1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later 2 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support 3 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. 4 * 5 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. 6 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. 7 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation 8 * All Rights Reserved. 9 * 10 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> 11 * 12 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, 13 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. 14 * 15 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in 16 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by 17 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. 18 * 19 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>, 20 * 2006. 21 * 22 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was 23 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. 24 * 25 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional 26 * filesystem information. 27 * 28 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> 29 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. 30 */ 31 32 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt 33 34 #include <linux/init.h> 35 #include <asm/types.h> 36 #include <linux/atomic.h> 37 #include <linux/fs.h> 38 #include <linux/namei.h> 39 #include <linux/mm.h> 40 #include <linux/export.h> 41 #include <linux/slab.h> 42 #include <linux/mount.h> 43 #include <linux/socket.h> 44 #include <linux/mqueue.h> 45 #include <linux/audit.h> 46 #include <linux/personality.h> 47 #include <linux/time.h> 48 #include <linux/netlink.h> 49 #include <linux/compiler.h> 50 #include <asm/unistd.h> 51 #include <linux/security.h> 52 #include <linux/list.h> 53 #include <linux/binfmts.h> 54 #include <linux/highmem.h> 55 #include <linux/syscalls.h> 56 #include <asm/syscall.h> 57 #include <linux/capability.h> 58 #include <linux/fs_struct.h> 59 #include <linux/compat.h> 60 #include <linux/ctype.h> 61 #include <linux/string.h> 62 #include <linux/uaccess.h> 63 #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h> 64 #include <uapi/linux/limits.h> 65 #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h> 66 #include <uapi/linux/openat2.h> // struct open_how 67 #include <uapi/linux/fanotify.h> 68 69 #include "audit.h" 70 71 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */ 72 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0 73 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1 74 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2 75 76 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits), 77 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */ 78 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500 79 80 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */ 81 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128 82 83 /* number of audit rules */ 84 int audit_n_rules; 85 86 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */ 87 int audit_signals; 88 89 struct audit_aux_data { 90 struct audit_aux_data *next; 91 int type; 92 }; 93 94 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */ 95 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16 96 97 struct audit_aux_data_pids { 98 struct audit_aux_data d; 99 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 100 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 101 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 102 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 103 struct lsm_prop target_ref[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 104 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; 105 int pid_count; 106 }; 107 108 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps { 109 struct audit_aux_data d; 110 struct audit_file_caps fcap; 111 unsigned int fcap_ver; 112 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap; 113 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap; 114 }; 115 116 struct audit_tree_refs { 117 struct audit_tree_refs *next; 118 struct audit_chunk *c[31]; 119 }; 120 121 struct audit_nfcfgop_tab { 122 enum audit_nfcfgop op; 123 const char *s; 124 }; 125 126 static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = { 127 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER, "xt_register" }, 128 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE, "xt_replace" }, 129 { AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER, "xt_unregister" }, 130 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_table" }, 131 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_table" }, 132 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER, "nft_register_chain" }, 133 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_chain" }, 134 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER, "nft_register_rule" }, 135 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_rule" }, 136 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER, "nft_register_set" }, 137 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_set" }, 138 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER, "nft_register_setelem" }, 139 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_setelem" }, 140 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER, "nft_register_gen" }, 141 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER, "nft_register_obj" }, 142 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_obj" }, 143 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET, "nft_reset_obj" }, 144 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_flowtable" }, 145 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_flowtable" }, 146 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_RESET, "nft_reset_setelem" }, 147 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_RESET, "nft_reset_rule" }, 148 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID, "nft_invalid" }, 149 }; 150 151 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) 152 { 153 unsigned int n; 154 155 if (unlikely(!ctx)) 156 return 0; 157 n = ctx->major; 158 159 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { 160 case AUDITSC_NATIVE: 161 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && 162 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) 163 return 1; 164 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && 165 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n)) 166 return 1; 167 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && 168 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) 169 return 1; 170 return 0; 171 case AUDITSC_COMPAT: /* 32bit on biarch */ 172 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && 173 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) 174 return 1; 175 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && 176 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n)) 177 return 1; 178 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && 179 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) 180 return 1; 181 return 0; 182 case AUDITSC_OPEN: 183 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); 184 case AUDITSC_OPENAT: 185 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); 186 case AUDITSC_SOCKETCALL: 187 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); 188 case AUDITSC_EXECVE: 189 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; 190 case AUDITSC_OPENAT2: 191 return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)ctx->openat2.flags); 192 default: 193 return 0; 194 } 195 } 196 197 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) 198 { 199 struct audit_names *n; 200 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val; 201 202 if (unlikely(!ctx)) 203 return 0; 204 205 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 206 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) && 207 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode)) 208 return 1; 209 } 210 211 return 0; 212 } 213 214 /* 215 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *; 216 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data. 217 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees. 218 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL, 219 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously, 220 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself. 221 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. 222 */ 223 224 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) 225 { 226 if (!ctx->prio) { 227 ctx->prio = 1; 228 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD; 229 } 230 } 231 232 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) 233 { 234 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; 235 int left = ctx->tree_count; 236 237 if (likely(left)) { 238 p->c[--left] = chunk; 239 ctx->tree_count = left; 240 return 1; 241 } 242 if (!p) 243 return 0; 244 p = p->next; 245 if (p) { 246 p->c[30] = chunk; 247 ctx->trees = p; 248 ctx->tree_count = 30; 249 return 1; 250 } 251 return 0; 252 } 253 254 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) 255 { 256 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; 257 258 ctx->trees = kzalloc_obj(struct audit_tree_refs); 259 if (!ctx->trees) { 260 ctx->trees = p; 261 return 0; 262 } 263 if (p) 264 p->next = ctx->trees; 265 else 266 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees; 267 ctx->tree_count = 31; 268 return 1; 269 } 270 271 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, 272 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count) 273 { 274 struct audit_tree_refs *q; 275 int n; 276 277 if (!p) { 278 /* we started with empty chain */ 279 p = ctx->first_trees; 280 count = 31; 281 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */ 282 if (!p) 283 return; 284 } 285 n = count; 286 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) { 287 while (n--) { 288 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); 289 q->c[n] = NULL; 290 } 291 } 292 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) { 293 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); 294 q->c[n] = NULL; 295 } 296 ctx->trees = p; 297 ctx->tree_count = count; 298 } 299 300 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) 301 { 302 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; 303 304 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { 305 q = p->next; 306 kfree(p); 307 } 308 } 309 310 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) 311 { 312 struct audit_tree_refs *p; 313 int n; 314 315 if (!tree) 316 return 0; 317 /* full ones */ 318 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) { 319 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++) 320 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) 321 return 1; 322 } 323 /* partial */ 324 if (p) { 325 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++) 326 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) 327 return 1; 328 } 329 return 0; 330 } 331 332 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid, 333 struct audit_names *name, 334 struct audit_field *f, 335 struct audit_context *ctx) 336 { 337 struct audit_names *n; 338 int rc; 339 340 if (name) { 341 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid); 342 if (rc) 343 return rc; 344 } 345 346 if (ctx) { 347 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 348 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid); 349 if (rc) 350 return rc; 351 } 352 } 353 return 0; 354 } 355 356 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid, 357 struct audit_names *name, 358 struct audit_field *f, 359 struct audit_context *ctx) 360 { 361 struct audit_names *n; 362 int rc; 363 364 if (name) { 365 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid); 366 if (rc) 367 return rc; 368 } 369 370 if (ctx) { 371 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 372 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid); 373 if (rc) 374 return rc; 375 } 376 } 377 return 0; 378 } 379 380 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, 381 const struct cred *cred, 382 struct audit_field *f, 383 struct audit_context *ctx, 384 struct audit_names *name) 385 { 386 switch (f->val) { 387 /* process to file object comparisons */ 388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID: 389 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx); 390 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID: 391 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx); 392 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID: 393 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx); 