1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support 2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. 3 * 4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. 5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. 6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation 7 * All Rights Reserved. 8 * 9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or 12 * (at your option) any later version. 13 * 14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the 17 * GNU General Public License for more details. 18 * 19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software 21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA 22 * 23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> 24 * 25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, 26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. 27 * 28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in 29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by 30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. 31 * 32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>, 33 * 2006. 34 * 35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was 36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. 37 * 38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional 39 * filesystem information. 40 * 41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> 42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. 43 */ 44 45 #include <linux/init.h> 46 #include <asm/types.h> 47 #include <asm/atomic.h> 48 #include <linux/fs.h> 49 #include <linux/namei.h> 50 #include <linux/mm.h> 51 #include <linux/module.h> 52 #include <linux/mount.h> 53 #include <linux/socket.h> 54 #include <linux/mqueue.h> 55 #include <linux/audit.h> 56 #include <linux/personality.h> 57 #include <linux/time.h> 58 #include <linux/netlink.h> 59 #include <linux/compiler.h> 60 #include <asm/unistd.h> 61 #include <linux/security.h> 62 #include <linux/list.h> 63 #include <linux/tty.h> 64 #include <linux/binfmts.h> 65 #include <linux/highmem.h> 66 #include <linux/syscalls.h> 67 #include <linux/inotify.h> 68 #include <linux/capability.h> 69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h> 70 71 #include "audit.h" 72 73 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context 74 * for saving names from getname(). */ 75 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 76 77 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */ 78 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1 79 80 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */ 81 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500 82 83 /* number of audit rules */ 84 int audit_n_rules; 85 86 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */ 87 int audit_signals; 88 89 struct audit_cap_data { 90 kernel_cap_t permitted; 91 kernel_cap_t inheritable; 92 union { 93 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */ 94 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */ 95 }; 96 }; 97 98 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and 99 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved 100 * pointers at syscall exit time). 101 * 102 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ 103 struct audit_names { 104 const char *name; 105 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */ 106 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */ 107 unsigned long ino; 108 dev_t dev; 109 umode_t mode; 110 uid_t uid; 111 gid_t gid; 112 dev_t rdev; 113 u32 osid; 114 struct audit_cap_data fcap; 115 unsigned int fcap_ver; 116 }; 117 118 struct audit_aux_data { 119 struct audit_aux_data *next; 120 int type; 121 }; 122 123 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 124 125 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */ 126 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16 127 128 struct audit_aux_data_execve { 129 struct audit_aux_data d; 130 int argc; 131 int envc; 132 struct mm_struct *mm; 133 }; 134 135 struct audit_aux_data_pids { 136 struct audit_aux_data d; 137 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 138 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 139 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 140 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 141 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 142 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; 143 int pid_count; 144 }; 145 146 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps { 147 struct audit_aux_data d; 148 struct audit_cap_data fcap; 149 unsigned int fcap_ver; 150 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap; 151 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap; 152 }; 153 154 struct audit_aux_data_capset { 155 struct audit_aux_data d; 156 pid_t pid; 157 struct audit_cap_data cap; 158 }; 159 160 struct audit_tree_refs { 161 struct audit_tree_refs *next; 162 struct audit_chunk *c[31]; 163 }; 164 165 /* The per-task audit context. */ 166 struct audit_context { 167 int dummy; /* must be the first element */ 168 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ 169 enum audit_state state, current_state; 170 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ 171 int major; /* syscall number */ 172 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ 173 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ 174 long return_code;/* syscall return code */ 175 u64 prio; 176 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ 177 int name_count; 178 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; 179 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */ 180 struct path pwd; 181 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ 182 struct audit_aux_data *aux; 183 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids; 184 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr; 185 size_t sockaddr_len; 186 /* Save things to print about task_struct */ 187 pid_t pid, ppid; 188 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; 189 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; 190 unsigned long personality; 191 int arch; 192 193 pid_t target_pid; 194 uid_t target_auid; 195 uid_t target_uid; 196 unsigned int target_sessionid; 197 u32 target_sid; 198 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; 199 200 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; 201 struct list_head killed_trees; 202 int tree_count; 203 204 int type; 205 union { 206 struct { 207 int nargs; 208 long args[6]; 209 } socketcall; 210 struct { 211 uid_t uid; 212 gid_t gid; 213 mode_t mode; 214 u32 osid; 215 int has_perm; 216 uid_t perm_uid; 217 gid_t perm_gid; 218 mode_t perm_mode; 219 unsigned long qbytes; 220 } ipc; 221 struct { 222 mqd_t mqdes; 223 struct mq_attr mqstat; 224 } mq_getsetattr; 225 struct { 226 mqd_t mqdes; 227 int sigev_signo; 228 } mq_notify; 229 struct { 230 mqd_t mqdes; 231 size_t msg_len; 232 unsigned int msg_prio; 233 struct timespec abs_timeout; 234 } mq_sendrecv; 235 struct { 236 int oflag; 237 mode_t mode; 238 struct mq_attr attr; 239 } mq_open; 240 struct { 241 pid_t pid; 242 struct audit_cap_data cap; 243 } capset; 244 }; 245 int fds[2]; 246 247 #if AUDIT_DEBUG 248 int put_count; 249 int ino_count; 250 #endif 251 }; 252 253 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE]) 254 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask) 255 { 256 int n = ACC_MODE(flags); 257 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT)) 258 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE; 259 return n & mask; 260 } 261 262 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) 263 { 264 unsigned n; 265 if (unlikely(!ctx)) 266 return 0; 267 n = ctx->major; 268 269 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { 270 case 0: /* native */ 271 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && 272 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) 273 return 1; 274 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && 275 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n)) 276 return 1; 277 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && 278 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) 279 return 1; 280 return 0; 281 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ 282 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && 283 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) 284 return 1; 285 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && 286 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n)) 287 return 1; 288 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && 289 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) 290 return 1; 291 return 0; 292 case 2: /* open */ 293 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); 294 case 3: /* openat */ 295 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); 296 case 4: /* socketcall */ 297 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); 298 case 5: /* execve */ 299 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; 300 default: 301 return 0; 302 } 303 } 304 305 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which) 306 { 307 unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT; 308 mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT; 309 310 if (unlikely(!ctx)) 311 return 0; 312 313 if (index >= ctx->name_count) 314 return 0; 315 if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1) 316 return 0; 317 if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT) 318 return 0; 319 return 1; 320 } 321 322 /* 323 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *; 324 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data. 325 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees. 326 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL, 327 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously, 328 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself. 329 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. 