xref: /linux/fs/crypto/hkdf.c (revision 0526b56cbc3c489642bd6a5fe4b718dea7ef0ee8)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 /*
3  * Implementation of HKDF ("HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation
4  * Function"), aka RFC 5869.  See also the original paper (Krawczyk 2010):
5  * "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme".
6  *
7  * This is used to derive keys from the fscrypt master keys.
8  *
9  * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
10  */
11 
12 #include <crypto/hash.h>
13 #include <crypto/sha2.h>
14 
15 #include "fscrypt_private.h"
16 
17 /*
18  * HKDF supports any unkeyed cryptographic hash algorithm, but fscrypt uses
19  * SHA-512 because it is well-established, secure, and reasonably efficient.
20  *
21  * HKDF-SHA256 was also considered, as its 256-bit security strength would be
22  * sufficient here.  A 512-bit security strength is "nice to have", though.
23  * Also, on 64-bit CPUs, SHA-512 is usually just as fast as SHA-256.  In the
24  * common case of deriving an AES-256-XTS key (512 bits), that can result in
25  * HKDF-SHA512 being much faster than HKDF-SHA256, as the longer digest size of
26  * SHA-512 causes HKDF-Expand to only need to do one iteration rather than two.
27  */
28 #define HKDF_HMAC_ALG		"hmac(sha512)"
29 #define HKDF_HASHLEN		SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
30 
31 /*
32  * HKDF consists of two steps:
33  *
34  * 1. HKDF-Extract: extract a pseudorandom key of length HKDF_HASHLEN bytes from
35  *    the input keying material and optional salt.
36  * 2. HKDF-Expand: expand the pseudorandom key into output keying material of
37  *    any length, parameterized by an application-specific info string.
38  *
39  * HKDF-Extract can be skipped if the input is already a pseudorandom key of
40  * length HKDF_HASHLEN bytes.  However, cipher modes other than AES-256-XTS take
41  * shorter keys, and we don't want to force users of those modes to provide
42  * unnecessarily long master keys.  Thus fscrypt still does HKDF-Extract.  No
43  * salt is used, since fscrypt master keys should already be pseudorandom and
44  * there's no way to persist a random salt per master key from kernel mode.
45  */
46 
47 /* HKDF-Extract (RFC 5869 section 2.2), unsalted */
48 static int hkdf_extract(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm, const u8 *ikm,
49 			unsigned int ikmlen, u8 prk[HKDF_HASHLEN])
50 {
51 	static const u8 default_salt[HKDF_HASHLEN];
52 	int err;
53 
54 	err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, default_salt, HKDF_HASHLEN);
55 	if (err)
56 		return err;
57 
58 	return crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hmac_tfm, ikm, ikmlen, prk);
59 }
60 
61 /*
62  * Compute HKDF-Extract using the given master key as the input keying material,
63  * and prepare an HMAC transform object keyed by the resulting pseudorandom key.
64  *
65  * Afterwards, the keyed HMAC transform object can be used for HKDF-Expand many
66  * times without having to recompute HKDF-Extract each time.
67  */
68 int fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, const u8 *master_key,
69 		      unsigned int master_key_size)
70 {
71 	struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
72 	u8 prk[HKDF_HASHLEN];
73 	int err;
74 
75 	hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(HKDF_HMAC_ALG, 0, 0);
76 	if (IS_ERR(hmac_tfm)) {
77 		fscrypt_err(NULL, "Error allocating " HKDF_HMAC_ALG ": %ld",
78 			    PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm));
79 		return PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm);
80 	}
81 
82 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_shash_digestsize(hmac_tfm) != sizeof(prk))) {
83 		err = -EINVAL;
84 		goto err_free_tfm;
85 	}
86 
87 	err = hkdf_extract(hmac_tfm, master_key, master_key_size, prk);
88 	if (err)
89 		goto err_free_tfm;
90 
91 	err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, prk, sizeof(prk));
92 	if (err)
93 		goto err_free_tfm;
94 
95 	hkdf->hmac_tfm = hmac_tfm;
96 	goto out;
97 
98 err_free_tfm:
99 	crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm);
100 out:
101 	memzero_explicit(prk, sizeof(prk));
102 	return err;
103 }
104 
105 /*
106  * HKDF-Expand (RFC 5869 section 2.3).  This expands the pseudorandom key, which
107  * was already keyed into 'hkdf->hmac_tfm' by fscrypt_init_hkdf(), into 'okmlen'
108  * bytes of output keying material parameterized by the application-specific
109  * 'info' of length 'infolen' bytes, prefixed by "fscrypt\0" and the 'context'
110  * byte.  This is thread-safe and may be called by multiple threads in parallel.
111  *
112  * ('context' isn't part of the HKDF specification; it's just a prefix fscrypt
113  * adds to its application-specific info strings to guarantee that it doesn't
114  * accidentally repeat an info string when using HKDF for different purposes.)
115  */
116 int fscrypt_hkdf_expand(const struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, u8 context,
117 			const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen,
118 			u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen)
119 {
120 	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, hkdf->hmac_tfm);
121 	u8 prefix[9];
122 	unsigned int i;
123 	int err;
124 	const u8 *prev = NULL;
125 	u8 counter = 1;
126 	u8 tmp[HKDF_HASHLEN];
127 
128 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(okmlen > 255 * HKDF_HASHLEN))
129 		return -EINVAL;
130 
131 	desc->tfm = hkdf->hmac_tfm;
132 
133 	memcpy(prefix, "fscrypt\0", 8);
134 	prefix[8] = context;
135 
136 	for (i = 0; i < okmlen; i += HKDF_HASHLEN) {
137 
138 		err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
139 		if (err)
140 			goto out;
141 
142 		if (prev) {
143 			err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prev, HKDF_HASHLEN);
144 			if (err)
145 				goto out;
146 		}
147 
148 		err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prefix, sizeof(prefix));
149 		if (err)
150 			goto out;
151 
152 		err = crypto_shash_update(desc, info, infolen);
153 		if (err)
154 			goto out;
155 
156 		BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(counter) != 1);
157 		if (okmlen - i < HKDF_HASHLEN) {
158 			err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, tmp);
159 			if (err)
160 				goto out;
161 			memcpy(&okm[i], tmp, okmlen - i);
162 			memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
163 		} else {
164 			err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, &okm[i]);
165 			if (err)
166 				goto out;
167 		}
168 		counter++;
169 		prev = &okm[i];
170 	}
171 	err = 0;
172 out:
173 	if (unlikely(err))
174 		memzero_explicit(okm, okmlen); /* so caller doesn't need to */
175 	shash_desc_zero(desc);
176 	return err;
177 }
178 
179 void fscrypt_destroy_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf)
180 {
181 	crypto_free_shash(hkdf->hmac_tfm);
182 }
183