1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com 3 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook 4 * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io 5 */ 6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h> 7 #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h> 8 #include <linux/kernel.h> 9 #include <linux/types.h> 10 #include <linux/slab.h> 11 #include <linux/bpf.h> 12 #include <linux/btf.h> 13 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> 14 #include <linux/filter.h> 15 #include <net/netlink.h> 16 #include <linux/file.h> 17 #include <linux/vmalloc.h> 18 #include <linux/stringify.h> 19 #include <linux/bsearch.h> 20 #include <linux/sort.h> 21 #include <linux/perf_event.h> 22 #include <linux/ctype.h> 23 #include <linux/error-injection.h> 24 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> 25 #include <linux/btf_ids.h> 26 #include <linux/poison.h> 27 28 #include "disasm.h" 29 30 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { 31 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \ 32 [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops, 33 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) 34 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name) 35 #include <linux/bpf_types.h> 36 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE 37 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE 38 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE 39 }; 40 41 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program 42 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. 43 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. 44 * 45 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. 46 * It rejects the following programs: 47 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns 48 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) 49 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) 50 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps 51 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. 52 * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the 53 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of 54 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. 55 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k 56 * 57 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction 58 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. 59 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is 60 * copied to R1. 61 * 62 * All registers are 64-bit. 63 * R0 - return register 64 * R1-R5 argument passing registers 65 * R6-R9 callee saved registers 66 * R10 - frame pointer read-only 67 * 68 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context 69 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. 70 * 71 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: 72 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), 73 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), 74 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 75 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize 76 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. 77 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK 78 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). 79 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. 80 * 81 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which 82 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. 83 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) 84 * 85 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register 86 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are 87 * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function. 88 * 89 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' 90 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. 91 * 92 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against 93 * function argument constraints. 94 * 95 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. 96 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be 97 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as 98 * 'pointer to map element key' 99 * 100 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): 101 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, 102 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, 103 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 104 * 105 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' 106 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and 107 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside 108 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. 109 * 110 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: 111 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) 112 * { 113 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; 114 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; 115 * void *value; 116 * 117 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that 118 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on 119 * the stack of eBPF program. 120 * } 121 * 122 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: 123 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR 124 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK 125 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP 126 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), 127 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: 128 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, 129 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes 130 * 131 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, 132 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits 133 * and were initialized prior to this call. 134 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at 135 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets 136 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function 137 * returns either pointer to map value or NULL. 138 * 139 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' 140 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to 141 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false 142 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). 143 * 144 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 145 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. 146 * 147 * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel 148 * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by 149 * the BPF program: 150 * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET 151 * 152 * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a 153 * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state. 154 * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into 155 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type 156 * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is 157 * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference. 158 * 159 * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as 160 * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as 161 * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function, 162 * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased 163 * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it. 164 */ 165 166 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */ 167 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem { 168 /* verifer state is 'st' 169 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx' 170 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx' 171 */ 172 struct bpf_verifier_state st; 173 int insn_idx; 174 int prev_insn_idx; 175 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next; 176 /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */ 177 u32 log_pos; 178 }; 179 180 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192 181 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64 182 183 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON (1ULL << 63) 184 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN (1ULL << 62) 185 186 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV 1UL 187 #define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)((0xeB9FUL << 1) + \ 188 POISON_POINTER_DELTA)) 189 #define BPF_MAP_PTR(X) ((struct bpf_map *)((X) & ~BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV)) 190 191 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); 192 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id); 193 194 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 195 { 196 return BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON; 197 } 198 199 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 200 { 201 return aux->map_ptr_state & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV; 202 } 203 204 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 205 const struct bpf_map *map, bool unpriv) 206 { 207 BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON & BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV); 208 unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux); 209 aux->map_ptr_state = (unsigned long)map | 210 (unpriv ? BPF_MAP_PTR_UNPRIV : 0UL); 211 } 212 213 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 214 { 215 return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON; 216 } 217 218 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 219 { 220 return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN); 221 } 222 223 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 224 { 225 return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 226 } 227 228 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state) 229 { 230 bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux); 231 232 aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | 233 (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL); 234 } 235 236 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 237 { 238 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 239 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL; 240 } 241 242 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 243 { 244 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 245 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL; 246 } 247 248 struct bpf_call_arg_meta { 249 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 250 bool raw_mode; 251 bool pkt_access; 252 u8 release_regno; 253 int regno; 254 int access_size; 255 int mem_size; 256 u64 msize_max_value; 257 int ref_obj_id; 258 int map_uid; 259 int func_id; 260 struct btf *btf; 261 u32 btf_id; 262 struct btf *ret_btf; 263 u32 ret_btf_id; 264 u32 subprogno; 265 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 266 u8 uninit_dynptr_regno; 267 }; 268 269 struct btf *btf_vmlinux; 270 271 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); 272 273 static const struct bpf_line_info * 274 find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off) 275 { 276 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 277 const struct bpf_prog *prog; 278 u32 i, nr_linfo; 279 280 prog = env->prog; 281 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 282 283 if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len) 284 return NULL; 285 286 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 287 for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++) 288 if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off) 289 break; 290 291 return &linfo[i - 1]; 292 } 293 294 void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const char *fmt, 295 va_list args) 296 { 297 unsigned int n; 298 299 n = vscnprintf(log->kbuf, BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE, fmt, args); 300 301 WARN_ONCE(n >= BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE - 1, 302 "verifier log line truncated - local buffer too short\n"); 303 304 if (log->level == BPF_LOG_KERNEL) { 305 bool newline = n > 0 && log->kbuf[n - 1] == '\n'; 306 307 pr_err("BPF: %s%s", log->kbuf, newline ? "" : "\n"); 308 return; 309 } 310 311 n = min(log->len_total - log->len_used - 1, n); 312 log->kbuf[n] = '\0'; 313 if (!copy_to_user(log->ubuf + log->len_used, log->kbuf, n + 1)) 314 log->len_used += n; 315 else 316 log->ubuf = NULL; 317 } 318 319 static void bpf_vlog_reset(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 new_pos) 320 { 321 char zero = 0; 322 323 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) 324 return; 325 326 log->len_used = new_pos; 327 if (put_user(zero, log->ubuf + new_pos)) 328 log->ubuf = NULL; 329 } 330 331 /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier. 332 * bpf_verifier_log_write() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, 333 * so the user can figure out what's wrong with the program 334 */ 335 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 336 const char *fmt, ...) 337 { 338 va_list args; 339 340 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 341 return; 342 343 va_start(args, fmt); 344 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 345 va_end(args); 346 } 347 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_verifier_log_write); 348 349 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...) 350 { 351 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data; 352 va_list args; 353 354 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 355 return; 356 357 va_start(args, fmt); 358 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args); 359 va_end(args); 360 } 361 362 __printf(2, 3) void bpf_log(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 363 const char *fmt, ...) 364 { 365 va_list args; 366 367 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(log)) 368 return; 369 370 va_start(args, fmt); 371 bpf_verifier_vlog(log, fmt, args); 372 va_end(args); 373 } 374 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_log); 375 376 static const char *ltrim(const char *s) 377 { 378 while (isspace(*s)) 379 s++; 380 381 return s; 382 } 383 384 __printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 385 u32 insn_off, 386 const char *prefix_fmt, ...) 387 { 388 const struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 389 390 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log)) 391 return; 392 393 linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off); 394 if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo) 395 return; 396 397 if (prefix_fmt) { 398 va_list args; 399 400 va_start(args, prefix_fmt); 401 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args); 402 va_end(args); 403 } 404 405 verbose(env, "%s\n", 406 ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf, 407 linfo->line_off))); 408 409 env->prev_linfo = linfo; 410 } 411 412 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 413 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 414 struct tnum *range, const char *ctx, 415 const char *reg_name) 416 { 417 char tn_buf[48]; 418 419 verbose(env, "At %s the register %s ", ctx, reg_name); 420 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 421 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 422 verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf); 423 } else { 424 verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value"); 425 } 426 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), *range); 427 verbose(env, " should have been in %s\n", tn_buf); 428 } 429 430 static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 431 { 432 type = base_type(type); 433 return type == PTR_TO_PACKET || 434 type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META; 435 } 436 437 static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) 438 { 439 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 440 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || 441 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 442 type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 443 } 444 445 static bool reg_type_not_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) 446 { 447 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || 448 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK || 449 type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || 450 type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 451 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; 452 } 453 454 static bool type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(u32 type) 455 { 456 return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && type_flag(type) & MEM_ALLOC; 457 } 458 459 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 460 { 461 struct btf_record *rec = NULL; 462 struct btf_struct_meta *meta; 463 464 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 465 rec = reg->map_ptr->record; 466 } else if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) { 467 meta = btf_find_struct_meta(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 468 if (meta) 469 rec = meta->record; 470 } 471 return rec; 472 } 473 474 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 475 { 476 return btf_record_has_field(reg_btf_record(reg), BPF_SPIN_LOCK); 477 } 478 479 static bool type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type) 480 { 481 return type & MEM_RDONLY; 482 } 483 484 static bool type_may_be_null(u32 type) 485 { 486 return type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 487 } 488 489 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 490 const struct bpf_map *map) 491 { 492 enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC; 493 494 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp || 495 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp || 496 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp || 497 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve || 498 func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) 499 return true; 500 501 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 502 (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 503 map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)) 504 return true; 505 506 return false; 507 } 508 509 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 510 { 511 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock || 512 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock || 513 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock || 514 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock || 515 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock || 516 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_mptcp_sock || 517 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock || 518 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock; 519 } 520 521 static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 522 { 523 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data; 524 } 525 526 static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 527 { 528 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 529 func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback || 530 func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma || 531 func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop || 532 func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain; 533 } 534 535 static bool is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) 536 { 537 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get || 538 func_id == BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get || 539 func_id == BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get || 540 func_id == BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get; 541 } 542 543 static bool helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(enum bpf_func_id func_id, 544 const struct bpf_map *map) 545 { 546 int ref_obj_uses = 0; 547 548 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) 549 ref_obj_uses++; 550 if (is_acquire_function(func_id, map)) 551 ref_obj_uses++; 552 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) 553 ref_obj_uses++; 554 555 return ref_obj_uses > 1; 556 } 557 558 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 559 { 560 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX && 561 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 562 insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG; 563 } 564 565 /* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' 566 * 567 * Note that reg_type_str() can not appear more than once in a single verbose() 568 * statement. 569 */ 570 static const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 571 enum bpf_reg_type type) 572 { 573 char postfix[16] = {0}, prefix[64] = {0}; 574 static const char * const str[] = { 575 [NOT_INIT] = "?", 576 [SCALAR_VALUE] = "scalar", 577 [PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx", 578 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr", 579 [PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value", 580 [PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp", 581 [PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt", 582 [PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta", 583 [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", 584 [PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS] = "flow_keys", 585 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = "sock", 586 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = "sock_common", 587 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock", 588 [PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer", 589 [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock", 590 [PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = "ptr_", 591 [PTR_TO_MEM] = "mem", 592 [PTR_TO_BUF] = "buf", 593 [PTR_TO_FUNC] = "func", 594 [PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = "map_key", 595 [CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = "dynptr_ptr", 596 }; 597 598 if (type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 599 if (base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 600 strncpy(postfix, "or_null_", 16); 601 else 602 strncpy(postfix, "_or_null", 16); 603 } 604 605 snprintf(prefix, sizeof(prefix), "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", 606 type & MEM_RDONLY ? "rdonly_" : "", 607 type & MEM_RINGBUF ? "ringbuf_" : "", 608 type & MEM_USER ? "user_" : "", 609 type & MEM_PERCPU ? "percpu_" : "", 610 type & MEM_RCU ? "rcu_" : "", 611 type & PTR_UNTRUSTED ? "untrusted_" : "", 612 type & PTR_TRUSTED ? "trusted_" : "" 613 ); 614 615 snprintf(env->type_str_buf, TYPE_STR_BUF_LEN, "%s%s%s", 616 prefix, str[base_type(type)], postfix); 617 return env->type_str_buf; 618 } 619 620 static char slot_type_char[] = { 621 [STACK_INVALID] = '?', 622 [STACK_SPILL] = 'r', 623 [STACK_MISC] = 'm', 624 [STACK_ZERO] = '0', 625 [STACK_DYNPTR] = 'd', 626 }; 627 628 static void print_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 629 enum bpf_reg_liveness live) 630 { 631 if (live & (REG_LIVE_READ | REG_LIVE_WRITTEN | REG_LIVE_DONE)) 632 verbose(env, "_"); 633 if (live & REG_LIVE_READ) 634 verbose(env, "r"); 635 if (live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 636 verbose(env, "w"); 637 if (live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 638 verbose(env, "D"); 639 } 640 641 static int get_spi(s32 off) 642 { 643 return (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 644 } 645 646 static bool is_spi_bounds_valid(struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi, int nr_slots) 647 { 648 int allocated_slots = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 649 650 /* We need to check that slots between [spi - nr_slots + 1, spi] are 651 * within [0, allocated_stack). 652 * 653 * Please note that the spi grows downwards. For example, a dynptr 654 * takes the size of two stack slots; the first slot will be at 655 * spi and the second slot will be at spi - 1. 656 */ 657 return spi - nr_slots + 1 >= 0 && spi < allocated_slots; 658 } 659 660 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 661 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 662 { 663 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 664 665 return cur->frame[reg->frameno]; 666 } 667 668 static const char *kernel_type_name(const struct btf* btf, u32 id) 669 { 670 return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off); 671 } 672 673 static void mark_reg_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno) 674 { 675 env->scratched_regs |= 1U << regno; 676 } 677 678 static void mark_stack_slot_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 spi) 679 { 680 env->scratched_stack_slots |= 1ULL << spi; 681 } 682 683 static bool reg_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno) 684 { 685 return (env->scratched_regs >> regno) & 1; 686 } 687 688 static bool stack_slot_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u64 regno) 689 { 690 return (env->scratched_stack_slots >> regno) & 1; 691 } 692 693 static bool verifier_state_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 694 { 695 return env->scratched_regs || env->scratched_stack_slots; 696 } 697 698 static void mark_verifier_state_clean(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 699 { 700 env->scratched_regs = 0U; 701 env->scratched_stack_slots = 0ULL; 702 } 703 704 /* Used for printing the entire verifier state. */ 705 static void mark_verifier_state_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 706 { 707 env->scratched_regs = ~0U; 708 env->scratched_stack_slots = ~0ULL; 709 } 710 711 static enum bpf_dynptr_type arg_to_dynptr_type(enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 712 { 713 switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) { 714 case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 715 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL; 716 case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 717 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 718 default: 719 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID; 720 } 721 } 722 723 static bool dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 724 { 725 return type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF; 726 } 727 728 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 729 enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 730 bool first_slot); 731 732 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 733 struct bpf_reg_state *reg); 734 735 static void mark_dynptr_stack_regs(struct bpf_reg_state *sreg1, 736 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg2, 737 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 738 { 739 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg1, type, true); 740 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg2, type, false); 741 } 742 743 static void mark_dynptr_cb_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 744 enum bpf_dynptr_type type) 745 { 746 __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, type, true); 747 } 748 749 750 static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 751 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx) 752 { 753 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 754 enum bpf_dynptr_type type; 755 int spi, i, id; 756 757 spi = get_spi(reg->off); 758 759 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS)) 760 return -EINVAL; 761 762 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 763 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 764 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR; 765 } 766 767 type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 768 if (type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) 769 return -EINVAL; 770 771 mark_dynptr_stack_regs(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 772 &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, type); 773 774 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(type)) { 775 /* The id is used to track proper releasing */ 776 id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 777 if (id < 0) 778 return id; 779 780 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 781 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id; 782 } 783 784 return 0; 785 } 786 787 static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 788 { 789 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 790 int spi, i; 791 792 spi = get_spi(reg->off); 793 794 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS)) 795 return -EINVAL; 796 797 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 798 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 799 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID; 800 } 801 802 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */ 803 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) 804 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id)); 805 806 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 807 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr); 808 return 0; 809 } 810 811 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 812 { 813 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 814 int spi, i; 815 816 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 817 return false; 818 819 spi = get_spi(reg->off); 820 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS)) 821 return true; 822 823 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 824 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_DYNPTR || 825 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] == STACK_DYNPTR) 826 return false; 827 } 828 829 return true; 830 } 831 832 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 833 { 834 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 835 int spi; 836 int i; 837 838 /* This already represents first slot of initialized bpf_dynptr */ 839 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 840 return true; 841 842 spi = get_spi(reg->off); 843 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS) || 844 !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) 845 return false; 846 847 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 848 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR || 849 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR) 850 return false; 851 } 852 853 return true; 854 } 855 856 static bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 857 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 858 { 859 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 860 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type; 861 int spi; 862 863 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR takes any type of dynptr */ 864 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 865 return true; 866 867 dynptr_type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type); 868 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 869 return reg->dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 870 } else { 871 spi = get_spi(reg->off); 872 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == dynptr_type; 873 } 874 } 875 876 /* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when 877 * it was spilled to the stack. 878 */ 879 static bool is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack) 880 { 881 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL; 882 } 883 884 static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype) 885 { 886 if (*stype != STACK_INVALID) 887 *stype = STACK_MISC; 888 } 889 890 static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 891 const struct bpf_func_state *state, 892 bool print_all) 893 { 894 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 895 enum bpf_reg_type t; 896 int i; 897 898 if (state->frameno) 899 verbose(env, " frame%d:", state->frameno); 900 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 901 reg = &state->regs[i]; 902 t = reg->type; 903 if (t == NOT_INIT) 904 continue; 905 if (!print_all && !reg_scratched(env, i)) 906 continue; 907 verbose(env, " R%d", i); 908 print_liveness(env, reg->live); 909 verbose(env, "="); 910 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 911 verbose(env, "P"); 912 if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) && 913 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 914 /* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */ 915 verbose(env, "%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); 916 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 917 } else { 918 const char *sep = ""; 919 920 verbose(env, "%s", reg_type_str(env, t)); 921 if (base_type(t) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 922 verbose(env, "%s", kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id)); 923 verbose(env, "("); 924 /* 925 * _a stands for append, was shortened to avoid multiline statements below. 926 * This macro is used to output a comma separated list of attributes. 927 */ 928 #define verbose_a(fmt, ...) ({ verbose(env, "%s" fmt, sep, __VA_ARGS__); sep = ","; }) 929 930 if (reg->id) 931 verbose_a("id=%d", reg->id); 932 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 933 verbose_a("ref_obj_id=%d", reg->ref_obj_id); 934 if (t != SCALAR_VALUE) 935 verbose_a("off=%d", reg->off); 936 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t)) 937 verbose_a("r=%d", reg->range); 938 else if (base_type(t) == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || 939 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || 940 base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) 941 verbose_a("ks=%d,vs=%d", 942 reg->map_ptr->key_size, 943 reg->map_ptr->value_size); 944 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 945 /* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but 946 * could be a pointer whose offset is too big 947 * for reg->off 948 */ 949 verbose_a("imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value); 950 } else { 951 if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value && 952 reg->smin_value != S64_MIN) 953 verbose_a("smin=%lld", (long long)reg->smin_value); 954 if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value && 955 reg->smax_value != S64_MAX) 956 verbose_a("smax=%lld", (long long)reg->smax_value); 957 if (reg->umin_value != 0) 958 verbose_a("umin=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value); 959 if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX) 960 verbose_a("umax=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value); 961 if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) { 962 char tn_buf[48]; 963 964 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 965 verbose_a("var_off=%s", tn_buf); 966 } 967 if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value && 968 reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN) 969 verbose_a("s32_min=%d", (int)(reg->s32_min_value)); 970 if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value && 971 reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX) 972 verbose_a("s32_max=%d", (int)(reg->s32_max_value)); 973 if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value && 974 reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN) 975 verbose_a("u32_min=%d", (int)(reg->u32_min_value)); 976 if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value && 977 reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX) 978 verbose_a("u32_max=%d", (int)(reg->u32_max_value)); 979 } 980 #undef verbose_a 981 982 verbose(env, ")"); 983 } 984 } 985 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 986 char types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE + 1]; 987 bool valid = false; 988 int j; 989 990 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 991 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[j] != STACK_INVALID) 992 valid = true; 993 types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[ 994 state->stack[i].slot_type[j]]; 995 } 996 types_buf[BPF_REG_SIZE] = 0; 997 if (!valid) 998 continue; 999 if (!print_all && !stack_slot_scratched(env, i)) 1000 continue; 1001 verbose(env, " fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE); 1002 print_liveness(env, state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live); 1003 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) { 1004 reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 1005 t = reg->type; 1006 verbose(env, "=%s", t == SCALAR_VALUE ? "" : reg_type_str(env, t)); 1007 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->precise) 1008 verbose(env, "P"); 1009 if (t == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 1010 verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off); 1011 } else { 1012 verbose(env, "=%s", types_buf); 1013 } 1014 } 1015 if (state->acquired_refs && state->refs[0].id) { 1016 verbose(env, " refs=%d", state->refs[0].id); 1017 for (i = 1; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) 1018 if (state->refs[i].id) 1019 verbose(env, ",%d", state->refs[i].id); 1020 } 1021 if (state->in_callback_fn) 1022 verbose(env, " cb"); 1023 if (state->in_async_callback_fn) 1024 verbose(env, " async_cb"); 1025 verbose(env, "\n"); 1026 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 1027 } 1028 1029 static inline u32 vlog_alignment(u32 pos) 1030 { 1031 return round_up(max(pos + BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT / 2, BPF_LOG_ALIGNMENT), 1032 BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT) - pos - 1; 1033 } 1034 1035 static void print_insn_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1036 const struct bpf_func_state *state) 1037 { 1038 if (env->prev_log_len && env->prev_log_len == env->log.len_used) { 1039 /* remove new line character */ 1040 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->prev_log_len - 1); 1041 verbose(env, "%*c;", vlog_alignment(env->prev_insn_print_len), ' '); 1042 } else { 1043 verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx); 1044 } 1045 print_verifier_state(env, state, false); 1046 } 1047 1048 /* copy array src of length n * size bytes to dst. dst is reallocated if it's too 1049 * small to hold src. This is different from krealloc since we don't want to preserve 1050 * the contents of dst. 1051 * 1052 * Leaves dst untouched if src is NULL or length is zero. Returns NULL if memory could 1053 * not be allocated. 1054 */ 1055 static void *copy_array(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags) 1056 { 1057 size_t alloc_bytes; 1058 void *orig = dst; 1059 size_t bytes; 1060 1061 if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(src)) 1062 goto out; 1063 1064 if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes))) 1065 return NULL; 1066 1067 alloc_bytes = max(ksize(orig), kmalloc_size_roundup(bytes)); 1068 dst = krealloc(orig, alloc_bytes, flags); 1069 if (!dst) { 1070 kfree(orig); 1071 return NULL; 1072 } 1073 1074 memcpy(dst, src, bytes); 1075 out: 1076 return dst ? dst : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1077 } 1078 1079 /* resize an array from old_n items to new_n items. the array is reallocated if it's too 1080 * small to hold new_n items. new items are zeroed out if the array grows. 1081 * 1082 * Contrary to krealloc_array, does not free arr if new_n is zero. 1083 */ 1084 static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size) 1085 { 1086 size_t alloc_size; 1087 void *new_arr; 1088 1089 if (!new_n || old_n == new_n) 1090 goto out; 1091 1092 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(new_n, size)); 1093 new_arr = krealloc(arr, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); 1094 if (!new_arr) { 1095 kfree(arr); 1096 return NULL; 1097 } 1098 arr = new_arr; 1099 1100 if (new_n > old_n) 1101 memset(arr + old_n * size, 0, (new_n - old_n) * size); 1102 1103 out: 1104 return arr ? arr : ZERO_SIZE_PTR; 1105 } 1106 1107 static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1108 { 1109 dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs, 1110 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL); 1111 if (!dst->refs) 1112 return -ENOMEM; 1113 1114 dst->acquired_refs = src->acquired_refs; 1115 return 0; 1116 } 1117 1118 static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1119 { 1120 size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1121 1122 dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state), 1123 GFP_KERNEL); 1124 if (!dst->stack) 1125 return -ENOMEM; 1126 1127 dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack; 1128 return 0; 1129 } 1130 1131 static int resize_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, size_t n) 1132 { 1133 state->refs = realloc_array(state->refs, state->acquired_refs, n, 1134 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state)); 1135 if (!state->refs) 1136 return -ENOMEM; 1137 1138 state->acquired_refs = n; 1139 return 0; 1140 } 1141 1142 static int grow_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int size) 1143 { 1144 size_t old_n = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, n = size / BPF_REG_SIZE; 1145 1146 if (old_n >= n) 1147 return 0; 1148 1149 state->stack = realloc_array(state->stack, old_n, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state)); 1150 if (!state->stack) 1151 return -ENOMEM; 1152 1153 state->allocated_stack = size; 1154 return 0; 1155 } 1156 1157 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include 1158 * this new pointer reference. 1159 * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register 1160 * On failure, returns a negative errno. 1161 */ 1162 static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 1163 { 1164 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 1165 int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs; 1166 int id, err; 1167 1168 err = resize_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1); 1169 if (err) 1170 return err; 1171 id = ++env->id_gen; 1172 state->refs[new_ofs].id = id; 1173 state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx; 1174 state->refs[new_ofs].callback_ref = state->in_callback_fn ? state->frameno : 0; 1175 1176 return id; 1177 } 1178 1179 /* release function corresponding to acquire_reference_state(). Idempotent. */ 1180 static int release_reference_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, int ptr_id) 1181 { 1182 int i, last_idx; 1183 1184 last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1; 1185 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 1186 if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id) { 1187 /* Cannot release caller references in callbacks */ 1188 if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) 1189 return -EINVAL; 1190 if (last_idx && i != last_idx) 1191 memcpy(&state->refs[i], &state->refs[last_idx], 1192 sizeof(*state->refs)); 1193 memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs)); 1194 state->acquired_refs--; 1195 return 0; 1196 } 1197 } 1198 return -EINVAL; 1199 } 1200 1201 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) 1202 { 1203 if (!state) 1204 return; 1205 kfree(state->refs); 1206 kfree(state->stack); 1207 kfree(state); 1208 } 1209 1210 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) 1211 { 1212 kfree(state->jmp_history); 1213 state->jmp_history = NULL; 1214 state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; 1215 } 1216 1217 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, 1218 bool free_self) 1219 { 1220 int i; 1221 1222 for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) { 1223 free_func_state(state->frame[i]); 1224 state->frame[i] = NULL; 1225 } 1226 clear_jmp_history(state); 1227 if (free_self) 1228 kfree(state); 1229 } 1230 1231 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space 1232 * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack 1233 */ 1234 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, 1235 const struct bpf_func_state *src) 1236 { 1237 int err; 1238 1239 memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, acquired_refs)); 1240 err = copy_reference_state(dst, src); 1241 if (err) 1242 return err; 1243 return copy_stack_state(dst, src); 1244 } 1245 1246 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, 1247 const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) 1248 { 1249 struct bpf_func_state *dst; 1250 int i, err; 1251 1252 dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, 1253 src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(struct bpf_idx_pair), 1254 GFP_USER); 1255 if (!dst_state->jmp_history) 1256 return -ENOMEM; 1257 dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; 1258 1259 /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */ 1260 for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) { 1261 free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]); 1262 dst_state->frame[i] = NULL; 1263 } 1264 dst_state->speculative = src->speculative; 1265 dst_state->active_rcu_lock = src->active_rcu_lock; 1266 dst_state->curframe = src->curframe; 1267 dst_state->active_lock.ptr = src->active_lock.ptr; 1268 dst_state->active_lock.id = src->active_lock.id; 1269 dst_state->branches = src->branches; 1270 dst_state->parent = src->parent; 1271 dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; 1272 dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; 1273 for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { 1274 dst = dst_state->frame[i]; 1275 if (!dst) { 1276 dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL); 1277 if (!dst) 1278 return -ENOMEM; 1279 dst_state->frame[i] = dst; 1280 } 1281 err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]); 1282 if (err) 1283 return err; 1284 } 1285 return 0; 1286 } 1287 1288 static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 1289 { 1290 while (st) { 1291 u32 br = --st->branches; 1292 1293 /* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here, 1294 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: 1295 */ 1296 WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0, 1297 "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n", 1298 br); 1299 if (br) 1300 break; 1301 st = st->parent; 1302 } 1303 } 1304 1305 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, 1306 int *insn_idx, bool pop_log) 1307 { 1308 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1309 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head; 1310 int err; 1311 1312 if (env->head == NULL) 1313 return -ENOENT; 1314 1315 if (cur) { 1316 err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st); 1317 if (err) 1318 return err; 1319 } 1320 if (pop_log) 1321 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos); 1322 if (insn_idx) 1323 *insn_idx = head->insn_idx; 1324 if (prev_insn_idx) 1325 *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx; 1326 elem = head->next; 1327 free_verifier_state(&head->st, false); 1328 kfree(head); 1329 env->head = elem; 1330 env->stack_size--; 1331 return 0; 1332 } 1333 1334 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1335 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 1336 bool speculative) 1337 { 1338 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 1339 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 1340 int err; 1341 1342 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 1343 if (!elem) 1344 goto err; 1345 1346 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 1347 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 1348 elem->next = env->head; 1349 elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used; 1350 env->head = elem; 1351 env->stack_size++; 1352 err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); 1353 if (err) 1354 goto err; 1355 elem->st.speculative |= speculative; 1356 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 1357 verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n", 1358 env->stack_size); 1359 goto err; 1360 } 1361 if (elem->st.parent) { 1362 ++elem->st.parent->branches; 1363 /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here, 1364 * but 1365 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch 1366 * instructions 1367 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create 1368 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current 1369 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state 1370 * which might have large 'branches' count. 1371 */ 1372 } 1373 return &elem->st; 1374 err: 1375 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 1376 env->cur_state = NULL; 1377 /* pop all elements and return */ 1378 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 1379 return NULL; 1380 } 1381 1382 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 1383 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = { 1384 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5 1385 }; 1386 1387 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */ 1388 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1389 { 1390 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm); 1391 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm; 1392 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm; 1393 reg->umin_value = imm; 1394 reg->umax_value = imm; 1395 1396 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 1397 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 1398 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 1399 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 1400 } 1401 1402 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as 1403 * known to have the value @imm. 1404 */ 1405 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1406 { 1407 /* Clear off and union(map_ptr, range) */ 1408 memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0, 1409 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type)); 1410 reg->id = 0; 1411 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 1412 ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm); 1413 } 1414 1415 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm) 1416 { 1417 reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm); 1418 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm; 1419 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm; 1420 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm; 1421 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm; 1422 } 1423 1424 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be 1425 * used only on registers holding a pointer type. 1426 */ 1427 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1428 { 1429 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 1430 } 1431 1432 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1433 { 1434 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0); 1435 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1436 } 1437 1438 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1439 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1440 { 1441 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1442 verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1443 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */ 1444 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++) 1445 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1446 return; 1447 } 1448 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno); 1449 } 1450 1451 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum bpf_dynptr_type type, 1452 bool first_slot) 1453 { 1454 /* reg->type has no meaning for STACK_DYNPTR, but when we set reg for 1455 * callback arguments, it does need to be CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, so simply 1456 * set it unconditionally as it is ignored for STACK_DYNPTR anyway. 1457 */ 1458 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg); 1459 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 1460 reg->dynptr.type = type; 1461 reg->dynptr.first_slot = first_slot; 1462 } 1463 1464 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1465 { 1466 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 1467 const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 1468 1469 if (map->inner_map_meta) { 1470 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 1471 reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta; 1472 /* transfer reg's id which is unique for every map_lookup_elem 1473 * as UID of the inner map. 1474 */ 1475 if (btf_record_has_field(map->inner_map_meta->record, BPF_TIMER)) 1476 reg->map_uid = reg->id; 1477 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) { 1478 reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK; 1479 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP || 1480 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) { 1481 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; 1482 } else { 1483 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 1484 } 1485 return; 1486 } 1487 1488 reg->type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 1489 } 1490 1491 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1492 { 1493 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 1494 } 1495 1496 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1497 { 1498 return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) || 1499 reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END; 1500 } 1501 1502 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */ 1503 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 1504 enum bpf_reg_type which) 1505 { 1506 /* The register can already have a range from prior markings. 1507 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its 1508 * origin. 1509 */ 1510 return reg->type == which && 1511 reg->id == 0 && 1512 reg->off == 0 && 1513 tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 1514 } 1515 1516 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */ 1517 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1518 { 1519 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 1520 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 1521 reg->umin_value = 0; 1522 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 1523 1524 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 1525 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 1526 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 1527 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 1528 } 1529 1530 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1531 { 1532 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 1533 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 1534 reg->umin_value = 0; 1535 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 1536 } 1537 1538 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1539 { 1540 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 1541 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 1542 reg->u32_min_value = 0; 1543 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 1544 } 1545 1546 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1547 { 1548 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 1549 1550 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 1551 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, 1552 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN)); 1553 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 1554 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, 1555 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX)); 1556 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value); 1557 reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value, 1558 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask)); 1559 } 1560 1561 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1562 { 1563 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */ 1564 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, 1565 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN)); 1566 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */ 1567 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, 1568 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX)); 1569 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value); 1570 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value, 1571 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask); 1572 } 1573 1574 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1575 { 1576 __update_reg32_bounds(reg); 1577 __update_reg64_bounds(reg); 1578 } 1579 1580 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */ 1581 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1582 { 1583 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 1584 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 1585 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 1586 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 1587 */ 1588 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 || reg->s32_max_value < 0) { 1589 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 1590 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 1591 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 1592 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 1593 return; 1594 } 1595 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 1596 * boundary, so we must be careful. 1597 */ 1598 if ((s32)reg->u32_max_value >= 0) { 1599 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 1600 * is positive, hence safe. 1601 */ 1602 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value; 1603 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value = 1604 min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value); 1605 } else if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value < 0) { 1606 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 1607 * is negative, hence safe. 1608 */ 1609 reg->s32_min_value = reg->u32_min_value = 1610 max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value); 1611 reg->s32_max_value = reg->u32_max_value; 1612 } 1613 } 1614 1615 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1616 { 1617 /* Learn sign from signed bounds. 1618 * If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds 1619 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g. 1620 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff. 1621 */ 1622 if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) { 1623 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 1624 reg->umin_value); 1625 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 1626 reg->umax_value); 1627 return; 1628 } 1629 /* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign 1630 * boundary, so we must be careful. 1631 */ 1632 if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) { 1633 /* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax 1634 * is positive, hence safe. 1635 */ 1636 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 1637 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, 1638 reg->umax_value); 1639 } else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) { 1640 /* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin 1641 * is negative, hence safe. 1642 */ 1643 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, 1644 reg->umin_value); 1645 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 1646 } 1647 } 1648 1649 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1650 { 1651 __reg32_deduce_bounds(reg); 1652 __reg64_deduce_bounds(reg); 1653 } 1654 1655 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */ 1656 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1657 { 1658 struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off, 1659 tnum_range(reg->umin_value, 1660 reg->umax_value)); 1661 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg->var_off), 1662 tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value, 1663 reg->u32_max_value)); 1664 1665 reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off); 1666 } 1667 1668 static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1669 { 1670 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */ 1671 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1672 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ 1673 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); 1674 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ 1675 __reg_bound_offset(reg); 1676 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds 1677 * slightly, e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc), 1678 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax. 1679 */ 1680 __update_reg_bounds(reg); 1681 } 1682 1683 static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a) 1684 { 1685 return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX; 1686 } 1687 1688 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1689 { 1690 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value; 1691 reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value; 1692 1693 /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must 1694 * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later 1695 * from tnum. 1696 */ 1697 if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) && 1698 __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) { 1699 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value; 1700 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value; 1701 } else { 1702 reg->smin_value = 0; 1703 reg->smax_value = U32_MAX; 1704 } 1705 } 1706 1707 static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1708 { 1709 /* special case when 64-bit register has upper 32-bit register 1710 * zeroed. Typically happens after zext or <<32, >>32 sequence 1711 * allowing us to use 32-bit bounds directly, 1712 */ 1713 if (tnum_equals_const(tnum_clear_subreg(reg->var_off), 0)) { 1714 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 1715 } else { 1716 /* Otherwise the best we can do is push lower 32bit known and 1717 * unknown bits into register (var_off set from jmp logic) 1718 * then learn as much as possible from the 64-bit tnum 1719 * known and unknown bits. The previous smin/smax bounds are 1720 * invalid here because of jmp32 compare so mark them unknown 1721 * so they do not impact tnum bounds calculation. 1722 */ 1723 __mark_reg64_unbounded(reg); 1724 } 1725 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 1726 } 1727 1728 static bool __reg64_bound_s32(s64 a) 1729 { 1730 return a >= S32_MIN && a <= S32_MAX; 1731 } 1732 1733 static bool __reg64_bound_u32(u64 a) 1734 { 1735 return a >= U32_MIN && a <= U32_MAX; 1736 } 1737 1738 static void __reg_combine_64_into_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1739 { 1740 __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg); 1741 if (__reg64_bound_s32(reg->smin_value) && __reg64_bound_s32(reg->smax_value)) { 1742 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->smin_value; 1743 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->smax_value; 1744 } 1745 if (__reg64_bound_u32(reg->umin_value) && __reg64_bound_u32(reg->umax_value)) { 1746 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)reg->umin_value; 1747 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)reg->umax_value; 1748 } 1749 reg_bounds_sync(reg); 1750 } 1751 1752 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */ 1753 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1754 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1755 { 1756 /* 1757 * Clear type, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and 1758 * padding between 'type' and union 1759 */ 1760 memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)); 1761 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 1762 reg->id = 0; 1763 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 1764 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown; 1765 reg->frameno = 0; 1766 reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable; 1767 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); 1768 } 1769 1770 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1771 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1772 { 1773 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1774 verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1775 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 1776 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 1777 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1778 return; 1779 } 1780 __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno); 1781 } 1782 1783 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1784 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 1785 { 1786 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 1787 reg->type = NOT_INIT; 1788 } 1789 1790 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1791 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) 1792 { 1793 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) { 1794 verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno); 1795 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */ 1796 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++) 1797 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1798 return; 1799 } 1800 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); 1801 } 1802 1803 static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1804 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, 1805 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, 1806 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, 1807 enum bpf_type_flag flag) 1808 { 1809 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 1810 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 1811 return; 1812 } 1813 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); 1814 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag; 1815 regs[regno].btf = btf; 1816 regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; 1817 } 1818 1819 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) 1820 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1821 struct bpf_func_state *state) 1822 { 1823 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; 1824 int i; 1825 1826 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) { 1827 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i); 1828 regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 1829 regs[i].parent = NULL; 1830 regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 1831 } 1832 1833 /* frame pointer */ 1834 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK; 1835 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP); 1836 regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno; 1837 } 1838 1839 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1) 1840 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1841 struct bpf_func_state *state, 1842 int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno) 1843 { 1844 state->callsite = callsite; 1845 state->frameno = frameno; 1846 state->subprogno = subprogno; 1847 state->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 0); 1848 init_reg_state(env, state); 1849 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 1850 } 1851 1852 /* Similar to push_stack(), but for async callbacks */ 1853 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 1854 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, 1855 int subprog) 1856 { 1857 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; 1858 struct bpf_func_state *frame; 1859 1860 elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); 1861 if (!elem) 1862 goto err; 1863 1864 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; 1865 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 1866 elem->next = env->head; 1867 elem->log_pos = env->log.len_used; 1868 env->head = elem; 1869 env->stack_size++; 1870 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { 1871 verbose(env, 1872 "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex for async cb.\n", 1873 env->stack_size); 1874 goto err; 1875 } 1876 /* Unlike push_stack() do not copy_verifier_state(). 1877 * The caller state doesn't matter. 1878 * This is async callback. It starts in a fresh stack. 1879 * Initialize it similar to do_check_common(). 1880 */ 1881 elem->st.branches = 1; 1882 frame = kzalloc(sizeof(*frame), GFP_KERNEL); 1883 if (!frame) 1884 goto err; 1885 init_func_state(env, frame, 1886 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 1887 0 /* frameno within this callchain */, 1888 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 1889 elem->st.frame[0] = frame; 1890 return &elem->st; 1891 err: 1892 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 1893 env->cur_state = NULL; 1894 /* pop all elements and return */ 1895 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 1896 return NULL; 1897 } 1898 1899 1900 enum reg_arg_type { 1901 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */ 1902 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */ 1903 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */ 1904 }; 1905 1906 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b) 1907 { 1908 return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start - 1909 ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start; 1910 } 1911 1912 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 1913 { 1914 struct bpf_subprog_info *p; 1915 1916 p = bsearch(&off, env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 1917 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs); 1918 if (!p) 1919 return -ENOENT; 1920 return p - env->subprog_info; 1921 1922 } 1923 1924 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) 1925 { 1926 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 1927 int ret; 1928 1929 if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) { 1930 verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n"); 1931 return -EINVAL; 1932 } 1933 ret = find_subprog(env, off); 1934 if (ret >= 0) 1935 return ret; 1936 if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) { 1937 verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n"); 1938 return -E2BIG; 1939 } 1940 /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */ 1941 env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off; 1942 sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt, 1943 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL); 1944 return env->subprog_cnt - 1; 1945 } 1946 1947 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256 1948 #define MAX_KFUNC_BTFS 256 1949 1950 struct bpf_kfunc_desc { 1951 struct btf_func_model func_model; 1952 u32 func_id; 1953 s32 imm; 1954 u16 offset; 1955 }; 1956 1957 struct bpf_kfunc_btf { 1958 struct btf *btf; 1959 struct module *module; 1960 u16 offset; 1961 }; 1962 1963 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab { 1964 struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS]; 1965 u32 nr_descs; 1966 }; 1967 1968 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab { 1969 struct bpf_kfunc_btf descs[MAX_KFUNC_BTFS]; 1970 u32 nr_descs; 1971 }; 1972 1973 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off(const void *a, const void *b) 1974 { 1975 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 1976 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 1977 1978 /* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */ 1979 return d0->func_id - d1->func_id ?: d0->offset - d1->offset; 1980 } 1981 1982 static int kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off(const void *a, const void *b) 1983 { 1984 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d0 = a; 1985 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d1 = b; 1986 1987 return d0->offset - d1->offset; 1988 } 1989 1990 static const struct bpf_kfunc_desc * 1991 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, u16 offset) 1992 { 1993 struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 1994 .func_id = func_id, 1995 .offset = offset, 1996 }; 1997 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 1998 1999 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2000 return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2001 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off); 2002 } 2003 2004 static struct btf *__find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2005 s16 offset) 2006 { 2007 struct bpf_kfunc_btf kf_btf = { .offset = offset }; 2008 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab; 2009 struct bpf_kfunc_btf *b; 2010 struct module *mod; 2011 struct btf *btf; 2012 int btf_fd; 2013 2014 tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 2015 b = bsearch(&kf_btf, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2016 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off); 2017 if (!b) { 2018 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_BTFS) { 2019 verbose(env, "too many different module BTFs\n"); 2020 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); 2021 } 2022 2023 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 2024 verbose(env, "kfunc offset > 0 without fd_array is invalid\n"); 2025 return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO); 2026 } 2027 2028 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&btf_fd, env->fd_array, 2029 offset * sizeof(btf_fd), 2030 sizeof(btf_fd))) 2031 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); 2032 2033 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 2034 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 2035 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF fd specified\n"); 2036 return btf; 2037 } 2038 2039 if (!btf_is_module(btf)) { 2040 verbose(env, "BTF fd for kfunc is not a module BTF\n"); 2041 btf_put(btf); 2042 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 2043 } 2044 2045 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf); 2046 if (!mod) { 2047 btf_put(btf); 2048 return ERR_PTR(-ENXIO); 2049 } 2050 2051 b = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 2052 b->btf = btf; 2053 b->module = mod; 2054 b->offset = offset; 2055 2056 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2057 kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off, NULL); 2058 } 2059 return b->btf; 2060 } 2061 2062 void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab) 2063 { 2064 if (!tab) 2065 return; 2066 2067 while (tab->nr_descs--) { 2068 module_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].module); 2069 btf_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].btf); 2070 } 2071 kfree(tab); 2072 } 2073 2074 static struct btf *find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s16 offset) 2075 { 2076 if (offset) { 2077 if (offset < 0) { 2078 /* In the future, this can be allowed to increase limit 2079 * of fd index into fd_array, interpreted as u16. 2080 */ 2081 verbose(env, "negative offset disallowed for kernel module function call\n"); 2082 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 2083 } 2084 2085 return __find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 2086 } 2087 return btf_vmlinux ?: ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); 2088 } 2089 2090 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset) 2091 { 2092 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto; 2093 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *btf_tab; 2094 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2095 struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux; 2096 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 2097 const char *func_name; 2098 struct btf *desc_btf; 2099 unsigned long call_imm; 2100 unsigned long addr; 2101 int err; 2102 2103 prog_aux = env->prog->aux; 2104 tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab; 2105 btf_tab = prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 2106 if (!tab) { 2107 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 2108 verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 2109 return -ENOTSUPP; 2110 } 2111 2112 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) { 2113 verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n"); 2114 return -ENOTSUPP; 2115 } 2116 2117 if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) { 2118 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n"); 2119 return -ENOTSUPP; 2120 } 2121 2122 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) { 2123 verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 2124 return -EINVAL; 2125 } 2126 2127 tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL); 2128 if (!tab) 2129 return -ENOMEM; 2130 prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab; 2131 } 2132 2133 /* func_id == 0 is always invalid, but instead of returning an error, be 2134 * conservative and wait until the code elimination pass before returning 2135 * error, so that invalid calls that get pruned out can be in BPF programs 2136 * loaded from userspace. It is also required that offset be untouched 2137 * for such calls. 2138 */ 2139 if (!func_id && !offset) 2140 return 0; 2141 2142 if (!btf_tab && offset) { 2143 btf_tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*btf_tab), GFP_KERNEL); 2144 if (!btf_tab) 2145 return -ENOMEM; 2146 prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab = btf_tab; 2147 } 2148 2149 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset); 2150 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) { 2151 verbose(env, "failed to find BTF for kernel function\n"); 2152 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 2153 } 2154 2155 if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id, offset)) 2156 return 0; 2157 2158 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) { 2159 verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n"); 2160 return -E2BIG; 2161 } 2162 2163 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 2164 if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) { 2165 verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %u is not a function\n", 2166 func_id); 2167 return -EINVAL; 2168 } 2169 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 2170 if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) { 2171 verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %u does not have a valid func_proto\n", 2172 func_id); 2173 return -EINVAL; 2174 } 2175 2176 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 2177 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(func_name); 2178 if (!addr) { 2179 verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n", 2180 func_name); 2181 return -EINVAL; 2182 } 2183 2184 call_imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(addr); 2185 /* Check whether or not the relative offset overflows desc->imm */ 2186 if ((unsigned long)(s32)call_imm != call_imm) { 2187 verbose(env, "address of kernel function %s is out of range\n", 2188 func_name); 2189 return -EINVAL; 2190 } 2191 2192 desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++]; 2193 desc->func_id = func_id; 2194 desc->imm = call_imm; 2195 desc->offset = offset; 2196 err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, desc_btf, 2197 func_proto, func_name, 2198 &desc->func_model); 2199 if (!err) 2200 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2201 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off, NULL); 2202 return err; 2203 } 2204 2205 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm(const void *a, const void *b) 2206 { 2207 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a; 2208 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b; 2209 2210 if (d0->imm > d1->imm) 2211 return 1; 2212 else if (d0->imm < d1->imm) 2213 return -1; 2214 return 0; 2215 } 2216 2217 static void sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(struct bpf_prog *prog) 2218 { 2219 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2220 2221 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2222 if (!tab) 2223 return; 2224 2225 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]), 2226 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm, NULL); 2227 } 2228 2229 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog) 2230 { 2231 return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2232 } 2233 2234 const struct btf_func_model * 2235 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog, 2236 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 2237 { 2238 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = { 2239 .imm = insn->imm, 2240 }; 2241 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res; 2242 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab; 2243 2244 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 2245 res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, 2246 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm); 2247 2248 return res ? &res->func_model : NULL; 2249 } 2250 2251 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 2252 { 2253 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 2254 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 2255 int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 2256 2257 /* Add entry function. */ 2258 ret = add_subprog(env, 0); 2259 if (ret) 2260 return ret; 2261 2262 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 2263 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) && 2264 !