xref: /linux/kernel/auditfilter.c (revision e60e1ee60630cafef5e430c2ae364877e061d980)
1 /* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events
2  *
3  * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
4  * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
5  * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
6  *
7  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9  * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10  * (at your option) any later version.
11  *
12  * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
15  * GNU General Public License for more details.
16  *
17  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18  * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19  * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
20  */
21 
22 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
23 
24 #include <linux/kernel.h>
25 #include <linux/audit.h>
26 #include <linux/kthread.h>
27 #include <linux/mutex.h>
28 #include <linux/fs.h>
29 #include <linux/namei.h>
30 #include <linux/netlink.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/slab.h>
33 #include <linux/security.h>
34 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
35 #include <net/sock.h>
36 #include "audit.h"
37 
38 /*
39  * Locking model:
40  *
41  * audit_filter_mutex:
42  *		Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
43  *		data.  Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
44  *		contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
45  *		LSM rules during filtering.  If modified, these structures
46  *		must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
47  *		An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
48  *		be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
49  */
50 
51 /* Audit filter lists, defined in <linux/audit.h> */
52 struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
53 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
54 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
55 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
56 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
57 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
58 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]),
59 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[6]),
60 #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 7
61 #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
62 #endif
63 };
64 static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
65 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[0]),
66 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[1]),
67 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[2]),
68 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[3]),
69 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]),
70 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]),
71 	LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[6]),
72 };
73 
74 DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
75 
76 static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
77 {
78 	switch (f->type) {
79 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
80 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
81 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
82 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
83 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
84 	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
85 	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
86 	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
87 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
88 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
89 		kfree(f->lsm_str);
90 		security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
91 	}
92 }
93 
94 static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
95 {
96 	int i;
97 	struct audit_krule *erule = &e->rule;
98 
99 	/* some rules don't have associated watches */
100 	if (erule->watch)
101 		audit_put_watch(erule->watch);
102 	if (erule->fields)
103 		for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++)
104 			audit_free_lsm_field(&erule->fields[i]);
105 	kfree(erule->fields);
106 	kfree(erule->filterkey);
107 	kfree(e);
108 }
109 
110 void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
111 {
112 	struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
113 	audit_free_rule(e);
114 }
115 
116 /* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */
117 static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count)
118 {
119 	struct audit_entry *entry;
120 	struct audit_field *fields;
121 
122 	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
123 	if (unlikely(!entry))
124 		return NULL;
125 
126 	fields = kcalloc(field_count, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
127 	if (unlikely(!fields)) {
128 		kfree(entry);
129 		return NULL;
130 	}
131 	entry->rule.fields = fields;
132 
133 	return entry;
134 }
135 
136 /* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
137  * buffer. */
138 char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
139 {
140 	char *str;
141 
142 	if (!*bufp || (len == 0) || (len > *remain))
143 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
144 
145 	/* Of the currently implemented string fields, PATH_MAX
146 	 * defines the longest valid length.
147 	 */
148 	if (len > PATH_MAX)
149 		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
150 
151 	str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
152 	if (unlikely(!str))
153 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
154 
155 	memcpy(str, *bufp, len);
156 	str[len] = 0;
157 	*bufp += len;
158 	*remain -= len;
159 
160 	return str;
161 }
162 
163 /* Translate an inode field to kernel representation. */
164 static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule,
165 				 struct audit_field *f)
166 {
167 	if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
168 	    krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree ||
169 	    (f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal))
170 		return -EINVAL;
171 
172 	krule->inode_f = f;
173 	return 0;
174 }
175 
176 static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES];
177 
