0' valid. 18967 */ 18968 static bool check_scalar_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 18969 { 18970 old_id = old_id ? old_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen; 18971 cur_id = cur_id ? cur_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen; 18972 18973 return check_ids(old_id, cur_id, idmap); 18974 } 18975 18976 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 18977 struct bpf_func_state *st, 18978 u32 ip) 18979 { 18980 u16 live_regs = env->insn_aux_data[ip].live_regs_before; 18981 int i, j; 18982 18983 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 18984 /* liveness must not touch this register anymore */ 18985 if (!(live_regs & BIT(i))) 18986 /* since the register is unused, clear its state 18987 * to make further comparison simpler 18988 */ 18989 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]); 18990 } 18991 18992 for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 18993 if (!bpf_stack_slot_alive(env, st->frameno, i)) { 18994 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr); 18995 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 18996 st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 18997 } 18998 } 18999 } 19000 19001 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19002 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 19003 { 19004 int i, ip; 19005 19006 bpf_live_stack_query_init(env, st); 19007 st->cleaned = true; 19008 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 19009 ip = frame_insn_idx(st, i); 19010 clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i], ip); 19011 } 19012 } 19013 19014 /* the parentage chains form a tree. 19015 * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and 19016 * pushed into state stack for future exploration. 19017 * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifier states 19018 * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already, 19019 * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when 19020 * the verifier explores other branches. 19021 * Example: 19022 * 1: *(u64)(r10 - 8) = 1 19023 * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1 19024 * 3: *(u64)(r10 - 8) = 2 19025 * 4: r0 = *(u64)(r10 - 8) 19026 * 5: exit 19027 * when the verifier reaches exit insn the stack slot -8 in the state list of 19028 * insn 2 is not yet marked alive. Then the verifier pops the other_branch 19029 * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. After the insn 4 read, liveness 19030 * analysis would propagate read mark for -8 at insn 2. 19031 * 19032 * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring 19033 * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second 19034 * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and 19035 * their final liveness marks are already propagated. 19036 * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited() 19037 * we can call this clean_live_states() function to clear dead the registers and stack 19038 * slots to simplify state merging. 19039 * 19040 * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee 19041 * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare 19042 * the callsites 19043 */ 19044 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, 19045 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 19046 { 19047 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 19048 struct list_head *pos, *head; 19049 19050 head = explored_state(env, insn); 19051 list_for_each(pos, head) { 19052 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); 19053 if (sl->state.branches) 19054 continue; 19055 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || 19056 !same_callsites(&sl->state, cur)) 19057 continue; 19058 if (sl->state.cleaned) 19059 /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ 19060 continue; 19061 if (incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state)) 19062 continue; 19063 clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state); 19064 } 19065 } 19066 19067 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 19068 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 19069 struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 19070 { 19071 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 19072 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && 19073 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); 19074 } 19075 19076 enum exact_level { 19077 NOT_EXACT, 19078 EXACT, 19079 RANGE_WITHIN 19080 }; 19081 19082 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ 19083 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 19084 struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap, 19085 enum exact_level exact) 19086 { 19087 if (exact == EXACT) 19088 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap); 19089 19090 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) { 19091 if (exact == NOT_EXACT || rcur->type == NOT_INIT) 19092 /* explored state can't have used this */ 19093 return true; 19094 } 19095 19096 /* Enforce that register types have to match exactly, including their 19097 * modifiers (like PTR_MAYBE_NULL, MEM_RDONLY, etc), as a general 19098 * rule. 19099 * 19100 * One can make a point that using a pointer register as unbounded 19101 * SCALAR would be technically acceptable, but this could lead to 19102 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak while pointers 19103 * are not. We could make this safe in special cases if root is 19104 * calling us, but it's probably not worth the hassle. 19105 * 19106 * Also, register types that are *not* MAYBE_NULL could technically be 19107 * safe to use as their MAYBE_NULL variants (e.g., PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE 19108 * is safe to be used as PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, provided both point 19109 * to the same map). 19110 * However, if the old MAYBE_NULL register then got NULL checked, 19111 * doing so could have affected others with the same id, and we can't 19112 * check for that because we lost the id when we converted to 19113 * a non-MAYBE_NULL variant. 19114 * So, as a general rule we don't allow mixing MAYBE_NULL and 19115 * non-MAYBE_NULL registers as well. 19116 */ 19117 if (rold->type != rcur->type) 19118 return false; 19119 19120 switch (base_type(rold->type)) { 19121 case SCALAR_VALUE: 19122 if (env->explore_alu_limits) { 19123 /* explore_alu_limits disables tnum_in() and range_within() 19124 * logic and requires everything to be strict 19125 */ 19126 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 19127 check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 19128 } 19129 if (!rold->precise && exact == NOT_EXACT) 19130 return true; 19131 if ((rold->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) != (rcur->id & BPF_ADD_CONST)) 19132 return false; 19133 if ((rold->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) && (rold->off != rcur->off)) 19134 return false; 19135 /* Why check_ids() for scalar registers? 19136 * 19137 * Consider the following BPF code: 19138 * 1: r6 = ... unbound scalar, ID=a ... 19139 * 2: r7 = ... unbound scalar, ID=b ... 19140 * 3: if (r6 > r7) goto +1 19141 * 4: r6 = r7 19142 * 5: if (r6 > X) goto ... 19143 * 6: ... memory operation using r7 ... 19144 * 19145 * First verification path is [1-6]: 19146 * - at (4) same bpf_reg_state::id (b) would be assigned to r6 and r7; 19147 * - at (5) r6 would be marked <= X, sync_linked_regs() would also mark 19148 * r7 <= X, because r6 and r7 share same id. 19149 * Next verification path is [1-4, 6]. 19150 * 19151 * Instruction (6) would be reached in two states: 19152 * I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6; 19153 * II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6. 19154 * 19155 * Use check_ids() to distinguish these states. 19156 * --- 19157 * Also verify that new value satisfies old value range knowledge. 19158 */ 19159 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 19160 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && 19161 check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 19162 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 19163 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 19164 case PTR_TO_MEM: 19165 case PTR_TO_BUF: 19166 case PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER: 19167 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and 19168 * everything else matches, we are OK. 19169 */ 19170 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 && 19171 range_within(rold, rcur) && 19172 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && 19173 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && 19174 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); 19175 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 19176 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 19177 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr 19178 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are 19179 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, 19180 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or 19181 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. 19182 */ 19183 if (rold->range > rcur->range) 19184 return false; 19185 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; 19186 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. 19187 */ 19188 if (rold->off != rcur->off) 19189 return false; 19190 /* id relations must be preserved */ 19191 if (!check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) 19192 return false; 19193 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 19194 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 19195 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 19196 case PTR_TO_STACK: 19197 /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to 19198 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar 19199 */ 19200 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap) && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; 19201 case PTR_TO_ARENA: 19202 return true; 19203 case PTR_TO_INSN: 19204 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 && 19205 rold->off == rcur->off && range_within(rold, rcur) && 19206 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 19207 default: 19208 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap); 19209 } 19210 } 19211 19212 static struct bpf_reg_state unbound_reg; 19213 19214 static __init int unbound_reg_init(void) 19215 { 19216 __mark_reg_unknown_imprecise(&unbound_reg); 19217 return 0; 19218 } 19219 late_initcall(unbound_reg_init); 19220 19221 static bool is_stack_all_misc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19222 struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 19223 { 19224 u32 i; 19225 19226 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(stack->slot_type); ++i) { 19227 if ((stack->slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC) || 19228 (stack->slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)) 19229 continue; 19230 return false; 19231 } 19232 19233 return true; 19234 } 19235 19236 static struct bpf_reg_state *scalar_reg_for_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19237 struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 19238 { 19239 if (is_spilled_scalar_reg64(stack)) 19240 return &stack->spilled_ptr; 19241 19242 if (is_stack_all_misc(env, stack)) 19243 return &unbound_reg; 19244 19245 return NULL; 19246 } 19247 19248 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 19249 struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap, 19250 enum exact_level exact) 19251 { 19252 int i, spi; 19253 19254 /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional 19255 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state 19256 * didn't use them 19257 */ 19258 for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) { 19259 struct bpf_reg_state *old_reg, *cur_reg; 19260 19261 spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; 19262 19263 if (exact != NOT_EXACT && 19264 (i >= cur->allocated_stack || 19265 old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 19266 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])) 19267 return false; 19268 19269 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) 19270 continue; 19271 19272 if (env->allow_uninit_stack && 19273 old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC) 19274 continue; 19275 19276 /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack 19277 * and these slots were used 19278 */ 19279 if (i >= cur->allocated_stack) 19280 return false; 19281 19282 /* 64-bit scalar spill vs all slots MISC and vice versa. 19283 * Load from all slots MISC produces unbound scalar. 19284 * Construct a fake register for such stack and call 19285 * regsafe() to ensure scalar ids are compared. 19286 */ 19287 old_reg = scalar_reg_for_stack(env, &old->stack[spi]); 19288 cur_reg = scalar_reg_for_stack(env, &cur->stack[spi]); 19289 if (old_reg && cur_reg) { 19290 if (!regsafe(env, old_reg, cur_reg, idmap, exact)) 19291 return false; 19292 i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; 19293 continue; 19294 } 19295 19296 /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack 19297 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack. 19298 * The opposite is not true 19299 */ 19300 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC && 19301 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) 19302 continue; 19303 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 19304 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) 19305 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in 19306 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC -> 19307 * this verifier states are not equivalent, 19308 * return false to continue verification of this path 19309 */ 19310 return false; 19311 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE != BPF_REG_SIZE - 1) 19312 continue; 19313 /* Both old and cur are having same slot_type */ 19314 switch (old->stack[spi].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) { 19315 case STACK_SPILL: 19316 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing 19317 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types 19318 * are the same as well. 19319 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored 19320 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} 19321 * but current path has stored: 19322 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} 19323 * such verifier states are not equivalent. 19324 * return false to continue verification of this path 19325 */ 19326 if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 19327 &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap, exact)) 19328 return false; 19329 break; 19330 case STACK_DYNPTR: 19331 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19332 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19333 if (old_reg->dynptr.type != cur_reg->dynptr.type || 19334 old_reg->dynptr.first_slot != cur_reg->dynptr.first_slot || 19335 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap)) 19336 return false; 19337 break; 19338 case STACK_ITER: 19339 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19340 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19341 /* iter.depth is not compared between states as it 19342 * doesn't matter for correctness and would otherwise 19343 * prevent convergence; we maintain it only to prevent 19344 * infinite loop check triggering, see 19345 * iter_active_depths_differ() 19346 */ 19347 if (old_reg->iter.btf != cur_reg->iter.btf || 19348 old_reg->iter.btf_id != cur_reg->iter.btf_id || 19349 old_reg->iter.state != cur_reg->iter.state || 19350 /* ignore {old_reg,cur_reg}->iter.depth, see above */ 19351 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap)) 19352 return false; 19353 break; 19354 case STACK_IRQ_FLAG: 19355 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19356 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19357 if (!check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap) || 19358 old_reg->irq.kfunc_class != cur_reg->irq.kfunc_class) 19359 return false; 19360 break; 19361 case STACK_MISC: 19362 case STACK_ZERO: 19363 case STACK_INVALID: 19364 continue; 19365 /* Ensure that new unhandled slot types return false by default */ 19366 default: 19367 return false; 19368 } 19369 } 19370 return true; 19371 } 19372 19373 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 19374 struct bpf_idmap *idmap) 19375 { 19376 int i; 19377 19378 if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs) 19379 return false; 19380 19381 if (old->active_locks != cur->active_locks) 19382 return false; 19383 19384 if (old->active_preempt_locks != cur->active_preempt_locks) 19385 return false; 19386 19387 if (old->active_rcu_locks != cur->active_rcu_locks) 19388 return false; 19389 19390 if (!check_ids(old->active_irq_id, cur->active_irq_id, idmap)) 19391 return false; 19392 19393 if (!check_ids(old->active_lock_id, cur->active_lock_id, idmap) || 19394 old->active_lock_ptr != cur->active_lock_ptr) 19395 return false; 19396 19397 for (i = 0; i < old->acquired_refs; i++) { 19398 if (!check_ids(old->refs[i].id, cur->refs[i].id, idmap) || 19399 old->refs[i].type != cur->refs[i].type) 19400 return false; 19401 switch (old->refs[i].type) { 19402 case REF_TYPE_PTR: 19403 case REF_TYPE_IRQ: 19404 break; 19405 case REF_TYPE_LOCK: 19406 case REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK: 19407 case REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK_IRQ: 19408 if (old->refs[i].ptr != cur->refs[i].ptr) 19409 return false; 19410 break; 19411 default: 19412 WARN_ONCE(1, "Unhandled enum type for reference state: %d\n", old->refs[i].type); 19413 return false; 19414 } 19415 } 19416 19417 return true; 19418 } 19419 19420 /* compare two verifier states 19421 * 19422 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since 19423 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them 19424 * 19425 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of 19426 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has 19427 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution 19428 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already 19429 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. 19430 * 19431 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative 19432 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. 19433 * Example: 19434 * explored current 19435 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) 19436 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) 19437 * 19438 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more 19439 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means 19440 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too 19441 * 19442 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid 19443 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that 19444 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely 19445 */ 19446 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 19447 struct bpf_func_state *cur, u32 insn_idx, enum exact_level exact) 19448 { 19449 u16 live_regs = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].live_regs_before; 19450 u16 i; 19451 19452 if (old->callback_depth > cur->callback_depth) 19453 return false; 19454 19455 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 19456 if (((1 << i) & live_regs) && 19457 !regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], 19458 &env->idmap_scratch, exact)) 19459 return false; 19460 19461 if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch, exact)) 19462 return false; 19463 19464 return true; 19465 } 19466 19467 static void reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 19468 { 19469 env->idmap_scratch.tmp_id_gen = env->id_gen; 19470 memset(&env->idmap_scratch.map, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch.map)); 19471 } 19472 19473 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19474 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 19475 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 19476 enum exact_level exact) 19477 { 19478 u32 insn_idx; 19479 int i; 19480 19481 if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) 19482 return false; 19483 19484 reset_idmap_scratch(env); 19485 19486 /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation 19487 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. 19488 */ 19489 if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative) 19490 return false; 19491 19492 if (old->in_sleepable != cur->in_sleepable) 19493 return false; 19494 19495 if (!refsafe(old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch)) 19496 return false; 19497 19498 /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same 19499 * and all frame states need to be equivalent 19500 */ 19501 for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { 19502 insn_idx = frame_insn_idx(old, i); 19503 if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 19504 return false; 19505 if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i], insn_idx, exact)) 19506 return false; 19507 } 19508 return true; 19509 } 19510 19511 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and 19512 * propagate them into the current state 19513 */ 19514 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 19515 const struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 19516 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, 19517 bool *changed) 19518 { 19519 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; 19520 struct bpf_func_state *state; 19521 int i, err = 0, fr; 19522 bool first; 19523 19524 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 19525 state = old->frame[fr]; 19526 state_reg = state->regs; 19527 first = true; 19528 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { 19529 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 19530 !state_reg->precise) 19531 continue; 19532 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 19533 if (first) 19534 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating r%d", fr, i); 19535 else 19536 verbose(env, ",r%d", i); 19537 } 19538 bt_set_frame_reg(&env->bt, fr, i); 19539 first = false; 19540 } 19541 19542 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 19543 if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) 19544 continue; 19545 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 19546 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 19547 !state_reg->precise) 19548 continue; 19549 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 19550 if (first) 19551 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating fp%d", 19552 fr, (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 19553 else 19554 verbose(env, ",fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 19555 } 19556 bt_set_frame_slot(&env->bt, fr, i); 19557 first = false; 19558 } 19559 if (!first && (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)) 19560 verbose(env, "\n"); 19561 } 19562 19563 err = __mark_chain_precision(env, cur, -1, changed); 19564 if (err < 0) 19565 return err; 19566 19567 return 0; 19568 } 19569 19570 #define MAX_BACKEDGE_ITERS 64 19571 19572 /* Propagate read and precision marks from visit->backedges[*].state->equal_state 19573 * to corresponding parent states of visit->backedges[*].state until fixed point is reached, 19574 * then free visit->backedges. 19575 * After execution of this function incomplete_read_marks() will return false 19576 * for all states corresponding to @visit->callchain. 19577 */ 19578 static int propagate_backedges(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_scc_visit *visit) 19579 { 19580 struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge; 19581 struct bpf_verifier_state *st; 19582 bool changed; 19583 int i, err; 19584 19585 i = 0; 19586 do { 19587 if (i++ > MAX_BACKEDGE_ITERS) { 19588 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 19589 verbose(env, "%s: too many iterations\n", __func__); 19590 for (backedge = visit->backedges; backedge; backedge = backedge->next) 19591 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, &backedge->state); 19592 break; 19593 } 19594 changed = false; 19595 for (backedge = visit->backedges; backedge; backedge = backedge->next) { 19596 st = &backedge->state; 19597 err = propagate_precision(env, st->equal_state, st, &changed); 19598 if (err) 19599 return err; 19600 } 19601 } while (changed); 19602 19603 free_backedges(visit); 19604 return 0; 19605 } 19606 19607 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 19608 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 19609 { 19610 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 19611 int i, fr = cur->curframe; 19612 19613 if (old->curframe != fr) 19614 return false; 19615 19616 fold = old->frame[fr]; 19617 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 19618 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 19619 if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i], 19620 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, frameno))) 19621 return false; 19622 return true; 19623 } 19624 19625 static bool is_iter_next_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 19626 { 19627 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].is_iter_next; 19628 } 19629 19630 /* is_state_visited() handles iter_next() (see process_iter_next_call() for 19631 * terminology) calls specially: as opposed to bounded BPF loops, it *expects* 19632 * states to match, which otherwise would look like an infinite loop. So while 19633 * iter_next() calls are taken care of, we still need to be careful and 19634 * prevent erroneous and too eager declaration of "infinite loop", when 19635 * iterators are involved. 19636 * 19637 * Here's a situation in pseudo-BPF assembly form: 19638 * 19639 * 0: again: ; set up iter_next() call args 19640 * 1: r1 = &it ; <CHECKPOINT HERE> 19641 * 2: call bpf_iter_num_next ; this is iter_next() call 19642 * 3: if r0 == 0 goto done 19643 * 4: ... something useful here ... 19644 * 5: goto again ; another iteration 19645 * 6: done: 19646 * 7: r1 = &it 19647 * 8: call bpf_iter_num_destroy ; clean up iter state 19648 * 9: exit 19649 * 19650 * This is a typical loop. Let's assume that we have a prune point at 1:, 19651 * before we get to `call bpf_iter_num_next` (e.g., because of that `goto 19652 * again`, assuming other heuristics don't get in a way). 19653 * 19654 * When we first time come to 1:, let's say we have some state X. We proceed 19655 * to 2:, fork states, enqueue ACTIVE, validate NULL case successfully, exit. 19656 * Now we come back to validate that forked ACTIVE state. We proceed through 19657 * 3-5, come to goto, jump to 1:. Let's assume our state didn't change, so we 19658 * are converging. But the problem is that we don't know that yet, as this 19659 * convergence has to happen at iter_next() call site only. So if nothing is 19660 * done, at 1: verifier will use bounded loop logic and declare infinite 19661 * looping (and would be *technically* correct, if not for iterator's 19662 * "eventual sticky NULL" contract, see process_iter_next_call()). But we 19663 * don't want that. So what we do in process_iter_next_call() when we go on 19664 * another ACTIVE iteration, we bump slot->iter.depth, to mark that it's 19665 * a different iteration. So when we suspect an infinite loop, we additionally 19666 * check if any of the *ACTIVE* iterator states depths differ. If yes, we 19667 * pretend we are not looping and wait for next iter_next() call. 19668 * 19669 * This only applies to ACTIVE state. In DRAINED state we don't expect to 19670 * loop, because that would actually mean infinite loop, as DRAINED state is 19671 * "sticky", and so we'll keep returning into the same instruction with the 19672 * same state (at least in one of possible code paths). 19673 * 19674 * This approach allows to keep infinite loop heuristic even in the face of 19675 * active iterator. E.g., C snippet below is and will be detected as 19676 * infinitely looping: 19677 * 19678 * struct bpf_iter_num it; 19679 * int *p, x; 19680 * 19681 * bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10); 19682 * while ((p = bpf_iter_num_next(&t))) { 19683 * x = p; 19684 * while (x--) {} // <<-- infinite loop here 19685 * } 19686 * 19687 */ 19688 static bool iter_active_depths_differ(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 19689 { 19690 struct bpf_reg_state *slot, *cur_slot; 19691 struct bpf_func_state *state; 19692 int i, fr; 19693 19694 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 19695 state = old->frame[fr]; 19696 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 19697 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_ITER) 19698 continue; 19699 19700 slot = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 19701 if (slot->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) 19702 continue; 19703 19704 cur_slot = &cur->frame[fr]->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 19705 if (cur_slot->iter.depth != slot->iter.depth) 19706 return true; 19707 } 19708 } 19709 return false; 19710 } 19711 19712 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 19713 { 19714 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; 19715 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 19716 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new; 19717 bool force_new_state, add_new_state, loop; 19718 int n, err, states_cnt = 0; 19719 struct list_head *pos, *tmp, *head; 19720 19721 force_new_state = env->test_state_freq || is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx) || 19722 /* Avoid accumulating infinitely long jmp history */ 19723 cur->jmp_history_cnt > 40; 19724 19725 /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions 19726 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 19727 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen 19728 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions. 19729 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric. 19730 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier 19731 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup. 19732 */ 19733 add_new_state = force_new_state; 19734 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 && 19735 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8) 19736 add_new_state = true; 19737 19738 clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur); 19739 19740 loop = false; 19741 head = explored_state(env, insn_idx); 19742 list_for_each_safe(pos, tmp, head) { 19743 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); 19744 states_cnt++; 19745 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx) 19746 continue; 19747 19748 if (sl->state.branches) { 19749 struct bpf_func_state *frame = sl->state.frame[sl->state.curframe]; 19750 19751 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn && 19752 frame->async_entry_cnt != cur->frame[cur->curframe]->async_entry_cnt) { 19753 /* Different async_entry_cnt means that the verifier is 19754 * processing another entry into async callback. 