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) 2265 continue; 2266 2267 if (!env->bpf_capable) { 2268 verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"); 2269 return -EPERM; 2270 } 2271 2272 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn) || bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 2273 ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 2274 else 2275 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off); 2276 2277 if (ret < 0) 2278 return ret; 2279 } 2280 2281 /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration 2282 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased. 2283 */ 2284 subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; 2285 2286 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 2287 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 2288 verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); 2289 2290 return 0; 2291 } 2292 2293 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 2294 { 2295 int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0; 2296 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 2297 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 2298 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 2299 2300 /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */ 2301 subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start; 2302 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 2303 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 2304 u8 code = insn[i].code; 2305 2306 if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 2307 insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 2308 insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 2309 subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true; 2310 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD && 2311 (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND)) 2312 subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true; 2313 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) 2314 goto next; 2315 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL) 2316 goto next; 2317 off = i + insn[i].off + 1; 2318 if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) { 2319 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off); 2320 return -EINVAL; 2321 } 2322 next: 2323 if (i == subprog_end - 1) { 2324 /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another 2325 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit 2326 * or unconditional jump back 2327 */ 2328 if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) && 2329 code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { 2330 verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n"); 2331 return -EINVAL; 2332 } 2333 subprog_start = subprog_end; 2334 cur_subprog++; 2335 if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt) 2336 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start; 2337 } 2338 } 2339 return 0; 2340 } 2341 2342 /* Parentage chain of this register (or stack slot) should take care of all 2343 * issues like callee-saved registers, stack slot allocation time, etc. 2344 */ 2345 static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2346 const struct bpf_reg_state *state, 2347 struct bpf_reg_state *parent, u8 flag) 2348 { 2349 bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ 2350 int cnt = 0; 2351 2352 while (parent) { 2353 /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ 2354 if (writes && state->live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN) 2355 break; 2356 if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 2357 verbose(env, "verifier BUG type %s var_off %lld off %d\n", 2358 reg_type_str(env, parent->type), 2359 parent->var_off.value, parent->off); 2360 return -EFAULT; 2361 } 2362 /* The first condition is more likely to be true than the 2363 * second, checked it first. 2364 */ 2365 if ((parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ) == flag || 2366 parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ64) 2367 /* The parentage chain never changes and 2368 * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ. 2369 * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and 2370 * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ. 2371 * This case happens when the same register is read 2372 * multiple times without writes into it in-between. 2373 * Also, if parent has the stronger REG_LIVE_READ64 set, 2374 * then no need to set the weak REG_LIVE_READ32. 2375 */ 2376 break; 2377 /* ... then we depend on parent's value */ 2378 parent->live |= flag; 2379 /* REG_LIVE_READ64 overrides REG_LIVE_READ32. */ 2380 if (flag == REG_LIVE_READ64) 2381 parent->live &= ~REG_LIVE_READ32; 2382 state = parent; 2383 parent = state->parent; 2384 writes = true; 2385 cnt++; 2386 } 2387 2388 if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt) 2389 env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt; 2390 return 0; 2391 } 2392 2393 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization 2394 * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates 2395 * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE. 2396 */ 2397 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 2398 u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t) 2399 { 2400 u8 code, class, op; 2401 2402 code = insn->code; 2403 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 2404 op = BPF_OP(code); 2405 if (class == BPF_JMP) { 2406 /* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE 2407 * conservatively. 2408 */ 2409 if (op == BPF_EXIT) 2410 return true; 2411 if (op == BPF_CALL) { 2412 /* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking 2413 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we 2414 * don't care the register def because they are anyway 2415 * marked as NOT_INIT already. 2416 */ 2417 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 2418 return false; 2419 /* Helper call will reach here because of arg type 2420 * check, conservatively return TRUE. 2421 */ 2422 if (t == SRC_OP) 2423 return true; 2424 2425 return false; 2426 } 2427 } 2428 2429 if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP || 2430 /* BPF_END always use BPF_ALU class. */ 2431 (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64)) 2432 return true; 2433 2434 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32) 2435 return false; 2436 2437 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 2438 if (t != SRC_OP) 2439 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 2440 /* LDX source must be ptr. */ 2441 return true; 2442 } 2443 2444 if (class == BPF_STX) { 2445 /* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has multiple source 2446 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is 2447 * asking about it. 2448 */ 2449 if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2450 return true; 2451 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW; 2452 } 2453 2454 if (class == BPF_LD) { 2455 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code); 2456 2457 /* LD_IMM64 */ 2458 if (mode == BPF_IMM) 2459 return true; 2460 2461 /* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */ 2462 if (t != SRC_OP) 2463 return false; 2464 2465 /* Implicit ctx ptr. */ 2466 if (regno == BPF_REG_6) 2467 return true; 2468 2469 /* Explicit source could be any width. */ 2470 return true; 2471 } 2472 2473 if (class == BPF_ST) 2474 /* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */ 2475 return true; 2476 2477 /* Conservatively return true at default. */ 2478 return true; 2479 } 2480 2481 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */ 2482 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn) 2483 { 2484 switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) { 2485 case BPF_JMP: 2486 case BPF_JMP32: 2487 case BPF_ST: 2488 return -1; 2489 case BPF_STX: 2490 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC && 2491 (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)) { 2492 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 2493 return BPF_REG_0; 2494 else 2495 return insn->src_reg; 2496 } else { 2497 return -1; 2498 } 2499 default: 2500 return insn->dst_reg; 2501 } 2502 } 2503 2504 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */ 2505 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 2506 { 2507 int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn); 2508 2509 if (dst_reg == -1) 2510 return false; 2511 2512 return !is_reg64(env, insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP); 2513 } 2514 2515 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2516 struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 2517 { 2518 s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def; 2519 2520 if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG) 2521 return; 2522 2523 env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true; 2524 /* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */ 2525 reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 2526 } 2527 2528 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 2529 enum reg_arg_type t) 2530 { 2531 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 2532 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 2533 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx; 2534 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs; 2535 bool rw64; 2536 2537 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { 2538 verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno); 2539 return -EINVAL; 2540 } 2541 2542 mark_reg_scratched(env, regno); 2543 2544 reg = ®s[regno]; 2545 rw64 = is_reg64(env, insn, regno, reg, t); 2546 if (t == SRC_OP) { 2547 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */ 2548 if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) { 2549 verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno); 2550 return -EACCES; 2551 } 2552 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */ 2553 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) 2554 return 0; 2555 2556 if (rw64) 2557 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 2558 2559 return mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, 2560 rw64 ? REG_LIVE_READ64 : REG_LIVE_READ32); 2561 } else { 2562 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */ 2563 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) { 2564 verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n"); 2565 return -EACCES; 2566 } 2567 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 2568 reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 2569 if (t == DST_OP) 2570 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); 2571 } 2572 return 0; 2573 } 2574 2575 static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 2576 { 2577 env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true; 2578 } 2579 2580 static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 2581 { 2582 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jmp_point; 2583 } 2584 2585 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ 2586 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2587 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 2588 { 2589 u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; 2590 struct bpf_idx_pair *p; 2591 size_t alloc_size; 2592 2593 if (!is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) 2594 return 0; 2595 2596 cnt++; 2597 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(cnt, sizeof(*p))); 2598 p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, alloc_size, GFP_USER); 2599 if (!p) 2600 return -ENOMEM; 2601 p[cnt - 1].idx = env->insn_idx; 2602 p[cnt - 1].prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 2603 cur->jmp_history = p; 2604 cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; 2605 return 0; 2606 } 2607 2608 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded 2609 * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution. 2610 */ 2611 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, 2612 u32 *history) 2613 { 2614 u32 cnt = *history; 2615 2616 if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { 2617 i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; 2618 (*history)--; 2619 } else { 2620 i--; 2621 } 2622 return i; 2623 } 2624 2625 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn) 2626 { 2627 const struct btf_type *func; 2628 struct btf *desc_btf; 2629 2630 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 2631 return NULL; 2632 2633 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(data, insn->off); 2634 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 2635 return "<error>"; 2636 2637 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, insn->imm); 2638 return btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 2639 } 2640 2641 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to 2642 * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and 2643 * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. 2644 */ 2645 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, 2646 u32 *reg_mask, u64 *stack_mask) 2647 { 2648 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 2649 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 2650 .cb_print = verbose, 2651 .private_data = env, 2652 }; 2653 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; 2654 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 2655 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 2656 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 2657 u32 dreg = 1u << insn->dst_reg; 2658 u32 sreg = 1u << insn->src_reg; 2659 u32 spi; 2660 2661 if (insn->code == 0) 2662 return 0; 2663 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 2664 verbose(env, "regs=%x stack=%llx before ", *reg_mask, *stack_mask); 2665 verbose(env, "%d: ", idx); 2666 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 2667 } 2668 2669 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 2670 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 2671 return 0; 2672 if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 2673 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2674 /* dreg = sreg 2675 * dreg needs precision after this insn 2676 * sreg needs precision before this insn 2677 */ 2678 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2679 *reg_mask |= sreg; 2680 } else { 2681 /* dreg = K 2682 * dreg needs precision after this insn. 2683 * Corresponding register is already marked 2684 * as precise=true in this verifier state. 2685 * No further markings in parent are necessary 2686 */ 2687 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2688 } 2689 } else { 2690 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 2691 /* dreg += sreg 2692 * both dreg and sreg need precision 2693 * before this insn 2694 */ 2695 *reg_mask |= sreg; 2696 } /* else dreg += K 2697 * dreg still needs precision before this insn 2698 */ 2699 } 2700 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 2701 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 2702 return 0; 2703 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2704 2705 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision. 2706 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended. 2707 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated 2708 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state. 2709 * No further tracking necessary. 2710 */ 2711 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 2712 return 0; 2713 2714 /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack. 2715 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be 2716 * tracked with precision 2717 */ 2718 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 2719 if (spi >= 64) { 2720 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 2721 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2722 return -EFAULT; 2723 } 2724 *stack_mask |= 1ull << spi; 2725 } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) { 2726 if (*reg_mask & dreg) 2727 /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg 2728 * to access memory. It means backtracking 2729 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction. 2730 */ 2731 return -ENOTSUPP; 2732 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */ 2733 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) 2734 return 0; 2735 spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE; 2736 if (spi >= 64) { 2737 verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi); 2738 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2739 return -EFAULT; 2740 } 2741 if (!(*stack_mask & (1ull << spi))) 2742 return 0; 2743 *stack_mask &= ~(1ull << spi); 2744 if (class == BPF_STX) 2745 *reg_mask |= sreg; 2746 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 2747 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 2748 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 2749 return -ENOTSUPP; 2750 /* BPF helpers that invoke callback subprogs are 2751 * equivalent to BPF_PSEUDO_CALL above 2752 */ 2753 if (insn->src_reg == 0 && is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) 2754 return -ENOTSUPP; 2755 /* regular helper call sets R0 */ 2756 *reg_mask &= ~1; 2757 if (*reg_mask & 0x3f) { 2758 /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5 2759 * they should have been found already. 2760 */ 2761 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", *reg_mask); 2762 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 2763 return -EFAULT; 2764 } 2765 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 2766 return -ENOTSUPP; 2767 } 2768 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 2769 if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) 2770 return 0; 2771 *reg_mask &= ~dreg; 2772 /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind. 2773 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision 2774 * into parent is necessary 2775 */ 2776 if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS) 2777 /* to be analyzed */ 2778 return -ENOTSUPP; 2779 } 2780 return 0; 2781 } 2782 2783 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm: 2784 * . at the start all registers have precise=false. 2785 * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns. 2786 * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in: 2787 * . ptr + scalar alu 2788 * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) 2789 * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected 2790 * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and 2791 * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers 2792 * should be precise. 2793 * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) 2794 * are equivalent if both are not precise. 2795 * 2796 * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain, 2797 * since many different registers and stack slots could have been 2798 * used to compute single precise scalar. 2799 * 2800 * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then 2801 * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects 2802 * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper 2803 * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe. 2804 * 2805 * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states. 2806 * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn. 2807 * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later. 2808 * 2809 * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like: 2810 * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) 2811 * r9 -= r8 2812 * r5 = r9 2813 * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7 2814 * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff)) 2815 * r5 += 1 2816 * ... 2817 * call bpf_perf_event_output#25 2818 * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO 2819 * 2820 * and this case: 2821 * r6 = 1 2822 * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0 2823 * r0 += r6 2824 * if r0 == 0 goto 2825 * 2826 * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame. 2827 * 2828 * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started, 2829 * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees 2830 * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to 2831 * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences") 2832 * 2833 * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking. 2834 */ 2835 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 2836 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 2837 { 2838 struct bpf_func_state *func; 2839 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 2840 int i, j; 2841 2842 /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path. 2843 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars. 2844 * We also skip current state and go straight to first parent state, 2845 * because precision markings in current non-checkpointed state are 2846 * not needed. See why in the comment in __mark_chain_precision below. 2847 */ 2848 for (st = st->parent; st; st = st->parent) { 2849 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 2850 func = st->frame[i]; 2851 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 2852 reg = &func->regs[j]; 2853 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2854 continue; 2855 reg->precise = true; 2856 } 2857 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 2858 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 2859 continue; 2860 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 2861 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2862 continue; 2863 reg->precise = true; 2864 } 2865 } 2866 } 2867 } 2868 2869 static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 2870 { 2871 struct bpf_func_state *func; 2872 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 2873 int i, j; 2874 2875 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { 2876 func = st->frame[i]; 2877 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) { 2878 reg = &func->regs[j]; 2879 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2880 continue; 2881 reg->precise = false; 2882 } 2883 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) { 2884 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j])) 2885 continue; 2886 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr; 2887 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 2888 continue; 2889 reg->precise = false; 2890 } 2891 } 2892 } 2893 2894 /* 2895 * __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and 2896 * chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0) 2897 * and/or stack slot *spi* (if spi >= 0) are marked as precisely tracked 2898 * SCALARS, as well as any other registers and slots that contribute to 2899 * a tracked state of given registers/stack slots, depending on specific BPF 2900 * assembly instructions (see backtrack_insns() for exact instruction handling 2901 * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to 2902 * traverse entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the 2903 * necessary registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as 2904 * precise. 2905 * 2906 * One important and subtle aspect is that precise marks *do not matter* in 2907 * the currently verified state (current state). It is important to understand 2908 * why this is the case. 2909 * 2910 * First, note that current state is the state that is not yet "checkpointed", 2911 * i.e., it is not yet put into env->explored_states, and it has no children 2912 * states as well. It's ephemeral, and can end up either a) being discarded if 2913 * compatible explored state is found at some point or BPF_EXIT instruction is 2914 * reached or b) checkpointed and put into env->explored_states, branching out 2915 * into one or more children states. 2916 * 2917 * In the former case, precise markings in current state are completely 2918 * ignored by state comparison code (see regsafe() for details). Only 2919 * checkpointed ("old") state precise markings are important, and if old 2920 * state's register/slot is precise, regsafe() assumes current state's 2921 * register/slot as precise and checks value ranges exactly and precisely. If 2922 * states turn out to be compatible, current state's necessary precise 2923 * markings and any required parent states' precise markings are enforced 2924 * after the fact with propagate_precision() logic, after the fact. But it's 2925 * important to realize that in this case, even after marking current state 2926 * registers/slots as precise, we immediately discard current state. So what 2927 * actually matters is any of the precise markings propagated into current 2928 * state's parent states, which are always checkpointed (due to b) case above). 2929 * As such, for scenario a) it doesn't matter if current state has precise 2930 * markings set or not. 2931 * 2932 * Now, for the scenario b), checkpointing and forking into child(ren) 2933 * state(s). Note that before current state gets to checkpointing step, any 2934 * processed instruction always assumes precise SCALAR register/slot 2935 * knowledge: if precise value or range is useful to prune jump branch, BPF 2936 * verifier takes this opportunity enthusiastically. Similarly, when 2937 * register's value is used to calculate offset or memory address, exact 2938 * knowledge of SCALAR range is assumed, checked, and enforced. So, similar to 2939 * what we mentioned above about state comparison ignoring precise markings 2940 * during state comparison, BPF verifier ignores and also assumes precise 2941 * markings *at will* during instruction verification process. But as verifier 2942 * assumes precision, it also propagates any precision dependencies across 2943 * parent states, which are not yet finalized, so can be further restricted 2944 * based on new knowledge gained from restrictions enforced by their children 2945 * states. This is so that once those parent states are finalized, i.e., when 2946 * they have no more active children state, state comparison logic in 2947 * is_state_visited() would enforce strict and precise SCALAR ranges, if 2948 * required for correctness. 2949 * 2950 * To build a bit more intuition, note also that once a state is checkpointed, 2951 * the path we took to get to that state is not important. This is crucial 2952 * property for state pruning. When state is checkpointed and finalized at 2953 * some instruction index, it can be correctly and safely used to "short 2954 * circuit" any *compatible* state that reaches exactly the same instruction 2955 * index. I.e., if we jumped to that instruction from a completely different 2956 * code path than original finalized state was derived from, it doesn't 2957 * matter, current state can be discarded because from that instruction 2958 * forward having a compatible state will ensure we will safely reach the 2959 * exit. States describe preconditions for further exploration, but completely 2960 * forget the history of how we got here. 2961 * 2962 * This also means that even if we needed precise SCALAR range to get to 2963 * finalized state, but from that point forward *that same* SCALAR register is 2964 * never used in a precise context (i.e., it's precise value is not needed for 2965 * correctness), it's correct and safe to mark such register as "imprecise" 2966 * (i.e., precise marking set to false). This is what we rely on when we do 2967 * not set precise marking in current state. If no child state requires 2968 * precision for any given SCALAR register, it's safe to dictate that it can 2969 * be imprecise. If any child state does require this register to be precise, 2970 * we'll mark it precise later retroactively during precise markings 2971 * propagation from child state to parent states. 2972 * 2973 * Skipping precise marking setting in current state is a mild version of 2974 * relying on the above observation. But we can utilize this property even 2975 * more aggressively by proactively forgetting any precise marking in the 2976 * current state (which we inherited from the parent state), right before we 2977 * checkpoint it and branch off into new child state. This is done by 2978 * mark_all_scalars_imprecise() to hopefully get more permissive and generic 2979 * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states. 2980 */ 2981 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno, 2982 int spi) 2983 { 2984 struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; 2985 int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 2986 int last_idx = env->insn_idx; 2987 struct bpf_func_state *func; 2988 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 2989 u32 reg_mask = regno >= 0 ? 1u << regno : 0; 2990 u64 stack_mask = spi >= 0 ? 1ull << spi : 0; 2991 bool skip_first = true; 2992 bool new_marks = false; 2993 int i, err; 2994 2995 if (!env->bpf_capable) 2996 return 0; 2997 2998 /* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack 2999 * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision 3000 * tracking in the current state is unnecessary. 3001 */ 3002 func = st->frame[frame]; 3003 if (regno >= 0) { 3004 reg = &func->regs[regno]; 3005 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3006 WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse"); 3007 return -EFAULT; 3008 } 3009 new_marks = true; 3010 } 3011 3012 while (spi >= 0) { 3013 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[spi])) { 3014 stack_mask = 0; 3015 break; 3016 } 3017 reg = &func->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 3018 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3019 stack_mask = 0; 3020 break; 3021 } 3022 new_marks = true; 3023 break; 3024 } 3025 3026 if (!new_marks) 3027 return 0; 3028 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 3029 return 0; 3030 3031 for (;;) { 3032 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); 3033 u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; 3034 3035 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 3036 verbose(env, "last_idx %d first_idx %d\n", last_idx, first_idx); 3037 3038 if (last_idx < 0) { 3039 /* we are at the entry into subprog, which 3040 * is expected for global funcs, but only if 3041 * requested precise registers are R1-R5 3042 * (which are global func's input arguments) 3043 */ 3044 if (st->curframe == 0 && 3045 st->frame[0]->subprogno > 0 && 3046 st->frame[0]->callsite == BPF_MAIN_FUNC && 3047 stack_mask == 0 && (reg_mask & ~0x3e) == 0) { 3048 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 3049 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 3050 reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i]; 3051 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3052 reg_mask &= ~(1u << i); 3053 continue; 3054 } 3055 reg->precise = true; 3056 } 3057 return 0; 3058 } 3059 3060 verbose(env, "BUG backtracing func entry subprog %d reg_mask %x stack_mask %llx\n", 3061 st->frame[0]->subprogno, reg_mask, stack_mask); 3062 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3063 return -EFAULT; 3064 } 3065 3066 for (i = last_idx;;) { 3067 if (skip_first) { 3068 err = 0; 3069 skip_first = false; 3070 } else { 3071 err = backtrack_insn(env, i, ®_mask, &stack_mask); 3072 } 3073 if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { 3074 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); 3075 return 0; 3076 } else if (err) { 3077 return err; 3078 } 3079 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 3080 /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state. 3081 * Since this state is already marked, just return. 3082 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state. 3083 */ 3084 return 0; 3085 if (i == first_idx) 3086 break; 3087 i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); 3088 if (i >= env->prog->len) { 3089 /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0 3090 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask 3091 * to backtrack. 3092 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where 3093 * particular register was initialized with a constant. 3094 */ 3095 verbose(env, "BUG backtracking idx %d\n", i); 3096 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 3097 return -EFAULT; 3098 } 3099 } 3100 st = st->parent; 3101 if (!st) 3102 break; 3103 3104 new_marks = false; 3105 func = st->frame[frame]; 3106 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask); 3107 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { 3108 reg = &func->regs[i]; 3109 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3110 reg_mask &= ~(1u << i); 3111 continue; 3112 } 3113 if (!reg->precise) 3114 new_marks = true; 3115 reg->precise = true; 3116 } 3117 3118 bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask); 3119 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { 3120 if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) { 3121 /* the sequence of instructions: 3122 * 2: (bf) r3 = r10 3123 * 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0 3124 * 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) 3125 * doesn't contain jmps. It's backtracked 3126 * as a single block. 3127 * During backtracking insn 3 is not recognized as 3128 * stack access, so at the end of backtracking 3129 * stack slot fp-8 is still marked in stack_mask. 3130 * However the parent state may not have accessed 3131 * fp-8 and it's "unallocated" stack space. 3132 * In such case fallback to conservative. 3133 */ 3134 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, st); 3135 return 0; 3136 } 3137 3138 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[i])) { 3139 stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); 3140 continue; 3141 } 3142 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 3143 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3144 stack_mask &= ~(1ull << i); 3145 continue; 3146 } 3147 if (!reg->precise) 3148 new_marks = true; 3149 reg->precise = true; 3150 } 3151 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { 3152 verbose(env, "parent %s regs=%x stack=%llx marks:", 3153 new_marks ? "didn't have" : "already had", 3154 reg_mask, stack_mask); 3155 print_verifier_state(env, func, true); 3156 } 3157 3158 if (!reg_mask && !stack_mask) 3159 break; 3160 if (!new_marks) 3161 break; 3162 3163 last_idx = st->last_insn_idx; 3164 first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; 3165 } 3166 return 0; 3167 } 3168 3169 int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 3170 { 3171 return __mark_chain_precision(env, env->cur_state->curframe, regno, -1); 3172 } 3173 3174 static int mark_chain_precision_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int regno) 3175 { 3176 return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, regno, -1); 3177 } 3178 3179 static int mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, int spi) 3180 { 3181 return __mark_chain_precision(env, frame, -1, spi); 3182 } 3183 3184 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) 3185 { 3186 switch (base_type(type)) { 3187 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 3188 case PTR_TO_STACK: 3189 case PTR_TO_CTX: 3190 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 3191 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 3192 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 3193 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 3194 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 3195 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 3196 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 3197 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 3198 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 3199 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 3200 case PTR_TO_BUF: 3201 case PTR_TO_MEM: 3202 case PTR_TO_FUNC: 3203 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 3204 return true; 3205 default: 3206 return false; 3207 } 3208 } 3209 3210 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */ 3211 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3212 { 3213 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0); 3214 } 3215 3216 static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3217 { 3218 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 3219 } 3220 3221 static bool __is_scalar_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3222 { 3223 return tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off) && 3224 reg->smin_value == S64_MIN && reg->smax_value == S64_MAX && 3225 reg->umin_value == 0 && reg->umax_value == U64_MAX && 3226 reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN && reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX && 3227 reg->u32_min_value == 0 && reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX; 3228 } 3229 3230 static bool register_is_bounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3231 { 3232 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !__is_scalar_unbounded(reg); 3233 } 3234 3235 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, 3236 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 3237 { 3238 if (allow_ptr_leaks) 3239 return false; 3240 3241 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE; 3242 } 3243 3244 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state, 3245 int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 3246 int size) 3247 { 3248 int i; 3249 3250 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg; 3251 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 3252 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3253 3254 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > BPF_REG_SIZE - size; i--) 3255 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1] = STACK_SPILL; 3256 3257 /* size < 8 bytes spill */ 3258 for (; i; i--) 3259 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1]); 3260 } 3261 3262 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers, 3263 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access() 3264 */ 3265 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3266 /* stack frame we're writing to */ 3267 struct bpf_func_state *state, 3268 int off, int size, int value_regno, 3269 int insn_idx) 3270 { 3271 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 3272 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err; 3273 u32 dst_reg = env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx].dst_reg; 3274 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL; 3275 3276 err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(slot + 1, BPF_REG_SIZE)); 3277 if (err) 3278 return err; 3279 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0, 3280 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits 3281 */ 3282 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && 3283 state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && 3284 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 3285 verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); 3286 return -EACCES; 3287 } 3288 3289 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 3290 if (value_regno >= 0) 3291 reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 3292 if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) { 3293 bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type); 3294 3295 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 3296 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID) { 3297 sanitize = true; 3298 break; 3299 } 3300 } 3301 3302 if (sanitize) 3303 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true; 3304 } 3305 3306 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 3307 if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) && 3308 !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) { 3309 if (dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP) { 3310 /* The backtracking logic can only recognize explicit 3311 * stack slot address like [fp - 8]. Other spill of 3312 * scalar via different register has to be conservative. 3313 * Backtrack from here and mark all registers as precise 3314 * that contributed into 'reg' being a constant. 3315 */ 3316 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 3317 if (err) 3318 return err; 3319 } 3320 save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); 3321 } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) { 3322 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */ 3323 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 3324 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 3325 verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n"); 3326 return -EACCES; 3327 } 3328 if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 3329 verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n"); 3330 return -EINVAL; 3331 } 3332 save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size); 3333 } else { 3334 u8 type = STACK_MISC; 3335 3336 /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */ 3337 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 3338 /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr. */ 3339 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi])) 3340 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) 3341 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]); 3342 3343 /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written 3344 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon 3345 * when stack slots are partially written. 3346 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be 3347 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks 3348 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs 3349 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes 3350 */ 3351 if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE) 3352 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3353 3354 /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */ 3355 if (reg && register_is_null(reg)) { 3356 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 3357 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 3358 if (err) 3359 return err; 3360 type = STACK_ZERO; 3361 } 3362 3363 /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */ 3364 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) 3365 state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = 3366 type; 3367 } 3368 return 0; 3369 } 3370 3371 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is 3372 * known to contain a variable offset. 3373 * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively 3374 * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the 3375 * dynamic range is potentially written to. 3376 * 3377 * 'off' includes 'regno->off'. 3378 * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to 3379 * the stack. 3380 * 3381 * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know 3382 * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for 3383 * future reads cannot be terminated by this write. 3384 * 3385 * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered 3386 * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets 3387 * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to 3388 * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets. 3389 */ 3390 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3391 /* func where register points to */ 3392 struct bpf_func_state *state, 3393 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 3394 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 3395 { 3396 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */ 3397 int min_off, max_off; 3398 int i, err; 3399 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL; 3400 bool writing_zero = false; 3401 /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any 3402 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO 3403 */ 3404 bool zero_used = false; 3405 3406 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; 3407 ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno]; 3408 min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off; 3409 max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size; 3410 if (value_regno >= 0) 3411 value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno]; 3412 if (value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg)) 3413 writing_zero = true; 3414 3415 err = grow_stack_state(state, round_up(-min_off, BPF_REG_SIZE)); 3416 if (err) 3417 return err; 3418 3419 3420 /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */ 3421 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 3422 u8 new_type, *stype; 3423 int slot, spi; 3424 3425 slot = -i - 1; 3426 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3427 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 3428 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi); 3429 3430 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) { 3431 /* Reject the write if range we may write to has not 3432 * been initialized beforehand. If we didn't reject 3433 * here, the ptr status would be erased below (even 3434 * though not all slots are actually overwritten), 3435 * possibly opening the door to leaks. 3436 * 3437 * We do however catch STACK_INVALID case below, and 3438 * only allow reading possibly uninitialized memory 3439 * later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to 3440 * that slot. 3441 */ 3442 verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d", 3443 insn_idx, i); 3444 return -EINVAL; 3445 } 3446 3447 /* Erase all spilled pointers. */ 3448 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT; 3449 3450 /* Update the slot type. */ 3451 new_type = STACK_MISC; 3452 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) { 3453 new_type = STACK_ZERO; 3454 zero_used = true; 3455 } 3456 /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to 3457 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot 3458 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as 3459 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory. 3460 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots 3461 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject 3462 * them, the error would be too confusing. 3463 */ 3464 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) { 3465 verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d", 3466 insn_idx, i); 3467 return -EINVAL; 3468 } 3469 *stype = new_type; 3470 } 3471 if (zero_used) { 3472 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */ 3473 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno); 3474 if (err) 3475 return err; 3476 } 3477 return 0; 3478 } 3479 3480 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off, 3481 * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the 3482 * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then 3483 * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be 3484 * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must 3485 * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as 3486 * read. 3487 */ 3488 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3489 /* func where src register points to */ 3490 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state, 3491 int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno) 3492 { 3493 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3494 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3495 int i, slot, spi; 3496 u8 *stype; 3497 int zeros = 0; 3498 3499 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) { 3500 slot = -i - 1; 3501 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3502 stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 3503 if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO) 3504 break; 3505 zeros++; 3506 } 3507 if (zeros == max_off - min_off) { 3508 /* any access_size read into register is zero extended, 3509 * so the whole register == const_zero 3510 */ 3511 __mark_reg_const_zero(&state->regs[dst_regno]); 3512 /* backtracking doesn't support STACK_ZERO yet, 3513 * so mark it precise here, so that later 3514 * backtracking can stop here. 3515 * Backtracking may not need this if this register 3516 * doesn't participate in pointer adjustment. 3517 * Forward propagation of precise flag is not 3518 * necessary either. This mark is only to stop 3519 * backtracking. Any register that contributed 3520 * to const 0 was marked precise before spill. 3521 */ 3522 state->regs[dst_regno].precise = true; 3523 } else { 3524 /* have read misc data from the stack */ 3525 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 3526 } 3527 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3528 } 3529 3530 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by 3531 * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a 3532 * spilled reg. 3533 * 3534 * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a 3535 * register. 3536 * 3537 * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds. 3538 */ 3539 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3540 /* func where src register points to */ 3541 struct bpf_func_state *reg_state, 3542 int off, int size, int dst_regno) 3543 { 3544 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3545 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3546 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 3547 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3548 u8 *stype, type; 3549 3550 stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type; 3551 reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; 3552 3553 if (is_spilled_reg(®_state->stack[spi])) { 3554 u8 spill_size = 1; 3555 3556 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--) 3557 spill_size++; 3558 3559 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE || spill_size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { 3560 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 3561 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 3562 verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n"); 3563 return -EACCES; 3564 } 3565 3566 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3567 if (dst_regno < 0) 3568 return 0; 3569 3570 if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == spill_size) { 3571 /* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the 3572 * subreg_def for this insn. Save it first. 3573 */ 3574 s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def; 3575 3576 state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg; 3577 state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def; 3578 } else { 3579 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 3580 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 3581 if (type == STACK_SPILL) 3582 continue; 3583 if (type == STACK_MISC) 3584 continue; 3585 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 3586 off, i, size); 3587 return -EACCES; 3588 } 3589 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno); 3590 } 3591 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3592 return 0; 3593 } 3594 3595 if (dst_regno >= 0) { 3596 /* restore register state from stack */ 3597 state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg; 3598 /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely 3599 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited() 3600 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions 3601 */ 3602 state->regs[dst_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 3603 } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) { 3604 /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether 3605 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE 3606 * (e.g. for XADD). 3607 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that 3608 * with spilled pointers. 3609 */ 3610 verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n", 3611 off); 3612 return -EACCES; 3613 } 3614 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3615 } else { 3616 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { 3617 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 3618 if (type == STACK_MISC) 3619 continue; 3620 if (type == STACK_ZERO) 3621 continue; 3622 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", 3623 off, i, size); 3624 return -EACCES; 3625 } 3626 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 3627 if (dst_regno >= 0) 3628 mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno); 3629 } 3630 return 0; 3631 } 3632 3633 enum bpf_access_src { 3634 ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */ 3635 ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */ 3636 }; 3637 3638 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3639 int regno, int off, int access_size, 3640 bool zero_size_allowed, 3641 enum bpf_access_src type, 3642 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta); 3643 3644 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 3645 { 3646 return cur_regs(env) + regno; 3647 } 3648 3649 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register 3650 * 'dst_regno'. 3651 * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'), 3652 * but not its variable offset. 3653 * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned. 3654 * 3655 * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with 3656 * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when 3657 * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing 3658 * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable 3659 * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used 3660 * instead. 3661 */ 3662 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3663 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno) 3664 { 3665 /* The state of the source register. */ 3666 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 3667 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg); 3668 int err; 3669 int min_off, max_off; 3670 3671 /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted. 3672 */ 3673 err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 3674 false, ACCESS_DIRECT, NULL); 3675 if (err) 3676 return err; 3677 3678 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 3679 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 3680 mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno); 3681 return 0; 3682 } 3683 3684 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or 3685 * check_stack_read_var_off. 3686 * 3687 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack 3688 * bounds. 3689 * 3690 * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It 3691 * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register. 3692 */ 3693 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3694 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 3695 int dst_regno) 3696 { 3697 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 3698 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3699 int err; 3700 /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */ 3701 bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 3702 3703 /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a 3704 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see 3705 * check_stack_read_fixed_off). 3706 */ 3707 if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) { 3708 char tn_buf[48]; 3709 3710 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3711 verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n", 3712 tn_buf, off, size); 3713 return -EACCES; 3714 } 3715 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity 3716 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack 3717 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 3718 */ 3719 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && var_off) { 3720 char tn_buf[48]; 3721 3722 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3723 verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 3724 ptr_regno, tn_buf); 3725 return -EACCES; 3726 } 3727 3728 if (!var_off) { 3729 off += reg->var_off.value; 3730 err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 3731 dst_regno); 3732 } else { 3733 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 3734 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this 3735 * branch. 3736 */ 3737 err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size, 3738 dst_regno); 3739 } 3740 return err; 3741 } 3742 3743 3744 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or 3745 * check_stack_write_var_off. 3746 * 3747 * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack. 3748 * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any). 3749 * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can 3750 * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register. 3751 * 3752 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size. 3753 */ 3754 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3755 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, 3756 int value_regno, int insn_idx) 3757 { 3758 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno); 3759 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 3760 int err; 3761 3762 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 3763 off += reg->var_off.value; 3764 err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size, 3765 value_regno, insn_idx); 3766 } else { 3767 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling 3768 * than fixed offset ones. 3769 */ 3770 err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state, 3771 ptr_regno, off, size, 3772 value_regno, insn_idx); 3773 } 3774 return err; 3775 } 3776 3777 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3778 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) 3779 { 3780 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 3781 struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr; 3782 u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map); 3783 3784 if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) { 3785 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3786 map->value_size, off, size); 3787 return -EACCES; 3788 } 3789 3790 if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) { 3791 verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3792 map->value_size, off, size); 3793 return -EACCES; 3794 } 3795 3796 return 0; 3797 } 3798 3799 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */ 3800 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 3801 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 3802 bool zero_size_allowed) 3803 { 3804 bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed); 3805 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 3806 3807 if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size) 3808 return 0; 3809 3810 reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 3811 switch (reg->type) { 3812 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 3813 verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3814 mem_size, off, size); 3815 break; 3816 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 3817 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n", 3818 mem_size, off, size); 3819 break; 3820 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 3821 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 3822 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 3823 verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", 3824 off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size); 3825 break; 3826 case PTR_TO_MEM: 3827 default: 3828 verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n", 3829 mem_size, off, size); 3830 } 3831 3832 return -EACCES; 3833 } 3834 3835 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */ 3836 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 3837 int off, int size, u32 mem_size, 3838 bool zero_size_allowed) 3839 { 3840 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 3841 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 3842 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 3843 int err; 3844 3845 /* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we 3846 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off 3847 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. 3848 * 3849 * The minimum value is only important with signed 3850 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a 3851 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our 3852 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use 3853 * will have a set floor within our range. 3854 */ 3855 if (reg->smin_value < 0 && 3856 (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN || 3857 (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) || 3858 reg->smin_value + off < 0)) { 3859 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 3860 regno); 3861 return -EACCES; 3862 } 3863 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, 3864 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 3865 if (err) { 3866 verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 3867 regno); 3868 return err; 3869 } 3870 3871 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be 3872 * sure we won't do bad things. 3873 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too. 3874 */ 3875 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 3876 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n", 3877 regno); 3878 return -EACCES; 3879 } 3880 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, 3881 mem_size, zero_size_allowed); 3882 if (err) { 3883 verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n", 3884 regno); 3885 return err; 3886 } 3887 3888 return 0; 3889 } 3890 3891 static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3892 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 3893 bool fixed_off_ok) 3894 { 3895 /* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper 3896 * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form. 3897 */ 3898 3899 if (reg->off < 0) { 3900 verbose(env, "negative offset %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 3901 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 3902 return -EACCES; 3903 } 3904 3905 if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) { 3906 verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n", 3907 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off); 3908 return -EACCES; 3909 } 3910 3911 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 3912 char tn_buf[48]; 3913 3914 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 3915 verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n", 3916 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf); 3917 return -EACCES; 3918 } 3919 3920 return 0; 3921 } 3922 3923 int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3924 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno) 3925 { 3926 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 3927 } 3928 3929 static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 3930 struct btf_field *kptr_field, 3931 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno) 3932 { 3933 const char *targ_name = kernel_type_name(kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id); 3934 int perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED; 3935 const char *reg_name = ""; 3936 3937 /* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */ 3938 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 3939 perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 3940 3941 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags)) 3942 goto bad_type; 3943 3944 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 3945 verbose(env, "R%d must point to kernel BTF\n", regno); 3946 return -EINVAL; 3947 } 3948 /* We need to verify reg->type and reg->btf, before accessing reg->btf */ 3949 reg_name = kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 3950 3951 /* For ref_ptr case, release function check should ensure we get one 3952 * referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and that its fixed offset is 0. For the 3953 * normal store of unreferenced kptr, we must ensure var_off is zero. 3954 * Since ref_ptr cannot be accessed directly by BPF insns, checks for 3955 * reg->off and reg->ref_obj_id are not needed here. 3956 */ 3957 if (__check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true)) 3958 return -EACCES; 3959 3960 /* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux or module BTF, and 3961 * we also need to take into account the reg->off. 3962 * 3963 * We want to support cases like: 3964 * 3965 * struct foo { 3966 * struct bar br; 3967 * struct baz bz; 3968 * }; 3969 * 3970 * struct foo *v; 3971 * v = func(); // PTR_TO_BTF_ID 3972 * val->foo = v; // reg->off is zero, btf and btf_id match type 3973 * val->bar = &v->br; // reg->off is still zero, but we need to retry with 3974 * // first member type of struct after comparison fails 3975 * val->baz = &v->bz; // reg->off is non-zero, so struct needs to be walked 3976 * // to match type 3977 * 3978 * In the kptr_ref case, check_func_arg_reg_off already ensures reg->off 3979 * is zero. We must also ensure that btf_struct_ids_match does not walk 3980 * the struct to match type against first member of struct, i.e. reject 3981 * second case from above. Hence, when type is BPF_KPTR_REF, we set 3982 * strict mode to true for type match. 3983 */ 3984 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 3985 kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, 3986 kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF)) 3987 goto bad_type; 3988 return 0; 3989 bad_type: 3990 verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno, 3991 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name); 3992 verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name); 3993 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF) 3994 verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED), 3995 targ_name); 3996 else 3997 verbose(env, "\n"); 3998 return -EINVAL; 3999 } 4000 4001 static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 4002 int value_regno, int insn_idx, 4003 struct btf_field *kptr_field) 4004 { 4005 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; 4006 int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 4007 struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg; 4008 4009 /* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller: 4010 * - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr 4011 * - size of access (must be BPF_DW) 4012 * - tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) 4013 * - kptr_field->offset == off + reg->var_off.value 4014 */ 4015 /* Only BPF_[LDX,STX,ST] | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW is supported */ 4016 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { 4017 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_MEM instruction mode\n"); 4018 return -EACCES; 4019 } 4020 4021 /* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as 4022 * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr. 4023 */ 4024 if (class != BPF_LDX && kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) { 4025 verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n"); 4026 return -EACCES; 4027 } 4028 4029 if (class == BPF_LDX) { 4030 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 4031 /* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer 4032 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type. 4033 */ 4034 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, kptr_field->kptr.btf, 4035 kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED); 4036 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg */ 4037 val_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 4038 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 4039 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); 4040 if (!register_is_null(val_reg) && 4041 map_kptr_match_type(env, kptr_field, val_reg, value_regno)) 4042 return -EACCES; 4043 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 4044 if (insn->imm) { 4045 verbose(env, "BPF_ST imm must be 0 when storing to kptr at off=%u\n", 4046 kptr_field->offset); 4047 return -EACCES; 4048 } 4049 } else { 4050 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_LDX/BPF_STX/BPF_ST\n"); 4051 return -EACCES; 4052 } 4053 return 0; 4054 } 4055 4056 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ 4057 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 4058 int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed, 4059 enum bpf_access_src src) 4060 { 4061 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 4062 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 4063 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno]; 4064 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 4065 struct btf_record *rec; 4066 int err, i; 4067 4068 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, map->value_size, 4069 zero_size_allowed); 4070 if (err) 4071 return err; 4072 4073 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record)) 4074 return 0; 4075 rec = map->record; 4076 for (i = 0; i < rec->cnt; i++) { 4077 struct btf_field *field = &rec->fields[i]; 4078 u32 p = field->offset; 4079 4080 /* If any part of a field can be touched by load/store, reject 4081 * this program. To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2), 4082 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2. 4083 */ 4084 if (reg->smin_value + off < p + btf_field_type_size(field->type) && 4085 p < reg->umax_value + off + size) { 4086 switch (field->type) { 4087 case BPF_KPTR_UNREF: 4088 case BPF_KPTR_REF: 4089 if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) { 4090 verbose(env, "kptr cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n"); 4091 return -EACCES; 4092 } 4093 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 4094 verbose(env, "kptr access cannot have variable offset\n"); 4095 return -EACCES; 4096 } 4097 if (p != off + reg->var_off.value) { 4098 verbose(env, "kptr access misaligned expected=%u off=%llu\n", 4099 p, off + reg->var_off.value); 4100 return -EACCES; 4101 } 4102 if (size != bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_DW)) { 4103 verbose(env, "kptr access size must be BPF_DW\n"); 4104 return -EACCES; 4105 } 4106 break; 4107 default: 4108 verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n", 4109 btf_field_type_name(field->type)); 4110 return -EACCES; 4111 } 4112 } 4113 } 4114 return 0; 4115 } 4116 4117 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff 4118 4119 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4120 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 4121 enum bpf_access_type t) 4122 { 4123 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 4124 4125 switch (prog_type) { 4126 /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */ 4127 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN: 4128 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT: 4129 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL: 4130 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 4131 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 4132 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 4133 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 4134 return false; 4135 fallthrough; 4136 4137 /* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */ 4138 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 4139 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 4140 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 4141 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT: 4142 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: 4143 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: 4144 if (meta) 4145 return meta->pkt_access; 4146 4147 env->seen_direct_write = true; 4148 return true; 4149 4150 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 4151 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 4152 env->seen_direct_write = true; 4153 4154 return true; 4155 4156 default: 4157 return false; 4158 } 4159 } 4160 4161 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, 4162 int size, bool zero_size_allowed) 4163 { 4164 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 4165 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 4166 int err; 4167 4168 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any 4169 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed 4170 * offset. 4171 */ 4172 4173 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough 4174 * detail to prove they're safe. 4175 */ 4176 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 4177 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 4178 regno); 4179 return -EACCES; 4180 } 4181 4182 err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL : 4183 __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range, 4184 zero_size_allowed); 4185 if (err) { 4186 verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno); 4187 return err; 4188 } 4189 4190 /* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16. 4191 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff, 4192 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info 4193 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access. 4194 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32. 4195 */ 4196 env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = 4197 max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset, 4198 off + reg->umax_value + size - 1); 4199 4200 return err; 4201 } 4202 4203 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */ 4204 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, 4205 enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, 4206 struct btf **btf, u32 *btf_id) 4207 { 4208 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = { 4209 .reg_type = *reg_type, 4210 .log = &env->log, 4211 }; 4212 4213 if (env->ops->is_valid_access && 4214 env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, &info)) { 4215 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a 4216 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole 4217 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower 4218 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size 4219 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other 4220 * type of narrower access. 4221 */ 4222 *reg_type = info.reg_type; 4223 4224 if (base_type(*reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 4225 *btf = info.btf; 4226 *btf_id = info.btf_id; 4227 } else { 4228 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size; 4229 } 4230 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ 4231 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) 4232 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; 4233 return 0; 4234 } 4235 4236 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size); 4237 return -EACCES; 4238 } 4239 4240 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, 4241 int size) 4242 { 4243 if (size < 0 || off < 0 || 4244 (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) { 4245 verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n", 4246 off, size); 4247 return -EACCES; 4248 } 4249 return 0; 4250 } 4251 4252 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, 4253 u32 regno, int off, int size, 4254 enum bpf_access_type t) 4255 { 4256 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 4257 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 4258 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {}; 4259 bool valid; 4260 4261 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 4262 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", 4263 regno); 4264 return -EACCES; 4265 } 4266 4267 switch (reg->type) { 4268 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 4269 valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 4270 break; 4271 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 4272 valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 4273 break; 4274 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 4275 valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 4276 break; 4277 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 4278 valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); 4279 break; 4280 default: 4281 valid = false; 4282 } 4283 4284 4285 if (valid) { 4286 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = 4287 info.ctx_field_size; 4288 return 0; 4289 } 4290 4291 verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n", 4292 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type), off, size); 4293 4294 return -EACCES; 4295 } 4296 4297 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4298 { 4299 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno)); 4300 } 4301 4302 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4303 { 4304 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4305 4306 return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; 4307 } 4308 4309 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4310 { 4311 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4312 4313 return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type); 4314 } 4315 4316 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4317 { 4318 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4319 4320 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type); 4321 } 4322 4323 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) 4324 { 4325 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 4326 4327 /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */ 4328 return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS; 4329 } 4330 4331 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4332 { 4333 /* A referenced register is always trusted. */ 4334 if (reg->ref_obj_id) 4335 return true; 4336 4337 /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the 4338 * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the 4339 * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in 4340 * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are 4341 * not. 4342 * 4343 * Eventually, we should make PTR_TRUSTED the single source of truth 4344 * for whether a register is trusted. 