xref: /linux/crypto/dh.c (revision ba4c5fad598c07492844e514add3ccda467063b2)
1  // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2  /*  Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method [RFC2631]
3   *
4   * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
5   * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com>
6   */
7  
8  #include <linux/fips.h>
9  #include <linux/module.h>
10  #include <crypto/internal/kpp.h>
11  #include <crypto/kpp.h>
12  #include <crypto/dh.h>
13  #include <crypto/rng.h>
14  #include <linux/mpi.h>
15  
16  struct dh_ctx {
17  	MPI p;	/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
18  	MPI g;	/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
19  	MPI xa;	/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
20  };
21  
22  static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
23  {
24  	mpi_free(ctx->p);
25  	mpi_free(ctx->g);
26  	mpi_free(ctx->xa);
27  	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
28  }
29  
30  /*
31   * If base is g we compute the public key
32   *	ya = g^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
33   * else if base if the counterpart public key we compute the shared secret
34   *	ZZ = yb^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
35   */
36  static int _compute_val(const struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI base, MPI val)
37  {
38  	/* val = base^xa mod p */
39  	return mpi_powm(val, base, ctx->xa, ctx->p);
40  }
41  
42  static inline struct dh_ctx *dh_get_ctx(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
43  {
44  	return kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
45  }
46  
47  static int dh_check_params_length(unsigned int p_len)
48  {
49  	if (fips_enabled)
50  		return (p_len < 2048) ? -EINVAL : 0;
51  
52  	return (p_len < 1536) ? -EINVAL : 0;
53  }
54  
55  static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params)
56  {
57  	if (dh_check_params_length(params->p_size << 3))
58  		return -EINVAL;
59  
60  	ctx->p = mpi_read_raw_data(params->p, params->p_size);
61  	if (!ctx->p)
62  		return -EINVAL;
63  
64  	ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size);
65  	if (!ctx->g)
66  		return -EINVAL;
67  
68  	return 0;
69  }
70  
71  static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
72  			 unsigned int len)
73  {
74  	struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
75  	struct dh params;
76  
77  	/* Free the old MPI key if any */
78  	dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
79  
80  	if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0)
81  		goto err_clear_ctx;
82  
83  	if (dh_set_params(ctx, &params) < 0)
84  		goto err_clear_ctx;
85  
86  	ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size);
87  	if (!ctx->xa)
88  		goto err_clear_ctx;
89  
90  	return 0;
91  
92  err_clear_ctx:
93  	dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
94  	return -EINVAL;
95  }
96  
97  /*
98   * SP800-56A public key verification:
99   *
100   * * For the safe-prime groups in FIPS mode, Q can be computed
101   *   trivially from P and a full validation according to SP800-56A
102   *   section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed.
103   *
104   * * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation
105   *   according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed.
106   */
107  static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y)
108  {
109  	MPI val, q;
110  	int ret;
111  
112  	if (!fips_enabled)
113  		return 0;
114  
115  	if (unlikely(!ctx->p))
116  		return -EINVAL;
117  
118  	/*
119  	 * Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2.
120  	 *
121  	 * The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1
122  	 * in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that
123  	 * p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and
124  	 * thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1.
125  	 */
126  	if (mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) < 1 || mpi_cmp(y, ctx->p) >= 0)
127  		return -EINVAL;
128  
129  	/*
130  	 * Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p
131  	 *
132  	 * For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2.
133  	 */
134  	val = mpi_alloc(0);
135  	if (!val)
136  		return -ENOMEM;
137  
138  	q = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(ctx->p));
139  	if (!q) {
140  		mpi_free(val);
141  		return -ENOMEM;
142  	}
143  
144  	/*
145  	 * ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one
146  	 * from it before shifting to the right.