330 */ 331 332 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE 333 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) 334 { 335 if (!ctx->prio) { 336 ctx->prio = 1; 337 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; 338 } 339 } 340 341 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) 342 { 343 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; 344 int left = ctx->tree_count; 345 if (likely(left)) { 346 p->c[--left] = chunk; 347 ctx->tree_count = left; 348 return 1; 349 } 350 if (!p) 351 return 0; 352 p = p->next; 353 if (p) { 354 p->c[30] = chunk; 355 ctx->trees = p; 356 ctx->tree_count = 30; 357 return 1; 358 } 359 return 0; 360 } 361 362 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) 363 { 364 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; 365 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL); 366 if (!ctx->trees) { 367 ctx->trees = p; 368 return 0; 369 } 370 if (p) 371 p->next = ctx->trees; 372 else 373 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees; 374 ctx->tree_count = 31; 375 return 1; 376 } 377 #endif 378 379 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, 380 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count) 381 { 382 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE 383 struct audit_tree_refs *q; 384 int n; 385 if (!p) { 386 /* we started with empty chain */ 387 p = ctx->first_trees; 388 count = 31; 389 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */ 390 if (!p) 391 return; 392 } 393 n = count; 394 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) { 395 while (n--) { 396 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); 397 q->c[n] = NULL; 398 } 399 } 400 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) { 401 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); 402 q->c[n] = NULL; 403 } 404 ctx->trees = p; 405 ctx->tree_count = count; 406 #endif 407 } 408 409 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) 410 { 411 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; 412 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { 413 q = p->next; 414 kfree(p); 415 } 416 } 417 418 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) 419 { 420 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE 421 struct audit_tree_refs *p; 422 int n; 423 if (!tree) 424 return 0; 425 /* full ones */ 426 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) { 427 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++) 428 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) 429 return 1; 430 } 431 /* partial */ 432 if (p) { 433 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++) 434 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) 435 return 1; 436 } 437 #endif 438 return 0; 439 } 440 441 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ 442 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 443 * otherwise. */ 444 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, 445 struct audit_krule *rule, 446 struct audit_context *ctx, 447 struct audit_names *name, 448 enum audit_state *state) 449 { 450 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk); 451 int i, j, need_sid = 1; 452 u32 sid; 453 454 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { 455 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; 456 int result = 0; 457 458 switch (f->type) { 459 case AUDIT_PID: 460 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val); 461 break; 462 case AUDIT_PPID: 463 if (ctx) { 464 if (!ctx->ppid) 465 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid(); 466 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val); 467 } 468 break; 469 case AUDIT_UID: 470 result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val); 471 break; 472 case AUDIT_EUID: 473 result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val); 474 break; 475 case AUDIT_SUID: 476 result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val); 477 break; 478 case AUDIT_FSUID: 479 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val); 480 break; 481 case AUDIT_GID: 482 result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val); 483 break; 484 case AUDIT_EGID: 485 result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val); 486 break; 487 case AUDIT_SGID: 488 result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val); 489 break; 490 case AUDIT_FSGID: 491 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val); 492 break; 493 case AUDIT_PERS: 494 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); 495 break; 496 case AUDIT_ARCH: 497 if (ctx) 498 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); 499 break; 500 501 case AUDIT_EXIT: 502 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) 503 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); 504 break; 505 case AUDIT_SUCCESS: 506 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { 507 if (f->val) 508 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); 509 else 510 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); 511 } 512 break; 513 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: 514 if (name) 515 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), 516 f->op, f->val); 517 else if (ctx) { 518 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { 519 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { 520 ++result; 521 break; 522 } 523 } 524 } 525 break; 526 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: 527 if (name) 528 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), 529 f->op, f->val); 530 else if (ctx) { 531 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { 532 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { 533 ++result; 534 break; 535 } 536 } 537 } 538 break; 539 case AUDIT_INODE: 540 if (name) 541 result = (name->ino == f->val); 542 else if (ctx) { 543 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { 544 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) { 545 ++result; 546 break; 547 } 548 } 549 } 550 break; 551 case AUDIT_WATCH: 552 if (name && audit_watch_inode(rule->watch) != (unsigned long)-1) 553 result = (name->dev == audit_watch_dev(rule->watch) && 554 name->ino == audit_watch_inode(rule->watch)); 555 break; 556 case AUDIT_DIR: 557 if (ctx) 558 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); 559 break; 560 case AUDIT_LOGINUID: 561 result = 0; 562 if (ctx) 563 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val); 564 break; 565 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: 566 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: 567 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: 568 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: 569 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: 570 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating 571 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a 572 match for now to avoid losing information that 573 may be wanted. An error message will also be 574 logged upon error */ 575 if (f->lsm_rule) { 576 if (need_sid) { 577 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); 578 need_sid = 0; 579 } 580 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, 581 f->op, 582 f->lsm_rule, 583 ctx); 584 } 585 break; 586 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: 587 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: 588 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: 589 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: 590 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: 591 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR 592 also applies here */ 593 if (f->lsm_rule) { 594 /* Find files that match */ 595 if (name) { 596 result = security_audit_rule_match( 597 name->osid, f->type, f->op, 598 f->lsm_rule, ctx); 599 } else if (ctx) { 600 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { 601 if (security_audit_rule_match( 602 ctx->names[j].osid, 603 f->type, f->op, 604 f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { 605 ++result; 606 break; 607 } 608 } 609 } 610 /* Find ipc objects that match */ 611 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) 612 break; 613 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, 614 f->type, f->op, 615 f->lsm_rule, ctx)) 616 ++result; 617 } 618 break; 619 case AUDIT_ARG0: 620 case AUDIT_ARG1: 621 case AUDIT_ARG2: 622 case AUDIT_ARG3: 623 if (ctx) 624 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); 625 break; 626 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: 627 /* ignore this field for filtering */ 628 result = 1; 629 break; 630 case AUDIT_PERM: 631 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); 632 break; 633 case AUDIT_FILETYPE: 634 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); 635 break; 636 } 637 638 if (!result) { 639 put_cred(cred); 640 return 0; 641 } 642 } 643 644 if (ctx) { 645 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio) 646 return 0; 647 if (rule->filterkey) { 648 kfree(ctx->filterkey); 649 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); 650 } 651 ctx->prio = rule->prio; 652 } 653 switch (rule->action) { 654 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; 655 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; 656 } 657 put_cred(cred); 658 return 1; 659 } 660 661 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is 662 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task 663 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. 664 */ 665 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) 666 { 667 struct audit_entry *e; 668 enum audit_state state; 669 670 rcu_read_lock(); 671 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { 672 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) { 673 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) 674 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); 675 rcu_read_unlock(); 676 return state; 677 } 678 } 679 rcu_read_unlock(); 680 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; 681 } 682 683 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the 684 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is 685 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit 686 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). 