178 int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list)
179 {
180 	__u32 *p = kcalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE, sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL);
181 	if (!p)
182 		return -ENOMEM;
183 	while (*list != ~0U) {
184 		unsigned n = *list++;
185 		if (n >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES) {
186 			kfree(p);
187 			return -EINVAL;
188 		}
189 		p[AUDIT_WORD(n)] |= AUDIT_BIT(n);
190 	}
191 	if (class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || classes[class]) {
192 		kfree(p);
193 		return -EINVAL;
194 	}
195 	classes[class] = p;
196 	return 0;
197 }
198 
199 int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall)
200 {
201 	if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32))
202 		return 0;
203 	if (unlikely(class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || !classes[class]))
204 		return 0;
205 	return classes[class][AUDIT_WORD(syscall)] & AUDIT_BIT(syscall);
206 }
207 
208 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
209 static inline int audit_match_class_bits(int class, u32 *mask)
210 {
211 	int i;
212 
213 	if (classes[class]) {
214 		for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
215 			if (mask[i] & classes[class][i])
216 				return 0;
217 	}
218 	return 1;
219 }
220 
221 static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry)
222 {
223 	struct audit_field *arch = entry->rule.arch_f;
224 
225 	if (!arch) {
226 		/* When arch is unspecified, we must check both masks on biarch
227 		 * as syscall number alone is ambiguous. */
228 		return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
229 					       entry->rule.mask) &&
230 			audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
231 					       entry->rule.mask));
232 	}
233 
234 	switch(audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) {
235 	case 0: /* native */
236 		return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
237 					       entry->rule.mask));
238 	case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
239 		return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
240 					       entry->rule.mask));
241 	default:
242 		return 1;
243 	}
244 }
245 #endif
246 
247 /* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */
248 static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule_data *rule)
249 {
250 	unsigned listnr;
251 	struct audit_entry *entry;
252 	int i, err;
253 
254 	err = -EINVAL;
255 	listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
256 	switch(listnr) {
257 	default:
258 		goto exit_err;
259 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
260 	case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY:
261 		if (rule->action == AUDIT_ALWAYS)
262 			goto exit_err;
263 	case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT:
264 	case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK:
265 #endif
266 	case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
267 	case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE:
268 	case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
269 		;
270 	}
271 	if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) {
272 		pr_err("AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n");
273 		goto exit_err;
274 	}
275 	if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
276 		goto exit_err;
277 	if (rule->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
278 		goto exit_err;
279 
280 	err = -ENOMEM;
281 	entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count);
282 	if (!entry)
283 		goto exit_err;
284 
285 	entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
286 	entry->rule.listnr = listnr;
287 	entry->rule.action = rule->action;
288 	entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count;
289 
290 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
291 		entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
292 
293 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES; i++) {
294 		int bit = AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - i - 1;
295 		__u32 *p = &entry->rule.mask[AUDIT_WORD(bit)];
296 		__u32 *class;
297 
298 		if (!(*p & AUDIT_BIT(bit)))
299 			continue;
300 		*p &= ~AUDIT_BIT(bit);
301 		class = classes[i];
302 		if (class) {
303 			int j;
304 			for (j = 0; j < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; j++)
305 				entry->rule.mask[j] |= class[j];
306 		}
307 	}
308 
309 	return entry;
310 
311 exit_err:
312 	return ERR_PTR(err);
313 }
314 
315 static u32 audit_ops[] =
316 {
317 	[Audit_equal] = AUDIT_EQUAL,
318 	[Audit_not_equal] = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL,
319 	[Audit_bitmask] = AUDIT_BIT_MASK,
320 	[Audit_bittest] = AUDIT_BIT_TEST,
321 	[Audit_lt] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN,
322 	[Audit_gt] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN,
323 	[Audit_le] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
324 	[Audit_ge] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
325 };
326 
327 static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op)
328 {
329 	u32 n;
330 	for (n = Audit_equal; n < Audit_bad && audit_ops[n] != op; n++)
331 		;
332 	return n;
333 }
334 
335 /* check if an audit field is valid */
336 static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
337 {
338 	switch(f->type) {
339 	case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
340 		if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE &&
341 		    entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER)
342 			return -EINVAL;
343 		break;
344 	case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
345 		if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_FS)
346 			return -EINVAL;
347 		break;
348 	}
349 
350 	switch(entry->rule.listnr) {
351 	case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
352 		switch(f->type) {
353 		case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
354 		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
355 			break;
356 		default:
357 			return -EINVAL;
358 		}
359 	}
360 
361 	switch(f->type) {
362 	default:
363 		return -EINVAL;
364 	case AUDIT_UID:
365 	case AUDIT_EUID:
366 	case AUDIT_SUID:
367 	case AUDIT_FSUID:
368 	case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
369 	case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
370 	case AUDIT_GID:
371 	case AUDIT_EGID:
372 	case AUDIT_SGID:
373 	case AUDIT_FSGID:
374 	case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
375 	case AUDIT_PID:
376 	case AUDIT_PERS:
377 	case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
378 	case AUDIT_PPID:
379 	case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
380 	case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
381 	case AUDIT_EXIT:
382 	case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
383 	case AUDIT_INODE:
384 	case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
385 		/* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
386 		if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
387 			return -EINVAL;
388 		break;
389 	case AUDIT_ARG0:
390 	case AUDIT_ARG1:
391 	case AUDIT_ARG2:
392 	case AUDIT_ARG3:
393 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
394 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
395 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
396 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
397 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
398 	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
399 	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
400 	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
401 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
402 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
403 	case AUDIT_WATCH:
404 	case AUDIT_DIR:
405 	case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
406 		break;
407 	case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
408 		if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
409 			return -EINVAL;
410 	/* FALL THROUGH */
411 	case AUDIT_ARCH:
412 	case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
413 		if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
414 			return -EINVAL;
415 		break;
416 	case AUDIT_PERM:
417 		if (f->val & ~15)
418 			return -EINVAL;
419 		break;
420 	case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
421 		if (f->val & ~S_IFMT)
422 			return -EINVAL;
423 		break;
424 	case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
425 		if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
426 			return -EINVAL;
427 		break;
428 	case AUDIT_EXE:
429 		if (f->op != Audit_equal)
430 			return -EINVAL;
431 		if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT)
432 			return -EINVAL;
433 		break;
434 	}
435 	return 0;
436 }
437 
438 /* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule representation. */
439 static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
440 					       size_t datasz)
441 {
442 	int err = 0;
443 	struct audit_entry *entry;
444 	void *bufp;
445 	size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
446 	int i;
447 	char *str;
448 	struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark;
449 
450 	entry = audit_to_entry_common(data);
451 	if (IS_ERR(entry))
452 		goto exit_nofree;
453 
454 	bufp = data->buf;
455 	for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
456 		struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
457 
458 		err = -EINVAL;
459 
460 		f->op = audit_to_op(data->fieldflags[i]);
461 		if (f->op == Audit_bad)
462 			goto exit_free;
463 
464 		f->type = data->fields[i];
465 		f->val = data->values[i];
466 
467 		/* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
468 		if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
469 			f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
470 			f->val = 0;
471 			entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY;
472 		}
473 
474 		err = audit_field_valid(entry, f);
475 		if (err)
476 			goto exit_free;
477 
478 		err = -EINVAL;
479 		switch (f->type) {
480 		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
481 		case AUDIT_UID:
482 		case AUDIT_EUID:
483 		case AUDIT_SUID:
484 		case AUDIT_FSUID:
485 		case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
486 			f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
487 			if (!uid_valid(f->uid))
488 				goto exit_free;
489 			break;
490 		case AUDIT_GID:
491 		case AUDIT_EGID:
492 		case AUDIT_SGID:
493 		case AUDIT_FSGID:
494 		case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
495 			f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
496 			if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
497 				goto exit_free;
498 			break;
499 		case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
500 		case AUDIT_ARCH:
501 			entry->rule.arch_f = f;
502 			break;
503 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
504 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
505 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
506 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
507 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
508 		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
509 		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
510 		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
511 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
512 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
513 			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
514 			if (IS_ERR(str))
515 				goto exit_free;
516 			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
517 
518 			err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
519 						       (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
520 			/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
521 			 * become valid after a policy reload. */
522 			if (err == -EINVAL) {
523 				pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n",
524 					str);
525 				err = 0;
526 			}
527 			if (err) {
528 				kfree(str);
529 				goto exit_free;
530 			} else
531 				f->lsm_str = str;
532 			break;
533 		case AUDIT_WATCH:
534 			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
535 			if (IS_ERR(str))
536 				goto exit_free;
537 			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
538 
539 			err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f->val, f->op);