147  	 */
148  	ret = mpi_rshift(q, ctx->p, 1) ?:
149  	      mpi_powm(val, y, q, ctx->p);
150  
151  	mpi_free(q);
152  	if (ret) {
153  		mpi_free(val);
154  		return ret;
155  	}
156  
157  	ret = mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1);
158  
159  	mpi_free(val);
160  
161  	if (ret != 0)
162  		return -EINVAL;
163  
164  	return 0;
165  }
166  
167  static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
168  {
169  	struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req);
170  	struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
171  	MPI base, val = mpi_alloc(0);
172  	int ret = 0;
173  	int sign;
174  
175  	if (!val)
176  		return -ENOMEM;
177  
178  	if (unlikely(!ctx->xa)) {
179  		ret = -EINVAL;
180  		goto err_free_val;
181  	}
182  
183  	if (req->src) {
184  		base = mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(req->src, req->src_len);
185  		if (!base) {
186  			ret = -EINVAL;
187  			goto err_free_val;
188  		}
189  		ret = dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, base);
190  		if (ret)
191  			goto err_free_base;
192  	} else {
193  		base = ctx->g;
194  	}
195  
196  	ret = _compute_val(ctx, base, val);
197  	if (ret)
198  		goto err_free_base;
199  
200  	if (fips_enabled) {
201  		/* SP800-56A rev3 5.7.1.1 check: Validation of shared secret */
202  		if (req->src) {
203  			MPI pone;
204  
205  			/* z <= 1 */
206  			if (mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1) < 1) {
207  				ret = -EBADMSG;
208  				goto err_free_base;
209  			}
210  
211  			/* z == p - 1 */
212  			pone = mpi_alloc(0);
213  
214  			if (!pone) {
215  				ret = -ENOMEM;
216  				goto err_free_base;
217  			}
218  
219  			ret = mpi_sub_ui(pone, ctx->p, 1);
220  			if (!ret && !mpi_cmp(pone, val))
221  				ret = -EBADMSG;
222  
223  			mpi_free(pone);
224  
225  			if (ret)
226  				goto err_free_base;
227  
228  		/* SP800-56A rev 3 5.6.2.1.3 key check */
229  		} else {
230  			if (dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, val)) {
231  				ret = -EAGAIN;
232  				goto err_free_val;
233  			}
234  		}
235  	}
236  
237  	ret = mpi_write_to_sgl(val, req->dst, req->dst_len, &sign);
238  	if (ret)
239  		goto err_free_base;
240  
241  	if (sign < 0)
242  		ret = -EBADMSG;
243  err_free_base:
244  	if (req->src)
245  		mpi_free(base);
246  err_free_val:
247  	mpi_free(val);
248  	return ret;
249  }
250  
251  static unsigned int dh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
252  {
253  	struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
254  
255  	return mpi_get_size(ctx->p);
256  }
257  
258  static void dh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
259  {
260  	struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
261  
262  	dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
263  }
264  
265  static struct kpp_alg dh = {
266  	.set_secret = dh_set_secret,
267  	.generate_public_key = dh_compute_value,
268  	.compute_shared_secret = dh_compute_value,
269  	.max_size = dh_max_size,
270  	.exit = dh_exit_tfm,
271  	.base = {
272  		.cra_name = "dh",
273  		.cra_driver_name = "dh-generic",
274  		.cra_priority = 100,
275  		.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
276  		.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_ctx),
277  	},
278  };
279  
280  
281  struct dh_safe_prime {
282  	unsigned int max_strength;
283  	unsigned int p_size;
284  	const char *p;
285  };
286  
287  static const char safe_prime_g[]  = { 2 };
288  
289  struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx {
290  	struct crypto_kpp_spawn dh_spawn;
291  	const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime;
292  };
293  
294  struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx {
295  	struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm;
296  };
297  
298  static void dh_safe_prime_free_instance(struct kpp_instance *inst)
299  {
300  	struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst);
301  
302  	crypto_drop_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn);
303  	kfree(inst);
304  }
305  
306  static inline struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(
307  	struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
308  {
309  	return kpp_instance_ctx(kpp_alg_instance(tfm));
310  }
311  
312  static int dh_safe_prime_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
313  {
314  	struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx =
315  		dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm);
316  	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
317  
318  	tfm_ctx->dh_tfm = crypto_spawn_kpp(&inst_ctx->dh_spawn);
319  	if (IS_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm))
320  		return PTR_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
321  
322  	kpp_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct kpp_request) +
323  			     crypto_kpp_reqsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm));
324  
325  	return 0;
326  }
327  
328  static void dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
329  {
330  	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
331  
332  	crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
333  }
334  
335  static u64 __add_u64_to_be(__be64 *dst, unsigned int n, u64 val)
336  {
337  	unsigned int i;
338  
339  	for (i = n; val && i > 0; --i) {
340  		u64 tmp = be64_to_cpu(dst[i - 1]);
341  
342  		tmp += val;
343  		val = tmp >= val ? 0 : 1;
344  		dst[i - 1] = cpu_to_be64(tmp);
345  	}
346  
347  	return val;
348  }
349  
350  static void *dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime,
351  				       unsigned int *key_size)
352  {
353  	unsigned int n, oversampling_size;
354  	__be64 *key;
355  	int err;
356  	u64 h, o;
357  
358  	/*
359  	 * Generate a private key following NIST SP800-56Ar3,
360  	 * sec. 5.6.1.1.1 and 5.6.1.1.3 resp..