4345 */ 4346 return type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS && 4347 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type); 4348 } 4349 4350 static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4351 { 4352 return reg->type & MEM_RCU; 4353 } 4354 4355 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4356 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4357 int off, int size, bool strict) 4358 { 4359 struct tnum reg_off; 4360 int ip_align; 4361 4362 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 4363 if (!strict || size == 1) 4364 return 0; 4365 4366 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling 4367 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of 4368 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms 4369 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get 4370 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate 4371 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an 4372 * unconditional IP align value of '2'. 4373 */ 4374 ip_align = 2; 4375 4376 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off)); 4377 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 4378 char tn_buf[48]; 4379 4380 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4381 verbose(env, 4382 "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n", 4383 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 4384 return -EACCES; 4385 } 4386 4387 return 0; 4388 } 4389 4390 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4391 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4392 const char *pointer_desc, 4393 int off, int size, bool strict) 4394 { 4395 struct tnum reg_off; 4396 4397 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */ 4398 if (!strict || size == 1) 4399 return 0; 4400 4401 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off)); 4402 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) { 4403 char tn_buf[48]; 4404 4405 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4406 verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n", 4407 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size); 4408 return -EACCES; 4409 } 4410 4411 return 0; 4412 } 4413 4414 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4415 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, 4416 int size, bool strict_alignment_once) 4417 { 4418 bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once; 4419 const char *pointer_desc = ""; 4420 4421 switch (reg->type) { 4422 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 4423 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 4424 /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits 4425 * right in front, treat it the very same way. 4426 */ 4427 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict); 4428 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: 4429 pointer_desc = "flow keys "; 4430 break; 4431 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 4432 pointer_desc = "key "; 4433 break; 4434 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 4435 pointer_desc = "value "; 4436 break; 4437 case PTR_TO_CTX: 4438 pointer_desc = "context "; 4439 break; 4440 case PTR_TO_STACK: 4441 pointer_desc = "stack "; 4442 /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off() 4443 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being 4444 * aligned. 4445 */ 4446 strict = true; 4447 break; 4448 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 4449 pointer_desc = "sock "; 4450 break; 4451 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 4452 pointer_desc = "sock_common "; 4453 break; 4454 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 4455 pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; 4456 break; 4457 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 4458 pointer_desc = "xdp_sock "; 4459 break; 4460 default: 4461 break; 4462 } 4463 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size, 4464 strict); 4465 } 4466 4467 static int update_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4468 const struct bpf_func_state *func, 4469 int off) 4470 { 4471 u16 stack = env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth; 4472 4473 if (stack >= -off) 4474 return 0; 4475 4476 /* update known max for given subprogram */ 4477 env->subprog_info[func->subprogno].stack_depth = -off; 4478 return 0; 4479 } 4480 4481 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function 4482 * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. 4483 * Ignore jump and exit insns. 4484 * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm 4485 * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites 4486 */ 4487 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 4488 { 4489 int depth = 0, frame = 0, idx = 0, i = 0, subprog_end; 4490 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info; 4491 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 4492 bool tail_call_reachable = false; 4493 int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 4494 int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; 4495 int j; 4496 4497 process_func: 4498 /* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when 4499 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack 4500 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario 4501 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 4502 * 8k). 4503 * 4504 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example: 4505 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128 4506 * subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256 4507 * tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256 4508 * func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320) 4509 * subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64 4510 * subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128 4511 * tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128 4512 * func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416) 4513 * 4514 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid 4515 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above. 4516 */ 4517 if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) { 4518 verbose(env, 4519 "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n", 4520 depth); 4521 return -EACCES; 4522 } 4523 /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity 4524 * of interpreter stack size 4525 */ 4526 depth += round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 4527 if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) { 4528 verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n", 4529 frame + 1, depth); 4530 return -EACCES; 4531 } 4532 continue_func: 4533 subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start; 4534 for (; i < subprog_end; i++) { 4535 int next_insn; 4536 4537 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i)) 4538 continue; 4539 /* remember insn and function to return to */ 4540 ret_insn[frame] = i + 1; 4541 ret_prog[frame] = idx; 4542 4543 /* find the callee */ 4544 next_insn = i + insn[i].imm + 1; 4545 idx = find_subprog(env, next_insn); 4546 if (idx < 0) { 4547 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 4548 next_insn); 4549 return -EFAULT; 4550 } 4551 if (subprog[idx].is_async_cb) { 4552 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) { 4553 verbose(env, "verifier bug. subprog has tail_call and async cb\n"); 4554 return -EFAULT; 4555 } 4556 /* async callbacks don't increase bpf prog stack size */ 4557 continue; 4558 } 4559 i = next_insn; 4560 4561 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call) 4562 tail_call_reachable = true; 4563 4564 frame++; 4565 if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 4566 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n", 4567 frame); 4568 return -E2BIG; 4569 } 4570 goto process_func; 4571 } 4572 /* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the 4573 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs; 4574 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the 4575 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls 4576 */ 4577 if (tail_call_reachable) 4578 for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) 4579 subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true; 4580 if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable) 4581 env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true; 4582 4583 /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog' 4584 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT 4585 */ 4586 if (frame == 0) 4587 return 0; 4588 depth -= round_up(max_t(u32, subprog[idx].stack_depth, 1), 32); 4589 frame--; 4590 i = ret_insn[frame]; 4591 idx = ret_prog[frame]; 4592 goto continue_func; 4593 } 4594 4595 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 4596 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4597 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx) 4598 { 4599 int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog; 4600 4601 subprog = find_subprog(env, start); 4602 if (subprog < 0) { 4603 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 4604 start); 4605 return -EFAULT; 4606 } 4607 return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth; 4608 } 4609 #endif 4610 4611 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4612 const char *buf_info, 4613 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4614 int regno, int off, int size) 4615 { 4616 if (off < 0) { 4617 verbose(env, 4618 "R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n", 4619 regno, buf_info, off, size); 4620 return -EACCES; 4621 } 4622 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 4623 char tn_buf[48]; 4624 4625 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4626 verbose(env, 4627 "R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 4628 regno, off, tn_buf); 4629 return -EACCES; 4630 } 4631 4632 return 0; 4633 } 4634 4635 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4636 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4637 int regno, int off, int size) 4638 { 4639 int err; 4640 4641 err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size); 4642 if (err) 4643 return err; 4644 4645 if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access) 4646 env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size; 4647 4648 return 0; 4649 } 4650 4651 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4652 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 4653 int regno, int off, int size, 4654 bool zero_size_allowed, 4655 u32 *max_access) 4656 { 4657 const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr"; 4658 int err; 4659 4660 err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size); 4661 if (err) 4662 return err; 4663 4664 if (off + size > *max_access) 4665 *max_access = off + size; 4666 4667 return 0; 4668 } 4669 4670 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */ 4671 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 4672 { 4673 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 4674 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg); 4675 } 4676 4677 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes) 4678 * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE 4679 */ 4680 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size) 4681 { 4682 u64 mask; 4683 4684 /* clear high bits in bit representation */ 4685 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size); 4686 4687 /* fix arithmetic bounds */ 4688 mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1; 4689 if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) { 4690 reg->umin_value &= mask; 4691 reg->umax_value &= mask; 4692 } else { 4693 reg->umin_value = 0; 4694 reg->umax_value = mask; 4695 } 4696 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value; 4697 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value; 4698 4699 /* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register 4700 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into 4701 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already. 4702 */ 4703 if (size >= 4) 4704 return; 4705 __reg_combine_64_into_32(reg); 4706 } 4707 4708 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map) 4709 { 4710 /* A map is considered read-only if the following condition are true: 4711 * 4712 * 1) BPF program side cannot change any of the map content. The 4713 * BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG flag is throughout the lifetime of a map 4714 * and was set at map creation time. 4715 * 2) The map value(s) have been initialized from user space by a 4716 * loader and then "frozen", such that no new map update/delete 4717 * operations from syscall side are possible for the rest of 4718 * the map's lifetime from that point onwards. 4719 * 3) Any parallel/pending map update/delete operations from syscall 4720 * side have been completed. Only after that point, it's safe to 4721 * assume that map value(s) are immutable. 4722 */ 4723 return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 4724 READ_ONCE(map->frozen) && 4725 !bpf_map_write_active(map); 4726 } 4727 4728 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val) 4729 { 4730 void *ptr; 4731 u64 addr; 4732 int err; 4733 4734 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 4735 if (err) 4736 return err; 4737 ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off; 4738 4739 switch (size) { 4740 case sizeof(u8): 4741 *val = (u64)*(u8 *)ptr; 4742 break; 4743 case sizeof(u16): 4744 *val = (u64)*(u16 *)ptr; 4745 break; 4746 case sizeof(u32): 4747 *val = (u64)*(u32 *)ptr; 4748 break; 4749 case sizeof(u64): 4750 *val = *(u64 *)ptr; 4751 break; 4752 default: 4753 return -EINVAL; 4754 } 4755 return 0; 4756 } 4757 4758 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4759 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 4760 int regno, int off, int size, 4761 enum bpf_access_type atype, 4762 int value_regno) 4763 { 4764 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 4765 const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 4766 const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off); 4767 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 4768 u32 btf_id; 4769 int ret; 4770 4771 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 4772 verbose(env, 4773 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 4774 tname); 4775 return -EPERM; 4776 } 4777 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 4778 verbose(env, 4779 "Cannot access kernel 'struct %s' from non-GPL compatible program\n", 4780 tname); 4781 return -EINVAL; 4782 } 4783 if (off < 0) { 4784 verbose(env, 4785 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 4786 regno, tname, off); 4787 return -EACCES; 4788 } 4789 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) { 4790 char tn_buf[48]; 4791 4792 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 4793 verbose(env, 4794 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n", 4795 regno, tname, off, tn_buf); 4796 return -EACCES; 4797 } 4798 4799 if (reg->type & MEM_USER) { 4800 verbose(env, 4801 "R%d is ptr_%s access user memory: off=%d\n", 4802 regno, tname, off); 4803 return -EACCES; 4804 } 4805 4806 if (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU) { 4807 verbose(env, 4808 "R%d is ptr_%s access percpu memory: off=%d\n", 4809 regno, tname, off); 4810 return -EACCES; 4811 } 4812 4813 if (env->ops->btf_struct_access && !type_is_alloc(reg->type)) { 4814 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { 4815 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: reg->btf must be kernel btf\n"); 4816 return -EFAULT; 4817 } 4818 ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag); 4819 } else { 4820 /* Writes are permitted with default btf_struct_access for 4821 * program allocated objects (which always have ref_obj_id > 0), 4822 * but not for untrusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC. 4823 */ 4824 if (atype != BPF_READ && reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 4825 verbose(env, "only read is supported\n"); 4826 return -EACCES; 4827 } 4828 4829 if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 4830 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero\n"); 4831 return -EFAULT; 4832 } 4833 4834 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag); 4835 } 4836 4837 if (ret < 0) 4838 return ret; 4839 4840 /* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it 4841 * also inherit the untrusted flag. 4842 */ 4843 if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED) 4844 flag |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 4845 4846 /* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is 4847 * no longer trusted except the rcu case below. 4848 */ 4849 flag &= ~PTR_TRUSTED; 4850 4851 if (flag & MEM_RCU) { 4852 /* Mark value register as MEM_RCU only if it is protected by 4853 * bpf_rcu_read_lock() and the ptr reg is rcu or trusted. MEM_RCU 4854 * itself can already indicate trustedness inside the rcu 4855 * read lock region. Also mark rcu pointer as PTR_MAYBE_NULL since 4856 * it could be null in some cases. 4857 */ 4858 if (!env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock || 4859 !(is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg))) 4860 flag &= ~MEM_RCU; 4861 else 4862 flag |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 4863 } else if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { 4864 /* ptr (reg) is marked as MEM_RCU, but the struct field is not tagged 4865 * with __rcu. Mark the flag as PTR_UNTRUSTED conservatively. 4866 */ 4867 flag |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 4868 } 4869 4870 if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 4871 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag); 4872 4873 return 0; 4874 } 4875 4876 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4877 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, 4878 int regno, int off, int size, 4879 enum bpf_access_type atype, 4880 int value_regno) 4881 { 4882 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 4883 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 4884 struct bpf_reg_state map_reg; 4885 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; 4886 const struct btf_type *t; 4887 const char *tname; 4888 u32 btf_id; 4889 int ret; 4890 4891 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 4892 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n"); 4893 return -ENOTSUPP; 4894 } 4895 4896 if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) { 4897 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n", 4898 map->map_type); 4899 return -ENOTSUPP; 4900 } 4901 4902 t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id); 4903 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off); 4904 4905 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 4906 verbose(env, 4907 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", 4908 tname); 4909 return -EPERM; 4910 } 4911 4912 if (off < 0) { 4913 verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n", 4914 regno, tname, off); 4915 return -EACCES; 4916 } 4917 4918 if (atype != BPF_READ) { 4919 verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname); 4920 return -EACCES; 4921 } 4922 4923 /* Simulate access to a PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ 4924 memset(&map_reg, 0, sizeof(map_reg)); 4925 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0); 4926 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, &map_reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag); 4927 if (ret < 0) 4928 return ret; 4929 4930 if (value_regno >= 0) 4931 mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag); 4932 4933 return 0; 4934 } 4935 4936 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The 4937 * maximum valid offset is -1. 4938 * 4939 * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and 4940 * -state->allocated_stack for reads. 4941 */ 4942 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off, 4943 struct bpf_func_state *state, 4944 enum bpf_access_type t) 4945 { 4946 int min_valid_off; 4947 4948 if (t == BPF_WRITE) 4949 min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK; 4950 else 4951 min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack; 4952 4953 if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1) 4954 return -EACCES; 4955 return 0; 4956 } 4957 4958 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack 4959 * bounds. 4960 * 4961 * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any). 4962 */ 4963 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( 4964 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 4965 int regno, int off, int access_size, 4966 enum bpf_access_src src, enum bpf_access_type type) 4967 { 4968 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 4969 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 4970 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 4971 int min_off, max_off; 4972 int err; 4973 char *err_extra; 4974 4975 if (src == ACCESS_HELPER) 4976 /* We don't know if helpers are reading or writing (or both). */ 4977 err_extra = " indirect access to"; 4978 else if (type == BPF_READ) 4979 err_extra = " read from"; 4980 else 4981 err_extra = " write to"; 4982 4983 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 4984 min_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 4985 if (access_size > 0) 4986 max_off = min_off + access_size - 1; 4987 else 4988 max_off = min_off; 4989 } else { 4990 if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || 4991 reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 4992 verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n", 4993 err_extra, regno); 4994 return -EACCES; 4995 } 4996 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 4997 if (access_size > 0) 4998 max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1; 4999 else 5000 max_off = min_off; 5001 } 5002 5003 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type); 5004 if (!err) 5005 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type); 5006 5007 if (err) { 5008 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5009 verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n", 5010 err_extra, regno, off, access_size); 5011 } else { 5012 char tn_buf[48]; 5013 5014 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5015 verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s size=%d\n", 5016 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, access_size); 5017 } 5018 } 5019 return err; 5020 } 5021 5022 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) 5023 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory 5024 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory 5025 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory 5026 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory 5027 */ 5028 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, 5029 int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, 5030 int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once) 5031 { 5032 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 5033 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; 5034 struct bpf_func_state *state; 5035 int size, err = 0; 5036 5037 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size); 5038 if (size < 0) 5039 return size; 5040 5041 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */ 5042 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once); 5043 if (err) 5044 return err; 5045 5046 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */ 5047 off += reg->off; 5048 5049 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) { 5050 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 5051 verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno); 5052 return -EACCES; 5053 } 5054 5055 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 5056 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 5057 if (err) 5058 return err; 5059 if (value_regno >= 0) 5060 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5061 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 5062 struct btf_field *kptr_field = NULL; 5063 5064 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5065 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5066 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno); 5067 return -EACCES; 5068 } 5069 err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t); 5070 if (err) 5071 return err; 5072 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false, ACCESS_DIRECT); 5073 if (err) 5074 return err; 5075 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 5076 kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record, 5077 off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR); 5078 if (kptr_field) { 5079 err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field); 5080 } else if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 5081 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 5082 5083 /* if map is read-only, track its contents as scalars */ 5084 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && 5085 bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) && 5086 map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 5087 int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value; 5088 u64 val = 0; 5089 5090 err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size, 5091 &val); 5092 if (err) 5093 return err; 5094 5095 regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 5096 __mark_reg_known(®s[value_regno], val); 5097 } else { 5098 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5099 } 5100 } 5101 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 5102 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 5103 5104 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 5105 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 5106 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5107 return -EACCES; 5108 } 5109 5110 if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) { 5111 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 5112 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5113 return -EACCES; 5114 } 5115 5116 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5117 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5118 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno); 5119 return -EACCES; 5120 } 5121 5122 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, 5123 reg->mem_size, false); 5124 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem)) 5125 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5126 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { 5127 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE; 5128 struct btf *btf = NULL; 5129 u32 btf_id = 0; 5130 5131 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5132 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5133 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); 5134 return -EACCES; 5135 } 5136 5137 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno); 5138 if (err < 0) 5139 return err; 5140 5141 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type, &btf, 5142 &btf_id); 5143 if (err) 5144 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 5145 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { 5146 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a 5147 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter 5148 * case, we know the offset is zero. 5149 */ 5150 if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 5151 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5152 } else { 5153 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, 5154 value_regno); 5155 if (type_may_be_null(reg_type)) 5156 regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen; 5157 /* A load of ctx field could have different 5158 * actual load size with the one encoded in the 5159 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not 5160 * a sub-register. 5161 */ 5162 regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 5163 if (base_type(reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 5164 regs[value_regno].btf = btf; 5165 regs[value_regno].btf_id = btf_id; 5166 } 5167 } 5168 regs[value_regno].type = reg_type; 5169 } 5170 5171 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 5172 /* Basic bounds checks. */ 5173 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, ACCESS_DIRECT, t); 5174 if (err) 5175 return err; 5176 5177 state = func(env, reg); 5178 err = update_stack_depth(env, state, off); 5179 if (err) 5180 return err; 5181 5182 if (t == BPF_READ) 5183 err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size, 5184 value_regno); 5185 else 5186 err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size, 5187 value_regno, insn_idx); 5188 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) { 5189 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) { 5190 verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n"); 5191 return -EACCES; 5192 } 5193 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5194 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5195 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n", 5196 value_regno); 5197 return -EACCES; 5198 } 5199 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false); 5200 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 5201 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5202 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) { 5203 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 && 5204 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) { 5205 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n", 5206 value_regno); 5207 return -EACCES; 5208 } 5209 5210 err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size); 5211 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 5212 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5213 } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) { 5214 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 5215 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 5216 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5217 return -EACCES; 5218 } 5219 err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); 5220 if (!err && value_regno >= 0) 5221 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5222 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) { 5223 err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size); 5224 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) 5225 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5226 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 5227 !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { 5228 err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 5229 value_regno); 5230 } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { 5231 err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, 5232 value_regno); 5233 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BUF) { 5234 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); 5235 u32 *max_access; 5236 5237 if (rdonly_mem) { 5238 if (t == BPF_WRITE) { 5239 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", 5240 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5241 return -EACCES; 5242 } 5243 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 5244 } else { 5245 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 5246 } 5247 5248 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false, 5249 max_access); 5250 5251 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (rdonly_mem || t == BPF_READ)) 5252 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); 5253 } else { 5254 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, 5255 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5256 return -EACCES; 5257 } 5258 5259 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ && 5260 regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 5261 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */ 5262 coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size); 5263 } 5264 return err; 5265 } 5266 5267 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn) 5268 { 5269 int load_reg; 5270 int err; 5271 5272 switch (insn->imm) { 5273 case BPF_ADD: 5274 case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH: 5275 case BPF_AND: 5276 case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH: 5277 case BPF_OR: 5278 case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH: 5279 case BPF_XOR: 5280 case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH: 5281 case BPF_XCHG: 5282 case BPF_CMPXCHG: 5283 break; 5284 default: 5285 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n", insn->imm); 5286 return -EINVAL; 5287 } 5288 5289 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 5290 verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n"); 5291 return -EINVAL; 5292 } 5293 5294 /* check src1 operand */ 5295 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 5296 if (err) 5297 return err; 5298 5299 /* check src2 operand */ 5300 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 5301 if (err) 5302 return err; 5303 5304 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) { 5305 /* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */ 5306 const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0; 5307 5308 err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP); 5309 if (err) 5310 return err; 5311 5312 if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) { 5313 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg); 5314 return -EACCES; 5315 } 5316 } 5317 5318 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 5319 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg); 5320 return -EACCES; 5321 } 5322 5323 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 5324 is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 5325 is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) || 5326 is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 5327 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 5328 insn->dst_reg, 5329 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 5330 return -EACCES; 5331 } 5332 5333 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) { 5334 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) 5335 load_reg = BPF_REG_0; 5336 else 5337 load_reg = insn->src_reg; 5338 5339 /* check and record load of old value */ 5340 err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP); 5341 if (err) 5342 return err; 5343 } else { 5344 /* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't 5345 * actually load it into a register. 5346 */ 5347 load_reg = -1; 5348 } 5349 5350 /* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch 5351 * case to simulate the register fill. 5352 */ 5353 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 5354 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true); 5355 if (!err && load_reg >= 0) 5356 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 5357 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, 5358 true); 5359 if (err) 5360 return err; 5361 5362 /* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */ 5363 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, 5364 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true); 5365 if (err) 5366 return err; 5367 5368 return 0; 5369 } 5370 5371 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through 5372 * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending 5373 * on the access type, that all elements of the stack are initialized. 5374 * 5375 * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any). 5376 * 5377 * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the 5378 * read offsets are marked as read. 5379 */ 5380 static int check_stack_range_initialized( 5381 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off, 5382 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 5383 enum bpf_access_src type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5384 { 5385 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno); 5386 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 5387 int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi; 5388 char *err_extra = type == ACCESS_HELPER ? " indirect" : ""; 5389 enum bpf_access_type bounds_check_type; 5390 /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are 5391 * read-only. 5392 */ 5393 bool clobber = false; 5394 5395 if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) { 5396 verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n"); 5397 return -EACCES; 5398 } 5399 5400 if (type == ACCESS_HELPER) { 5401 /* The bounds checks for writes are more permissive than for 5402 * reads. However, if raw_mode is not set, we'll do extra 5403 * checks below. 5404 */ 5405 bounds_check_type = BPF_WRITE; 5406 clobber = true; 5407 } else { 5408 bounds_check_type = BPF_READ; 5409 } 5410 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size, 5411 type, bounds_check_type); 5412 if (err) 5413 return err; 5414 5415 5416 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5417 min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off; 5418 } else { 5419 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for 5420 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in 5421 * Spectre masking for stack ALU. 5422 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). 5423 */ 5424 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { 5425 char tn_buf[48]; 5426 5427 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5428 verbose(env, "R%d%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", 5429 regno, err_extra, tn_buf); 5430 return -EACCES; 5431 } 5432 /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed 5433 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to 5434 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on 5435 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may 5436 * cause uninitialized stack leaking. 5437 */ 5438 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) 5439 meta = NULL; 5440 5441 min_off = reg->smin_value + off; 5442 max_off = reg->smax_value + off; 5443 } 5444 5445 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 5446 meta->access_size = access_size; 5447 meta->regno = regno; 5448 return 0; 5449 } 5450 5451 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) { 5452 u8 *stype; 5453 5454 slot = -i - 1; 5455 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE; 5456 if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) 5457 goto err; 5458 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; 5459 if (*stype == STACK_MISC) 5460 goto mark; 5461 if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) { 5462 if (clobber) { 5463 /* helper can write anything into the stack */ 5464 *stype = STACK_MISC; 5465 } 5466 goto mark; 5467 } 5468 5469 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && 5470 (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE || 5471 env->allow_ptr_leaks)) { 5472 if (clobber) { 5473 __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); 5474 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 5475 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]); 5476 } 5477 goto mark; 5478 } 5479 5480 err: 5481 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5482 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n", 5483 err_extra, regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size); 5484 } else { 5485 char tn_buf[48]; 5486 5487 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 5488 verbose(env, "invalid%s read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n", 5489 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size); 5490 } 5491 return -EACCES; 5492 mark: 5493 /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause 5494 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read' 5495 */ 5496 mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 5497 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent, 5498 REG_LIVE_READ64); 5499 /* We do not set REG_LIVE_WRITTEN for stack slot, as we can not 5500 * be sure that whether stack slot is written to or not. Hence, 5501 * we must still conservatively propagate reads upwards even if 5502 * helper may write to the entire memory range. 5503 */ 5504 } 5505 return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off); 5506 } 5507 5508 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5509 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, 5510 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5511 { 5512 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 5513 u32 *max_access; 5514 5515 switch (base_type(reg->type)) { 5516 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 5517 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 5518 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 5519 zero_size_allowed); 5520 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 5521 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 5522 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 5523 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5524 return -EACCES; 5525 } 5526 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 5527 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); 5528 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 5529 if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 5530 meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : 5531 BPF_READ)) 5532 return -EACCES; 5533 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, 5534 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER); 5535 case PTR_TO_MEM: 5536 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 5537 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 5538 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 5539 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5540 return -EACCES; 5541 } 5542 } 5543 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, 5544 access_size, reg->mem_size, 5545 zero_size_allowed); 5546 case PTR_TO_BUF: 5547 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { 5548 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { 5549 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, 5550 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5551 return -EACCES; 5552 } 5553 5554 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; 5555 } else { 5556 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access; 5557 } 5558 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off, 5559 access_size, zero_size_allowed, 5560 max_access); 5561 case PTR_TO_STACK: 5562 return check_stack_range_initialized( 5563 env, 5564 regno, reg->off, access_size, 5565 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER, meta); 5566 case PTR_TO_CTX: 5567 /* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context, 5568 * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we 5569 * can not statically check its size. 5570 * Dynamically check it now. 5571 */ 5572 if (!env->ops->convert_ctx_access) { 5573 enum bpf_access_type atype = meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ; 5574 int offset = access_size - 1; 5575 5576 /* Allow zero-byte read from PTR_TO_CTX */ 5577 if (access_size == 0) 5578 return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; 5579 5580 return check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, offset, BPF_B, 5581 atype, -1, false); 5582 } 5583 5584 fallthrough; 5585 default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */ 5586 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */ 5587 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && 5588 register_is_null(reg)) 5589 return 0; 5590 5591 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s ", regno, 5592 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 5593 verbose(env, "expected=%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_STACK)); 5594 return -EACCES; 5595 } 5596 } 5597 5598 static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 5599 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 5600 bool zero_size_allowed, 5601 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5602 { 5603 int err; 5604 5605 /* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers 5606 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values. 5607 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine 5608 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register 5609 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors 5610 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an 5611 * int type and negative retvals are allowed. 5612 */ 5613 meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; 5614 5615 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check 5616 * happens using its boundaries. 5617 */ 5618 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 5619 /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw 5620 * mode so that the program is required to 5621 * initialize all the memory that the helper could 5622 * just partially fill up. 5623 */ 5624 meta = NULL; 5625 5626 if (reg->smin_value < 0) { 5627 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n", 5628 regno); 5629 return -EACCES; 5630 } 5631 5632 if (reg->umin_value == 0) { 5633 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0, 5634 zero_size_allowed, 5635 meta); 5636 if (err) 5637 return err; 5638 } 5639 5640 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) { 5641 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n", 5642 regno); 5643 return -EACCES; 5644 } 5645 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 5646 reg->umax_value, 5647 zero_size_allowed, meta); 5648 if (!err) 5649 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 5650 return err; 5651 } 5652 5653 int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5654 u32 regno, u32 mem_size) 5655 { 5656 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type); 5657 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 5658 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 5659 int err; 5660 5661 if (register_is_null(reg)) 5662 return 0; 5663 5664 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 5665 /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory 5666 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as 5667 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller. 5668 */ 5669 if (may_be_null) { 5670 saved_reg = *reg; 5671 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 5672 } 5673 5674 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); 5675 /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ 5676 meta.raw_mode = true; 5677 err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); 5678 5679 if (may_be_null) 5680 *reg = saved_reg; 5681 5682 return err; 5683 } 5684 5685 static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 5686 u32 regno) 5687 { 5688 struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1]; 5689 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type); 5690 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; 5691 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 5692 int err; 5693 5694 WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5); 5695 5696 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 5697 5698 if (may_be_null) { 5699 saved_reg = *mem_reg; 5700 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg); 5701 } 5702 5703 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); 5704 /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ 5705 meta.raw_mode = true; 5706 err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); 5707 5708 if (may_be_null) 5709 *mem_reg = saved_reg; 5710 return err; 5711 } 5712 5713 /* Implementation details: 5714 * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL. 5715 * bpf_obj_new returns PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL. 5716 * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id. 5717 * Two separate bpf_obj_new will also have different reg->id. 5718 * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, the verifier 5719 * clears reg->id after value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only 5720 * cares about the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care 5721 * about actual address of the map element. 5722 * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps 5723 * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so 5724 * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that 5725 * point to different bpf_spin_locks. Likewise for pointers to allocated objects 5726 * returned from bpf_obj_new. 5727 * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid 5728 * dead-locks. 5729 * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than 5730 * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only 5731 * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs. 5732 * cur_state->active_lock remembers which map value element or allocated 5733 * object got locked and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock. 5734 */ 5735 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5736 bool is_lock) 5737 { 5738 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 5739 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 5740 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 5741 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 5742 struct bpf_map *map = NULL; 5743 struct btf *btf = NULL; 5744 struct btf_record *rec; 5745 5746 if (!is_const) { 5747 verbose(env, 5748 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_spin_lock has to be at the constant offset\n", 5749 regno); 5750 return -EINVAL; 5751 } 5752 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 5753 map = reg->map_ptr; 5754 if (!map->btf) { 5755 verbose(env, 5756 "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_spin_lock\n", 5757 map->name); 5758 return -EINVAL; 5759 } 5760 } else { 5761 btf = reg->btf; 5762 } 5763 5764 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 5765 if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 5766 verbose(env, "%s '%s' has no valid bpf_spin_lock\n", map ? "map" : "local", 5767 map ? map->name : "kptr"); 5768 return -EINVAL; 5769 } 5770 if (rec->spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) { 5771 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_spin_lock' that is at %d\n", 5772 val + reg->off, rec->spin_lock_off); 5773 return -EINVAL; 5774 } 5775 if (is_lock) { 5776 if (cur->active_lock.ptr) { 5777 verbose(env, 5778 "Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n"); 5779 return -EINVAL; 5780 } 5781 if (map) 5782 cur->active_lock.ptr = map; 5783 else 5784 cur->active_lock.ptr = btf; 5785 cur->active_lock.id = reg->id; 5786 } else { 5787 struct bpf_func_state *fstate = cur_func(env); 5788 void *ptr; 5789 int i; 5790 5791 if (map) 5792 ptr = map; 5793 else 5794 ptr = btf; 5795 5796 if (!cur->active_lock.ptr) { 5797 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock without taking a lock\n"); 5798 return -EINVAL; 5799 } 5800 if (cur->active_lock.ptr != ptr || 5801 cur->active_lock.id != reg->id) { 5802 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock\n"); 5803 return -EINVAL; 5804 } 5805 cur->active_lock.ptr = NULL; 5806 cur->active_lock.id = 0; 5807 5808 for (i = fstate->acquired_refs - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 5809 int err; 5810 5811 /* Complain on error because this reference state cannot 5812 * be freed before this point, as bpf_spin_lock critical 5813 * section does not allow functions that release the 5814 * allocated object immediately. 5815 */ 5816 if (!fstate->refs[i].release_on_unlock) 5817 continue; 5818 err = release_reference(env, fstate->refs[i].id); 5819 if (err) { 5820 verbose(env, "failed to release release_on_unlock reference"); 5821 return err; 5822 } 5823 } 5824 } 5825 return 0; 5826 } 5827 5828 static int process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5829 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5830 { 5831 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 5832 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 5833 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 5834 u64 val = reg->var_off.value; 5835 5836 if (!is_const) { 5837 verbose(env, 5838 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_timer has to be at the constant offset\n", 5839 regno); 5840 return -EINVAL; 5841 } 5842 if (!map->btf) { 5843 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_timer\n", 5844 map->name); 5845 return -EINVAL; 5846 } 5847 if (!btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 5848 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid bpf_timer\n", map->name); 5849 return -EINVAL; 5850 } 5851 if (map->record->timer_off != val + reg->off) { 5852 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct bpf_timer' that is at %d\n", 5853 val + reg->off, map->record->timer_off); 5854 return -EINVAL; 5855 } 5856 if (meta->map_ptr) { 5857 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Two map pointers in a timer helper\n"); 5858 return -EFAULT; 5859 } 5860 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 5861 meta->map_ptr = map; 5862 return 0; 5863 } 5864 5865 static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5866 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5867 { 5868 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 5869 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 5870 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 5871 u32 kptr_off; 5872 5873 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 5874 verbose(env, 5875 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. kptr has to be at the constant offset\n", 5876 regno); 5877 return -EINVAL; 5878 } 5879 if (!map_ptr->btf) { 5880 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_kptr_xchg\n", 5881 map_ptr->name); 5882 return -EINVAL; 5883 } 5884 if (!btf_record_has_field(map_ptr->record, BPF_KPTR)) { 5885 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid kptr\n", map_ptr->name); 5886 return -EINVAL; 5887 } 5888 5889 meta->map_ptr = map_ptr; 5890 kptr_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 5891 kptr_field = btf_record_find(map_ptr->record, kptr_off, BPF_KPTR); 5892 if (!kptr_field) { 5893 verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off); 5894 return -EACCES; 5895 } 5896 if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) { 5897 verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off); 5898 return -EACCES; 5899 } 5900 meta->kptr_field = kptr_field; 5901 return 0; 5902 } 5903 5904 /* There are two register types representing a bpf_dynptr, one is PTR_TO_STACK 5905 * which points to a stack slot, and the other is CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR. 5906 * 5907 * In both cases we deal with the first 8 bytes, but need to mark the next 8 5908 * bytes as STACK_DYNPTR in case of PTR_TO_STACK. In case of 5909 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, we are guaranteed to get the beginning of the object. 5910 * 5911 * Mutability of bpf_dynptr is at two levels, one is at the level of struct 5912 * bpf_dynptr itself, i.e. whether the helper is receiving a pointer to struct 5913 * bpf_dynptr or pointer to const struct bpf_dynptr. In the former case, it can 5914 * mutate the view of the dynptr and also possibly destroy it. In the latter 5915 * case, it cannot mutate the bpf_dynptr itself but it can still mutate the 5916 * memory that dynptr points to. 5917 * 5918 * The verifier will keep track both levels of mutation (bpf_dynptr's in 5919 * reg->type and the memory's in reg->dynptr.type), but there is no support for 5920 * readonly dynptr view yet, hence only the first case is tracked and checked. 5921 * 5922 * This is consistent with how C applies the const modifier to a struct object, 5923 * where the pointer itself inside bpf_dynptr becomes const but not what it 5924 * points to. 5925 * 5926 * Helpers which do not mutate the bpf_dynptr set MEM_RDONLY in their argument 5927 * type, and declare it as 'const struct bpf_dynptr *' in their prototype. 5928 */ 5929 int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, 5930 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 5931 { 5932 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 5933 5934 /* MEM_UNINIT and MEM_RDONLY are exclusive, when applied to an 5935 * ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (or ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_*): 5936 */ 5937 if ((arg_type & (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) == (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) { 5938 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured dynptr helper type flags\n"); 5939 return -EFAULT; 5940 } 5941 /* CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR already has fixed and var_off as 0 due to 5942 * check_func_arg_reg_off's logic. We only need to check offset 5943 * alignment for PTR_TO_STACK. 5944 */ 5945 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK && (reg->off % BPF_REG_SIZE)) { 5946 verbose(env, "cannot pass in dynptr at an offset=%d\n", reg->off); 5947 return -EINVAL; 5948 } 5949 /* MEM_UNINIT - Points to memory that is an appropriate candidate for 5950 * constructing a mutable bpf_dynptr object. 5951 * 5952 * Currently, this is only possible with PTR_TO_STACK 5953 * pointing to a region of at least 16 bytes which doesn't 5954 * contain an existing bpf_dynptr. 5955 * 5956 * MEM_RDONLY - Points to a initialized bpf_dynptr that will not be 5957 * mutated or destroyed. However, the memory it points to 5958 * may be mutated. 5959 * 5960 * None - Points to a initialized dynptr that can be mutated and 5961 * destroyed, including mutation of the memory it points 5962 * to. 5963 */ 5964 if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) { 5965 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) { 5966 verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n"); 5967 return -EINVAL; 5968 } 5969 5970 /* We only support one dynptr being uninitialized at the moment, 5971 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now. 5972 */ 5973 if (meta->uninit_dynptr_regno) { 5974 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple uninitialized dynptr args\n"); 5975 return -EFAULT; 5976 } 5977 5978 meta->uninit_dynptr_regno = regno; 5979 } else /* MEM_RDONLY and None case from above */ { 5980 /* For the reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK case, bpf_dynptr is never const */ 5981 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR && !(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) { 5982 verbose(env, "cannot pass pointer to const bpf_dynptr, the helper mutates it\n"); 5983 return -EINVAL; 5984 } 5985 5986 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) { 5987 verbose(env, 5988 "Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #%d\n", 5989 regno); 5990 return -EINVAL; 5991 } 5992 5993 /* Fold modifiers (in this case, MEM_RDONLY) when checking expected type */ 5994 if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, arg_type & ~MEM_RDONLY)) { 5995 const char *err_extra = ""; 5996 5997 switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) { 5998 case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL: 5999 err_extra = "local"; 6000 break; 6001 case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF: 6002 err_extra = "ringbuf"; 6003 break; 6004 default: 6005 err_extra = "<unknown>"; 6006 break; 6007 } 6008 verbose(env, 6009 "Expected a dynptr of type %s as arg #%d\n", 6010 err_extra, regno); 6011 return -EINVAL; 6012 } 6013 } 6014 return 0; 6015 } 6016 6017 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 6018 { 6019 return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE || 6020 type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO; 6021 } 6022 6023 static bool arg_type_is_release(enum bpf_arg_type type) 6024 { 6025 return type & OBJ_RELEASE; 6026 } 6027 6028 static bool arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type) 6029 { 6030 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 6031 } 6032 6033 static int int_ptr_type_to_size(enum bpf_arg_type type) 6034 { 6035 if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_INT) 6036 return sizeof(u32); 6037 else if (type == ARG_PTR_TO_LONG) 6038 return sizeof(u64); 6039 6040 return -EINVAL; 6041 } 6042 6043 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6044 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 6045 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type) 6046 { 6047 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 6048 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 6049 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n"); 6050 return -EACCES; 6051 } 6052 6053 switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { 6054 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 6055 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 6056 if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 6057 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON; 6058 } else { 6059 verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n"); 6060 return -EINVAL; 6061 } 6062 break; 6063 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 6064 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem) 6065 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 6066 break; 6067 default: 6068 break; 6069 } 6070 return 0; 6071 } 6072 6073 struct bpf_reg_types { 6074 const enum bpf_reg_type types[10]; 6075 u32 *btf_id; 6076 }; 6077 6078 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = { 6079 .types = { 6080 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 6081 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 6082 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 6083 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 6084 }, 6085 }; 6086 6087 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 6088 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = { 6089 .types = { 6090 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON, 6091 PTR_TO_SOCKET, 6092 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK, 6093 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, 6094 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 6095 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 6096 }, 6097 .btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 6098 }; 6099 #endif 6100 6101 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = { 6102 .types = { 6103 PTR_TO_STACK, 6104 PTR_TO_PACKET, 6105 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 6106 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 6107 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 6108 PTR_TO_MEM, 6109 PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF, 6110 PTR_TO_BUF, 6111 }, 6112 }; 6113 6114 static const struct bpf_reg_types int_ptr_types = { 6115 .types = { 6116 PTR_TO_STACK, 6117 PTR_TO_PACKET, 6118 PTR_TO_PACKET_META, 6119 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, 6120 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 6121 }, 6122 }; 6123 6124 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = { 6125 .types = { 6126 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, 6127 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, 6128 } 6129 }; 6130 6131 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } }; 6132 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } }; 6133 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } }; 6134 static const struct bpf_reg_types ringbuf_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF } }; 6135 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } }; 6136 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { 6137 .types = { 6138 PTR_TO_BTF_ID, 6139 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, 6140 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU, 6141 }, 6142 }; 6143 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { 6144 .types = { 6145 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU, 6146 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED, 6147 } 6148 }; 6149 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } }; 6150 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } }; 6151 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 6152 static const struct bpf_reg_types timer_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 6153 static const struct bpf_reg_types kptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }; 6154 static const struct bpf_reg_types dynptr_types = { 6155 .types = { 6156 PTR_TO_STACK, 6157 CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 6158 } 6159 }; 6160 6161 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { 6162 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &mem_types, 6163 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = &mem_types, 6164 [ARG_CONST_SIZE] = &scalar_types, 6165 [ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 6166 [ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types, 6167 [ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR] = &const_map_ptr_types, 6168 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX] = &context_types, 6169 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &sock_types, 6170 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 6171 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_id_sock_common_types, 6172 #endif 6173 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &fullsock_types, 6174 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = &btf_ptr_types, 6175 [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types, 6176 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types, 6177 [ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM] = &ringbuf_mem_types, 6178 [ARG_PTR_TO_INT] = &int_ptr_types, 6179 [ARG_PTR_TO_LONG] = &int_ptr_types, 6180 [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types, 6181 [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types, 6182 [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK] = &stack_ptr_types, 6183 [ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR] = &const_str_ptr_types, 6184 [ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER] = &timer_types, 6185 [ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR] = &kptr_types, 6186 [ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = &dynptr_types, 6187 }; 6188 6189 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 6190 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, 6191 const u32 *arg_btf_id, 6192 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 6193 { 6194 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 6195 enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type; 6196 const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible; 6197 int i, j; 6198 6199 compatible = compatible_reg_types[base_type(arg_type)]; 6200 if (!compatible) { 6201 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type); 6202 return -EFAULT; 6203 } 6204 6205 /* ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY, 6206 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM and NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY 6207 * 6208 * Same for MAYBE_NULL: 6209 * 6210 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL, 6211 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM but NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL 6212 * 6213 * Therefore we fold these flags depending on the arg_type before comparison. 6214 */ 6215 if (arg_type & MEM_RDONLY) 6216 type &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 6217 if (arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) 6218 type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 6219 6220 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) { 6221 expected = compatible->types[i]; 6222 if (expected == NOT_INIT) 6223 break; 6224 6225 if (type == expected) 6226 goto found; 6227 } 6228 6229 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 6230 for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++) 6231 verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 6232 verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j])); 6233 return -EACCES; 6234 6235 found: 6236 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg->type & PTR_TRUSTED) { 6237 /* For bpf_sk_release, it needs to match against first member 6238 * 'struct sock_common', hence make an exception for it. This 6239 * allows bpf_sk_release to work for multiple socket types. 6240 */ 6241 bool strict_type_match = arg_type_is_release(arg_type) && 6242 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_release; 6243 6244 if (!arg_btf_id) { 6245 if (!compatible->btf_id) { 6246 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n"); 6247 return -EFAULT; 6248 } 6249 arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id; 6250 } 6251 6252 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 6253 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) 6254 return -EACCES; 6255 } else { 6256 if (arg_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 6257 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 6258 verbose(env, "R%d has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON type\n", 6259 regno); 6260 return -EACCES; 6261 } 6262 6263 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off, 6264 btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id, 6265 strict_type_match)) { 6266 verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n", 6267 regno, kernel_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), 6268 kernel_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id)); 6269 return -EACCES; 6270 } 6271 } 6272 } else if (type_is_alloc(reg->type)) { 6273 if (meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_lock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 6274 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC\n"); 6275 return -EFAULT; 6276 } 6277 } 6278 6279 return 0; 6280 } 6281 6282 int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6283 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, 6284 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type) 6285 { 6286 u32 type = reg->type; 6287 6288 /* When referenced register is passed to release function, its fixed 6289 * offset must be 0. 6290 * 6291 * We will check arg_type_is_release reg has ref_obj_id when storing 6292 * meta->release_regno. 6293 */ 6294 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 6295 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR with OBJ_RELEASE is a bit special, as it 6296 * may not directly point to the object being released, but to 6297 * dynptr pointing to such object, which might be at some offset 6298 * on the stack. In that case, we simply to fallback to the 6299 * default handling. 6300 */ 6301 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && type == PTR_TO_STACK) 6302 return 0; 6303 /* Doing check_ptr_off_reg check for the offset will catch this 6304 * because fixed_off_ok is false, but checking here allows us 6305 * to give the user a better error message. 6306 */ 6307 if (reg->off) { 6308 verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func or trusted arg to kfunc\n", 6309 regno); 6310 return -EINVAL; 6311 } 6312 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 6313 } 6314 6315 switch (type) { 6316 /* Pointer types where both fixed and variable offset is explicitly allowed: */ 6317 case PTR_TO_STACK: 6318 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 6319 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 6320 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 6321 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 6322 case PTR_TO_MEM: 6323 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY: 6324 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF: 6325 case PTR_TO_BUF: 6326 case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY: 6327 case SCALAR_VALUE: 6328 return 0; 6329 /* All the rest must be rejected, except PTR_TO_BTF_ID which allows 6330 * fixed offset. 6331 */ 6332 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 6333 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 6334 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: 6335 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: 6336 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED: 6337 /* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function, 6338 * its fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset 6339 * can be non-zero. This was already checked above. So pass 6340 * fixed_off_ok as true to allow fixed offset for all other 6341 * cases. var_off always must be 0 for PTR_TO_BTF_ID, hence we 6342 * still need to do checks instead of returning. 6343 */ 6344 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true); 6345 default: 6346 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false); 6347 } 6348 } 6349 6350 static u32 dynptr_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 6351 { 6352 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 6353 int spi; 6354 6355 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) 6356 return reg->ref_obj_id; 6357 6358 spi = get_spi(reg->off); 6359 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id; 6360 } 6361 6362 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, 6363 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 6364 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 6365 { 6366 u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg; 6367 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno]; 6368 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg]; 6369 enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; 6370 u32 *arg_btf_id = NULL; 6371 int err = 0; 6372 6373 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) 6374 return 0; 6375 6376 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP); 6377 if (err) 6378 return err; 6379 6380 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) { 6381 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) { 6382 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", 6383 regno); 6384 return -EACCES; 6385 } 6386 return 0; 6387 } 6388 6389 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && 6390 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) { 6391 verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n"); 6392 return -EACCES; 6393 } 6394 6395 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 6396 err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type); 6397 if (err) 6398 return err; 6399 } 6400 6401 if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg_type)) 6402 /* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip 6403 * type checking. 6404 */ 6405 goto skip_type_check; 6406 6407 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 6408 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 6409 base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 6410 arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg]; 6411 6412 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta); 6413 if (err) 6414 return err; 6415 6416 err = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 6417 if (err) 6418 return err; 6419 6420 skip_type_check: 6421 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) { 6422 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) { 6423 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); 6424 int spi; 6425 6426 /* Only dynptr created on stack can be released, thus 6427 * the get_spi and stack state checks for spilled_ptr 6428 * should only be done before process_dynptr_func for 6429 * PTR_TO_STACK. 6430 */ 6431 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 6432 spi = get_spi(reg->off); 6433 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS) || 6434 !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id) { 6435 verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno); 6436 return -EINVAL; 6437 } 6438 } else { 6439 verbose(env, "cannot release unowned const bpf_dynptr\n"); 6440 return -EINVAL; 6441 } 6442 } else if (!reg->ref_obj_id && !register_is_null(reg)) { 6443 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced when passed to release function\n", 6444 regno); 6445 return -EINVAL; 6446 } 6447 if (meta->release_regno) { 6448 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one release argument\n"); 6449 return -EFAULT; 6450 } 6451 meta->release_regno = regno; 6452 } 6453 6454 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 6455 if (meta->ref_obj_id) { 6456 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 6457 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 6458 meta->ref_obj_id); 6459 return -EFAULT; 6460 } 6461 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 6462 } 6463 6464 switch (base_type(arg_type)) { 6465 case ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR: 6466 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */ 6467 if (meta->map_ptr) { 6468 /* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject: 6469 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1) 6470 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2) 6471 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) { 6472 * timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1); 6473 * if (timer) 6474 * // mismatch would have been allowed 6475 * bpf_timer_init(timer, inner_map2); 6476 * } 6477 * 6478 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps. 6479 */ 6480 if (meta->map_ptr != reg->map_ptr || 6481 meta->map_uid != reg->map_uid) { 6482 verbose(env, 6483 "timer pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n", 6484 meta->map_uid, reg->map_uid); 6485 return -EINVAL; 6486 } 6487 } 6488 meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr; 6489 meta->map_uid = reg->map_uid; 6490 break; 6491 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 6492 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call: 6493 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within 6494 * stack limits and initialized 6495 */ 6496 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 6497 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before 6498 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before 6499 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means 6500 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier 6501 */ 6502 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); 6503 return -EACCES; 6504 } 6505 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 6506 meta->map_ptr->key_size, false, 6507 NULL); 6508 break; 6509 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 6510 if (type_may_be_null(arg_type) && register_is_null(reg)) 6511 return 0; 6512 6513 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: 6514 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity 6515 */ 6516 if (!meta->map_ptr) { 6517 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ 6518 verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); 6519 return -EACCES; 6520 } 6521 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 6522 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 6523 meta->map_ptr->value_size, false, 6524 meta); 6525 break; 6526 case ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID: 6527 if (!reg->btf_id) { 6528 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno); 6529 return -EACCES; 6530 } 6531 meta->ret_btf = reg->btf; 6532 meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id; 6533 break; 6534 case ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK: 6535 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) { 6536 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, true); 6537 if (err) 6538 return err; 6539 } else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { 6540 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, false); 6541 if (err) 6542 return err; 6543 } else { 6544 verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n"); 6545 return -EFAULT; 6546 } 6547 break; 6548 case ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER: 6549 err = process_timer_func(env, regno, meta); 6550 if (err) 6551 return err; 6552 break; 6553 case ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC: 6554 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno; 6555 break; 6556 case ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 6557 /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the 6558 * next is_mem_size argument below. 