687 */ 688 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, 689 struct audit_context *ctx, 690 struct list_head *list) 691 { 692 struct audit_entry *e; 693 enum audit_state state; 694 695 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) 696 return AUDIT_DISABLED; 697 698 rcu_read_lock(); 699 if (!list_empty(list)) { 700 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); 701 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); 702 703 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { 704 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && 705 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, 706 &state)) { 707 rcu_read_unlock(); 708 ctx->current_state = state; 709 return state; 710 } 711 } 712 } 713 rcu_read_unlock(); 714 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; 715 } 716 717 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been 718 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash 719 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[]. 720 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). 721 */ 722 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) 723 { 724 int i; 725 struct audit_entry *e; 726 enum audit_state state; 727 728 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) 729 return; 730 731 rcu_read_lock(); 732 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) { 733 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); 734 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); 735 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i]; 736 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); 737 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; 738 739 if (list_empty(list)) 740 continue; 741 742 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { 743 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && 744 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) { 745 rcu_read_unlock(); 746 ctx->current_state = state; 747 return; 748 } 749 } 750 } 751 rcu_read_unlock(); 752 } 753 754 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, 755 int return_valid, 756 long return_code) 757 { 758 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; 759 760 if (likely(!context)) 761 return NULL; 762 context->return_valid = return_valid; 763 764 /* 765 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual 766 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific 767 * signal handlers 768 * 769 * This is actually a test for: 770 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || 771 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) 772 * 773 * but is faster than a bunch of || 774 */ 775 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && 776 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && 777 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) 778 context->return_code = -EINTR; 779 else 780 context->return_code = return_code; 781 782 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) { 783 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); 784 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); 785 } 786 787 tsk->audit_context = NULL; 788 return context; 789 } 790 791 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) 792 { 793 int i; 794 795 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 796 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { 797 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" 798 " name_count=%d put_count=%d" 799 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", 800 __FILE__, __LINE__, 801 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, 802 context->name_count, context->put_count, 803 context->ino_count); 804 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { 805 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, 806 context->names[i].name, 807 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); 808 } 809 dump_stack(); 810 return; 811 } 812 #endif 813 #if AUDIT_DEBUG 814 context->put_count = 0; 815 context->ino_count = 0; 816 #endif 817 818 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { 819 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put) 820 __putname(context->names[i].name); 821 } 822 context->name_count = 0; 823 path_put(&context->pwd); 824 context->pwd.dentry = NULL; 825 context->pwd.mnt = NULL; 826 } 827 828 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) 829 { 830 struct audit_aux_data *aux; 831 832 while ((aux = context->aux)) { 833 context->aux = aux->next; 834 kfree(aux); 835 } 836 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { 837 context->aux_pids = aux->next; 838 kfree(aux); 839 } 840 } 841 842 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, 843 enum audit_state state) 844 { 845 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); 846 context->state = state; 847 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; 848 } 849 850 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) 851 { 852 struct audit_context *context; 853 854 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) 855 return NULL; 856 audit_zero_context(context, state); 857 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); 858 return context; 859 } 860 861 /** 862 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task 863 * @tsk: task 864 * 865 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context 866 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the 867 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is 868 * needed. 869 */ 870 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) 871 { 872 struct audit_context *context; 873 enum audit_state state; 874 char *key = NULL; 875 876 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) 877 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ 878 879 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); 880 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) 881 return 0; 882 883 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { 884 kfree(key); 885 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); 886 return -ENOMEM; 887 } 888 context->filterkey = key; 889 890 tsk->audit_context = context; 891 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); 892 return 0; 893 } 894 895 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) 896 { 897 struct audit_context *previous; 898 int count = 0; 899 900 do { 901 previous = context->previous; 902 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) { 903 ++count; 904 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:" 905 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n", 906 context->serial, context->major, 907 context->name_count, count); 908 } 909 audit_free_names(context); 910 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); 911 free_tree_refs(context); 912 audit_free_aux(context); 913 kfree(context->filterkey); 914 kfree(context->sockaddr); 915 kfree(context); 916 context = previous; 917 } while (context); 918 if (count >= 10) 919 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); 920 } 921 922 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) 923 { 924 char *ctx = NULL; 925 unsigned len; 926 int error; 927 u32 sid; 928 929 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); 930 if (!sid) 931 return; 932 933 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); 934 if (error) { 935 if (error != -EINVAL) 936 goto error_path; 937 return; 938 } 939 940 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); 941 security_release_secctx(ctx, len); 942 return; 943 944 error_path: 945 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context"); 946 return; 947 } 948 949 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context); 950 951 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk) 952 { 953 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)]; 954 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm; 955 struct vm_area_struct *vma; 956 957 /* tsk == current */ 958 959 get_task_comm(name, tsk); 960 audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); 961 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); 962 963 if (mm) { 964 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); 965 vma = mm->mmap; 966 while (vma) { 967 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && 968 vma->vm_file) { 969 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", 970 &vma->vm_file->f_path); 971 break; 972 } 973 vma = vma->vm_next; 974 } 975 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); 976 } 977 audit_log_task_context(ab); 978 } 979 980 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, 981 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, 982 u32 sid, char *comm) 983 { 984 struct audit_buffer *ab; 985 char *ctx = NULL; 986 u32 len; 987 int rc = 0; 988 989 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); 990 if (!ab) 991 return rc; 992 993 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid, 994 uid, sessionid); 995 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { 996 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); 997 rc = 1; 998 } else { 999 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); 1000 security_release_secctx(ctx, len); 1001 } 1002 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); 1003 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); 1004 audit_log_end(ab); 1005 1006 return rc; 1007 } 1008 1009 /* 1010 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't 1011 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being 1012 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry) 1013 * 1014 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when 1015 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting 1016 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to 1017 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space 1018 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was. 1019 */ 1020 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context, 1021 struct audit_buffer **ab, 1022 int arg_num, 1023 size_t *len_sent, 1024 const char __user *p, 1025 char *buf) 1026 { 1027 char