361  	 *
362  	 * 5.6.1.1.1: choose key length N such that
363  	 * 2 * ->max_strength <= N <= log2(q) + 1 = ->p_size * 8 - 1
364  	 * with q = (p - 1) / 2 for the safe-prime groups.
365  	 * Choose the lower bound's next power of two for N in order to
366  	 * avoid excessively large private keys while still
367  	 * maintaining some extra reserve beyond the bare minimum in
368  	 * most cases. Note that for each entry in safe_prime_groups[],
369  	 * the following holds for such N:
370  	 * - N >= 256, in particular it is a multiple of 2^6 = 64
371  	 *   bits and
372  	 * - N < log2(q) + 1, i.e. N respects the upper bound.
373  	 */
374  	n = roundup_pow_of_two(2 * safe_prime->max_strength);
375  	WARN_ON_ONCE(n & ((1u << 6) - 1));
376  	n >>= 6; /* Convert N into units of u64. */
377  
378  	/*
379  	 * Reserve one extra u64 to hold the extra random bits
380  	 * required as per 5.6.1.1.3.
381  	 */
382  	oversampling_size = (n + 1) * sizeof(__be64);
383  	key = kmalloc(oversampling_size, GFP_KERNEL);
384  	if (!key)
385  		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
386  
387  	/*
388  	 * 5.6.1.1.3, step 3 (and implicitly step 4): obtain N + 64
389  	 * random bits and interpret them as a big endian integer.
390  	 */
391  	err = -EFAULT;
392  	if (crypto_get_default_rng())
393  		goto out_err;
394  
395  	err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, (u8 *)key,
396  				   oversampling_size);
397  	crypto_put_default_rng();
398  	if (err)
399  		goto out_err;
400  
401  	/*
402  	 * 5.6.1.1.3, step 5 is implicit: 2^N < q and thus,
403  	 * M = min(2^N, q) = 2^N.
404  	 *
405  	 * For step 6, calculate
406  	 * key = (key[] mod (M - 1)) + 1 = (key[] mod (2^N - 1)) + 1.
407  	 *
408  	 * In order to avoid expensive divisions, note that
409  	 * 2^N mod (2^N - 1) = 1 and thus, for any integer h,
410  	 * 2^N * h mod (2^N - 1) = h mod (2^N - 1) always holds.
411  	 * The big endian integer key[] composed of n + 1 64bit words
412  	 * may be written as key[] = h * 2^N + l, with h = key[0]
413  	 * representing the 64 most significant bits and l
414  	 * corresponding to the remaining 2^N bits. With the remark
415  	 * from above,
416  	 * h * 2^N + l mod (2^N - 1) = l + h mod (2^N - 1).
417  	 * As both, l and h are less than 2^N, their sum after
418  	 * this first reduction is guaranteed to be <= 2^(N + 1) - 2.
419  	 * Or equivalently, that their sum can again be written as
420  	 * h' * 2^N + l' with h' now either zero or one and if one,
421  	 * then l' <= 2^N - 2. Thus, all bits at positions >= N will
422  	 * be zero after a second reduction:
423  	 * h' * 2^N + l' mod (2^N - 1) = l' + h' mod (2^N - 1).