6559 */ 6560 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; 6561 if (arg_type & MEM_FIXED_SIZE) { 6562 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, 6563 fn->arg_size[arg], false, 6564 meta); 6565 } 6566 break; 6567 case ARG_CONST_SIZE: 6568 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, false, meta); 6569 break; 6570 case ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 6571 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, meta); 6572 break; 6573 case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 6574 err = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, arg_type, meta); 6575 if (err) 6576 return err; 6577 break; 6578 case ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO: 6579 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6580 verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n", 6581 regno); 6582 return -EACCES; 6583 } 6584 meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; 6585 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 6586 if (err) 6587 return err; 6588 break; 6589 case ARG_PTR_TO_INT: 6590 case ARG_PTR_TO_LONG: 6591 { 6592 int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type); 6593 6594 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, false, meta); 6595 if (err) 6596 return err; 6597 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, size, true); 6598 break; 6599 } 6600 case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR: 6601 { 6602 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr; 6603 int map_off; 6604 u64 map_addr; 6605 char *str_ptr; 6606 6607 if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) { 6608 verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno); 6609 return -EACCES; 6610 } 6611 6612 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 6613 verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno); 6614 return -EACCES; 6615 } 6616 6617 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 6618 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 6619 return -EACCES; 6620 } 6621 6622 err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, 6623 map->value_size - reg->off, false, 6624 ACCESS_HELPER); 6625 if (err) 6626 return err; 6627 6628 map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 6629 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off); 6630 if (err) { 6631 verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n"); 6632 return err; 6633 } 6634 6635 str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr); 6636 if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) { 6637 verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n"); 6638 return -EINVAL; 6639 } 6640 break; 6641 } 6642 case ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR: 6643 err = process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta); 6644 if (err) 6645 return err; 6646 break; 6647 } 6648 6649 return err; 6650 } 6651 6652 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) 6653 { 6654 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; 6655 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 6656 6657 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem) 6658 return false; 6659 6660 /* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these 6661 * contexts, so updating is safe. 6662 */ 6663 switch (type) { 6664 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 6665 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER) 6666 return true; 6667 break; 6668 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 6669 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 6670 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 6671 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: 6672 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: 6673 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: 6674 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 6675 return true; 6676 default: 6677 break; 6678 } 6679 6680 verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n"); 6681 return false; 6682 } 6683 6684 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 6685 { 6686 return env->prog->jit_requested && 6687 bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(); 6688 } 6689 6690 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 6691 struct bpf_map *map, int func_id) 6692 { 6693 if (!map) 6694 return 0; 6695 6696 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */ 6697 switch (map->map_type) { 6698 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY: 6699 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 6700 goto error; 6701 break; 6702 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY: 6703 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read && 6704 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output && 6705 func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output && 6706 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value && 6707 func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output) 6708 goto error; 6709 break; 6710 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 6711 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output && 6712 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve && 6713 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query && 6714 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr && 6715 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr && 6716 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr) 6717 goto error; 6718 break; 6719 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 6720 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain) 6721 goto error; 6722 break; 6723 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE: 6724 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid) 6725 goto error; 6726 break; 6727 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY: 6728 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup && 6729 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup) 6730 goto error; 6731 break; 6732 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE: 6733 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE: 6734 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage) 6735 goto error; 6736 break; 6737 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP: 6738 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH: 6739 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 6740 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 6741 goto error; 6742 break; 6743 /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases 6744 * appear. 6745 */ 6746 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP: 6747 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) 6748 goto error; 6749 break; 6750 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: 6751 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 6752 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 6753 goto error; 6754 break; 6755 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 6756 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 6757 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) 6758 goto error; 6759 break; 6760 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: 6761 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && 6762 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && 6763 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 6764 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && 6765 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 6766 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 6767 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 6768 goto error; 6769 break; 6770 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: 6771 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && 6772 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && 6773 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 6774 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && 6775 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && 6776 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 6777 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id)) 6778 goto error; 6779 break; 6780 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: 6781 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport) 6782 goto error; 6783 break; 6784 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE: 6785 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK: 6786 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 6787 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 6788 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 6789 goto error; 6790 break; 6791 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 6792 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get && 6793 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete) 6794 goto error; 6795 break; 6796 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 6797 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get && 6798 func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete) 6799 goto error; 6800 break; 6801 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 6802 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get && 6803 func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete) 6804 goto error; 6805 break; 6806 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 6807 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get && 6808 func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete) 6809 goto error; 6810 break; 6811 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER: 6812 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 6813 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem) 6814 goto error; 6815 break; 6816 default: 6817 break; 6818 } 6819 6820 /* ... and second from the function itself. */ 6821 switch (func_id) { 6822 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 6823 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) 6824 goto error; 6825 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) { 6826 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 6827 return -EINVAL; 6828 } 6829 break; 6830 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read: 6831 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: 6832 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: 6833 case BPF_FUNC_skb_output: 6834 case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output: 6835 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) 6836 goto error; 6837 break; 6838 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output: 6839 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve: 6840 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query: 6841 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr: 6842 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr: 6843 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr: 6844 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF) 6845 goto error; 6846 break; 6847 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 6848 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF) 6849 goto error; 6850 break; 6851 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid: 6852 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE) 6853 goto error; 6854 break; 6855 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup: 6856 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: 6857 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY) 6858 goto error; 6859 break; 6860 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 6861 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP && 6862 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH && 6863 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP && 6864 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) 6865 goto error; 6866 break; 6867 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map: 6868 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map: 6869 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update: 6870 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP) 6871 goto error; 6872 break; 6873 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash: 6874 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash: 6875 case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update: 6876 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 6877 goto error; 6878 break; 6879 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 6880 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE && 6881 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE) 6882 goto error; 6883 break; 6884 case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport: 6885 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY && 6886 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP && 6887 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) 6888 goto error; 6889 break; 6890 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 6891 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 6892 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) 6893 goto error; 6894 break; 6895 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 6896 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 6897 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE && 6898 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK && 6899 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER) 6900 goto error; 6901 break; 6902 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 6903 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY && 6904 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH && 6905 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH) 6906 goto error; 6907 break; 6908 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get: 6909 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete: 6910 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE) 6911 goto error; 6912 break; 6913 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get: 6914 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete: 6915 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) 6916 goto error; 6917 break; 6918 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get: 6919 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete: 6920 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE) 6921 goto error; 6922 break; 6923 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get: 6924 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete: 6925 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE) 6926 goto error; 6927 break; 6928 default: 6929 break; 6930 } 6931 6932 return 0; 6933 error: 6934 verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n", 6935 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 6936 return -EINVAL; 6937 } 6938 6939 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 6940 { 6941 int count = 0; 6942 6943 if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 6944 count++; 6945 if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 6946 count++; 6947 if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 6948 count++; 6949 if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 6950 count++; 6951 if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) 6952 count++; 6953 6954 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, 6955 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have 6956 * right now. 6957 */ 6958 return count <= 1; 6959 } 6960 6961 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int arg) 6962 { 6963 bool is_fixed = fn->arg_type[arg] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE; 6964 bool has_size = fn->arg_size[arg] != 0; 6965 bool is_next_size = false; 6966 6967 if (arg + 1 < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type)) 6968 is_next_size = arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg_type[arg + 1]); 6969 6970 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[arg]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) 6971 return is_next_size; 6972 6973 return has_size == is_next_size || is_next_size == is_fixed; 6974 } 6975 6976 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 6977 { 6978 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' 6979 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need 6980 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy 6981 * helper function specification. 6982 */ 6983 if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) || 6984 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 0) || 6985 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 1) || 6986 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 2) || 6987 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 3) || 6988 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 4)) 6989 return false; 6990 6991 return true; 6992 } 6993 6994 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn) 6995 { 6996 int i; 6997 6998 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) { 6999 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) 7000 return !!fn->arg_btf_id[i]; 7001 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) 7002 return fn->arg_btf_id[i] == BPF_PTR_POISON; 7003 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i] && 7004 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */ 7005 (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || 7006 !(fn->arg_type[i] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE))) 7007 return false; 7008 } 7009 7010 return true; 7011 } 7012 7013 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int func_id) 7014 { 7015 return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) && 7016 check_arg_pair_ok(fn) && 7017 check_btf_id_ok(fn) ? 0 : -EINVAL; 7018 } 7019 7020 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] 7021 * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE. 7022 */ 7023 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7024 { 7025 struct bpf_func_state *state; 7026 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 7027 7028 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 7029 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg)) 7030 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 7031 })); 7032 } 7033 7034 enum { 7035 AT_PKT_END = -1, 7036 BEYOND_PKT_END = -2, 7037 }; 7038 7039 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open) 7040 { 7041 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 7042 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn]; 7043 7044 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET) 7045 /* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */ 7046 return; 7047 7048 /* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end. 7049 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown. 7050 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end 7051 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end 7052 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end 7053 */ 7054 if (range_open) 7055 reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END; 7056 else 7057 reg->range = AT_PKT_END; 7058 } 7059 7060 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel 7061 * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference. 7062 */ 7063 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7064 int ref_obj_id) 7065 { 7066 struct bpf_func_state *state; 7067 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 7068 int err; 7069 7070 err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id); 7071 if (err) 7072 return err; 7073 7074 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 7075 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) { 7076 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) 7077 __mark_reg_not_init(env, reg); 7078 else 7079 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg); 7080 } 7081 })); 7082 7083 return 0; 7084 } 7085 7086 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7087 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 7088 { 7089 int i; 7090 7091 /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ 7092 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 7093 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 7094 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 7095 } 7096 } 7097 7098 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7099 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7100 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7101 int insn_idx); 7102 7103 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7104 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7105 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx); 7106 7107 static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 7108 int *insn_idx, int subprog, 7109 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) 7110 { 7111 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 7112 struct bpf_func_info_aux *func_info_aux; 7113 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 7114 int err; 7115 bool is_global = false; 7116 7117 if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) { 7118 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n", 7119 state->curframe + 2); 7120 return -E2BIG; 7121 } 7122 7123 caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; 7124 if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { 7125 verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n", 7126 state->curframe + 1); 7127 return -EFAULT; 7128 } 7129 7130 func_info_aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux; 7131 if (func_info_aux) 7132 is_global = func_info_aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL; 7133 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); 7134 if (err == -EFAULT) 7135 return err; 7136 if (is_global) { 7137 if (err) { 7138 verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n", 7139 subprog); 7140 return err; 7141 } else { 7142 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 7143 verbose(env, 7144 "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", 7145 subprog); 7146 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 7147 7148 /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ 7149 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 7150 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 7151 7152 /* continue with next insn after call */ 7153 return 0; 7154 } 7155 } 7156 7157 /* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are 7158 * interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as 7159 * callbacks 7160 */ 7161 if (set_callee_state_cb != set_callee_state && !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { 7162 verbose(env, "verifier bug: helper %s#%d is not marked as callback-calling\n", 7163 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 7164 return -EFAULT; 7165 } 7166 7167 if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 7168 insn->src_reg == 0 && 7169 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 7170 struct bpf_verifier_state *async_cb; 7171 7172 /* there is no real recursion here. timer callbacks are async */ 7173 env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true; 7174 async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, 7175 *insn_idx, subprog); 7176 if (!async_cb) 7177 return -EFAULT; 7178 callee = async_cb->frame[0]; 7179 callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1; 7180 7181 /* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */ 7182 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); 7183 if (err) 7184 return err; 7185 7186 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 7187 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); 7188 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 7189 /* continue with next insn after call */ 7190 return 0; 7191 } 7192 7193 callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); 7194 if (!callee) 7195 return -ENOMEM; 7196 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; 7197 7198 /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write 7199 * into its own stack before reading from it. 7200 * callee can read/write into caller's stack 7201 */ 7202 init_func_state(env, callee, 7203 /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ 7204 *insn_idx /* callsite */, 7205 state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, 7206 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); 7207 7208 /* Transfer references to the callee */ 7209 err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller); 7210 if (err) 7211 goto err_out; 7212 7213 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); 7214 if (err) 7215 goto err_out; 7216 7217 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); 7218 7219 /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ 7220 state->curframe++; 7221 7222 /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ 7223 *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1; 7224 7225 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 7226 verbose(env, "caller:\n"); 7227 print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); 7228 verbose(env, "callee:\n"); 7229 print_verifier_state(env, callee, true); 7230 } 7231 return 0; 7232 7233 err_out: 7234 free_func_state(callee); 7235 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; 7236 return err; 7237 } 7238 7239 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7240 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7241 struct bpf_func_state *callee) 7242 { 7243 /* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, 7244 * void *callback_ctx, u64 flags); 7245 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 7246 * void *callback_ctx); 7247 */ 7248 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 7249 7250 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 7251 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 7252 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 7253 7254 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 7255 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 7256 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 7257 7258 /* pointer to stack or null */ 7259 callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 7260 7261 /* unused */ 7262 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7263 return 0; 7264 } 7265 7266 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7267 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7268 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx) 7269 { 7270 int i; 7271 7272 /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent 7273 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain 7274 */ 7275 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) 7276 callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i]; 7277 return 0; 7278 } 7279 7280 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 7281 int *insn_idx) 7282 { 7283 int subprog, target_insn; 7284 7285 target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; 7286 subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); 7287 if (subprog < 0) { 7288 verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 7289 target_insn); 7290 return -EFAULT; 7291 } 7292 7293 return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state); 7294 } 7295 7296 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7297 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7298 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7299 int insn_idx) 7300 { 7301 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 7302 struct bpf_map *map; 7303 int err; 7304 7305 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(insn_aux)) { 7306 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 7307 return -EINVAL; 7308 } 7309 7310 map = BPF_MAP_PTR(insn_aux->map_ptr_state); 7311 if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args || 7312 !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) { 7313 verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n"); 7314 return -ENOTSUPP; 7315 } 7316 7317 err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee); 7318 if (err) 7319 return err; 7320 7321 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 7322 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7323 return 0; 7324 } 7325 7326 static int set_loop_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7327 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7328 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7329 int insn_idx) 7330 { 7331 /* bpf_loop(u32 nr_loops, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, 7332 * u64 flags); 7333 * callback_fn(u32 index, void *callback_ctx); 7334 */ 7335 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 7336 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 7337 7338 /* unused */ 7339 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 7340 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 7341 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7342 7343 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 7344 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7345 return 0; 7346 } 7347 7348 static int set_timer_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7349 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7350 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7351 int insn_idx) 7352 { 7353 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr; 7354 7355 /* bpf_timer_set_callback(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn); 7356 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value); 7357 */ 7358 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 7359 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]); 7360 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr; 7361 7362 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY; 7363 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 7364 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr; 7365 7366 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 7367 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 7368 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr; 7369 7370 /* unused */ 7371 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 7372 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7373 callee->in_async_callback_fn = true; 7374 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7375 return 0; 7376 } 7377 7378 static int set_find_vma_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7379 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7380 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7381 int insn_idx) 7382 { 7383 /* bpf_find_vma(struct task_struct *task, u64 addr, 7384 * void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags) 7385 * (callback_fn)(struct task_struct *task, 7386 * struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *callback_ctx); 7387 */ 7388 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1]; 7389 7390 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 7391 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]); 7392 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf = btf_vmlinux; 7393 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_VMA], 7394 7395 /* pointer to stack or null */ 7396 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_4]; 7397 7398 /* unused */ 7399 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 7400 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7401 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 7402 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7403 return 0; 7404 } 7405 7406 static int set_user_ringbuf_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7407 struct bpf_func_state *caller, 7408 struct bpf_func_state *callee, 7409 int insn_idx) 7410 { 7411 /* bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void 7412 * callback_ctx, u64 flags); 7413 * callback_fn(const struct bpf_dynptr_t* dynptr, void *callback_ctx); 7414 */ 7415 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]); 7416 mark_dynptr_cb_reg(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1], BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL); 7417 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3]; 7418 7419 /* unused */ 7420 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]); 7421 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]); 7422 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]); 7423 7424 callee->in_callback_fn = true; 7425 callee->callback_ret_range = tnum_range(0, 1); 7426 return 0; 7427 } 7428 7429 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) 7430 { 7431 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 7432 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; 7433 struct bpf_reg_state *r0; 7434 int err; 7435 7436 callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; 7437 r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]; 7438 if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 7439 /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer 7440 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller, 7441 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack 7442 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits, 7443 * but let's be conservative 7444 */ 7445 verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n"); 7446 return -EINVAL; 7447 } 7448 7449 caller = state->frame[state->curframe - 1]; 7450 if (callee->in_callback_fn) { 7451 /* enforce R0 return value range [0, 1]. */ 7452 struct tnum range = callee->callback_ret_range; 7453 7454 if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 7455 verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n"); 7456 return -EACCES; 7457 } 7458 if (!tnum_in(range, r0->var_off)) { 7459 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0"); 7460 return -EINVAL; 7461 } 7462 } else { 7463 /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ 7464 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; 7465 } 7466 7467 /* callback_fn frame should have released its own additions to parent's 7468 * reference state at this point, or check_reference_leak would 7469 * complain, hence it must be the same as the caller. There is no need 7470 * to copy it back. 7471 */ 7472 if (!callee->in_callback_fn) { 7473 /* Transfer references to the caller */ 7474 err = copy_reference_state(caller, callee); 7475 if (err) 7476 return err; 7477 } 7478 7479 *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; 7480 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 7481 verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); 7482 print_verifier_state(env, callee, true); 7483 verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); 7484 print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); 7485 } 7486 /* clear everything in the callee */ 7487 free_func_state(callee); 7488 state->frame[state->curframe--] = NULL; 7489 return 0; 7490 } 7491 7492 static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, 7493 int func_id, 7494 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) 7495 { 7496 struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; 7497 7498 if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER || 7499 (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack && 7500 func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack && 7501 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str && 7502 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str && 7503 func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str)) 7504 return; 7505 7506 ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; 7507 ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value; 7508 ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 7509 ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO; 7510 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg); 7511 } 7512 7513 static int 7514 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 7515 int func_id, int insn_idx) 7516 { 7517 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 7518 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 7519 7520 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call && 7521 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 7522 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && 7523 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && 7524 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem && 7525 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem && 7526 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem && 7527 func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem && 7528 func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map && 7529 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem) 7530 return 0; 7531 7532 if (map == NULL) { 7533 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 7534 return -EINVAL; 7535 } 7536 7537 /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions 7538 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the 7539 * state of the map from program side. 7540 */ 7541 if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) && 7542 (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 7543 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 7544 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 7545 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) { 7546 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n"); 7547 return -EACCES; 7548 } 7549 7550 if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state)) 7551 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr, 7552 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 7553 else if (BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state) != meta->map_ptr) 7554 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON, 7555 !meta->map_ptr->bypass_spec_v1); 7556 return 0; 7557 } 7558 7559 static int 7560 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, 7561 int func_id, int insn_idx) 7562 { 7563 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; 7564 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg; 7565 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; 7566 u64 val, max; 7567 int err; 7568 7569 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) 7570 return 0; 7571 if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { 7572 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 7573 return -EINVAL; 7574 } 7575 7576 reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 7577 val = reg->var_off.value; 7578 max = map->max_entries; 7579 7580 if (!(register_is_const(reg) && val < max)) { 7581 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 7582 return 0; 7583 } 7584 7585 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); 7586 if (err) 7587 return err; 7588 if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) 7589 bpf_map_key_store(aux, val); 7590 else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 7591 bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val) 7592 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); 7593 return 0; 7594 } 7595 7596 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7597 { 7598 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 7599 bool refs_lingering = false; 7600 int i; 7601 7602 if (state->frameno && !state->in_callback_fn) 7603 return 0; 7604 7605 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 7606 if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno) 7607 continue; 7608 verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n", 7609 state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx); 7610 refs_lingering = true; 7611 } 7612 return refs_lingering ? -EINVAL : 0; 7613 } 7614 7615 static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 7616 struct bpf_reg_state *regs) 7617 { 7618 struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; 7619 struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_5]; 7620 struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr; 7621 struct bpf_bprintf_data data = {}; 7622 int err, fmt_map_off, num_args; 7623 u64 fmt_addr; 7624 char *fmt; 7625 7626 /* data must be an array of u64 */ 7627 if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8) 7628 return -EINVAL; 7629 num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8; 7630 7631 /* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const 7632 * and map_direct_value_addr is set. 7633 */ 7634 fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value; 7635 err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr, 7636 fmt_map_off); 7637 if (err) { 7638 verbose(env, "verifier bug\n"); 7639 return -EFAULT; 7640 } 7641 fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off; 7642 7643 /* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we 7644 * can focus on validating the format specifiers. 7645 */ 7646 err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, num_args, &data); 7647 if (err < 0) 7648 verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n"); 7649 7650 return err; 7651 } 7652 7653 static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7654 { 7655 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 7656 int func_id = BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip; 7657 7658 if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) { 7659 if (!bpf_prog_has_trampoline(env->prog)) { 7660 verbose(env, "func %s#%d supported only for fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs\n", 7661 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7662 return -ENOTSUPP; 7663 } 7664 return 0; 7665 } else if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) { 7666 return 0; 7667 } 7668 7669 verbose(env, "func %s#%d not supported for program type %d\n", 7670 func_id_name(func_id), func_id, type); 7671 return -ENOTSUPP; 7672 } 7673 7674 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7675 { 7676 return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; 7677 } 7678 7679 static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 7680 { 7681 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 7682 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_4]; 7683 bool reg_is_null = register_is_null(reg); 7684 7685 if (reg_is_null) 7686 mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4); 7687 7688 return reg_is_null; 7689 } 7690 7691 static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno) 7692 { 7693 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *state = &cur_aux(env)->loop_inline_state; 7694 7695 if (!state->initialized) { 7696 state->initialized = 1; 7697 state->fit_for_inline = loop_flag_is_zero(env); 7698 state->callback_subprogno = subprogno; 7699 return; 7700 } 7701 7702 if (!state->fit_for_inline) 7703 return; 7704 7705 state->fit_for_inline = (loop_flag_is_zero(env) && 7706 state->callback_subprogno == subprogno); 7707 } 7708 7709 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 7710 int *insn_idx_p) 7711 { 7712 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 7713 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL; 7714 enum bpf_return_type ret_type; 7715 enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag; 7716 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 7717 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; 7718 int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 7719 bool changes_data; 7720 int i, err, func_id; 7721 7722 /* find function prototype */ 7723 func_id = insn->imm; 7724 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) { 7725 verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 7726 func_id); 7727 return -EINVAL; 7728 } 7729 7730 if (env->ops->get_func_proto) 7731 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog); 7732 if (!fn) { 7733 verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), 7734 func_id); 7735 return -EINVAL; 7736 } 7737 7738 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */ 7739 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) { 7740 verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n"); 7741 return -EINVAL; 7742 } 7743 7744 if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) { 7745 verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n"); 7746 return -EINVAL; 7747 } 7748 7749 if (!env->prog->aux->sleepable && fn->might_sleep) { 7750 verbose(env, "helper call might sleep in a non-sleepable prog\n"); 7751 return -EINVAL; 7752 } 7753 7754 /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ 7755 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func); 7756 if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { 7757 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n", 7758 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7759 return -EINVAL; 7760 } 7761 7762 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 7763 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access; 7764 7765 err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id); 7766 if (err) { 7767 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 7768 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7769 return err; 7770 } 7771 7772 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 7773 if (fn->might_sleep) { 7774 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in rcu_read_lock region\n", 7775 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7776 return -EINVAL; 7777 } 7778 7779 if (env->prog->aux->sleepable && is_storage_get_function(func_id)) 7780 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].storage_get_func_atomic = true; 7781 } 7782 7783 meta.func_id = func_id; 7784 /* check args */ 7785 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { 7786 err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn); 7787 if (err) 7788 return err; 7789 } 7790 7791 err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 7792 if (err) 7793 return err; 7794 7795 err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx); 7796 if (err) 7797 return err; 7798 7799 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset 7800 * is inferred from register state. 7801 */ 7802 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { 7803 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, 7804 BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 7805 if (err) 7806 return err; 7807 } 7808 7809 regs = cur_regs(env); 7810 7811 /* This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot 7812 * be reinitialized by any dynptr helper. Hence, mark_stack_slots_dynptr 7813 * is safe to do directly. 7814 */ 7815 if (meta.uninit_dynptr_regno) { 7816 if (regs[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno].type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 7817 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be initialized\n"); 7818 return -EFAULT; 7819 } 7820 /* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */ 7821 for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) { 7822 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.uninit_dynptr_regno, 7823 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 7824 if (err) 7825 return err; 7826 } 7827 7828 err = mark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno], 7829 fn->arg_type[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno - BPF_REG_1], 7830 insn_idx); 7831 if (err) 7832 return err; 7833 } 7834 7835 if (meta.release_regno) { 7836 err = -EINVAL; 7837 /* This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot 7838 * be released by any dynptr helper. Hence, unmark_stack_slots_dynptr 7839 * is safe to do directly. 7840 */ 7841 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1])) { 7842 if (regs[meta.release_regno].type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 7843 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be released\n"); 7844 return -EFAULT; 7845 } 7846 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.release_regno]); 7847 } else if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 7848 err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id); 7849 } else if (register_is_null(®s[meta.release_regno])) { 7850 /* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be 7851 * released is NULL, which must be > R0. 7852 */ 7853 err = 0; 7854 } 7855 if (err) { 7856 verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 7857 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 7858 return err; 7859 } 7860 } 7861 7862 switch (func_id) { 7863 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: 7864 err = check_reference_leak(env); 7865 if (err) { 7866 verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n"); 7867 return err; 7868 } 7869 break; 7870 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: 7871 /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0, 7872 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error. 7873 */ 7874 if (!register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) { 7875 verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n"); 7876 return -EINVAL; 7877 } 7878 break; 7879 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 7880 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 7881 set_map_elem_callback_state); 7882 break; 7883 case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback: 7884 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 7885 set_timer_callback_state); 7886 break; 7887 case BPF_FUNC_find_vma: 7888 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 7889 set_find_vma_callback_state); 7890 break; 7891 case BPF_FUNC_snprintf: 7892 err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs); 7893 break; 7894 case BPF_FUNC_loop: 7895 update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno); 7896 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 7897 set_loop_callback_state); 7898 break; 7899 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem: 7900 if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 7901 verbose(env, "Unsupported reg type %s for bpf_dynptr_from_mem data\n", 7902 reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type)); 7903 return -EACCES; 7904 } 7905 break; 7906 case BPF_FUNC_set_retval: 7907 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 7908 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 7909 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 7910 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 7911 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 7912 */ 7913 verbose(env, "BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 7914 return -EINVAL; 7915 } 7916 } 7917 break; 7918 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data: 7919 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) { 7920 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[i])) { 7921 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_1 + i]; 7922 7923 if (meta.ref_obj_id) { 7924 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.ref_obj_id already set\n"); 7925 return -EFAULT; 7926 } 7927 7928 meta.ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); 7929 break; 7930 } 7931 } 7932 if (i == MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) { 7933 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr in bpf_dynptr_data()\n"); 7934 return -EFAULT; 7935 } 7936 break; 7937 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: 7938 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, 7939 set_user_ringbuf_callback_state); 7940 break; 7941 } 7942 7943 if (err) 7944 return err; 7945 7946 /* reset caller saved regs */ 7947 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 7948 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 7949 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 7950 } 7951 7952 /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */ 7953 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 7954 7955 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */ 7956 ret_type = fn->ret_type; 7957 ret_flag = type_flag(ret_type); 7958 7959 switch (base_type(ret_type)) { 7960 case RET_INTEGER: 7961 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */ 7962 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7963 break; 7964 case RET_VOID: 7965 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT; 7966 break; 7967 case RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 7968 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */ 7969 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7970 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access() 7971 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access 7972 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() 7973 */ 7974 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { 7975 verbose(env, 7976 "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); 7977 return -EINVAL; 7978 } 7979 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; 7980 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map_uid; 7981 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag; 7982 if (!type_may_be_null(ret_type) && 7983 btf_record_has_field(meta.map_ptr->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 7984 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 7985 } 7986 break; 7987 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET: 7988 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7989 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET | ret_flag; 7990 break; 7991 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 7992 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7993 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | ret_flag; 7994 break; 7995 case RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 7996 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 7997 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | ret_flag; 7998 break; 7999 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM: 8000 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8001 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 8002 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size; 8003 break; 8004 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID: 8005 { 8006 const struct btf_type *t; 8007 8008 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8009 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL); 8010 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 8011 u32 tsize; 8012 const struct btf_type *ret; 8013 const char *tname; 8014 8015 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 8016 ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize); 8017 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 8018 tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off); 8019 verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 8020 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 8021 return -EINVAL; 8022 } 8023 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag; 8024 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize; 8025 } else { 8026 /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it 8027 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise 8028 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in 8029 * check_mem_access(). 8030 */ 8031 ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY; 8032 8033 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 8034 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf; 8035 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 8036 } 8037 break; 8038 } 8039 case RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 8040 { 8041 struct btf *ret_btf; 8042 int ret_btf_id; 8043 8044 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 8045 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag; 8046 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { 8047 ret_btf = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf; 8048 ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf_id; 8049 } else { 8050 if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { 8051 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); 8052 verbose(env, "func %s has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON return type\n", 8053 func_id_name(func_id)); 8054 return -EINVAL; 8055 } 8056 ret_btf = btf_vmlinux; 8057 ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id; 8058 } 8059 if (ret_btf_id == 0) { 8060 verbose(env, "invalid return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 8061 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), 8062 func_id); 8063 return -EINVAL; 8064 } 8065 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 8066 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 8067 break; 8068 } 8069 default: 8070 verbose(env, "unknown return type %u of func %s#%d\n", 8071 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 8072 return -EINVAL; 8073 } 8074 8075 if (type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type)) 8076 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 8077 8078 if (helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 8079 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: func %s#%d sets ref_obj_id more than once\n", 8080 func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 8081 return -EFAULT; 8082 } 8083 8084 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id) || is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) { 8085 /* For release_reference() */ 8086 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 8087 } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { 8088 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 8089 8090 if (id < 0) 8091 return id; 8092 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */ 8093 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 8094 /* For release_reference() */ 8095 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 8096 } 8097 8098 do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); 8099 8100 err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); 8101 if (err) 8102 return err; 8103 8104 if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack || 8105 func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) && 8106 !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) { 8107 const char *err_str; 8108 8109 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS 8110 err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); 8111 err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n"; 8112 #else 8113 err = -ENOTSUPP; 8114 err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n"; 8115 #endif 8116 if (err) { 8117 verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); 8118 return err; 8119 } 8120 8121 env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true; 8122 } 8123 8124 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack) 8125 env->prog->call_get_stack = true; 8126 8127 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 8128 if (check_get_func_ip(env)) 8129 return -ENOTSUPP; 8130 env->prog->call_get_func_ip = true; 8131 } 8132 8133 if (changes_data) 8134 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); 8135 return 0; 8136 } 8137 8138 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by 8139 * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument. 8140 */ 8141 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, 8142 size_t reg_size) 8143 { 8144 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno]; 8145 8146 if (regno == BPF_REG_0) { 8147 /* Function return value */ 8148 reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 8149 reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ? 8150 DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1; 8151 } else { 8152 /* Function argument */ 8153 if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) { 8154 mark_insn_zext(env, reg); 8155 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64); 8156 } else { 8157 mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ32); 8158 } 8159 } 8160 } 8161 8162 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta { 8163 /* In parameters */ 8164 struct btf *btf; 8165 u32 func_id; 8166 u32 kfunc_flags; 8167 const struct btf_type *func_proto; 8168 const char *func_name; 8169 /* Out parameters */ 8170 u32 ref_obj_id; 8171 u8 release_regno; 8172 bool r0_rdonly; 8173 u32 ret_btf_id; 8174 u64 r0_size; 8175 struct { 8176 u64 value; 8177 bool found; 8178 } arg_constant; 8179 struct { 8180 struct btf *btf; 8181 u32 btf_id; 8182 } arg_obj_drop; 8183 struct { 8184 struct btf_field *field; 8185 } arg_list_head; 8186 }; 8187 8188 static bool is_kfunc_acquire(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8189 { 8190 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ACQUIRE; 8191 } 8192 8193 static bool is_kfunc_ret_null(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8194 { 8195 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RET_NULL; 8196 } 8197 8198 static bool is_kfunc_release(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8199 { 8200 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RELEASE; 8201 } 8202 8203 static bool is_kfunc_trusted_args(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8204 { 8205 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_TRUSTED_ARGS; 8206 } 8207 8208 static bool is_kfunc_sleepable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8209 { 8210 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_SLEEPABLE; 8211 } 8212 8213 static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8214 { 8215 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE; 8216 } 8217 8218 static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8219 { 8220 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU; 8221 } 8222 8223 static bool is_kfunc_arg_kptr_get(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg) 8224 { 8225 return arg == 0 && (meta->kfunc_flags & KF_KPTR_GET); 8226 } 8227 8228 static bool __kfunc_param_match_suffix(const struct btf *btf, 8229 const struct btf_param *arg, 8230 const char *suffix) 8231 { 8232 int suffix_len = strlen(suffix), len; 8233 const char *param_name; 8234 8235 /* In the future, this can be ported to use BTF tagging */ 8236 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 8237 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 8238 return false; 8239 len = strlen(param_name); 8240 if (len < suffix_len) 8241 return false; 8242 param_name += len - suffix_len; 8243 return !strncmp(param_name, suffix, suffix_len); 8244 } 8245 8246 static bool is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(const struct btf *btf, 8247 const struct btf_param *arg, 8248 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 8249 { 8250 const struct btf_type *t; 8251 8252 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 8253 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 8254 return false; 8255 8256 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__sz"); 8257 } 8258 8259 static bool is_kfunc_arg_constant(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8260 { 8261 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__k"); 8262 } 8263 8264 static bool is_kfunc_arg_ignore(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8265 { 8266 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__ign"); 8267 } 8268 8269 static bool is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8270 { 8271 return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__alloc"); 8272 } 8273 8274 static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf *btf, 8275 const struct btf_param *arg, 8276 const char *name) 8277 { 8278 int len, target_len = strlen(name); 8279 const char *param_name; 8280 8281 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off); 8282 if (str_is_empty(param_name)) 8283 return false; 8284 len = strlen(param_name); 8285 if (len != target_len) 8286 return false; 8287 if (strcmp(param_name, name)) 8288 return false; 8289 8290 return true; 8291 } 8292 8293 enum { 8294 KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID, 8295 KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID, 8296 KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID, 8297 }; 8298 8299 BTF_ID_LIST(kf_arg_btf_ids) 8300 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_dynptr_kern) 8301 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_head) 8302 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_node) 8303 8304 static bool __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(const struct btf *btf, 8305 const struct btf_param *arg, int type) 8306 { 8307 const struct btf_type *t; 8308 u32 res_id; 8309 8310 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL); 8311 if (!t) 8312 return false; 8313 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 8314 return false; 8315 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &res_id); 8316 if (!t) 8317 return false; 8318 return btf_types_are_same(btf, res_id, btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[type]); 8319 } 8320 8321 static bool is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8322 { 8323 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID); 8324 } 8325 8326 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_head(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8327 { 8328 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID); 8329 } 8330 8331 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg) 8332 { 8333 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID); 8334 } 8335 8336 /* Returns true if struct is composed of scalars, 4 levels of nesting allowed */ 8337 static bool __btf_type_is_scalar_struct(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8338 const struct btf *btf, 8339 const struct btf_type *t, int rec) 8340 { 8341 const struct btf_type *member_type; 8342 const struct btf_member *member; 8343 u32 i; 8344 8345 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) 8346 return false; 8347 8348 for_each_member(i, t, member) { 8349 const struct btf_array *array; 8350 8351 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, member->type, NULL); 8352 if (btf_type_is_struct(member_type)) { 8353 if (rec >= 3) { 8354 verbose(env, "max struct nesting depth exceeded\n"); 8355 return false; 8356 } 8357 if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, btf, member_type, rec + 1)) 8358 return false; 8359 continue; 8360 } 8361 if (btf_type_is_array(member_type)) { 8362 array = btf_array(member_type); 8363 if (!array->nelems) 8364 return false; 8365 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, array->type, NULL); 8366 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 8367 return false; 8368 continue; 8369 } 8370 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type)) 8371 return false; 8372 } 8373 return true; 8374 } 8375 8376 8377 static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = { 8378 #ifdef CONFIG_NET 8379 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK], 8380 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON], 8381 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_TCP], 8382 #endif 8383 }; 8384 8385 enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type { 8386 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, 8387 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID, /* Allocated object */ 8388 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR, /* PTR_TO_KPTR but type specific */ 8389 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, 8390 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD, 8391 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE, 8392 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID, /* Also covers reg2btf_ids conversions */ 8393 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, 8394 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE, /* Size derived from next argument, skip it */ 8395 }; 8396 8397 enum special_kfunc_type { 8398 KF_bpf_obj_new_impl, 8399 KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl, 8400 KF_bpf_list_push_front, 8401 KF_bpf_list_push_back, 8402 KF_bpf_list_pop_front, 8403 KF_bpf_list_pop_back, 8404 KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx, 8405 KF_bpf_rdonly_cast, 8406 KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock, 8407 KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock, 8408 }; 8409 8410 BTF_SET_START(special_kfunc_set) 8411 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 8412 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 8413 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front) 8414 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back) 8415 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 8416 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 8417 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 8418 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 8419 BTF_SET_END(special_kfunc_set) 8420 8421 BTF_ID_LIST(special_kfunc_list) 8422 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl) 8423 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl) 8424 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front) 8425 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back) 8426 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front) 8427 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back) 8428 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx) 8429 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast) 8430 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_lock) 8431 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_unlock) 8432 8433 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8434 { 8435 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock]; 8436 } 8437 8438 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8439 { 8440 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock]; 8441 } 8442 8443 static enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type 8444 get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8445 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 8446 const struct btf_type *t, const struct btf_type *ref_t, 8447 const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args, 8448 int argno, int nargs) 8449 { 8450 u32 regno = argno + 1; 8451 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 8452 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; 8453 bool arg_mem_size = false; 8454 8455 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) 8456 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 8457 8458 /* In this function, we verify the kfunc's BTF as per the argument type, 8459 * leaving the rest of the verification with respect to the register 8460 * type to our caller. When a set of conditions hold in the BTF type of 8461 * arguments, we resolve it to a known kfunc_ptr_arg_type. 8462 */ 8463 if (btf_get_prog_ctx_type(&env->log, meta->btf, t, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), argno)) 8464 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX; 8465 8466 if (is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 8467 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID; 8468 8469 if (is_kfunc_arg_kptr_get(meta, argno)) { 8470 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(ref_t)) { 8471 verbose(env, "arg#0 BTF type must be a double pointer for kptr_get kfunc\n"); 8472 return -EINVAL; 8473 } 8474 ref_t = btf_type_by_id(meta->btf, ref_t->type); 8475 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta->btf, ref_t->name_off); 8476 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) { 8477 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#0 pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 8478 meta->func_name, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 8479 return -EINVAL; 8480 } 8481 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR; 8482 } 8483 8484 if (is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 8485 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR; 8486 8487 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_head(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 8488 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD; 8489 8490 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_node(meta->btf, &args[argno])) 8491 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE; 8492 8493 if ((base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])) { 8494 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) { 8495 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 8496 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 8497 return -EINVAL; 8498 } 8499 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 8500 } 8501 8502 if (argno + 1 < nargs && is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1])) 8503 arg_mem_size = true; 8504 8505 /* This is the catch all argument type of register types supported by 8506 * check_helper_mem_access. However, we only allow when argument type is 8507 * pointer to scalar, or struct composed (recursively) of scalars. When 8508 * arg_mem_size is true, the pointer can be void *. 8509 */ 8510 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(ref_t) && !__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, meta->btf, ref_t, 0) && 8511 (arg_mem_size ? !btf_type_is_void(ref_t) : 1)) { 8512 verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s must point to %sscalar, or struct with scalar\n", 8513 argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, arg_mem_size ? "void, " : ""); 8514 return -EINVAL; 8515 } 8516 return arg_mem_size ? KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE : KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM; 8517 } 8518 8519 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8520 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 8521 const struct btf_type *ref_t, 8522 const char *ref_tname, u32 ref_id, 8523 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 8524 int argno) 8525 { 8526 const struct btf_type *reg_ref_t; 8527 bool strict_type_match = false; 8528 const struct btf *reg_btf; 8529 const char *reg_ref_tname; 8530 u32 reg_ref_id; 8531 8532 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 8533 reg_btf = reg->btf; 8534 reg_ref_id = reg->btf_id; 8535 } else { 8536 reg_btf = btf_vmlinux; 8537 reg_ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]; 8538 } 8539 8540 if (is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) || (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id)) 8541 strict_type_match = true; 8542 8543 reg_ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(reg_btf, reg_ref_id, ®_ref_id); 8544 reg_ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg_btf, reg_ref_t->name_off); 8545 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, reg->off, meta->btf, ref_id, strict_type_match)) { 8546 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s but R%d has a pointer to %s %s\n", 8547 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, argno + 1, 8548 btf_type_str(reg_ref_t), reg_ref_tname); 8549 return -EINVAL; 8550 } 8551 return 0; 8552 } 8553 8554 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_kptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8555 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 8556 const struct btf_type *ref_t, 8557 const char *ref_tname, 8558 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, 8559 int argno) 8560 { 8561 struct btf_field *kptr_field; 8562 8563 /* check_func_arg_reg_off allows var_off for 8564 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, but we need fixed offset to find 8565 * off_desc. 8566 */ 8567 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8568 verbose(env, "arg#0 must have constant offset\n"); 8569 return -EINVAL; 8570 } 8571 8572 kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record, reg->off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR); 8573 if (!kptr_field || kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) { 8574 verbose(env, "arg#0 no referenced kptr at map value offset=%llu\n", 8575 reg->off + reg->var_off.value); 8576 return -EINVAL; 8577 } 8578 8579 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, meta->btf, ref_t->type, 0, kptr_field->kptr.btf, 8580 kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, true)) { 8581 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s\n", 8582 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname); 8583 return -EINVAL; 8584 } 8585 return 0; 8586 } 8587 8588 static int ref_set_release_on_unlock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 ref_obj_id) 8589 { 8590 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env); 8591 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 8592 int i; 8593 8594 /* bpf_spin_lock only allows calling list_push and list_pop, no BPF 8595 * subprogs, no global functions. This means that the references would 8596 * not be released inside the critical section but they may be added to 8597 * the reference state, and the acquired_refs are never copied out for a 8598 * different frame as BPF to BPF calls don't work in bpf_spin_lock 8599 * critical sections. 