19755 * Seeing the same state is not an indication of infinite 19756 * loop or infinite recursion. 19757 * But finding the same state doesn't mean that it's safe 19758 * to stop processing the current state. The previous state 19759 * hasn't yet reached bpf_exit, since state.branches > 0. 19760 * Checking in_async_callback_fn alone is not enough either. 19761 * Since the verifier still needs to catch infinite loops 19762 * inside async callbacks. 19763 */ 19764 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 19765 } 19766 /* BPF open-coded iterators loop detection is special. 19767 * states_maybe_looping() logic is too simplistic in detecting 19768 * states that *might* be equivalent, because it doesn't know 19769 * about ID remapping, so don't even perform it. 19770 * See process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ() 19771 * for overview of the logic. When current and one of parent 19772 * states are detected as equivalent, it's a good thing: we prove 19773 * convergence and can stop simulating further iterations. 19774 * It's safe to assume that iterator loop will finish, taking into 19775 * account iter_next() contract of eventually returning 19776 * sticky NULL result. 19777 * 19778 * Note, that states have to be compared exactly in this case because 19779 * read and precision marks might not be finalized inside the loop. 19780 * E.g. as in the program below: 19781 * 19782 * 1. r7 = -16 19783 * 2. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 19784 * 3. while (bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8])) { 19785 * 4. if (r6 != 42) { 19786 * 5. r7 = -32 19787 * 6. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 19788 * 7. continue 19789 * 8. } 19790 * 9. r0 = r10 19791 * 10. r0 += r7 19792 * 11. r8 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0) 19793 * 12. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 19794 * 13. } 19795 * 19796 * Here verifier would first visit path 1-3, create a checkpoint at 3 19797 * with r7=-16, continue to 4-7,3. Existing checkpoint at 3 does 19798 * not have read or precision mark for r7 yet, thus inexact states 19799 * comparison would discard current state with r7=-32 19800 * => unsafe memory access at 11 would not be caught. 19801 */ 19802 if (is_iter_next_insn(env, insn_idx)) { 19803 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN)) { 19804 struct bpf_func_state *cur_frame; 19805 struct bpf_reg_state *iter_state, *iter_reg; 19806 int spi; 19807 19808 cur_frame = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 19809 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() enforces that 19810 * iter state pointer is always the first arg 19811 */ 19812 iter_reg = &cur_frame->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 19813 /* current state is valid due to states_equal(), 19814 * so we can assume valid iter and reg state, 19815 * no need for extra (re-)validations 19816 */ 19817 spi = __get_spi(iter_reg->off + iter_reg->var_off.value); 19818 iter_state = &func(env, iter_reg)->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 19819 if (iter_state->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) { 19820 loop = true; 19821 goto hit; 19822 } 19823 } 19824 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 19825 } 19826 if (is_may_goto_insn_at(env, insn_idx)) { 19827 if (sl->state.may_goto_depth != cur->may_goto_depth && 19828 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN)) { 19829 loop = true; 19830 goto hit; 19831 } 19832 } 19833 if (bpf_calls_callback(env, insn_idx)) { 19834 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN)) 19835 goto hit; 19836 goto skip_inf_loop_check; 19837 } 19838 /* attempt to detect infinite loop to avoid unnecessary doomed work */ 19839 if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && 19840 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, EXACT) && 19841 !iter_active_depths_differ(&sl->state, cur) && 19842 sl->state.may_goto_depth == cur->may_goto_depth && 19843 sl->state.callback_unroll_depth == cur->callback_unroll_depth) { 19844 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 19845 verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); 19846 verbose(env, "cur state:"); 19847 print_verifier_state(env, cur, cur->curframe, true); 19848 verbose(env, "old state:"); 19849 print_verifier_state(env, &sl->state, cur->curframe, true); 19850 return -EINVAL; 19851 } 19852 /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state 19853 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct 19854 * states and may not help future pruning. 19855 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that 19856 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly. 19857 * The most abusive loop will be: 19858 * r1 += 1 19859 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2 19860 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states. 19861 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states 19862 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning. 19863 */ 19864 skip_inf_loop_check: 19865 if (!force_new_state && 19866 env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 && 19867 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100) 19868 add_new_state = false; 19869 goto miss; 19870 } 19871 /* See comments for mark_all_regs_read_and_precise() */ 19872 loop = incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state); 19873 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, loop ? RANGE_WITHIN : NOT_EXACT)) { 19874 hit: 19875 sl->hit_cnt++; 19876 19877 /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and 19878 * current state is equivalent to it (except precision marks) 19879 * the precision needs to be propagated back in 19880 * the current state. 19881 */ 19882 err = 0; 19883 if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) 19884 err = push_jmp_history(env, cur, 0, 0); 19885 err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state, cur, NULL); 19886 if (err) 19887 return err; 19888 /* When processing iterator based loops above propagate_liveness and 19889 * propagate_precision calls are not sufficient to transfer all relevant 19890 * read and precision marks. E.g. consider the following case: 19891 * 19892 * .-> A --. Assume the states are visited in the order A, B, C. 19893 * | | | Assume that state B reaches a state equivalent to state A. 19894 * | v v At this point, state C is not processed yet, so state A 19895 * '-- B C has not received any read or precision marks from C. 19896 * Thus, marks propagated from A to B are incomplete. 19897 * 19898 * The verifier mitigates this by performing the following steps: 19899 * 19900 * - Prior to the main verification pass, strongly connected components 19901 * (SCCs) are computed over the program's control flow graph, 19902 * intraprocedurally. 19903 * 19904 * - During the main verification pass, `maybe_enter_scc()` checks 19905 * whether the current verifier state is entering an SCC. If so, an 19906 * instance of a `bpf_scc_visit` object is created, and the state 19907 * entering the SCC is recorded as the entry state. 19908 * 19909 * - This instance is associated not with the SCC itself, but with a 19910 * `bpf_scc_callchain`: a tuple consisting of the call sites leading to 19911 * the SCC and the SCC id. See `compute_scc_callchain()`. 19912 * 19913 * - When a verification path encounters a `states_equal(..., 19914 * RANGE_WITHIN)` condition, there exists a call chain describing the 19915 * current state and a corresponding `bpf_scc_visit` instance. A copy 19916 * of the current state is created and added to 19917 * `bpf_scc_visit->backedges`. 19918 * 19919 * - When a verification path terminates, `maybe_exit_scc()` is called 19920 * from `update_branch_counts()`. For states with `branches == 0`, it 19921 * checks whether the state is the entry state of any `bpf_scc_visit` 19922 * instance. If it is, this indicates that all paths originating from 19923 * this SCC visit have been explored. `propagate_backedges()` is then 19924 * called, which propagates read and precision marks through the 19925 * backedges until a fixed point is reached. 19926 * (In the earlier example, this would propagate marks from A to B, 19927 * from C to A, and then again from A to B.) 19928 * 19929 * A note on callchains 19930 * -------------------- 19931 * 19932 * Consider the following example: 19933 * 19934 * void foo() { loop { ... SCC#1 ... } } 19935 * void main() { 19936 * A: foo(); 19937 * B: ... 19938 * C: foo(); 19939 * } 19940 * 19941 * Here, there are two distinct callchains leading to SCC#1: 19942 * - (A, SCC#1) 19943 * - (C, SCC#1) 19944 * 19945 * Each callchain identifies a separate `bpf_scc_visit` instance that 19946 * accumulates backedge states. The `propagate_{liveness,precision}()` 19947 * functions traverse the parent state of each backedge state, which 19948 * means these parent states must remain valid (i.e., not freed) while 19949 * the corresponding `bpf_scc_visit` instance exists. 19950 * 19951 * Associating `bpf_scc_visit` instances directly with SCCs instead of 19952 * callchains would break this invariant: 19953 * - States explored during `C: foo()` would contribute backedges to 19954 * SCC#1, but SCC#1 would only be exited once the exploration of 19955 * `A: foo()` completes. 19956 * - By that time, the states explored between `A: foo()` and `C: foo()` 19957 * (i.e., `B: ...`) may have already been freed, causing the parent 19958 * links for states from `C: foo()` to become invalid. 19959 */ 19960 if (loop) { 19961 struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge; 19962 19963 backedge = kzalloc(sizeof(*backedge), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 19964 if (!backedge) 19965 return -ENOMEM; 19966 err = copy_verifier_state(&backedge->state, cur); 19967 backedge->state.equal_state = &sl->state; 19968 backedge->state.insn_idx = insn_idx; 19969 err = err ?: add_scc_backedge(env, &sl->state, backedge); 19970 if (err) { 19971 free_verifier_state(&backedge->state, false); 19972 kfree(backedge); 19973 return err; 19974 } 19975 } 19976 return 1; 19977 } 19978 miss: 19979 /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count. 19980 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state 19981 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have 19982 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning 19983 * and some at the end) to help pruning. 19984 */ 19985 if (add_new_state) 19986 sl->miss_cnt++; 19987 /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial 19988 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view. 19989 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time, 19990 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed. 19991 * 'n' controls how many times state could miss before eviction. 19992 * Use bigger 'n' for checkpoints because evicting checkpoint states 19993 * too early would hinder iterator convergence. 19994 */ 19995 n = is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx) && sl->state.branches > 0 ? 64 : 3; 19996 if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * n + n) { 19997 /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to 19998 * speed up verification 19999 */ 20000 sl->in_free_list = true; 20001 list_del(&sl->node); 20002 list_add(&sl->node, &env->free_list); 20003 env->free_list_size++; 20004 env->explored_states_size--; 20005 maybe_free_verifier_state(env, sl); 20006 } 20007 } 20008 20009 if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) 20010 env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; 20011 20012 if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) 20013 return 0; 20014 20015 if (!add_new_state) 20016 return 0; 20017 20018 /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one. 20019 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, 20020 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) 20021 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be 20022 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) 20023 * again on the way to bpf_exit. 20024 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state 20025 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. 20026 */ 20027 new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 20028 if (!new_sl) 20029 return -ENOMEM; 20030 env->total_states++; 20031 env->explored_states_size++; 20032 update_peak_states(env); 20033 env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; 20034 env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; 20035 20036 /* forget precise markings we inherited, see __mark_chain_precision */ 20037 if (env->bpf_capable) 20038 mark_all_scalars_imprecise(env, cur); 20039 20040 /* add new state to the head of linked list */ 20041 new = &new_sl->state; 20042 err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); 20043 if (err) { 20044 free_verifier_state(new, false); 20045 kfree(new_sl); 20046 return err; 20047 } 20048 new->insn_idx = insn_idx; 20049 verifier_bug_if(new->branches != 1, env, 20050 "%s:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d", 20051 __func__, new->branches, insn_idx); 20052 err = maybe_enter_scc(env, new); 20053 if (err) { 20054 free_verifier_state(new, false); 20055 kfree(new_sl); 20056 return err; 20057 } 20058 20059 cur->parent = new; 20060 cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; 20061 cur->dfs_depth = new->dfs_depth + 1; 20062 clear_jmp_history(cur); 20063 list_add(&new_sl->node, head); 20064 return 0; 20065 } 20066 20067 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */ 20068 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) 20069 { 20070 switch (base_type(type)) { 20071 case PTR_TO_CTX: 20072 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 20073 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 20074 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 20075 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 20076 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 20077 case PTR_TO_ARENA: 20078 return false; 20079 default: 20080 return true; 20081 } 20082 } 20083 20084 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we 20085 * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok 20086 * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch: 20087 * 20088 * R1 = sock_ptr 20089 * goto X; 20090 * ... 20091 * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr; 20092 * goto X; 20093 * ... 20094 * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0); 20095 */ 20096 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) 20097 { 20098 return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) || 20099 !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); 20100 } 20101 20102 static bool is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(enum bpf_reg_type type) 20103 { 20104 switch (base_type(type)) { 20105 case PTR_TO_MEM: 20106 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 20107 return true; 20108 default: 20109 return false; 20110 } 20111 } 20112 20113 static bool is_ptr_to_mem(enum bpf_reg_type type) 20114 { 20115 return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_MEM; 20116 } 20117 20118 static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type, 20119 bool allow_trust_mismatch) 20120 { 20121 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 20122 enum bpf_reg_type merged_type; 20123 20124 if (*prev_type == NOT_INIT) { 20125 /* Saw a valid insn 20126 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) 20127 * save type to validate intersecting paths 20128 */ 20129 *prev_type = type; 20130 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(type, *prev_type)) { 20131 /* Abuser program is trying to use the same insn 20132 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) 20133 * with different pointer types: 20134 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and 20135 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. 20136 * Reject it. 20137 */ 20138 if (allow_trust_mismatch && 20139 is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(type) && 20140 is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(*prev_type)) { 20141 /* 20142 * Have to support a use case when one path through 20143 * the program yields TRUSTED pointer while another 20144 * is UNTRUSTED. Fallback to UNTRUSTED to generate 20145 * BPF_PROBE_MEM/BPF_PROBE_MEMSX. 20146 * Same behavior of MEM_RDONLY flag. 20147 */ 20148 if (is_ptr_to_mem(type) || is_ptr_to_mem(*prev_type)) 20149 merged_type = PTR_TO_MEM; 20150 else 20151 merged_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 20152 if ((type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) || (*prev_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) 20153 merged_type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 20154 if ((type & MEM_RDONLY) || (*prev_type & MEM_RDONLY)) 20155 merged_type |= MEM_RDONLY; 20156 *prev_type = merged_type; 20157 } else { 20158 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 20159 return -EINVAL; 20160 } 20161 } 20162 20163 return 0; 20164 } 20165 20166 enum { 20167 PROCESS_BPF_EXIT = 1 20168 }; 20169 20170 static int process_bpf_exit_full(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 20171 bool *do_print_state, 20172 bool exception_exit) 20173 { 20174 /* We must do check_reference_leak here before 20175 * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when 20176 * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback function, 20177 * for which reference_state must match caller reference 20178 * state when it exits. 20179 */ 20180 int err = check_resource_leak(env, exception_exit, 20181 !env->cur_state->curframe, 20182 "BPF_EXIT instruction in main prog"); 20183 if (err) 20184 return err; 20185 20186 /* The side effect of the prepare_func_exit which is 20187 * being skipped is that it frees bpf_func_state. 20188 * Typically, process_bpf_exit will only be hit with 20189 * outermost exit. copy_verifier_state in pop_stack will 20190 * handle freeing of any extra bpf_func_state left over 20191 * from not processing all nested function exits. We 20192 * also skip return code checks as they are not needed 20193 * for exceptional exits. 20194 */ 20195 if (exception_exit) 20196 return PROCESS_BPF_EXIT; 20197 20198 if (env->cur_state->curframe) { 20199 /* exit from nested function */ 20200 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); 20201 if (err) 20202 return err; 20203 *do_print_state = true; 20204 return 0; 20205 } 20206 20207 err = check_return_code(env, BPF_REG_0, "R0"); 20208 if (err) 20209 return err; 20210 return PROCESS_BPF_EXIT; 20211 } 20212 20213 static int indirect_jump_min_max_index(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 20214 int regno, 20215 struct bpf_map *map, 20216 u32 *pmin_index, u32 *pmax_index) 20217 { 20218 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 20219 u64 min_index, max_index; 20220 const u32 size = 8; 20221 20222 if (check_add_overflow(reg->umin_value, reg->off, &min_index) || 20223 (min_index > (u64) U32_MAX * size)) { 20224 verbose(env, "the sum of R%u umin_value %llu and off %u is too big\n", 20225 regno, reg->umin_value, reg->off); 20226 return -ERANGE; 20227 } 20228 if (check_add_overflow(reg->umax_value, reg->off, &max_index) || 20229 (max_index > (u64) U32_MAX * size)) { 20230 verbose(env, "the sum of R%u umax_value %llu and off %u is too big\n", 20231 regno, reg->umax_value, reg->off); 20232 return -ERANGE; 20233 } 20234 20235 min_index /= size; 20236 max_index /= size; 20237 20238 if (max_index >= map->max_entries) { 20239 verbose(env, "R%u points to outside of jump table: [%llu,%llu] max_entries %u\n", 20240 regno, min_index, max_index, map->max_entries); 20241 return -EINVAL; 20242 } 20243 20244 *pmin_index = min_index; 20245 *pmax_index = max_index; 20246 return 0; 20247 } 20248 20249 /* gotox *dst_reg */ 20250 static int check_indirect_jump(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 20251 { 20252 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; 20253 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; 20254 struct bpf_map *map; 20255 u32 min_index, max_index; 20256 int err = 0; 20257 int n; 20258 int i; 20259 20260 dst_reg = reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg); 20261 if (dst_reg->type != PTR_TO_INSN) { 20262 verbose(env, "R%d has type %s, expected PTR_TO_INSN\n", 20263 insn->dst_reg, reg_type_str(env, dst_reg->type)); 20264 return -EINVAL; 20265 } 20266 20267 map = dst_reg->map_ptr; 20268 if (verifier_bug_if(!map, env, "R%d has an empty map pointer", insn->dst_reg)) 20269 return -EFAULT; 20270 20271 if (verifier_bug_if(map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY, env, 20272 "R%d has incorrect map type %d", insn->dst_reg, map->map_type)) 20273 return -EFAULT; 20274 20275 err = indirect_jump_min_max_index(env, insn->dst_reg, map, &min_index, &max_index); 20276 if (err) 20277 return err; 20278 20279 /* Ensure that the buffer is large enough */ 20280 if (!env->gotox_tmp_buf || env->gotox_tmp_buf->cnt < max_index - min_index + 1) { 20281 env->gotox_tmp_buf = iarray_realloc(env->gotox_tmp_buf, 20282 max_index - min_index + 1); 20283 if (!env->gotox_tmp_buf) 20284 return -ENOMEM; 20285 } 20286 20287 n = copy_insn_array_uniq(map, min_index, max_index, env->gotox_tmp_buf->items); 20288 if (n < 0) 20289 return n; 20290 if (n == 0) { 20291 verbose(env, "register R%d doesn't point to any offset in map id=%d\n", 20292 insn->dst_reg, map->id); 20293 return -EINVAL; 20294 } 20295 20296 for (i = 0; i < n - 1; i++) { 20297 other_branch = push_stack(env, env->gotox_tmp_buf->items[i], 20298 env->insn_idx, env->cur_state->speculative); 20299 if (IS_ERR(other_branch)) 20300 return PTR_ERR(other_branch); 20301 } 20302 env->insn_idx = env->gotox_tmp_buf->items[n-1]; 20303 return 0; 20304 } 20305 20306 static int do_check_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool *do_print_state) 20307 { 20308 int err; 20309 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[env->insn_idx]; 20310 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 20311 20312 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 20313 err = check_alu_op(env, insn); 20314 if (err) 20315 return err; 20316 20317 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 20318 bool is_ldsx = BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX; 20319 20320 /* Check for reserved fields is already done in 20321 * resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(). 20322 */ 20323 err = check_load_mem(env, insn, false, is_ldsx, true, "ldx"); 20324 if (err) 20325 return err; 20326 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 20327 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { 20328 err = check_atomic(env, insn); 20329 if (err) 20330 return err; 20331 env->insn_idx++; 20332 return 0; 20333 } 20334 20335 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) { 20336 verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); 20337 return -EINVAL; 20338 } 20339 20340 err = check_store_reg(env, insn, false); 20341 if (err) 20342 return err; 20343 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 20344 enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; 20345 20346 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || 20347 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 20348 verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); 20349 return -EINVAL; 20350 } 20351 /* check src operand */ 20352 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 20353 if (err) 20354 return err; 20355 20356 dst_reg_type = cur_regs(env)[insn->dst_reg].type; 20357 20358 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 20359 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 20360 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 20361 BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); 20362 if (err) 20363 return err; 20364 20365 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); 20366 if (err) 20367 return err; 20368 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 20369 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 20370 20371 env->jmps_processed++; 20372 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 20373 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 20374 (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && 20375 insn->off != 0) || 20376 (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && 20377 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && 20378 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) || 20379 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || class == BPF_JMP32) { 20380 verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); 20381 return -EINVAL; 20382 } 20383 20384 if (env->cur_state->active_locks) { 20385 if ((insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && 20386 insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) || 20387 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && 20388 (insn->off != 0 || !kfunc_spin_allowed(insn->imm)))) { 20389 verbose(env, 20390 "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); 20391 return -EINVAL; 20392 } 20393 } 20394 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) { 20395 err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 20396 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 20397 err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 20398 if (!err && is_bpf_throw_kfunc(insn)) 20399 return process_bpf_exit_full(env, do_print_state, true); 20400 } else { 20401 err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 20402 } 20403 if (err) 20404 return err; 20405 20406 mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0); 20407 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 20408 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 20409 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 20410 insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 20411 verbose(env, "BPF_JA|BPF_X uses reserved fields\n"); 20412 return -EINVAL; 20413 } 20414 return check_indirect_jump(env, insn); 20415 } 20416 20417 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 20418 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 20419 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 20420 (class == BPF_JMP && insn->imm != 0) || 20421 (class == BPF_JMP32 && insn->off != 0)) { 20422 verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); 20423 return -EINVAL; 20424 } 20425 20426 if (class == BPF_JMP) 20427 env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; 20428 else 20429 env->insn_idx += insn->imm + 1; 20430 return 0; 20431 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 20432 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 20433 insn->imm != 0 || 20434 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 20435 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 20436 class == BPF_JMP32) { 20437 verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); 20438 return -EINVAL; 20439 } 20440 return process_bpf_exit_full(env, do_print_state, false); 20441 } else { 20442 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 20443 if (err) 20444 return err; 20445 } 20446 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 20447 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 20448 20449 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { 20450 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); 20451 if (err) 20452 return err; 20453 20454 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { 20455 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); 20456 if (err) 20457 return err; 20458 20459 env->insn_idx++; 20460 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 20461 } else { 20462 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); 20463 return -EINVAL; 20464 } 20465 } else { 20466 verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); 20467 return -EINVAL; 20468 } 20469 20470 env->insn_idx++; 20471 return 0; 20472 } 20473 20474 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 20475 { 20476 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 20477 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 20478 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 20479 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 20480 bool do_print_state = false; 20481 int prev_insn_idx = -1; 20482 20483 for (;;) { 20484 struct bpf_insn *insn; 20485 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux; 20486 int err, marks_err; 20487 20488 /* reset current history entry on each new instruction */ 20489 env->cur_hist_ent = NULL; 20490 20491 env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 20492 if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { 20493 verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", 20494 env->insn_idx, insn_cnt); 20495 return -EFAULT; 20496 } 20497 20498 insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; 20499 insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; 20500 20501 if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { 20502 verbose(env, 20503 "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", 20504 env->insn_processed); 20505 return -E2BIG; 20506 } 20507 20508 state->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 20509 state->insn_idx = env->insn_idx; 20510 20511 if (is_prune_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 20512 err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx); 20513 if (err < 0) 20514 return err; 20515 if (err == 1) { 20516 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ 20517 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 20518 if (do_print_state) 20519 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n", 20520 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 20521 env->cur_state->speculative ? 