424  	 * At this point, it is still possible that
425  	 * l' + h' = 2^N - 1, i.e. that l' + h' mod (2^N - 1)
426  	 * is zero. This condition will be detected below by means of
427  	 * the final increment overflowing in this case.
428  	 */
429  	h = be64_to_cpu(key[0]);
430  	h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h);
431  	h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h);
432  	WARN_ON_ONCE(h);
433  
434  	/* Increment to obtain the final result. */
435  	o = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, 1);
436  	/*
437  	 * The overflow bit o from the increment is either zero or
438  	 * one. If zero, key[1:n] holds the final result in big-endian
439  	 * order. If one, key[1:n] is zero now, but needs to be set to
440  	 * one, c.f. above.
441  	 */
442  	if (o)
443  		key[n] = cpu_to_be64(1);
444  
445  	/* n is in units of u64, convert to bytes. */
446  	*key_size = n << 3;
447  	/* Strip the leading extra __be64, which is (virtually) zero by now. */
448  	memmove(key, &key[1], *key_size);
449  
450  	return key;
451  
452  out_err:
453  	kfree_sensitive(key);
454  	return ERR_PTR(err);
455  }
456  
457  static int dh_safe_prime_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buffer,
458  				    unsigned int len)
459  {
460  	struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx =
461  		dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm);
462  	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
463  	struct dh params = {};
464  	void *buf = NULL, *key = NULL;
465  	unsigned int buf_size;
466  	int err;
467  
468  	if (buffer) {
469  		err = __crypto_dh_decode_key(buffer, len, &params);
470  		if (err)
471  			return err;
472  		if (params.p_size || params.g_size)
473  			return -EINVAL;
474  	}
475  
476  	params.p = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p;
477  	params.p_size = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p_size;
478  	params.g = safe_prime_g;
479  	params.g_size = sizeof(safe_prime_g);
480  
481  	if (!params.key_size) {
482  		key = dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(inst_ctx->safe_prime,
483  						&params.key_size);
484  		if (IS_ERR(key))
485  			return PTR_ERR(key);
486  		params.key = key;
487  	}
488  
489  	buf_size = crypto_dh_key_len(&params);
490  	buf = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
491  	if (!buf) {
492  		err = -ENOMEM;
493  		goto out;
494  	}
495  
496  	err = crypto_dh_encode_key(buf, buf_size, &params);
497  	if (err)
498  		goto out;
499  
500  	err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm, buf, buf_size);
501  out:
502  	kfree_sensitive(buf);
503  	kfree_sensitive(key);
504  	return err;
505  }
506  
507  static void dh_safe_prime_complete_req(void *data, int err)
508  {
509  	struct kpp_request *req = data;
510  
511  	kpp_request_complete(req, err);
512  }
513  
514  static struct kpp_request *dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(struct kpp_request *req)
515  {
516  	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx =
517  		kpp_tfm_ctx(crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req));
518  	struct kpp_request *dh_req = kpp_request_ctx(req);
519  
520  	kpp_request_set_tfm(dh_req, tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
521  	kpp_request_set_callback(dh_req, req->base.flags,
522  				 dh_safe_prime_complete_req, req);
523  
524  	kpp_request_set_input(dh_req, req->src, req->src_len);
525  	kpp_request_set_output(dh_req, req->dst, req->dst_len);
526  
527  	return dh_req;
528  }
529  
530  static int dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key(struct kpp_request *req)
531  {
532  	struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req);
533  
534  	return crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(dh_req);
535  }
536  
537  static int dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret(struct kpp_request *req)
538  {
539  	struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req);
540  
541  	return crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(dh_req);
542  }
543  
544  static unsigned int dh_safe_prime_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
545  {
546  	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
547  
548  	return crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
549  }
550  
551  static int __maybe_unused __dh_safe_prime_create(
552  	struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb,
553  	const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime)
554  {
555  	struct kpp_instance *inst;
556  	struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx;
557  	const char *dh_name;
558  	struct kpp_alg *dh_alg;
559  	u32 mask;
560  	int err;
561  
562  	err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, &mask);
563  	if (err)
564  		return err;
565  
566  	dh_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
567  	if (IS_ERR(dh_name))
568  		return PTR_ERR(dh_name);
569  
570  	inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
571  	if (!inst)
572  		return -ENOMEM;
573  
574  	ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst);
575  
576  	err = crypto_grab_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn, kpp_crypto_instance(inst),
577  			      dh_name, 0, mask);
578  	if (err)
579  		goto err_free_inst;
580  
581  	err = -EINVAL;
582  	dh_alg = crypto_spawn_kpp_alg(&ctx->dh_spawn);
583  	if (strcmp(dh_alg->base.cra_name, "dh"))
584  		goto err_free_inst;
585  
586  	ctx->safe_prime = safe_prime;
587  
588  	err = crypto_inst_setname(kpp_crypto_instance(inst),
589  				  tmpl->name, &dh_alg->base);
590  	if (err)
591  		goto err_free_inst;
592  
593  	inst->alg.set_secret = dh_safe_prime_set_secret;
594  	inst->alg.generate_public_key = dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key;
595  	inst->alg.compute_shared_secret = dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret;
596  	inst->alg.max_size = dh_safe_prime_max_size;
597  	inst->alg.init = dh_safe_prime_init_tfm;
598  	inst->alg.exit = dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm;
599  	inst->alg.base.cra_priority = dh_alg->base.cra_priority;
600  	inst->alg.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
601  	inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx);
602  
603  	inst->free = dh_safe_prime_free_instance;
604  
605  	err = kpp_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
606  	if (err)
607  		goto err_free_inst;
608  
609  	return 0;
610  
611  err_free_inst:
612  	dh_safe_prime_free_instance(inst);
613  
614  	return err;
615  }
616  
617  #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS
618  
619  static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe2048_prime = {
620  	.max_strength = 112,