394 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID: 395 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx); 396 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID: 397 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx); 398 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID: 399 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx); 400 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID: 401 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx); 402 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID: 403 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx); 404 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID: 405 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx); 406 /* uid comparisons */ 407 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID: 408 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, 409 audit_get_loginuid(tsk)); 410 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID: 411 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid); 412 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID: 413 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid); 414 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID: 415 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid); 416 /* auid comparisons */ 417 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID: 418 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op, 419 cred->euid); 420 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID: 421 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op, 422 cred->suid); 423 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID: 424 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op, 425 cred->fsuid); 426 /* euid comparisons */ 427 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID: 428 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid); 429 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID: 430 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid); 431 /* suid comparisons */ 432 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID: 433 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid); 434 /* gid comparisons */ 435 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID: 436 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid); 437 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID: 438 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid); 439 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID: 440 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid); 441 /* egid comparisons */ 442 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID: 443 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid); 444 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID: 445 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid); 446 /* sgid comparison */ 447 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID: 448 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid); 449 default: 450 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n"); 451 return 0; 452 } 453 return 0; 454 } 455 456 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ 457 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 458 * otherwise. 459 * 460 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are 461 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are 462 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed. 463 */ 464 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, 465 struct audit_krule *rule, 466 struct audit_context *ctx, 467 struct audit_names *name, 468 enum audit_state *state, 469 bool task_creation) 470 { 471 const struct cred *cred; 472 int i, need_sid = 1; 473 struct lsm_prop prop = { }; 474 unsigned int sessionid; 475 476 if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio) 477 return 0; 478 479 WARN_ON(tsk != current && !task_creation); 480 cred = tsk->cred; 481 482 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { 483 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; 484 struct audit_names *n; 485 int result = 0; 486 pid_t pid; 487 488 switch (f->type) { 489 case AUDIT_PID: 490 pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk); 491 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val); 492 break; 493 case AUDIT_PPID: 494 if (ctx) { 495 if (!ctx->ppid) 496 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk); 497 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val); 498 } 499 break; 500 case AUDIT_EXE: 501 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe); 502 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) 503 result = !result; 504 break; 505 case AUDIT_UID: 506 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid); 507 break; 508 case AUDIT_EUID: 509 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid); 510 break; 511 case AUDIT_SUID: 512 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid); 513 break; 514 case AUDIT_FSUID: 515 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid); 516 break; 517 case AUDIT_GID: 518 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid); 519 if (f->op == Audit_equal) { 520 if (!result) 521 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid); 522 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) { 523 if (result) 524 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid); 525 } 526 break; 527 case AUDIT_EGID: 528 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid); 529 if (f->op == Audit_equal) { 530 if (!result) 531 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid); 532 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) { 533 if (result) 534 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid); 535 } 536 break; 537 case AUDIT_SGID: 538 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid); 539 break; 540 case AUDIT_FSGID: 541 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid); 542 break; 543 case AUDIT_SESSIONID: 544 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk); 545 result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val); 546 break; 547 case AUDIT_PERS: 548 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); 549 break; 550 case AUDIT_ARCH: 551 if (ctx) 552 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); 553 break; 554 555 case AUDIT_EXIT: 556 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) 557 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); 558 break; 559 case AUDIT_SUCCESS: 560 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) { 561 if (f->val) 562 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); 563 else 564 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); 565 } 566 break; 567 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: 568 if (name) { 569 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || 570 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) 571 ++result; 572 } else if (ctx) { 573 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 574 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || 575 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { 576 ++result; 577 break; 578 } 579 } 580 } 581 break; 582 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: 583 if (name) { 584 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || 585 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) 586 ++result; 587 } else if (ctx) { 588 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 589 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || 590 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { 591 ++result; 592 break; 593 } 594 } 595 } 596 break; 597 case AUDIT_INODE: 598 if (name) 599 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val); 600 else if (ctx) { 601 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 602 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) { 603 ++result; 604 break; 605 } 606 } 607 } 608 break; 609 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: 610 if (name) { 611 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid); 612 } else if (ctx) { 613 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 614 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) { 615 ++result; 616 break; 617 } 618 } 619 } 620 break; 621 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: 622 if (name) { 623 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid); 624 } else if (ctx) { 625 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 626 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) { 627 ++result; 628 break; 629 } 630 } 631 } 632 break; 633 case AUDIT_WATCH: 634 if (name) { 635 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, 636 name->ino, 637 name->dev); 638 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) 639 result = !result; 640 } 641 break; 642 case AUDIT_DIR: 643 if (ctx) { 644 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); 645 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) 646 result = !result; 647 } 648 break; 649 case AUDIT_LOGINUID: 650 result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), 651 f->op, f->uid); 652 break; 653 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: 654 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val); 655 break; 656 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM: 657 if (ctx && ctx->sockaddr) 658 result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family, 659 f->op, f->val); 660 break; 661 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: 662 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: 663 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: 664 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: 665 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: 666 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating 667 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a 668 match for now to avoid losing information that 669 may be wanted. An error message will also be 670 logged upon error */ 671 if (f->lsm_rule) { 672 if (need_sid) { 673 /* @tsk should always be equal to 674 * @current with the exception of 675 * fork()/copy_process() in which case 676 * the new @tsk creds are still a dup 677 * of @current's creds so we can still 678 * use 679 * security_current_getlsmprop_subj() 680 * here even though it always refs 681 * @current's creds 682 */ 683 security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); 684 need_sid = 0; 685 } 686 result = security_audit_rule_match(&prop, 687 f->type, 688 f->op, 689 f->lsm_rule); 690 } 691 break; 692 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: 693 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: 694 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: 695 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: 696 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: 697 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR 698 also applies here */ 699 if (f->lsm_rule) { 700 /* Find files that match */ 701 if (name) { 702 result = security_audit_rule_match( 703 &name->oprop, 704 f->type, 705 f->op, 706 f->lsm_rule); 707 } else if (ctx) { 708 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 709 if (security_audit_rule_match( 710 &n->oprop, 711 f->type, 712 f->op, 713 f->lsm_rule)) { 714 ++result; 715 break; 716 } 717 } 718 } 719 /* Find ipc objects that match */ 720 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) 721 break; 722 if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.oprop, 723 f->type, f->op, 724 f->lsm_rule)) 725 ++result; 726 } 727 break; 728 case AUDIT_ARG0: 729 case AUDIT_ARG1: 730 case AUDIT_ARG2: 731 case AUDIT_ARG3: 732 if (ctx) 733 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); 734 break; 735 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: 736 /* ignore this field for filtering */ 737 result = 1; 738 break; 739 case AUDIT_PERM: 740 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); 741 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) 742 result = !result; 743 break; 744 case AUDIT_FILETYPE: 745 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); 746 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) 747 result = !result; 748 break; 749 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: 750 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name); 751 break; 752 } 753 if (!result) 754 return 0; 755 } 756 757 if (ctx) { 758 if (rule->filterkey) { 759 kfree(ctx->filterkey); 760 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); 761 } 762 ctx->prio = rule->prio; 763 } 764 switch (rule->action) { 765 case AUDIT_NEVER: 766 *state = AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED; 767 break; 768 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: 769 *state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD; 770 break; 771 } 772 return 1; 773 } 774 775 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is 776 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task 777 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. 