20522 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 20523 else 20524 verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx); 20525 } 20526 goto process_bpf_exit; 20527 } 20528 } 20529 20530 if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 20531 err = push_jmp_history(env, state, 0, 0); 20532 if (err) 20533 return err; 20534 } 20535 20536 if (signal_pending(current)) 20537 return -EAGAIN; 20538 20539 if (need_resched()) 20540 cond_resched(); 20541 20542 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 && do_print_state) { 20543 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:", 20544 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 20545 env->cur_state->speculative ? 20546 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 20547 print_verifier_state(env, state, state->curframe, true); 20548 do_print_state = false; 20549 } 20550 20551 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 20552 if (verifier_state_scratched(env)) 20553 print_insn_state(env, state, state->curframe); 20554 20555 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 20556 env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 20557 verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx); 20558 verbose_insn(env, insn); 20559 env->prev_insn_print_pos = env->log.end_pos - env->prev_log_pos; 20560 env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos; 20561 } 20562 20563 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 20564 err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx, 20565 env->prev_insn_idx); 20566 if (err) 20567 return err; 20568 } 20569 20570 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 20571 prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; 20572 20573 /* Reduce verification complexity by stopping speculative path 20574 * verification when a nospec is encountered. 20575 */ 20576 if (state->speculative && insn_aux->nospec) 20577 goto process_bpf_exit; 20578 20579 err = bpf_reset_stack_write_marks(env, env->insn_idx); 20580 if (err) 20581 return err; 20582 err = do_check_insn(env, &do_print_state); 20583 if (err >= 0 || error_recoverable_with_nospec(err)) { 20584 marks_err = bpf_commit_stack_write_marks(env); 20585 if (marks_err) 20586 return marks_err; 20587 } 20588 if (error_recoverable_with_nospec(err) && state->speculative) { 20589 /* Prevent this speculative path from ever reaching the 20590 * insn that would have been unsafe to execute. 20591 */ 20592 insn_aux->nospec = true; 20593 /* If it was an ADD/SUB insn, potentially remove any 20594 * markings for alu sanitization. 20595 */ 20596 insn_aux->alu_state = 0; 20597 goto process_bpf_exit; 20598 } else if (err < 0) { 20599 return err; 20600 } else if (err == PROCESS_BPF_EXIT) { 20601 goto process_bpf_exit; 20602 } 20603 WARN_ON_ONCE(err); 20604 20605 if (state->speculative && insn_aux->nospec_result) { 20606 /* If we are on a path that performed a jump-op, this 20607 * may skip a nospec patched-in after the jump. This can 20608 * currently never happen because nospec_result is only 20609 * used for the write-ops 20610 * `*(size*)(dst_reg+off)=src_reg|imm32` which must 20611 * never skip the following insn. Still, add a warning 20612 * to document this in case nospec_result is used 20613 * elsewhere in the future. 20614 * 20615 * All non-branch instructions have a single 20616 * fall-through edge. For these, nospec_result should 20617 * already work. 20618 */ 20619 if (verifier_bug_if(BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP || 20620 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32, env, 20621 "speculation barrier after jump instruction may not have the desired effect")) 20622 return -EFAULT; 20623 process_bpf_exit: 20624 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 20625 err = update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); 20626 if (err) 20627 return err; 20628 err = bpf_update_live_stack(env); 20629 if (err) 20630 return err; 20631 err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, &env->insn_idx, 20632 pop_log); 20633 if (err < 0) { 20634 if (err != -ENOENT) 20635 return err; 20636 break; 20637 } else { 20638 do_print_state = true; 20639 continue; 20640 } 20641 } 20642 } 20643 20644 return 0; 20645 } 20646 20647 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf) 20648 { 20649 const struct btf_type *t; 20650 const char *tname; 20651 int i, n; 20652 20653 /* 20654 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu" 20655 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF 20656 * types to look at only module's own BTF types. 20657 */ 20658 n = btf_nr_types(btf); 20659 if (btf_is_module(btf)) 20660 i = btf_nr_types(btf_vmlinux); 20661 else 20662 i = 1; 20663 20664 for(; i < n; i++) { 20665 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i); 20666 if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC) 20667 continue; 20668 20669 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 20670 if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu")) 20671 return i; 20672 } 20673 20674 return -ENOENT; 20675 } 20676 20677 /* 20678 * Add btf to the used_btfs array and return the index. (If the btf was 20679 * already added, then just return the index.) Upon successful insertion 20680 * increase btf refcnt, and, if present, also refcount the corresponding 20681 * kernel module. 20682 */ 20683 static int __add_used_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct btf *btf) 20684 { 20685 struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod; 20686 int i; 20687 20688 /* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */ 20689 for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) 20690 if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) 20691 return i; 20692 20693 if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) { 20694 verbose(env, "The total number of btfs per program has reached the limit of %u\n", 20695 MAX_USED_BTFS); 20696 return -E2BIG; 20697 } 20698 20699 btf_get(btf); 20700 20701 btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt]; 20702 btf_mod->btf = btf; 20703 btf_mod->module = NULL; 20704 20705 /* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */ 20706 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 20707 btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf); 20708 if (!btf_mod->module) { 20709 btf_put(btf); 20710 return -ENXIO; 20711 } 20712 } 20713 20714 return env->used_btf_cnt++; 20715 } 20716 20717 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */ 20718 static int __check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 20719 struct bpf_insn *insn, 20720 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 20721 struct btf *btf) 20722 { 20723 const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi; 20724 const struct btf_type *datasec; 20725 const struct btf_type *t; 20726 const char *sym_name; 20727 bool percpu = false; 20728 u32 type, id = insn->imm; 20729 s32 datasec_id; 20730 u64 addr; 20731 int i; 20732 20733 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id); 20734 if (!t) { 20735 verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id); 20736 return -ENOENT; 20737 } 20738 20739 if (!btf_type_is_var(t) && !btf_type_is_func(t)) { 20740 verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR or KIND_FUNC\n", id); 20741 return -EINVAL; 20742 } 20743 20744 sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 20745 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name); 20746 if (!addr) { 20747 verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n", 20748 sym_name); 20749 return -ENOENT; 20750 } 20751 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 20752 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 20753 20754 if (btf_type_is_func(t)) { 20755 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 20756 aux->btf_var.mem_size = 0; 20757 return 0; 20758 } 20759 20760 datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf); 20761 if (datasec_id > 0) { 20762 datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id); 20763 for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) { 20764 if (vsi->type == id) { 20765 percpu = true; 20766 break; 20767 } 20768 } 20769 } 20770 20771 type = t->type; 20772 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL); 20773 if (percpu) { 20774 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU; 20775 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 20776 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 20777 } else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 20778 const struct btf_type *ret; 20779 const char *tname; 20780 u32 tsize; 20781 20782 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 20783 ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize); 20784 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 20785 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 20786 verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 20787 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 20788 return -EINVAL; 20789 } 20790 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 20791 aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize; 20792 } else { 20793 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 20794 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 20795 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 20796 } 20797 20798 return 0; 20799 } 20800 20801 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 20802 struct bpf_insn *insn, 20803 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 20804 { 20805 struct btf *btf; 20806 int btf_fd; 20807 int err; 20808 20809 btf_fd = insn[1].imm; 20810 if (btf_fd) { 20811 CLASS(fd, f)(btf_fd); 20812 20813 btf = __btf_get_by_fd(f); 20814 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 20815 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n"); 20816 return -EINVAL; 20817 } 20818 } else { 20819 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 20820 verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n"); 20821 return -EINVAL; 20822 } 20823 btf = btf_vmlinux; 20824 } 20825 20826 err = __check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux, btf); 20827 if (err) 20828 return err; 20829 20830 err = __add_used_btf(env, btf); 20831 if (err < 0) 20832 return err; 20833 return 0; 20834 } 20835 20836 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type) 20837 { 20838 switch (type) { 20839 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 20840 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: 20841 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: 20842 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 20843 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE: 20844 return true; 20845 default: 20846 return false; 20847 } 20848 } 20849 20850 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map) 20851 { 20852 return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE || 20853 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE); 20854 } 20855 20856 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 20857 struct bpf_map *map, 20858 struct bpf_prog *prog) 20859 20860 { 20861 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 20862 20863 if (map->excl_prog_sha && 20864 memcmp(map->excl_prog_sha, prog->digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) { 20865 verbose(env, "program's hash doesn't match map's excl_prog_hash\n"); 20866 return -EACCES; 20867 } 20868 20869 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_LIST_HEAD) || 20870 btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_RB_ROOT)) { 20871 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 20872 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_{list_head,rb_root} yet\n"); 20873 return -EINVAL; 20874 } 20875 } 20876 20877 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK | BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK)) { 20878 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) { 20879 verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 20880 return -EINVAL; 20881 } 20882 20883 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 20884 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 20885 return -EINVAL; 20886 } 20887 } 20888 20889 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 20890 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 20891 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_timer yet\n"); 20892 return -EINVAL; 20893 } 20894 } 20895 20896 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_WORKQUEUE)) { 20897 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 20898 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_wq yet\n"); 20899 return -EINVAL; 20900 } 20901 } 20902 20903 if ((bpf_prog_is_offloaded(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_offloaded(map)) && 20904 !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) { 20905 verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n"); 20906 return -EINVAL; 20907 } 20908 20909 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 20910 verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n"); 20911 return -EINVAL; 20912 } 20913 20914 if (prog->sleepable) 20915 switch (map->map_type) { 20916 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH: 20917 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH: 20918 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: 20919 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH: 20920 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY: 20921 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH: 20922 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 20923 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 20924 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 20925 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 20926 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 20927 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 20928 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 20929 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 20930 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: 20931 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: 20932 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA: 20933 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY: 20934 break; 20935 default: 20936 verbose(env, 20937 "Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, ringbuf and local storage maps\n"); 20938 return -EINVAL; 20939 } 20940 20941 if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) && 20942 bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) { 20943 verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n"); 20944 return -EBUSY; 20945 } 20946 20947 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA) { 20948 if (env->prog->aux->arena) { 20949 verbose(env, "Only one arena per program\n"); 20950 return -EBUSY; 20951 } 20952 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks || !env->bpf_capable) { 20953 verbose(env, "CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON are required to use arena\n"); 20954 return -EPERM; 20955 } 20956 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) { 20957 verbose(env, "JIT is required to use arena\n"); 20958 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 20959 } 20960 if (!bpf_jit_supports_arena()) { 20961 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support arena\n"); 20962 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 20963 } 20964 env->prog->aux->arena = (void *)map; 20965 if (!bpf_arena_get_user_vm_start(env->prog->aux->arena)) { 20966 verbose(env, "arena's user address must be set via map_extra or mmap()\n"); 20967 return -EINVAL; 20968 } 20969 } 20970 20971 return 0; 20972 } 20973 20974 static int __add_used_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_map *map) 20975 { 20976 int i, err; 20977 20978 /* check whether we recorded this map already */ 20979 for (i = 0; i < env->used_map_cnt; i++) 20980 if (env->used_maps[i] == map) 20981 return i; 20982 20983 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { 20984 verbose(env, "The total number of maps per program has reached the limit of %u\n", 20985 MAX_USED_MAPS); 20986 return -E2BIG; 20987 } 20988 20989 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); 20990 if (err) 20991 return err; 20992 20993 if (env->prog->sleepable) 20994 atomic64_inc(&map->sleepable_refcnt); 20995 20996 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, 20997 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it 20998 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded 20999 * and all maps are released in bpf_free_used_maps() 21000 */ 21001 bpf_map_inc(map); 21002 21003 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; 21004 21005 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) { 21006 err = bpf_insn_array_init(map, env->prog); 21007 if (err) { 21008 verbose(env, "Failed to properly initialize insn array\n"); 21009 return err; 21010 } 21011 env->insn_array_maps[env->insn_array_map_cnt++] = map; 21012 } 21013 21014 return env->used_map_cnt - 1; 21015 } 21016 21017 /* Add map behind fd to used maps list, if it's not already there, and return 21018 * its index. 21019 * Returns <0 on error, or >= 0 index, on success. 21020 */ 21021 static int add_used_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int fd) 21022 { 21023 struct bpf_map *map; 21024 CLASS(fd, f)(fd); 21025 21026 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 21027 if (IS_ERR(map)) { 21028 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", fd); 21029 return PTR_ERR(map); 21030 } 21031 21032 return __add_used_map(env, map); 21033 } 21034 21035 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions: 21036 * 21037 * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer. 21038 * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var. 21039 * 21040 * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id. 21041 */ 21042 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21043 { 21044 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 21045 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21046 int i, err; 21047 21048 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); 21049 if (err) 21050 return err; 21051 21052 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 21053 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 21054 ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM && BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEMSX) || 21055 insn->imm != 0)) { 21056 verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); 21057 return -EINVAL; 21058 } 21059 21060 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { 21061 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 21062 struct bpf_map *map; 21063 int map_idx; 21064 u64 addr; 21065 u32 fd; 21066 21067 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || 21068 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || 21069 insn[1].off != 0) { 21070 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 21071 return -EINVAL; 21072 } 21073 21074 if (insn[0].src_reg == 0) 21075 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ 21076 goto next_insn; 21077 21078 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 21079 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 21080 err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux); 21081 if (err) 21082 return err; 21083 goto next_insn; 21084 } 21085 21086 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 21087 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 21088 aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 21089 goto next_insn; 21090 } 21091 21092 /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is 21093 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn. 21094 */ 21095 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 21096 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE: 21097 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 21098 break; 21099 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD: 21100 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 21101 if (insn[1].imm == 0) 21102 break; 21103 fallthrough; 21104 default: 21105 verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 21106 return -EINVAL; 21107 } 21108 21109 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 21110 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 21111 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 21112 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 21113 verbose(env, "fd_idx without fd_array is invalid\n"); 21114 return -EPROTO; 21115 } 21116 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array, 21117 insn[0].imm * sizeof(fd), 21118 sizeof(fd))) 21119 return -EFAULT; 21120 break; 21121 default: 21122 fd = insn[0].imm; 21123 break; 21124 } 21125 21126 map_idx = add_used_map(env, fd); 21127 if (map_idx < 0) 21128 return map_idx; 21129 map = env->used_maps[map_idx]; 21130 21131 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 21132 aux->map_index = map_idx; 21133 21134 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 21135 insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 21136 addr = (unsigned long)map; 21137 } else { 21138 u32 off = insn[1].imm; 21139 21140 if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 21141 verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off); 21142 return -EINVAL; 21143 } 21144 21145 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 21146 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 21147 return -EINVAL; 21148 } 21149 21150 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 21151 if (err) { 21152 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n", 21153 map->value_size, off); 21154 return err; 21155 } 21156 21157 aux->map_off = off; 21158 addr += off; 21159 } 21160 21161 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 21162 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 21163 21164 next_insn: 21165 insn++; 21166 i++; 21167 continue; 21168 } 21169 21170 /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */ 21171 if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) { 21172 verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code); 21173 return -EINVAL; 21174 } 21175 } 21176 21177 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid 21178 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. 21179 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. 21180 */ 21181 return 0; 21182 } 21183 21184 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 21185 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21186 { 21187 __bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps, 21188 env->used_map_cnt); 21189 } 21190 21191 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 21192 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21193 { 21194 __bpf_free_used_btfs(env->used_btfs, env->used_btf_cnt); 21195 } 21196 21197 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ 21198 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21199 { 21200 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 21201 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21202 int i; 21203 21204 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 21205 if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) 21206 continue; 21207 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) 21208 continue; 21209 insn->src_reg = 0; 21210 } 21211 } 21212 21213 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range 21214 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying 21215 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero 21216 */ 21217 static void adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 21218 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt) 21219 { 21220 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *data = env->insn_aux_data; 21221 struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi; 21222 u32 old_seen = data[off].seen; 21223 u32 prog_len; 21224 int i; 21225 21226 /* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path 21227 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the 21228 * original insn at old prog. 21229 */ 21230 data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(insn + off + cnt - 1); 21231 21232 if (cnt == 1) 21233 return; 21234 prog_len = new_prog->len; 21235 21236 memmove(data + off + cnt - 1, data + off, 21237 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); 21238 memset(data + off, 0, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (cnt - 1)); 21239 for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) { 21240 /* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */ 21241 data[i].seen = old_seen; 21242 data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(insn + i); 21243 } 21244 } 21245 21246 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 21247 { 21248 int i; 21249 21250 if (len == 1) 21251 return; 21252 /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */ 21253 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 21254 if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off) 21255 continue; 21256 env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1; 21257 } 21258 } 21259 21260 static void release_insn_arrays(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21261 { 21262 int i; 21263 21264 for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++) 21265 bpf_insn_array_release(env->insn_array_maps[i]); 21266 } 21267 21268 static void adjust_insn_arrays(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 21269 { 21270 int i; 21271 21272 if (len == 1) 21273 return; 21274 21275 for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++) 21276 bpf_insn_array_adjust(env->insn_array_maps[i], off, len); 21277 } 21278 21279 static void adjust_insn_arrays_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 21280 { 21281 int i; 21282 21283 for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++) 21284 bpf_insn_array_adjust_after_remove(env->insn_array_maps[i], off, len); 21285 } 21286 21287 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len) 21288 { 21289 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 21290 int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 21291 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc; 21292 21293 for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) { 21294 desc = &tab[i]; 21295 if (desc->insn_idx <= off) 21296 continue; 21297 desc->insn_idx += len - 1; 21298 } 21299 } 21300 21301 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 21302 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) 21303 { 21304 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 21305 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data = NULL; 21306 21307 if (len > 1) { 21308 new_data = vrealloc(env->insn_aux_data, 21309 array_size(env->prog->len + len - 1, 21310 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data)), 21311 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO); 21312 if (!new_data) 21313 return NULL; 21314 21315 env->insn_aux_data = new_data; 21316 } 21317 21318 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); 21319 if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) { 21320 if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE) 21321 verbose(env, 21322 "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n", 21323 env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx); 21324 return NULL; 21325 } 21326 adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog, off, len); 21327 adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len); 21328 adjust_insn_arrays(env, off, len); 21329 adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, off, len); 21330 return new_prog; 21331 } 21332 21333 /* 21334 * For all jmp insns in a given 'prog' that point to 'tgt_idx' insn adjust the 21335 * jump offset by 'delta'. 