621  	.p_size = 256,
622  	.p =
623  	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
624  	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
625  	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
626  	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
627  	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
628  	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
629  	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
630  	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
631  	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
632  	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
633  	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
634  	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
635  	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
636  	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
637  	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
638  	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x28\x5c\x97\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
639  };
640  
641  static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe3072_prime = {
642  	.max_strength = 128,
643  	.p_size = 384,
644  	.p =
645  	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
646  	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
647  	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
648  	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
649  	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
650  	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
651  	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
652  	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
653  	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
654  	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
655  	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
656  	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
657  	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
658  	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
659  	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
660  	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
661  	"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
662  	"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
663  	"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
664  	"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
665  	"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
666  	"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
667  	"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
668  	"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\xc6\x2e\x37\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
669  };
670  
671  static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe4096_prime = {
672  	.max_strength = 152,
673  	.p_size = 512,
674  	.p =
675  	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
676  	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
677  	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
678  	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
679  	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
680  	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
681  	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
682  	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
683  	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
684  	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
685  	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
686  	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
687  	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
688  	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
689  	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
690  	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
691  	"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
692  	"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
693  	"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
694  	"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
695  	"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
696  	"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
697  	"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
698  	"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
699  	"\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
700  	"\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
701  	"\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
702  	"\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
703  	"\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
704  	"\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
705  	"\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
706  	"\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x65\x5f\x6a\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
707  };
708  
709  static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe6144_prime = {
710  	.max_strength = 176,
711  	.p_size = 768,
712  	.p =
713  	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
714  	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
715  	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
716  	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
717  	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
718  	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
719  	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
720  	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
721  	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
722  	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
723  	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
724  	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
725  	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
726  	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
727  	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
728  	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
729  	"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
730  	"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
731  	"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
732  	"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
733  	"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
734  	"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
735  	"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
736  	"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
737  	"\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
738  	"\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
739  	"\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
740  	"\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
741  	"\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
