1 #include <linux/bpf.h> 2 #include <linux/vmalloc.h> 3 #include <linux/fdtable.h> 4 #include <linux/file.h> 5 #include <linux/fs.h> 6 #include <linux/kernel.h> 7 #include <linux/idr.h> 8 #include <linux/namei.h> 9 #include <linux/user_namespace.h> 10 #include <linux/security.h> 11 12 static bool bpf_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) 13 { 14 return ns_capable(ns, cap) || (cap != CAP_SYS_ADMIN && ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)); 15 } 16 17 bool bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap) 18 { 19 struct user_namespace *userns; 20 21 /* BPF token allows ns_capable() level of capabilities */ 22 userns = token ? token->userns : &init_user_ns; 23 if (!bpf_ns_capable(userns, cap)) 24 return false; 25 if (token && security_bpf_token_capable(token, cap) < 0) 26 return false; 27 return true; 28 } 29 30 void bpf_token_inc(struct bpf_token *token) 31 { 32 atomic64_inc(&token->refcnt); 33 } 34 35 static void bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token) 36 { 37 security_bpf_token_free(token); 38 put_user_ns(token->userns); 39 kfree(token); 40 } 41 42 static void bpf_token_put_deferred(struct work_struct *work) 43 { 44 struct bpf_token *token = container_of(work, struct bpf_token, work); 45 46 bpf_token_free(token); 47 } 48 49 void bpf_token_put(struct bpf_token *token) 50 { 51 if (!token) 52 return; 53 54 if (!atomic64_dec_and_test(&token->refcnt)) 55 return; 56 57 INIT_WORK(&token->work, bpf_token_put_deferred); 58 schedule_work(&token->work); 59 } 60 61 static int bpf_token_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) 62 { 63 struct bpf_token *token = filp->private_data; 64 65 bpf_token_put(token); 66 return 0; 67 } 68 69 static void bpf_token_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp) 70 { 71 struct bpf_token *token = filp->private_data; 72 u64 mask; 73 74 BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_CMD >= 64); 75 mask = (1ULL << __MAX_BPF_CMD) - 1; 76 if ((token->allowed_cmds & mask) == mask) 77 seq_printf(m, "allowed_cmds:\tany\n"); 78 else 79 seq_printf(m, "allowed_cmds:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_cmds); 80 81 BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE >= 64); 82 mask = (1ULL << __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE) - 1; 83 if ((token->allowed_maps & mask) == mask) 84 seq_printf(m, "allowed_maps:\tany\n"); 85 else 86 seq_printf(m, "allowed_maps:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_maps); 87 88 BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_PROG_TYPE >= 64); 89 mask = (1ULL << __MAX_BPF_PROG_TYPE) - 1; 90 if ((token->allowed_progs & mask) == mask) 91 seq_printf(m, "allowed_progs:\tany\n"); 92 else 93 seq_printf(m, "allowed_progs:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_progs); 94 95 BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE >= 64); 96 mask = (1ULL << __MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE) - 1; 97 if ((token->allowed_attachs & mask) == mask) 98 seq_printf(m, "allowed_attachs:\tany\n"); 99 else 100 seq_printf(m, "allowed_attachs:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_attachs); 101 } 102 103 #define BPF_TOKEN_INODE_NAME "bpf-token" 104 105 static const struct inode_operations bpf_token_iops = { }; 106 107 static const struct file_operations bpf_token_fops = { 108 .release = bpf_token_release, 109 .show_fdinfo = bpf_token_show_fdinfo, 110 }; 111 112 int bpf_token_create(union bpf_attr *attr) 113 { 114 struct bpf_mount_opts *mnt_opts; 115 struct bpf_token *token = NULL; 116 struct user_namespace *userns; 117 struct inode *inode; 118 struct file *file; 119 struct path path; 120 struct fd f; 121 umode_t mode; 122 int err, fd; 123 124 f = fdget(attr->token_create.bpffs_fd); 125 if (!f.file) 126 return -EBADF; 127 128 path = f.file->f_path; 129 path_get(&path); 130 fdput(f); 131 132 if (path.dentry != path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_root) { 133 err = -EINVAL; 134 goto out_path; 135 } 136 if (path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_op != &bpf_super_ops) { 137 err = -EINVAL; 138 goto out_path; 139 } 140 err = path_permission(&path, MAY_ACCESS); 141 if (err) 142 goto out_path; 143 144 userns = path.dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns; 145 /* 146 * Enforce that creators of BPF tokens are in the same user 147 * namespace as the BPF FS instance. This makes reasoning about 148 * permissions a lot easier and we can always relax this later. 