778 */ 779 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) 780 { 781 struct audit_entry *e; 782 enum audit_state state; 783 784 rcu_read_lock(); 785 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { 786 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, 787 &state, true)) { 788 if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) 789 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); 790 rcu_read_unlock(); 791 return state; 792 } 793 } 794 rcu_read_unlock(); 795 return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD; 796 } 797 798 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val) 799 { 800 int word, bit; 801 802 if (val > 0xffffffff) 803 return false; 804 805 word = AUDIT_WORD(val); 806 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE) 807 return false; 808 809 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val); 810 811 return rule->mask[word] & bit; 812 } 813 814 /** 815 * __audit_filter_op - common filter helper for operations (syscall/uring/etc) 816 * @tsk: associated task 817 * @ctx: audit context 818 * @list: audit filter list 819 * @name: audit_name (can be NULL) 820 * @op: current syscall/uring_op 821 * 822 * Run the udit filters specified in @list against @tsk using @ctx, 823 * @name, and @op, as necessary; the caller is responsible for ensuring 824 * that the call is made while the RCU read lock is held. The @name 825 * parameter can be NULL, but all others must be specified. 826 * Returns 1/true if the filter finds a match, 0/false if none are found. 827 */ 828 static int __audit_filter_op(struct task_struct *tsk, 829 struct audit_context *ctx, 830 struct list_head *list, 831 struct audit_names *name, 832 unsigned long op) 833 { 834 struct audit_entry *e; 835 enum audit_state state; 836 837 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { 838 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, op) && 839 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, name, 840 &state, false)) { 841 ctx->current_state = state; 842 return 1; 843 } 844 } 845 return 0; 846 } 847 848 /** 849 * audit_filter_uring - apply filters to an io_uring operation 850 * @tsk: associated task 851 * @ctx: audit context 852 */ 853 static void audit_filter_uring(struct task_struct *tsk, 854 struct audit_context *ctx) 855 { 856 if (auditd_test_task(tsk)) 857 return; 858 859 rcu_read_lock(); 860 __audit_filter_op(tsk, ctx, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT], 861 NULL, ctx->uring_op); 862 rcu_read_unlock(); 863 } 864 865 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is 866 * not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not 867 * high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record 868 * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD). 869 */ 870 static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, 871 struct audit_context *ctx) 872 { 873 if (auditd_test_task(tsk)) 874 return; 875 876 rcu_read_lock(); 877 __audit_filter_op(tsk, ctx, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT], 878 NULL, ctx->major); 879 rcu_read_unlock(); 880 } 881 882 /* 883 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match. 884 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash 885 */ 886 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk, 887 struct audit_names *n, 888 struct audit_context *ctx) 889 { 890 int h = audit_hash_ino(n->ino); 891 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; 892 893 return __audit_filter_op(tsk, ctx, list, n, ctx->major); 894 } 895 896 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been 897 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash 898 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names. 899 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). 900 */ 901 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) 902 { 903 struct audit_names *n; 904 905 if (auditd_test_task(tsk)) 906 return; 907 908 rcu_read_lock(); 909 910 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 911 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx)) 912 break; 913 } 914 rcu_read_unlock(); 915 } 916 917 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context) 918 { 919 kfree(context->proctitle.value); 920 context->proctitle.value = NULL; 921 context->proctitle.len = 0; 922 } 923 924 static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context) 925 { 926 if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) { 927 kfree(context->module.name); 928 context->module.name = NULL; 929 } 930 } 931 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) 932 { 933 struct audit_names *n, *next; 934 935 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) { 936 list_del(&n->list); 937 if (n->name) 938 putname(n->name); 939 if (n->should_free) 940 kfree(n); 941 } 942 context->name_count = 0; 943 path_put(&context->pwd); 944 context->pwd.dentry = NULL; 945 context->pwd.mnt = NULL; 946 } 947 948 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) 949 { 950 struct audit_aux_data *aux; 951 952 while ((aux = context->aux)) { 953 context->aux = aux->next; 954 kfree(aux); 955 } 956 context->aux = NULL; 957 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { 958 context->aux_pids = aux->next; 959 kfree(aux); 960 } 961 context->aux_pids = NULL; 962 } 963 964 /** 965 * audit_reset_context - reset a audit_context structure 966 * @ctx: the audit_context to reset 967 * 968 * All fields in the audit_context will be reset to an initial state, all 969 * references held by fields will be dropped, and private memory will be 970 * released. When this function returns the audit_context will be suitable 971 * for reuse, so long as the passed context is not NULL or a dummy context. 972 */ 973 static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx) 974 { 975 if (!ctx) 976 return; 977 978 /* if ctx is non-null, reset the "ctx->context" regardless */ 979 ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED; 980 if (ctx->dummy) 981 return; 982 983 /* 984 * NOTE: It shouldn't matter in what order we release the fields, so 985 * release them in the order in which they appear in the struct; 986 * this gives us some hope of quickly making sure we are 987 * resetting the audit_context properly. 988 * 989 * Other things worth mentioning: 990 * - we don't reset "dummy" 991 * - we don't reset "state", we do reset "current_state" 992 * - we preserve "filterkey" if "state" is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD 993 * - much of this is likely overkill, but play it safe for now 994 * - we really need to work on improving the audit_context struct 995 */ 996 997 ctx->current_state = ctx->state; 998 ctx->stamp.serial = 0; 999 ctx->stamp.ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 }; 1000 ctx->major = 0; 1001 ctx->uring_op = 0; 1002 memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv)); 1003 ctx->return_code = 0; 1004 ctx->prio = (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0); 1005 ctx->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID; 1006 audit_free_names(ctx); 1007 if (ctx->state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) { 1008 kfree(ctx->filterkey); 1009 ctx->filterkey = NULL; 1010 } 1011 audit_free_aux(ctx); 1012 kfree(ctx->sockaddr); 1013 ctx->sockaddr = NULL; 1014 ctx->sockaddr_len = 0; 1015 ctx->ppid = 0; 1016 ctx->uid = ctx->euid = ctx->suid = ctx->fsuid = KUIDT_INIT(0); 1017 ctx->gid = ctx->egid = ctx->sgid = ctx->fsgid = KGIDT_INIT(0); 1018 ctx->personality = 0; 1019 ctx->arch = 0; 1020 ctx->target_pid = 0; 1021 ctx->target_auid = ctx->target_uid = KUIDT_INIT(0); 1022 ctx->target_sessionid = 0; 1023 lsmprop_init(&ctx->target_ref); 1024 ctx->target_comm[0] = '\0'; 1025 unroll_tree_refs(ctx, NULL, 0); 1026 WARN_ON(!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees)); 1027 audit_free_module(ctx); 1028 ctx->fds[0] = -1; 1029 ctx->type = 0; /* reset last for audit_free_*() */ 1030 } 1031 1032 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) 1033 { 1034 struct audit_context *context; 1035 1036 context = kzalloc_obj(*context); 1037 if (!context) 1038 return NULL; 1039 context->context = AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED; 1040 context->state = state; 1041 context->prio = state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0; 1042 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); 1043 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list); 1044 context->fds[0] = -1; 1045 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID; 1046 return context; 1047 } 1048 1049 /** 1050 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task 1051 * @tsk: task 1052 * 1053 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context 1054 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the 1055 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is 1056 * needed. 1057 */ 1058 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) 1059 { 1060 struct audit_context *context; 1061 enum audit_state state; 1062 char *key = NULL; 1063 1064 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) 1065 return 0; 1066 1067 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); 1068 if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) { 1069 clear_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT); 1070 return 0; 1071 } 1072 1073 context = audit_alloc_context(state); 1074 if (!context) { 1075 kfree(key); 1076 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); 1077 return -ENOMEM; 1078 } 1079 context->filterkey = key; 1080 1081 audit_set_context(tsk, context); 1082 set_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT); 1083 return 0; 1084 } 1085 1086 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) 1087 { 1088 /* resetting is extra work, but it is likely just noise */ 1089 audit_reset_context(context); 1090 audit_proctitle_free(context); 1091 free_tree_refs(context); 1092 kfree(context->filterkey); 1093 kfree(context); 1094 } 1095 1096 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, 1097 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, 1098 unsigned int sessionid, struct lsm_prop *prop, 1099 char *comm) 1100 { 1101 struct audit_buffer *ab; 1102 int rc = 0; 1103 1104 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); 1105 if (!ab) 1106 return rc; 1107 1108 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, 1109 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), 1110 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); 1111 if (lsmprop_is_set(prop) && audit_log_obj_ctx(ab, prop)) 1112 rc = 1; 1113 1114 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); 1115 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); 1116 audit_log_end(ab); 1117 1118 return rc; 1119 } 1120 1121 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, 1122 struct audit_buffer **ab) 1123 { 1124 long len_max; 1125 long len_rem; 1126 long len_full; 1127 long len_buf; 1128 long len_abuf = 0; 1129 long len_tmp; 1130 bool require_data; 1131 bool encode; 1132 unsigned int iter; 1133 unsigned int arg; 1134 char *buf_head; 1135 char *buf; 1136 const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start; 1137 1138 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg 1139 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the 1140 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */ 1141 char abuf[96]; 1142 1143 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the 1144 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it 1145 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle 1146 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */ 1147 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500); 1148 len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; 1149 1150 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */ 1151 buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 1152 if (!buf_head) { 1153 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string"); 1154 return; 1155 } 1156 buf = buf_head; 1157 1158 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc); 1159 1160 len_rem = len_max; 1161 len_buf = 0; 1162 len_full = 0; 1163 require_data = true; 1164 encode = false; 1165 iter = 0; 1166 arg = 0; 1167 do { 1168 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything 1169 * serious, but the audit record format insists we 1170 * provide an argument length for really long arguments, 1171 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but 1172 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for 1173 * recording in the log, although we don't use it 1174 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */ 1175 if (len_full == 0) 1176 len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1; 1177 1178 /* read more data from userspace */ 1179 if (require_data) { 1180 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */ 1181 if (buf != buf_head) { 1182 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf); 1183 buf = buf_head; 1184 } 1185 1186 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */ 1187 len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p, 1188 len_max - len_buf); 1189 if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) { 1190 /* unable to copy from userspace */ 1191 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); 1192 goto out; 1193 } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) { 1194 /* buffer is not large enough */ 1195 require_data = true; 1196 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple 1197 * buffers force the encoding so we stand 1198 * a chance at a sane len_full value and 1199 * consistent record encoding */ 1200 encode = true; 1201 len_full = len_full * 2; 1202 p += len_tmp; 1203 } else { 1204 require_data = false; 1205 if (!encode) 1206 encode = audit_string_contains_control( 1207 buf, len_tmp); 1208 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */ 1209 if (len_full < len_max) 1210 len_full = (encode ? 