21336 */ 21337 static int adjust_jmp_off(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 tgt_idx, u32 delta) 21338 { 21339 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 21340 u32 insn_cnt = prog->len, i; 21341 s32 imm; 21342 s16 off; 21343 21344 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 21345 u8 code = insn->code; 21346 21347 if (tgt_idx <= i && i < tgt_idx + delta) 21348 continue; 21349 21350 if ((BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) || 21351 BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT) 21352 continue; 21353 21354 if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA)) { 21355 if (i + 1 + insn->imm != tgt_idx) 21356 continue; 21357 if (check_add_overflow(insn->imm, delta, &imm)) 21358 return -ERANGE; 21359 insn->imm = imm; 21360 } else { 21361 if (i + 1 + insn->off != tgt_idx) 21362 continue; 21363 if (check_add_overflow(insn->off, delta, &off)) 21364 return -ERANGE; 21365 insn->off = off; 21366 } 21367 } 21368 return 0; 21369 } 21370 21371 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 21372 u32 off, u32 cnt) 21373 { 21374 int i, j; 21375 21376 /* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */ 21377 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 21378 if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off) 21379 break; 21380 /* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */ 21381 for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++) 21382 if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt) 21383 break; 21384 /* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing 21385 * the front of previous prog 21386 */ 21387 if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt) 21388 j--; 21389 21390 if (j > i) { 21391 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 21392 int move; 21393 21394 /* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 21395 move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j; 21396 21397 memmove(env->subprog_info + i, 21398 env->subprog_info + j, 21399 sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move); 21400 env->subprog_cnt -= j - i; 21401 21402 /* remove func_info */ 21403 if (aux->func_info) { 21404 move = aux->func_info_cnt - j; 21405 21406 memmove(aux->func_info + i, 21407 aux->func_info + j, 21408 sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move); 21409 aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i; 21410 /* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites, 21411 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust 21412 */ 21413 } 21414 } else { 21415 /* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */ 21416 if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off) 21417 i++; 21418 } 21419 21420 /* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 21421 for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 21422 env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt; 21423 21424 return 0; 21425 } 21426 21427 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 21428 u32 cnt) 21429 { 21430 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 21431 u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo; 21432 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 21433 21434 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 21435 if (!nr_linfo) 21436 return 0; 21437 21438 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 21439 21440 /* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */ 21441 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) 21442 if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off) 21443 break; 21444 21445 l_off = i; 21446 l_cnt = 0; 21447 for (; i < nr_linfo; i++) 21448 if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt) 21449 l_cnt++; 21450 else 21451 break; 21452 21453 /* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit" 21454 * last removed linfo. prog is already modified, so prog->len == off 21455 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed). 21456 */ 21457 if (prog->len != off && l_cnt && 21458 (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) { 21459 l_cnt--; 21460 linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt; 21461 } 21462 21463 /* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */ 21464 if (l_cnt) { 21465 memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i, 21466 sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i)); 21467 21468 prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt; 21469 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 21470 } 21471 21472 /* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */ 21473 for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++) 21474 linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt; 21475 21476 /* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */ 21477 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 21478 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) { 21479 /* program may have started in the removed region but 21480 * may not be fully removed 21481 */ 21482 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt) 21483 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt; 21484 else 21485 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off; 21486 } 21487 21488 return 0; 21489 } 21490 21491 /* 21492 * Clean up dynamically allocated fields of aux data for instructions [start, ...] 21493 */ 21494 static void clear_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int start, int len) 21495 { 21496 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 21497 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 21498 int end = start + len; 21499 int i; 21500 21501 for (i = start; i < end; i++) { 21502 if (aux_data[i].jt) { 21503 kvfree(aux_data[i].jt); 21504 aux_data[i].jt = NULL; 21505 } 21506 21507 if (bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[i])) 21508 i++; 21509 } 21510 } 21511 21512 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt) 21513 { 21514 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 21515 unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len; 21516 int err; 21517 21518 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 21519 bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt); 21520 21521 /* Should be called before bpf_remove_insns, as it uses prog->insnsi */ 21522 clear_insn_aux_data(env, off, cnt); 21523 21524 err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt); 21525 if (err) 21526 return err; 21527 21528 err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 21529 if (err) 21530 return err; 21531 21532 err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 21533 if (err) 21534 return err; 21535 21536 adjust_insn_arrays_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 21537 21538 memmove(aux_data + off, aux_data + off + cnt, 21539 sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt)); 21540 21541 return 0; 21542 } 21543 21544 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not 21545 * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can 21546 * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code 21547 * with 'ja -1'. 21548 * 21549 * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the 21550 * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then 21551 * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception 21552 * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead 21553 * code could be located. 21554 */ 21555 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21556 { 21557 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 21558 struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1); 21559 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 21560 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21561 int i; 21562 21563 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 21564 if (aux_data[i].seen) 21565 continue; 21566 memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap)); 21567 aux_data[i].zext_dst = false; 21568 } 21569 } 21570 21571 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code) 21572 { 21573 u8 op; 21574 21575 op = BPF_OP(code); 21576 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32) 21577 return op != BPF_JA; 21578 21579 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP) 21580 return false; 21581 21582 return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL; 21583 } 21584 21585 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21586 { 21587 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 21588 struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 21589 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 21590 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21591 int i; 21592 21593 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 21594 if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code)) 21595 continue; 21596 21597 if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen) 21598 ja.off = insn->off; 21599 else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen) 21600 ja.off = 0; 21601 else 21602 continue; 21603 21604 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 21605 bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja); 21606 21607 memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja)); 21608 } 21609 } 21610 21611 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21612 { 21613 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 21614 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21615 int i, err; 21616 21617 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 21618 int j; 21619 21620 j = 0; 21621 while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen) 21622 j++; 21623 if (!j) 21624 continue; 21625 21626 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j); 21627 if (err) 21628 return err; 21629 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21630 } 21631 21632 return 0; 21633 } 21634 21635 static const struct bpf_insn NOP = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 21636 static const struct bpf_insn MAY_GOTO_0 = BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND, 0, 0, 0, 0); 21637 21638 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21639 { 21640 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 21641 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21642 bool is_may_goto_0, is_ja; 21643 int i, err; 21644 21645 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 21646 is_may_goto_0 = !memcmp(&insn[i], &MAY_GOTO_0, sizeof(MAY_GOTO_0)); 21647 is_ja = !memcmp(&insn[i], &NOP, sizeof(NOP)); 21648 21649 if (!is_may_goto_0 && !is_ja) 21650 continue; 21651 21652 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1); 21653 if (err) 21654 return err; 21655 insn_cnt--; 21656 /* Go back one insn to catch may_goto +1; may_goto +0 sequence */ 21657 i -= (is_may_goto_0 && i > 0) ? 2 : 1; 21658 } 21659 21660 return 0; 21661 } 21662 21663 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 21664 const union bpf_attr *attr) 21665 { 21666 struct bpf_insn *patch; 21667 /* use env->insn_buf as two independent buffers */ 21668 struct bpf_insn *zext_patch = env->insn_buf; 21669 struct bpf_insn *rnd_hi32_patch = &env->insn_buf[2]; 21670 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 21671 int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len; 21672 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 21673 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 21674 bool rnd_hi32; 21675 21676 rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32; 21677 zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0); 21678 rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 21679 rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); 21680 rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX); 21681 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { 21682 int adj_idx = i + delta; 21683 struct bpf_insn insn; 21684 int load_reg; 21685 21686 insn = insns[adj_idx]; 21687 load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn); 21688 if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) { 21689 u8 code, class; 21690 u32 imm_rnd; 21691 21692 if (!rnd_hi32) 21693 continue; 21694 21695 code = insn.code; 21696 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 21697 if (load_reg == -1) 21698 continue; 21699 21700 /* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for 21701 * BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL 21702 * here. 21703 */ 21704 if (is_reg64(&insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) { 21705 if (class == BPF_LD && 21706 BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM) 21707 i++; 21708 continue; 21709 } 21710 21711 /* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */ 21712 if (class == BPF_LDX && 21713 aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX) 21714 continue; 21715 21716 imm_rnd = get_random_u32(); 21717 rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn; 21718 rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd; 21719 rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg; 21720 patch = rnd_hi32_patch; 21721 patch_len = 4; 21722 goto apply_patch_buffer; 21723 } 21724 21725 /* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested 21726 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG. 21727 * 21728 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into 21729 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs' 21730 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the 21731 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is 21732 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the 21733 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext. 21734 */ 21735 if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn)) 21736 continue; 21737 21738 /* Zero-extension is done by the caller. */ 21739 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(&insn)) 21740 continue; 21741 21742 if (verifier_bug_if(load_reg == -1, env, 21743 "zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined")) 21744 return -EFAULT; 21745 21746 zext_patch[0] = insn; 21747 zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg; 21748 zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg; 21749 patch = zext_patch; 21750 patch_len = 2; 21751 apply_patch_buffer: 21752 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len); 21753 if (!new_prog) 21754 return -ENOMEM; 21755 env->prog = new_prog; 21756 insns = new_prog->insnsi; 21757 aux = env->insn_aux_data; 21758 delta += patch_len - 1; 21759 } 21760 21761 return 0; 21762 } 21763 21764 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a 21765 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure: 21766 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff 21767 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock 21768 */ 21769 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 21770 { 21771 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; 21772 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops; 21773 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, ret, delta = 0, epilogue_cnt = 0; 21774 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 21775 struct bpf_insn *epilogue_buf = env->epilogue_buf; 21776 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf = env->insn_buf; 21777 struct bpf_insn *insn; 21778 u32 target_size, size_default, off; 21779 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 21780 enum bpf_access_type type; 21781 bool is_narrower_load; 21782 int epilogue_idx = 0; 21783 21784 if (ops->gen_epilogue) { 21785 epilogue_cnt = ops->gen_epilogue(epilogue_buf, env->prog, 21786 -(subprogs[0].stack_depth + 8)); 21787 if (epilogue_cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { 21788 verifier_bug(env, "epilogue is too long"); 21789 return -EFAULT; 21790 } else if (epilogue_cnt) { 21791 /* Save the ARG_PTR_TO_CTX for the epilogue to use */ 21792 cnt = 0; 21793 subprogs[0].stack_depth += 8; 21794 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_1, 21795 -subprogs[0].stack_depth); 21796 insn_buf[cnt++] = env->prog->insnsi[0]; 21797 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 21798 if (!new_prog) 21799 return -ENOMEM; 21800 env->prog = new_prog; 21801 delta += cnt - 1; 21802 21803 ret = add_kfunc_in_insns(env, epilogue_buf, epilogue_cnt - 1); 21804 if (ret < 0) 21805 return ret; 21806 } 21807 } 21808 21809 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { 21810 if (!ops->gen_prologue) { 21811 verifier_bug(env, "gen_prologue is null"); 21812 return -EFAULT; 21813 } 21814 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, 21815 env->prog); 21816 if (cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { 21817 verifier_bug(env, "prologue is too long"); 21818 return -EFAULT; 21819 } else if (cnt) { 21820 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 21821 if (!new_prog) 21822 return -ENOMEM; 21823 21824 env->prog = new_prog; 21825 delta += cnt - 1; 21826 21827 ret = add_kfunc_in_insns(env, insn_buf, cnt - 1); 21828 if (ret < 0) 21829 return ret; 21830 } 21831 } 21832 21833 if (delta) 21834 WARN_ON(adjust_jmp_off(env->prog, 0, delta)); 21835 21836 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 21837 return 0; 21838 21839 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; 21840 21841 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 21842 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; 21843 u8 mode; 21844 21845 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].nospec) { 21846 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].alu_state); 21847 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 21848 21849 *patch++ = BPF_ST_NOSPEC(); 21850 *patch++ = *insn; 21851 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 21852 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 21853 if (!new_prog) 21854 return -ENOMEM; 21855 21856 delta += cnt - 1; 21857 env->prog = new_prog; 21858 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 21859 /* This can not be easily merged with the 21860 * nospec_result-case, because an insn may require a 21861 * nospec before and after itself. Therefore also do not 21862 * 'continue' here but potentially apply further 21863 * patching to insn. *insn should equal patch[1] now. 21864 */ 21865 } 21866 21867 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 21868 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 21869 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 21870 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 21871 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_B) || 21872 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_H) || 21873 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_W)) { 21874 type = BPF_READ; 21875 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 21876 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 21877 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 21878 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 21879 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 21880 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 21881 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 21882 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 21883 type = BPF_WRITE; 21884 } else if ((insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_B) || 21885 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_H) || 21886 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_W) || 21887 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_DW)) && 21888 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type == PTR_TO_ARENA) { 21889 insn->code = BPF_STX | BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC | BPF_SIZE(insn->code); 21890 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 21891 continue; 21892 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && 21893 epilogue_cnt && 21894 i + delta < subprogs[1].start) { 21895 /* Generate epilogue for the main prog */ 21896 if (epilogue_idx) { 21897 /* jump back to the earlier generated epilogue */ 21898 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP32_A(epilogue_idx - i - delta - 1); 21899 cnt = 1; 21900 } else { 21901 memcpy(insn_buf, epilogue_buf, 21902 epilogue_cnt * sizeof(*epilogue_buf)); 21903 cnt = epilogue_cnt; 21904 /* epilogue_idx cannot be 0. It must have at 21905 * least one ctx ptr saving insn before the 21906 * epilogue. 21907 */ 21908 epilogue_idx = i + delta; 21909 } 21910 goto patch_insn_buf; 21911 } else { 21912 continue; 21913 } 21914 21915 if (type == BPF_WRITE && 21916 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].nospec_result) { 21917 /* nospec_result is only used to mitigate Spectre v4 and 21918 * to limit verification-time for Spectre v1. 21919 */ 21920 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 21921 21922 *patch++ = *insn; 21923 *patch++ = BPF_ST_NOSPEC(); 21924 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 21925 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 21926 if (!new_prog) 21927 return -ENOMEM; 21928 21929 delta += cnt - 1; 21930 env->prog = new_prog; 21931 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 21932 continue; 21933 } 21934 21935 switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { 21936 case PTR_TO_CTX: 21937 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) 21938 continue; 21939 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access; 21940 break; 21941 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 21942 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 21943 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; 21944 break; 21945 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 21946 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 21947 break; 21948 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 21949 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 21950 break; 21951 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 21952 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 21953 /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike 21954 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot 21955 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle 21956 * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed 21957 * for this case. 21958 */ 21959 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 21960 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 21961 if (type == BPF_READ) { 21962 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) 21963 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | 21964 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 21965 else 21966 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEMSX | 21967 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 21968 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 21969 } 21970 continue; 21971 case PTR_TO_ARENA: 21972 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX) { 21973 if (!bpf_jit_supports_insn(insn, true)) { 21974 verbose(env, "sign extending loads from arena are not supported yet\n"); 21975 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 21976 } 21977 insn->code = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) | BPF_PROBE_MEM32SX | BPF_SIZE(insn->code); 21978 } else { 21979 insn->code = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) | BPF_PROBE_MEM32 | BPF_SIZE(insn->code); 21980 } 21981 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 21982 continue; 21983 default: 21984 continue; 21985 } 21986 21987 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; 21988 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); 21989 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 21990 21991 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, 21992 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific 21993 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, 21994 * we will apply proper mask to the result. 21995 */ 21996 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; 21997 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size); 21998 off = insn->off; 21999 if (is_narrower_load) { 22000 u8 size_code; 22001 22002 if (type == BPF_WRITE) { 22003 verifier_bug(env, "narrow ctx access misconfigured"); 22004 return -EFAULT; 22005 } 22006 22007 size_code = BPF_H; 22008 if (ctx_field_size == 4) 22009 size_code = BPF_W; 22010 else if (ctx_field_size == 8) 22011 size_code = BPF_DW; 22012 22013 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); 22014 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; 22015 } 22016 22017 target_size = 0; 22018 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, 22019 &target_size); 22020 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE || 22021 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { 22022 verifier_bug(env, "error during ctx access conversion (%d)", cnt); 22023 return -EFAULT; 22024 } 22025 22026 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { 22027 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( 22028 off, size, size_default) * 8; 22029 if (shift && cnt + 1 >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { 22030 verifier_bug(env, "narrow ctx load misconfigured"); 22031 return -EFAULT; 22032 } 22033 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { 22034 if (shift) 22035 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, 22036 insn->dst_reg, 22037 shift); 22038 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 22039 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 22040 } else { 22041 if (shift) 22042 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, 22043 insn->dst_reg, 22044 shift); 22045 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 22046 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1); 22047 } 22048 } 22049 if (mode == BPF_MEMSX) 22050 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X, 22051 insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg, 22052 size * 8, 0); 22053 22054 patch_insn_buf: 22055 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22056 if (!new_prog) 22057 return -ENOMEM; 22058 22059 delta += cnt - 1; 22060 22061 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 22062 env->prog = new_prog; 22063 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22064 } 22065 22066 return 0; 22067 } 22068 22069 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 22070 { 22071 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp; 22072 int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog; 22073 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 22074 struct bpf_insn *insn; 22075 void *old_bpf_func; 22076 int err, num_exentries; 22077 int old_len, subprog_start_adjustment = 0; 22078 22079 if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) 22080 return 0; 22081 22082 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 22083 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 22084 continue; 22085 22086 /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but 22087 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is 22088 * propagated in any case. 22089 */ 22090 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 22091 if (verifier_bug_if(subprog < 0, env, "No program to jit at insn %d", 22092 i + insn->imm + 1)) 22093 return -EFAULT; 22094 /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of 22095 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs 22096 */ 22097 insn->off = subprog; 22098 /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback 22099 * to interpreter will be needed 22100 */ 22101 env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; 22102 /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ 22103 insn->imm = 1; 22104 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 22105 #if defined(MODULES_VADDR) 22106 u64 addr = MODULES_VADDR; 22107 #else 22108 u64 addr = VMALLOC_START; 22109 #endif 22110 /* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions 22111 * if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm. 22112 * Set close enough to possible prog address. 22113 */ 22114 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 22115 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 22116 } 22117 } 22118 22119 err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog); 22120 if (err) 22121 goto out_undo_insn; 22122 22123 err = -ENOMEM; 22124 func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL); 22125 if (!func) 22126 goto out_undo_insn; 22127 22128 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 22129 subprog_start = subprog_end; 22130 subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start; 22131 22132 len = subprog_end - subprog_start; 22133 /* bpf_prog_run() doesn't call subprogs directly, 22134 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs. 22135 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id 22136 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL 22137 */ 22138 func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER); 22139 if (!func[i]) 22140 goto out_free; 22141 memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start], 22142 len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); 22143 func[i]->type = prog->type; 22144 func[i]->len = len; 22145 if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i])) 22146 goto out_free; 22147 func[i]->is_func = 1; 22148 func[i]->sleepable = prog->sleepable; 22149 func[i]->aux->func_idx = i; 22150 /* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */ 22151 func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf; 22152 func[i]->aux->subprog_start = subprog_start + subprog_start_adjustment; 22153 func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info; 22154 func[i]->aux->func_info_cnt = prog->aux->func_info_cnt; 22155 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 22156 func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 22157 func[i]->aux->main_prog_aux = prog->aux; 22158 22159 for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { 22160 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke; 22161 22162 poke = &prog->aux->poke_tab[j]; 22163 if (poke->insn_idx < subprog_end && 22164 poke->insn_idx >= subprog_start) 22165 poke->aux = func[i]->aux; 22166 } 22167 22168 func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F'; 22169 func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 22170 if (env->subprog_info[i].priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE) 22171 func[i]->aux->jits_use_priv_stack = true; 22172 22173 func[i]->jit_requested = 1; 22174 func[i]->blinding_requested = prog->blinding_requested; 22175 func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 22176 func[i]->aux->kfunc_btf_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 22177 func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 22178 func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 22179 func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo; 22180 func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx; 22181 func[i]->aux->arena = prog->aux->arena; 22182 func[i]->aux->used_maps = env->used_maps; 22183 func[i]->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 22184 num_exentries = 0; 22185 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 22186 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 22187 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 22188 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM || 22189 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM32 || 22190 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM32SX || 22191 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) 22192 num_exentries++; 22193 if ((BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX || 22194 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ST) && 22195 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM32) 22196 num_exentries++; 22197 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 22198 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC) 22199 num_exentries++; 22200 } 22201 func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries; 22202 func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable; 22203 func[i]->aux->exception_cb = env->subprog_info[i].is_exception_cb; 22204 func[i]->aux->changes_pkt_data = env->subprog_info[i].changes_pkt_data; 22205 func[i]->aux->might_sleep = env->subprog_info[i].might_sleep; 22206 if (!i) 22207 func[i]->aux->exception_boundary = env->seen_exception; 22208 22209 /* 22210 * To properly pass the absolute subprog start to jit 22211 * all instruction adjustments should be accumulated 22212 */ 22213 old_len = func[i]->len; 22214 func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 22215 subprog_start_adjustment += func[i]->len - old_len; 22216 22217 if (!func[i]->jited) { 22218 err = -ENOTSUPP; 22219 goto out_free; 22220 } 22221 cond_resched(); 22222 } 22223 22224 /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed 22225 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and 22226 * run last pass of JIT 22227 */ 22228 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 22229 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 22230 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 22231 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 22232 subprog = insn->off; 22233 insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func; 22234 insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32; 22235 continue; 22236 } 22237 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 22238 continue; 22239 subprog = insn->off; 22240 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(func[subprog]->bpf_func); 22241 } 22242 22243 /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses 22244 * of the JITed images for each function in the program 22245 * 22246 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field 22247 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start 22248 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base 22249 * 22250 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee 22251 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of 22252 * the call instruction, as an index for this list 22253 */ 22254 func[i]->aux->func = func; 22255 func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt - env->hidden_subprog_cnt; 22256 func[i]->aux->real_func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 22257 } 22258 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 22259 old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func; 22260 tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 22261 if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) { 22262 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 22263 err = -ENOTSUPP; 22264 goto out_free; 22265 } 22266 cond_resched(); 22267 } 22268 22269 /* 22270 * Cleanup func[i]->aux fields which aren't required 22271 * or can become invalid in future 22272 */ 22273 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 22274 func[i]->aux->used_maps = NULL; 22275 func[i]->aux->used_map_cnt = 0; 22276 } 22277 22278 /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and 22279 * populate kallsysm. Begin at the first subprogram, since 22280 * bpf_prog_load will add the kallsyms for the main program. 