8600 */ 8601 if (!ref_obj_id) { 8602 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id is zero for release_on_unlock\n"); 8603 return -EFAULT; 8604 } 8605 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) { 8606 if (state->refs[i].id == ref_obj_id) { 8607 if (state->refs[i].release_on_unlock) { 8608 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: expected false release_on_unlock"); 8609 return -EFAULT; 8610 } 8611 state->refs[i].release_on_unlock = true; 8612 /* Now mark everyone sharing same ref_obj_id as untrusted */ 8613 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 8614 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) 8615 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 8616 })); 8617 return 0; 8618 } 8619 } 8620 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref state missing for ref_obj_id\n"); 8621 return -EFAULT; 8622 } 8623 8624 /* Implementation details: 8625 * 8626 * Each register points to some region of memory, which we define as an 8627 * allocation. Each allocation may embed a bpf_spin_lock which protects any 8628 * special BPF objects (bpf_list_head, bpf_rb_root, etc.) part of the same 8629 * allocation. The lock and the data it protects are colocated in the same 8630 * memory region. 8631 * 8632 * Hence, everytime a register holds a pointer value pointing to such 8633 * allocation, the verifier preserves a unique reg->id for it. 8634 * 8635 * The verifier remembers the lock 'ptr' and the lock 'id' whenever 8636 * bpf_spin_lock is called. 8637 * 8638 * To enable this, lock state in the verifier captures two values: 8639 * active_lock.ptr = Register's type specific pointer 8640 * active_lock.id = A unique ID for each register pointer value 8641 * 8642 * Currently, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC are the two 8643 * supported register types. 8644 * 8645 * The active_lock.ptr in case of map values is the reg->map_ptr, and in case of 8646 * allocated objects is the reg->btf pointer. 8647 * 8648 * The active_lock.id is non-unique for maps supporting direct_value_addr, as we 8649 * can establish the provenance of the map value statically for each distinct 8650 * lookup into such maps. They always contain a single map value hence unique 8651 * IDs for each pseudo load pessimizes the algorithm and rejects valid programs. 8652 * 8653 * So, in case of global variables, they use array maps with max_entries = 1, 8654 * hence their active_lock.ptr becomes map_ptr and id = 0 (since they all point 8655 * into the same map value as max_entries is 1, as described above). 8656 * 8657 * In case of inner map lookups, the inner map pointer has same map_ptr as the 8658 * outer map pointer (in verifier context), but each lookup into an inner map 8659 * assigns a fresh reg->id to the lookup, so while lookups into distinct inner 8660 * maps from the same outer map share the same map_ptr as active_lock.ptr, they 8661 * will get different reg->id assigned to each lookup, hence different 8662 * active_lock.id. 8663 * 8664 * In case of allocated objects, active_lock.ptr is the reg->btf, and the 8665 * reg->id is a unique ID preserved after the NULL pointer check on the pointer 8666 * returned from bpf_obj_new. Each allocation receives a new reg->id. 8667 */ 8668 static int check_reg_allocation_locked(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) 8669 { 8670 void *ptr; 8671 u32 id; 8672 8673 switch ((int)reg->type) { 8674 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 8675 ptr = reg->map_ptr; 8676 break; 8677 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: 8678 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED: 8679 ptr = reg->btf; 8680 break; 8681 default: 8682 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reg type for lock check\n"); 8683 return -EFAULT; 8684 } 8685 id = reg->id; 8686 8687 if (!env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) 8688 return -EINVAL; 8689 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr != ptr || 8690 env->cur_state->active_lock.id != id) { 8691 verbose(env, "held lock and object are not in the same allocation\n"); 8692 return -EINVAL; 8693 } 8694 return 0; 8695 } 8696 8697 static bool is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) 8698 { 8699 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front] || 8700 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back] || 8701 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 8702 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]; 8703 } 8704 8705 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8706 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 8707 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8708 { 8709 struct btf_field *field; 8710 struct btf_record *rec; 8711 u32 list_head_off; 8712 8713 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux || !is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(meta->func_id)) { 8714 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: bpf_list_head argument for unknown kfunc\n"); 8715 return -EFAULT; 8716 } 8717 8718 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8719 verbose(env, 8720 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_list_head has to be at the constant offset\n", 8721 regno); 8722 return -EINVAL; 8723 } 8724 8725 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 8726 list_head_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 8727 field = btf_record_find(rec, list_head_off, BPF_LIST_HEAD); 8728 if (!field) { 8729 verbose(env, "bpf_list_head not found at offset=%u\n", list_head_off); 8730 return -EINVAL; 8731 } 8732 8733 /* All functions require bpf_list_head to be protected using a bpf_spin_lock */ 8734 if (check_reg_allocation_locked(env, reg)) { 8735 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock at off=%d must be held for bpf_list_head\n", 8736 rec->spin_lock_off); 8737 return -EINVAL; 8738 } 8739 8740 if (meta->arg_list_head.field) { 8741 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: repeating bpf_list_head arg\n"); 8742 return -EFAULT; 8743 } 8744 meta->arg_list_head.field = field; 8745 return 0; 8746 } 8747 8748 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 8749 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, 8750 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8751 { 8752 const struct btf_type *et, *t; 8753 struct btf_field *field; 8754 struct btf_record *rec; 8755 u32 list_node_off; 8756 8757 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux || 8758 (meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front] && 8759 meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back])) { 8760 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: bpf_list_node argument for unknown kfunc\n"); 8761 return -EFAULT; 8762 } 8763 8764 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8765 verbose(env, 8766 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. bpf_list_node has to be at the constant offset\n", 8767 regno); 8768 return -EINVAL; 8769 } 8770 8771 rec = reg_btf_record(reg); 8772 list_node_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value; 8773 field = btf_record_find(rec, list_node_off, BPF_LIST_NODE); 8774 if (!field || field->offset != list_node_off) { 8775 verbose(env, "bpf_list_node not found at offset=%u\n", list_node_off); 8776 return -EINVAL; 8777 } 8778 8779 field = meta->arg_list_head.field; 8780 8781 et = btf_type_by_id(field->graph_root.btf, field->graph_root.value_btf_id); 8782 t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id); 8783 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, 0, field->graph_root.btf, 8784 field->graph_root.value_btf_id, true)) { 8785 verbose(env, "operation on bpf_list_head expects arg#1 bpf_list_node at offset=%d " 8786 "in struct %s, but arg is at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 8787 field->graph_root.node_offset, 8788 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off), 8789 list_node_off, btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off)); 8790 return -EINVAL; 8791 } 8792 8793 if (list_node_off != field->graph_root.node_offset) { 8794 verbose(env, "arg#1 offset=%d, but expected bpf_list_node at offset=%d in struct %s\n", 8795 list_node_off, field->graph_root.node_offset, 8796 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off)); 8797 return -EINVAL; 8798 } 8799 /* Set arg#1 for expiration after unlock */ 8800 return ref_set_release_on_unlock(env, reg->ref_obj_id); 8801 } 8802 8803 static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) 8804 { 8805 const char *func_name = meta->func_name, *ref_tname; 8806 const struct btf *btf = meta->btf; 8807 const struct btf_param *args; 8808 u32 i, nargs; 8809 int ret; 8810 8811 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta->func_proto + 1); 8812 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta->func_proto); 8813 if (nargs > MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) { 8814 verbose(env, "Function %s has %d > %d args\n", func_name, nargs, 8815 MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS); 8816 return -EINVAL; 8817 } 8818 8819 /* Check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the 8820 * verifier sees. 8821 */ 8822 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 8823 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[i + 1]; 8824 const struct btf_type *t, *ref_t, *resolve_ret; 8825 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = ARG_DONTCARE; 8826 u32 regno = i + 1, ref_id, type_size; 8827 bool is_ret_buf_sz = false; 8828 int kf_arg_type; 8829 8830 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, args[i].type, NULL); 8831 8832 if (is_kfunc_arg_ignore(btf, &args[i])) 8833 continue; 8834 8835 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 8836 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 8837 verbose(env, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno); 8838 return -EINVAL; 8839 } 8840 8841 if (is_kfunc_arg_constant(meta->btf, &args[i])) { 8842 if (meta->arg_constant.found) { 8843 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n"); 8844 return -EFAULT; 8845 } 8846 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8847 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno); 8848 return -EINVAL; 8849 } 8850 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 8851 if (ret < 0) 8852 return ret; 8853 meta->arg_constant.found = true; 8854 meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value; 8855 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdonly_buf_size")) { 8856 meta->r0_rdonly = true; 8857 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 8858 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdwr_buf_size")) { 8859 is_ret_buf_sz = true; 8860 } 8861 8862 if (is_ret_buf_sz) { 8863 if (meta->r0_size) { 8864 verbose(env, "2 or more rdonly/rdwr_buf_size parameters for kfunc"); 8865 return -EINVAL; 8866 } 8867 8868 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 8869 verbose(env, "R%d is not a const\n", regno); 8870 return -EINVAL; 8871 } 8872 8873 meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value; 8874 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); 8875 if (ret) 8876 return ret; 8877 } 8878 continue; 8879 } 8880 8881 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 8882 verbose(env, "Unrecognized arg#%d type %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 8883 return -EINVAL; 8884 } 8885 8886 if (reg->ref_obj_id) { 8887 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) { 8888 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", 8889 regno, reg->ref_obj_id, 8890 meta->ref_obj_id); 8891 return -EFAULT; 8892 } 8893 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; 8894 if (is_kfunc_release(meta)) 8895 meta->release_regno = regno; 8896 } 8897 8898 ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &ref_id); 8899 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off); 8900 8901 kf_arg_type = get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(env, meta, t, ref_t, ref_tname, args, i, nargs); 8902 if (kf_arg_type < 0) 8903 return kf_arg_type; 8904 8905 switch (kf_arg_type) { 8906 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 8907 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 8908 if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && !is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) 8909 break; 8910 8911 if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) { 8912 if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) { 8913 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); 8914 return -EINVAL; 8915 } 8916 if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) { 8917 verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno); 8918 return -EINVAL; 8919 } 8920 } 8921 8922 fallthrough; 8923 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 8924 /* Trusted arguments have the same offset checks as release arguments */ 8925 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 8926 break; 8927 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR: 8928 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 8929 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 8930 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 8931 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 8932 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 8933 /* Trusted by default */ 8934 break; 8935 default: 8936 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 8937 return -EFAULT; 8938 } 8939 8940 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) 8941 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; 8942 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); 8943 if (ret < 0) 8944 return ret; 8945 8946 switch (kf_arg_type) { 8947 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: 8948 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 8949 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to ctx, but got %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t)); 8950 return -EINVAL; 8951 } 8952 8953 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 8954 ret = get_kern_ctx_btf_id(&env->log, resolve_prog_type(env->prog)); 8955 if (ret < 0) 8956 return -EINVAL; 8957 meta->ret_btf_id = ret; 8958 } 8959 break; 8960 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: 8961 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 8962 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 8963 return -EINVAL; 8964 } 8965 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 8966 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 8967 return -EINVAL; 8968 } 8969 if (meta->btf == btf_vmlinux && 8970 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 8971 meta->arg_obj_drop.btf = reg->btf; 8972 meta->arg_obj_drop.btf_id = reg->btf_id; 8973 } 8974 break; 8975 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR: 8976 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { 8977 verbose(env, "arg#0 expected pointer to map value\n"); 8978 return -EINVAL; 8979 } 8980 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_kptr(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, meta, i); 8981 if (ret < 0) 8982 return ret; 8983 break; 8984 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR: 8985 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK && 8986 reg->type != CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { 8987 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to stack or dynptr_ptr\n", i); 8988 return -EINVAL; 8989 } 8990 8991 ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY, NULL); 8992 if (ret < 0) 8993 return ret; 8994 break; 8995 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD: 8996 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && 8997 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 8998 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i); 8999 return -EINVAL; 9000 } 9001 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { 9002 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 9003 return -EINVAL; 9004 } 9005 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(env, reg, regno, meta); 9006 if (ret < 0) 9007 return ret; 9008 break; 9009 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE: 9010 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) { 9011 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i); 9012 return -EINVAL; 9013 } 9014 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) { 9015 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n"); 9016 return -EINVAL; 9017 } 9018 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(env, reg, regno, meta); 9019 if (ret < 0) 9020 return ret; 9021 break; 9022 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 9023 /* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */ 9024 if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || 9025 (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) && 9026 !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) { 9027 verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 9028 verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n", 9029 reg_type_str(env, base_type(reg->type) | 9030 (type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS))); 9031 return -EINVAL; 9032 } 9033 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, ref_id, meta, i); 9034 if (ret < 0) 9035 return ret; 9036 break; 9037 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM: 9038 resolve_ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, ref_t, &type_size); 9039 if (IS_ERR(resolve_ret)) { 9040 verbose(env, "arg#%d reference type('%s %s') size cannot be determined: %ld\n", 9041 i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, PTR_ERR(resolve_ret)); 9042 return -EINVAL; 9043 } 9044 ret = check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, type_size); 9045 if (ret < 0) 9046 return ret; 9047 break; 9048 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE: 9049 ret = check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(env, ®s[regno + 1], regno + 1); 9050 if (ret < 0) { 9051 verbose(env, "arg#%d arg#%d memory, len pair leads to invalid memory access\n", i, i + 1); 9052 return ret; 9053 } 9054 /* Skip next '__sz' argument */ 9055 i++; 9056 break; 9057 } 9058 } 9059 9060 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && !meta->release_regno) { 9061 verbose(env, "release kernel function %s expects refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n", 9062 func_name); 9063 return -EINVAL; 9064 } 9065 9066 return 0; 9067 } 9068 9069 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 9070 int *insn_idx_p) 9071 { 9072 const struct btf_type *t, *func, *func_proto, *ptr_type; 9073 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 9074 const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name; 9075 bool sleepable, rcu_lock, rcu_unlock; 9076 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; 9077 u32 i, nargs, func_id, ptr_type_id; 9078 int err, insn_idx = *insn_idx_p; 9079 const struct btf_param *args; 9080 const struct btf_type *ret_t; 9081 struct btf *desc_btf; 9082 u32 *kfunc_flags; 9083 9084 /* skip for now, but return error when we find this in fixup_kfunc_call */ 9085 if (!insn->imm) 9086 return 0; 9087 9088 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, insn->off); 9089 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf)) 9090 return PTR_ERR(desc_btf); 9091 9092 func_id = insn->imm; 9093 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func_id); 9094 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off); 9095 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, func->type); 9096 9097 kfunc_flags = btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(desc_btf, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), func_id); 9098 if (!kfunc_flags) { 9099 verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n", 9100 func_name); 9101 return -EACCES; 9102 } 9103 9104 /* Prepare kfunc call metadata */ 9105 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); 9106 meta.btf = desc_btf; 9107 meta.func_id = func_id; 9108 meta.kfunc_flags = *kfunc_flags; 9109 meta.func_proto = func_proto; 9110 meta.func_name = func_name; 9111 9112 if (is_kfunc_destructive(&meta) && !capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) { 9113 verbose(env, "destructive kfunc calls require CAP_SYS_BOOT capability\n"); 9114 return -EACCES; 9115 } 9116 9117 sleepable = is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta); 9118 if (sleepable && !env->prog->aux->sleepable) { 9119 verbose(env, "program must be sleepable to call sleepable kfunc %s\n", func_name); 9120 return -EACCES; 9121 } 9122 9123 rcu_lock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(&meta); 9124 rcu_unlock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(&meta); 9125 if ((rcu_lock || rcu_unlock) && !env->rcu_tag_supported) { 9126 verbose(env, "no vmlinux btf rcu tag support for kfunc %s\n", func_name); 9127 return -EACCES; 9128 } 9129 9130 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 9131 struct bpf_func_state *state; 9132 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 9133 9134 if (rcu_lock) { 9135 verbose(env, "nested rcu read lock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 9136 return -EINVAL; 9137 } else if (rcu_unlock) { 9138 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ 9139 if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { 9140 reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL); 9141 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; 9142 } 9143 })); 9144 env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock = false; 9145 } else if (sleepable) { 9146 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within rcu_read_lock region\n", func_name); 9147 return -EACCES; 9148 } 9149 } else if (rcu_lock) { 9150 env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock = true; 9151 } else if (rcu_unlock) { 9152 verbose(env, "unmatched rcu read unlock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name); 9153 return -EINVAL; 9154 } 9155 9156 /* Check the arguments */ 9157 err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta); 9158 if (err < 0) 9159 return err; 9160 /* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted 9161 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now. 9162 */ 9163 if (meta.release_regno) { 9164 err = release_reference(env, regs[meta.release_regno].ref_obj_id); 9165 if (err) { 9166 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n", 9167 func_name, func_id); 9168 return err; 9169 } 9170 } 9171 9172 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) 9173 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 9174 9175 /* Check return type */ 9176 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 9177 9178 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta) && !btf_type_is_struct_ptr(meta.btf, t)) { 9179 /* Only exception is bpf_obj_new_impl */ 9180 if (meta.btf != btf_vmlinux || meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 9181 verbose(env, "acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n"); 9182 return -EINVAL; 9183 } 9184 } 9185 9186 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) { 9187 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9188 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size); 9189 } else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) { 9190 ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t->type, &ptr_type_id); 9191 9192 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) { 9193 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 9194 struct btf *ret_btf; 9195 u32 ret_btf_id; 9196 9197 if (unlikely(!bpf_global_ma_set)) 9198 return -ENOMEM; 9199 9200 if (((u64)(u32)meta.arg_constant.value) != meta.arg_constant.value) { 9201 verbose(env, "local type ID argument must be in range [0, U32_MAX]\n"); 9202 return -EINVAL; 9203 } 9204 9205 ret_btf = env->prog->aux->btf; 9206 ret_btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value; 9207 9208 /* This may be NULL due to user not supplying a BTF */ 9209 if (!ret_btf) { 9210 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new requires prog BTF\n"); 9211 return -EINVAL; 9212 } 9213 9214 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 9215 if (!ret_t || !__btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 9216 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 9217 return -EINVAL; 9218 } 9219 9220 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9221 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 9222 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf; 9223 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id; 9224 9225 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size = ret_t->size; 9226 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta = 9227 btf_find_struct_meta(ret_btf, ret_btf_id); 9228 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 9229 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta = 9230 btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_obj_drop.btf, 9231 meta.arg_obj_drop.btf_id); 9232 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] || 9233 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back]) { 9234 struct btf_field *field = meta.arg_list_head.field; 9235 9236 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9237 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC; 9238 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = field->graph_root.btf; 9239 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = field->graph_root.value_btf_id; 9240 regs[BPF_REG_0].off = field->graph_root.node_offset; 9241 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) { 9242 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9243 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED; 9244 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 9245 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id; 9246 } else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 9247 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, meta.arg_constant.value); 9248 if (!ret_t || !btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { 9249 verbose(env, 9250 "kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); 9251 return -EINVAL; 9252 } 9253 9254 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9255 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; 9256 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 9257 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.arg_constant.value; 9258 } else { 9259 verbose(env, "kernel function %s unhandled dynamic return type\n", 9260 meta.func_name); 9261 return -EFAULT; 9262 } 9263 } else if (!__btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) { 9264 if (!meta.r0_size) { 9265 ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, 9266 ptr_type->name_off); 9267 verbose(env, 9268 "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n", 9269 func_name, 9270 btf_type_str(ptr_type), 9271 ptr_type_name); 9272 return -EINVAL; 9273 } 9274 9275 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9276 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM; 9277 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size; 9278 9279 if (meta.r0_rdonly) 9280 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY; 9281 9282 /* Ensures we don't access the memory after a release_reference() */ 9283 if (meta.ref_obj_id) 9284 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id; 9285 } else { 9286 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 9287 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; 9288 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 9289 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id; 9290 } 9291 9292 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) { 9293 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; 9294 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg, see 93c230e3f5bd6 */ 9295 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 9296 } 9297 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *)); 9298 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta)) { 9299 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx); 9300 9301 if (id < 0) 9302 return id; 9303 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) 9304 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id; 9305 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id; 9306 } 9307 if (reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(®s[BPF_REG_0]) && !regs[BPF_REG_0].id) 9308 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; 9309 } /* else { add_kfunc_call() ensures it is btf_type_is_void(t) } */ 9310 9311 nargs = btf_type_vlen(func_proto); 9312 args = (const struct btf_param *)(func_proto + 1); 9313 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) { 9314 u32 regno = i + 1; 9315 9316 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, args[i].type, NULL); 9317 if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 9318 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *)); 9319 else 9320 /* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */ 9321 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size); 9322 } 9323 9324 return 0; 9325 } 9326 9327 static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 9328 { 9329 /* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 9330 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b); 9331 9332 if (b < 0) 9333 return res > a; 9334 return res < a; 9335 } 9336 9337 static bool signed_add32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 9338 { 9339 /* Do the add in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 9340 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a + (u32)b); 9341 9342 if (b < 0) 9343 return res > a; 9344 return res < a; 9345 } 9346 9347 static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b) 9348 { 9349 /* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */ 9350 s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b); 9351 9352 if (b < 0) 9353 return res < a; 9354 return res > a; 9355 } 9356 9357 static bool signed_sub32_overflows(s32 a, s32 b) 9358 { 9359 /* Do the sub in u32, where overflow is well-defined */ 9360 s32 res = (s32)((u32)a - (u32)b); 9361 9362 if (b < 0) 9363 return res < a; 9364 return res > a; 9365 } 9366 9367 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9368 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 9369 enum bpf_reg_type type) 9370 { 9371 bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off); 9372 s64 val = reg->var_off.value; 9373 s64 smin = reg->smin_value; 9374 9375 if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) { 9376 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n", 9377 reg_type_str(env, type), val); 9378 return false; 9379 } 9380 9381 if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 9382 verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n", 9383 reg_type_str(env, type), reg->off); 9384 return false; 9385 } 9386 9387 if (smin == S64_MIN) { 9388 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n", 9389 reg_type_str(env, type)); 9390 return false; 9391 } 9392 9393 if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 9394 verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n", 9395 smin, reg_type_str(env, type)); 9396 return false; 9397 } 9398 9399 return true; 9400 } 9401 9402 enum { 9403 REASON_BOUNDS = -1, 9404 REASON_TYPE = -2, 9405 REASON_PATHS = -3, 9406 REASON_LIMIT = -4, 9407 REASON_STACK = -5, 9408 }; 9409 9410 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 9411 u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left) 9412 { 9413 u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0; 9414 9415 switch (ptr_reg->type) { 9416 case PTR_TO_STACK: 9417 /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the 9418 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar 9419 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is 9420 * currently prohibited for unprivileged. 9421 */ 9422 max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left; 9423 ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off); 9424 break; 9425 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 9426 max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size; 9427 ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ? 9428 ptr_reg->smin_value : 9429 ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off; 9430 break; 9431 default: 9432 return REASON_TYPE; 9433 } 9434 9435 if (ptr_limit >= max) 9436 return REASON_LIMIT; 9437 *alu_limit = ptr_limit; 9438 return 0; 9439 } 9440 9441 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9442 const struct bpf_insn *insn) 9443 { 9444 return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K; 9445 } 9446 9447 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, 9448 u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit) 9449 { 9450 /* If we arrived here from different branches with different 9451 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work. 9452 */ 9453 if (aux->alu_state && 9454 (aux->alu_state != alu_state || 9455 aux->alu_limit != alu_limit)) 9456 return REASON_PATHS; 9457 9458 /* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */ 9459 aux->alu_state = alu_state; 9460 aux->alu_limit = alu_limit; 9461 return 0; 9462 } 9463 9464 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9465 struct bpf_insn *insn) 9466 { 9467 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 9468 9469 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 9470 return 0; 9471 9472 return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0); 9473 } 9474 9475 static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode) 9476 { 9477 return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB; 9478 } 9479 9480 struct bpf_sanitize_info { 9481 struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux; 9482 bool mask_to_left; 9483 }; 9484 9485 static struct bpf_verifier_state * 9486 sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9487 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 9488 u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx) 9489 { 9490 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; 9491 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 9492 9493 branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true); 9494 if (branch && insn) { 9495 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs; 9496 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 9497 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 9498 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 9499 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 9500 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg); 9501 } 9502 } 9503 return branch; 9504 } 9505 9506 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9507 struct bpf_insn *insn, 9508 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 9509 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 9510 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9511 struct bpf_sanitize_info *info, 9512 const bool commit_window) 9513 { 9514 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux; 9515 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 9516 bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 9517 bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; 9518 bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg; 9519 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 9520 u32 alu_state, alu_limit; 9521 struct bpf_reg_state tmp; 9522 bool ret; 9523 int err; 9524 9525 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)) 9526 return 0; 9527 9528 /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative 9529 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care 9530 * to explore bad access from here. 9531 */ 9532 if (vstate->speculative) 9533 goto do_sim; 9534 9535 if (!commit_window) { 9536 if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) && 9537 (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0)) 9538 return REASON_BOUNDS; 9539 9540 info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || 9541 (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); 9542 } 9543 9544 err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left); 9545 if (err < 0) 9546 return err; 9547 9548 if (commit_window) { 9549 /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on 9550 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation. 9551 */ 9552 alu_state = info->aux.alu_state; 9553 alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit); 9554 } else { 9555 alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0; 9556 alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0; 9557 alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? 9558 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; 9559 9560 /* Limit pruning on unknown scalars to enable deep search for 9561 * potential masking differences from other program paths. 9562 */ 9563 if (!off_is_imm) 9564 env->explore_alu_limits = true; 9565 } 9566 9567 err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit); 9568 if (err < 0) 9569 return err; 9570 do_sim: 9571 /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already 9572 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification 9573 * stack. 9574 * 9575 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based 9576 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as 9577 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either). 9578 */ 9579 if (commit_window || off_is_imm) 9580 return 0; 9581 9582 /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under 9583 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of 9584 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off 9585 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there 9586 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example, 9587 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction 9588 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore 9589 * bad access. 9590 */ 9591 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) { 9592 tmp = *dst_reg; 9593 *dst_reg = *ptr_reg; 9594 } 9595 ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1, 9596 env->insn_idx); 9597 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret) 9598 *dst_reg = tmp; 9599 return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0; 9600 } 9601 9602 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 9603 { 9604 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 9605 9606 /* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the 9607 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in 9608 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still 9609 * rewrite/sanitize them. 9610 */ 9611 if (!vstate->speculative) 9612 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt; 9613 } 9614 9615 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9616 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason, 9617 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, 9618 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 9619 { 9620 static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root"; 9621 const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub"; 9622 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; 9623 9624 switch (reason) { 9625 case REASON_BOUNDS: 9626 verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n", 9627 off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err); 9628 break; 9629 case REASON_TYPE: 9630 verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n", 9631 off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err); 9632 break; 9633 case REASON_PATHS: 9634 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n", 9635 dst, op, err); 9636 break; 9637 case REASON_LIMIT: 9638 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n", 9639 dst, op, err); 9640 break; 9641 case REASON_STACK: 9642 verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n", 9643 dst, err); 9644 break; 9645 default: 9646 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n", 9647 reason); 9648 break; 9649 } 9650 9651 return -EACCES; 9652 } 9653 9654 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't 9655 * have a variable offset. 9656 * 9657 * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it 9658 * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also 9659 * retrieve_ptr_limit(). 9660 * 9661 * 9662 * 'off' includes 'reg->off'. 9663 */ 9664 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( 9665 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9666 int regno, 9667 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 9668 int off) 9669 { 9670 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { 9671 char tn_buf[48]; 9672 9673 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); 9674 verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n", 9675 regno, tn_buf, off); 9676 return -EACCES; 9677 } 9678 9679 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { 9680 verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, " 9681 "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off); 9682 return -EACCES; 9683 } 9684 9685 return 0; 9686 } 9687 9688 static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9689 const struct bpf_insn *insn, 9690 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 9691 { 9692 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 9693 9694 /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds 9695 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. 9696 */ 9697 if (env->bypass_spec_v1) 9698 return 0; 9699 9700 switch (dst_reg->type) { 9701 case PTR_TO_STACK: 9702 if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg, 9703 dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value)) 9704 return -EACCES; 9705 break; 9706 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 9707 if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false, ACCESS_HELPER)) { 9708 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " 9709 "prohibited for !root\n", dst); 9710 return -EACCES; 9711 } 9712 break; 9713 default: 9714 break; 9715 } 9716 9717 return 0; 9718 } 9719 9720 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. 9721 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. 9722 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a 9723 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks. 9724 */ 9725 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 9726 struct bpf_insn *insn, 9727 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, 9728 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) 9729 { 9730 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 9731 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 9732 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg; 9733 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off); 9734 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value, 9735 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; 9736 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, 9737 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; 9738 struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {}; 9739 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 9740 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; 9741 int ret; 9742 9743 dst_reg = ®s[dst]; 9744 9745 if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 9746 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 9747 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from 9748 * e.g. dead branches. 9749 */ 9750 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 9751 return 0; 9752 } 9753 9754 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { 9755 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */ 9756 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 9757 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 9758 return 0; 9759 } 9760 9761 verbose(env, 9762 "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 9763 dst); 9764 return -EACCES; 9765 } 9766 9767 if (ptr_reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { 9768 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n", 9769 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 9770 return -EACCES; 9771 } 9772 9773 switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) { 9774 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: 9775 /* smin_val represents the known value */ 9776 if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) 9777 break; 9778 fallthrough; 9779 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: 9780 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 9781 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 9782 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 9783 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 9784 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", 9785 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); 9786 return -EACCES; 9787 default: 9788 break; 9789 } 9790 9791 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id. 9792 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset. 9793 */ 9794 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type; 9795 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 9796 9797 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) || 9798 !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 9799 return -EINVAL; 9800 9801 /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */ 9802 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 9803 9804 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 9805 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 9806 &info, false); 9807 if (ret < 0) 9808 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 9809 } 9810 9811 switch (opcode) { 9812 case BPF_ADD: 9813 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow 9814 * the s32 'off' field 9815 */ 9816 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val == 9817 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) { 9818 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */ 9819 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 9820 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 9821 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 9822 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 9823 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 9824 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val; 9825 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 9826 break; 9827 } 9828 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off 9829 * == 0, since it's a scalar. 9830 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive 9831 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id' 9832 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET. 9833 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets 9834 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset 9835 * from ptr_reg. 9836 */ 9837 if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) || 9838 signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) { 9839 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 9840 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 9841 } else { 9842 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val; 9843 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val; 9844 } 9845 if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr || 9846 umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) { 9847 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 9848 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 9849 } else { 9850 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val; 9851 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val; 9852 } 9853 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 9854 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 9855 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 9856 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 9857 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 9858 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 9859 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 9860 } 9861 break; 9862 case BPF_SUB: 9863 if (dst_reg == off_reg) { 9864 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */ 9865 verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n", 9866 dst); 9867 return -EACCES; 9868 } 9869 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to 9870 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not 9871 * be able to deal with it. 9872 */ 9873 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) { 9874 verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n", 9875 dst); 9876 return -EACCES; 9877 } 9878 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val == 9879 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) { 9880 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */ 9881 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr; 9882 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr; 9883 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr; 9884 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr; 9885 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off; 9886 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id; 9887 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val; 9888 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 9889 break; 9890 } 9891 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known 9892 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good. 9893 */ 9894 if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) || 9895 signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) { 9896 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 9897 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 9898 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 9899 } else { 9900 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val; 9901 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val; 9902 } 9903 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) { 9904 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 9905 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 9906 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 9907 } else { 9908 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 9909 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val; 9910 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val; 9911 } 9912 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off); 9913 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; 9914 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; 9915 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { 9916 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 9917 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ 9918 if (smin_val < 0) 9919 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); 9920 } 9921 break; 9922 case BPF_AND: 9923 case BPF_OR: 9924 case BPF_XOR: 9925 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */ 9926 verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n", 9927 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 9928 return -EACCES; 9929 default: 9930 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */ 9931 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n", 9932 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 9933 return -EACCES; 9934 } 9935 9936 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) 9937 return -EINVAL; 9938 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 9939 if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) 9940 return -EACCES; 9941 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 9942 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, 9943 &info, true); 9944 if (ret < 0) 9945 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); 9946 } 9947 9948 return 0; 9949 } 9950 9951 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9952 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9953 { 9954 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 9955 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 9956 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 9957 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 9958 9959 if (signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smin_val) || 9960 signed_add32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smax_val)) { 9961 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 9962 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 9963 } else { 9964 dst_reg->s32_min_value += smin_val; 9965 dst_reg->s32_max_value += smax_val; 9966 } 9967 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value + umin_val < umin_val || 9968 dst_reg->u32_max_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 9969 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 9970 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 9971 } else { 9972 dst_reg->u32_min_value += umin_val; 9973 dst_reg->u32_max_value += umax_val; 9974 } 9975 } 9976 9977 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 9978 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 9979 { 9980 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 9981 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 9982 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 9983 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 9984 9985 if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) || 9986 signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) { 9987 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 9988 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 9989 } else { 9990 dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val; 9991 dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val; 9992 } 9993 if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val || 9994 dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) { 9995 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 9996 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 9997 } else { 9998 dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val; 9999 dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val; 10000 } 10001 } 10002 10003 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10004 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10005 { 10006 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 10007 s32 smax_val = src_reg->s32_max_value; 10008 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10009 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10010 10011 if (signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_min_value, smax_val) || 10012 signed_sub32_overflows(dst_reg->s32_max_value, smin_val)) { 10013 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10014 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10015 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10016 } else { 10017 dst_reg->s32_min_value -= smax_val; 10018 dst_reg->s32_max_value -= smin_val; 10019 } 10020 if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) { 10021 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10022 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 10023 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 10024 } else { 10025 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 10026 dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val; 10027 dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val; 10028 } 10029 } 10030 10031 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10032 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10033 { 10034 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 10035 s64 smax_val = src_reg->smax_value; 10036 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10037 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10038 10039 if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) || 10040 signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) { 10041 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10042 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10043 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10044 } else { 10045 dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val; 10046 dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val; 10047 } 10048 if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { 10049 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10050 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 10051 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 10052 } else { 10053 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ 10054 dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val; 10055 dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val; 10056 } 10057 } 10058 10059 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10060 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10061 { 10062 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 10063 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10064 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10065 10066 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0) { 10067 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 10068 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 10069 return; 10070 } 10071 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 10072 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S32_MAX). 10073 */ 10074 if (umax_val > U16_MAX || dst_reg->u32_max_value > U16_MAX) { 10075 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 10076 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 10077 return; 10078 } 10079 dst_reg->u32_min_value *= umin_val; 10080 dst_reg->u32_max_value *= umax_val; 10081 if (dst_reg->u32_max_value > S32_MAX) { 10082 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10083 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10084 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10085 } else { 10086 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 10087 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 10088 } 10089 } 10090 10091 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10092 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10093 { 10094 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 10095 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10096 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10097 10098 if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) { 10099 /* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */ 10100 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10101 return; 10102 } 10103 /* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and 10104 * copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX). 10105 */ 10106 if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) { 10107 /* Potential overflow, we know nothing */ 10108 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10109 return; 10110 } 10111 dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val; 10112 dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val; 10113 if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) { 10114 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ 10115 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10116 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10117 } else { 10118 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 10119 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 10120 } 10121 } 10122 10123 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10124 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10125 { 10126 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 10127 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 10128 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 10129 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 10130 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10131 10132 if (src_known && dst_known) { 10133 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 10134 return; 10135 } 10136 10137 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 10138 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 10139 */ 10140 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 10141 dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val); 10142 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 10143 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 10144 * ain't nobody got time for that. 10145 */ 10146 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10147 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10148 } else { 10149 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 10150 * cast result into s64. 10151 */ 10152 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 10153 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 10154 } 10155 } 10156 10157 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10158 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10159 { 10160 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 10161 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 10162 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 10163 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10164 10165 if (src_known && dst_known) { 10166 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 10167 return; 10168 } 10169 10170 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently 10171 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima. 10172 */ 10173 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 10174 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val); 10175 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 10176 /* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers, 10177 * ain't nobody got time for that. 10178 */ 10179 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10180 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10181 } else { 10182 /* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 10183 * cast result into s64. 10184 */ 10185 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 10186 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 10187 } 10188 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 10189 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10190 } 10191 10192 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10193 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10194 { 10195 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 10196 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 10197 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 10198 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 10199 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10200 10201 if (src_known && dst_known) { 10202 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 10203 return; 10204 } 10205 10206 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 10207 * maximum of the operands' minima 10208 */ 10209 dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val); 10210 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 10211 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 10212 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 10213 * ain't nobody got time for that. 10214 */ 10215 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10216 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10217 } else { 10218 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 10219 * cast result into s64. 10220 */ 10221 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 10222 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 10223 } 10224 } 10225 10226 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10227 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10228 { 10229 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 10230 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 10231 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 10232 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10233 10234 if (src_known && dst_known) { 10235 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 10236 return; 10237 } 10238 10239 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the 10240 * maximum of the operands' minima 10241 */ 10242 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val); 10243 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 10244 if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) { 10245 /* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers, 10246 * ain't nobody got time for that. 10247 */ 10248 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10249 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10250 } else { 10251 /* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to 10252 * cast result into s64. 10253 */ 10254 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 10255 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 10256 } 10257 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 10258 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10259 } 10260 10261 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10262 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10263 { 10264 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 10265 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 10266 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 10267 s32 smin_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; 10268 10269 if (src_known && dst_known) { 10270 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value); 10271 return; 10272 } 10273 10274 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */ 10275 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value; 10276 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask; 10277 10278 if (dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 10279 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 10280 * so safe to cast u32 result into s32. 10281 */ 10282 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value; 10283 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value; 10284 } else { 10285 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10286 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10287 } 10288 } 10289 10290 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10291 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10292 { 10293 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); 10294 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off); 10295 s64 smin_val = src_reg->smin_value; 10296 10297 if (src_known && dst_known) { 10298 /* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */ 10299 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value); 10300 return; 10301 } 10302 10303 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */ 10304 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value; 10305 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask; 10306 10307 if (dst_reg->smin_value >= 0 && smin_val >= 0) { 10308 /* XORing two positive sign numbers gives a positive, 10309 * so safe to cast u64 result into s64. 10310 */ 10311 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value; 10312 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value; 10313 } else { 10314 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10315 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10316 } 10317 10318 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10319 } 10320 10321 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10322 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 10323 { 10324 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick 10325 * up from var_off) 10326 */ 10327 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10328 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10329 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 10330 if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) { 10331 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 10332 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 10333 } else { 10334 dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val; 10335 dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val; 10336 } 10337 } 10338 10339 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10340 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10341 { 10342 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10343 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10344 /* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */ 10345 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 10346 10347 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 10348 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val)); 10349 /* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so 10350 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and 10351 * if some path skips this step we are still safe. 10352 */ 10353 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10354 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 10355 } 10356 10357 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10358 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val) 10359 { 10360 /* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign 10361 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. In this case if 32bit bounds are 10362 * positive we know this shift will also be positive so we can track 10363 * bounds correctly. Otherwise we lose all sign bit information except 10364 * what we can pick up from var_off. Perhaps we can generalize this 10365 * later to shifts of any length. 10366 */ 10367 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0) 10368 dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32; 10369 else 10370 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10371 10372 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= 0) 10373 dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32; 10374 else 10375 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10376 10377 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */ 10378 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) { 10379 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 10380 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 10381 } else { 10382 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val; 10383 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val; 10384 } 10385 } 10386 10387 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10388 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10389 { 10390 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10391 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10392 10393 /* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */ 10394 __scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 10395 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val); 10396 10397 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 10398 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */ 10399 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10400 } 10401 10402 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10403 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10404 { 10405 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off); 10406 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; 10407 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10408 10409 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 10410 * be negative, then either: 10411 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 10412 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 10413 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 10414 * signed bounds 10415 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 10416 * about the result 10417 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 10418 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 10419 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 10420 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 10421 * var_off of the result. 10422 */ 10423 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN; 10424 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX; 10425 10426 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val); 10427 dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val; 10428 dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val; 10429 10430 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10431 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 10432 } 10433 10434 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10435 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10436 { 10437 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; 10438 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10439 10440 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might 10441 * be negative, then either: 10442 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is 10443 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds 10444 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the 10445 * signed bounds 10446 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing 10447 * about the result 10448 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the 10449 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds. 10450 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds 10451 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and 10452 * var_off of the result. 10453 */ 10454 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN; 10455 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX; 10456 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val); 10457 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val; 10458 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val; 10459 10460 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 10461 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded 10462 * so we can recalculate later from tnum. 10463 */ 10464 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 10465 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10466 } 10467 10468 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10469 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10470 { 10471 u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; 10472 10473 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and 10474 * umax_val is equal to umin_val. 10475 */ 10476 dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val); 10477 dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val); 10478 10479 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32); 10480 10481 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 10482 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 10483 */ 10484 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; 10485 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; 10486 10487 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg); 10488 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg); 10489 } 10490 10491 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10492 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg) 10493 { 10494 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; 10495 10496 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal 10497 * to umin_val. 10498 */ 10499 dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val; 10500 dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val; 10501 10502 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64); 10503 10504 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on 10505 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result. 10506 */ 10507 dst_reg->umin_value = 0; 10508 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; 10509 10510 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends 10511 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out 10512 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum. 10513 */ 10514 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg); 10515 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg); 10516 } 10517 10518 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual 10519 * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts 10520 * need extra checks in the 32-bit case. 10521 */ 10522 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10523 struct bpf_insn *insn, 10524 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10525 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg) 10526 { 10527 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 10528 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 10529 bool src_known; 10530 s64 smin_val, smax_val; 10531 u64 umin_val, umax_val; 10532 s32 s32_min_val, s32_max_val; 10533 u32 u32_min_val, u32_max_val; 10534 u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32; 10535 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64); 10536 int ret; 10537 10538 smin_val = src_reg.smin_value; 10539 smax_val = src_reg.smax_value; 10540 umin_val = src_reg.umin_value; 10541 umax_val = src_reg.umax_value; 10542 10543 s32_min_val = src_reg.s32_min_value; 10544 s32_max_val = src_reg.s32_max_value; 10545 u32_min_val = src_reg.u32_min_value; 10546 u32_max_val = src_reg.u32_max_value; 10547 10548 if (alu32) { 10549 src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 10550 if ((src_known && 10551 (s32_min_val != s32_max_val || u32_min_val != u32_max_val)) || 10552 s32_min_val > s32_max_val || u32_min_val > u32_max_val) { 10553 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 10554 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 10555 */ 10556 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 10557 return 0; 10558 } 10559 } else { 10560 src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off); 10561 if ((src_known && 10562 (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) || 10563 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) { 10564 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds 10565 * derived from e.g. dead branches. 