1211 len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp); 1212 p += len_tmp + 1; 1213 } 1214 len_buf += len_tmp; 1215 buf_head[len_buf] = '\0'; 1216 1217 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */ 1218 len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2); 1219 } 1220 1221 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */ 1222 if (len_buf >= 0) { 1223 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we 1224 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the 1225 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with 1226 * a new buffer */ 1227 if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) { 1228 len_rem = len_max; 1229 audit_log_end(*ab); 1230 *ab = audit_log_start(context, 1231 GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE); 1232 if (!*ab) 1233 goto out; 1234 } 1235 1236 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */ 1237 len_tmp = 0; 1238 if (require_data || (iter > 0) || 1239 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) { 1240 if (iter == 0) { 1241 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp], 1242 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp, 1243 " a%d_len=%lu", 1244 arg, len_full); 1245 } 1246 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp], 1247 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp, 1248 " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++); 1249 } else 1250 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp], 1251 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp, 1252 " a%d=", arg); 1253 WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf)); 1254 abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0'; 1255 1256 /* log the arg in the audit record */ 1257 audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf); 1258 len_rem -= len_tmp; 1259 len_tmp = len_buf; 1260 if (encode) { 1261 if (len_abuf > len_rem) 1262 len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */ 1263 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp); 1264 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2; 1265 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2; 1266 } else { 1267 if (len_abuf > len_rem) 1268 len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */ 1269 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp); 1270 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2; 1271 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need 1272 * to add quotes to the remaining string */ 1273 len_abuf -= len_tmp; 1274 } 1275 len_buf -= len_tmp; 1276 buf += len_tmp; 1277 } 1278 1279 /* ready to move to the next argument? */ 1280 if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) { 1281 arg++; 1282 iter = 0; 1283 len_full = 0; 1284 require_data = true; 1285 encode = false; 1286 } 1287 } while (arg < context->execve.argc); 1288 1289 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */ 1290 1291 out: 1292 kfree(buf_head); 1293 } 1294 1295 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, 1296 kernel_cap_t *cap) 1297 { 1298 if (cap_isclear(*cap)) { 1299 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix); 1300 return; 1301 } 1302 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%016llx", prefix, cap->val); 1303 } 1304 1305 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) 1306 { 1307 if (name->fcap_ver == -1) { 1308 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?"); 1309 return; 1310 } 1311 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted); 1312 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable); 1313 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d", 1314 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver, 1315 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid)); 1316 } 1317 1318 static void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **ab) 1319 { 1320 const struct audit_ntp_data *ntp = &context->time.ntp_data; 1321 const struct timespec64 *tk = &context->time.tk_injoffset; 1322 static const char * const ntp_name[] = { 1323 "offset", 1324 "freq", 1325 "status", 1326 "tai", 1327 "tick", 1328 "adjust", 1329 }; 1330 int type; 1331 1332 if (context->type == AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL) { 1333 for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++) { 1334 if (ntp->vals[type].newval != ntp->vals[type].oldval) { 1335 if (!*ab) { 1336 *ab = audit_log_start(context, 1337 GFP_KERNEL, 1338 AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL); 1339 if (!*ab) 1340 return; 1341 } 1342 audit_log_format(*ab, "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", 1343 ntp_name[type], 1344 ntp->vals[type].oldval, 1345 ntp->vals[type].newval); 1346 audit_log_end(*ab); 1347 *ab = NULL; 1348 } 1349 } 1350 } 1351 if (tk->tv_sec != 0 || tk->tv_nsec != 0) { 1352 if (!*ab) { 1353 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, 1354 AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET); 1355 if (!*ab) 1356 return; 1357 } 1358 audit_log_format(*ab, "sec=%lli nsec=%li", 1359 (long long)tk->tv_sec, tk->tv_nsec); 1360 audit_log_end(*ab); 1361 *ab = NULL; 1362 } 1363 } 1364 1365 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) 1366 { 1367 struct audit_buffer *ab; 1368 int i; 1369 1370 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type); 1371 if (!ab) 1372 return; 1373 1374 switch (context->type) { 1375 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { 1376 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; 1377 1378 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); 1379 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) 1380 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, 1381 context->socketcall.args[i]); 1382 break; } 1383 case AUDIT_IPC: 1384 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", 1385 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid), 1386 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), 1387 context->ipc.mode); 1388 if (lsmprop_is_set(&context->ipc.oprop)) { 1389 if (audit_log_obj_ctx(ab, &context->ipc.oprop)) 1390 *call_panic = 1; 1391 } 1392 if (context->ipc.has_perm) { 1393 audit_log_end(ab); 1394 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, 1395 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM); 1396 if (unlikely(!ab)) 1397 return; 1398 audit_log_format(ab, 1399 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", 1400 context->ipc.qbytes, 1401 context->ipc.perm_uid, 1402 context->ipc.perm_gid, 1403 context->ipc.perm_mode); 1404 } 1405 break; 1406 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: 1407 audit_log_format(ab, 1408 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " 1409 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld", 1410 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode, 1411 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags, 1412 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg, 1413 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize, 1414 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs); 1415 break; 1416 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: 1417 audit_log_format(ab, 1418 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u " 1419 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld", 1420 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes, 1421 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len, 1422 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio, 1423 (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec, 1424 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec); 1425 break; 1426 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: 1427 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d", 1428 context->mq_notify.mqdes, 1429 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo); 1430 break; 1431 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { 1432 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; 1433 1434 audit_log_format(ab, 1435 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " 1436 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ", 1437 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes, 1438 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg, 1439 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs); 1440 break; } 1441 case AUDIT_CAPSET: 1442 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid); 1443 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); 1444 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted); 1445 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective); 1446 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient); 1447 break; 1448 case AUDIT_MMAP: 1449 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd, 1450 context->mmap.flags); 1451 break; 1452 case AUDIT_OPENAT2: 1453 audit_log_format(ab, "oflag=0%llo mode=0%llo resolve=0x%llx", 1454 context->openat2.flags, 1455 context->openat2.mode, 1456 context->openat2.resolve); 1457 break; 1458 case AUDIT_EXECVE: 1459 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab); 1460 break; 1461 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE: 1462 audit_log_format(ab, "name="); 1463 if (context->module.name) { 1464 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name); 1465 } else 1466 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)"); 1467 1468 break; 1469 case AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL: 1470 case AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET: 1471 /* this call deviates from the rest, eating the buffer */ 1472 audit_log_time(context, &ab); 1473 break; 1474 } 1475 audit_log_end(ab); 1476 } 1477 1478 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len) 1479 { 1480 char *end = proctitle + len - 1; 1481 1482 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end)) 1483 end--; 1484 1485 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */ 1486 len = end - proctitle + 1; 1487 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0; 1488 return len; 1489 } 1490 1491 /* 1492 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names 1493 * @context: audit_context for the task 1494 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details 1495 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name 1496 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names 1497 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails 1498 */ 1499 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, 1500 const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic) 1501 { 1502 struct audit_buffer *ab; 1503 1504 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); 1505 if (!ab) 1506 return; 1507 1508 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num); 1509 1510 if (path) 1511 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path); 1512 else if (n->name) { 1513 switch (n->name_len) { 1514 