22281 */ 22282 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 22283 err = bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]); 22284 if (err) 22285 goto out_free; 22286 } 22287 22288 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 22289 bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]); 22290 22291 /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main 22292 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can 22293 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. 22294 */ 22295 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 22296 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 22297 insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 22298 insn[1].imm = insn->off; 22299 insn->off = 0; 22300 continue; 22301 } 22302 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 22303 continue; 22304 insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 22305 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); 22306 insn->imm = subprog; 22307 } 22308 22309 prog->jited = 1; 22310 prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func; 22311 prog->jited_len = func[0]->jited_len; 22312 prog->aux->extable = func[0]->aux->extable; 22313 prog->aux->num_exentries = func[0]->aux->num_exentries; 22314 prog->aux->func = func; 22315 prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt - env->hidden_subprog_cnt; 22316 prog->aux->real_func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 22317 prog->aux->bpf_exception_cb = (void *)func[env->exception_callback_subprog]->bpf_func; 22318 prog->aux->exception_boundary = func[0]->aux->exception_boundary; 22319 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 22320 return 0; 22321 out_free: 22322 /* We failed JIT'ing, so at this point we need to unregister poke 22323 * descriptors from subprogs, so that kernel is not attempting to 22324 * patch it anymore as we're freeing the subprog JIT memory. 22325 */ 22326 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 22327 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 22328 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux); 22329 } 22330 /* At this point we're guaranteed that poke descriptors are not 22331 * live anymore. We can just unlink its descriptor table as it's 22332 * released with the main prog. 22333 */ 22334 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 22335 if (!func[i]) 22336 continue; 22337 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = NULL; 22338 bpf_jit_free(func[i]); 22339 } 22340 kfree(func); 22341 out_undo_insn: 22342 /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ 22343 prog->jit_requested = 0; 22344 prog->blinding_requested = 0; 22345 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 22346 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 22347 continue; 22348 insn->off = 0; 22349 insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 22350 } 22351 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 22352 return err; 22353 } 22354 22355 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 22356 { 22357 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 22358 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 22359 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 22360 bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog); 22361 int i, depth; 22362 #endif 22363 int err = 0; 22364 22365 if (env->prog->jit_requested && 22366 !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 22367 err = jit_subprogs(env); 22368 if (err == 0) 22369 return 0; 22370 if (err == -EFAULT) 22371 return err; 22372 } 22373 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 22374 if (has_kfunc_call) { 22375 verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 22376 return -EINVAL; 22377 } 22378 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) { 22379 /* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls 22380 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 22381 */ 22382 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 22383 return -EINVAL; 22384 } 22385 for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 22386 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 22387 /* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls 22388 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 22389 */ 22390 verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 22391 return -EINVAL; 22392 } 22393 22394 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 22395 continue; 22396 depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); 22397 if (depth < 0) 22398 return depth; 22399 bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth); 22400 } 22401 err = 0; 22402 #endif 22403 return err; 22404 } 22405 22406 /* replace a generic kfunc with a specialized version if necessary */ 22407 static int specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc, int insn_idx) 22408 { 22409 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 22410 bool seen_direct_write; 22411 void *xdp_kfunc; 22412 bool is_rdonly; 22413 u32 func_id = desc->func_id; 22414 u16 offset = desc->offset; 22415 unsigned long addr = desc->addr; 22416 22417 if (offset) /* return if module BTF is used */ 22418 return 0; 22419 22420 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) { 22421 xdp_kfunc = bpf_dev_bound_resolve_kfunc(prog, func_id); 22422 if (xdp_kfunc) 22423 addr = (unsigned long)xdp_kfunc; 22424 /* fallback to default kfunc when not supported by netdev */ 22425 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) { 22426 seen_direct_write = env->seen_direct_write; 22427 is_rdonly = !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE); 22428 22429 if (is_rdonly) 22430 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly; 22431 22432 /* restore env->seen_direct_write to its original value, since 22433 * may_access_direct_pkt_data mutates it 22434 */ 22435 env->seen_direct_write = seen_direct_write; 22436 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_set_dentry_xattr]) { 22437 if (bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked(prog)) 22438 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked; 22439 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_remove_dentry_xattr]) { 22440 if (bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked(prog)) 22441 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked; 22442 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_file]) { 22443 if (!env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].non_sleepable) 22444 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_dynptr_from_file_sleepable; 22445 } 22446 desc->addr = addr; 22447 return 0; 22448 } 22449 22450 static void __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux, 22451 u16 struct_meta_reg, 22452 u16 node_offset_reg, 22453 struct bpf_insn *insn, 22454 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, 22455 int *cnt) 22456 { 22457 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta; 22458 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(struct_meta_reg, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 22459 22460 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 22461 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 22462 insn_buf[2] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(node_offset_reg, insn_aux->insert_off); 22463 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 22464 *cnt = 4; 22465 } 22466 22467 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 22468 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, int insn_idx, int *cnt) 22469 { 22470 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 22471 int err; 22472 22473 if (!insn->imm) { 22474 verbose(env, "invalid kernel function call not eliminated in verifier pass\n"); 22475 return -EINVAL; 22476 } 22477 22478 *cnt = 0; 22479 22480 /* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with an offset relative to 22481 * __bpf_call_base, unless the JIT needs to call functions that are 22482 * further than 32 bits away (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()). 22483 */ 22484 desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off); 22485 if (!desc) { 22486 verifier_bug(env, "kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u", 22487 insn->imm); 22488 return -EFAULT; 22489 } 22490 22491 err = specialize_kfunc(env, desc, insn_idx); 22492 if (err) 22493 return err; 22494 22495 if (!bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()) 22496 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr); 22497 if (insn->off) 22498 return 0; 22499 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] || 22500 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) { 22501 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 22502 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 22503 u64 obj_new_size = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size; 22504 22505 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl] && kptr_struct_meta) { 22506 verifier_bug(env, "NULL kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d", 22507 insn_idx); 22508 return -EFAULT; 22509 } 22510 22511 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, obj_new_size); 22512 insn_buf[1] = addr[0]; 22513 insn_buf[2] = addr[1]; 22514 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 22515 *cnt = 4; 22516 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl] || 22517 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl] || 22518 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) { 22519 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 22520 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 22521 22522 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl] && kptr_struct_meta) { 22523 verifier_bug(env, "NULL kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d", 22524 insn_idx); 22525 return -EFAULT; 22526 } 22527 22528 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] && 22529 !kptr_struct_meta) { 22530 verifier_bug(env, "kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d", 22531 insn_idx); 22532 return -EFAULT; 22533 } 22534 22535 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 22536 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 22537 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 22538 *cnt = 3; 22539 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] || 22540 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] || 22541 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 22542 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 22543 int struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_3; 22544 int node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_4; 22545 22546 /* rbtree_add has extra 'less' arg, so args-to-fixup are in diff regs */ 22547 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { 22548 struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_4; 22549 node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_5; 22550 } 22551 22552 if (!kptr_struct_meta) { 22553 verifier_bug(env, "kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d", 22554 insn_idx); 22555 return -EFAULT; 22556 } 22557 22558 __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(&env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx], struct_meta_reg, 22559 node_offset_reg, insn, insn_buf, cnt); 22560 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] || 22561 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 22562 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 22563 *cnt = 1; 22564 } 22565 22566 if (env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].arg_prog) { 22567 u32 regno = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].arg_prog; 22568 struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(regno, (long)env->prog->aux) }; 22569 int idx = *cnt; 22570 22571 insn_buf[idx++] = ld_addrs[0]; 22572 insn_buf[idx++] = ld_addrs[1]; 22573 insn_buf[idx++] = *insn; 22574 *cnt = idx; 22575 } 22576 return 0; 22577 } 22578 22579 /* The function requires that first instruction in 'patch' is insnsi[prog->len - 1] */ 22580 static int add_hidden_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *patch, int len) 22581 { 22582 struct bpf_subprog_info *info = env->subprog_info; 22583 int cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 22584 struct bpf_prog *prog; 22585 22586 /* We only reserve one slot for hidden subprogs in subprog_info. */ 22587 if (env->hidden_subprog_cnt) { 22588 verifier_bug(env, "only one hidden subprog supported"); 22589 return -EFAULT; 22590 } 22591 /* We're not patching any existing instruction, just appending the new 22592 * ones for the hidden subprog. Hence all of the adjustment operations 22593 * in bpf_patch_insn_data are no-ops. 22594 */ 22595 prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, env->prog->len - 1, patch, len); 22596 if (!prog) 22597 return -ENOMEM; 22598 env->prog = prog; 22599 info[cnt + 1].start = info[cnt].start; 22600 info[cnt].start = prog->len - len + 1; 22601 env->subprog_cnt++; 22602 env->hidden_subprog_cnt++; 22603 return 0; 22604 } 22605 22606 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass. 22607 * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations. 22608 */ 22609 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 22610 { 22611 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 22612 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = prog->expected_attach_type; 22613 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 22614 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 22615 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 22616 const int insn_cnt = prog->len; 22617 const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; 22618 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 22619 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf = env->insn_buf; 22620 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 22621 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 22622 int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0, cur_subprog = 0; 22623 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; 22624 u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 22625 u16 stack_depth_extra = 0; 22626 22627 if (env->seen_exception && !env->exception_callback_subprog) { 22628 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 22629 22630 *patch++ = env->prog->insnsi[insn_cnt - 1]; 22631 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 22632 *patch++ = BPF_EXIT_INSN(); 22633 ret = add_hidden_subprog(env, insn_buf, patch - insn_buf); 22634 if (ret < 0) 22635 return ret; 22636 prog = env->prog; 22637 insn = prog->insnsi; 22638 22639 env->exception_callback_subprog = env->subprog_cnt - 1; 22640 /* Don't update insn_cnt, as add_hidden_subprog always appends insns */ 22641 mark_subprog_exc_cb(env, env->exception_callback_subprog); 22642 } 22643 22644 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt;) { 22645 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X) && insn->imm) { 22646 if ((insn->off == BPF_ADDR_SPACE_CAST && insn->imm == 1) || 22647 (((struct bpf_map *)env->prog->aux->arena)->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_USER_CONV)) { 22648 /* convert to 32-bit mov that clears upper 32-bit */ 22649 insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_X; 22650 /* clear off and imm, so it's a normal 'wX = wY' from JIT pov */ 22651 insn->off = 0; 22652 insn->imm = 0; 22653 } /* cast from as(0) to as(1) should be handled by JIT */ 22654 goto next_insn; 22655 } 22656 22657 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].needs_zext) 22658 /* Convert BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 to 32-bit ALU */ 22659 insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_OP(insn->code) | BPF_SRC(insn->code); 22660 22661 /* Make sdiv/smod divide-by-minus-one exceptions impossible. */ 22662 if ((insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K) || 22663 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K) || 22664 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_K) || 22665 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_K)) && 22666 insn->off == 1 && insn->imm == -1) { 22667 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; 22668 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; 22669 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 22670 22671 if (isdiv) 22672 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | 22673 BPF_NEG | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg, 22674 0, 0, 0); 22675 else 22676 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0); 22677 22678 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22679 22680 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22681 if (!new_prog) 22682 return -ENOMEM; 22683 22684 delta += cnt - 1; 22685 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22686 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22687 goto next_insn; 22688 } 22689 22690 /* Make divide-by-zero and divide-by-minus-one exceptions impossible. */ 22691 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 22692 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || 22693 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 22694 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { 22695 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; 22696 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; 22697 bool is_sdiv = isdiv && insn->off == 1; 22698 bool is_smod = !isdiv && insn->off == 1; 22699 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 22700 22701 if (is_sdiv) { 22702 /* [R,W]x sdiv 0 -> 0 22703 * LLONG_MIN sdiv -1 -> LLONG_MIN 22704 * INT_MIN sdiv -1 -> INT_MIN 22705 */ 22706 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg); 22707 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | 22708 BPF_ADD | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, 22709 0, 0, 1); 22710 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 22711 BPF_JGT | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, 22712 0, 4, 1); 22713 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 22714 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, 22715 0, 1, 0); 22716 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | 22717 BPF_MOV | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg, 22718 0, 0, 0); 22719 /* BPF_NEG(LLONG_MIN) == -LLONG_MIN == LLONG_MIN */ 22720 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | 22721 BPF_NEG | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg, 22722 0, 0, 0); 22723 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); 22724 *patch++ = *insn; 22725 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22726 } else if (is_smod) { 22727 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ 22728 /* [R,W]x mod -1 -> 0 */ 22729 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg); 22730 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | 22731 BPF_ADD | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, 22732 0, 0, 1); 22733 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 22734 BPF_JGT | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, 22735 0, 3, 1); 22736 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 22737 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, 22738 0, 3 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 1); 22739 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0); 22740 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); 22741 *patch++ = *insn; 22742 22743 if (!is64) { 22744 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); 22745 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg); 22746 } 22747 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22748 } else if (isdiv) { 22749 /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */ 22750 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 22751 BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 22752 0, 2, 0); 22753 *patch++ = BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg); 22754 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); 22755 *patch++ = *insn; 22756 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22757 } else { 22758 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ 22759 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 22760 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 22761 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0); 22762 *patch++ = *insn; 22763 22764 if (!is64) { 22765 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); 22766 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg); 22767 } 22768 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22769 } 22770 22771 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22772 if (!new_prog) 22773 return -ENOMEM; 22774 22775 delta += cnt - 1; 22776 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22777 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22778 goto next_insn; 22779 } 22780 22781 /* Make it impossible to de-reference a userspace address */ 22782 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 22783 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM || 22784 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) { 22785 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 22786 u64 uaddress_limit = bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(); 22787 22788 if (!uaddress_limit) 22789 goto next_insn; 22790 22791 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg); 22792 if (insn->off) 22793 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_AX, insn->off); 22794 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); 22795 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_AX, uaddress_limit >> 32, 2); 22796 *patch++ = *insn; 22797 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); 22798 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0); 22799 22800 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22801 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22802 if (!new_prog) 22803 return -ENOMEM; 22804 22805 delta += cnt - 1; 22806 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22807 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22808 goto next_insn; 22809 } 22810 22811 /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */ 22812 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && 22813 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || 22814 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { 22815 cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); 22816 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { 22817 verifier_bug(env, "%d insns generated for ld_abs", cnt); 22818 return -EFAULT; 22819 } 22820 22821 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22822 if (!new_prog) 22823 return -ENOMEM; 22824 22825 delta += cnt - 1; 22826 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22827 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22828 goto next_insn; 22829 } 22830 22831 /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */ 22832 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) || 22833 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) { 22834 const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X; 22835 const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X; 22836 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; 22837 bool issrc, isneg, isimm; 22838 u32 off_reg; 22839 22840 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 22841 if (!aux->alu_state || 22842 aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER) 22843 goto next_insn; 22844 22845 isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE; 22846 issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) == 22847 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC; 22848 isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE; 22849 22850 off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg; 22851 if (isimm) { 22852 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 22853 } else { 22854 if (isneg) 22855 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 22856 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 22857 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 22858 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 22859 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 22860 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63); 22861 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 22862 } 22863 if (!issrc) 22864 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg); 22865 insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX; 22866 if (isneg) 22867 insn->code = insn->code == code_add ? 22868 code_sub : code_add; 22869 *patch++ = *insn; 22870 if (issrc && isneg && !isimm) 22871 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 22872 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 22873 22874 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22875 if (!new_prog) 22876 return -ENOMEM; 22877 22878 delta += cnt - 1; 22879 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22880 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22881 goto next_insn; 22882 } 22883 22884 if (is_may_goto_insn(insn) && bpf_jit_supports_timed_may_goto()) { 22885 int stack_off_cnt = -stack_depth - 16; 22886 22887 /* 22888 * Two 8 byte slots, depth-16 stores the count, and 22889 * depth-8 stores the start timestamp of the loop. 22890 * 22891 * The starting value of count is BPF_MAX_TIMED_LOOPS 22892 * (0xffff). Every iteration loads it and subs it by 1, 22893 * until the value becomes 0 in AX (thus, 1 in stack), 22894 * after which we call arch_bpf_timed_may_goto, which 22895 * either sets AX to 0xffff to keep looping, or to 0 22896 * upon timeout. AX is then stored into the stack. In 22897 * the next iteration, we either see 0 and break out, or 22898 * continue iterating until the next time value is 0 22899 * after subtraction, rinse and repeat. 