540 			if (err) {
541 				kfree(str);
542 				goto exit_free;
543 			}
544 			break;
545 		case AUDIT_DIR:
546 			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
547 			if (IS_ERR(str))
548 				goto exit_free;
549 			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
550 
551 			err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op);
552 			kfree(str);
553 			if (err)
554 				goto exit_free;
555 			break;
556 		case AUDIT_INODE:
557 			err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
558 			if (err)
559 				goto exit_free;
560 			break;
561 		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
562 			if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN)
563 				goto exit_free;
564 			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
565 			if (IS_ERR(str))
566 				goto exit_free;
567 			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
568 			entry->rule.filterkey = str;
569 			break;
570 		case AUDIT_EXE:
571 			if (entry->rule.exe || f->val > PATH_MAX)
572 				goto exit_free;
573 			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
574 			if (IS_ERR(str)) {
575 				err = PTR_ERR(str);
576 				goto exit_free;
577 			}
578 			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
579 
580 			audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f->val);
581 			if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) {
582 				kfree(str);
583 				err = PTR_ERR(audit_mark);
584 				goto exit_free;
585 			}
586 			entry->rule.exe = audit_mark;
587 			break;
588 		}
589 	}
590 
591 	if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal)
592 		entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
593 
594 exit_nofree:
595 	return entry;
596 
597 exit_free:
598 	if (entry->rule.tree)
599 		audit_put_tree(entry->rule.tree); /* that's the temporary one */
600 	if (entry->rule.exe)
601 		audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); /* that's the template one */
602 	audit_free_rule(entry);
603 	return ERR_PTR(err);
604 }
605 
606 /* Pack a filter field's string representation into data block. */
607 static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, const char *str)
608 {
609 	size_t len = strlen(str);
610 
611 	memcpy(*bufp, str, len);
612 	*bufp += len;
613 
614 	return len;
615 }
616 
617 /* Translate kernel rule representation to struct audit_rule_data. */
618 static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
619 {
620 	struct audit_rule_data *data;
621 	void *bufp;
622 	int i;
623 
624 	data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) + krule->buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
625 	if (unlikely(!data))
626 		return NULL;
627 	memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
628 
629 	data->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
630 	data->action = krule->action;
631 	data->field_count = krule->field_count;
632 	bufp = data->buf;
633 	for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
634 		struct audit_field *f = &krule->fields[i];
635 
636 		data->fields[i] = f->type;
637 		data->fieldflags[i] = audit_ops[f->op];
638 		switch(f->type) {
639 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
640 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
641 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
642 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
643 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
644 		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
645 		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
646 		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
647 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
648 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
649 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
650 				audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str);
651 			break;
652 		case AUDIT_WATCH:
653 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
654 				audit_pack_string(&bufp,
655 						  audit_watch_path(krule->watch));
656 			break;
657 		case AUDIT_DIR:
658 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
659 				audit_pack_string(&bufp,
660 						  audit_tree_path(krule->tree));
661 			break;
662 		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
663 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
664 				audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
665 			break;
666 		case AUDIT_EXE:
667 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
668 				audit_pack_string(&bufp, audit_mark_path(krule->exe));
669 			break;
670 		case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
671 			if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) {
672 				data->fields[i] = AUDIT_LOGINUID;
673 				data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET;
674 				break;
675 			}
676 			/* fallthrough if set */
677 		default:
678 			data->values[i] = f->val;
679 		}
680 	}
681 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
682 
683 	return data;
684 }
685 
686 /* Compare two rules in kernel format.  Considered success if rules
687  * don't match. */
688 static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
689 {
690 	int i;
691 
692 	if (a->flags != b->flags ||
693 	    a->pflags != b->pflags ||
694 	    a->listnr != b->listnr ||
695 	    a->action != b->action ||
696 	    a->field_count != b->field_count)
697 		return 1;
698 
699 	for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
700 		if (a->fields[i].type != b->fields[i].type ||
701 		    a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op)
702 			return 1;
703 
704 		switch(a->fields[i].type) {
705 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
706 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
707 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
708 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
709 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
710 		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
711 		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
712 		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
713 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
714 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