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: 1515 /* log the full path */ 1516 audit_log_format(ab, " name="); 1517 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name); 1518 break; 1519 case 0: 1520 /* name was specified as a relative path and the 1521 * directory component is the cwd 1522 */ 1523 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) 1524 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd); 1525 else 1526 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); 1527 break; 1528 default: 1529 /* log the name's directory component */ 1530 audit_log_format(ab, " name="); 1531 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name, 1532 n->name_len); 1533 } 1534 } else 1535 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); 1536 1537 if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) 1538 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%llu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", 1539 n->ino, 1540 MAJOR(n->dev), 1541 MINOR(n->dev), 1542 n->mode, 1543 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid), 1544 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid), 1545 MAJOR(n->rdev), 1546 MINOR(n->rdev)); 1547 if (lsmprop_is_set(&n->oprop) && 1548 audit_log_obj_ctx(ab, &n->oprop)) 1549 *call_panic = 2; 1550 1551 /* log the audit_names record type */ 1552 switch (n->type) { 1553 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL: 1554 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL"); 1555 break; 1556 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT: 1557 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT"); 1558 break; 1559 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE: 1560 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE"); 1561 break; 1562 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE: 1563 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE"); 1564 break; 1565 default: 1566 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN"); 1567 break; 1568 } 1569 1570 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); 1571 audit_log_end(ab); 1572 } 1573 1574 static void audit_log_proctitle(void) 1575 { 1576 int res; 1577 char *buf; 1578 char *msg = "(null)"; 1579 int len = strlen(msg); 1580 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 1581 struct audit_buffer *ab; 1582 1583 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE); 1584 if (!ab) 1585 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */ 1586 1587 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle="); 1588 1589 /* Not cached */ 1590 if (!context->proctitle.value) { 1591 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); 1592 if (!buf) 1593 goto out; 1594 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */ 1595 res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN); 1596 if (res == 0) { 1597 kfree(buf); 1598 goto out; 1599 } 1600 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res); 1601 if (res == 0) { 1602 kfree(buf); 1603 goto out; 1604 } 1605 context->proctitle.value = buf; 1606 context->proctitle.len = res; 1607 } 1608 msg = context->proctitle.value; 1609 len = context->proctitle.len; 1610 out: 1611 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len); 1612 audit_log_end(ab); 1613 } 1614 1615 /** 1616 * audit_log_uring - generate a AUDIT_URINGOP record 1617 * @ctx: the audit context 1618 */ 1619 static void audit_log_uring(struct audit_context *ctx) 1620 { 1621 struct audit_buffer *ab; 1622 const struct cred *cred; 1623 1624 ab = audit_log_start(ctx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_URINGOP); 1625 if (!ab) 1626 return; 1627 cred = current_cred(); 1628 audit_log_format(ab, "uring_op=%d", ctx->uring_op); 1629 if (ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) 1630 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", 1631 str_yes_no(ctx->return_valid == 1632 AUDITSC_SUCCESS), 1633 ctx->return_code); 1634 audit_log_format(ab, 1635 " items=%d" 1636 " ppid=%d pid=%d uid=%u gid=%u euid=%u suid=%u" 1637 " fsuid=%u egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u", 1638 ctx->name_count, 1639 task_ppid_nr(current), task_tgid_nr(current), 1640 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid), 1641 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid), 1642 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid), 1643 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid), 1644 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid), 1645 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid), 1646 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid), 1647 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid)); 1648 audit_log_task_context(ab); 1649 audit_log_key(ab, ctx->filterkey); 1650 audit_log_end(ab); 1651 } 1652 1653 static void audit_log_exit(void) 1654 { 1655 int i, call_panic = 0; 1656 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 1657 struct audit_buffer *ab; 1658 struct audit_aux_data *aux; 1659 struct audit_names *n; 1660 1661 context->personality = current->personality; 1662 1663 switch (context->context) { 1664 case AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL: 1665 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); 1666 if (!ab) 1667 return; 1668 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", 1669 context->arch, context->major); 1670 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) 1671 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); 1672 if (context->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) 1673 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", 1674 str_yes_no(context->return_valid == 1675 AUDITSC_SUCCESS), 1676 context->return_code); 1677 audit_log_format(ab, 1678 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d", 1679 context->argv[0], 1680 context->argv[1], 1681 context->argv[2], 1682 context->argv[3], 1683 context->name_count); 1684 audit_log_task_info(ab); 1685 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); 1686 audit_log_end(ab); 1687 break; 1688 case AUDIT_CTX_URING: 1689 audit_log_uring(context); 1690 break; 1691 default: 1692 BUG(); 1693 break; 1694 } 1695 1696 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { 1697 1698 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); 1699 if (!ab) 1700 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ 1701 1702 switch (aux->type) { 1703 1704 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { 1705 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; 1706 1707 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); 1708 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); 1709 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); 1710 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); 1711 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); 1712 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); 1713 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); 1714 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient); 1715 audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); 1716 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); 1717 audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); 1718 audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient); 1719 audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d", 1720 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 1721 axs->fcap.rootid)); 1722 break; } 1723 1724 } 1725 audit_log_end(ab); 1726 } 1727 1728 if (context->type) 1729 show_special(context, &call_panic); 1730 1731 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) { 1732 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR); 1733 if (ab) { 1734 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", 1735 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]); 1736 audit_log_end(ab); 1737 } 1738 } 1739 1740 if (context->sockaddr_len) { 1741 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR); 1742 if (ab) { 1743 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); 1744 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr, 1745 context->sockaddr_len); 1746 audit_log_end(ab); 1747 } 1748 } 1749 1750 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { 1751 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; 1752 1753 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) 1754 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], 1755 axs->target_auid[i], 1756 axs->target_uid[i], 1757 axs->target_sessionid[i], 1758 &axs->target_ref[i], 1759 axs->target_comm[i])) 1760 call_panic = 1; 1761 } 1762 1763 if (context->target_pid && 1764 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, 1765 context->target_auid, context->target_uid, 1766 context->target_sessionid, 1767 &context->target_ref, 1768 context->target_comm)) 1769 call_panic = 1; 1770 1771 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { 1772 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); 1773 if (ab) { 1774 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd); 1775 audit_log_end(ab); 1776 } 1777 } 1778 1779 i = 0; 1780 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { 1781 if (n->hidden) 1782 continue; 1783 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic); 1784 } 1785 1786 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) 1787 audit_log_proctitle(); 1788 1789 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ 1790 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); 1791 if (ab) 1792 audit_log_end(ab); 1793 if (call_panic) 1794 audit_panic("error in audit_log_exit()"); 1795 } 1796 1797 /** 1798 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context 1799 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free 1800 * 1801 * Called from copy_process, do_exit, and the io_uring code 1802 */ 1803 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) 1804 { 1805 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; 1806 1807 if (!context) 1808 return; 1809 1810 /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */ 1811 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) 1812 audit_kill_trees(context); 1813 1814 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code; 1815 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a 1816 * random task_struct that doesn't have any meaningful data we 1817 * need to log via audit_log_exit(). 1818 */ 1819 if (tsk == current && !context->dummy) { 1820 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID; 1821 context->return_code = 0; 1822 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) { 1823 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context); 1824 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); 1825 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) 1826 audit_log_exit(); 1827 } else if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_URING) { 1828 /* TODO: verify this case is real and valid */ 1829 audit_filter_uring(tsk, context); 1830 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); 1831 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) 1832 audit_log_uring(context); 1833 } 1834 } 1835 1836 audit_set_context(tsk, NULL); 1837 audit_free_context(context); 1838 } 1839 1840 /** 1841 * audit_return_fixup - fixup the return codes in the audit_context 1842 * @ctx: the audit_context 1843 * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not 1844 * @code: operation return code 1845 * 1846 * We need to fixup the return code in the audit logs if the actual return 1847 * codes are later going to be fixed by the arch specific signal handlers. 1848 */ 1849 static void audit_return_fixup(struct audit_context *ctx, 1850 int success, long code) 1851 { 1852 /* 1853 * This is actually a test for: 1854 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || 1855 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) 1856 * 1857 * but is faster than a bunch of || 1858 */ 1859 if (unlikely(code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && 1860 (code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && 1861 (code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) 1862 ctx->return_code = -EINTR; 1863 else 1864 ctx->return_code = code; 1865 ctx->return_valid = (success ? AUDITSC_SUCCESS : AUDITSC_FAILURE); 1866 } 1867 1868 /** 1869 * __audit_uring_entry - prepare the kernel task's audit context for io_uring 1870 * @op: the io_uring opcode 1871 * 1872 * This is similar to audit_syscall_entry() but is intended for use by io_uring 1873 * operations. This function should only ever be called from 1874 * audit_uring_entry() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that 1875 * function. 