arg_num_len_buf[12]; 1028 const char __user *tmp_p = p; 1029 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */ 1030 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5; 1031 size_t len, len_left, to_send; 1032 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; 1033 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0; 1034 int ret; 1035 1036 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */ 1037 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1; 1038 1039 /* 1040 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings 1041 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar 1042 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created 1043 * any. 1044 */ 1045 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) { 1046 WARN_ON(1); 1047 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); 1048 return -1; 1049 } 1050 1051 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */ 1052 do { 1053 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN) 1054 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; 1055 else 1056 to_send = len_left; 1057 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send); 1058 /* 1059 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just 1060 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user- 1061 * space yet. 1062 */ 1063 if (ret) { 1064 WARN_ON(1); 1065 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); 1066 return -1; 1067 } 1068 buf[to_send] = '\0'; 1069 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send); 1070 if (has_cntl) { 1071 /* 1072 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only 1073 * send half as much in each message 1074 */ 1075 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2; 1076 break; 1077 } 1078 len_left -= to_send; 1079 tmp_p += to_send; 1080 } while (len_left > 0); 1081 1082 len_left = len; 1083 1084 if (len > max_execve_audit_len) 1085 too_long = 1; 1086 1087 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */ 1088 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) { 1089 int room_left; 1090 1091 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len) 1092 to_send = max_execve_audit_len; 1093 else 1094 to_send = len_left; 1095 1096 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */ 1097 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent; 1098 if (has_cntl) 1099 room_left -= (to_send * 2); 1100 else 1101 room_left -= to_send; 1102 if (room_left < 0) { 1103 *len_sent = 0; 1104 audit_log_end(*ab); 1105 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE); 1106 if (!*ab) 1107 return 0; 1108 } 1109 1110 /* 1111 * first record needs to say how long the original string was 1112 * so we can be sure nothing was lost. 1113 */ 1114 if ((i == 0) && (too_long)) 1115 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num, 1116 has_cntl ? 2*len : len); 1117 1118 /* 1119 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already 1120 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters 1121 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user 1122 */ 1123 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len) 1124 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send); 1125 else 1126 ret = 0; 1127 if (ret) { 1128 WARN_ON(1); 1129 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); 1130 return -1; 1131 } 1132 buf[to_send] = '\0'; 1133 1134 /* actually log it */ 1135 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num); 1136 if (too_long) 1137 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i); 1138 audit_log_format(*ab, "="); 1139 if (has_cntl) 1140 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send); 1141 else 1142 audit_log_string(*ab, buf); 1143 1144 p += to_send; 1145 len_left -= to_send; 1146 *len_sent += arg_num_len; 1147 if (has_cntl) 1148 *len_sent += to_send * 2; 1149 else 1150 *len_sent += to_send; 1151 } 1152 /* include the null we didn't log */ 1153 return len + 1; 1154 } 1155 1156 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, 1157 struct audit_buffer **ab, 1158 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi) 1159 { 1160 int i; 1161 size_t len, len_sent = 0; 1162 const char __user *p; 1163 char *buf; 1164 1165 if (axi->mm != current->mm) 1166 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */ 1167 1168 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start; 1169 1170 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc); 1171 1172 /* 1173 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just 1174 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size 1175 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg() 1176 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe. 1177 */ 1178 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 1179 if (!buf) { 1180 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n"); 1181 return; 1182 } 1183 1184 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) { 1185 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i, 1186 &len_sent, p, buf); 1187 if (len <= 0) 1188 break; 1189 p += len; 1190 } 1191 kfree(buf); 1192 } 1193 1194 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) 1195 { 1196 int i; 1197 1198 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); 1199 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { 1200 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]); 1201 } 1202 } 1203 1204 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) 1205 { 1206 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted; 1207 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable; 1208 int log = 0; 1209 1210 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) { 1211 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm); 1212 log = 1; 1213 } 1214 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) { 1215 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh); 1216 log = 1; 1217 } 1218 1219 if (log) 1220 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver); 1221 } 1222 1223 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) 1224 { 1225 struct audit_buffer *ab; 1226 int i; 1227 1228 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type); 1229 if (!ab) 1230 return; 1231 1232 switch (context->type) { 1233 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { 1234 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; 1235 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); 1236 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) 1237 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, 1238 context->socketcall.args[i]); 1239 break; } 1240 case AUDIT_IPC: { 1241 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; 1242 1243 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o", 1244 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode); 1245 if (osid) { 1246 char *ctx = NULL; 1247 u32 len; 1248 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) { 1249 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); 1250 *call_panic = 1; 1251 } else { 1252 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); 1253 security_release_secctx(ctx, len); 1254 } 1255 } 1256 if (context->ipc.has_perm) { 1257 audit_log_end(ab); 1258 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, 1259 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM); 1260 audit_log_format(ab, 1261 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o", 1262 context->ipc.qbytes, 1263 context->ipc.perm_uid, 1264 context->ipc.perm_gid, 1265 context->ipc.perm_mode); 1266 if (!ab) 1267 return; 1268 } 1269 break; } 1270 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: { 1271 audit_log_format(ab, 1272 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " 1273 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld", 1274 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode, 1275 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags, 1276 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg, 1277 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize, 1278 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs); 1279 break; } 1280 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: { 1281 audit_log_format(ab, 1282 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u " 1283 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld", 1284 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes, 1285 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len, 1286 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio, 1287 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec, 1288 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec); 1289 break; } 1290 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: { 1291 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d", 1292 context->mq_notify.mqdes, 1293 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo); 1294 break; } 1295 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { 1296 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; 1297 audit_log_format(ab, 1298 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " 1299 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ", 1300 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes, 1301 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg, 1302 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs); 1303 break; } 1304 case AUDIT_CAPSET: { 1305 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid); 1306 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); 1307 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted); 1308 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective); 1309 break; } 1310 } 1311 audit_log_end(ab); 1312 } 1313 1314 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) 1315 { 1316 const struct cred *cred; 1317 int i, call_panic = 0; 1318 struct audit_buffer *ab; 1319 struct audit_aux_data *aux; 1320 const char *tty; 1321 1322 /* tsk == current */ 1323 context->pid = tsk->pid; 1324 if (!context->ppid) 1325 context->ppid = sys_getppid(); 1326 cred = current_cred(); 1327 context->uid = cred->uid; 1328 context->gid = cred->gid; 1329 