149 */ 150 if (current_user_ns() != userns) { 151 err = -EPERM; 152 goto out_path; 153 } 154 if (!ns_capable(userns, CAP_BPF)) { 155 err = -EPERM; 156 goto out_path; 157 } 158 159 /* Creating BPF token in init_user_ns doesn't make much sense. */ 160 if (current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns) { 161 err = -EOPNOTSUPP; 162 goto out_path; 163 } 164 165 mnt_opts = path.dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info; 166 if (mnt_opts->delegate_cmds == 0 && 167 mnt_opts->delegate_maps == 0 && 168 mnt_opts->delegate_progs == 0 && 169 mnt_opts->delegate_attachs == 0) { 170 err = -ENOENT; /* no BPF token delegation is set up */ 171 goto out_path; 172 } 173 174 mode = S_IFREG | ((S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) & ~current_umask()); 175 inode = bpf_get_inode(path.mnt->mnt_sb, NULL, mode); 176 if (IS_ERR(inode)) { 177 err = PTR_ERR(inode); 178 goto out_path; 179 } 180 181 inode->i_op = &bpf_token_iops; 182 inode->i_fop = &bpf_token_fops; 183 clear_nlink(inode); /* make sure it is unlinked */ 184 185 file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, path.mnt, BPF_TOKEN_INODE_NAME, O_RDWR, &bpf_token_fops); 186 if (IS_ERR(file)) { 187 iput(inode); 188 err = PTR_ERR(file); 189 goto out_path; 190 } 191 192 token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_USER); 193 if (!token) { 194 err = -ENOMEM; 195 goto out_file; 196 } 197 198 atomic64_set(&token->refcnt, 1); 199 200 /* remember bpffs owning userns for future ns_capable() checks */ 201 token->userns = get_user_ns(userns); 202 203 token->allowed_cmds = mnt_opts->delegate_cmds; 204 token->allowed_maps = mnt_opts->delegate_maps; 205 token->allowed_progs = mnt_opts->delegate_progs; 206 token->allowed_attachs = mnt_opts->delegate_attachs; 207 208 err = security_bpf_token_create(token, attr, &path); 209 if (err) 210 goto out_token; 211 212 fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC); 213 if (fd < 0) { 214 err = fd; 215 goto out_token; 216 } 217 218 file->private_data = token; 219 fd_install(fd, file); 220 221 path_put(&path); 222 return fd; 223 224 out_token: 225 bpf_token_free(token); 226 out_file: 227 fput(file); 228 out_path: 229 path_put(&path); 230 return err; 231 } 232 233 struct bpf_token *bpf_token_get_from_fd(u32 ufd) 234 { 235 struct fd f = fdget(ufd); 236 struct bpf_token *token; 237 238 if (!f.file) 239 return ERR_PTR(-EBADF); 240 if (f.file->f_op != &bpf_token_fops) { 241 fdput(f); 242 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); 243 } 244 245 token = f.file->private_data; 246 bpf_token_inc(token); 247 fdput(f); 248 249 return token; 250 } 251 252 bool bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd) 253 { 254 if (!token) 255 return false; 256 if (!(token->allowed_cmds & (1ULL << cmd))) 257 return false; 258 return security_bpf_token_cmd(token, cmd) == 0; 259 } 260 261 bool bpf_token_allow_map_type(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_map_type type) 262 { 263 if (!token || type >= __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE) 264 return false; 265 266 return token->allowed_maps & (1ULL << type); 267 } 268 269 bool bpf_token_allow_prog_type(const struct bpf_token *token, 270 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type, 271 enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) 272 { 273 if (!token || prog_type >= __MAX_BPF_PROG_TYPE || attach_type >= __MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE) 274 return false; 275 276 return (token->allowed_progs & (1ULL << prog_type)) && 277 (token->allowed_attachs & (1ULL << attach_type)); 278 } 279