715 			if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str))
716 				return 1;
717 			break;
718 		case AUDIT_WATCH:
719 			if (strcmp(audit_watch_path(a->watch),
720 				   audit_watch_path(b->watch)))
721 				return 1;
722 			break;
723 		case AUDIT_DIR:
724 			if (strcmp(audit_tree_path(a->tree),
725 				   audit_tree_path(b->tree)))
726 				return 1;
727 			break;
728 		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
729 			/* both filterkeys exist based on above type compare */
730 			if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
731 				return 1;
732 			break;
733 		case AUDIT_EXE:
734 			/* both paths exist based on above type compare */
735 			if (strcmp(audit_mark_path(a->exe),
736 				   audit_mark_path(b->exe)))
737 				return 1;
738 			break;
739 		case AUDIT_UID:
740 		case AUDIT_EUID:
741 		case AUDIT_SUID:
742 		case AUDIT_FSUID:
743 		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
744 		case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
745 			if (!uid_eq(a->fields[i].uid, b->fields[i].uid))
746 				return 1;
747 			break;
748 		case AUDIT_GID:
749 		case AUDIT_EGID:
750 		case AUDIT_SGID:
751 		case AUDIT_FSGID:
752 		case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
753 			if (!gid_eq(a->fields[i].gid, b->fields[i].gid))
754 				return 1;
755 			break;
756 		default:
757 			if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
758 				return 1;
759 		}
760 	}
761 
762 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
763 		if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
764 			return 1;
765 
766 	return 0;
767 }
768 
769 /* Duplicate LSM field information.  The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
770  * re-initialized. */
771 static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
772 					   struct audit_field *sf)
773 {
774 	int ret = 0;
775 	char *lsm_str;
776 
777 	/* our own copy of lsm_str */
778 	lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL);
779 	if (unlikely(!lsm_str))
780 		return -ENOMEM;
781 	df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
782 
783 	/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
784 	ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
785 				       (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
786 	/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
787 	 * become valid after a policy reload. */
788 	if (ret == -EINVAL) {
789 		pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n",
790 			df->lsm_str);
791 		ret = 0;
792 	}
793 
794 	return ret;
795 }
796 
797 /* Duplicate an audit rule.  This will be a deep copy with the exception
798  * of the watch - that pointer is carried over.  The LSM specific fields
799  * will be updated in the copy.  The point is to be able to replace the old
800  * rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
801  * The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
802  * the initial copy. */
803 struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
804 {
805 	u32 fcount = old->field_count;
806 	struct audit_entry *entry;
807 	struct audit_krule *new;
808 	char *fk;
809 	int i, err = 0;
810 
811 	entry = audit_init_entry(fcount);
812 	if (unlikely(!entry))
813 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
814 
815 	new = &entry->rule;
816 	new->flags = old->flags;
817 	new->pflags = old->pflags;
818 	new->listnr = old->listnr;
819 	new->action = old->action;
820 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
821 		new->mask[i] = old->mask[i];
822 	new->prio = old->prio;
823 	new->buflen = old->buflen;
824 	new->inode_f = old->inode_f;
825 	new->field_count = old->field_count;
826 
827 	/*
828 	 * note that we are OK with not refcounting here; audit_match_tree()
829 	 * never dereferences tree and we can't get false positives there
830 	 * since we'd have to have rule gone from the list *and* removed
831 	 * before the chunks found by lookup had been allocated, i.e. before
832 	 * the beginning of list scan.
833 	 */
834 	new->tree = old->tree;
835 	memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
836 
837 	/* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
838 	 * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
839 	for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
840 		switch (new->fields[i].type) {
841 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
842 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
843 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
844 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
845 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
846 		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
847 		case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
848 		case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
849 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
850 		case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
851 			err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
852 						       &old->fields[i]);
853 			break;
854 		case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
855 			fk = kstrdup(old->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
856 			if (unlikely(!fk))
857 				err = -ENOMEM;
858 			else
859 				new->filterkey = fk;
860 			break;
861 		case AUDIT_EXE:
862 			err = audit_dupe_exe(new, old);
863 			break;
864 		}
865 		if (err) {
866 			if (new->exe)
867 				audit_remove_mark(new->exe);
868 			audit_free_rule(entry);
869 			return ERR_PTR(err);
870 		}
871 	}
872 
873 	if (old->watch) {
874 		audit_get_watch(old->watch);
875 		new->watch = old->watch;
876 	}
877 
878 	return entry;
879 }
880 
881 /* Find an existing audit rule.
882  * Caller must hold audit_filter_mutex to prevent stale rule data. */
883 static struct audit_entry *audit_find_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
884 					   struct list_head **p)
885 {
886 	struct audit_entry *e, *found = NULL;
887 	struct list_head *list;
888 	int h;
889 
890 	if (entry->rule.inode_f) {
891 		h = audit_hash_ino(entry->rule.inode_f->val);
892 		*p = list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
893 	} else if (entry->rule.watch) {