22900 */ 22901 stack_depth_extra = 16; 22902 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_AX, BPF_REG_10, stack_off_cnt); 22903 if (insn->off >= 0) 22904 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off + 5); 22905 else 22906 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off - 1); 22907 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, 1); 22908 insn_buf[3] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_AX, 0, 2); 22909 /* 22910 * AX is used as an argument to pass in stack_off_cnt 22911 * (to add to r10/fp), and also as the return value of 22912 * the call to arch_bpf_timed_may_goto. 22913 */ 22914 insn_buf[4] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, stack_off_cnt); 22915 insn_buf[5] = BPF_EMIT_CALL(arch_bpf_timed_may_goto); 22916 insn_buf[6] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_AX, stack_off_cnt); 22917 cnt = 7; 22918 22919 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22920 if (!new_prog) 22921 return -ENOMEM; 22922 22923 delta += cnt - 1; 22924 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22925 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22926 goto next_insn; 22927 } else if (is_may_goto_insn(insn)) { 22928 int stack_off = -stack_depth - 8; 22929 22930 stack_depth_extra = 8; 22931 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_AX, BPF_REG_10, stack_off); 22932 if (insn->off >= 0) 22933 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off + 2); 22934 else 22935 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off - 1); 22936 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, 1); 22937 insn_buf[3] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_AX, stack_off); 22938 cnt = 4; 22939 22940 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22941 if (!new_prog) 22942 return -ENOMEM; 22943 22944 delta += cnt - 1; 22945 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22946 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22947 goto next_insn; 22948 } 22949 22950 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 22951 goto next_insn; 22952 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 22953 goto next_insn; 22954 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 22955 ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn, insn_buf, i + delta, &cnt); 22956 if (ret) 22957 return ret; 22958 if (cnt == 0) 22959 goto next_insn; 22960 22961 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 22962 if (!new_prog) 22963 return -ENOMEM; 22964 22965 delta += cnt - 1; 22966 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 22967 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 22968 goto next_insn; 22969 } 22970 22971 /* Skip inlining the helper call if the JIT does it. */ 22972 if (bpf_jit_inlines_helper_call(insn->imm)) 22973 goto next_insn; 22974 22975 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) 22976 prog->dst_needed = 1; 22977 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) 22978 bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); 22979 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return) 22980 prog->kprobe_override = 1; 22981 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 22982 /* If we tail call into other programs, we 22983 * cannot make any assumptions since they can 22984 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in 22985 * the program array. 22986 */ 22987 prog->cb_access = 1; 22988 if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) 22989 prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; 22990 prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF; 22991 22992 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid 22993 * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal 22994 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler 22995 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet 22996 */ 22997 insn->imm = 0; 22998 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; 22999 23000 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 23001 if (env->bpf_capable && !prog->blinding_requested && 23002 prog->jit_requested && 23003 !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 23004 !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) && 23005 !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) { 23006 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = { 23007 .reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL, 23008 .tail_call.map = aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr, 23009 .tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux), 23010 .insn_idx = i + delta, 23011 }; 23012 23013 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc); 23014 if (ret < 0) { 23015 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); 23016 return ret; 23017 } 23018 23019 insn->imm = ret + 1; 23020 goto next_insn; 23021 } 23022 23023 if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) 23024 goto next_insn; 23025 23026 /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call 23027 * emit two extra insns: 23028 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out; 23029 * index &= array->index_mask; 23030 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation 23031 */ 23032 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) { 23033 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 23034 return -EINVAL; 23035 } 23036 23037 map_ptr = aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr; 23038 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, 23039 map_ptr->max_entries, 2); 23040 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 23041 container_of(map_ptr, 23042 struct bpf_array, 23043 map)->index_mask); 23044 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 23045 cnt = 3; 23046 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23047 if (!new_prog) 23048 return -ENOMEM; 23049 23050 delta += cnt - 1; 23051 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23052 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23053 goto next_insn; 23054 } 23055 23056 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 23057 /* The verifier will process callback_fn as many times as necessary 23058 * with different maps and the register states prepared by 23059 * set_timer_callback_state will be accurate. 23060 * 23061 * The following use case is valid: 23062 * map1 is shared by prog1, prog2, prog3. 23063 * prog1 calls bpf_timer_init for some map1 elements 23064 * prog2 calls bpf_timer_set_callback for some map1 elements. 23065 * Those that were not bpf_timer_init-ed will return -EINVAL. 23066 * prog3 calls bpf_timer_start for some map1 elements. 23067 * Those that were not both bpf_timer_init-ed and 23068 * bpf_timer_set_callback-ed will return -EINVAL. 23069 */ 23070 struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = { 23071 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, (long)prog->aux), 23072 }; 23073 23074 insn_buf[0] = ld_addrs[0]; 23075 insn_buf[1] = ld_addrs[1]; 23076 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 23077 cnt = 3; 23078 23079 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23080 if (!new_prog) 23081 return -ENOMEM; 23082 23083 delta += cnt - 1; 23084 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23085 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23086 goto patch_call_imm; 23087 } 23088 23089 if (is_storage_get_function(insn->imm)) { 23090 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].non_sleepable) 23091 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_ATOMIC); 23092 else 23093 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_KERNEL); 23094 insn_buf[1] = *insn; 23095 cnt = 2; 23096 23097 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23098 if (!new_prog) 23099 return -ENOMEM; 23100 23101 delta += cnt - 1; 23102 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23103 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23104 goto patch_call_imm; 23105 } 23106 23107 /* bpf_per_cpu_ptr() and bpf_this_cpu_ptr() */ 23108 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].call_with_percpu_alloc_ptr) { 23109 /* patch with 'r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0)' since for percpu data, 23110 * bpf_mem_alloc() returns a ptr to the percpu data ptr. 23111 */ 23112 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, 0); 23113 insn_buf[1] = *insn; 23114 cnt = 2; 23115 23116 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23117 if (!new_prog) 23118 return -ENOMEM; 23119 23120 delta += cnt - 1; 23121 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23122 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23123 goto patch_call_imm; 23124 } 23125 23126 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup 23127 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit 23128 * only. 23129 */ 23130 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 23131 (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || 23132 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 23133 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 23134 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 23135 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem || 23136 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem || 23137 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map || 23138 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 23139 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)) { 23140 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 23141 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) 23142 goto patch_call_imm; 23143 23144 map_ptr = aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr; 23145 ops = map_ptr->ops; 23146 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 23147 ops->map_gen_lookup) { 23148 cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); 23149 if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP) 23150 goto patch_map_ops_generic; 23151 if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { 23152 verifier_bug(env, "%d insns generated for map lookup", cnt); 23153 return -EFAULT; 23154 } 23155 23156 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, 23157 insn_buf, cnt); 23158 if (!new_prog) 23159 return -ENOMEM; 23160 23161 delta += cnt - 1; 23162 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23163 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23164 goto next_insn; 23165 } 23166 23167 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, 23168 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 23169 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem, 23170 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 23171 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem, 23172 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 23173 u64 flags))NULL)); 23174 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem, 23175 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value, 23176 u64 flags))NULL)); 23177 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem, 23178 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 23179 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem, 23180 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 23181 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect, 23182 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u64 index, u64 flags))NULL)); 23183 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_for_each_callback, 23184 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, 23185 bpf_callback_t callback_fn, 23186 void *callback_ctx, 23187 u64 flags))NULL)); 23188 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem, 23189 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 cpu))NULL)); 23190 23191 patch_map_ops_generic: 23192 switch (insn->imm) { 23193 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: 23194 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_elem); 23195 goto next_insn; 23196 case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: 23197 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_update_elem); 23198 goto next_insn; 23199 case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: 23200 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_delete_elem); 23201 goto next_insn; 23202 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 23203 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_push_elem); 23204 goto next_insn; 23205 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 23206 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_pop_elem); 23207 goto next_insn; 23208 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 23209 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_peek_elem); 23210 goto next_insn; 23211 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 23212 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_redirect); 23213 goto next_insn; 23214 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 23215 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_for_each_callback); 23216 goto next_insn; 23217 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 23218 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem); 23219 goto next_insn; 23220 } 23221 23222 goto patch_call_imm; 23223 } 23224 23225 /* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */ 23226 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 23227 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) { 23228 struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = { 23229 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 23230 (unsigned long)&jiffies), 23231 }; 23232 23233 insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0]; 23234 insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1]; 23235 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 23236 BPF_REG_0, 0); 23237 cnt = 3; 23238 23239 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 23240 cnt); 23241 if (!new_prog) 23242 return -ENOMEM; 23243 23244 delta += cnt - 1; 23245 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23246 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23247 goto next_insn; 23248 } 23249 23250 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && !defined(CONFIG_UML) 23251 /* Implement bpf_get_smp_processor_id() inline. */ 23252 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id && 23253 verifier_inlines_helper_call(env, insn->imm)) { 23254 /* BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id inlining is an 23255 * optimization, so if cpu_number is ever 23256 * changed in some incompatible and hard to support 23257 * way, it's fine to back out this inlining logic 23258 */ 23259 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP 23260 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, (u32)(unsigned long)&cpu_number); 23261 insn_buf[1] = BPF_MOV64_PERCPU_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0); 23262 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0); 23263 cnt = 3; 23264 #else 23265 insn_buf[0] = BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0); 23266 cnt = 1; 23267 #endif 23268 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23269 if (!new_prog) 23270 return -ENOMEM; 23271 23272 delta += cnt - 1; 23273 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23274 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23275 goto next_insn; 23276 } 23277 #endif 23278 /* Implement bpf_get_func_arg inline. */ 23279 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 23280 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg) { 23281 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 23282 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 23283 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, 6); 23284 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 3); 23285 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1); 23286 insn_buf[4] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0); 23287 insn_buf[5] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 23288 insn_buf[6] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 23289 insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(1); 23290 insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL); 23291 cnt = 9; 23292 23293 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23294 if (!new_prog) 23295 return -ENOMEM; 23296 23297 delta += cnt - 1; 23298 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23299 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23300 goto next_insn; 23301 } 23302 23303 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ret inline. */ 23304 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 23305 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ret) { 23306 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || 23307 eatype == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 23308 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 23309 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 23310 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_0, 3); 23311 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 23312 insn_buf[3] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 23313 insn_buf[4] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, 0); 23314 insn_buf[5] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 23315 cnt = 6; 23316 } else { 23317 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EOPNOTSUPP); 23318 cnt = 1; 23319 } 23320 23321 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23322 if (!new_prog) 23323 return -ENOMEM; 23324 23325 delta += cnt - 1; 23326 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23327 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23328 goto next_insn; 23329 } 23330 23331 /* Implement get_func_arg_cnt inline. */ 23332 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 23333 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg_cnt) { 23334 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 23335 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 23336 23337 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 23338 if (!new_prog) 23339 return -ENOMEM; 23340 23341 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23342 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23343 goto next_insn; 23344 } 23345 23346 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ip inline. */ 23347 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 23348 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 23349 /* Load IP address from ctx - 16 */ 23350 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -16); 23351 23352 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 23353 if (!new_prog) 23354 return -ENOMEM; 23355 23356 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23357 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23358 goto next_insn; 23359 } 23360 23361 /* Implement bpf_get_branch_snapshot inline. */ 23362 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) && 23363 prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 23364 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_branch_snapshot) { 23365 /* We are dealing with the following func protos: 23366 * u64 bpf_get_branch_snapshot(void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags); 23367 * int perf_snapshot_branch_stack(struct perf_branch_entry *entries, u32 cnt); 23368 */ 23369 const u32 br_entry_size = sizeof(struct perf_branch_entry); 23370 23371 /* struct perf_branch_entry is part of UAPI and is 23372 * used as an array element, so extremely unlikely to 23373 * ever grow or shrink 23374 */ 23375 BUILD_BUG_ON(br_entry_size != 24); 23376 23377 /* if (unlikely(flags)) return -EINVAL */ 23378 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_3, 0, 7); 23379 23380 /* Transform size (bytes) into number of entries (cnt = size / 24). 23381 * But to avoid expensive division instruction, we implement 23382 * divide-by-3 through multiplication, followed by further 23383 * division by 8 through 3-bit right shift. 23384 * Refer to book "Hacker's Delight, 2nd ed." by Henry S. Warren, Jr., 23385 * p. 227, chapter "Unsigned Division by 3" for details and proofs. 23386 * 23387 * N / 3 <=> M * N / 2^33, where M = (2^33 + 1) / 3 = 0xaaaaaaab. 23388 */ 23389 insn_buf[1] = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0xaaaaaaab); 23390 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MUL, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0); 23391 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_2, 36); 23392 23393 /* call perf_snapshot_branch_stack implementation */ 23394 insn_buf[4] = BPF_EMIT_CALL(static_call_query(perf_snapshot_branch_stack)); 23395 /* if (entry_cnt == 0) return -ENOENT */ 23396 insn_buf[5] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 4); 23397 /* return entry_cnt * sizeof(struct perf_branch_entry) */ 23398 insn_buf[6] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MUL, BPF_REG_0, br_entry_size); 23399 insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(3); 23400 /* return -EINVAL; */ 23401 insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL); 23402 insn_buf[9] = BPF_JMP_A(1); 23403 /* return -ENOENT; */ 23404 insn_buf[10] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -ENOENT); 23405 cnt = 11; 23406 23407 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23408 if (!new_prog) 23409 return -ENOMEM; 23410 23411 delta += cnt - 1; 23412 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23413 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23414 goto next_insn; 23415 } 23416 23417 /* Implement bpf_kptr_xchg inline */ 23418 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 23419 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && 23420 bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg()) { 23421 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2); 23422 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ATOMIC_OP(BPF_DW, BPF_XCHG, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0); 23423 cnt = 2; 23424 23425 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 23426 if (!new_prog) 23427 return -ENOMEM; 23428 23429 delta += cnt - 1; 23430 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23431 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23432 goto next_insn; 23433 } 23434 patch_call_imm: 23435 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); 23436 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed 23437 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions 23438 */ 23439 if (!fn->func) { 23440 verifier_bug(env, 23441 "not inlined functions %s#%d is missing func", 23442 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 23443 return -EFAULT; 23444 } 23445 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; 23446 next_insn: 23447 if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) { 23448 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra; 23449 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_extra = stack_depth_extra; 23450 23451 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 23452 if (stack_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK && !prog->jit_requested) { 23453 verbose(env, "stack size %d(extra %d) is too large\n", 23454 stack_depth, stack_depth_extra); 23455 return -EINVAL; 23456 } 23457 cur_subprog++; 23458 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 23459 stack_depth_extra = 0; 23460 } 23461 i++; 23462 insn++; 23463 } 23464 23465 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = subprogs[0].stack_depth; 23466 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 23467 int delta = bpf_jit_supports_timed_may_goto() ? 2 : 1; 23468 int subprog_start = subprogs[i].start; 23469 int stack_slots = subprogs[i].stack_extra / 8; 23470 int slots = delta, cnt = 0; 23471 23472 if (!stack_slots) 23473 continue; 23474 /* We need two slots in case timed may_goto is supported. */ 23475 if (stack_slots > slots) { 23476 verifier_bug(env, "stack_slots supports may_goto only"); 23477 return -EFAULT; 23478 } 23479 23480 stack_depth = subprogs[i].stack_depth; 23481 if (bpf_jit_supports_timed_may_goto()) { 23482 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, -stack_depth, 23483 BPF_MAX_TIMED_LOOPS); 23484 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, -stack_depth + 8, 0); 23485 } else { 23486 /* Add ST insn to subprog prologue to init extra stack */ 23487 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, -stack_depth, 23488 BPF_MAX_LOOPS); 23489 } 23490 /* Copy first actual insn to preserve it */ 23491 insn_buf[cnt++] = env->prog->insnsi[subprog_start]; 23492 23493 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, subprog_start, insn_buf, cnt); 23494 if (!new_prog) 23495 return -ENOMEM; 23496 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 23497 /* 23498 * If may_goto is a first insn of a prog there could be a jmp 23499 * insn that points to it, hence adjust all such jmps to point 23500 * to insn after BPF_ST that inits may_goto count. 23501 * Adjustment will succeed because bpf_patch_insn_data() didn't fail. 23502 */ 23503 WARN_ON(adjust_jmp_off(env->prog, subprog_start, delta)); 23504 } 23505 23506 /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */ 23507 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 23508 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 23509 if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || 23510 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || 23511 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { 23512 verifier_bug(env, "poke tab is misconfigured"); 23513 return -EFAULT; 23514 } 23515 23516 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); 23517 if (ret < 0) { 23518 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); 23519 return ret; 23520 } 23521 } 23522 23523 ret = sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(env); 23524 if (ret) 23525 return ret; 23526 23527 return 0; 23528 } 23529 23530 static struct bpf_prog *inline_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 23531 int position, 23532 s32 stack_base, 23533 u32 callback_subprogno, 23534 u32 *total_cnt) 23535 { 23536 s32 r6_offset = stack_base + 0 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 23537 s32 r7_offset = stack_base + 1 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 23538 s32 r8_offset = stack_base + 2 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 23539 int reg_loop_max = BPF_REG_6; 23540 int reg_loop_cnt = BPF_REG_7; 23541 int reg_loop_ctx = BPF_REG_8; 23542 23543 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf = env->insn_buf; 23544 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 23545 u32 callback_start; 23546 u32 call_insn_offset; 23547 s32 callback_offset; 23548 u32 cnt = 0; 23549 23550 /* This represents an inlined version of bpf_iter.c:bpf_loop, 23551 * be careful to modify this code in sync. 23552 */ 23553 23554 /* Return error and jump to the end of the patch if 23555 * expected number of iterations is too big. 23556 */ 23557 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_1, BPF_MAX_LOOPS, 2); 23558 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -E2BIG); 23559 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 16); 23560 /* spill R6, R7, R8 to use these as loop vars */ 23561 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, r6_offset); 23562 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, r7_offset); 23563 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_8, r8_offset); 23564 /* initialize loop vars */ 23565 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_max, BPF_REG_1); 23566 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV32_IMM(reg_loop_cnt, 0); 23567 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_ctx, BPF_REG_3); 23568 /* loop header, 23569 * if reg_loop_cnt >= reg_loop_max skip the loop body 23570 */ 23571 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, reg_loop_cnt, reg_loop_max, 5); 23572 /* callback call, 23573 * correct callback offset would be set after patching 23574 */ 23575 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, reg_loop_cnt); 23576 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, reg_loop_ctx); 23577 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_CALL_REL(0); 23578 /* increment loop counter */ 23579 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, reg_loop_cnt, 1); 23580 /* jump to loop header if callback returned 0 */ 23581 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, -6); 23582 /* return value of bpf_loop, 23583 * set R0 to the number of iterations 23584 */ 23585 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, reg_loop_cnt); 23586 /* restore original values of R6, R7, R8 */ 23587 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, r6_offset); 23588 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, r7_offset); 23589 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, r8_offset); 23590 23591 *total_cnt = cnt; 23592 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, position, insn_buf, cnt); 23593 if (!new_prog) 23594 return new_prog; 23595 23596 /* callback start is known only after patching */ 23597 callback_start = env->subprog_info[callback_subprogno].start; 23598 /* Note: insn_buf[12] is an offset of BPF_CALL_REL instruction */ 23599 call_insn_offset = position + 12; 23600 callback_offset = callback_start - call_insn_offset - 1; 23601 new_prog->insnsi[call_insn_offset].imm = callback_offset; 23602 23603 return new_prog; 23604 } 23605 23606 static bool is_bpf_loop_call(struct bpf_insn *insn) 23607 { 23608 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 23609 insn->src_reg == 0 && 23610 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_loop; 23611 } 23612 23613 /* For all sub-programs in the program (including main) check 23614 * insn_aux_data to see if there are bpf_loop calls that require 23615 * inlining. If such calls are found the calls are replaced with a 23616 * sequence of instructions produced by `inline_bpf_loop` function and 23617 * subprog stack_depth is increased by the size of 3 registers. 23618 * This stack space is used to spill values of the R6, R7, R8. These 23619 * registers are used to store the loop bound, counter and context 23620 * variables. 23621 */ 23622 static int optimize_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 23623 { 23624 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; 23625 int i, cur_subprog = 0, cnt, delta = 0; 23626 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 23627 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 23628 u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 23629 u16 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 23630 u16 stack_depth_extra = 0; 23631 23632 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 23633 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *inline_state = 23634 &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].loop_inline_state; 23635 23636 if (is_bpf_loop_call(insn) && inline_state->fit_for_inline) { 23637 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 23638 23639 stack_depth_extra = BPF_REG_SIZE * 3 + stack_depth_roundup; 23640 new_prog = inline_bpf_loop(env, 23641 i + delta, 23642 -(stack_depth + stack_depth_extra), 23643 inline_state->callback_subprogno, 23644 &cnt); 23645 if (!new_prog) 23646 return -ENOMEM; 23647 23648 delta += cnt - 1; 23649 env->prog = new_prog; 23650 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 23651 } 23652 23653 if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) { 23654 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra; 23655 cur_subprog++; 23656 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 23657 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 23658 stack_depth_extra = 0; 23659 } 23660 } 23661 23662 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 23663 23664 return 0; 23665 } 23666 23667 /* Remove unnecessary spill/fill pairs, members of fastcall pattern, 23668 * adjust subprograms stack depth when possible. 