1876 */ 1877 void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op) 1878 { 1879 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); 1880 1881 if (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) 1882 return; 1883 1884 /* 1885 * NOTE: It's possible that we can be called from the process' context 1886 * before it returns to userspace, and before audit_syscall_exit() 1887 * is called. In this case there is not much to do, just record 1888 * the io_uring details and return. 1889 */ 1890 ctx->uring_op = op; 1891 if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) 1892 return; 1893 1894 ctx->dummy = !audit_n_rules; 1895 if (!ctx->dummy && ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) 1896 ctx->prio = 0; 1897 1898 ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING; 1899 ctx->current_state = ctx->state; 1900 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->stamp.ctime); 1901 } 1902 1903 /** 1904 * __audit_uring_exit - wrap up the kernel task's audit context after io_uring 1905 * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not 1906 * @code: operation return code 1907 * 1908 * This is similar to audit_syscall_exit() but is intended for use by io_uring 1909 * operations. This function should only ever be called from 1910 * audit_uring_exit() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that 1911 * function. 1912 */ 1913 void __audit_uring_exit(int success, long code) 1914 { 1915 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); 1916 1917 if (ctx->dummy) { 1918 if (ctx->context != AUDIT_CTX_URING) 1919 return; 1920 goto out; 1921 } 1922 1923 audit_return_fixup(ctx, success, code); 1924 if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) { 1925 /* 1926 * NOTE: See the note in __audit_uring_entry() about the case 1927 * where we may be called from process context before we 1928 * return to userspace via audit_syscall_exit(). In this 1929 * case we simply emit a URINGOP record and bail, the 1930 * normal syscall exit handling will take care of 1931 * everything else. 1932 * It is also worth mentioning that when we are called, 1933 * the current process creds may differ from the creds 1934 * used during the normal syscall processing; keep that 1935 * in mind if/when we move the record generation code. 1936 */ 1937 1938 /* 1939 * We need to filter on the syscall info here to decide if we 1940 * should emit a URINGOP record. I know it seems odd but this 1941 * solves the problem where users have a filter to block *all* 1942 * syscall records in the "exit" filter; we want to preserve 1943 * the behavior here. 1944 */ 1945 audit_filter_syscall(current, ctx); 1946 if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) 1947 audit_filter_uring(current, ctx); 1948 audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx); 1949 if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) 1950 return; 1951 1952 audit_log_uring(ctx); 1953 return; 1954 } 1955 1956 /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */ 1957 if (!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees)) 1958 audit_kill_trees(ctx); 1959 1960 /* run through both filters to ensure we set the filterkey properly */ 1961 audit_filter_uring(current, ctx); 1962 audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx); 1963 if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) 1964 goto out; 1965 audit_log_exit(); 1966 1967 out: 1968 audit_reset_context(ctx); 1969 } 1970 1971 /** 1972 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry 1973 * @major: major syscall type (function) 1974 * @a1: additional syscall register 1 1975 * @a2: additional syscall register 2 1976 * @a3: additional syscall register 3 1977 * @a4: additional syscall register 4 1978 * 1979 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the 1980 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or 1981 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the 1982 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD, 1983 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it 1984 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it 1985 * be written). 1986 */ 1987 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, 1988 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) 1989 { 1990 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 1991 enum audit_state state; 1992 1993 if (!audit_enabled || !context) 1994 return; 1995 1996 WARN_ON(context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED); 1997 WARN_ON(context->name_count); 1998 if (context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED || context->name_count) { 1999 audit_panic("unrecoverable error in audit_syscall_entry()"); 2000 return; 2001 } 2002 2003 state = context->state; 2004 if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) 2005 return; 2006 2007 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; 2008 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) { 2009 context->prio = 0; 2010 if (auditd_test_task(current)) 2011 return; 2012 } 2013 2014 context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current); 2015 context->major = major; 2016 context->argv[0] = a1; 2017 context->argv[1] = a2; 2018 context->argv[2] = a3; 2019 context->argv[3] = a4; 2020 context->context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL; 2021 context->current_state = state; 2022 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->stamp.ctime); 2023 } 2024 2025 /** 2026 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call 2027 * @success: success value of the syscall 2028 * @return_code: return value of the syscall 2029 * 2030 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as 2031 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from 2032 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit 2033 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, 2034 * free the names stored from getname(). 2035 */ 2036 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) 2037 { 2038 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2039 2040 if (!context || context->dummy || 2041 context->context != AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) 2042 goto out; 2043 2044 /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */ 2045 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) 2046 audit_kill_trees(context); 2047 2048 audit_return_fixup(context, success, return_code); 2049 /* run through both filters to ensure we set the filterkey properly */ 2050 audit_filter_syscall(current, context); 2051 audit_filter_inodes(current, context); 2052 if (context->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) 2053 goto out; 2054 2055 audit_log_exit(); 2056 2057 out: 2058 audit_reset_context(context); 2059 } 2060 2061 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) 2062 { 2063 struct audit_context *context; 2064 struct audit_tree_refs *p; 2065 struct audit_chunk *chunk; 2066 int count; 2067 2068 if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) 2069 return; 2070 context = audit_context(); 2071 p = context->trees; 2072 count = context->tree_count; 2073 rcu_read_lock(); 2074 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); 2075 rcu_read_unlock(); 2076 if (!chunk) 2077 return; 2078 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) 2079 return; 2080 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) { 2081 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); 2082 audit_set_auditable(context); 2083 audit_put_chunk(chunk); 2084 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); 2085 return; 2086 } 2087 put_tree_ref(context, chunk); 2088 } 2089 2090 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) 2091 { 2092 struct audit_context *context; 2093 struct audit_tree_refs *p; 2094 const struct dentry *d, *parent; 2095 struct audit_chunk *drop; 2096 unsigned long seq; 2097 int count; 2098 2099 context = audit_context(); 2100 p = context->trees; 2101 count = context->tree_count; 2102 retry: 2103 drop = NULL; 2104 d = dentry; 2105 rcu_read_lock(); 2106 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); 2107 for (;;) { 2108 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d); 2109 2110 if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) { 2111 struct audit_chunk *chunk; 2112 2113 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); 2114 if (chunk) { 2115 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { 2116 drop = chunk; 2117 break; 2118 } 2119 } 2120 } 2121 parent = d->d_parent; 2122 if (parent == d) 2123 break; 2124 d = parent; 2125 } 2126 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */ 2127 rcu_read_unlock(); 2128 if (!drop) { 2129 /* just a race with rename */ 2130 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); 2131 goto retry; 2132 } 2133 audit_put_chunk(drop); 2134 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) { 2135 /* OK, got more space */ 2136 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); 2137 goto retry; 2138 } 2139 /* too bad */ 2140 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); 2141 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); 2142 audit_set_auditable(context); 2143 return; 2144 } 2145 rcu_read_unlock(); 2146 } 2147 2148 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context, 2149 unsigned char type) 2150 { 2151 struct audit_names *aname; 2152 2153 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) { 2154 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count]; 2155 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname)); 2156 } else { 2157 aname = kzalloc_obj(*aname, GFP_NOFS); 2158 if (!aname) 2159 return NULL; 2160 aname->should_free = true; 2161 } 2162 2163 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET; 2164 aname->type = type; 2165 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list); 2166 2167 context->name_count++; 2168 if (!context->pwd.dentry) 2169 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); 2170 return aname; 2171 } 2172 2173 /** 2174 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list 2175 * @name: name to add 2176 * 2177 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. 2178 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). 2179 */ 2180 void __audit_getname(struct filename *name) 2181 { 2182 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2183 struct audit_names *n; 2184 2185 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED) 2186 return; 2187 2188 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); 2189 if (!n) 2190 return; 2191 2192 n->name = name; 2193 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; 2194 name->aname = n; 2195 name->refcnt++; 2196 } 2197 2198 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, 2199 const struct dentry *dentry) 2200 { 2201 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; 2202 int rc; 2203 2204 if (!dentry) 2205 return 0; 2206 2207 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, &caps); 2208 if (rc) 2209 return rc; 2210 2211 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted; 2212 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; 2213 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); 2214 name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid; 2215 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> 2216 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; 2217 2218 return 0; 2219 } 2220 2221 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ 2222 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, 2223 const struct dentry *dentry, 2224 struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) 2225 { 2226 name->ino = inode->i_ino; 2227 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; 2228 name->mode = inode->i_mode; 2229 name->uid = inode->i_uid; 2230 name->gid = inode->i_gid; 2231 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; 2232 security_inode_getlsmprop(inode, &name->oprop); 2233 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) { 2234 name->fcap_ver = -1; 2235 return; 2236 } 2237 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry); 2238 } 2239 2240 /** 2241 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup 2242 * @name: name being audited 2243 * @dentry: dentry being audited 2244 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry 2245 */ 2246 void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, 2247 unsigned int flags) 2248 { 2249 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2250 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); 2251 struct audit_names *n; 2252 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT; 2253 struct audit_entry *e; 2254 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS]; 2255 int i; 2256 2257 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED) 2258 return; 2259 2260 rcu_read_lock(); 2261 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { 2262 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { 2263 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; 2264 2265 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE 2266 && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic, 2267 f->op, f->val) 2268 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) { 2269 rcu_read_unlock(); 2270 return; 2271 } 2272 } 2273 } 2274 rcu_read_unlock(); 2275 2276 if (!name) 2277 goto out_alloc; 2278 2279 /* 2280 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can 2281 * just use it directly if the type is correct. 