894 		/* we don't know the inode number, so must walk entire hash */
895 		for (h = 0; h < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; h++) {
896 			list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
897 			list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
898 				if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
899 					found = e;
900 					goto out;
901 				}
902 		}
903 		goto out;
904 	} else {
905 		*p = list = &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr];
906 	}
907 
908 	list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
909 		if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
910 			found = e;
911 			goto out;
912 		}
913 
914 out:
915 	return found;
916 }
917 
918 static u64 prio_low = ~0ULL/2;
919 static u64 prio_high = ~0ULL/2 - 1;
920 
921 /* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. */
922 static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
923 {
924 	struct audit_entry *e;
925 	struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
926 	struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
927 	struct list_head *list;
928 	int err = 0;
929 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
930 	int dont_count = 0;
931 
932 	/* If any of these, don't count towards total */
933 	switch(entry->rule.listnr) {
934 	case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
935 	case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE:
936 	case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
937 		dont_count = 1;
938 	}
939 #endif
940 
941 	mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
942 	e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
943 	if (e) {
944 		mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
945 		err = -EEXIST;
946 		/* normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it on failure */
947 		if (tree)
948 			audit_put_tree(tree);
949 		return err;
950 	}
951 
952 	if (watch) {
953 		/* audit_filter_mutex is dropped and re-taken during this call */
954 		err = audit_add_watch(&entry->rule, &list);
955 		if (err) {
956 			mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
957 			/*
958 			 * normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it
959 			 * on failure
960 			 */
961 			if (tree)
962 				audit_put_tree(tree);
963 			return err;
964 		}
965 	}
966 	if (tree) {
967 		err = audit_add_tree_rule(&entry->rule);
968 		if (err) {
969 			mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
970 			return err;
971 		}
972 	}
973 
974 	entry->rule.prio = ~0ULL;
975 	if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT) {
976 		if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND)
977 			entry->rule.prio = ++prio_high;
978 		else
979 			entry->rule.prio = --prio_low;
980 	}
981 
982 	if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
983 		list_add(&entry->rule.list,
984 			 &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
985 		list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
986 		entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
987 	} else {
988 		list_add_tail(&entry->rule.list,
989 			      &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
990 		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
991 	}
992 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
993 	if (!dont_count)
994 		audit_n_rules++;
995 
996 	if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
997 		audit_signals++;
998 #endif
999 	mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1000 
1001 	return err;
1002 }
1003 
1004 /* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. */
1005 int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
1006 {
1007 	struct audit_entry  *e;
1008 	struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
1009 	struct list_head *list;
1010 	int ret = 0;
1011 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
1012 	int dont_count = 0;
1013 
1014 	/* If any of these, don't count towards total */
1015 	switch(entry->rule.listnr) {
1016 	case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
1017 	case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE:
1018 	case AUDIT_FILTER_FS:
1019 		dont_count = 1;
1020 	}
1021 #endif
1022 
1023 	mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1024 	e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
1025 	if (!e) {
1026 		ret = -ENOENT;
1027 		goto out;
1028 	}
1029 
1030 	if (e->rule.watch)
1031 		audit_remove_watch_rule(&e->rule);
1032 
1033 	if (e->rule.tree)
1034 		audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule);
1035 
1036 	if (e->rule.exe)
1037 		audit_remove_mark_rule(&e->rule);
1038 
1039 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
1040 	if (!dont_count)
1041 		audit_n_rules--;
1042 
1043 	if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
1044 		audit_signals--;
1045 #endif
1046 
1047 	list_del_rcu(&e->list);
1048 	list_del(&e->rule.list);
1049 	call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
1050 
1051 out:
1052 	mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1053 
1054 	if (tree)
1055 		audit_put_tree(tree);	/* that's the temporary one */
1056 
1057 	return ret;
1058 }
1059 
1060 /* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */
1061 static void audit_list_rules(int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
1062 {
1063 	struct sk_buff *skb;
1064 	struct audit_krule *r;
1065 	int i;
1066 
1067 	/* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
1068 	 * iterator to sync with list writers. */
1069 	for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
1070 		list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
1071 			struct audit_rule_data *data;
1072 
1073 			data = audit_krule_to_data(r);
1074 			if (unlikely(!data))
1075 				break;
1076 			skb = audit_make_reply(seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1,
1077 					       data,
1078 					       sizeof(*data) + data->buflen);
1079 			if (skb)
1080 				skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1081 			kfree(data);
1082 		}
1083 	}
1084 	skb = audit_make_reply(seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
1085 	if (skb)
1086 		skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1087 }