context->euid = cred->euid; 1330 context->suid = cred->suid; 1331 context->fsuid = cred->fsuid; 1332 context->egid = cred->egid; 1333 context->sgid = cred->sgid; 1334 context->fsgid = cred->fsgid; 1335 context->personality = tsk->personality; 1336 1337 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); 1338 if (!ab) 1339 return; /* audit_panic has been called */ 1340 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", 1341 context->arch, context->major); 1342 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) 1343 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); 1344 if (context->return_valid) 1345 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", 1346 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", 1347 context->return_code); 1348 1349 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); 1350 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name) 1351 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name; 1352 else 1353 tty = "(none)"; 1354 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); 1355 1356 audit_log_format(ab, 1357 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" 1358 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" 1359 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" 1360 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u", 1361 context->argv[0], 1362 context->argv[1], 1363 context->argv[2], 1364 context->argv[3], 1365 context->name_count, 1366 context->ppid, 1367 context->pid, 1368 tsk->loginuid, 1369 context->uid, 1370 context->gid, 1371 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, 1372 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty, 1373 tsk->sessionid); 1374 1375 1376 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk); 1377 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); 1378 audit_log_end(ab); 1379 1380 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { 1381 1382 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); 1383 if (!ab) 1384 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ 1385 1386 switch (aux->type) { 1387 1388 case AUDIT_EXECVE: { 1389 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux; 1390 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi); 1391 break; } 1392 1393 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { 1394 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; 1395 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); 1396 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); 1397 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); 1398 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); 1399 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); 1400 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); 1401 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); 1402 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); 1403 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); 1404 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); 1405 break; } 1406 1407 } 1408 audit_log_end(ab); 1409 } 1410 1411 if (context->type) 1412 show_special(context, &call_panic); 1413 1414 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) { 1415 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR); 1416 if (ab) { 1417 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", 1418 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]); 1419 audit_log_end(ab); 1420 } 1421 } 1422 1423 if (context->sockaddr_len) { 1424 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR); 1425 if (ab) { 1426 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); 1427 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr, 1428 context->sockaddr_len); 1429 audit_log_end(ab); 1430 } 1431 } 1432 1433 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { 1434 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; 1435 1436 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) 1437 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], 1438 axs->target_auid[i], 1439 axs->target_uid[i], 1440 axs->target_sessionid[i], 1441 axs->target_sid[i], 1442 axs->target_comm[i])) 1443 call_panic = 1; 1444 } 1445 1446 if (context->target_pid && 1447 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, 1448 context->target_auid, context->target_uid, 1449 context->target_sessionid, 1450 context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) 1451 call_panic = 1; 1452 1453 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { 1454 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); 1455 if (ab) { 1456 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd); 1457 audit_log_end(ab); 1458 } 1459 } 1460 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { 1461 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i]; 1462 1463 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); 1464 if (!ab) 1465 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ 1466 1467 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); 1468 1469 if (n->name) { 1470 switch(n->name_len) { 1471 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: 1472 /* log the full path */ 1473 audit_log_format(ab, " name="); 1474 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name); 1475 break; 1476 case 0: 1477 /* name was specified as a relative path and the 1478 * directory component is the cwd */ 1479 audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd); 1480 break; 1481 default: 1482 /* log the name's directory component */ 1483 audit_log_format(ab, " name="); 1484 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name, 1485 n->name_len); 1486 } 1487 } else 1488 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); 1489 1490 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) { 1491 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu" 1492 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" 1493 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", 1494 n->ino, 1495 MAJOR(n->dev), 1496 MINOR(n->dev), 1497 n->mode, 1498 n->uid, 1499 n->gid, 1500 MAJOR(n->rdev), 1501 MINOR(n->rdev)); 1502 } 1503 if (n->osid != 0) { 1504 char *ctx = NULL; 1505 u32 len; 1506 if (security_secid_to_secctx( 1507 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { 1508 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid); 1509 call_panic = 2; 1510 } else { 1511 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); 1512 security_release_secctx(ctx, len); 1513 } 1514 } 1515 1516 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); 1517 1518 audit_log_end(ab); 1519 } 1520 1521 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ 1522 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); 1523 if (ab) 1524 audit_log_end(ab); 1525 if (call_panic) 1526 audit_panic("error converting sid to string"); 1527 } 1528 1529 /** 1530 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context 1531 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free 1532 * 1533 * Called from copy_process and do_exit 1534 */ 1535 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) 1536 { 1537 struct audit_context *context; 1538 1539 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); 1540 if (likely(!context)) 1541 return; 1542 1543 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit 1544 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. 1545 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this 1546 * in the context of the idle thread */ 1547 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */ 1548 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) 1549 audit_log_exit(context, tsk); 1550 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) 1551 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); 1552 1553 audit_free_context(context); 1554 } 1555 1556 /** 1557 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry 1558 * @arch: architecture type 1559 * @major: major syscall type (function) 1560 * @a1: additional syscall register 1 1561 * @a2: additional syscall register 2 1562 * @a3: additional syscall register 3 1563 * @a4: additional syscall register 4 1564 * 1565 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the 1566 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or 1567 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the 1568 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, 1569 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it 1570 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it 1571 * be written). 1572 */ 1573 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major, 1574 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, 1575 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) 1576 { 1577 struct task_struct *tsk = current; 1578 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; 1579 enum audit_state state; 1580 1581 if (unlikely(!context)) 1582 return; 1583 1584 /* 1585 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system 1586 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of 1587 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new 1588 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you 1589 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.) 