2282 */ 2283 n = name->aname; 2284 if (n) { 2285 if (parent) { 2286 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || 2287 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) 2288 goto out; 2289 } else { 2290 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) 2291 goto out; 2292 } 2293 } 2294 2295 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) { 2296 if (n->ino) { 2297 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */ 2298 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino || 2299 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev) 2300 continue; 2301 } else if (n->name) { 2302 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */ 2303 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name)) 2304 continue; 2305 } else 2306 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */ 2307 continue; 2308 2309 /* match the correct record type */ 2310 if (parent) { 2311 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || 2312 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) 2313 goto out; 2314 } else { 2315 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) 2316 goto out; 2317 } 2318 } 2319 2320 out_alloc: 2321 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */ 2322 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); 2323 if (!n) 2324 return; 2325 if (name) { 2326 n->name = name; 2327 name->refcnt++; 2328 } 2329 2330 out: 2331 if (parent) { 2332 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL; 2333 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; 2334 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN) 2335 n->hidden = true; 2336 } else { 2337 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; 2338 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL; 2339 } 2340 handle_path(dentry); 2341 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL); 2342 } 2343 2344 void __audit_file(const struct file *file) 2345 { 2346 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0); 2347 } 2348 2349 /** 2350 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects 2351 * @parent: inode of dentry parent 2352 * @dentry: dentry being audited 2353 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for 2354 * 2355 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode 2356 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. 2357 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. 2358 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after 2359 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object 2360 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during 2361 * unsuccessful attempts. 2362 */ 2363 void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, 2364 const struct dentry *dentry, 2365 const unsigned char type) 2366 { 2367 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2368 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); 2369 const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name; 2370 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; 2371 struct audit_entry *e; 2372 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS]; 2373 int i; 2374 2375 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED) 2376 return; 2377 2378 rcu_read_lock(); 2379 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { 2380 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { 2381 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; 2382 2383 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE 2384 && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic, 2385 f->op, f->val) 2386 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) { 2387 rcu_read_unlock(); 2388 return; 2389 } 2390 } 2391 } 2392 rcu_read_unlock(); 2393 2394 if (inode) 2395 handle_one(inode); 2396 2397 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { 2398 /* can only match entries that have a name */ 2399 if (!n->name) 2400 continue; 2401 2402 /* look for a parent entry first */ 2403 if (!found_parent && 2404 (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) && 2405 (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev && 2406 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len))) { 2407 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; 2408 found_parent = n; 2409 if (found_child) 2410 break; 2411 continue; 2412 } 2413 2414 /* is there a matching child entry? */ 2415 if (!found_child && 2416 (n->type == type || n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) && 2417 (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) || 2418 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, 2419 found_parent ? 2420 found_parent->name_len : 2421 AUDIT_NAME_FULL))) { 2422 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) 2423 n->type = type; 2424 found_child = n; 2425 if (found_parent) 2426 break; 2427 } 2428 } 2429 2430 if (!found_parent) { 2431 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */ 2432 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT); 2433 if (!n) 2434 return; 2435 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0); 2436 } 2437 2438 if (!found_child) { 2439 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type); 2440 if (!found_child) 2441 return; 2442 2443 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent 2444 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in 2445 * audit_free_names() */ 2446 if (found_parent) { 2447 found_child->name = found_parent->name; 2448 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; 2449 found_child->name->refcnt++; 2450 } 2451 } 2452 2453 if (inode) 2454 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0); 2455 else 2456 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET; 2457 } 2458 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); 2459 2460 /** 2461 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values 2462 * @ctx: audit_context for the task 2463 * @stamp: timestamp to record 2464 * 2465 * Also sets the context as auditable. 2466 */ 2467 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_stamp *stamp) 2468 { 2469 if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED) 2470 return 0; 2471 if (!ctx->stamp.serial) 2472 ctx->stamp.serial = audit_serial(); 2473 *stamp = ctx->stamp; 2474 if (!ctx->prio) { 2475 ctx->prio = 1; 2476 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD; 2477 } 2478 return 1; 2479 } 2480 2481 /** 2482 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open 2483 * @oflag: open flag 2484 * @mode: mode bits 2485 * @attr: queue attributes 2486 * 2487 */ 2488 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) 2489 { 2490 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2491 2492 if (attr) 2493 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); 2494 else 2495 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); 2496 2497 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag; 2498 context->mq_open.mode = mode; 2499 2500 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN; 2501 } 2502 2503 /** 2504 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive 2505 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor 2506 * @msg_len: Message length 2507 * @msg_prio: Message priority 2508 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time 2509 * 2510 */ 2511 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, 2512 const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout) 2513 { 2514 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2515 struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; 2516 2517 if (abs_timeout) 2518 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p)); 2519 else 2520 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p)); 2521 2522 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes; 2523 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len; 2524 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio; 2525 2526 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV; 2527 } 2528 2529 /** 2530 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify 2531 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor 2532 * @notification: Notification event 2533 * 2534 */ 2535 2536 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) 2537 { 2538 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2539 2540 if (notification) 2541 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; 2542 else 2543 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0; 2544 2545 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes; 2546 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY; 2547 } 2548 2549 /** 2550 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute 2551 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor 2552 * @mqstat: MQ flags 2553 * 2554 */ 2555 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) 2556 { 2557 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2558 2559 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; 2560 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; 2561 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; 2562 } 2563 2564 /** 2565 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object 2566 * @ipcp: ipc permissions 2567 * 2568 */ 2569 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) 2570 { 2571 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2572 2573 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; 2574 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; 2575 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; 2576 context->ipc.has_perm = 0; 2577 security_ipc_getlsmprop(ipcp, &context->ipc.oprop); 2578 context->type = AUDIT_IPC; 2579 } 2580 2581 /** 2582 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions 2583 * @qbytes: msgq bytes 2584 * @uid: msgq user id 2585 * @gid: msgq group id 2586 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) 2587 * 2588 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj(). 2589 */ 2590 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode) 2591 { 2592 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2593 2594 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; 2595 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; 2596 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid; 2597 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode; 2598 context->ipc.has_perm = 1; 2599 } 2600 2601 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 2602 { 2603 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2604 2605 /* clear proctitle in audit context to allow replacement */ 2606 audit_proctitle_free(context); 2607 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE; 2608 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc; 2609 } 2610 2611 2612 /** 2613 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall 2614 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS. 2615 * @args: args array 2616 * 2617 */ 2618 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) 2619 { 2620 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2621 2622 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args) 2623 return -EINVAL; 2624 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; 2625 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; 2626 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); 2627 return 0; 2628 } 2629 2630 /** 2631 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair 2632 * @fd1: the first file descriptor 2633 * @fd2: the second file descriptor 2634 * 2635 */ 2636 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) 2637 { 2638 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2639 2640 context->fds[0] = fd1; 2641 context->fds[1] = fd2; 2642 } 2643 2644 /** 2645 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto 2646 * @len: data length in user space 2647 * @a: data address in kernel space 2648 * 2649 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. 