1088 
1089 /* Log rule additions and removals */
1090 static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int res)
1091 {
1092 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
1093 	uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current));
1094 	unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
1095 
1096 	if (!audit_enabled)
1097 		return;
1098 
1099 	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
1100 	if (!ab)
1101 		return;
1102 	audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u" ,loginuid, sessionid);
1103 	audit_log_task_context(ab);
1104 	audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", action);
1105 	audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
1106 	audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res);
1107 	audit_log_end(ab);
1108 }
1109 
1110 /**
1111  * audit_rule_change - apply all rules to the specified message type
1112  * @type: audit message type
1113  * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
1114  * @data: payload data
1115  * @datasz: size of payload data
1116  */
1117 int audit_rule_change(int type, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz)
1118 {
1119 	int err = 0;
1120 	struct audit_entry *entry;
1121 
1122 	entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
1123 	if (IS_ERR(entry))
1124 		return PTR_ERR(entry);
1125 
1126 	switch (type) {
1127 	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
1128 		err = audit_add_rule(entry);
1129 		audit_log_rule_change("add_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
1130 		break;
1131 	case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
1132 		err = audit_del_rule(entry);
1133 		audit_log_rule_change("remove_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
1134 		break;
1135 	default:
1136 		err = -EINVAL;
1137 		WARN_ON(1);
1138 	}
1139 
1140 	if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE) {
1141 		if (entry->rule.exe)
1142 			audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
1143 		audit_free_rule(entry);
1144 	}
1145 
1146 	return err;
1147 }
1148 
1149 /**
1150  * audit_list_rules_send - list the audit rules
1151  * @request_skb: skb of request we are replying to (used to target the reply)
1152  * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
1153  */
1154 int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq)
1155 {
1156 	u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid;
1157 	struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk);
1158 	struct task_struct *tsk;
1159 	struct audit_netlink_list *dest;
1160 	int err = 0;
1161 
1162 	/* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
1163 	 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
1164 	 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
1165 	 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
1166 	 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
1167 
1168 	dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL);
1169 	if (!dest)
1170 		return -ENOMEM;
1171 	dest->net = get_net(net);
1172 	dest->portid = portid;
1173 	skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q);
1174 
1175 	mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1176 	audit_list_rules(seq, &dest->q);
1177 	mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1178 
1179 	tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list");
1180 	if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
1181 		skb_queue_purge(&dest->q);
1182 		kfree(dest);
1183 		err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
1184 	}
1185 
1186 	return err;
1187 }
1188 
1189 int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right)
1190 {
1191 	switch (op) {
1192 	case Audit_equal:
1193 		return (left == right);
1194 	case Audit_not_equal:
1195 		return (left != right);
1196 	case Audit_lt:
1197 		return (left < right);
1198 	case Audit_le:
1199 		return (left <= right);
1200 	case Audit_gt:
1201 		return (left > right);
1202 	case Audit_ge:
1203 		return (left >= right);
1204 	case Audit_bitmask:
1205 		return (left & right);
1206 	case Audit_bittest:
1207 		return ((left & right) == right);
1208 	default:
1209 		BUG();
1210 		return 0;
1211 	}
1212 }
1213 
1214 int audit_uid_comparator(kuid_t left, u32 op, kuid_t right)
1215 {
1216 	switch (op) {
1217 	case Audit_equal:
1218 		return uid_eq(left, right);
1219 	case Audit_not_equal:
1220 		return !uid_eq(left, right);
1221 	case Audit_lt:
1222 		return uid_lt(left, right);
1223 	case Audit_le:
1224 		return uid_lte(left, right);
1225 	case Audit_gt:
1226 		return uid_gt(left, right);
1227 	case Audit_ge:
1228 		return uid_gte(left, right);
1229 	case Audit_bitmask:
1230 	case Audit_bittest:
1231 	default:
1232 		BUG();
1233 		return 0;
1234 	}
1235 }
1236 
1237 int audit_gid_comparator(kgid_t left, u32 op, kgid_t right)
1238 {
1239 	switch (op) {
1240 	case Audit_equal:
1241 		return gid_eq(left, right);
1242 	case Audit_not_equal:
1243 		return !gid_eq(left, right);
1244 	case Audit_lt:
1245 		return gid_lt(left, right);
1246 	case Audit_le:
1247 		return gid_lte(left, right);
1248 	case Audit_gt:
1249 		return gid_gt(left, right);
1250 	case Audit_ge:
1251 		return gid_gte(left, right);
1252 	case Audit_bitmask:
1253 	case Audit_bittest:
1254 	default:
1255 		BUG();
1256 		return 0;
1257 	}
1258 }
1259 
1260 /**
1261  * parent_len - find the length of the parent portion of a pathname
1262  * @path: pathname of which to determine length
1263  */
1264 int parent_len(const char *path)
1265 {
1266 	int plen;
1267 	const char *p;
1268 
1269 	plen = strlen(path);
1270 
1271 	if (plen == 0)
1272 		return plen;
1273 
1274 	/* disregard trailing slashes */
1275 	p = path + plen - 1;
1276 	while ((*p == '/') && (p > path))
1277 		p--;
1278 
1279 	/* walk backward until we find the next slash or hit beginning */
1280 	while ((*p != '/') && (p > path))
1281 		p--;
1282 
1283 	/* did we find a slash? Then increment to include it in path */
1284 	if (*p == '/')
1285 		p++;
1286 
1287 	return p - path;
1288 }
1289 
1290 /**
1291  * audit_compare_dname_path - compare given dentry name with last component in
1292  * 			      given path. Return of 0 indicates a match.