1590 * 1591 * i386 no 1592 * x86_64 no 1593 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S) 1594 * 1595 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner 1596 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught. 1597 */ 1598 if (context->in_syscall) { 1599 struct audit_context *newctx; 1600 1601 #if AUDIT_DEBUG 1602 printk(KERN_ERR 1603 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" 1604 " entering syscall=%d\n", 1605 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major); 1606 #endif 1607 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state); 1608 if (newctx) { 1609 newctx->previous = context; 1610 context = newctx; 1611 tsk->audit_context = newctx; 1612 } else { 1613 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we 1614 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname 1615 * will be lost). The only other alternative is 1616 * to abandon auditing. */ 1617 audit_zero_context(context, context->state); 1618 } 1619 } 1620 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); 1621 1622 if (!audit_enabled) 1623 return; 1624 1625 context->arch = arch; 1626 context->major = major; 1627 context->argv[0] = a1; 1628 context->argv[1] = a2; 1629 context->argv[2] = a3; 1630 context->argv[3] = a4; 1631 1632 state = context->state; 1633 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; 1634 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) { 1635 context->prio = 0; 1636 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); 1637 } 1638 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) 1639 return; 1640 1641 context->serial = 0; 1642 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; 1643 context->in_syscall = 1; 1644 context->current_state = state; 1645 context->ppid = 0; 1646 } 1647 1648 void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child) 1649 { 1650 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; 1651 struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context; 1652 if (!p || !ctx) 1653 return; 1654 if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) 1655 return; 1656 p->arch = ctx->arch; 1657 p->major = ctx->major; 1658 memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv)); 1659 p->ctime = ctx->ctime; 1660 p->dummy = ctx->dummy; 1661 p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall; 1662 p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL); 1663 p->ppid = current->pid; 1664 p->prio = ctx->prio; 1665 p->current_state = ctx->current_state; 1666 } 1667 1668 /** 1669 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call 1670 * @valid: success/failure flag 1671 * @return_code: syscall return value 1672 * 1673 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as 1674 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from 1675 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit 1676 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, 1677 * free the names stored from getname(). 1678 */ 1679 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code) 1680 { 1681 struct task_struct *tsk = current; 1682 struct audit_context *context; 1683 1684 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); 1685 1686 if (likely(!context)) 1687 return; 1688 1689 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) 1690 audit_log_exit(context, tsk); 1691 1692 context->in_syscall = 0; 1693 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; 1694 1695 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) 1696 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); 1697 1698 if (context->previous) { 1699 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; 1700 context->previous = NULL; 1701 audit_free_context(context); 1702 tsk->audit_context = new_context; 1703 } else { 1704 audit_free_names(context); 1705 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); 1706 audit_free_aux(context); 1707 context->aux = NULL; 1708 context->aux_pids = NULL; 1709 context->target_pid = 0; 1710 context->target_sid = 0; 1711 context->sockaddr_len = 0; 1712 context->type = 0; 1713 context->fds[0] = -1; 1714 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) { 1715 kfree(context->filterkey); 1716 context->filterkey = NULL; 1717 } 1718 tsk->audit_context = context; 1719 } 1720 } 1721 1722 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) 1723 { 1724 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE 1725 struct audit_context *context; 1726 struct audit_tree_refs *p; 1727 struct audit_chunk *chunk; 1728 int count; 1729 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) 1730 return; 1731 context = current->audit_context; 1732 p = context->trees; 1733 count = context->tree_count; 1734 rcu_read_lock(); 1735 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); 1736 rcu_read_unlock(); 1737 if (!chunk) 1738 return; 1739 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) 1740 return; 1741 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) { 1742 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); 1743 audit_set_auditable(context); 1744 audit_put_chunk(chunk); 1745 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); 1746 return; 1747 } 1748 put_tree_ref(context, chunk); 1749 #endif 1750 } 1751 1752 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) 1753 { 1754 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE 1755 struct audit_context *context; 1756 struct audit_tree_refs *p; 1757 const struct dentry *d, *parent; 1758 struct audit_chunk *drop; 1759 unsigned long seq; 1760 int count; 1761 1762 context = current->audit_context; 1763 p = context->trees; 1764 count = context->tree_count; 1765 retry: 1766 drop = NULL; 1767 d = dentry; 1768 rcu_read_lock(); 1769 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); 1770 for(;;) { 1771 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode; 1772 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) { 1773 struct audit_chunk *chunk; 1774 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); 1775 if (chunk) { 1776 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { 1777 drop = chunk; 1778 break; 1779 } 1780 } 1781 } 1782 parent = d->d_parent; 1783 if (parent == d) 1784 break; 1785 d = parent; 1786 } 1787 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */ 1788 rcu_read_unlock(); 1789 if (!drop) { 1790 /* just a race with rename */ 1791 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); 1792 goto retry; 1793 } 1794 audit_put_chunk(drop); 1795 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) { 1796 /* OK, got more space */ 1797 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); 1798 goto retry; 1799 } 1800 /* too bad */ 1801 printk(KERN_WARNING 1802 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); 1803 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); 1804 audit_set_auditable(context); 1805 return; 1806 } 1807 rcu_read_unlock(); 1808 #endif 1809 } 1810 1811 /** 1812 * audit_getname - add a name to the list 1813 * @name: name to add 1814 * 1815 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. 1816 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). 1817 */ 1818 void __audit_getname(const char *name) 1819 { 1820 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 1821 1822 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name) 1823 return; 1824 1825 if (!context->in_syscall) { 1826 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 1827 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", 1828 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); 1829 dump_stack(); 1830 #endif 1831 return; 1832 } 1833 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); 1834 context->names[context->name_count].name = name; 1835 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; 1836 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1; 1837 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; 1838 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0; 1839 ++context->name_count; 1840 if (!context->pwd.dentry) { 1841 read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); 1842 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd; 1843 path_get(¤t->fs->pwd); 1844 read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); 1845 } 1846 1847 } 1848 1849 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request 1850 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname 1851 * 1852 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, 1853 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. 1854 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). 1855 */ 1856 void audit_putname(const char *name) 1857 { 1858 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 1859 1860 BUG_ON(!context); 1861 if (!context->in_syscall) { 1862 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 1863 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", 1864 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); 1865 if (context->name_count) { 1866 int i; 1867 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) 1868 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, 1869 context->names[i].name, 1870 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); 1871 } 1872 #endif 1873 __putname(name); 1874 } 1875 #if AUDIT_DEBUG 1876 else { 1877 ++context->put_count; 1878 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { 1879 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" 1880 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" 1881 " put_count=%d\n", 1882 __FILE__, __LINE__, 1883 context->serial, context->major, 1884 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, 1885 context->put_count); 1886 dump_stack(); 1887 } 1888 } 1889 #endif 1890 } 1891 1892 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context, 1893 const struct inode *inode) 1894 { 1895 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) { 1896 if (inode) 1897 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: " 1898 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n", 1899 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), 1900 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), 1901 inode->i_ino); 1902 1903 else 1904 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n"); 1905 return 1; 1906 } 1907 context->name_count++; 1908 #if AUDIT_DEBUG 1909 context->ino_count++; 1910 #endif 1911 return 0; 1912 } 1913 1914 1915 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry) 1916 { 1917 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; 1918 int rc; 1919 1920 memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); 1921 memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); 1922 name->fcap.fE = 0; 1923 name->fcap_ver = 0; 1924 1925 if (!dentry) 1926 return 0; 1927 1928 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps); 1929 if (rc) 1930 return rc; 1931 1932 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted; 1933 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; 1934 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); 1935 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; 1936 1937 return 0; 1938 } 1939 1940 1941 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ 1942 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, 1943 const struct inode *inode) 1944 { 1945 name->ino = inode->i_ino; 1946 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; 1947 name->mode = inode->i_mode; 1948 name->uid = inode->i_uid; 1949 name->gid = inode->i_gid; 1950 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; 1951 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid); 1952 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry); 1953 } 1954 1955 /** 1956 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup 1957 * @name: name being audited 1958 * @dentry: dentry being audited 1959 * 1960 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). 