2650 */ 2651 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) 2652 { 2653 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2654 2655 if (!context->sockaddr) { 2656 void *p = kmalloc_obj(struct sockaddr_storage); 2657 2658 if (!p) 2659 return -ENOMEM; 2660 context->sockaddr = p; 2661 } 2662 2663 context->sockaddr_len = len; 2664 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len); 2665 return 0; 2666 } 2667 2668 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) 2669 { 2670 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2671 2672 context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); 2673 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); 2674 context->target_uid = task_uid(t); 2675 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); 2676 strscpy(context->target_comm, t->comm); 2677 security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &context->target_ref); 2678 } 2679 2680 /** 2681 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls 2682 * @t: task being signaled 2683 * 2684 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) 2685 * and uid that is doing that. 2686 */ 2687 int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) 2688 { 2689 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; 2690 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); 2691 kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t); 2692 2693 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) 2694 return 0; 2695 2696 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly 2697 * in audit_context */ 2698 if (!ctx->target_pid) { 2699 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); 2700 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); 2701 ctx->target_uid = t_uid; 2702 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); 2703 strscpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm); 2704 security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &ctx->target_ref); 2705 return 0; 2706 } 2707 2708 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids; 2709 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) { 2710 axp = kzalloc_obj(*axp, GFP_ATOMIC); 2711 if (!axp) 2712 return -ENOMEM; 2713 2714 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID; 2715 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; 2716 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; 2717 } 2718 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS)) 2719 return -EINVAL; 2720 2721 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t); 2722 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); 2723 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; 2724 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); 2725 security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &axp->target_ref[axp->pid_count]); 2726 strscpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm); 2727 axp->pid_count++; 2728 2729 return 0; 2730 } 2731 2732 /** 2733 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps 2734 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed 2735 * @new: the proposed new credentials 2736 * @old: the old credentials 2737 * 2738 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not 2739 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall 2740 * 2741 * -Eric 2742 */ 2743 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, 2744 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2745 { 2746 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; 2747 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2748 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; 2749 2750 ax = kmalloc_obj(*ax); 2751 if (!ax) 2752 return -ENOMEM; 2753 2754 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; 2755 ax->d.next = context->aux; 2756 context->aux = (void *)ax; 2757 2758 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&nop_mnt_idmap, 2759 bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); 2760 2761 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; 2762 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; 2763 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); 2764 ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid; 2765 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; 2766 2767 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; 2768 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; 2769 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; 2770 ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient; 2771 2772 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; 2773 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; 2774 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; 2775 ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient; 2776 return 0; 2777 } 2778 2779 /** 2780 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall 2781 * @new: the new credentials 2782 * @old: the old (current) credentials 2783 * 2784 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the 2785 * audit system if applicable 2786 */ 2787 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2788 { 2789 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2790 2791 context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current); 2792 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; 2793 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; 2794 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; 2795 context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient; 2796 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET; 2797 } 2798 2799 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) 2800 { 2801 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2802 2803 context->mmap.fd = fd; 2804 context->mmap.flags = flags; 2805 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; 2806 } 2807 2808 void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how) 2809 { 2810 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2811 2812 context->openat2.flags = how->flags; 2813 context->openat2.mode = how->mode; 2814 context->openat2.resolve = how->resolve; 2815 context->type = AUDIT_OPENAT2; 2816 } 2817 2818 void __audit_log_kern_module(const char *name) 2819 { 2820 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2821 2822 context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL); 2823 if (!context->module.name) 2824 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module"); 2825 context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE; 2826 } 2827 2828 void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar) 2829 { 2830 /* {subj,obj}_trust values are {0,1,2}: no,yes,unknown */ 2831 switch (friar->hdr.type) { 2832 case FAN_RESPONSE_INFO_NONE: 2833 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FANOTIFY, 2834 "resp=%u fan_type=%u fan_info=0 subj_trust=2 obj_trust=2", 2835 response, FAN_RESPONSE_INFO_NONE); 2836 break; 2837 case FAN_RESPONSE_INFO_AUDIT_RULE: 2838 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FANOTIFY, 2839 "resp=%u fan_type=%u fan_info=%X subj_trust=%u obj_trust=%u", 2840 response, friar->hdr.type, friar->rule_number, 2841 friar->subj_trust, friar->obj_trust); 2842 } 2843 } 2844 2845 void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset) 2846 { 2847 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2848 2849 /* only set type if not already set by NTP */ 2850 if (!context->type) 2851 context->type = AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET; 2852 memcpy(&context->time.tk_injoffset, &offset, sizeof(offset)); 2853 } 2854 2855 void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad) 2856 { 2857 struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); 2858 int type; 2859 2860 for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++) 2861 if (ad->vals[type].newval != ad->vals[type].oldval) { 2862 /* unconditionally set type, overwriting TK */ 2863 context->type = AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL; 2864 memcpy(&context->time.ntp_data, ad, sizeof(*ad)); 2865 break; 2866 } 2867 } 2868 2869 void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries, 2870 enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp) 2871 { 2872 struct audit_buffer *ab; 2873 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; 2874 2875 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG); 2876 if (!ab) 2877 return; 2878 audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s", 2879 name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s); 2880 2881 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current)); 2882 audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */ 2883 audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); 2884 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); 2885 audit_log_end(ab); 2886 } 2887 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg); 2888 2889 void __audit_log_fsopen(const char *fs_name) 2890 { 2891 struct audit_buffer *ab; 2892 2893 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FSOPEN); 2894 if (!ab) 2895 return; 2896 2897 audit_log_format(ab, "fs_name="); 2898 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fs_name); 2899 audit_log_end(ab); 2900 } 2901 2902 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) 2903 { 2904 kuid_t auid, uid; 2905 kgid_t gid; 2906 unsigned int sessionid; 2907 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; 2908 2909 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current); 2910 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); 2911 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); 2912 2913 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", 2914 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), 2915 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), 2916 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid), 2917 sessionid); 2918 audit_log_task_context(ab); 2919 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current)); 2920 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); 2921 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm); 2922 } 2923 2924 /** 2925 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally 2926 * @signr: signal value 2927 * 2928 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we 2929 * should record the event for investigation. 2930 */ 2931 void audit_core_dumps(long signr) 2932 { 2933 struct audit_buffer *ab; 2934 2935 if (!audit_enabled) 2936 return; 2937 2938 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ 2939 return; 2940 2941 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); 2942 if (unlikely(!ab)) 2943 return; 2944 audit_log_task(ab); 2945 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr); 2946 audit_log_end(ab); 2947 } 2948 2949 /** 2950 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action 2951 * @syscall: syscall number 2952 * @signr: signal value 2953 * @code: the seccomp action 2954 * 2955 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for 2956 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log(). 2957 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled 2958 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when 2959 * audit is not in use. 2960 */ 2961 void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) 2962 { 2963 struct audit_buffer *ab; 2964 2965 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP); 2966 if (unlikely(!ab)) 2967 return; 2968 audit_log_task(ab); 2969 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x", 2970 signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall, 2971 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code); 2972 audit_log_end(ab); 2973 } 2974 2975 void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names, 2976 int res) 2977 { 2978 struct audit_buffer *ab; 2979 2980 if (!audit_enabled) 2981 return; 2982 2983 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, 2984 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); 2985 if (unlikely(!ab)) 2986 return; 2987 2988 audit_log_format(ab, 2989 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d", 2990 names, old_names, res); 2991 audit_log_end(ab); 2992 } 2993 2994 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) 2995 { 2996 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); 2997 if (likely(!ctx || ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)) 2998 return NULL; 2999 return &ctx->killed_trees; 3000 } 3001