1293  * @dname:	dentry name that we're comparing
1294  * @path:	full pathname that we're comparing
1295  * @parentlen:	length of the parent if known. Passing in AUDIT_NAME_FULL
1296  * 		here indicates that we must compute this value.
1297  */
1298 int audit_compare_dname_path(const char *dname, const char *path, int parentlen)
1299 {
1300 	int dlen, pathlen;
1301 	const char *p;
1302 
1303 	dlen = strlen(dname);
1304 	pathlen = strlen(path);
1305 	if (pathlen < dlen)
1306 		return 1;
1307 
1308 	parentlen = parentlen == AUDIT_NAME_FULL ? parent_len(path) : parentlen;
1309 	if (pathlen - parentlen != dlen)
1310 		return 1;
1311 
1312 	p = path + parentlen;
1313 
1314 	return strncmp(p, dname, dlen);
1315 }
1316 
1317 int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
1318 {
1319 	struct audit_entry *e;
1320 	int ret = 1; /* Audit by default */
1321 
1322 	rcu_read_lock();
1323 	if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[listtype]))
1324 		goto unlock_and_return;
1325 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[listtype], list) {
1326 		int i, result = 0;
1327 
1328 		for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
1329 			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
1330 			pid_t pid;
1331 			u32 sid;
1332 
1333 			switch (f->type) {
1334 			case AUDIT_PID:
1335 				pid = task_pid_nr(current);
1336 				result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
1337 				break;
1338 			case AUDIT_UID:
1339 				result = audit_uid_comparator(current_uid(), f->op, f->uid);
1340 				break;
1341 			case AUDIT_GID:
1342 				result = audit_gid_comparator(current_gid(), f->op, f->gid);
1343 				break;
1344 			case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
1345 				result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current),
1346 							      f->op, f->uid);
1347 				break;
1348 			case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
1349 				result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(current),
1350 							  f->op, f->val);
1351 				break;
1352 			case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
1353 				result = audit_comparator(msgtype, f->op, f->val);
1354 				break;
1355 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
1356 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
1357 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
1358 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
1359 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
1360 				if (f->lsm_rule) {
1361 					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
1362 					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
1363 							f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, NULL);
1364 				}
1365 				break;
1366 			default:
1367 				goto unlock_and_return;
1368 			}
1369 			if (result < 0) /* error */
1370 				goto unlock_and_return;
1371 			if (!result)
1372 				break;
1373 		}
1374 		if (result > 0) {
1375 			if (e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER || listtype == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE)
1376 				ret = 0;
1377 			break;
1378 		}
1379 	}
1380 unlock_and_return:
1381 	rcu_read_unlock();
1382 	return ret;
1383 }
1384 
1385 static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
1386 {
1387 	struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
1388 	struct audit_entry *nentry;
1389 	int err = 0;
1390 
1391 	if (!security_audit_rule_known(r))
1392 		return 0;
1393 
1394 	nentry = audit_dupe_rule(r);
1395 	if (entry->rule.exe)
1396 		audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe);
1397 	if (IS_ERR(nentry)) {
1398 		/* save the first error encountered for the
1399 		 * return value */
1400 		err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
1401 		audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
1402 		if (r->watch)
1403 			list_del(&r->rlist);
1404 		list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
1405 		list_del(&r->list);
1406 	} else {
1407 		if (r->watch || r->tree)
1408 			list_replace_init(&r->rlist, &nentry->rule.rlist);
1409 		list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
1410 		list_replace(&r->list, &nentry->rule.list);
1411 	}
1412 	call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
1413 
1414 	return err;
1415 }
1416 
1417 /* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
1418  * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
1419  * specific filter fields.  When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
1420  * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
1421  * updated rule. */
1422 int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
1423 {
1424 	struct audit_krule *r, *n;
1425 	int i, err = 0;
1426 
1427 	/* audit_filter_mutex synchronizes the writers */
1428 	mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1429 
1430 	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
1431 		list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
1432 			int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
1433 			if (!err)
1434 				err = res;
1435 		}
1436 	}
1437 	mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1438 
1439 	return err;
1440 }
1441