1961 */ 1962 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry) 1963 { 1964 int idx; 1965 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 1966 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; 1967 1968 if (!context->in_syscall) 1969 return; 1970 if (context->name_count 1971 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name 1972 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) 1973 idx = context->name_count - 1; 1974 else if (context->name_count > 1 1975 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name 1976 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) 1977 idx = context->name_count - 2; 1978 else { 1979 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no 1980 * associated name? */ 1981 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode)) 1982 return; 1983 idx = context->name_count - 1; 1984 context->names[idx].name = NULL; 1985 } 1986 handle_path(dentry); 1987 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode); 1988 } 1989 1990 /** 1991 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects 1992 * @dname: inode's dentry name 1993 * @dentry: dentry being audited 1994 * @parent: inode of dentry parent 1995 * 1996 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode 1997 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. 1998 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. 1999 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after 2000 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object 2001 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during 2002 * unsuccessful attempts. 2003 */ 2004 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry, 2005 const struct inode *parent) 2006 { 2007 int idx; 2008 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2009 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; 2010 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; 2011 int dirlen = 0; 2012 2013 if (!context->in_syscall) 2014 return; 2015 2016 if (inode) 2017 handle_one(inode); 2018 /* determine matching parent */ 2019 if (!dname) 2020 goto add_names; 2021 2022 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */ 2023 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) { 2024 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx]; 2025 2026 if (!n->name) 2027 continue; 2028 2029 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && 2030 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) { 2031 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */ 2032 found_parent = n->name; 2033 goto add_names; 2034 } 2035 } 2036 2037 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */ 2038 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) { 2039 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx]; 2040 2041 if (!n->name) 2042 continue; 2043 2044 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */ 2045 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) || 2046 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) { 2047 if (inode) 2048 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode); 2049 else 2050 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1; 2051 found_child = n->name; 2052 goto add_names; 2053 } 2054 } 2055 2056 add_names: 2057 if (!found_parent) { 2058 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent)) 2059 return; 2060 idx = context->name_count - 1; 2061 context->names[idx].name = NULL; 2062 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent); 2063 } 2064 2065 if (!found_child) { 2066 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode)) 2067 return; 2068 idx = context->name_count - 1; 2069 2070 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent 2071 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in 2072 * audit_free_names() */ 2073 if (found_parent) { 2074 context->names[idx].name = found_parent; 2075 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; 2076 /* don't call __putname() */ 2077 context->names[idx].name_put = 0; 2078 } else { 2079 context->names[idx].name = NULL; 2080 } 2081 2082 if (inode) 2083 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode); 2084 else 2085 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1; 2086 } 2087 } 2088 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); 2089 2090 /** 2091 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values 2092 * @ctx: audit_context for the task 2093 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context 2094 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context 2095 * 2096 * Also sets the context as auditable. 2097 */ 2098 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, 2099 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) 2100 { 2101 if (!ctx->in_syscall) 2102 return 0; 2103 if (!ctx->serial) 2104 ctx->serial = audit_serial(); 2105 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; 2106 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; 2107 *serial = ctx->serial; 2108 if (!ctx->prio) { 2109 ctx->prio = 1; 2110 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; 2111 } 2112 return 1; 2113 } 2114 2115 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ 2116 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); 2117 2118 /** 2119 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid 2120 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified 2121 * @loginuid: loginuid value 2122 * 2123 * Returns 0. 2124 * 2125 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). 2126 */ 2127 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) 2128 { 2129 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id); 2130 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context; 2131 2132 if (context && context->in_syscall) { 2133 struct audit_buffer *ab; 2134 2135 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); 2136 if (ab) { 2137 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " 2138 "old auid=%u new auid=%u" 2139 " old ses=%u new ses=%u", 2140 task->pid, task_uid(task), 2141 task->loginuid, loginuid, 2142 task->sessionid, sessionid); 2143 audit_log_end(ab); 2144 } 2145 } 2146 task->sessionid = sessionid; 2147 task->loginuid = loginuid; 2148 return 0; 2149 } 2150 2151 /** 2152 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open 2153 * @oflag: open flag 2154 * @mode: mode bits 2155 * @attr: queue attributes 2156 * 2157 */ 2158 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) 2159 { 2160 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2161 2162 if (attr) 2163 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); 2164 else 2165 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); 2166 2167 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag; 2168 context->mq_open.mode = mode; 2169 2170 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN; 2171 } 2172 2173 /** 2174 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive 2175 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor 2176 * @msg_len: Message length 2177 * @msg_prio: Message priority 2178 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time 2179 * 2180 */ 2181 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, 2182 const struct timespec *abs_timeout) 2183 { 2184 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2185 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; 2186 2187 if (abs_timeout) 2188 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec)); 2189 else 2190 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec)); 2191 2192 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes; 2193 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len; 2194 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio; 2195 2196 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV; 2197 } 2198 2199 /** 2200 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify 2201 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor 2202 * @notification: Notification event 2203 * 2204 */ 2205 2206 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) 2207 { 2208 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2209 2210 if (notification) 2211 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; 2212 else 2213 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0; 2214 2215 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes; 2216 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY; 2217 } 2218 2219 /** 2220 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute 2221 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor 2222 * @mqstat: MQ flags 2223 * 2224 */ 2225 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) 2226 { 2227 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2228 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; 2229 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; 2230 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; 2231 } 2232 2233 /** 2234 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object 2235 * @ipcp: ipc permissions 2236 * 2237 */ 2238 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) 2239 { 2240 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2241 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; 2242 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; 2243 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; 2244 context->ipc.has_perm = 0; 2245 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); 2246 context->type = AUDIT_IPC; 2247 } 2248 2249 /** 2250 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions 2251 * @qbytes: msgq bytes 2252 * @uid: msgq user id 2253 * @gid: msgq group id 2254 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) 2255 * 2256 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj(). 