23669 */ 23670 static int remove_fastcall_spills_fills(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 23671 { 23672 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 23673 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 23674 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 23675 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 23676 u32 spills_num; 23677 bool modified = false; 23678 int i, j; 23679 23680 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 23681 if (aux[i].fastcall_spills_num > 0) { 23682 spills_num = aux[i].fastcall_spills_num; 23683 /* NOPs would be removed by opt_remove_nops() */ 23684 for (j = 1; j <= spills_num; ++j) { 23685 *(insn - j) = NOP; 23686 *(insn + j) = NOP; 23687 } 23688 modified = true; 23689 } 23690 if ((subprog + 1)->start == i + 1) { 23691 if (modified && !subprog->keep_fastcall_stack) 23692 subprog->stack_depth = -subprog->fastcall_stack_off; 23693 subprog++; 23694 modified = false; 23695 } 23696 } 23697 23698 return 0; 23699 } 23700 23701 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 23702 { 23703 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 23704 struct list_head *head, *pos, *tmp; 23705 struct bpf_scc_info *info; 23706 int i, j; 23707 23708 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 23709 env->cur_state = NULL; 23710 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 23711 23712 list_for_each_safe(pos, tmp, &env->free_list) { 23713 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); 23714 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 23715 kfree(sl); 23716 } 23717 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->free_list); 23718 23719 for (i = 0; i < env->scc_cnt; ++i) { 23720 info = env->scc_info[i]; 23721 if (!info) 23722 continue; 23723 for (j = 0; j < info->num_visits; j++) 23724 free_backedges(&info->visits[j]); 23725 kvfree(info); 23726 env->scc_info[i] = NULL; 23727 } 23728 23729 if (!env->explored_states) 23730 return; 23731 23732 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) { 23733 head = &env->explored_states[i]; 23734 23735 list_for_each_safe(pos, tmp, head) { 23736 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); 23737 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 23738 kfree(sl); 23739 } 23740 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->explored_states[i]); 23741 } 23742 } 23743 23744 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 23745 { 23746 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 23747 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub = subprog_info(env, subprog); 23748 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 23749 struct bpf_verifier_state *state; 23750 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 23751 int ret, i; 23752 23753 env->prev_linfo = NULL; 23754 env->pass_cnt++; 23755 23756 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 23757 if (!state) 23758 return -ENOMEM; 23759 state->curframe = 0; 23760 state->speculative = false; 23761 state->branches = 1; 23762 state->in_sleepable = env->prog->sleepable; 23763 state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 23764 if (!state->frame[0]) { 23765 kfree(state); 23766 return -ENOMEM; 23767 } 23768 env->cur_state = state; 23769 init_func_state(env, state->frame[0], 23770 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 23771 0 /* frameno */, 23772 subprog); 23773 state->first_insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start; 23774 state->last_insn_idx = -1; 23775 23776 regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs; 23777 if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 23778 const char *sub_name = subprog_name(env, subprog); 23779 struct bpf_subprog_arg_info *arg; 23780 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 23781 23782 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 23783 verbose(env, "Validating %s() func#%d...\n", sub_name, subprog); 23784 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog); 23785 if (ret) 23786 goto out; 23787 23788 if (subprog_is_exc_cb(env, subprog)) { 23789 state->frame[0]->in_exception_callback_fn = true; 23790 /* We have already ensured that the callback returns an integer, just 23791 * like all global subprogs. We need to determine it only has a single 23792 * scalar argument. 23793 */ 23794 if (sub->arg_cnt != 1 || sub->args[0].arg_type != ARG_ANYTHING) { 23795 verbose(env, "exception cb only supports single integer argument\n"); 23796 ret = -EINVAL; 23797 goto out; 23798 } 23799 } 23800 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= sub->arg_cnt; i++) { 23801 arg = &sub->args[i - BPF_REG_1]; 23802 reg = ®s[i]; 23803 23804 if (arg->arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 23805 reg->type = PTR_TO_CTX; 23806 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 23807 } else if (arg->arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 23808 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 23809 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 23810 } else if (arg->arg_type == (ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY)) { 23811 /* assume unspecial LOCAL dynptr type */ 23812 __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL, true, ++env->id_gen); 23813 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) { 23814 reg->type = PTR_TO_MEM; 23815 reg->type |= arg->arg_type & 23816 (PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED | MEM_RDONLY); 23817 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 23818 reg->mem_size = arg->mem_size; 23819 if (arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) 23820 reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 23821 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 23822 reg->type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 23823 if (arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) 23824 reg->type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 23825 if (arg->arg_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) 23826 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 23827 if (arg->arg_type & PTR_TRUSTED) 23828 reg->type |= PTR_TRUSTED; 23829 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 23830 reg->btf = bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); /* can't fail at this point */ 23831 reg->btf_id = arg->btf_id; 23832 reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 23833 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_ARENA) { 23834 /* caller can pass either PTR_TO_ARENA or SCALAR */ 23835 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 23836 } else { 23837 verifier_bug(env, "unhandled arg#%d type %d", 23838 i - BPF_REG_1, arg->arg_type); 23839 ret = -EFAULT; 23840 goto out; 23841 } 23842 } 23843 } else { 23844 /* if main BPF program has associated BTF info, validate that 23845 * it's matching expected signature, and otherwise mark BTF 23846 * info for main program as unreliable 23847 */ 23848 if (env->prog->aux->func_info_aux) { 23849 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, 0); 23850 if (ret || sub->arg_cnt != 1 || sub->args[0].arg_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) 23851 env->prog->aux->func_info_aux[0].unreliable = true; 23852 } 23853 23854 /* 1st arg to a function */ 23855 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; 23856 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); 23857 } 23858 23859 /* Acquire references for struct_ops program arguments tagged with "__ref" */ 23860 if (!subprog && env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 23861 for (i = 0; i < aux->ctx_arg_info_size; i++) 23862 aux->ctx_arg_info[i].ref_obj_id = aux->ctx_arg_info[i].refcounted ? 23863 acquire_reference(env, 0) : 0; 23864 } 23865 23866 ret = do_check(env); 23867 out: 23868 if (!ret && pop_log) 23869 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); 23870 free_states(env); 23871 return ret; 23872 } 23873 23874 /* Lazily verify all global functions based on their BTF, if they are called 23875 * from main BPF program or any of subprograms transitively. 23876 * BPF global subprogs called from dead code are not validated. 23877 * All callable global functions must pass verification. 23878 * Otherwise the whole program is rejected. 23879 * Consider: 23880 * int bar(int); 23881 * int foo(int f) 23882 * { 23883 * return bar(f); 23884 * } 23885 * int bar(int b) 23886 * { 23887 * ... 23888 * } 23889 * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it 23890 * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar() 23891 * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified 23892 * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value. 23893 */ 23894 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 23895 { 23896 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 23897 struct bpf_func_info_aux *sub_aux; 23898 int i, ret, new_cnt; 23899 23900 if (!aux->func_info) 23901 return 0; 23902 23903 /* exception callback is presumed to be always called */ 23904 if (env->exception_callback_subprog) 23905 subprog_aux(env, env->exception_callback_subprog)->called = true; 23906 23907 again: 23908 new_cnt = 0; 23909 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 23910 if (!subprog_is_global(env, i)) 23911 continue; 23912 23913 sub_aux = subprog_aux(env, i); 23914 if (!sub_aux->called || sub_aux->verified) 23915 continue; 23916 23917 env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start; 23918 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0); 23919 ret = do_check_common(env, i); 23920 if (ret) { 23921 return ret; 23922 } else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 23923 verbose(env, "Func#%d ('%s') is safe for any args that match its prototype\n", 23924 i, subprog_name(env, i)); 23925 } 23926 23927 /* We verified new global subprog, it might have called some 23928 * more global subprogs that we haven't verified yet, so we 23929 * need to do another pass over subprogs to verify those. 23930 */ 23931 sub_aux->verified = true; 23932 new_cnt++; 23933 } 23934 23935 /* We can't loop forever as we verify at least one global subprog on 23936 * each pass. 23937 */ 23938 if (new_cnt) 23939 goto again; 23940 23941 return 0; 23942 } 23943 23944 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 23945 { 23946 int ret; 23947 23948 env->insn_idx = 0; 23949 ret = do_check_common(env, 0); 23950 if (!ret) 23951 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 23952 return ret; 23953 } 23954 23955 23956 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 23957 { 23958 int i; 23959 23960 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) { 23961 verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n", 23962 div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000)); 23963 verbose(env, "stack depth "); 23964 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 23965 u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 23966 23967 verbose(env, "%d", depth); 23968 if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) 23969 verbose(env, "+"); 23970 } 23971 verbose(env, "\n"); 23972 } 23973 verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d " 23974 "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n", 23975 env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS, 23976 env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states, 23977 env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk); 23978 } 23979 23980 int bpf_prog_ctx_arg_info_init(struct bpf_prog *prog, 23981 const struct bpf_ctx_arg_aux *info, u32 cnt) 23982 { 23983 prog->aux->ctx_arg_info = kmemdup_array(info, cnt, sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 23984 prog->aux->ctx_arg_info_size = cnt; 23985 23986 return prog->aux->ctx_arg_info ? 0 : -ENOMEM; 23987 } 23988 23989 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 23990 { 23991 const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto; 23992 const struct bpf_struct_ops_desc *st_ops_desc; 23993 const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops; 23994 const struct btf_member *member; 23995 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 23996 bool has_refcounted_arg = false; 23997 u32 btf_id, member_idx, member_off; 23998 struct btf *btf; 23999 const char *mname; 24000 int i, err; 24001 24002 if (!prog->gpl_compatible) { 24003 verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n"); 24004 return -EINVAL; 24005 } 24006 24007 if (!prog->aux->attach_btf_id) 24008 return -ENOTSUPP; 24009 24010 btf = prog->aux->attach_btf; 24011 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 24012 /* Make sure st_ops is valid through the lifetime of env */ 24013 env->attach_btf_mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 24014 if (!env->attach_btf_mod) { 24015 verbose(env, "struct_ops module %s is not found\n", 24016 btf_get_name(btf)); 24017 return -ENOTSUPP; 24018 } 24019 } 24020 24021 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 24022 st_ops_desc = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf, btf_id); 24023 if (!st_ops_desc) { 24024 verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n", 24025 btf_id); 24026 return -ENOTSUPP; 24027 } 24028 st_ops = st_ops_desc->st_ops; 24029 24030 t = st_ops_desc->type; 24031 member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type; 24032 if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) { 24033 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n", 24034 member_idx, st_ops->name); 24035 return -EINVAL; 24036 } 24037 24038 member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx]; 24039 mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, member->name_off); 24040 func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf, member->type, 24041 NULL); 24042 if (!func_proto) { 24043 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n", 24044 mname, member_idx, st_ops->name); 24045 return -EINVAL; 24046 } 24047 24048 member_off = __btf_member_bit_offset(t, member) / 8; 24049 err = bpf_struct_ops_supported(st_ops, member_off); 24050 if (err) { 24051 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", 24052 mname, st_ops->name); 24053 return err; 24054 } 24055 24056 if (st_ops->check_member) { 24057 err = st_ops->check_member(t, member, prog); 24058 24059 if (err) { 24060 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", 24061 mname, st_ops->name); 24062 return err; 24063 } 24064 } 24065 24066 if (prog->aux->priv_stack_requested && !bpf_jit_supports_private_stack()) { 24067 verbose(env, "Private stack not supported by jit\n"); 24068 return -EACCES; 24069 } 24070 24071 for (i = 0; i < st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].cnt; i++) { 24072 if (st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].info->refcounted) { 24073 has_refcounted_arg = true; 24074 break; 24075 } 24076 } 24077 24078 /* Tail call is not allowed for programs with refcounted arguments since we 24079 * cannot guarantee that valid refcounted kptrs will be passed to the callee. 24080 */ 24081 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 24082 if (has_refcounted_arg && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 24083 verbose(env, "program with __ref argument cannot tail call\n"); 24084 return -EINVAL; 24085 } 24086 } 24087 24088 prog->aux->st_ops = st_ops; 24089 prog->aux->attach_st_ops_member_off = member_off; 24090 24091 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto; 24092 prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname; 24093 env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops; 24094 24095 return bpf_prog_ctx_arg_info_init(prog, st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].info, 24096 st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].cnt); 24097 } 24098 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" 24099 24100 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name) 24101 { 24102 if (within_error_injection_list(addr) || 24103 !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) 24104 return 0; 24105 24106 return -EINVAL; 24107 } 24108 24109 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on 24110 * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list 24111 */ 24112 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 24113 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context. 24114 * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view. 24115 */ 24116 BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio) 24117 #ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_PAGE_ALLOC 24118 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page) 24119 #endif 24120 #ifdef CONFIG_FAILSLAB 24121 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab) 24122 #endif 24123 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 24124 24125 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id) 24126 { 24127 return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); 24128 } 24129 24130 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 24131 const struct bpf_prog *prog, 24132 const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, 24133 u32 btf_id, 24134 struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info) 24135 { 24136 bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT; 24137 bool prog_tracing = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING; 24138 char trace_symbol[KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN]; 24139 const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_"; 24140 struct bpf_raw_event_map *btp; 24141 int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i; 24142 const struct btf_type *t; 24143 bool conservative = true; 24144 const char *tname, *fname; 24145 struct btf *btf; 24146 long addr = 0; 24147 struct module *mod = NULL; 24148 24149 if (!btf_id) { 24150 bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n"); 24151 return -EINVAL; 24152 } 24153 btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf; 24154 if (!btf) { 24155 bpf_log(log, 24156 "FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n"); 24157 return -EINVAL; 24158 } 24159 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id); 24160 if (!t) { 24161 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id); 24162 return -EINVAL; 24163 } 24164 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 24165 if (!tname) { 24166 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id); 24167 return -EINVAL; 24168 } 24169 if (tgt_prog) { 24170 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux; 24171 bool tgt_changes_pkt_data; 24172 bool tgt_might_sleep; 24173 24174 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) && 24175 !bpf_prog_dev_bound_match(prog, tgt_prog)) { 24176 bpf_log(log, "Target program bound device mismatch"); 24177 return -EINVAL; 24178 } 24179 24180 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) 24181 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) { 24182 subprog = i; 24183 break; 24184 } 24185 if (subprog == -1) { 24186 bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname); 24187 return -EINVAL; 24188 } 24189 if (aux->func && aux->func[subprog]->aux->exception_cb) { 24190 bpf_log(log, 24191 "%s programs cannot attach to exception callback\n", 24192 prog_extension ? "Extension" : "FENTRY/FEXIT"); 24193 return -EINVAL; 24194 } 24195 conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable; 24196 if (prog_extension) { 24197 if (conservative) { 24198 bpf_log(log, 24199 "Cannot replace static functions\n"); 24200 return -EINVAL; 24201 } 24202 if (!prog->jit_requested) { 24203 bpf_log(log, 24204 "Extension programs should be JITed\n"); 24205 return -EINVAL; 24206 } 24207 tgt_changes_pkt_data = aux->func 24208 ? aux->func[subprog]->aux->changes_pkt_data 24209 : aux->changes_pkt_data; 24210 if (prog->aux->changes_pkt_data && !tgt_changes_pkt_data) { 24211 bpf_log(log, 24212 "Extension program changes packet data, while original does not\n"); 24213 return -EINVAL; 24214 } 24215 24216 tgt_might_sleep = aux->func 24217 ? aux->func[subprog]->aux->might_sleep 24218 : aux->might_sleep; 24219 if (prog->aux->might_sleep && !tgt_might_sleep) { 24220 bpf_log(log, 24221 "Extension program may sleep, while original does not\n"); 24222 return -EINVAL; 24223 } 24224 } 24225 if (!tgt_prog->jited) { 24226 bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n"); 24227 return -EINVAL; 24228 } 24229 if (prog_tracing) { 24230 if (aux->attach_tracing_prog) { 24231 /* 24232 * Target program is an fentry/fexit which is already attached 24233 * to another tracing program. More levels of nesting 24234 * attachment are not allowed. 24235 */ 24236 bpf_log(log, "Cannot nest tracing program attach more than once\n"); 24237 return -EINVAL; 24238 } 24239 } else if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) { 24240 /* 24241 * To avoid potential call chain cycles, prevent attaching of a 24242 * program extension to another extension. It's ok to attach 24243 * fentry/fexit to extension program. 24244 */ 24245 bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n"); 24246 return -EINVAL; 24247 } 24248 if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 24249 prog_extension && 24250 (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY || 24251 tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) { 24252 /* Program extensions can extend all program types 24253 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following. 24254 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance 24255 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program 24256 * type. When extension program is replacing XDP function 24257 * it is necessary to allow performance analysis of all 24258 * functions. Both original XDP program and its program 24259 * extension. Hence attaching fentry/fexit to 24260 * BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is allowed. If extending of 24261 * fentry/fexit was allowed it would be possible to create 24262 * long call chain fentry->extension->fentry->extension 24263 * beyond reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry 24264 * is not allowed. 24265 */ 24266 bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n"); 24267 return -EINVAL; 24268 } 24269 } else { 24270 if (prog_extension) { 24271 bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n"); 24272 return -EINVAL; 24273 } 24274 } 24275 24276 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 24277 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 24278 if (tgt_prog) { 24279 bpf_log(log, 24280 "Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n"); 24281 return -EINVAL; 24282 } 24283 if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) { 24284 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n", 24285 btf_id); 24286 return -EINVAL; 24287 } 24288 if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) { 24289 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n", 24290 btf_id, tname); 24291 return -EINVAL; 24292 } 24293 tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1; 24294 24295 /* The func_proto of "btf_trace_##tname" is generated from typedef without argument 24296 * names. Thus using bpf_raw_event_map to get argument names. 24297 */ 24298 btp = bpf_get_raw_tracepoint(tname); 24299 if (!btp) 24300 return -EINVAL; 24301 fname = kallsyms_lookup((unsigned long)btp->bpf_func, NULL, NULL, NULL, 24302 trace_symbol); 24303 bpf_put_raw_tracepoint(btp); 24304 24305 if (fname) 24306 ret = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, fname, BTF_KIND_FUNC); 24307 24308 if (!fname || ret < 0) { 24309 bpf_log(log, "Cannot find btf of tracepoint template, fall back to %s%s.\n", 24310 prefix, tname); 24311 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 24312 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 24313 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 24314 return -EINVAL; 24315 } else { 24316 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, ret); 24317 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) 24318 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 24319 return -EINVAL; 24320 } 24321 24322 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 24323 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 24324 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 24325 return -EINVAL; 24326 24327 break; 24328 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 24329 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 24330 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 24331 btf_id); 24332 return -EINVAL; 24333 } 24334 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 24335 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 24336 return -EINVAL; 24337 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 24338 if (ret) 24339 return ret; 24340 break; 24341 default: 24342 if (!prog_extension) 24343 return -EINVAL; 24344 fallthrough; 24345 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 24346 case BPF_LSM_MAC: 24347 case BPF_LSM_CGROUP: 24348 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 24349 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 24350 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 24351 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 24352 btf_id); 24353 return -EINVAL; 24354 } 24355 if (prog_extension && 24356 btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t)) 24357 return -EINVAL; 24358 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 24359 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 24360 return -EINVAL; 24361 24362 if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) && 24363 (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type || 24364 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type)) 24365 return -EINVAL; 24366 24367 if (tgt_prog && conservative) 24368 t = NULL; 24369 24370 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 24371 if (ret < 0) 24372 return ret; 24373 24374 if (tgt_prog) { 24375 if (subprog == 0) 24376 addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func; 24377 else 24378 addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func; 24379 } else { 24380 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 24381 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 24382 if (mod) 24383 addr = find_kallsyms_symbol_value(mod, tname); 24384 else 24385 addr = 0; 24386 } else { 24387 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname); 24388 } 24389 if (!addr) { 24390 module_put(mod); 24391 bpf_log(log, 24392 "The address of function %s cannot be found\n", 24393 tname); 24394 return -ENOENT; 24395 } 24396 } 24397 24398 if (prog->sleepable) { 24399 ret = -EINVAL; 24400 switch (prog->type) { 24401 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 24402 24403 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are 24404 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. 24405 */ 24406 if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) && 24407 within_error_injection_list(addr)) 24408 ret = 0; 24409 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can also be sleepable if they are 24410 * in the fmodret id set with the KF_SLEEPABLE flag. 24411 */ 24412 else { 24413 u32 *flags = btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id, 24414 prog); 24415 24416 if (flags && (*flags & KF_SLEEPABLE)) 24417 ret = 0; 24418 } 24419 break; 24420 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 24421 /* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs. 24422 * Only some of them are sleepable. 24423 */ 24424 if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id)) 24425 ret = 0; 24426 break; 24427 default: 24428 break; 24429 } 24430 if (ret) { 24431 module_put(mod); 24432 bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname); 24433 return ret; 24434 } 24435 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 24436 if (tgt_prog) { 24437 module_put(mod); 24438 bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n"); 24439 return -EINVAL; 24440 } 24441 ret = -EINVAL; 24442 if (btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id, prog) || 24443 !check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname)) 24444 ret = 0; 24445 if (ret) { 24446 module_put(mod); 24447 bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname); 24448 return ret; 24449 } 24450 } 24451 24452 break; 24453 } 24454 tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr; 24455 tgt_info->tgt_name = tname; 24456 tgt_info->tgt_type = t; 24457 tgt_info->tgt_mod = mod; 24458 return 0; 24459 } 24460 24461 BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny) 24462 BTF_ID_UNUSED 24463 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP 24464 BTF_ID(func, ___migrate_enable) 24465 BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable) 24466 BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable) 24467 #endif 24468 #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU 24469 BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict) 24470 #endif 24471 #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) || defined(CONFIG_TRACE_PREEMPT_TOGGLE) 24472 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_add) 24473 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_sub) 24474 #endif 24475 #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU 24476 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_lock) 24477 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_unlock) 24478 #endif 24479 BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny) 24480 24481 /* fexit and fmod_ret can't be used to attach to __noreturn functions. 