10566 */ 10567 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 10568 return 0; 10569 } 10570 } 10571 10572 if (!src_known && 10573 opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) { 10574 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg); 10575 return 0; 10576 } 10577 10578 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { 10579 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn); 10580 if (ret < 0) 10581 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL); 10582 } 10583 10584 /* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops. 10585 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both 10586 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the 10587 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32 10588 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD, 10589 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to 10590 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops. 10591 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of 10592 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy 10593 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may 10594 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark 10595 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting 10596 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds. 10597 */ 10598 switch (opcode) { 10599 case BPF_ADD: 10600 scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10601 scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10602 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10603 break; 10604 case BPF_SUB: 10605 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10606 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10607 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10608 break; 10609 case BPF_MUL: 10610 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10611 scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10612 scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10613 break; 10614 case BPF_AND: 10615 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10616 scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10617 scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10618 break; 10619 case BPF_OR: 10620 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10621 scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10622 scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10623 break; 10624 case BPF_XOR: 10625 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); 10626 scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10627 scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10628 break; 10629 case BPF_LSH: 10630 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 10631 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 10632 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 10633 */ 10634 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10635 break; 10636 } 10637 if (alu32) 10638 scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10639 else 10640 scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10641 break; 10642 case BPF_RSH: 10643 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 10644 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 10645 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 10646 */ 10647 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10648 break; 10649 } 10650 if (alu32) 10651 scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10652 else 10653 scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10654 break; 10655 case BPF_ARSH: 10656 if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) { 10657 /* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. 10658 * This includes shifts by a negative number. 10659 */ 10660 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10661 break; 10662 } 10663 if (alu32) 10664 scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10665 else 10666 scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg); 10667 break; 10668 default: 10669 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10670 break; 10671 } 10672 10673 /* ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register */ 10674 if (alu32) 10675 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 10676 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 10677 return 0; 10678 } 10679 10680 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max 10681 * and var_off. 10682 */ 10683 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 10684 struct bpf_insn *insn) 10685 { 10686 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; 10687 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 10688 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg; 10689 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0}; 10690 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 10691 int err; 10692 10693 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 10694 src_reg = NULL; 10695 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) 10696 ptr_reg = dst_reg; 10697 else 10698 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be 10699 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by find_equal_scalars() 10700 */ 10701 dst_reg->id = 0; 10702 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 10703 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 10704 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 10705 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 10706 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields 10707 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except 10708 * pointer subtraction 10709 */ 10710 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) { 10711 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10712 return 0; 10713 } 10714 verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n", 10715 insn->dst_reg, 10716 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]); 10717 return -EACCES; 10718 } else { 10719 /* scalar += pointer 10720 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our 10721 * src/dest handling in computing the range 10722 */ 10723 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 10724 if (err) 10725 return err; 10726 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 10727 src_reg, dst_reg); 10728 } 10729 } else if (ptr_reg) { 10730 /* pointer += scalar */ 10731 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 10732 if (err) 10733 return err; 10734 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 10735 dst_reg, src_reg); 10736 } else if (dst_reg->precise) { 10737 /* if dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well */ 10738 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 10739 if (err) 10740 return err; 10741 } 10742 } else { 10743 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only 10744 * need to be able to read from this state. 10745 */ 10746 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE; 10747 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm); 10748 src_reg = &off_reg; 10749 if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */ 10750 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn, 10751 ptr_reg, src_reg); 10752 } 10753 10754 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */ 10755 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { 10756 print_verifier_state(env, state, true); 10757 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); 10758 return -EINVAL; 10759 } 10760 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { 10761 print_verifier_state(env, state, true); 10762 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); 10763 return -EINVAL; 10764 } 10765 return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); 10766 } 10767 10768 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */ 10769 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 10770 { 10771 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 10772 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 10773 int err; 10774 10775 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) { 10776 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { 10777 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 10778 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 10779 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) { 10780 verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n"); 10781 return -EINVAL; 10782 } 10783 } else { 10784 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 10785 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) || 10786 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 10787 verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n"); 10788 return -EINVAL; 10789 } 10790 } 10791 10792 /* check src operand */ 10793 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 10794 if (err) 10795 return err; 10796 10797 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 10798 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n", 10799 insn->dst_reg); 10800 return -EACCES; 10801 } 10802 10803 /* check dest operand */ 10804 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 10805 if (err) 10806 return err; 10807 10808 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) { 10809 10810 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 10811 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 10812 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 10813 return -EINVAL; 10814 } 10815 10816 /* check src operand */ 10817 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 10818 if (err) 10819 return err; 10820 } else { 10821 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 10822 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n"); 10823 return -EINVAL; 10824 } 10825 } 10826 10827 /* check dest operand, mark as required later */ 10828 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 10829 if (err) 10830 return err; 10831 10832 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 10833 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg; 10834 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg; 10835 10836 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 10837 /* case: R1 = R2 10838 * copy register state to dest reg 10839 */ 10840 if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id) 10841 /* Assign src and dst registers the same ID 10842 * that will be used by find_equal_scalars() 10843 * to propagate min/max range. 10844 */ 10845 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; 10846 *dst_reg = *src_reg; 10847 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 10848 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; 10849 } else { 10850 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */ 10851 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 10852 verbose(env, 10853 "R%d partial copy of pointer\n", 10854 insn->src_reg); 10855 return -EACCES; 10856 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 10857 *dst_reg = *src_reg; 10858 /* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise 10859 * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly 10860 * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars() 10861 */ 10862 dst_reg->id = 0; 10863 dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN; 10864 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 10865 } else { 10866 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, 10867 insn->dst_reg); 10868 } 10869 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg); 10870 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 10871 } 10872 } else { 10873 /* case: R = imm 10874 * remember the value we stored into this reg 10875 */ 10876 /* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */ 10877 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 10878 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE; 10879 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { 10880 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 10881 insn->imm); 10882 } else { 10883 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, 10884 (u32)insn->imm); 10885 } 10886 } 10887 10888 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) { 10889 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode); 10890 return -EINVAL; 10891 10892 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */ 10893 10894 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 10895 if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) { 10896 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 10897 return -EINVAL; 10898 } 10899 /* check src1 operand */ 10900 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 10901 if (err) 10902 return err; 10903 } else { 10904 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) { 10905 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n"); 10906 return -EINVAL; 10907 } 10908 } 10909 10910 /* check src2 operand */ 10911 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 10912 if (err) 10913 return err; 10914 10915 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) && 10916 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) { 10917 verbose(env, "div by zero\n"); 10918 return -EINVAL; 10919 } 10920 10921 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || 10922 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 10923 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; 10924 10925 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) { 10926 verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm); 10927 return -EINVAL; 10928 } 10929 } 10930 10931 /* check dest operand */ 10932 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 10933 if (err) 10934 return err; 10935 10936 return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn); 10937 } 10938 10939 return 0; 10940 } 10941 10942 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 10943 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 10944 enum bpf_reg_type type, 10945 bool range_right_open) 10946 { 10947 struct bpf_func_state *state; 10948 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 10949 int new_range; 10950 10951 if (dst_reg->off < 0 || 10952 (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open)) 10953 /* This doesn't give us any range */ 10954 return; 10955 10956 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF || 10957 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF) 10958 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less 10959 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt. 10960 */ 10961 return; 10962 10963 new_range = dst_reg->off; 10964 if (range_right_open) 10965 new_range++; 10966 10967 /* Examples for register markings: 10968 * 10969 * pkt_data in dst register: 10970 * 10971 * r2 = r3; 10972 * r2 += 8; 10973 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception> 10974 * <access okay> 10975 * 10976 * r2 = r3; 10977 * r2 += 8; 10978 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay> 10979 * <handle exception> 10980 * 10981 * Where: 10982 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg 10983 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 10984 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 10985 * 10986 * pkt_data in src register: 10987 * 10988 * r2 = r3; 10989 * r2 += 8; 10990 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay> 10991 * <handle exception> 10992 * 10993 * r2 = r3; 10994 * r2 += 8; 10995 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception> 10996 * <access okay> 10997 * 10998 * Where: 10999 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg 11000 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0) 11001 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0) 11002 * 11003 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8) 11004 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) 11005 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on 11006 * the check. 11007 */ 11008 11009 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we 11010 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big 11011 * the range won't allow anything. 11012 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16. 11013 */ 11014 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 11015 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id) 11016 /* keep the maximum range already checked */ 11017 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range); 11018 })); 11019 } 11020 11021 static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode) 11022 { 11023 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off); 11024 s32 sval = (s32)val; 11025 11026 switch (opcode) { 11027 case BPF_JEQ: 11028 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 11029 return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 11030 break; 11031 case BPF_JNE: 11032 if (tnum_is_const(subreg)) 11033 return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val); 11034 break; 11035 case BPF_JSET: 11036 if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val) 11037 return 1; 11038 if (!((subreg.mask | subreg.value) & val)) 11039 return 0; 11040 break; 11041 case BPF_JGT: 11042 if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 11043 return 1; 11044 else if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 11045 return 0; 11046 break; 11047 case BPF_JSGT: 11048 if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 11049 return 1; 11050 else if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 11051 return 0; 11052 break; 11053 case BPF_JLT: 11054 if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 11055 return 1; 11056 else if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 11057 return 0; 11058 break; 11059 case BPF_JSLT: 11060 if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 11061 return 1; 11062 else if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 11063 return 0; 11064 break; 11065 case BPF_JGE: 11066 if (reg->u32_min_value >= val) 11067 return 1; 11068 else if (reg->u32_max_value < val) 11069 return 0; 11070 break; 11071 case BPF_JSGE: 11072 if (reg->s32_min_value >= sval) 11073 return 1; 11074 else if (reg->s32_max_value < sval) 11075 return 0; 11076 break; 11077 case BPF_JLE: 11078 if (reg->u32_max_value <= val) 11079 return 1; 11080 else if (reg->u32_min_value > val) 11081 return 0; 11082 break; 11083 case BPF_JSLE: 11084 if (reg->s32_max_value <= sval) 11085 return 1; 11086 else if (reg->s32_min_value > sval) 11087 return 0; 11088 break; 11089 } 11090 11091 return -1; 11092 } 11093 11094 11095 static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode) 11096 { 11097 s64 sval = (s64)val; 11098 11099 switch (opcode) { 11100 case BPF_JEQ: 11101 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 11102 return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 11103 break; 11104 case BPF_JNE: 11105 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) 11106 return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val); 11107 break; 11108 case BPF_JSET: 11109 if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val) 11110 return 1; 11111 if (!((reg->var_off.mask | reg->var_off.value) & val)) 11112 return 0; 11113 break; 11114 case BPF_JGT: 11115 if (reg->umin_value > val) 11116 return 1; 11117 else if (reg->umax_value <= val) 11118 return 0; 11119 break; 11120 case BPF_JSGT: 11121 if (reg->smin_value > sval) 11122 return 1; 11123 else if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 11124 return 0; 11125 break; 11126 case BPF_JLT: 11127 if (reg->umax_value < val) 11128 return 1; 11129 else if (reg->umin_value >= val) 11130 return 0; 11131 break; 11132 case BPF_JSLT: 11133 if (reg->smax_value < sval) 11134 return 1; 11135 else if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 11136 return 0; 11137 break; 11138 case BPF_JGE: 11139 if (reg->umin_value >= val) 11140 return 1; 11141 else if (reg->umax_value < val) 11142 return 0; 11143 break; 11144 case BPF_JSGE: 11145 if (reg->smin_value >= sval) 11146 return 1; 11147 else if (reg->smax_value < sval) 11148 return 0; 11149 break; 11150 case BPF_JLE: 11151 if (reg->umax_value <= val) 11152 return 1; 11153 else if (reg->umin_value > val) 11154 return 0; 11155 break; 11156 case BPF_JSLE: 11157 if (reg->smax_value <= sval) 11158 return 1; 11159 else if (reg->smin_value > sval) 11160 return 0; 11161 break; 11162 } 11163 11164 return -1; 11165 } 11166 11167 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (reg opcode val) goto target;" 11168 * and return: 11169 * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed 11170 * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn 11171 * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg < 5)" is unknown when register value 11172 * range [0,10] 11173 */ 11174 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode, 11175 bool is_jmp32) 11176 { 11177 if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg)) { 11178 if (!reg_type_not_null(reg->type)) 11179 return -1; 11180 11181 /* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can 11182 * use this to direct branch taken. 11183 */ 11184 if (val != 0) 11185 return -1; 11186 11187 switch (opcode) { 11188 case BPF_JEQ: 11189 return 0; 11190 case BPF_JNE: 11191 return 1; 11192 default: 11193 return -1; 11194 } 11195 } 11196 11197 if (is_jmp32) 11198 return is_branch32_taken(reg, val, opcode); 11199 return is_branch64_taken(reg, val, opcode); 11200 } 11201 11202 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode) 11203 { 11204 /* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */ 11205 static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = { 11206 /* these stay the same */ 11207 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ, 11208 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE, 11209 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET, 11210 /* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */ 11211 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = BPF_JLE, 11212 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = BPF_JLT, 11213 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = BPF_JGE, 11214 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = BPF_JGT, 11215 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE, 11216 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT, 11217 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE, 11218 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT 11219 }; 11220 return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4]; 11221 } 11222 11223 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 11224 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 11225 u8 opcode) 11226 { 11227 struct bpf_reg_state *pkt; 11228 11229 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 11230 pkt = dst_reg; 11231 } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { 11232 pkt = src_reg; 11233 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 11234 } else { 11235 return -1; 11236 } 11237 11238 if (pkt->range >= 0) 11239 return -1; 11240 11241 switch (opcode) { 11242 case BPF_JLE: 11243 /* pkt <= pkt_end */ 11244 fallthrough; 11245 case BPF_JGT: 11246 /* pkt > pkt_end */ 11247 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END) 11248 /* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */ 11249 return opcode == BPF_JGT; 11250 break; 11251 case BPF_JLT: 11252 /* pkt < pkt_end */ 11253 fallthrough; 11254 case BPF_JGE: 11255 /* pkt >= pkt_end */ 11256 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END) 11257 return opcode == BPF_JGE; 11258 break; 11259 } 11260 return -1; 11261 } 11262 11263 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the 11264 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're 11265 * simply doing a BPF_K check. 11266 * In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values. 11267 */ 11268 static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 11269 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 11270 u64 val, u32 val32, 11271 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 11272 { 11273 struct tnum false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 11274 struct tnum false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 11275 struct tnum true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 11276 struct tnum true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 11277 s64 sval = (s64)val; 11278 s32 sval32 = (s32)val32; 11279 11280 /* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its 11281 * variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into 11282 * the same object, but we don't bother with that. 11283 * Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we 11284 * only need to check one of them for pointerness. 11285 */ 11286 if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg)) 11287 return; 11288 11289 switch (opcode) { 11290 /* JEQ/JNE comparison doesn't change the register equivalence. 11291 * 11292 * r1 = r2; 11293 * if (r1 == 42) goto label; 11294 * ... 11295 * label: // here both r1 and r2 are known to be 42. 11296 * 11297 * Hence when marking register as known preserve it's ID. 11298 */ 11299 case BPF_JEQ: 11300 if (is_jmp32) { 11301 __mark_reg32_known(true_reg, val32); 11302 true_32off = tnum_subreg(true_reg->var_off); 11303 } else { 11304 ___mark_reg_known(true_reg, val); 11305 true_64off = true_reg->var_off; 11306 } 11307 break; 11308 case BPF_JNE: 11309 if (is_jmp32) { 11310 __mark_reg32_known(false_reg, val32); 11311 false_32off = tnum_subreg(false_reg->var_off); 11312 } else { 11313 ___mark_reg_known(false_reg, val); 11314 false_64off = false_reg->var_off; 11315 } 11316 break; 11317 case BPF_JSET: 11318 if (is_jmp32) { 11319 false_32off = tnum_and(false_32off, tnum_const(~val32)); 11320 if (is_power_of_2(val32)) 11321 true_32off = tnum_or(true_32off, 11322 tnum_const(val32)); 11323 } else { 11324 false_64off = tnum_and(false_64off, tnum_const(~val)); 11325 if (is_power_of_2(val)) 11326 true_64off = tnum_or(true_64off, 11327 tnum_const(val)); 11328 } 11329 break; 11330 case BPF_JGE: 11331 case BPF_JGT: 11332 { 11333 if (is_jmp32) { 11334 u32 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 : val32 - 1; 11335 u32 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val32 + 1 : val32; 11336 11337 false_reg->u32_max_value = min(false_reg->u32_max_value, 11338 false_umax); 11339 true_reg->u32_min_value = max(true_reg->u32_min_value, 11340 true_umin); 11341 } else { 11342 u64 false_umax = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val : val - 1; 11343 u64 true_umin = opcode == BPF_JGT ? val + 1 : val; 11344 11345 false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, false_umax); 11346 true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, true_umin); 11347 } 11348 break; 11349 } 11350 case BPF_JSGE: 11351 case BPF_JSGT: 11352 { 11353 if (is_jmp32) { 11354 s32 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 : sval32 - 1; 11355 s32 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval32 + 1 : sval32; 11356 11357 false_reg->s32_max_value = min(false_reg->s32_max_value, false_smax); 11358 true_reg->s32_min_value = max(true_reg->s32_min_value, true_smin); 11359 } else { 11360 s64 false_smax = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval : sval - 1; 11361 s64 true_smin = opcode == BPF_JSGT ? sval + 1 : sval; 11362 11363 false_reg->smax_value = min(false_reg->smax_value, false_smax); 11364 true_reg->smin_value = max(true_reg->smin_value, true_smin); 11365 } 11366 break; 11367 } 11368 case BPF_JLE: 11369 case BPF_JLT: 11370 { 11371 if (is_jmp32) { 11372 u32 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 : val32 + 1; 11373 u32 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val32 - 1 : val32; 11374 11375 false_reg->u32_min_value = max(false_reg->u32_min_value, 11376 false_umin); 11377 true_reg->u32_max_value = min(true_reg->u32_max_value, 11378 true_umax); 11379 } else { 11380 u64 false_umin = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val : val + 1; 11381 u64 true_umax = opcode == BPF_JLT ? val - 1 : val; 11382 11383 false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, false_umin); 11384 true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, true_umax); 11385 } 11386 break; 11387 } 11388 case BPF_JSLE: 11389 case BPF_JSLT: 11390 { 11391 if (is_jmp32) { 11392 s32 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 : sval32 + 1; 11393 s32 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval32 - 1 : sval32; 11394 11395 false_reg->s32_min_value = max(false_reg->s32_min_value, false_smin); 11396 true_reg->s32_max_value = min(true_reg->s32_max_value, true_smax); 11397 } else { 11398 s64 false_smin = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval : sval + 1; 11399 s64 true_smax = opcode == BPF_JSLT ? sval - 1 : sval; 11400 11401 false_reg->smin_value = max(false_reg->smin_value, false_smin); 11402 true_reg->smax_value = min(true_reg->smax_value, true_smax); 11403 } 11404 break; 11405 } 11406 default: 11407 return; 11408 } 11409 11410 if (is_jmp32) { 11411 false_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(false_64off), 11412 tnum_subreg(false_32off)); 11413 true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(true_64off), 11414 tnum_subreg(true_32off)); 11415 __reg_combine_32_into_64(false_reg); 11416 __reg_combine_32_into_64(true_reg); 11417 } else { 11418 false_reg->var_off = false_64off; 11419 true_reg->var_off = true_64off; 11420 __reg_combine_64_into_32(false_reg); 11421 __reg_combine_64_into_32(true_reg); 11422 } 11423 } 11424 11425 /* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is 11426 * the variable reg. 11427 */ 11428 static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, 11429 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, 11430 u64 val, u32 val32, 11431 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32) 11432 { 11433 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode); 11434 /* This uses zero as "not present in table"; luckily the zero opcode, 11435 * BPF_JA, can't get here. 11436 */ 11437 if (opcode) 11438 reg_set_min_max(true_reg, false_reg, val, val32, opcode, is_jmp32); 11439 } 11440 11441 /* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */ 11442 static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 11443 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) 11444 { 11445 src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value, 11446 dst_reg->umin_value); 11447 src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value, 11448 dst_reg->umax_value); 11449 src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value, 11450 dst_reg->smin_value); 11451 src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value, 11452 dst_reg->smax_value); 11453 src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off, 11454 dst_reg->var_off); 11455 reg_bounds_sync(src_reg); 11456 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); 11457 } 11458 11459 static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src, 11460 struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst, 11461 struct bpf_reg_state *false_src, 11462 struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst, 11463 u8 opcode) 11464 { 11465 switch (opcode) { 11466 case BPF_JEQ: 11467 __reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst); 11468 break; 11469 case BPF_JNE: 11470 __reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst); 11471 break; 11472 } 11473 } 11474 11475 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, 11476 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id, 11477 bool is_null) 11478 { 11479 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id && 11480 (is_rcu_reg(reg) || !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id))) { 11481 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been 11482 * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on 11483 * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't 11484 * convert the register. 11485 * 11486 * But in some cases, some helpers that return local kptrs 11487 * advance offset for the returned pointer. In those cases, it 11488 * is fine to expect to see reg->off. 11489 */ 11490 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0))) 11491 return; 11492 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->off)) 11493 return; 11494 if (is_null) { 11495 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 11496 /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point 11497 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it, 11498 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect. 11499 */ 11500 reg->id = 0; 11501 reg->ref_obj_id = 0; 11502 11503 return; 11504 } 11505 11506 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); 11507 11508 if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) { 11509 /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset 11510 * in release_reference(). 11511 * 11512 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other 11513 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset. 11514 */ 11515 reg->id = 0; 11516 } 11517 } 11518 } 11519 11520 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually 11521 * be folded together at some point. 11522 */ 11523 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno, 11524 bool is_null) 11525 { 11526 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; 11527 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg; 11528 u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id; 11529 u32 id = regs[regno].id; 11530 11531 if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null) 11532 /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch. 11533 * No one could have freed the reference state before 11534 * doing the NULL check. 11535 */ 11536 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_state(state, id)); 11537 11538 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 11539 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null); 11540 })); 11541 } 11542 11543 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn, 11544 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, 11545 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg, 11546 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch, 11547 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch) 11548 { 11549 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X) 11550 return false; 11551 11552 /* Pointers are always 64-bit. */ 11553 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32) 11554 return false; 11555 11556 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { 11557 case BPF_JGT: 11558 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 11559 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 11560 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 11561 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 11562 /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */ 11563 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 11564 dst_reg->type, false); 11565 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 11566 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 11567 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 11568 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 11569 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 11570 /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 11571 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 11572 src_reg->type, true); 11573 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 11574 } else { 11575 return false; 11576 } 11577 break; 11578 case BPF_JLT: 11579 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 11580 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 11581 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 11582 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 11583 /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */ 11584 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 11585 dst_reg->type, true); 11586 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 11587 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 11588 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 11589 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 11590 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 11591 /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */ 11592 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 11593 src_reg->type, false); 11594 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 11595 } else { 11596 return false; 11597 } 11598 break; 11599 case BPF_JGE: 11600 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 11601 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 11602 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 11603 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 11604 /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */ 11605 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, 11606 dst_reg->type, true); 11607 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false); 11608 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 11609 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 11610 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 11611 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 11612 /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */ 11613 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg, 11614 src_reg->type, false); 11615 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true); 11616 } else { 11617 return false; 11618 } 11619 break; 11620 case BPF_JLE: 11621 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && 11622 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) || 11623 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META && 11624 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) { 11625 /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */ 11626 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, 11627 dst_reg->type, false); 11628 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true); 11629 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END && 11630 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) || 11631 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) && 11632 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) { 11633 /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */ 11634 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg, 11635 src_reg->type, true); 11636 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false); 11637 } else { 11638 return false; 11639 } 11640 break; 11641 default: 11642 return false; 11643 } 11644 11645 return true; 11646 } 11647 11648 static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 11649 struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg) 11650 { 11651 struct bpf_func_state *state; 11652 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 11653 11654 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({ 11655 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id) 11656 *reg = *known_reg; 11657 })); 11658 } 11659 11660 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 11661 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) 11662 { 11663 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state; 11664 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch; 11665 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs; 11666 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL; 11667 struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs; 11668 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 11669 bool is_jmp32; 11670 int pred = -1; 11671 int err; 11672 11673 /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */ 11674 if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JSLE) { 11675 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode); 11676 return -EINVAL; 11677 } 11678 11679 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 11680 if (insn->imm != 0) { 11681 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 11682 return -EINVAL; 11683 } 11684 11685 /* check src1 operand */ 11686 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 11687 if (err) 11688 return err; 11689 11690 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) { 11691 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 11692 insn->src_reg); 11693 return -EACCES; 11694 } 11695 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 11696 } else { 11697 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 11698 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n"); 11699 return -EINVAL; 11700 } 11701 } 11702 11703 /* check src2 operand */ 11704 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 11705 if (err) 11706 return err; 11707 11708 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 11709 is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32; 11710 11711 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { 11712 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode, is_jmp32); 11713 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 11714 is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off))) { 11715 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 11716 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 11717 opcode, 11718 is_jmp32); 11719 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 11720 !is_jmp32 && tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)) { 11721 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, 11722 src_reg->var_off.value, 11723 opcode, 11724 is_jmp32); 11725 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && 11726 reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg) && 11727 !is_jmp32) { 11728 pred = is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode); 11729 } 11730 11731 if (pred >= 0) { 11732 /* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because 11733 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison. 11734 */ 11735 if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg)) 11736 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg); 11737 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err && 11738 !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg)) 11739 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg); 11740 if (err) 11741 return err; 11742 } 11743 11744 if (pred == 1) { 11745 /* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push 11746 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative 11747 * execution. 11748 */ 11749 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && 11750 !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1, 11751 *insn_idx)) 11752 return -EFAULT; 11753 *insn_idx += insn->off; 11754 return 0; 11755 } else if (pred == 0) { 11756 /* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the 11757 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for 11758 * simulation under speculative execution. 11759 */ 11760 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 && 11761 !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, 11762 *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, 11763 *insn_idx)) 11764 return -EFAULT; 11765 return 0; 11766 } 11767 11768 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, 11769 false); 11770 if (!other_branch) 11771 return -EFAULT; 11772 other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs; 11773 11774 /* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust 11775 * our min/max values for our dst register. 11776 * this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same 11777 * object, I suppose, see the PTR_MAYBE_NULL related if block below), 11778 * because otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't 11779 * comparable. 11780 */ 11781 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { 11782 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg]; 11783 11784 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && 11785 src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 11786 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off) || 11787 (is_jmp32 && 11788 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off)))) 11789 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 11790 dst_reg, 11791 src_reg->var_off.value, 11792 tnum_subreg(src_reg->var_off).value, 11793 opcode, is_jmp32); 11794 else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off) || 11795 (is_jmp32 && 11796 tnum_is_const(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off)))) 11797 reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 11798 src_reg, 11799 dst_reg->var_off.value, 11800 tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off).value, 11801 opcode, is_jmp32); 11802 else if (!is_jmp32 && 11803 (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)) 11804 /* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */ 11805 reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg], 11806 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 11807 src_reg, dst_reg, opcode); 11808 if (src_reg->id && 11809 !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) { 11810 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, src_reg); 11811 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 11812 } 11813 11814 } 11815 } else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { 11816 reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg], 11817 dst_reg, insn->imm, (u32)insn->imm, 11818 opcode, is_jmp32); 11819 } 11820 11821 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id && 11822 !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) { 11823 find_equal_scalars(this_branch, dst_reg); 11824 find_equal_scalars(other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 11825 } 11826 11827 /* if one pointer register is compared to another pointer 11828 * register check if PTR_MAYBE_NULL could be lifted. 11829 * E.g. register A - maybe null 11830 * register B - not null 11831 * for JNE A, B, ... - A is not null in the false branch; 11832 * for JEQ A, B, ... - A is not null in the true branch. 11833 * 11834 * Since PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to a kernel struct that does 11835 * not need to be null checked by the BPF program, i.e., 11836 * could be null even without PTR_MAYBE_NULL marking, so 11837 * only propagate nullness when neither reg is that type. 11838 */ 11839 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && 11840 __is_pointer_value(false, src_reg) && __is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg) && 11841 type_may_be_null(src_reg->type) != type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type) && 11842 base_type(src_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID && 11843 base_type(dst_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { 11844 eq_branch_regs = NULL; 11845 switch (opcode) { 11846 case BPF_JEQ: 11847 eq_branch_regs = other_branch_regs; 11848 break; 11849 case BPF_JNE: 11850 eq_branch_regs = regs; 11851 break; 11852 default: 11853 /* do nothing */ 11854 break; 11855 } 11856 if (eq_branch_regs) { 11857 if (type_may_be_null(src_reg->type)) 11858 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]); 11859 else 11860 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]); 11861 } 11862 } 11863 11864 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem(). 11865 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison 11866 * which will never be JMP32. 11867 */ 11868 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && 11869 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && 11870 type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) { 11871 /* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either 11872 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. 11873 */ 11874 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, 11875 opcode == BPF_JNE); 11876 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, 11877 opcode == BPF_JEQ); 11878 } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg], 11879 this_branch, other_branch) && 11880 is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 11881 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", 11882 insn->dst_reg); 11883 return -EACCES; 11884 } 11885 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) 11886 print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); 11887 return 0; 11888 } 11889 11890 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */ 11891 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 11892 { 11893 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env); 11894 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 11895 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg; 11896 struct bpf_map *map; 11897 int err; 11898 11899 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { 11900 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n"); 11901 return -EINVAL; 11902 } 11903 if (insn->off != 0) { 11904 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n"); 11905 return -EINVAL; 11906 } 11907 11908 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); 11909 if (err) 11910 return err; 11911 11912 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg]; 11913 if (insn->src_reg == 0) { 11914 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm; 11915 11916 dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE; 11917 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm); 11918 return 0; 11919 } 11920 11921 /* All special src_reg cases are listed below. From this point onwards 11922 * we either succeed and assign a corresponding dst_reg->type after 11923 * zeroing the offset, or fail and reject the program. 11924 */ 11925 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg); 11926 11927 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 11928 dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type; 11929 switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) { 11930 case PTR_TO_MEM: 11931 dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size; 11932 break; 11933 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 11934 dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf; 11935 dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id; 11936 break; 11937 default: 11938 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 11939 return -EFAULT; 11940 } 11941 return 0; 11942 } 11943 11944 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 11945 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 11946 u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env, 11947 env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1); 11948 11949 if (!aux->func_info) { 11950 verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n"); 11951 return -EINVAL; 11952 } 11953 if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) { 11954 verbose(env, "callback function not static\n"); 11955 return -EINVAL; 11956 } 11957 11958 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 11959 dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno; 11960 return 0; 11961 } 11962 11963 map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index]; 11964 dst_reg->map_ptr = map; 11965 11966 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE || 11967 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) { 11968 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; 11969 dst_reg->off = aux->map_off; 11970 WARN_ON_ONCE(map->max_entries != 1); 11971 /* We want reg->id to be same (0) as map_value is not distinct */ 11972 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 11973 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 11974 dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; 11975 } else { 11976 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 11977 return -EINVAL; 11978 } 11979 11980 return 0; 11981 } 11982 11983 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type) 11984 { 11985 switch (type) { 11986 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: 11987 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: 11988 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: 11989 return true; 11990 default: 11991 return false; 11992 } 11993 } 11994 11995 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions: 11996 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb 11997 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers, 11998 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0 11999 * 12000 * Implicit input: 12001 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX 12002 * 12003 * Explicit input: 12004 * SRC == any register 12005 * IMM == 32-bit immediate 12006 * 12007 * Output: 12008 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness 12009 */ 12010 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) 12011 { 12012 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); 12013 static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6; 12014 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 12015 int i, err; 12016 12017 if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) { 12018 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n"); 12019 return -EINVAL; 12020 } 12021 12022 if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { 12023 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 12024 return -EINVAL; 12025 } 12026 12027 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || 12028 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW || 12029 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) { 12030 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n"); 12031 return -EINVAL; 12032 } 12033 12034 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */ 12035 err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP); 12036 if (err) 12037 return err; 12038 12039 /* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as 12040 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to 12041 * reference leak. 12042 */ 12043 err = check_reference_leak(env); 12044 if (err) { 12045 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n"); 12046 return err; 12047 } 12048 12049 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 12050 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n"); 12051 return -EINVAL; 12052 } 12053 12054 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 12055 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be used inside bpf_rcu_read_lock-ed region\n"); 12056 return -EINVAL; 12057 } 12058 12059 if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) { 12060 verbose(env, 12061 "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n"); 12062 return -EINVAL; 12063 } 12064 12065 if (mode == BPF_IND) { 12066 /* check explicit source operand */ 12067 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 12068 if (err) 12069 return err; 12070 } 12071 12072 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg); 12073 if (err < 0) 12074 return err; 12075 12076 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */ 12077 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { 12078 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); 12079 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); 12080 } 12081 12082 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains 12083 * the value fetched from the packet. 12084 * Already marked as written above. 12085 */ 12086 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); 12087 /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ 12088 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; 12089 return 0; 12090 } 12091 12092 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12093 { 12094 struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown; 12095 const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 12096 struct bpf_reg_state *reg; 12097 struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); 12098 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog); 12099 int err; 12100 struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0]; 12101 const bool is_subprog = frame->subprogno; 12102 12103 /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ 12104 if (!is_subprog) { 12105 switch (prog_type) { 12106 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 12107 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) 12108 /* See below, can be 0 or 0-1 depending on hook. */ 12109 break; 12110 fallthrough; 12111 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: 12112 if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 12113 return 0; 12114 break; 12115 default: 12116 break; 12117 } 12118 } 12119 12120 /* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used 12121 * to return the value from eBPF program. 12122 * Make sure that it's readable at this time 12123 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote 12124 * something into it earlier 12125 */ 12126 err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP); 12127 if (err) 12128 return err; 12129 12130 if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) { 12131 verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n"); 12132 return -EACCES; 12133 } 12134 12135 reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0; 12136 12137 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn) { 12138 /* enforce return zero from async callbacks like timer */ 12139 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 12140 verbose(env, "In async callback the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 12141 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 12142 return -EINVAL; 12143 } 12144 12145 if (!tnum_in(tnum_const(0), reg->var_off)) { 12146 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "async callback", "R0"); 12147 return -EINVAL; 12148 } 12149 return 0; 12150 } 12151 12152 if (is_subprog) { 12153 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 12154 verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n", 12155 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 12156 return -EINVAL; 12157 } 12158 return 0; 12159 } 12160 12161 switch (prog_type) { 12162 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: 12163 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG || 12164 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG || 12165 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME || 12166 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME || 12167 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME || 12168 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME) 12169 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 12170 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND || 12171 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND) 12172 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 12173 break; 12174 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: 12175 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) { 12176 range = tnum_range(0, 3); 12177 enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3); 12178 } 12179 break; 12180 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: 12181 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: 12182 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: 12183 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: 12184 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: 12185 break; 12186 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 12187 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id) 12188 return 0; 12189 range = tnum_const(0); 12190 break; 12191 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 12192 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) { 12193 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 12194 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 12195 range = tnum_const(0); 12196 break; 12197 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 12198 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 12199 return 0; 12200 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 12201 break; 12202 default: 12203 return -ENOTSUPP; 12204 } 12205 break; 12206 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: 12207 range = tnum_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS); 12208 break; 12209 12210 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 12211 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { 12212 /* Regular BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM programs can return 12213 * any value. 12214 */ 12215 return 0; 12216 } 12217 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) { 12218 /* Make sure programs that attach to void 12219 * hooks don't try to modify return value. 12220 */ 12221 range = tnum_range(1, 1); 12222 } 12223 break; 12224 12225 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: 12226 /* freplace program can return anything as its return value 12227 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program. 12228 */ 12229 default: 12230 return 0; 12231 } 12232 12233 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { 12234 verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n", 12235 reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); 12236 return -EINVAL; 12237 } 12238 12239 if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { 12240 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "program exit", "R0"); 12241 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP && 12242 prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 12243 !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) 12244 verbose(env, "Note, BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n"); 12245 return -EINVAL; 12246 } 12247 12248 if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) && 12249 tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off)) 12250 env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1; 12251 return 0; 12252 } 12253 12254 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code 12255 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): 12256 * 2 label v as discovered 12257 * 3 let S be a stack 12258 * 4 S.push(v) 12259 * 5 while S is not empty 12260 * 6 t <- S.peek() 12261 * 7 if t is what we're looking for: 12262 * 8 return t 12263 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do 12264 * 10 if edge e is already labelled 12265 * 11 continue with the next edge 12266 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e) 12267 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored 12268 * 14 label e as tree-edge 12269 * 15 label w as discovered 12270 * 16 S.push(w) 12271 * 17 continue at 5 12272 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered 12273 * 19 label e as back-edge 12274 * 20 else 12275 * 21 // vertex w is explored 12276 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge 12277 * 23 label t as explored 12278 * 24 S.pop() 12279 * 12280 * convention: 12281 * 0x10 - discovered 12282 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled 12283 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled 12284 * 0x20 - explored 12285 */ 12286 12287 enum { 12288 DISCOVERED = 0x10, 12289 EXPLORED = 0x20, 12290 FALLTHROUGH = 1, 12291 BRANCH = 2, 12292 }; 12293 12294 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12295 { 12296 return env->prog->len; 12297 } 12298 12299 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state( 12300 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12301 int idx) 12302 { 12303 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state; 12304 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe]; 12305 12306 return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)]; 12307 } 12308 12309 static void mark_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) 12310 { 12311 env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true; 12312 } 12313 12314 static bool is_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 12315 { 12316 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point; 12317 } 12318 12319 enum { 12320 DONE_EXPLORING = 0, 12321 KEEP_EXPLORING = 1, 12322 }; 12323 12324 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above: 12325 * t - index of current instruction 12326 * w - next instruction 12327 * e - edge 12328 */ 12329 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12330 bool loop_ok) 12331 { 12332 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack; 12333 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state; 12334 12335 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH)) 12336 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12337 12338 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH)) 12339 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12340 12341 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) { 12342 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 12343 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 12344 return -EINVAL; 12345 } 12346 12347 if (e == BRANCH) { 12348 /* mark branch target for state pruning */ 12349 mark_prune_point(env, w); 12350 mark_jmp_point(env, w); 12351 } 12352 12353 if (insn_state[w] == 0) { 12354 /* tree-edge */ 12355 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 12356 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED; 12357 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len) 12358 return -E2BIG; 12359 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w; 12360 return KEEP_EXPLORING; 12361 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) { 12362 if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable) 12363 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12364 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t); 12365 verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w); 12366 verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w); 12367 return -EINVAL; 12368 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) { 12369 /* forward- or cross-edge */ 12370 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; 12371 } else { 12372 verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); 12373 return -EFAULT; 12374 } 12375 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12376 } 12377 12378 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, struct bpf_insn *insns, 12379 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12380 bool visit_callee) 12381 { 12382 int ret; 12383 12384 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); 12385 if (ret) 12386 return ret; 12387 12388 mark_prune_point(env, t + 1); 12389 /* when we exit from subprog, we need to record non-linear history */ 12390 mark_jmp_point(env, t + 1); 12391 12392 if (visit_callee) { 12393 mark_prune_point(env, t); 12394 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env, 12395 /* It's ok to allow recursion from CFG point of 12396 * view. __check_func_call() will do the actual 12397 * check. 12398 */ 12399 bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t)); 12400 } 12401 return ret; 12402 } 12403 12404 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following: 12405 * < 0 - an error occurred 12406 * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored 12407 * KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored 12408 */ 12409 static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12410 { 12411 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 12412 int ret; 12413 12414 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t)) 12415 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, true); 12416 12417 /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */ 12418 if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP && 12419 BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP32) 12420 return push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false); 12421 12422 switch (BPF_OP(insns[t].code)) { 12423 case BPF_EXIT: 12424 return DONE_EXPLORING; 12425 12426 case BPF_CALL: 12427 if (insns[t].imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) 12428 /* Mark this call insn as a prune point to trigger 12429 * is_state_visited() check before call itself is 12430 * processed by __check_func_call(). Otherwise new 12431 * async state will be pushed for further exploration. 12432 */ 12433 mark_prune_point(env, t); 12434 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, 12435 insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL); 12436 12437 case BPF_JA: 12438 if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) 12439 return -EINVAL; 12440 12441 /* unconditional jump with single edge */ 12442 ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, 12443 true); 12444 if (ret) 12445 return ret; 12446 12447 mark_prune_point(env, t + insns[t].off + 1); 12448 mark_jmp_point(env, t + insns[t].off + 1); 12449 12450 return ret; 12451 12452 default: 12453 /* conditional jump with two edges */ 12454 mark_prune_point(env, t); 12455 12456 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true); 12457 if (ret) 12458 return ret; 12459 12460 return push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env, true); 12461 } 12462 } 12463 12464 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program 12465 * loop == back-edge in directed graph 12466 */ 12467 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12468 { 12469 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 12470 int *insn_stack, *insn_state; 12471 int ret = 0; 12472 int i; 12473 12474 insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 12475 if (!insn_state) 12476 return -ENOMEM; 12477 12478 insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); 12479 if (!insn_stack) { 12480 kvfree(insn_state); 12481 return -ENOMEM; 12482 } 12483 12484 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */ 12485 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */ 12486 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1; 12487 12488 while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) { 12489 int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1]; 12490 12491 ret = visit_insn(t, env); 12492 switch (ret) { 12493 case DONE_EXPLORING: 12494 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED; 12495 env->cfg.cur_stack--; 12496 break; 12497 case KEEP_EXPLORING: 12498 break; 12499 default: 12500 if (ret > 0) { 12501 verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n"); 12502 ret = -EFAULT; 12503 } 12504 goto err_free; 12505 } 12506 } 12507 12508 if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) { 12509 verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); 12510 ret = -EFAULT; 12511 goto err_free; 12512 } 12513 12514 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 12515 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) { 12516 verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i); 12517 ret = -EINVAL; 12518 goto err_free; 12519 } 12520 } 12521 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */ 12522 12523 err_free: 12524 kvfree(insn_state); 12525 kvfree(insn_stack); 12526 env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL; 12527 return ret; 12528 } 12529 12530 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12531 { 12532 int i; 12533 12534 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 12535 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 12536 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 12537 return -EINVAL; 12538 } 12539 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 12540 verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n"); 12541 return -EINVAL; 12542 } 12543 } 12544 return 0; 12545 } 12546 12547 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */ 12548 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8 12549 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252 12550 12551 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12552 const union bpf_attr *attr, 12553 bpfptr_t uattr) 12554 { 12555 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type; 12556 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size; 12557 u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info); 12558 struct bpf_func_info *krecord; 12559 struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL; 12560 struct bpf_prog *prog; 12561 const struct btf *btf; 12562 bpfptr_t urecord; 12563 u32 prev_offset = 0; 12564 bool scalar_return; 12565 int ret = -ENOMEM; 12566 12567 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt; 12568 if (!nfuncs) { 12569 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 12570 return -EINVAL; 12571 return 0; 12572 } 12573 12574 if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) { 12575 verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n"); 12576 return -EINVAL; 12577 } 12578 12579 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size; 12580 if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE || 12581 urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE || 12582 urec_size % sizeof(u32)) { 12583 verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size); 12584 return -EINVAL; 12585 } 12586 12587 prog = env->prog; 12588 btf = prog->aux->btf; 12589 12590 urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); 12591 min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size); 12592 12593 krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 12594 if (!krecord) 12595 return -ENOMEM; 12596 info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 12597 if (!info_aux) 12598 goto err_free; 12599 12600 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) { 12601 ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size); 12602 if (ret) { 12603 if (ret == -E2BIG) { 12604 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info"); 12605 /* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero 12606 * out the rest of the record. 12607 */ 12608 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 12609 offsetof(union bpf_attr, func_info_rec_size), 12610 &min_size, sizeof(min_size))) 12611 ret = -EFAULT; 12612 } 12613 goto err_free; 12614 } 12615 12616 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) { 12617 ret = -EFAULT; 12618 goto err_free; 12619 } 12620 12621 /* check insn_off */ 12622 ret = -EINVAL; 12623 if (i == 0) { 12624 if (krecord[i].insn_off) { 12625 verbose(env, 12626 "nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record", 12627 krecord[i].insn_off); 12628 goto err_free; 12629 } 12630 } else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) { 12631 verbose(env, 12632 "same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)", 12633 krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset); 12634 goto err_free; 12635 } 12636 12637 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) { 12638 verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n"); 12639 goto err_free; 12640 } 12641 12642 /* check type_id */ 12643 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id); 12644 if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) { 12645 verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info", 12646 krecord[i].type_id); 12647 goto err_free; 12648 } 12649 info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info); 12650 12651 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type); 12652 if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto))) 12653 /* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */ 12654 goto err_free; 12655 ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL); 12656 scalar_return = 12657 btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_is_any_enum(ret_type); 12658 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) { 12659 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 12660 goto err_free; 12661 } 12662 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) { 12663 verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n"); 12664 goto err_free; 12665 } 12666 12667 prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off; 12668 bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size); 12669 } 12670 12671 prog->aux->func_info = krecord; 12672 prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs; 12673 prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux; 12674 return 0; 12675 12676 err_free: 12677 kvfree(krecord); 12678 kfree(info_aux); 12679 return ret; 12680 } 12681 12682 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 12683 { 12684 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 12685 int i; 12686 12687 if (!aux->func_info) 12688 return; 12689 12690 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 12691 aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start; 12692 } 12693 12694 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE offsetofend(struct bpf_line_info, line_col) 12695 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 12696 12697 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12698 const union bpf_attr *attr, 12699 bpfptr_t uattr) 12700 { 12701 u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0; 12702 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub; 12703 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 12704 struct bpf_prog *prog; 12705 const struct btf *btf; 12706 bpfptr_t ulinfo; 12707 int err; 12708 12709 nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt; 12710 if (!nr_linfo) 12711 return 0; 12712 if (nr_linfo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_line_info)) 12713 return -EINVAL; 12714 12715 rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size; 12716 if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE || 12717 rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE || 12718 rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1)) 12719 return -EINVAL; 12720 12721 /* Need to zero it in case the userspace may 12722 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object. 12723 */ 12724 linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info), 12725 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); 12726 if (!linfo) 12727 return -ENOMEM; 12728 12729 prog = env->prog; 12730 btf = prog->aux->btf; 12731 12732 s = 0; 12733 sub = env->subprog_info; 12734 ulinfo = make_bpfptr(attr->line_info, uattr.is_kernel); 12735 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info); 12736 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 12737 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) { 12738 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size); 12739 if (err) { 12740 if (err == -E2BIG) { 12741 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info"); 12742 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 12743 offsetof(union bpf_attr, line_info_rec_size), 12744 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 12745 err = -EFAULT; 12746 } 12747 goto err_free; 12748 } 12749 12750 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) { 12751 err = -EFAULT; 12752 goto err_free; 12753 } 12754 12755 /* 12756 * Check insn_off to ensure 12757 * 1) strictly increasing AND 12758 * 2) bounded by prog->len 12759 * 12760 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into 12761 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case 12762 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the 12763 * first sub also and the first sub must have 12764 * subprog_info[0].start == 0. 12765 */ 12766 if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) || 12767 linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) { 12768 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n", 12769 i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset, 12770 prog->len); 12771 err = -EINVAL; 12772 goto err_free; 12773 } 12774 12775 if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) { 12776 verbose(env, 12777 "Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n", 12778 i); 12779 err = -EINVAL; 12780 goto err_free; 12781 } 12782 12783 if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) || 12784 !