2257 */ 2258 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) 2259 { 2260 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2261 2262 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; 2263 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; 2264 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid; 2265 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode; 2266 context->ipc.has_perm = 1; 2267 } 2268 2269 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 2270 { 2271 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax; 2272 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2273 2274 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy)) 2275 return 0; 2276 2277 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); 2278 if (!ax) 2279 return -ENOMEM; 2280 2281 ax->argc = bprm->argc; 2282 ax->envc = bprm->envc; 2283 ax->mm = bprm->mm; 2284 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE; 2285 ax->d.next = context->aux; 2286 context->aux = (void *)ax; 2287 return 0; 2288 } 2289 2290 2291 /** 2292 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall 2293 * @nargs: number of args 2294 * @args: args array 2295 * 2296 */ 2297 void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) 2298 { 2299 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2300 2301 if (likely(!context || context->dummy)) 2302 return; 2303 2304 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; 2305 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; 2306 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); 2307 } 2308 2309 /** 2310 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair 2311 * @fd1: the first file descriptor 2312 * @fd2: the second file descriptor 2313 * 2314 */ 2315 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) 2316 { 2317 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2318 context->fds[0] = fd1; 2319 context->fds[1] = fd2; 2320 } 2321 2322 /** 2323 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto 2324 * @len: data length in user space 2325 * @a: data address in kernel space 2326 * 2327 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. 2328 */ 2329 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) 2330 { 2331 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2332 2333 if (likely(!context || context->dummy)) 2334 return 0; 2335 2336 if (!context->sockaddr) { 2337 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); 2338 if (!p) 2339 return -ENOMEM; 2340 context->sockaddr = p; 2341 } 2342 2343 context->sockaddr_len = len; 2344 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len); 2345 return 0; 2346 } 2347 2348 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) 2349 { 2350 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2351 2352 context->target_pid = t->pid; 2353 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); 2354 context->target_uid = task_uid(t); 2355 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); 2356 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); 2357 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); 2358 } 2359 2360 /** 2361 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem 2362 * @sig: signal value 2363 * @t: task being signaled 2364 * 2365 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) 2366 * and uid that is doing that. 2367 */ 2368 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) 2369 { 2370 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; 2371 struct task_struct *tsk = current; 2372 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context; 2373 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); 2374 2375 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) { 2376 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) { 2377 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid; 2378 if (tsk->loginuid != -1) 2379 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; 2380 else 2381 audit_sig_uid = uid; 2382 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); 2383 } 2384 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) 2385 return 0; 2386 } 2387 2388 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly 2389 * in audit_context */ 2390 if (!ctx->target_pid) { 2391 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid; 2392 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); 2393 ctx->target_uid = t_uid; 2394 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); 2395 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); 2396 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); 2397 return 0; 2398 } 2399 2400 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids; 2401 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) { 2402 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC); 2403 if (!axp) 2404 return -ENOMEM; 2405 2406 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID; 2407 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; 2408 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; 2409 } 2410 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); 2411 2412 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid; 2413 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); 2414 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; 2415 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); 2416 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); 2417 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); 2418 axp->pid_count++; 2419 2420 return 0; 2421 } 2422 2423 /** 2424 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps 2425 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed 2426 * @new: the proposed new credentials 2427 * @old: the old credentials 2428 * 2429 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not 2430 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall 2431 * 2432 * -Eric 2433 */ 2434 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, 2435 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2436 { 2437 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; 2438 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2439 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; 2440 struct dentry *dentry; 2441 2442 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); 2443 if (!ax) 2444 return -ENOMEM; 2445 2446 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; 2447 ax->d.next = context->aux; 2448 context->aux = (void *)ax; 2449 2450 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); 2451 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps); 2452 dput(dentry); 2453 2454 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; 2455 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; 2456 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); 2457 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; 2458 2459 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; 2460 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; 2461 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; 2462 2463 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; 2464 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; 2465 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; 2466 return 0; 2467 } 2468 2469 /** 2470 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall 2471 * @pid: target pid of the capset call 2472 * @new: the new credentials 2473 * @old: the old (current) credentials 2474 * 2475 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the 2476 * audit system if applicable 2477 */ 2478 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid, 2479 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2480 { 2481 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2482 context->capset.pid = pid; 2483 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; 2484 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; 2485 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; 2486 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET; 2487 } 2488 2489 /** 2490 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally 2491 * @signr: signal value 2492 * 2493 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we 2494 * should record the event for investigation. 2495 */ 2496 void audit_core_dumps(long signr) 2497 { 2498 struct audit_buffer *ab; 2499 u32 sid; 2500 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid; 2501 gid_t gid; 2502 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); 2503 2504 if (!audit_enabled) 2505 return; 2506 2507 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ 2508 return; 2509 2510 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); 2511 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); 2512 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", 2513 auid, uid, gid, sessionid); 2514 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); 2515 if (sid) { 2516 char *ctx = NULL; 2517 u32 len; 2518 2519 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) 2520 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid); 2521 else { 2522 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); 2523 security_release_secctx(ctx, len); 2524 } 2525 } 2526 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); 2527 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); 2528 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); 2529 audit_log_end(ab); 2530 } 2531 2532 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) 2533 { 2534 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; 2535 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall)) 2536 return NULL; 2537 return &ctx->killed_trees; 2538 } 2539