24482 * Currently, we must manually list all __noreturn functions here. Once a more 24483 * robust solution is implemented, this workaround can be removed. 24484 */ 24485 BTF_SET_START(noreturn_deny) 24486 #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION 24487 BTF_ID(func, __ia32_sys_exit) 24488 BTF_ID(func, __ia32_sys_exit_group) 24489 #endif 24490 #ifdef CONFIG_KUNIT 24491 BTF_ID(func, __kunit_abort) 24492 BTF_ID(func, kunit_try_catch_throw) 24493 #endif 24494 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES 24495 BTF_ID(func, __module_put_and_kthread_exit) 24496 #endif 24497 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 24498 BTF_ID(func, __x64_sys_exit) 24499 BTF_ID(func, __x64_sys_exit_group) 24500 #endif 24501 BTF_ID(func, do_exit) 24502 BTF_ID(func, do_group_exit) 24503 BTF_ID(func, kthread_complete_and_exit) 24504 BTF_ID(func, kthread_exit) 24505 BTF_ID(func, make_task_dead) 24506 BTF_SET_END(noreturn_deny) 24507 24508 static bool can_be_sleepable(struct bpf_prog *prog) 24509 { 24510 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 24511 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 24512 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 24513 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 24514 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 24515 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 24516 return true; 24517 default: 24518 return false; 24519 } 24520 } 24521 return prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM || 24522 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE /* only for uprobes */ || 24523 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS; 24524 } 24525 24526 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 24527 { 24528 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 24529 struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog; 24530 struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {}; 24531 u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 24532 struct bpf_trampoline *tr; 24533 int ret; 24534 u64 key; 24535 24536 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL) { 24537 if (prog->sleepable) 24538 /* attach_btf_id checked to be zero already */ 24539 return 0; 24540 verbose(env, "Syscall programs can only be sleepable\n"); 24541 return -EINVAL; 24542 } 24543 24544 if (prog->sleepable && !can_be_sleepable(prog)) { 24545 verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret, lsm, iter, uprobe, and struct_ops programs can be sleepable\n"); 24546 return -EINVAL; 24547 } 24548 24549 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) 24550 return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env); 24551 24552 if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 24553 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 24554 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 24555 return 0; 24556 24557 ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info); 24558 if (ret) 24559 return ret; 24560 24561 if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 24562 /* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to 24563 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the 24564 * verification 24565 */ 24566 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type]; 24567 prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 24568 } 24569 24570 /* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */ 24571 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type; 24572 prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name; 24573 prog->aux->mod = tgt_info.tgt_mod; 24574 24575 if (tgt_prog) { 24576 prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type; 24577 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 24578 } 24579 24580 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) { 24581 prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true; 24582 return 0; 24583 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) { 24584 return bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog); 24585 } 24586 24587 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { 24588 ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog); 24589 if (ret < 0) 24590 return ret; 24591 } else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 24592 btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) { 24593 verbose(env, "Attaching tracing programs to function '%s' is rejected.\n", 24594 tgt_info.tgt_name); 24595 return -EINVAL; 24596 } else if ((prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || 24597 prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) && 24598 btf_id_set_contains(&noreturn_deny, btf_id)) { 24599 verbose(env, "Attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn function '%s' is rejected.\n", 24600 tgt_info.tgt_name); 24601 return -EINVAL; 24602 } 24603 24604 key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id); 24605 tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info); 24606 if (!tr) 24607 return -ENOMEM; 24608 24609 if (tgt_prog && tgt_prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) 24610 tr->flags = BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX; 24611 24612 prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr; 24613 return 0; 24614 } 24615 24616 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) 24617 { 24618 if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { 24619 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 24620 if (!btf_vmlinux) 24621 btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); 24622 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 24623 } 24624 return btf_vmlinux; 24625 } 24626 24627 /* 24628 * The add_fd_from_fd_array() is executed only if fd_array_cnt is non-zero. In 24629 * this case expect that every file descriptor in the array is either a map or 24630 * a BTF. Everything else is considered to be trash. 24631 */ 24632 static int add_fd_from_fd_array(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int fd) 24633 { 24634 struct bpf_map *map; 24635 struct btf *btf; 24636 CLASS(fd, f)(fd); 24637 int err; 24638 24639 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 24640 if (!IS_ERR(map)) { 24641 err = __add_used_map(env, map); 24642 if (err < 0) 24643 return err; 24644 return 0; 24645 } 24646 24647 btf = __btf_get_by_fd(f); 24648 if (!IS_ERR(btf)) { 24649 err = __add_used_btf(env, btf); 24650 if (err < 0) 24651 return err; 24652 return 0; 24653 } 24654 24655 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map or btf\n", fd); 24656 return PTR_ERR(map); 24657 } 24658 24659 static int process_fd_array(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) 24660 { 24661 size_t size = sizeof(int); 24662 int ret; 24663 int fd; 24664 u32 i; 24665 24666 env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel); 24667 24668 /* 24669 * The only difference between old (no fd_array_cnt is given) and new 24670 * APIs is that in the latter case the fd_array is expected to be 24671 * continuous and is scanned for map fds right away 24672 */ 24673 if (!attr->fd_array_cnt) 24674 return 0; 24675 24676 /* Check for integer overflow */ 24677 if (attr->fd_array_cnt >= (U32_MAX / size)) { 24678 verbose(env, "fd_array_cnt is too big (%u)\n", attr->fd_array_cnt); 24679 return -EINVAL; 24680 } 24681 24682 for (i = 0; i < attr->fd_array_cnt; i++) { 24683 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array, i * size, size)) 24684 return -EFAULT; 24685 24686 ret = add_fd_from_fd_array(env, fd); 24687 if (ret) 24688 return ret; 24689 } 24690 24691 return 0; 24692 } 24693 24694 /* Each field is a register bitmask */ 24695 struct insn_live_regs { 24696 u16 use; /* registers read by instruction */ 24697 u16 def; /* registers written by instruction */ 24698 u16 in; /* registers that may be alive before instruction */ 24699 u16 out; /* registers that may be alive after instruction */ 24700 }; 24701 24702 /* Bitmask with 1s for all caller saved registers */ 24703 #define ALL_CALLER_SAVED_REGS ((1u << CALLER_SAVED_REGS) - 1) 24704 24705 /* Compute info->{use,def} fields for the instruction */ 24706 static void compute_insn_live_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 24707 struct bpf_insn *insn, 24708 struct insn_live_regs *info) 24709 { 24710 struct call_summary cs; 24711 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 24712 u8 code = BPF_OP(insn->code); 24713 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 24714 u16 src = BIT(insn->src_reg); 24715 u16 dst = BIT(insn->dst_reg); 24716 u16 r0 = BIT(0); 24717 u16 def = 0; 24718 u16 use = 0xffff; 24719 24720 switch (class) { 24721 case BPF_LD: 24722 switch (mode) { 24723 case BPF_IMM: 24724 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) { 24725 def = dst; 24726 use = 0; 24727 } 24728 break; 24729 case BPF_LD | BPF_ABS: 24730 case BPF_LD | BPF_IND: 24731 /* stick with defaults */ 24732 break; 24733 } 24734 break; 24735 case BPF_LDX: 24736 switch (mode) { 24737 case BPF_MEM: 24738 case BPF_MEMSX: 24739 def = dst; 24740 use = src; 24741 break; 24742 } 24743 break; 24744 case BPF_ST: 24745 switch (mode) { 24746 case BPF_MEM: 24747 def = 0; 24748 use = dst; 24749 break; 24750 } 24751 break; 24752 case BPF_STX: 24753 switch (mode) { 24754 case BPF_MEM: 24755 def = 0; 24756 use = dst | src; 24757 break; 24758 case BPF_ATOMIC: 24759 switch (insn->imm) { 24760 case BPF_CMPXCHG: 24761 use = r0 | dst | src; 24762 def = r0; 24763 break; 24764 case BPF_LOAD_ACQ: 24765 def = dst; 24766 use = src; 24767 break; 24768 case BPF_STORE_REL: 24769 def = 0; 24770 use = dst | src; 24771 break; 24772 default: 24773 use = dst | src; 24774 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) 24775 def = src; 24776 else 24777 def = 0; 24778 } 24779 break; 24780 } 24781 break; 24782 case BPF_ALU: 24783 case BPF_ALU64: 24784 switch (code) { 24785 case BPF_END: 24786 use = dst; 24787 def = dst; 24788 break; 24789 case BPF_MOV: 24790 def = dst; 24791 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) 24792 use = 0; 24793 else 24794 use = src; 24795 break; 24796 default: 24797 def = dst; 24798 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) 24799 use = dst; 24800 else 24801 use = dst | src; 24802 } 24803 break; 24804 case BPF_JMP: 24805 case BPF_JMP32: 24806 switch (code) { 24807 case BPF_JA: 24808 case BPF_JCOND: 24809 def = 0; 24810 use = 0; 24811 break; 24812 case BPF_EXIT: 24813 def = 0; 24814 use = r0; 24815 break; 24816 case BPF_CALL: 24817 def = ALL_CALLER_SAVED_REGS; 24818 use = def & ~BIT(BPF_REG_0); 24819 if (get_call_summary(env, insn, &cs)) 24820 use = GENMASK(cs.num_params, 1); 24821 break; 24822 default: 24823 def = 0; 24824 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) 24825 use = dst; 24826 else 24827 use = dst | src; 24828 } 24829 break; 24830 } 24831 24832 info->def = def; 24833 info->use = use; 24834 } 24835 24836 /* Compute may-live registers after each instruction in the program. 24837 * The register is live after the instruction I if it is read by some 24838 * instruction S following I during program execution and is not 24839 * overwritten between I and S. 24840 * 24841 * Store result in env->insn_aux_data[i].live_regs. 24842 */ 24843 static int compute_live_registers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 24844 { 24845 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = env->insn_aux_data; 24846 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 24847 struct insn_live_regs *state; 24848 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 24849 int err = 0, i, j; 24850 bool changed; 24851 24852 /* Use the following algorithm: 24853 * - define the following: 24854 * - I.use : a set of all registers read by instruction I; 24855 * - I.def : a set of all registers written by instruction I; 24856 * - I.in : a set of all registers that may be alive before I execution; 24857 * - I.out : a set of all registers that may be alive after I execution; 24858 * - insn_successors(I): a set of instructions S that might immediately 24859 * follow I for some program execution; 24860 * - associate separate empty sets 'I.in' and 'I.out' with each instruction; 24861 * - visit each instruction in a postorder and update 24862 * state[i].in, state[i].out as follows: 24863 * 24864 * state[i].out = U [state[s].in for S in insn_successors(i)] 24865 * state[i].in = (state[i].out / state[i].def) U state[i].use 24866 * 24867 * (where U stands for set union, / stands for set difference) 24868 * - repeat the computation while {in,out} fields changes for 24869 * any instruction. 24870 */ 24871 state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(*state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 24872 if (!state) { 24873 err = -ENOMEM; 24874 goto out; 24875 } 24876 24877 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; ++i) 24878 compute_insn_live_regs(env, &insns[i], &state[i]); 24879 24880 changed = true; 24881 while (changed) { 24882 changed = false; 24883 for (i = 0; i < env->cfg.cur_postorder; ++i) { 24884 int insn_idx = env->cfg.insn_postorder[i]; 24885 struct insn_live_regs *live = &state[insn_idx]; 24886 struct bpf_iarray *succ; 24887 u16 new_out = 0; 24888 u16 new_in = 0; 24889 24890 succ = bpf_insn_successors(env, insn_idx); 24891 for (int s = 0; s < succ->cnt; ++s) 24892 new_out |= state[succ->items[s]].in; 24893 new_in = (new_out & ~live->def) | live->use; 24894 if (new_out != live->out || new_in != live->in) { 24895 live->in = new_in; 24896 live->out = new_out; 24897 changed = true; 24898 } 24899 } 24900 } 24901 24902 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; ++i) 24903 insn_aux[i].live_regs_before = state[i].in; 24904 24905 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 24906 verbose(env, "Live regs before insn:\n"); 24907 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; ++i) { 24908 if (env->insn_aux_data[i].scc) 24909 verbose(env, "%3d ", env->insn_aux_data[i].scc); 24910 else 24911 verbose(env, " "); 24912 verbose(env, "%3d: ", i); 24913 for (j = BPF_REG_0; j < BPF_REG_10; ++j) 24914 if (insn_aux[i].live_regs_before & BIT(j)) 24915 verbose(env, "%d", j); 24916 else 24917 verbose(env, "."); 24918 verbose(env, " "); 24919 verbose_insn(env, &insns[i]); 24920 if (bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[i])) 24921 i++; 24922 } 24923 } 24924 24925 out: 24926 kvfree(state); 24927 return err; 24928 } 24929 24930 /* 24931 * Compute strongly connected components (SCCs) on the CFG. 24932 * Assign an SCC number to each instruction, recorded in env->insn_aux[*].scc. 24933 * If instruction is a sole member of its SCC and there are no self edges, 24934 * assign it SCC number of zero. 24935 * Uses a non-recursive adaptation of Tarjan's algorithm for SCC computation. 24936 */ 24937 static int compute_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 24938 { 24939 const u32 NOT_ON_STACK = U32_MAX; 24940 24941 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 24942 const u32 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 24943 int stack_sz, dfs_sz, err = 0; 24944 u32 *stack, *pre, *low, *dfs; 24945 u32 i, j, t, w; 24946 u32 next_preorder_num; 24947 u32 next_scc_id; 24948 bool assign_scc; 24949 struct bpf_iarray *succ; 24950 24951 next_preorder_num = 1; 24952 next_scc_id = 1; 24953 /* 24954 * - 'stack' accumulates vertices in DFS order, see invariant comment below; 24955 * - 'pre[t] == p' => preorder number of vertex 't' is 'p'; 24956 * - 'low[t] == n' => smallest preorder number of the vertex reachable from 't' is 'n'; 24957 * - 'dfs' DFS traversal stack, used to emulate explicit recursion. 24958 */ 24959 stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 24960 pre = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 24961 low = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 24962 dfs = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(*dfs), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 24963 if (!stack || !pre || !low || !dfs) { 24964 err = -ENOMEM; 24965 goto exit; 24966 } 24967 /* 24968 * References: 24969 * [1] R. Tarjan "Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms" 24970 * [2] D. J. Pearce "A Space-Efficient Algorithm for Finding Strongly Connected Components" 24971 * 24972 * The algorithm maintains the following invariant: 24973 * - suppose there is a path 'u' ~> 'v', such that 'pre[v] < pre[u]'; 24974 * - then, vertex 'u' remains on stack while vertex 'v' is on stack. 24975 * 24976 * Consequently: 24977 * - If 'low[v] < pre[v]', there is a path from 'v' to some vertex 'u', 24978 * such that 'pre[u] == low[v]'; vertex 'u' is currently on the stack, 24979 * and thus there is an SCC (loop) containing both 'u' and 'v'. 24980 * - If 'low[v] == pre[v]', loops containing 'v' have been explored, 24981 * and 'v' can be considered the root of some SCC. 24982 * 24983 * Here is a pseudo-code for an explicitly recursive version of the algorithm: 24984 * 24985 * NOT_ON_STACK = insn_cnt + 1 24986 * pre = [0] * insn_cnt 24987 * low = [0] * insn_cnt 24988 * scc = [0] * insn_cnt 24989 * stack = [] 24990 * 24991 * next_preorder_num = 1 24992 * next_scc_id = 1 24993 * 24994 * def recur(w): 24995 * nonlocal next_preorder_num 24996 * nonlocal next_scc_id 24997 * 24998 * pre[w] = next_preorder_num 24999 * low[w] = next_preorder_num 25000 * next_preorder_num += 1 25001 * stack.append(w) 25002 * for s in successors(w): 25003 * # Note: for classic algorithm the block below should look as: 25004 * # 25005 * # if pre[s] == 0: 25006 * # recur(s) 25007 * # low[w] = min(low[w], low[s]) 25008 * # elif low[s] != NOT_ON_STACK: 25009 * # low[w] = min(low[w], pre[s]) 25010 * # 25011 * # But replacing both 'min' instructions with 'low[w] = min(low[w], low[s])' 25012 * # does not break the invariant and makes itartive version of the algorithm 25013 * # simpler. See 'Algorithm #3' from [2]. 25014 * 25015 * # 's' not yet visited 25016 * if pre[s] == 0: 25017 * recur(s) 25018 * # if 's' is on stack, pick lowest reachable preorder number from it; 25019 * # if 's' is not on stack 'low[s] == NOT_ON_STACK > low[w]', 25020 * # so 'min' would be a noop. 25021 * low[w] = min(low[w], low[s]) 25022 * 25023 * if low[w] == pre[w]: 25024 * # 'w' is the root of an SCC, pop all vertices 25025 * # below 'w' on stack and assign same SCC to them. 25026 * while True: 25027 * t = stack.pop() 25028 * low[t] = NOT_ON_STACK 25029 * scc[t] = next_scc_id 25030 * if t == w: 25031 * break 25032 * next_scc_id += 1 25033 * 25034 * for i in range(0, insn_cnt): 25035 * if pre[i] == 0: 25036 * recur(i) 25037 * 25038 * Below implementation replaces explicit recursion with array 'dfs'. 25039 */ 25040 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 25041 if (pre[i]) 25042 continue; 25043 stack_sz = 0; 25044 dfs_sz = 1; 25045 dfs[0] = i; 25046 dfs_continue: 25047 while (dfs_sz) { 25048 w = dfs[dfs_sz - 1]; 25049 if (pre[w] == 0) { 25050 low[w] = next_preorder_num; 25051 pre[w] = next_preorder_num; 25052 next_preorder_num++; 25053 stack[stack_sz++] = w; 25054 } 25055 /* Visit 'w' successors */ 25056 succ = bpf_insn_successors(env, w); 25057 for (j = 0; j < succ->cnt; ++j) { 25058 if (pre[succ->items[j]]) { 25059 low[w] = min(low[w], low[succ->items[j]]); 25060 } else { 25061 dfs[dfs_sz++] = succ->items[j]; 25062 goto dfs_continue; 25063 } 25064 } 25065 /* 25066 * Preserve the invariant: if some vertex above in the stack 25067 * is reachable from 'w', keep 'w' on the stack. 25068 */ 25069 if (low[w] < pre[w]) { 25070 dfs_sz--; 25071 goto dfs_continue; 25072 } 25073 /* 25074 * Assign SCC number only if component has two or more elements, 25075 * or if component has a self reference. 25076 */ 25077 assign_scc = stack[stack_sz - 1] != w; 25078 for (j = 0; j < succ->cnt; ++j) { 25079 if (succ->items[j] == w) { 25080 assign_scc = true; 25081 break; 25082 } 25083 } 25084 /* Pop component elements from stack */ 25085 do { 25086 t = stack[--stack_sz]; 25087 low[t] = NOT_ON_STACK; 25088 if (assign_scc) 25089 aux[t].scc = next_scc_id; 25090 } while (t != w); 25091 if (assign_scc) 25092 next_scc_id++; 25093 dfs_sz--; 25094 } 25095 } 25096 env->scc_info = kvcalloc(next_scc_id, sizeof(*env->scc_info), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25097 if (!env->scc_info) { 25098 err = -ENOMEM; 25099 goto exit; 25100 } 25101 env->scc_cnt = next_scc_id; 25102 exit: 25103 kvfree(stack); 25104 kvfree(pre); 25105 kvfree(low); 25106 kvfree(dfs); 25107 return err; 25108 } 25109 25110 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u32 uattr_size) 25111 { 25112 u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); 25113 struct bpf_verifier_env *env; 25114 int i, len, ret = -EINVAL, err; 25115 u32 log_true_size; 25116 bool is_priv; 25117 25118 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(enum bpf_features); 25119 25120 /* no program is valid */ 25121 if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) 25122 return -EINVAL; 25123 25124 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, 25125 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called 25126 */ 25127 env = kvzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25128 if (!env) 25129 return -ENOMEM; 25130 25131 env->bt.env = env; 25132 25133 len = (*prog)->len; 25134 env->insn_aux_data = 25135 vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len)); 25136 ret = -ENOMEM; 25137 if (!env->insn_aux_data) 25138 goto err_free_env; 25139 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 25140 env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i; 25141 env->succ = iarray_realloc(NULL, 2); 25142 if (!env->succ) 25143 goto err_free_env; 25144 env->prog = *prog; 25145 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; 25146 25147 env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(env->prog->aux->token); 25148 env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(env->prog->aux->token); 25149 env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(env->prog->aux->token); 25150 env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(env->prog->aux->token); 25151 env->bpf_capable = is_priv = bpf_token_capable(env->prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF); 25152 25153 bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); 25154 25155 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ 25156 if (!is_priv) 25157 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 25158 25159 /* user could have requested verbose verifier output 25160 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace 25161 */ 25162 ret = bpf_vlog_init(&env->log, attr->log_level, 25163 (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf, 25164 attr->log_size); 25165 if (ret) 25166 goto err_unlock; 25167 25168 ret = process_fd_array(env, attr, uattr); 25169 if (ret) 25170 goto skip_full_check; 25171 25172 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 25173 25174 if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) { 25175 /* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */ 25176 verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n"); 25177 ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux); 25178 goto skip_full_check; 25179 } 25180 25181 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); 25182 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) 25183 env->strict_alignment = true; 25184 if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) 25185 env->strict_alignment = false; 25186 25187 if (is_priv) 25188 env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ; 25189 env->test_reg_invariants = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS; 25190 25191 env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env), 25192 sizeof(struct list_head), 25193 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25194 ret = -ENOMEM; 25195 if (!env->explored_states) 25196 goto skip_full_check; 25197 25198 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) 25199 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->explored_states[i]); 25200 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->free_list); 25201 25202 ret = check_btf_info_early(env, attr, uattr); 25203 if (ret < 0) 25204 goto skip_full_check; 25205 25206 ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env); 25207 if (ret < 0) 25208 goto skip_full_check; 25209 25210 ret = check_subprogs(env); 25211 if (ret < 0) 25212 goto skip_full_check; 25213 25214 ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr); 25215 if (ret < 0) 25216 goto skip_full_check; 25217 25218 ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env); 25219 if (ret < 0) 25220 goto skip_full_check; 25221 25222 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 25223 ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog); 25224 if (ret) 25225 goto skip_full_check; 25226 } 25227 25228 ret = check_cfg(env); 25229 if (ret < 0) 25230 goto skip_full_check; 25231 25232 ret = compute_postorder(env); 25233 if (ret < 0) 25234 goto skip_full_check; 25235 25236 ret = bpf_stack_liveness_init(env); 25237 if (ret) 25238 goto skip_full_check; 25239 25240 ret = check_attach_btf_id(env); 25241 if (ret) 25242 goto skip_full_check; 25243 25244 ret = compute_scc(env); 25245 if (ret < 0) 25246 goto skip_full_check; 25247 25248 ret = compute_live_registers(env); 25249 if (ret < 0) 25250 goto skip_full_check; 25251 25252 ret = mark_fastcall_patterns(env); 25253 if (ret < 0) 25254 goto skip_full_check; 25255 25256 ret = do_check_main(env); 25257 ret = ret ?: do_check_subprogs(env); 25258 25259 if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) 25260 ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env); 25261 25262 skip_full_check: 25263 kvfree(env->explored_states); 25264 25265 /* might decrease stack depth, keep it before passes that 25266 * allocate additional slots. 25267 */ 25268 if (ret == 0) 25269 ret = remove_fastcall_spills_fills(env); 25270 25271 if (ret == 0) 25272 ret = check_max_stack_depth(env); 25273 25274 /* instruction rewrites happen after this point */ 25275 if (ret == 0) 25276 ret = optimize_bpf_loop(env); 25277 25278 if (is_priv) { 25279 if (ret == 0) 25280 opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env); 25281 if (ret == 0) 25282 ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env); 25283 if (ret == 0) 25284 ret = opt_remove_nops(env); 25285 } else { 25286 if (ret == 0) 25287 sanitize_dead_code(env); 25288 } 25289 25290 if (ret == 0) 25291 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ 25292 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); 25293 25294 if (ret == 0) 25295 ret = do_misc_fixups(env); 25296 25297 /* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched 25298 * insns could be handled correctly. 25299 */ 25300 if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) { 25301 ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr); 25302 env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret 25303 : false; 25304 } 25305 25306 if (ret == 0) 25307 ret = fixup_call_args(env); 25308 25309 env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time; 25310 print_verification_stats(env); 25311 env->prog->aux->verified_insns = env->insn_processed; 25312 25313 /* preserve original error even if log finalization is successful */ 25314 err = bpf_vlog_finalize(&env->log, &log_true_size); 25315 if (err) 25316 ret = err; 25317 25318 if (uattr_size >= offsetofend(union bpf_attr, log_true_size) && 25319 copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, offsetof(union bpf_attr, log_true_size), 25320 &log_true_size, sizeof(log_true_size))) { 25321 ret = -EFAULT; 25322 goto err_release_maps; 25323 } 25324 25325 if (ret) 25326 goto err_release_maps; 25327 25328 if (env->used_map_cnt) { 25329 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ 25330 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, 25331 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), 25332 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25333 25334 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { 25335 ret = -ENOMEM; 25336 goto err_release_maps; 25337 } 25338 25339 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, 25340 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); 25341 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 25342 } 25343 if (env->used_btf_cnt) { 25344 /* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */ 25345 env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt, 25346 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]), 25347 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); 25348 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) { 25349 ret = -ENOMEM; 25350 goto err_release_maps; 25351 } 25352 25353 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs, 25354 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt); 25355 env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt; 25356 } 25357 if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) { 25358 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic 25359 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions 25360 */ 25361 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); 25362 } 25363 25364 adjust_btf_func(env); 25365 25366 err_release_maps: 25367 if (ret) 25368 release_insn_arrays(env); 25369 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) 25370 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release 25371 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them. 25372 */ 25373 release_maps(env); 25374 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) 25375 release_btfs(env); 25376 25377 /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets 25378 for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning 25379 */ 25380 if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 25381 env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0; 25382 25383 *prog = env->prog; 25384 25385 module_put(env->attach_btf_mod); 25386 err_unlock: 25387 if (!is_priv) 25388 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 25389 clear_insn_aux_data(env, 0, env->prog->len); 25390 vfree(env->insn_aux_data); 25391 err_free_env: 25392 bpf_stack_liveness_free(env); 25393 kvfree(env->cfg.insn_postorder); 25394 kvfree(env->scc_info); 25395 kvfree(env->succ); 25396 kvfree(env->gotox_tmp_buf); 25397 kvfree(env); 25398 return ret; 25399 } 25400