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) { 12785 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i); 12786 err = -EINVAL; 12787 goto err_free; 12788 } 12789 12790 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 12791 if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) { 12792 sub[s].linfo_idx = i; 12793 s++; 12794 } else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) { 12795 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s); 12796 err = -EINVAL; 12797 goto err_free; 12798 } 12799 } 12800 12801 prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off; 12802 bpfptr_add(&ulinfo, rec_size); 12803 } 12804 12805 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) { 12806 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n", 12807 env->subprog_cnt - s, s); 12808 err = -EINVAL; 12809 goto err_free; 12810 } 12811 12812 prog->aux->linfo = linfo; 12813 prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo; 12814 12815 return 0; 12816 12817 err_free: 12818 kvfree(linfo); 12819 return err; 12820 } 12821 12822 #define MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo) 12823 #define MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 12824 12825 static int check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12826 const union bpf_attr *attr, 12827 bpfptr_t uattr) 12828 { 12829 u32 i, nr_core_relo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size; 12830 struct bpf_core_relo core_relo = {}; 12831 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 12832 const struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf; 12833 struct bpf_core_ctx ctx = { 12834 .log = &env->log, 12835 .btf = btf, 12836 }; 12837 bpfptr_t u_core_relo; 12838 int err; 12839 12840 nr_core_relo = attr->core_relo_cnt; 12841 if (!nr_core_relo) 12842 return 0; 12843 if (nr_core_relo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo)) 12844 return -EINVAL; 12845 12846 rec_size = attr->core_relo_rec_size; 12847 if (rec_size < MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 12848 rec_size > MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE || 12849 rec_size % sizeof(u32)) 12850 return -EINVAL; 12851 12852 u_core_relo = make_bpfptr(attr->core_relos, uattr.is_kernel); 12853 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo); 12854 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size); 12855 12856 /* Unlike func_info and line_info, copy and apply each CO-RE 12857 * relocation record one at a time. 12858 */ 12859 for (i = 0; i < nr_core_relo; i++) { 12860 /* future proofing when sizeof(bpf_core_relo) changes */ 12861 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(u_core_relo, expected_size, rec_size); 12862 if (err) { 12863 if (err == -E2BIG) { 12864 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in core_relo"); 12865 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, 12866 offsetof(union bpf_attr, core_relo_rec_size), 12867 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size))) 12868 err = -EFAULT; 12869 } 12870 break; 12871 } 12872 12873 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&core_relo, u_core_relo, ncopy)) { 12874 err = -EFAULT; 12875 break; 12876 } 12877 12878 if (core_relo.insn_off % 8 || core_relo.insn_off / 8 >= prog->len) { 12879 verbose(env, "Invalid core_relo[%u].insn_off:%u prog->len:%u\n", 12880 i, core_relo.insn_off, prog->len); 12881 err = -EINVAL; 12882 break; 12883 } 12884 12885 err = bpf_core_apply(&ctx, &core_relo, i, 12886 &prog->insnsi[core_relo.insn_off / 8]); 12887 if (err) 12888 break; 12889 bpfptr_add(&u_core_relo, rec_size); 12890 } 12891 return err; 12892 } 12893 12894 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12895 const union bpf_attr *attr, 12896 bpfptr_t uattr) 12897 { 12898 struct btf *btf; 12899 int err; 12900 12901 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) { 12902 if (check_abnormal_return(env)) 12903 return -EINVAL; 12904 return 0; 12905 } 12906 12907 btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd); 12908 if (IS_ERR(btf)) 12909 return PTR_ERR(btf); 12910 if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) { 12911 btf_put(btf); 12912 return -EACCES; 12913 } 12914 env->prog->aux->btf = btf; 12915 12916 err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr); 12917 if (err) 12918 return err; 12919 12920 err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr); 12921 if (err) 12922 return err; 12923 12924 err = check_core_relo(env, attr, uattr); 12925 if (err) 12926 return err; 12927 12928 return 0; 12929 } 12930 12931 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */ 12932 static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old, 12933 struct bpf_reg_state *cur) 12934 { 12935 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value && 12936 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value && 12937 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value && 12938 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value && 12939 old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value && 12940 old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value && 12941 old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value && 12942 old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value; 12943 } 12944 12945 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have 12946 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from 12947 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids. 12948 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent 12949 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But 12950 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about 12951 * that. 12952 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If 12953 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. 12954 */ 12955 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 12956 { 12957 unsigned int i; 12958 12959 /* either both IDs should be set or both should be zero */ 12960 if (!!old_id != !!cur_id) 12961 return false; 12962 12963 if (old_id == 0) /* cur_id == 0 as well */ 12964 return true; 12965 12966 for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { 12967 if (!idmap[i].old) { 12968 /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ 12969 idmap[i].old = old_id; 12970 idmap[i].cur = cur_id; 12971 return true; 12972 } 12973 if (idmap[i].old == old_id) 12974 return idmap[i].cur == cur_id; 12975 } 12976 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ 12977 WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 12978 return false; 12979 } 12980 12981 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 12982 struct bpf_func_state *st) 12983 { 12984 enum bpf_reg_liveness live; 12985 int i, j; 12986 12987 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 12988 live = st->regs[i].live; 12989 /* liveness must not touch this register anymore */ 12990 st->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 12991 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 12992 /* since the register is unused, clear its state 12993 * to make further comparison simpler 12994 */ 12995 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]); 12996 } 12997 12998 for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 12999 live = st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live; 13000 /* liveness must not touch this stack slot anymore */ 13001 st->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_DONE; 13002 if (!(live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 13003 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr); 13004 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) 13005 st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID; 13006 } 13007 } 13008 } 13009 13010 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13011 struct bpf_verifier_state *st) 13012 { 13013 int i; 13014 13015 if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) 13016 /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ 13017 return; 13018 13019 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) 13020 clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]); 13021 } 13022 13023 /* the parentage chains form a tree. 13024 * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and 13025 * pushed into state stack for future exploration. 13026 * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states 13027 * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already, 13028 * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when 13029 * the verifier explores other branches. 13030 * Example: 13031 * 1: r0 = 1 13032 * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1 13033 * 3: r0 = 2 13034 * 4: exit 13035 * when the verifier reaches exit insn the register r0 in the state list of 13036 * insn 2 will be seen as !REG_LIVE_READ. Then the verifier pops the other_branch 13037 * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. At the insn 4 it will walk the 13038 * parentage chain from insn 4 into insn 2 and will mark r0 as REG_LIVE_READ. 13039 * 13040 * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring 13041 * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second 13042 * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and 13043 * their final liveness marks are already propagated. 13044 * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited() 13045 * we can call this clean_live_states() function to mark all liveness states 13046 * as REG_LIVE_DONE to indicate that 'parent' pointers of 'struct bpf_reg_state' 13047 * will not be used. 13048 * This function also clears the registers and stack for states that !READ 13049 * to simplify state merging. 13050 * 13051 * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee 13052 * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare 13053 * the callsites 13054 */ 13055 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, 13056 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 13057 { 13058 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; 13059 int i; 13060 13061 sl = *explored_state(env, insn); 13062 while (sl) { 13063 if (sl->state.branches) 13064 goto next; 13065 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || 13066 sl->state.curframe != cur->curframe) 13067 goto next; 13068 for (i = 0; i <= cur->curframe; i++) 13069 if (sl->state.frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 13070 goto next; 13071 clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state); 13072 next: 13073 sl = sl->next; 13074 } 13075 } 13076 13077 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 13078 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, 13079 struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 13080 { 13081 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && 13082 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && 13083 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap); 13084 } 13085 13086 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ 13087 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, 13088 struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 13089 { 13090 if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) 13091 /* explored state didn't use this */ 13092 return true; 13093 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) 13094 /* explored state can't have used this */ 13095 return true; 13096 if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT) 13097 return false; 13098 13099 /* Enforce that register types have to match exactly, including their 13100 * modifiers (like PTR_MAYBE_NULL, MEM_RDONLY, etc), as a general 13101 * rule. 13102 * 13103 * One can make a point that using a pointer register as unbounded 13104 * SCALAR would be technically acceptable, but this could lead to 13105 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak while pointers 13106 * are not. We could make this safe in special cases if root is 13107 * calling us, but it's probably not worth the hassle. 13108 * 13109 * Also, register types that are *not* MAYBE_NULL could technically be 13110 * safe to use as their MAYBE_NULL variants (e.g., PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE 13111 * is safe to be used as PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, provided both point 13112 * to the same map). 13113 * However, if the old MAYBE_NULL register then got NULL checked, 13114 * doing so could have affected others with the same id, and we can't 13115 * check for that because we lost the id when we converted to 13116 * a non-MAYBE_NULL variant. 13117 * So, as a general rule we don't allow mixing MAYBE_NULL and 13118 * non-MAYBE_NULL registers as well. 13119 */ 13120 if (rold->type != rcur->type) 13121 return false; 13122 13123 switch (base_type(rold->type)) { 13124 case SCALAR_VALUE: 13125 if (regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap)) 13126 return true; 13127 if (env->explore_alu_limits) 13128 return false; 13129 if (!rold->precise) 13130 return true; 13131 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 13132 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 13133 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 13134 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: 13135 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: 13136 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and 13137 * everything else matches, we are OK. 13138 */ 13139 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 && 13140 range_within(rold, rcur) && 13141 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && 13142 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); 13143 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: 13144 case PTR_TO_PACKET: 13145 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr 13146 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are 13147 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off, 13148 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or 13149 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. 13150 */ 13151 if (rold->range > rcur->range) 13152 return false; 13153 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; 13154 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. 13155 */ 13156 if (rold->off != rcur->off) 13157 return false; 13158 /* id relations must be preserved */ 13159 if (!check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap)) 13160 return false; 13161 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ 13162 return range_within(rold, rcur) && 13163 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); 13164 case PTR_TO_STACK: 13165 /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to 13166 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar 13167 */ 13168 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap) && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; 13169 default: 13170 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap); 13171 } 13172 } 13173 13174 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 13175 struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 13176 { 13177 int i, spi; 13178 13179 /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional 13180 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state 13181 * didn't use them 13182 */ 13183 for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) { 13184 spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; 13185 13186 if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) { 13187 i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; 13188 /* explored state didn't use this */ 13189 continue; 13190 } 13191 13192 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) 13193 continue; 13194 13195 /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack 13196 * and these slots were used 13197 */ 13198 if (i >= cur->allocated_stack) 13199 return false; 13200 13201 /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack 13202 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack. 13203 * The opposite is not true 13204 */ 13205 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC && 13206 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO) 13207 continue; 13208 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != 13209 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) 13210 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in 13211 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC -> 13212 * this verifier states are not equivalent, 13213 * return false to continue verification of this path 13214 */ 13215 return false; 13216 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE != BPF_REG_SIZE - 1) 13217 continue; 13218 if (!is_spilled_reg(&old->stack[spi])) 13219 continue; 13220 if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, 13221 &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap)) 13222 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing 13223 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types 13224 * are the same as well. 13225 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored 13226 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8} 13227 * but current path has stored: 13228 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16} 13229 * such verifier states are not equivalent. 13230 * return false to continue verification of this path 13231 */ 13232 return false; 13233 } 13234 return true; 13235 } 13236 13237 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur, 13238 struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) 13239 { 13240 int i; 13241 13242 if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs) 13243 return false; 13244 13245 for (i = 0; i < old->acquired_refs; i++) { 13246 if (!check_ids(old->refs[i].id, cur->refs[i].id, idmap)) 13247 return false; 13248 } 13249 13250 return true; 13251 } 13252 13253 /* compare two verifier states 13254 * 13255 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since 13256 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them 13257 * 13258 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of 13259 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has 13260 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution 13261 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already 13262 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish. 13263 * 13264 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative 13265 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one. 13266 * Example: 13267 * explored current 13268 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) 13269 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) 13270 * 13271 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more 13272 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means 13273 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too 13274 * 13275 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid 13276 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that 13277 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely 13278 */ 13279 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, 13280 struct bpf_func_state *cur) 13281 { 13282 int i; 13283 13284 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 13285 if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], 13286 env->idmap_scratch)) 13287 return false; 13288 13289 if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) 13290 return false; 13291 13292 if (!refsafe(old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) 13293 return false; 13294 13295 return true; 13296 } 13297 13298 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13299 struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 13300 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 13301 { 13302 int i; 13303 13304 if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) 13305 return false; 13306 13307 memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch)); 13308 13309 /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation 13310 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. 13311 */ 13312 if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative) 13313 return false; 13314 13315 if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr) 13316 return false; 13317 13318 /* Old and cur active_lock's have to be either both present 13319 * or both absent. 13320 */ 13321 if (!!old->active_lock.id != !!cur->active_lock.id) 13322 return false; 13323 13324 if (old->active_lock.id && 13325 !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, env->idmap_scratch)) 13326 return false; 13327 13328 if (old->active_rcu_lock != cur->active_rcu_lock) 13329 return false; 13330 13331 /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same 13332 * and all frame states need to be equivalent 13333 */ 13334 for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { 13335 if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) 13336 return false; 13337 if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i])) 13338 return false; 13339 } 13340 return true; 13341 } 13342 13343 /* Return 0 if no propagation happened. Return negative error code if error 13344 * happened. Otherwise, return the propagated bit. 13345 */ 13346 static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13347 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, 13348 struct bpf_reg_state *parent_reg) 13349 { 13350 u8 parent_flag = parent_reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 13351 u8 flag = reg->live & REG_LIVE_READ; 13352 int err; 13353 13354 /* When comes here, read flags of PARENT_REG or REG could be any of 13355 * REG_LIVE_READ64, REG_LIVE_READ32, REG_LIVE_NONE. There is no need 13356 * of propagation if PARENT_REG has strongest REG_LIVE_READ64. 13357 */ 13358 if (parent_flag == REG_LIVE_READ64 || 13359 /* Or if there is no read flag from REG. */ 13360 !flag || 13361 /* Or if the read flag from REG is the same as PARENT_REG. */ 13362 parent_flag == flag) 13363 return 0; 13364 13365 err = mark_reg_read(env, reg, parent_reg, flag); 13366 if (err) 13367 return err; 13368 13369 return flag; 13370 } 13371 13372 /* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the 13373 * straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at an 13374 * equivalent state (jump target or such) we didn't arrive by the straight-line 13375 * code, so read marks in the state must propagate to the parent regardless 13376 * of the state's write marks. That's what 'parent == state->parent' comparison 13377 * in mark_reg_read() is for. 13378 */ 13379 static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13380 const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, 13381 struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent) 13382 { 13383 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg; 13384 struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent; 13385 int i, frame, err = 0; 13386 13387 if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) { 13388 WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n", 13389 vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe); 13390 return -EFAULT; 13391 } 13392 /* Propagate read liveness of registers... */ 13393 BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG); 13394 for (frame = 0; frame <= vstate->curframe; frame++) { 13395 parent = vparent->frame[frame]; 13396 state = vstate->frame[frame]; 13397 parent_reg = parent->regs; 13398 state_reg = state->regs; 13399 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness, it's read-only */ 13400 for (i = frame < vstate->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) { 13401 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, &state_reg[i], 13402 &parent_reg[i]); 13403 if (err < 0) 13404 return err; 13405 if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64) 13406 mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]); 13407 } 13408 13409 /* Propagate stack slots. */ 13410 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE && 13411 i < parent->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 13412 parent_reg = &parent->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 13413 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 13414 err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg, 13415 parent_reg); 13416 if (err < 0) 13417 return err; 13418 } 13419 } 13420 return 0; 13421 } 13422 13423 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and 13424 * propagate them into the current state 13425 */ 13426 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 13427 const struct bpf_verifier_state *old) 13428 { 13429 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; 13430 struct bpf_func_state *state; 13431 int i, err = 0, fr; 13432 13433 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) { 13434 state = old->frame[fr]; 13435 state_reg = state->regs; 13436 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) { 13437 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 13438 !state_reg->precise) 13439 continue; 13440 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 13441 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating r%d\n", i, fr); 13442 err = mark_chain_precision_frame(env, fr, i); 13443 if (err < 0) 13444 return err; 13445 } 13446 13447 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 13448 if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i])) 13449 continue; 13450 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 13451 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || 13452 !state_reg->precise) 13453 continue; 13454 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) 13455 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating fp%d\n", 13456 (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE, fr); 13457 err = mark_chain_precision_stack_frame(env, fr, i); 13458 if (err < 0) 13459 return err; 13460 } 13461 } 13462 return 0; 13463 } 13464 13465 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, 13466 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) 13467 { 13468 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur; 13469 int i, fr = cur->curframe; 13470 13471 if (old->curframe != fr) 13472 return false; 13473 13474 fold = old->frame[fr]; 13475 fcur = cur->frame[fr]; 13476 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) 13477 if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i], 13478 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent))) 13479 return false; 13480 return true; 13481 } 13482 13483 13484 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) 13485 { 13486 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; 13487 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev; 13488 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new; 13489 int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0; 13490 bool add_new_state = env->test_state_freq ? true : false; 13491 13492 /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions 13493 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 13494 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen 13495 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions. 13496 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric. 13497 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier 13498 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup. 13499 */ 13500 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 && 13501 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8) 13502 add_new_state = true; 13503 13504 pprev = explored_state(env, insn_idx); 13505 sl = *pprev; 13506 13507 clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur); 13508 13509 while (sl) { 13510 states_cnt++; 13511 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx) 13512 goto next; 13513 13514 if (sl->state.branches) { 13515 struct bpf_func_state *frame = sl->state.frame[sl->state.curframe]; 13516 13517 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn && 13518 frame->async_entry_cnt != cur->frame[cur->curframe]->async_entry_cnt) { 13519 /* Different async_entry_cnt means that the verifier is 13520 * processing another entry into async callback. 13521 * Seeing the same state is not an indication of infinite 13522 * loop or infinite recursion. 13523 * But finding the same state doesn't mean that it's safe 13524 * to stop processing the current state. The previous state 13525 * hasn't yet reached bpf_exit, since state.branches > 0. 13526 * Checking in_async_callback_fn alone is not enough either. 13527 * Since the verifier still needs to catch infinite loops 13528 * inside async callbacks. 13529 */ 13530 } else if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && 13531 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { 13532 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); 13533 verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); 13534 return -EINVAL; 13535 } 13536 /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state 13537 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct 13538 * states and may not help future pruning. 13539 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that 13540 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly. 13541 * The most abusive loop will be: 13542 * r1 += 1 13543 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2 13544 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states. 13545 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states 13546 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning. 13547 */ 13548 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 && 13549 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100) 13550 add_new_state = false; 13551 goto miss; 13552 } 13553 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) { 13554 sl->hit_cnt++; 13555 /* reached equivalent register/stack state, 13556 * prune the search. 13557 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us. 13558 * If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they 13559 * will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation 13560 * from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our 13561 * own state will get the read marks recorded, but 13562 * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning 13563 * this state and will pop a new one. 13564 */ 13565 err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur); 13566 13567 /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and 13568 * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks) 13569 * the precision needs to be propagated back in 13570 * the current state. 13571 */ 13572 err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur); 13573 err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state); 13574 if (err) 13575 return err; 13576 return 1; 13577 } 13578 miss: 13579 /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count. 13580 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state 13581 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have 13582 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning 13583 * and some at the end) to help pruning. 13584 */ 13585 if (add_new_state) 13586 sl->miss_cnt++; 13587 /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial 13588 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view. 13589 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time, 13590 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed. 13591 */ 13592 if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) { 13593 /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to 13594 * speed up verification 13595 */ 13596 *pprev = sl->next; 13597 if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) { 13598 u32 br = sl->state.branches; 13599 13600 WARN_ONCE(br, 13601 "BUG live_done but branches_to_explore %d\n", 13602 br); 13603 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 13604 kfree(sl); 13605 env->peak_states--; 13606 } else { 13607 /* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may 13608 * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to 13609 * be freed at the end of verification 13610 */ 13611 sl->next = env->free_list; 13612 env->free_list = sl; 13613 } 13614 sl = *pprev; 13615 continue; 13616 } 13617 next: 13618 pprev = &sl->next; 13619 sl = *pprev; 13620 } 13621 13622 if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) 13623 env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; 13624 13625 if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) 13626 return 0; 13627 13628 if (!add_new_state) 13629 return 0; 13630 13631 /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one. 13632 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet, 13633 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe) 13634 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be 13635 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx) 13636 * again on the way to bpf_exit. 13637 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state 13638 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. 13639 */ 13640 new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); 13641 if (!new_sl) 13642 return -ENOMEM; 13643 env->total_states++; 13644 env->peak_states++; 13645 env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed; 13646 env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed; 13647 13648 /* forget precise markings we inherited, see __mark_chain_precision */ 13649 if (env->bpf_capable) 13650 mark_all_scalars_imprecise(env, cur); 13651 13652 /* add new state to the head of linked list */ 13653 new = &new_sl->state; 13654 err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur); 13655 if (err) { 13656 free_verifier_state(new, false); 13657 kfree(new_sl); 13658 return err; 13659 } 13660 new->insn_idx = insn_idx; 13661 WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1, 13662 "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx); 13663 13664 cur->parent = new; 13665 cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; 13666 clear_jmp_history(cur); 13667 new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx); 13668 *explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl; 13669 /* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all 13670 * registers connected. Only r6 - r9 of the callers are alive (pushed 13671 * to the stack implicitly by JITs) so in callers' frames connect just 13672 * r6 - r9 as an optimization. Callers will have r1 - r5 connected to 13673 * the state of the call instruction (with WRITTEN set), and r0 comes 13674 * from callee with its full parentage chain, anyway. 13675 */ 13676 /* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes 13677 * our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us. 13678 * (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark 13679 * their parent and current state never has children yet. Only 13680 * explored_states can get read marks.) 13681 */ 13682 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 13683 for (i = j < cur->curframe ? BPF_REG_6 : 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 13684 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].parent = &new->frame[j]->regs[i]; 13685 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) 13686 cur->frame[j]->regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 13687 } 13688 13689 /* all stack frames are accessible from callee, clear them all */ 13690 for (j = 0; j <= cur->curframe; j++) { 13691 struct bpf_func_state *frame = cur->frame[j]; 13692 struct bpf_func_state *newframe = new->frame[j]; 13693 13694 for (i = 0; i < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) { 13695 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.live = REG_LIVE_NONE; 13696 frame->stack[i].spilled_ptr.parent = 13697 &newframe->stack[i].spilled_ptr; 13698 } 13699 } 13700 return 0; 13701 } 13702 13703 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */ 13704 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) 13705 { 13706 switch (base_type(type)) { 13707 case PTR_TO_CTX: 13708 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 13709 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 13710 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 13711 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 13712 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 13713 return false; 13714 default: 13715 return true; 13716 } 13717 } 13718 13719 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we 13720 * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok 13721 * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch: 13722 * 13723 * R1 = sock_ptr 13724 * goto X; 13725 * ... 13726 * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr; 13727 * goto X; 13728 * ... 13729 * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0); 13730 */ 13731 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) 13732 { 13733 return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) || 13734 !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); 13735 } 13736 13737 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 13738 { 13739 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 13740 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; 13741 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 13742 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 13743 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 13744 bool do_print_state = false; 13745 int prev_insn_idx = -1; 13746 13747 for (;;) { 13748 struct bpf_insn *insn; 13749 u8 class; 13750 int err; 13751 13752 env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; 13753 if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) { 13754 verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n", 13755 env->insn_idx, insn_cnt); 13756 return -EFAULT; 13757 } 13758 13759 insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; 13760 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); 13761 13762 if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { 13763 verbose(env, 13764 "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", 13765 env->insn_processed); 13766 return -E2BIG; 13767 } 13768 13769 state->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; 13770 13771 if (is_prune_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 13772 err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx); 13773 if (err < 0) 13774 return err; 13775 if (err == 1) { 13776 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ 13777 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 13778 if (do_print_state) 13779 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n", 13780 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 13781 env->cur_state->speculative ? 13782 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 13783 else 13784 verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx); 13785 } 13786 goto process_bpf_exit; 13787 } 13788 } 13789 13790 if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { 13791 err = push_jmp_history(env, state); 13792 if (err) 13793 return err; 13794 } 13795 13796 if (signal_pending(current)) 13797 return -EAGAIN; 13798 13799 if (need_resched()) 13800 cond_resched(); 13801 13802 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 && do_print_state) { 13803 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:", 13804 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, 13805 env->cur_state->speculative ? 13806 " (speculative execution)" : ""); 13807 print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe], true); 13808 do_print_state = false; 13809 } 13810 13811 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 13812 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { 13813 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name, 13814 .cb_print = verbose, 13815 .private_data = env, 13816 }; 13817 13818 if (verifier_state_scratched(env)) 13819 print_insn_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]); 13820 13821 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; "); 13822 env->prev_log_len = env->log.len_used; 13823 verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx); 13824 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks); 13825 env->prev_insn_print_len = env->log.len_used - env->prev_log_len; 13826 env->prev_log_len = env->log.len_used; 13827 } 13828 13829 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 13830 err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx, 13831 env->prev_insn_idx); 13832 if (err) 13833 return err; 13834 } 13835 13836 regs = cur_regs(env); 13837 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 13838 prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; 13839 13840 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { 13841 err = check_alu_op(env, insn); 13842 if (err) 13843 return err; 13844 13845 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { 13846 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type; 13847 13848 /* check for reserved fields is already done */ 13849 13850 /* check src operand */ 13851 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 13852 if (err) 13853 return err; 13854 13855 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); 13856 if (err) 13857 return err; 13858 13859 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; 13860 13861 /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable, 13862 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func 13863 */ 13864 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, 13865 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 13866 BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false); 13867 if (err) 13868 return err; 13869 13870 prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 13871 13872 if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) { 13873 /* saw a valid insn 13874 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off) 13875 * save type to validate intersecting paths 13876 */ 13877 *prev_src_type = src_reg_type; 13878 13879 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(src_reg_type, *prev_src_type)) { 13880 /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn 13881 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) 13882 * with different pointer types: 13883 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and 13884 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch. 13885 * Reject it. 13886 */ 13887 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 13888 return -EINVAL; 13889 } 13890 13891 } else if (class == BPF_STX) { 13892 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type; 13893 13894 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { 13895 err = check_atomic(env, env->insn_idx, insn); 13896 if (err) 13897 return err; 13898 env->insn_idx++; 13899 continue; 13900 } 13901 13902 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) { 13903 verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); 13904 return -EINVAL; 13905 } 13906 13907 /* check src1 operand */ 13908 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP); 13909 if (err) 13910 return err; 13911 /* check src2 operand */ 13912 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 13913 if (err) 13914 return err; 13915 13916 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; 13917 13918 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 13919 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 13920 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 13921 BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false); 13922 if (err) 13923 return err; 13924 13925 prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; 13926 13927 if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) { 13928 *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type; 13929 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(dst_reg_type, *prev_dst_type)) { 13930 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); 13931 return -EINVAL; 13932 } 13933 13934 } else if (class == BPF_ST) { 13935 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || 13936 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { 13937 verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); 13938 return -EINVAL; 13939 } 13940 /* check src operand */ 13941 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); 13942 if (err) 13943 return err; 13944 13945 if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { 13946 verbose(env, "BPF_ST stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n", 13947 insn->dst_reg, 13948 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type)); 13949 return -EACCES; 13950 } 13951 13952 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ 13953 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, 13954 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), 13955 BPF_WRITE, -1, false); 13956 if (err) 13957 return err; 13958 13959 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { 13960 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); 13961 13962 env->jmps_processed++; 13963 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { 13964 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 13965 (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL 13966 && insn->off != 0) || 13967 (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && 13968 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && 13969 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) || 13970 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 13971 class == BPF_JMP32) { 13972 verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); 13973 return -EINVAL; 13974 } 13975 13976 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 13977 if ((insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) || 13978 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) || 13979 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && 13980 (insn->off != 0 || !is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(insn->imm)))) { 13981 verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); 13982 return -EINVAL; 13983 } 13984 } 13985 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 13986 err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 13987 else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) 13988 err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 13989 else 13990 err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 13991 if (err) 13992 return err; 13993 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { 13994 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 13995 insn->imm != 0 || 13996 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 13997 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 13998 class == BPF_JMP32) { 13999 verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); 14000 return -EINVAL; 14001 } 14002 14003 env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; 14004 continue; 14005 14006 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { 14007 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || 14008 insn->imm != 0 || 14009 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 14010 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || 14011 class == BPF_JMP32) { 14012 verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); 14013 return -EINVAL; 14014 } 14015 14016 if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr) { 14017 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n"); 14018 return -EINVAL; 14019 } 14020 14021 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) { 14022 verbose(env, "bpf_rcu_read_unlock is missing\n"); 14023 return -EINVAL; 14024 } 14025 14026 /* We must do check_reference_leak here before 14027 * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when 14028 * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback 14029 * function, for which reference_state must 14030 * match caller reference state when it exits. 14031 */ 14032 err = check_reference_leak(env); 14033 if (err) 14034 return err; 14035 14036 if (state->curframe) { 14037 /* exit from nested function */ 14038 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); 14039 if (err) 14040 return err; 14041 do_print_state = true; 14042 continue; 14043 } 14044 14045 err = check_return_code(env); 14046 if (err) 14047 return err; 14048 process_bpf_exit: 14049 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); 14050 update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); 14051 err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, 14052 &env->insn_idx, pop_log); 14053 if (err < 0) { 14054 if (err != -ENOENT) 14055 return err; 14056 break; 14057 } else { 14058 do_print_state = true; 14059 continue; 14060 } 14061 } else { 14062 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); 14063 if (err) 14064 return err; 14065 } 14066 } else if (class == BPF_LD) { 14067 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); 14068 14069 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { 14070 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); 14071 if (err) 14072 return err; 14073 14074 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { 14075 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); 14076 if (err) 14077 return err; 14078 14079 env->insn_idx++; 14080 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); 14081 } else { 14082 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); 14083 return -EINVAL; 14084 } 14085 } else { 14086 verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); 14087 return -EINVAL; 14088 } 14089 14090 env->insn_idx++; 14091 } 14092 14093 return 0; 14094 } 14095 14096 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf) 14097 { 14098 const struct btf_type *t; 14099 const char *tname; 14100 int i, n; 14101 14102 /* 14103 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu" 14104 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF 14105 * types to look at only module's own BTF types. 14106 */ 14107 n = btf_nr_types(btf); 14108 if (btf_is_module(btf)) 14109 i = btf_nr_types(btf_vmlinux); 14110 else 14111 i = 1; 14112 14113 for(; i < n; i++) { 14114 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i); 14115 if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC) 14116 continue; 14117 14118 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 14119 if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu")) 14120 return i; 14121 } 14122 14123 return -ENOENT; 14124 } 14125 14126 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */ 14127 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14128 struct bpf_insn *insn, 14129 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux) 14130 { 14131 const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi; 14132 const struct btf_type *datasec; 14133 struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod; 14134 const struct btf_type *t; 14135 const char *sym_name; 14136 bool percpu = false; 14137 u32 type, id = insn->imm; 14138 struct btf *btf; 14139 s32 datasec_id; 14140 u64 addr; 14141 int i, btf_fd, err; 14142 14143 btf_fd = insn[1].imm; 14144 if (btf_fd) { 14145 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd); 14146 if (IS_ERR(btf)) { 14147 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n"); 14148 return -EINVAL; 14149 } 14150 } else { 14151 if (!btf_vmlinux) { 14152 verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n"); 14153 return -EINVAL; 14154 } 14155 btf = btf_vmlinux; 14156 btf_get(btf); 14157 } 14158 14159 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id); 14160 if (!t) { 14161 verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id); 14162 err = -ENOENT; 14163 goto err_put; 14164 } 14165 14166 if (!btf_type_is_var(t)) { 14167 verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR.\n", id); 14168 err = -EINVAL; 14169 goto err_put; 14170 } 14171 14172 sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 14173 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name); 14174 if (!addr) { 14175 verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n", 14176 sym_name); 14177 err = -ENOENT; 14178 goto err_put; 14179 } 14180 14181 datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf); 14182 if (datasec_id > 0) { 14183 datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id); 14184 for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) { 14185 if (vsi->type == id) { 14186 percpu = true; 14187 break; 14188 } 14189 } 14190 } 14191 14192 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 14193 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 14194 14195 type = t->type; 14196 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL); 14197 if (percpu) { 14198 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU; 14199 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 14200 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 14201 } else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) { 14202 const struct btf_type *ret; 14203 const char *tname; 14204 u32 tsize; 14205 14206 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */ 14207 ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize); 14208 if (IS_ERR(ret)) { 14209 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 14210 verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n", 14211 tname, PTR_ERR(ret)); 14212 err = -EINVAL; 14213 goto err_put; 14214 } 14215 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY; 14216 aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize; 14217 } else { 14218 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; 14219 aux->btf_var.btf = btf; 14220 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type; 14221 } 14222 14223 /* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */ 14224 for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++) { 14225 if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf) { 14226 btf_put(btf); 14227 return 0; 14228 } 14229 } 14230 14231 if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) { 14232 err = -E2BIG; 14233 goto err_put; 14234 } 14235 14236 btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt]; 14237 btf_mod->btf = btf; 14238 btf_mod->module = NULL; 14239 14240 /* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */ 14241 if (btf_is_module(btf)) { 14242 btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf); 14243 if (!btf_mod->module) { 14244 err = -ENXIO; 14245 goto err_put; 14246 } 14247 } 14248 14249 env->used_btf_cnt++; 14250 14251 return 0; 14252 err_put: 14253 btf_put(btf); 14254 return err; 14255 } 14256 14257 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type) 14258 { 14259 switch (type) { 14260 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: 14261 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: 14262 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: 14263 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: 14264 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE: 14265 return true; 14266 default: 14267 return false; 14268 } 14269 } 14270 14271 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14272 struct bpf_map *map, 14273 struct bpf_prog *prog) 14274 14275 { 14276 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 14277 14278 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_LIST_HEAD)) { 14279 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 14280 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_list_head yet\n"); 14281 return -EINVAL; 14282 } 14283 } 14284 14285 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) { 14286 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) { 14287 verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 14288 return -EINVAL; 14289 } 14290 14291 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 14292 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 14293 return -EINVAL; 14294 } 14295 14296 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 14297 verbose(env, "sleepable progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n"); 14298 return -EINVAL; 14299 } 14300 } 14301 14302 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) { 14303 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) { 14304 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_timer yet\n"); 14305 return -EINVAL; 14306 } 14307 } 14308 14309 if ((bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) && 14310 !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) { 14311 verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n"); 14312 return -EINVAL; 14313 } 14314 14315 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { 14316 verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n"); 14317 return -EINVAL; 14318 } 14319 14320 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 14321 switch (map->map_type) { 14322 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH: 14323 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH: 14324 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY: 14325 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH: 14326 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY: 14327 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH: 14328 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS: 14329 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS: 14330 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF: 14331 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF: 14332 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE: 14333 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE: 14334 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE: 14335 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE: 14336 break; 14337 default: 14338 verbose(env, 14339 "Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, ringbuf and local storage maps\n"); 14340 return -EINVAL; 14341 } 14342 14343 return 0; 14344 } 14345 14346 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map) 14347 { 14348 return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE || 14349 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE); 14350 } 14351 14352 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions: 14353 * 14354 * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer. 14355 * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var. 14356 * 14357 * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id. 14358 */ 14359 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14360 { 14361 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 14362 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14363 int i, j, err; 14364 14365 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); 14366 if (err) 14367 return err; 14368 14369 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 14370 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 14371 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) { 14372 verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n"); 14373 return -EINVAL; 14374 } 14375 14376 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) { 14377 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 14378 struct bpf_map *map; 14379 struct fd f; 14380 u64 addr; 14381 u32 fd; 14382 14383 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 || 14384 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 || 14385 insn[1].off != 0) { 14386 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 14387 return -EINVAL; 14388 } 14389 14390 if (insn[0].src_reg == 0) 14391 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */ 14392 goto next_insn; 14393 14394 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) { 14395 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 14396 err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux); 14397 if (err) 14398 return err; 14399 goto next_insn; 14400 } 14401 14402 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) { 14403 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 14404 aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC; 14405 goto next_insn; 14406 } 14407 14408 /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is 14409 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn. 14410 */ 14411 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 14412 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE: 14413 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 14414 break; 14415 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD: 14416 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 14417 if (insn[1].imm == 0) 14418 break; 14419 fallthrough; 14420 default: 14421 verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n"); 14422 return -EINVAL; 14423 } 14424 14425 switch (insn[0].src_reg) { 14426 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE: 14427 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX: 14428 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) { 14429 verbose(env, "fd_idx without fd_array is invalid\n"); 14430 return -EPROTO; 14431 } 14432 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array, 14433 insn[0].imm * sizeof(fd), 14434 sizeof(fd))) 14435 return -EFAULT; 14436 break; 14437 default: 14438 fd = insn[0].imm; 14439 break; 14440 } 14441 14442 f = fdget(fd); 14443 map = __bpf_map_get(f); 14444 if (IS_ERR(map)) { 14445 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", 14446 insn[0].imm); 14447 return PTR_ERR(map); 14448 } 14449 14450 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog); 14451 if (err) { 14452 fdput(f); 14453 return err; 14454 } 14455 14456 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i]; 14457 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD || 14458 insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { 14459 addr = (unsigned long)map; 14460 } else { 14461 u32 off = insn[1].imm; 14462 14463 if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { 14464 verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off); 14465 fdput(f); 14466 return -EINVAL; 14467 } 14468 14469 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) { 14470 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n"); 14471 fdput(f); 14472 return -EINVAL; 14473 } 14474 14475 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off); 14476 if (err) { 14477 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n", 14478 map->value_size, off); 14479 fdput(f); 14480 return err; 14481 } 14482 14483 aux->map_off = off; 14484 addr += off; 14485 } 14486 14487 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr; 14488 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32; 14489 14490 /* check whether we recorded this map already */ 14491 for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) { 14492 if (env->used_maps[j] == map) { 14493 aux->map_index = j; 14494 fdput(f); 14495 goto next_insn; 14496 } 14497 } 14498 14499 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) { 14500 fdput(f); 14501 return -E2BIG; 14502 } 14503 14504 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier, 14505 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it 14506 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded 14507 * and all maps are released in free_used_maps() 14508 */ 14509 bpf_map_inc(map); 14510 14511 aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt; 14512 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map; 14513 14514 if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) && 14515 bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) { 14516 verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n"); 14517 fdput(f); 14518 return -EBUSY; 14519 } 14520 14521 fdput(f); 14522 next_insn: 14523 insn++; 14524 i++; 14525 continue; 14526 } 14527 14528 /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */ 14529 if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) { 14530 verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code); 14531 return -EINVAL; 14532 } 14533 } 14534 14535 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid 14536 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd. 14537 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access. 14538 */ 14539 return 0; 14540 } 14541 14542 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 14543 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14544 { 14545 __bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps, 14546 env->used_map_cnt); 14547 } 14548 14549 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */ 14550 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14551 { 14552 __bpf_free_used_btfs(env->prog->aux, env->used_btfs, 14553 env->used_btf_cnt); 14554 } 14555 14556 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */ 14557 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14558 { 14559 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 14560 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14561 int i; 14562 14563 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 14564 if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) 14565 continue; 14566 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) 14567 continue; 14568 insn->src_reg = 0; 14569 } 14570 } 14571 14572 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range 14573 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying 14574 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero 14575 */ 14576 static void adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14577 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, 14578 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt) 14579 { 14580 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *old_data = env->insn_aux_data; 14581 struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi; 14582 u32 old_seen = old_data[off].seen; 14583 u32 prog_len; 14584 int i; 14585 14586 /* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path 14587 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the 14588 * original insn at old prog. 14589 */ 14590 old_data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + off + cnt - 1); 14591 14592 if (cnt == 1) 14593 return; 14594 prog_len = new_prog->len; 14595 14596 memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off); 14597 memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off, 14598 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); 14599 for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) { 14600 /* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */ 14601 new_data[i].seen = old_seen; 14602 new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i); 14603 } 14604 env->insn_aux_data = new_data; 14605 vfree(old_data); 14606 } 14607 14608 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len) 14609 { 14610 int i; 14611 14612 if (len == 1) 14613 return; 14614 /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */ 14615 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 14616 if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off) 14617 continue; 14618 env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1; 14619 } 14620 } 14621 14622 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len) 14623 { 14624 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 14625 int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 14626 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc; 14627 14628 for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) { 14629 desc = &tab[i]; 14630 if (desc->insn_idx <= off) 14631 continue; 14632 desc->insn_idx += len - 1; 14633 } 14634 } 14635 14636 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 14637 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len) 14638 { 14639 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 14640 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data = NULL; 14641 14642 if (len > 1) { 14643 new_data = vzalloc(array_size(env->prog->len + len - 1, 14644 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data))); 14645 if (!new_data) 14646 return NULL; 14647 } 14648 14649 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len); 14650 if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) { 14651 if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE) 14652 verbose(env, 14653 "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n", 14654 env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx); 14655 vfree(new_data); 14656 return NULL; 14657 } 14658 adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_data, new_prog, off, len); 14659 adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len); 14660 adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, off, len); 14661 return new_prog; 14662 } 14663 14664 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14665 u32 off, u32 cnt) 14666 { 14667 int i, j; 14668 14669 /* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */ 14670 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) 14671 if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off) 14672 break; 14673 /* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */ 14674 for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++) 14675 if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt) 14676 break; 14677 /* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing 14678 * the front of previous prog 14679 */ 14680 if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt) 14681 j--; 14682 14683 if (j > i) { 14684 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 14685 int move; 14686 14687 /* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 14688 move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j; 14689 14690 memmove(env->subprog_info + i, 14691 env->subprog_info + j, 14692 sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move); 14693 env->subprog_cnt -= j - i; 14694 14695 /* remove func_info */ 14696 if (aux->func_info) { 14697 move = aux->func_info_cnt - j; 14698 14699 memmove(aux->func_info + i, 14700 aux->func_info + j, 14701 sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move); 14702 aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i; 14703 /* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites, 14704 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust 14705 */ 14706 } 14707 } else { 14708 /* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */ 14709 if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off) 14710 i++; 14711 } 14712 14713 /* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */ 14714 for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 14715 env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt; 14716 14717 return 0; 14718 } 14719 14720 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, 14721 u32 cnt) 14722 { 14723 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 14724 u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo; 14725 struct bpf_line_info *linfo; 14726 14727 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 14728 if (!nr_linfo) 14729 return 0; 14730 14731 linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 14732 14733 /* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */ 14734 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) 14735 if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off) 14736 break; 14737 14738 l_off = i; 14739 l_cnt = 0; 14740 for (; i < nr_linfo; i++) 14741 if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt) 14742 l_cnt++; 14743 else 14744 break; 14745 14746 /* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit" 14747 * last removed linfo. prog is already modified, so prog->len == off 14748 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed). 14749 */ 14750 if (prog->len != off && l_cnt && 14751 (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) { 14752 l_cnt--; 14753 linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt; 14754 } 14755 14756 /* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */ 14757 if (l_cnt) { 14758 memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i, 14759 sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i)); 14760 14761 prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt; 14762 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 14763 } 14764 14765 /* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */ 14766 for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++) 14767 linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt; 14768 14769 /* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */ 14770 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) 14771 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) { 14772 /* program may have started in the removed region but 14773 * may not be fully removed 14774 */ 14775 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt) 14776 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt; 14777 else 14778 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off; 14779 } 14780 14781 return 0; 14782 } 14783 14784 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt) 14785 { 14786 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 14787 unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len; 14788 int err; 14789 14790 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 14791 bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt); 14792 14793 err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt); 14794 if (err) 14795 return err; 14796 14797 err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 14798 if (err) 14799 return err; 14800 14801 err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt); 14802 if (err) 14803 return err; 14804 14805 memmove(aux_data + off, aux_data + off + cnt, 14806 sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt)); 14807 14808 return 0; 14809 } 14810 14811 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not 14812 * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can 14813 * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code 14814 * with 'ja -1'. 14815 * 14816 * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the 14817 * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then 14818 * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception 14819 * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead 14820 * code could be located. 14821 */ 14822 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14823 { 14824 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 14825 struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1); 14826 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 14827 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14828 int i; 14829 14830 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 14831 if (aux_data[i].seen) 14832 continue; 14833 memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap)); 14834 aux_data[i].zext_dst = false; 14835 } 14836 } 14837 14838 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code) 14839 { 14840 u8 op; 14841 14842 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32) 14843 return true; 14844 14845 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP) 14846 return false; 14847 14848 op = BPF_OP(code); 14849 return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL; 14850 } 14851 14852 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14853 { 14854 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 14855 struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 14856 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 14857 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14858 int i; 14859 14860 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 14861 if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code)) 14862 continue; 14863 14864 if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen) 14865 ja.off = insn->off; 14866 else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen) 14867 ja.off = 0; 14868 else 14869 continue; 14870 14871 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 14872 bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja); 14873 14874 memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja)); 14875 } 14876 } 14877 14878 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14879 { 14880 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; 14881 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14882 int i, err; 14883 14884 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 14885 int j; 14886 14887 j = 0; 14888 while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen) 14889 j++; 14890 if (!j) 14891 continue; 14892 14893 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j); 14894 if (err) 14895 return err; 14896 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14897 } 14898 14899 return 0; 14900 } 14901 14902 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 14903 { 14904 const struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0); 14905 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 14906 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 14907 int i, err; 14908 14909 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { 14910 if (memcmp(&insn[i], &ja, sizeof(ja))) 14911 continue; 14912 14913 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1); 14914 if (err) 14915 return err; 14916 insn_cnt--; 14917 i--; 14918 } 14919 14920 return 0; 14921 } 14922 14923 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 14924 const union bpf_attr *attr) 14925 { 14926 struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4]; 14927 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; 14928 int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len; 14929 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; 14930 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 14931 bool rnd_hi32; 14932 14933 rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32; 14934 zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0); 14935 rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 14936 rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); 14937 rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX); 14938 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { 14939 int adj_idx = i + delta; 14940 struct bpf_insn insn; 14941 int load_reg; 14942 14943 insn = insns[adj_idx]; 14944 load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn); 14945 if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) { 14946 u8 code, class; 14947 u32 imm_rnd; 14948 14949 if (!rnd_hi32) 14950 continue; 14951 14952 code = insn.code; 14953 class = BPF_CLASS(code); 14954 if (load_reg == -1) 14955 continue; 14956 14957 /* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for 14958 * BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL 14959 * here. 14960 */ 14961 if (is_reg64(env, &insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) { 14962 if (class == BPF_LD && 14963 BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM) 14964 i++; 14965 continue; 14966 } 14967 14968 /* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */ 14969 if (class == BPF_LDX && 14970 aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX) 14971 continue; 14972 14973 imm_rnd = get_random_u32(); 14974 rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn; 14975 rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd; 14976 rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg; 14977 patch = rnd_hi32_patch; 14978 patch_len = 4; 14979 goto apply_patch_buffer; 14980 } 14981 14982 /* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested 14983 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG. 14984 * 14985 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into 14986 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs' 14987 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the 14988 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is 14989 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the 14990 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext. 14991 */ 14992 if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn)) 14993 continue; 14994 14995 /* Zero-extension is done by the caller. */ 14996 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(&insn)) 14997 continue; 14998 14999 if (WARN_ON(load_reg == -1)) { 15000 verbose(env, "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined\n"); 15001 return -EFAULT; 15002 } 15003 15004 zext_patch[0] = insn; 15005 zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg; 15006 zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg; 15007 patch = zext_patch; 15008 patch_len = 2; 15009 apply_patch_buffer: 15010 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len); 15011 if (!new_prog) 15012 return -ENOMEM; 15013 env->prog = new_prog; 15014 insns = new_prog->insnsi; 15015 aux = env->insn_aux_data; 15016 delta += patch_len - 1; 15017 } 15018 15019 return 0; 15020 } 15021 15022 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a 15023 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure: 15024 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff 15025 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock 15026 */ 15027 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15028 { 15029 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops; 15030 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0; 15031 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 15032 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn; 15033 u32 target_size, size_default, off; 15034 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 15035 enum bpf_access_type type; 15036 bool is_narrower_load; 15037 15038 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { 15039 if (!ops->gen_prologue) { 15040 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 15041 return -EINVAL; 15042 } 15043 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, 15044 env->prog); 15045 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 15046 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 15047 return -EINVAL; 15048 } else if (cnt) { 15049 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); 15050 if (!new_prog) 15051 return -ENOMEM; 15052 15053 env->prog = new_prog; 15054 delta += cnt - 1; 15055 } 15056 } 15057 15058 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 15059 return 0; 15060 15061 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; 15062 15063 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 15064 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; 15065 bool ctx_access; 15066 15067 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 15068 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 15069 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 15070 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 15071 type = BPF_READ; 15072 ctx_access = true; 15073 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 15074 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 15075 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 15076 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) || 15077 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || 15078 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || 15079 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || 15080 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 15081 type = BPF_WRITE; 15082 ctx_access = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX; 15083 } else { 15084 continue; 15085 } 15086 15087 if (type == BPF_WRITE && 15088 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) { 15089 struct bpf_insn patch[] = { 15090 *insn, 15091 BPF_ST_NOSPEC(), 15092 }; 15093 15094 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch); 15095 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt); 15096 if (!new_prog) 15097 return -ENOMEM; 15098 15099 delta += cnt - 1; 15100 env->prog = new_prog; 15101 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15102 continue; 15103 } 15104 15105 if (!ctx_access) 15106 continue; 15107 15108 switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { 15109 case PTR_TO_CTX: 15110 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) 15111 continue; 15112 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access; 15113 break; 15114 case PTR_TO_SOCKET: 15115 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: 15116 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; 15117 break; 15118 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: 15119 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 15120 break; 15121 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: 15122 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access; 15123 break; 15124 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: 15125 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 15126 /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike 15127 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot 15128 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle 15129 * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed 15130 * for this case. 15131 */ 15132 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED: 15133 if (type == BPF_READ) { 15134 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | 15135 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code); 15136 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++; 15137 } 15138 continue; 15139 default: 15140 continue; 15141 } 15142 15143 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; 15144 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); 15145 15146 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, 15147 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific 15148 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, 15149 * we will apply proper mask to the result. 15150 */ 15151 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size; 15152 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size); 15153 off = insn->off; 15154 if (is_narrower_load) { 15155 u8 size_code; 15156 15157 if (type == BPF_WRITE) { 15158 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); 15159 return -EINVAL; 15160 } 15161 15162 size_code = BPF_H; 15163 if (ctx_field_size == 4) 15164 size_code = BPF_W; 15165 else if (ctx_field_size == 8) 15166 size_code = BPF_DW; 15167 15168 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1); 15169 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; 15170 } 15171 15172 target_size = 0; 15173 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, 15174 &target_size); 15175 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || 15176 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { 15177 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 15178 return -EINVAL; 15179 } 15180 15181 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { 15182 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( 15183 off, size, size_default) * 8; 15184 if (shift && cnt + 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 15185 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n"); 15186 return -EINVAL; 15187 } 15188 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { 15189 if (shift) 15190 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, 15191 insn->dst_reg, 15192 shift); 15193 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 15194 (1 << size * 8) - 1); 15195 } else { 15196 if (shift) 15197 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, 15198 insn->dst_reg, 15199 shift); 15200 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, 15201 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1); 15202 } 15203 } 15204 15205 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15206 if (!new_prog) 15207 return -ENOMEM; 15208 15209 delta += cnt - 1; 15210 15211 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */ 15212 env->prog = new_prog; 15213 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15214 } 15215 15216 return 0; 15217 } 15218 15219 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15220 { 15221 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp; 15222 int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog; 15223 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 15224 struct bpf_insn *insn; 15225 void *old_bpf_func; 15226 int err, num_exentries; 15227 15228 if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) 15229 return 0; 15230 15231 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 15232 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15233 continue; 15234 15235 /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but 15236 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is 15237 * propagated in any case. 15238 */ 15239 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1); 15240 if (subprog < 0) { 15241 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", 15242 i + insn->imm + 1); 15243 return -EFAULT; 15244 } 15245 /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of 15246 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs 15247 */ 15248 insn->off = subprog; 15249 /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback 15250 * to interpreter will be needed 15251 */ 15252 env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm; 15253 /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */ 15254 insn->imm = 1; 15255 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) 15256 /* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions 15257 * if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm. 15258 * Force a non zero here. 15259 */ 15260 insn[1].imm = 1; 15261 } 15262 15263 err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog); 15264 if (err) 15265 goto out_undo_insn; 15266 15267 err = -ENOMEM; 15268 func = kcalloc(env->subprog_cnt, sizeof(prog), GFP_KERNEL); 15269 if (!func) 15270 goto out_undo_insn; 15271 15272 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15273 subprog_start = subprog_end; 15274 subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start; 15275 15276 len = subprog_end - subprog_start; 15277 /* bpf_prog_run() doesn't call subprogs directly, 15278 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs. 15279 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id 15280 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL 15281 */ 15282 func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER); 15283 if (!func[i]) 15284 goto out_free; 15285 memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start], 15286 len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn)); 15287 func[i]->type = prog->type; 15288 func[i]->len = len; 15289 if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i])) 15290 goto out_free; 15291 func[i]->is_func = 1; 15292 func[i]->aux->func_idx = i; 15293 /* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */ 15294 func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf; 15295 func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info; 15296 func[i]->aux->func_info_cnt = prog->aux->func_info_cnt; 15297 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab; 15298 func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab = prog->aux->size_poke_tab; 15299 15300 for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) { 15301 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke; 15302 15303 poke = &prog->aux->poke_tab[j]; 15304 if (poke->insn_idx < subprog_end && 15305 poke->insn_idx >= subprog_start) 15306 poke->aux = func[i]->aux; 15307 } 15308 15309 func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F'; 15310 func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 15311 func[i]->jit_requested = 1; 15312 func[i]->blinding_requested = prog->blinding_requested; 15313 func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab; 15314 func[i]->aux->kfunc_btf_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab; 15315 func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo; 15316 func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo; 15317 func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo; 15318 func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx; 15319 num_exentries = 0; 15320 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 15321 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 15322 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && 15323 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM) 15324 num_exentries++; 15325 } 15326 func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries; 15327 func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable; 15328 func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 15329 if (!func[i]->jited) { 15330 err = -ENOTSUPP; 15331 goto out_free; 15332 } 15333 cond_resched(); 15334 } 15335 15336 /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed 15337 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and 15338 * run last pass of JIT 15339 */ 15340 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15341 insn = func[i]->insnsi; 15342 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) { 15343 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 15344 subprog = insn->off; 15345 insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func; 15346 insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32; 15347 continue; 15348 } 15349 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15350 continue; 15351 subprog = insn->off; 15352 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(func[subprog]->bpf_func); 15353 } 15354 15355 /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses 15356 * of the JITed images for each function in the program 15357 * 15358 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field 15359 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start 15360 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base 15361 * 15362 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee 15363 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of 15364 * the call instruction, as an index for this list 15365 */ 15366 func[i]->aux->func = func; 15367 func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 15368 } 15369 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15370 old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func; 15371 tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]); 15372 if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) { 15373 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 15374 err = -ENOTSUPP; 15375 goto out_free; 15376 } 15377 cond_resched(); 15378 } 15379 15380 /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and 15381 * populate kallsysm 15382 */ 15383 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15384 bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]); 15385 bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]); 15386 } 15387 15388 /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main 15389 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can 15390 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only. 15391 */ 15392 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 15393 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 15394 insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 15395 insn[1].imm = insn->off; 15396 insn->off = 0; 15397 continue; 15398 } 15399 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15400 continue; 15401 insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 15402 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1); 15403 insn->imm = subprog; 15404 } 15405 15406 prog->jited = 1; 15407 prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func; 15408 prog->jited_len = func[0]->jited_len; 15409 prog->aux->func = func; 15410 prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt; 15411 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 15412 return 0; 15413 out_free: 15414 /* We failed JIT'ing, so at this point we need to unregister poke 15415 * descriptors from subprogs, so that kernel is not attempting to 15416 * patch it anymore as we're freeing the subprog JIT memory. 15417 */ 15418 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 15419 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 15420 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux); 15421 } 15422 /* At this point we're guaranteed that poke descriptors are not 15423 * live anymore. We can just unlink its descriptor table as it's 15424 * released with the main prog. 15425 */ 15426 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 15427 if (!func[i]) 15428 continue; 15429 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = NULL; 15430 bpf_jit_free(func[i]); 15431 } 15432 kfree(func); 15433 out_undo_insn: 15434 /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */ 15435 prog->jit_requested = 0; 15436 prog->blinding_requested = 0; 15437 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 15438 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15439 continue; 15440 insn->off = 0; 15441 insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm; 15442 } 15443 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog); 15444 return err; 15445 } 15446 15447 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15448 { 15449 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 15450 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 15451 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 15452 bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog); 15453 int i, depth; 15454 #endif 15455 int err = 0; 15456 15457 if (env->prog->jit_requested && 15458 !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 15459 err = jit_subprogs(env); 15460 if (err == 0) 15461 return 0; 15462 if (err == -EFAULT) 15463 return err; 15464 } 15465 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 15466 if (has_kfunc_call) { 15467 verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 15468 return -EINVAL; 15469 } 15470 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) { 15471 /* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls 15472 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 15473 */ 15474 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n"); 15475 return -EINVAL; 15476 } 15477 for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) { 15478 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) { 15479 /* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls 15480 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet. 15481 */ 15482 verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n"); 15483 return -EINVAL; 15484 } 15485 15486 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) 15487 continue; 15488 depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i); 15489 if (depth < 0) 15490 return depth; 15491 bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth); 15492 } 15493 err = 0; 15494 #endif 15495 return err; 15496 } 15497 15498 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, 15499 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, int insn_idx, int *cnt) 15500 { 15501 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc; 15502 15503 if (!insn->imm) { 15504 verbose(env, "invalid kernel function call not eliminated in verifier pass\n"); 15505 return -EINVAL; 15506 } 15507 15508 /* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with 15509 * an address (relative to __bpf_call_base). 15510 */ 15511 desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off); 15512 if (!desc) { 15513 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u\n", 15514 insn->imm); 15515 return -EFAULT; 15516 } 15517 15518 *cnt = 0; 15519 insn->imm = desc->imm; 15520 if (insn->off) 15521 return 0; 15522 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) { 15523 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 15524 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 15525 u64 obj_new_size = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size; 15526 15527 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, obj_new_size); 15528 insn_buf[1] = addr[0]; 15529 insn_buf[2] = addr[1]; 15530 insn_buf[3] = *insn; 15531 *cnt = 4; 15532 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) { 15533 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta; 15534 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; 15535 15536 insn_buf[0] = addr[0]; 15537 insn_buf[1] = addr[1]; 15538 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 15539 *cnt = 3; 15540 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] || 15541 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { 15542 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 15543 *cnt = 1; 15544 } 15545 return 0; 15546 } 15547 15548 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass. 15549 * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations. 15550 */ 15551 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 15552 { 15553 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 15554 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = prog->expected_attach_type; 15555 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog); 15556 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi; 15557 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn; 15558 const int insn_cnt = prog->len; 15559 const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; 15560 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux; 15561 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16]; 15562 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 15563 struct bpf_map *map_ptr; 15564 int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0; 15565 15566 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 15567 /* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */ 15568 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 15569 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || 15570 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || 15571 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { 15572 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; 15573 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; 15574 struct bpf_insn *patchlet; 15575 struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = { 15576 /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */ 15577 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 15578 BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 15579 0, 2, 0), 15580 BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 15581 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 15582 *insn, 15583 }; 15584 struct bpf_insn chk_and_mod[] = { 15585 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ 15586 BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | 15587 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, 15588 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0), 15589 *insn, 15590 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), 15591 BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), 15592 }; 15593 15594 patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod; 15595 cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) : 15596 ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0); 15597 15598 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt); 15599 if (!new_prog) 15600 return -ENOMEM; 15601 15602 delta += cnt - 1; 15603 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15604 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15605 continue; 15606 } 15607 15608 /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */ 15609 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && 15610 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || 15611 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { 15612 cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); 15613 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 15614 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 15615 return -EINVAL; 15616 } 15617 15618 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15619 if (!new_prog) 15620 return -ENOMEM; 15621 15622 delta += cnt - 1; 15623 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15624 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15625 continue; 15626 } 15627 15628 /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */ 15629 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) || 15630 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) { 15631 const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X; 15632 const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X; 15633 struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; 15634 bool issrc, isneg, isimm; 15635 u32 off_reg; 15636 15637 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 15638 if (!aux->alu_state || 15639 aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER) 15640 continue; 15641 15642 isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE; 15643 issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) == 15644 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC; 15645 isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE; 15646 15647 off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg; 15648 if (isimm) { 15649 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 15650 } else { 15651 if (isneg) 15652 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 15653 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit); 15654 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 15655 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 15656 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0); 15657 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63); 15658 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg); 15659 } 15660 if (!issrc) 15661 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg); 15662 insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX; 15663 if (isneg) 15664 insn->code = insn->code == code_add ? 15665 code_sub : code_add; 15666 *patch++ = *insn; 15667 if (issrc && isneg && !isimm) 15668 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1); 15669 cnt = patch - insn_buf; 15670 15671 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15672 if (!new_prog) 15673 return -ENOMEM; 15674 15675 delta += cnt - 1; 15676 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15677 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15678 continue; 15679 } 15680 15681 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) 15682 continue; 15683 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) 15684 continue; 15685 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { 15686 ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn, insn_buf, i + delta, &cnt); 15687 if (ret) 15688 return ret; 15689 if (cnt == 0) 15690 continue; 15691 15692 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15693 if (!new_prog) 15694 return -ENOMEM; 15695 15696 delta += cnt - 1; 15697 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15698 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15699 continue; 15700 } 15701 15702 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm) 15703 prog->dst_needed = 1; 15704 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32) 15705 bpf_user_rnd_init_once(); 15706 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return) 15707 prog->kprobe_override = 1; 15708 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) { 15709 /* If we tail call into other programs, we 15710 * cannot make any assumptions since they can 15711 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in 15712 * the program array. 15713 */ 15714 prog->cb_access = 1; 15715 if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) 15716 prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK; 15717 prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF; 15718 15719 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid 15720 * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal 15721 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler 15722 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet 15723 */ 15724 insn->imm = 0; 15725 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL; 15726 15727 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 15728 if (env->bpf_capable && !prog->blinding_requested && 15729 prog->jit_requested && 15730 !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && 15731 !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) && 15732 !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) { 15733 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = { 15734 .reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL, 15735 .tail_call.map = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state), 15736 .tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux), 15737 .insn_idx = i + delta, 15738 }; 15739 15740 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc); 15741 if (ret < 0) { 15742 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n"); 15743 return ret; 15744 } 15745 15746 insn->imm = ret + 1; 15747 continue; 15748 } 15749 15750 if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) 15751 continue; 15752 15753 /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call 15754 * emit two extra insns: 15755 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out; 15756 * index &= array->index_mask; 15757 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation 15758 */ 15759 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) { 15760 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); 15761 return -EINVAL; 15762 } 15763 15764 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 15765 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3, 15766 map_ptr->max_entries, 2); 15767 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 15768 container_of(map_ptr, 15769 struct bpf_array, 15770 map)->index_mask); 15771 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 15772 cnt = 3; 15773 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15774 if (!new_prog) 15775 return -ENOMEM; 15776 15777 delta += cnt - 1; 15778 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15779 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15780 continue; 15781 } 15782 15783 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) { 15784 /* The verifier will process callback_fn as many times as necessary 15785 * with different maps and the register states prepared by 15786 * set_timer_callback_state will be accurate. 15787 * 15788 * The following use case is valid: 15789 * map1 is shared by prog1, prog2, prog3. 15790 * prog1 calls bpf_timer_init for some map1 elements 15791 * prog2 calls bpf_timer_set_callback for some map1 elements. 15792 * Those that were not bpf_timer_init-ed will return -EINVAL. 15793 * prog3 calls bpf_timer_start for some map1 elements. 15794 * Those that were not both bpf_timer_init-ed and 15795 * bpf_timer_set_callback-ed will return -EINVAL. 15796 */ 15797 struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = { 15798 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, (long)prog->aux), 15799 }; 15800 15801 insn_buf[0] = ld_addrs[0]; 15802 insn_buf[1] = ld_addrs[1]; 15803 insn_buf[2] = *insn; 15804 cnt = 3; 15805 15806 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15807 if (!new_prog) 15808 return -ENOMEM; 15809 15810 delta += cnt - 1; 15811 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15812 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15813 goto patch_call_imm; 15814 } 15815 15816 if (is_storage_get_function(insn->imm)) { 15817 if (!env->prog->aux->sleepable || 15818 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].storage_get_func_atomic) 15819 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_ATOMIC); 15820 else 15821 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_KERNEL); 15822 insn_buf[1] = *insn; 15823 cnt = 2; 15824 15825 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15826 if (!new_prog) 15827 return -ENOMEM; 15828 15829 delta += cnt - 1; 15830 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15831 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15832 goto patch_call_imm; 15833 } 15834 15835 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup 15836 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit 15837 * only. 15838 */ 15839 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 15840 (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem || 15841 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem || 15842 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem || 15843 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem || 15844 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem || 15845 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem || 15846 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map || 15847 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || 15848 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)) { 15849 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta]; 15850 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) 15851 goto patch_call_imm; 15852 15853 map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_ptr_state); 15854 ops = map_ptr->ops; 15855 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && 15856 ops->map_gen_lookup) { 15857 cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf); 15858 if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP) 15859 goto patch_map_ops_generic; 15860 if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { 15861 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 15862 return -EINVAL; 15863 } 15864 15865 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, 15866 insn_buf, cnt); 15867 if (!new_prog) 15868 return -ENOMEM; 15869 15870 delta += cnt - 1; 15871 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15872 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15873 continue; 15874 } 15875 15876 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem, 15877 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 15878 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem, 15879 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL)); 15880 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem, 15881 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, 15882 u64 flags))NULL)); 15883 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem, 15884 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value, 15885 u64 flags))NULL)); 15886 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem, 15887 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 15888 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem, 15889 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL)); 15890 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect, 15891 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u64 index, u64 flags))NULL)); 15892 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_for_each_callback, 15893 (int (*)(struct bpf_map *map, 15894 bpf_callback_t callback_fn, 15895 void *callback_ctx, 15896 u64 flags))NULL)); 15897 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem, 15898 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 cpu))NULL)); 15899 15900 patch_map_ops_generic: 15901 switch (insn->imm) { 15902 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: 15903 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_elem); 15904 continue; 15905 case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: 15906 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_update_elem); 15907 continue; 15908 case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: 15909 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_delete_elem); 15910 continue; 15911 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem: 15912 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_push_elem); 15913 continue; 15914 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem: 15915 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_pop_elem); 15916 continue; 15917 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem: 15918 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_peek_elem); 15919 continue; 15920 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map: 15921 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_redirect); 15922 continue; 15923 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: 15924 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_for_each_callback); 15925 continue; 15926 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem: 15927 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem); 15928 continue; 15929 } 15930 15931 goto patch_call_imm; 15932 } 15933 15934 /* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */ 15935 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 && 15936 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) { 15937 struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = { 15938 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0, 15939 (unsigned long)&jiffies), 15940 }; 15941 15942 insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0]; 15943 insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1]; 15944 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 15945 BPF_REG_0, 0); 15946 cnt = 3; 15947 15948 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 15949 cnt); 15950 if (!new_prog) 15951 return -ENOMEM; 15952 15953 delta += cnt - 1; 15954 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15955 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15956 continue; 15957 } 15958 15959 /* Implement bpf_get_func_arg inline. */ 15960 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 15961 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg) { 15962 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 15963 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 15964 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, 6); 15965 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 3); 15966 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1); 15967 insn_buf[4] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0); 15968 insn_buf[5] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 15969 insn_buf[6] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 15970 insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(1); 15971 insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL); 15972 cnt = 9; 15973 15974 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 15975 if (!new_prog) 15976 return -ENOMEM; 15977 15978 delta += cnt - 1; 15979 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 15980 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 15981 continue; 15982 } 15983 15984 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ret inline. */ 15985 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 15986 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ret) { 15987 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || 15988 eatype == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 15989 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 15990 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 15991 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_0, 3); 15992 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); 15993 insn_buf[3] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0); 15994 insn_buf[4] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, 0); 15995 insn_buf[5] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0); 15996 cnt = 6; 15997 } else { 15998 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EOPNOTSUPP); 15999 cnt = 1; 16000 } 16001 16002 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); 16003 if (!new_prog) 16004 return -ENOMEM; 16005 16006 delta += cnt - 1; 16007 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16008 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16009 continue; 16010 } 16011 16012 /* Implement get_func_arg_cnt inline. */ 16013 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16014 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg_cnt) { 16015 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */ 16016 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8); 16017 16018 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 16019 if (!new_prog) 16020 return -ENOMEM; 16021 16022 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16023 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16024 continue; 16025 } 16026 16027 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ip inline. */ 16028 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16029 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) { 16030 /* Load IP address from ctx - 16 */ 16031 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -16); 16032 16033 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1); 16034 if (!new_prog) 16035 return -ENOMEM; 16036 16037 env->prog = prog = new_prog; 16038 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16039 continue; 16040 } 16041 16042 patch_call_imm: 16043 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog); 16044 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed 16045 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions 16046 */ 16047 if (!fn->func) { 16048 verbose(env, 16049 "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", 16050 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); 16051 return -EFAULT; 16052 } 16053 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; 16054 } 16055 16056 /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */ 16057 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { 16058 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map; 16059 if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || 16060 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || 16061 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { 16062 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); 16063 return -EINVAL; 16064 } 16065 16066 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); 16067 if (ret < 0) { 16068 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n"); 16069 return ret; 16070 } 16071 } 16072 16073 sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm(env->prog); 16074 16075 return 0; 16076 } 16077 16078 static struct bpf_prog *inline_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, 16079 int position, 16080 s32 stack_base, 16081 u32 callback_subprogno, 16082 u32 *cnt) 16083 { 16084 s32 r6_offset = stack_base + 0 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 16085 s32 r7_offset = stack_base + 1 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 16086 s32 r8_offset = stack_base + 2 * BPF_REG_SIZE; 16087 int reg_loop_max = BPF_REG_6; 16088 int reg_loop_cnt = BPF_REG_7; 16089 int reg_loop_ctx = BPF_REG_8; 16090 16091 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 16092 u32 callback_start; 16093 u32 call_insn_offset; 16094 s32 callback_offset; 16095 16096 /* This represents an inlined version of bpf_iter.c:bpf_loop, 16097 * be careful to modify this code in sync. 16098 */ 16099 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[] = { 16100 /* Return error and jump to the end of the patch if 16101 * expected number of iterations is too big. 16102 */ 16103 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_1, BPF_MAX_LOOPS, 2), 16104 BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -E2BIG), 16105 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 16), 16106 /* spill R6, R7, R8 to use these as loop vars */ 16107 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, r6_offset), 16108 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, r7_offset), 16109 BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_8, r8_offset), 16110 /* initialize loop vars */ 16111 BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_max, BPF_REG_1), 16112 BPF_MOV32_IMM(reg_loop_cnt, 0), 16113 BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_ctx, BPF_REG_3), 16114 /* loop header, 16115 * if reg_loop_cnt >= reg_loop_max skip the loop body 16116 */ 16117 BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, reg_loop_cnt, reg_loop_max, 5), 16118 /* callback call, 16119 * correct callback offset would be set after patching 16120 */ 16121 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, reg_loop_cnt), 16122 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, reg_loop_ctx), 16123 BPF_CALL_REL(0), 16124 /* increment loop counter */ 16125 BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, reg_loop_cnt, 1), 16126 /* jump to loop header if callback returned 0 */ 16127 BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, -6), 16128 /* return value of bpf_loop, 16129 * set R0 to the number of iterations 16130 */ 16131 BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, reg_loop_cnt), 16132 /* restore original values of R6, R7, R8 */ 16133 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, r6_offset), 16134 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, r7_offset), 16135 BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, r8_offset), 16136 }; 16137 16138 *cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf); 16139 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, position, insn_buf, *cnt); 16140 if (!new_prog) 16141 return new_prog; 16142 16143 /* callback start is known only after patching */ 16144 callback_start = env->subprog_info[callback_subprogno].start; 16145 /* Note: insn_buf[12] is an offset of BPF_CALL_REL instruction */ 16146 call_insn_offset = position + 12; 16147 callback_offset = callback_start - call_insn_offset - 1; 16148 new_prog->insnsi[call_insn_offset].imm = callback_offset; 16149 16150 return new_prog; 16151 } 16152 16153 static bool is_bpf_loop_call(struct bpf_insn *insn) 16154 { 16155 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && 16156 insn->src_reg == 0 && 16157 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_loop; 16158 } 16159 16160 /* For all sub-programs in the program (including main) check 16161 * insn_aux_data to see if there are bpf_loop calls that require 16162 * inlining. If such calls are found the calls are replaced with a 16163 * sequence of instructions produced by `inline_bpf_loop` function and 16164 * subprog stack_depth is increased by the size of 3 registers. 16165 * This stack space is used to spill values of the R6, R7, R8. These 16166 * registers are used to store the loop bound, counter and context 16167 * variables. 16168 */ 16169 static int optimize_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16170 { 16171 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info; 16172 int i, cur_subprog = 0, cnt, delta = 0; 16173 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; 16174 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; 16175 u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 16176 u16 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 16177 u16 stack_depth_extra = 0; 16178 16179 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { 16180 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *inline_state = 16181 &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].loop_inline_state; 16182 16183 if (is_bpf_loop_call(insn) && inline_state->fit_for_inline) { 16184 struct bpf_prog *new_prog; 16185 16186 stack_depth_extra = BPF_REG_SIZE * 3 + stack_depth_roundup; 16187 new_prog = inline_bpf_loop(env, 16188 i + delta, 16189 -(stack_depth + stack_depth_extra), 16190 inline_state->callback_subprogno, 16191 &cnt); 16192 if (!new_prog) 16193 return -ENOMEM; 16194 16195 delta += cnt - 1; 16196 env->prog = new_prog; 16197 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; 16198 } 16199 16200 if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) { 16201 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra; 16202 cur_subprog++; 16203 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth; 16204 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth; 16205 stack_depth_extra = 0; 16206 } 16207 } 16208 16209 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 16210 16211 return 0; 16212 } 16213 16214 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16215 { 16216 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln; 16217 int i; 16218 16219 sl = env->free_list; 16220 while (sl) { 16221 sln = sl->next; 16222 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 16223 kfree(sl); 16224 sl = sln; 16225 } 16226 env->free_list = NULL; 16227 16228 if (!env->explored_states) 16229 return; 16230 16231 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) { 16232 sl = env->explored_states[i]; 16233 16234 while (sl) { 16235 sln = sl->next; 16236 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); 16237 kfree(sl); 16238 sl = sln; 16239 } 16240 env->explored_states[i] = NULL; 16241 } 16242 } 16243 16244 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) 16245 { 16246 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); 16247 struct bpf_verifier_state *state; 16248 struct bpf_reg_state *regs; 16249 int ret, i; 16250 16251 env->prev_linfo = NULL; 16252 env->pass_cnt++; 16253 16254 state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL); 16255 if (!state) 16256 return -ENOMEM; 16257 state->curframe = 0; 16258 state->speculative = false; 16259 state->branches = 1; 16260 state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL); 16261 if (!state->frame[0]) { 16262 kfree(state); 16263 return -ENOMEM; 16264 } 16265 env->cur_state = state; 16266 init_func_state(env, state->frame[0], 16267 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 16268 0 /* frameno */, 16269 subprog); 16270 state->first_insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start; 16271 state->last_insn_idx = -1; 16272 16273 regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs; 16274 if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 16275 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs); 16276 if (ret) 16277 goto out; 16278 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) { 16279 if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_CTX) 16280 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 16281 else if (regs[i].type == SCALAR_VALUE) 16282 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); 16283 else if (base_type(regs[i].type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { 16284 const u32 mem_size = regs[i].mem_size; 16285 16286 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); 16287 regs[i].mem_size = mem_size; 16288 regs[i].id = ++env->id_gen; 16289 } 16290 } 16291 } else { 16292 /* 1st arg to a function */ 16293 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX; 16294 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1); 16295 ret = btf_check_subprog_arg_match(env, subprog, regs); 16296 if (ret == -EFAULT) 16297 /* unlikely verifier bug. abort. 16298 * ret == 0 and ret < 0 are sadly acceptable for 16299 * main() function due to backward compatibility. 16300 * Like socket filter program may be written as: 16301 * int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) 16302 * and never dereference that ctx in the program. 16303 * 'struct pt_regs' is a type mismatch for socket 16304 * filter that should be using 'struct __sk_buff'. 16305 */ 16306 goto out; 16307 } 16308 16309 ret = do_check(env); 16310 out: 16311 /* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside 16312 * do_check() under memory pressure. 16313 */ 16314 if (env->cur_state) { 16315 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); 16316 env->cur_state = NULL; 16317 } 16318 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); 16319 if (!ret && pop_log) 16320 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); 16321 free_states(env); 16322 return ret; 16323 } 16324 16325 /* Verify all global functions in a BPF program one by one based on their BTF. 16326 * All global functions must pass verification. Otherwise the whole program is rejected. 16327 * Consider: 16328 * int bar(int); 16329 * int foo(int f) 16330 * { 16331 * return bar(f); 16332 * } 16333 * int bar(int b) 16334 * { 16335 * ... 16336 * } 16337 * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it 16338 * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar() 16339 * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified 16340 * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value. 16341 */ 16342 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16343 { 16344 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; 16345 int i, ret; 16346 16347 if (!aux->func_info) 16348 return 0; 16349 16350 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 16351 if (aux->func_info_aux[i].linkage != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) 16352 continue; 16353 env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start; 16354 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0); 16355 ret = do_check_common(env, i); 16356 if (ret) { 16357 return ret; 16358 } else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { 16359 verbose(env, 16360 "Func#%d is safe for any args that match its prototype\n", 16361 i); 16362 } 16363 } 16364 return 0; 16365 } 16366 16367 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16368 { 16369 int ret; 16370 16371 env->insn_idx = 0; 16372 ret = do_check_common(env, 0); 16373 if (!ret) 16374 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; 16375 return ret; 16376 } 16377 16378 16379 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16380 { 16381 int i; 16382 16383 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) { 16384 verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n", 16385 div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000)); 16386 verbose(env, "stack depth "); 16387 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { 16388 u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; 16389 16390 verbose(env, "%d", depth); 16391 if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) 16392 verbose(env, "+"); 16393 } 16394 verbose(env, "\n"); 16395 } 16396 verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d " 16397 "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n", 16398 env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS, 16399 env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states, 16400 env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk); 16401 } 16402 16403 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16404 { 16405 const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto; 16406 const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops; 16407 const struct btf_member *member; 16408 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 16409 u32 btf_id, member_idx; 16410 const char *mname; 16411 16412 if (!prog->gpl_compatible) { 16413 verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n"); 16414 return -EINVAL; 16415 } 16416 16417 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 16418 st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf_id); 16419 if (!st_ops) { 16420 verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n", 16421 btf_id); 16422 return -ENOTSUPP; 16423 } 16424 16425 t = st_ops->type; 16426 member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type; 16427 if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) { 16428 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n", 16429 member_idx, st_ops->name); 16430 return -EINVAL; 16431 } 16432 16433 member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx]; 16434 mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, member->name_off); 16435 func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf_vmlinux, member->type, 16436 NULL); 16437 if (!func_proto) { 16438 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n", 16439 mname, member_idx, st_ops->name); 16440 return -EINVAL; 16441 } 16442 16443 if (st_ops->check_member) { 16444 int err = st_ops->check_member(t, member); 16445 16446 if (err) { 16447 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n", 16448 mname, st_ops->name); 16449 return err; 16450 } 16451 } 16452 16453 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto; 16454 prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname; 16455 env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops; 16456 16457 return 0; 16458 } 16459 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" 16460 16461 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name) 16462 { 16463 if (within_error_injection_list(addr) || 16464 !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) 16465 return 0; 16466 16467 return -EINVAL; 16468 } 16469 16470 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on 16471 * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list 16472 */ 16473 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 16474 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context. 16475 * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view. 16476 */ 16477 BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio) 16478 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page) 16479 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab) 16480 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject) 16481 16482 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id) 16483 { 16484 return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); 16485 } 16486 16487 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, 16488 const struct bpf_prog *prog, 16489 const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog, 16490 u32 btf_id, 16491 struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info) 16492 { 16493 bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT; 16494 const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_"; 16495 int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i; 16496 const struct btf_type *t; 16497 bool conservative = true; 16498 const char *tname; 16499 struct btf *btf; 16500 long addr = 0; 16501 16502 if (!btf_id) { 16503 bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n"); 16504 return -EINVAL; 16505 } 16506 btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf; 16507 if (!btf) { 16508 bpf_log(log, 16509 "FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n"); 16510 return -EINVAL; 16511 } 16512 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id); 16513 if (!t) { 16514 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id); 16515 return -EINVAL; 16516 } 16517 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off); 16518 if (!tname) { 16519 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id); 16520 return -EINVAL; 16521 } 16522 if (tgt_prog) { 16523 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux; 16524 16525 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) 16526 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) { 16527 subprog = i; 16528 break; 16529 } 16530 if (subprog == -1) { 16531 bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname); 16532 return -EINVAL; 16533 } 16534 conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable; 16535 if (prog_extension) { 16536 if (conservative) { 16537 bpf_log(log, 16538 "Cannot replace static functions\n"); 16539 return -EINVAL; 16540 } 16541 if (!prog->jit_requested) { 16542 bpf_log(log, 16543 "Extension programs should be JITed\n"); 16544 return -EINVAL; 16545 } 16546 } 16547 if (!tgt_prog->jited) { 16548 bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n"); 16549 return -EINVAL; 16550 } 16551 if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) { 16552 /* Cannot fentry/fexit another fentry/fexit program. 16553 * Cannot attach program extension to another extension. 16554 * It's ok to attach fentry/fexit to extension program. 16555 */ 16556 bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n"); 16557 return -EINVAL; 16558 } 16559 if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16560 prog_extension && 16561 (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY || 16562 tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT)) { 16563 /* Program extensions can extend all program types 16564 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following. 16565 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance 16566 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program 16567 * type except themselves. When extension program is 16568 * replacing XDP function it is necessary to allow 16569 * performance analysis of all functions. Both original 16570 * XDP program and its program extension. Hence 16571 * attaching fentry/fexit to BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is 16572 * allowed. If extending of fentry/fexit was allowed it 16573 * would be possible to create long call chain 16574 * fentry->extension->fentry->extension beyond 16575 * reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry is not 16576 * allowed. 16577 */ 16578 bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit\n"); 16579 return -EINVAL; 16580 } 16581 } else { 16582 if (prog_extension) { 16583 bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n"); 16584 return -EINVAL; 16585 } 16586 } 16587 16588 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { 16589 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: 16590 if (tgt_prog) { 16591 bpf_log(log, 16592 "Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n"); 16593 return -EINVAL; 16594 } 16595 if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) { 16596 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n", 16597 btf_id); 16598 return -EINVAL; 16599 } 16600 if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) { 16601 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n", 16602 btf_id, tname); 16603 return -EINVAL; 16604 } 16605 tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1; 16606 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 16607 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) 16608 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 16609 return -EINVAL; 16610 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 16611 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 16612 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */ 16613 return -EINVAL; 16614 16615 break; 16616 case BPF_TRACE_ITER: 16617 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 16618 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 16619 btf_id); 16620 return -EINVAL; 16621 } 16622 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 16623 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 16624 return -EINVAL; 16625 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 16626 if (ret) 16627 return ret; 16628 break; 16629 default: 16630 if (!prog_extension) 16631 return -EINVAL; 16632 fallthrough; 16633 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: 16634 case BPF_LSM_MAC: 16635 case BPF_LSM_CGROUP: 16636 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: 16637 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: 16638 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { 16639 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", 16640 btf_id); 16641 return -EINVAL; 16642 } 16643 if (prog_extension && 16644 btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t)) 16645 return -EINVAL; 16646 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); 16647 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t)) 16648 return -EINVAL; 16649 16650 if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) && 16651 (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type || 16652 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type)) 16653 return -EINVAL; 16654 16655 if (tgt_prog && conservative) 16656 t = NULL; 16657 16658 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel); 16659 if (ret < 0) 16660 return ret; 16661 16662 if (tgt_prog) { 16663 if (subprog == 0) 16664 addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func; 16665 else 16666 addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func; 16667 } else { 16668 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname); 16669 if (!addr) { 16670 bpf_log(log, 16671 "The address of function %s cannot be found\n", 16672 tname); 16673 return -ENOENT; 16674 } 16675 } 16676 16677 if (prog->aux->sleepable) { 16678 ret = -EINVAL; 16679 switch (prog->type) { 16680 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: 16681 16682 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are 16683 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. 16684 */ 16685 if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) && 16686 within_error_injection_list(addr)) 16687 ret = 0; 16688 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can also be sleepable if they are 16689 * in the fmodret id set with the KF_SLEEPABLE flag. 16690 */ 16691 else { 16692 u32 *flags = btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id); 16693 16694 if (flags && (*flags & KF_SLEEPABLE)) 16695 ret = 0; 16696 } 16697 break; 16698 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: 16699 /* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs. 16700 * Only some of them are sleepable. 16701 */ 16702 if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id)) 16703 ret = 0; 16704 break; 16705 default: 16706 break; 16707 } 16708 if (ret) { 16709 bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname); 16710 return ret; 16711 } 16712 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { 16713 if (tgt_prog) { 16714 bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n"); 16715 return -EINVAL; 16716 } 16717 ret = -EINVAL; 16718 if (btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id) || 16719 !check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname)) 16720 ret = 0; 16721 if (ret) { 16722 bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname); 16723 return ret; 16724 } 16725 } 16726 16727 break; 16728 } 16729 tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr; 16730 tgt_info->tgt_name = tname; 16731 tgt_info->tgt_type = t; 16732 return 0; 16733 } 16734 16735 BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny) 16736 BTF_ID_UNUSED 16737 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP 16738 BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable) 16739 BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable) 16740 #endif 16741 #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU 16742 BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict) 16743 #endif 16744 BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny) 16745 16746 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) 16747 { 16748 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; 16749 struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog; 16750 struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {}; 16751 u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; 16752 struct bpf_trampoline *tr; 16753 int ret; 16754 u64 key; 16755 16756 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL) { 16757 if (prog->aux->sleepable) 16758 /* attach_btf_id checked to be zero already */ 16759 return 0; 16760 verbose(env, "Syscall programs can only be sleepable\n"); 16761 return -EINVAL; 16762 } 16763 16764 if (prog->aux->sleepable && prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16765 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) { 16766 verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret, lsm, and kprobe/uprobe programs can be sleepable\n"); 16767 return -EINVAL; 16768 } 16769 16770 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) 16771 return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env); 16772 16773 if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16774 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && 16775 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 16776 return 0; 16777 16778 ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info); 16779 if (ret) 16780 return ret; 16781 16782 if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { 16783 /* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to 16784 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the 16785 * verification 16786 */ 16787 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type]; 16788 prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 16789 } 16790 16791 /* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */ 16792 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type; 16793 prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name; 16794 16795 if (tgt_prog) { 16796 prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type; 16797 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type; 16798 } 16799 16800 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) { 16801 prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true; 16802 return 0; 16803 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) { 16804 if (!bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog)) 16805 return -EINVAL; 16806 return 0; 16807 } 16808 16809 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { 16810 ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog); 16811 if (ret < 0) 16812 return ret; 16813 } else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && 16814 btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) { 16815 return -EINVAL; 16816 } 16817 16818 key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id); 16819 tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info); 16820 if (!tr) 16821 return -ENOMEM; 16822 16823 prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr; 16824 return 0; 16825 } 16826 16827 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) 16828 { 16829 if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { 16830 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 16831 if (!btf_vmlinux) 16832 btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); 16833 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 16834 } 16835 return btf_vmlinux; 16836 } 16837 16838 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) 16839 { 16840 u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); 16841 struct bpf_verifier_env *env; 16842 struct bpf_verifier_log *log; 16843 int i, len, ret = -EINVAL; 16844 bool is_priv; 16845 16846 /* no program is valid */ 16847 if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) 16848 return -EINVAL; 16849 16850 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, 16851 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called 16852 */ 16853 env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); 16854 if (!env) 16855 return -ENOMEM; 16856 log = &env->log; 16857 16858 len = (*prog)->len; 16859 env->insn_aux_data = 16860 vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len)); 16861 ret = -ENOMEM; 16862 if (!env->insn_aux_data) 16863 goto err_free_env; 16864 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 16865 env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i; 16866 env->prog = *prog; 16867 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type]; 16868 env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel); 16869 is_priv = bpf_capable(); 16870 16871 bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); 16872 16873 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ 16874 if (!is_priv) 16875 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 16876 16877 if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) { 16878 /* user requested verbose verifier output 16879 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace 16880 */ 16881 log->level = attr->log_level; 16882 log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf; 16883 log->len_total = attr->log_size; 16884 16885 /* log attributes have to be sane */ 16886 if (!bpf_verifier_log_attr_valid(log)) { 16887 ret = -EINVAL; 16888 goto err_unlock; 16889 } 16890 } 16891 16892 mark_verifier_state_clean(env); 16893 16894 if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) { 16895 /* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */ 16896 verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n"); 16897 ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux); 16898 goto skip_full_check; 16899 } 16900 16901 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT); 16902 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) 16903 env->strict_alignment = true; 16904 if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) 16905 env->strict_alignment = false; 16906 16907 env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(); 16908 env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(); 16909 env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(); 16910 env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(); 16911 env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable(); 16912 env->rcu_tag_supported = btf_vmlinux && 16913 btf_find_by_name_kind(btf_vmlinux, "rcu", BTF_KIND_TYPE_TAG) > 0; 16914 16915 if (is_priv) 16916 env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ; 16917 16918 env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env), 16919 sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *), 16920 GFP_USER); 16921 ret = -ENOMEM; 16922 if (!env->explored_states) 16923 goto skip_full_check; 16924 16925 ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env); 16926 if (ret < 0) 16927 goto skip_full_check; 16928 16929 ret = check_subprogs(env); 16930 if (ret < 0) 16931 goto skip_full_check; 16932 16933 ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr); 16934 if (ret < 0) 16935 goto skip_full_check; 16936 16937 ret = check_attach_btf_id(env); 16938 if (ret) 16939 goto skip_full_check; 16940 16941 ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env); 16942 if (ret < 0) 16943 goto skip_full_check; 16944 16945 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 16946 ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog); 16947 if (ret) 16948 goto skip_full_check; 16949 } 16950 16951 ret = check_cfg(env); 16952 if (ret < 0) 16953 goto skip_full_check; 16954 16955 ret = do_check_subprogs(env); 16956 ret = ret ?: do_check_main(env); 16957 16958 if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) 16959 ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env); 16960 16961 skip_full_check: 16962 kvfree(env->explored_states); 16963 16964 if (ret == 0) 16965 ret = check_max_stack_depth(env); 16966 16967 /* instruction rewrites happen after this point */ 16968 if (ret == 0) 16969 ret = optimize_bpf_loop(env); 16970 16971 if (is_priv) { 16972 if (ret == 0) 16973 opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env); 16974 if (ret == 0) 16975 ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env); 16976 if (ret == 0) 16977 ret = opt_remove_nops(env); 16978 } else { 16979 if (ret == 0) 16980 sanitize_dead_code(env); 16981 } 16982 16983 if (ret == 0) 16984 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ 16985 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); 16986 16987 if (ret == 0) 16988 ret = do_misc_fixups(env); 16989 16990 /* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched 16991 * insns could be handled correctly. 16992 */ 16993 if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { 16994 ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr); 16995 env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret 16996 : false; 16997 } 16998 16999 if (ret == 0) 17000 ret = fixup_call_args(env); 17001 17002 env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time; 17003 print_verification_stats(env); 17004 env->prog->aux->verified_insns = env->insn_processed; 17005 17006 if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) 17007 ret = -ENOSPC; 17008 if (log->level && !log->ubuf) { 17009 ret = -EFAULT; 17010 goto err_release_maps; 17011 } 17012 17013 if (ret) 17014 goto err_release_maps; 17015 17016 if (env->used_map_cnt) { 17017 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ 17018 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, 17019 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), 17020 GFP_KERNEL); 17021 17022 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { 17023 ret = -ENOMEM; 17024 goto err_release_maps; 17025 } 17026 17027 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps, 17028 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt); 17029 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt; 17030 } 17031 if (env->used_btf_cnt) { 17032 /* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */ 17033 env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt, 17034 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]), 17035 GFP_KERNEL); 17036 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) { 17037 ret = -ENOMEM; 17038 goto err_release_maps; 17039 } 17040 17041 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs, 17042 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt); 17043 env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt; 17044 } 17045 if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) { 17046 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic 17047 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions 17048 */ 17049 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env); 17050 } 17051 17052 adjust_btf_func(env); 17053 17054 err_release_maps: 17055 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) 17056 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release 17057 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them. 17058 */ 17059 release_maps(env); 17060 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) 17061 release_btfs(env); 17062 17063 /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets 17064 for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning 17065 */ 17066 if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) 17067 env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0; 17068 17069 *prog = env->prog; 17070 err_unlock: 17071 if (!is_priv) 17072 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); 17073 vfree(env->insn_aux_data); 17074 err_free_env: 17075 kfree(env); 17076 return ret; 17077 } 17078