742  	"\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
743  	"\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
744  	"\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a"
745  	"\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6"
746  	"\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c"
747  	"\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71"
748  	"\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77"
749  	"\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8"
750  	"\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e"
751  	"\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4"
752  	"\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92"
753  	"\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82"
754  	"\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c"
755  	"\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46"
756  	"\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17"
757  	"\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04"
758  	"\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69"
759  	"\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4"
760  	"\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xd0\xe4\x0e\x65\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
761  };
762  
763  static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe8192_prime = {
764  	.max_strength = 200,
765  	.p_size = 1024,
766  	.p =
767  	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
768  	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
769  	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
770  	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
771  	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
772  	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
773  	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
774  	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
775  	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
776  	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
777  	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
778  	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
779  	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
780  	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
781  	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
782  	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
783  	"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
784  	"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
785  	"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
786  	"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
787  	"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
788  	"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
789  	"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
790  	"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
791  	"\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
792  	"\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
793  	"\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
794  	"\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
795  	"\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
796  	"\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
797  	"\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
798  	"\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a"
799  	"\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6"
800  	"\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c"
801  	"\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71"
802  	"\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77"
803  	"\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8"
804  	"\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e"
805  	"\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4"
806  	"\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92"
807  	"\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82"
808  	"\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c"
809  	"\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46"
810  	"\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17"
811  	"\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04"
812  	"\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69"
813  	"\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4"
814  	"\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xcf\xf4\x6a\xaa\x36\xad\x00\x4c\xf6\x00\xc8\x38"
815  	"\x1e\x42\x5a\x31\xd9\x51\xae\x64\xfd\xb2\x3f\xce\xc9\x50\x9d\x43"
816  	"\x68\x7f\xeb\x69\xed\xd1\xcc\x5e\x0b\x8c\xc3\xbd\xf6\x4b\x10\xef"
817  	"\x86\xb6\x31\x42\xa3\xab\x88\x29\x55\x5b\x2f\x74\x7c\x93\x26\x65"
818  	"\xcb\x2c\x0f\x1c\xc0\x1b\xd7\x02\x29\x38\x88\x39\xd2\xaf\x05\xe4"
819  	"\x54\x50\x4a\xc7\x8b\x75\x82\x82\x28\x46\xc0\xba\x35\xc3\x5f\x5c"
820  	"\x59\x16\x0c\xc0\x46\xfd\x82\x51\x54\x1f\xc6\x8c\x9c\x86\xb0\x22"
821  	"\xbb\x70\x99\x87\x6a\x46\x0e\x74\x51\xa8\xa9\x31\x09\x70\x3f\xee"
822  	"\x1c\x21\x7e\x6c\x38\x26\xe5\x2c\x51\xaa\x69\x1e\x0e\x42\x3c\xfc"
823  	"\x99\xe9\xe3\x16\x50\xc1\x21\x7b\x62\x48\x16\xcd\xad\x9a\x95\xf9"
824  	"\xd5\xb8\x01\x94\x88\xd9\xc0\xa0\xa1\xfe\x30\x75\xa5\x77\xe2\x31"
825  	"\x83\xf8\x1d\x4a\x3f\x2f\xa4\x57\x1e\xfc\x8c\xe0\xba\x8a\x4f\xe8"
826  	"\xb6\x85\x5d\xfe\x72\xb0\xa6\x6e\xde\xd2\xfb\xab\xfb\xe5\x8a\x30"
827  	"\xfa\xfa\xbe\x1c\x5d\x71\xa8\x7e\x2f\x74\x1e\xf8\xc1\xfe\x86\xfe"
828  	"\xa6\xbb\xfd\xe5\x30\x67\x7f\x0d\x97\xd1\x1d\x49\xf7\xa8\x44\x3d"
829  	"\x08\x22\xe5\x06\xa9\xf4\x61\x4e\x01\x1e\x2a\x94\x83\x8f\xf8\x8c"
830  	"\xd6\x8c\x8b\xb7\xc5\xc6\x42\x4c\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
831  };
832  
833  static int dh_ffdhe2048_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
834  			       struct rtattr **tb)
835  {
836  	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe2048_prime);
837  }
838  
839  static int dh_ffdhe3072_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
840  			       struct rtattr **tb)
841  {
842  	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe3072_prime);
843  }
844  
845  static int dh_ffdhe4096_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
846  			       struct rtattr **tb)
847  {
848  	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe4096_prime);
849  }
850  
851  static int dh_ffdhe6144_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
852  			       struct rtattr **tb)
853  {
854  	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe6144_prime);
855  }
856  
857  static int dh_ffdhe8192_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
858  			       struct rtattr **tb)
859  {
860  	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe8192_prime);
861  }
862  
863  static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {
864  	{
865  		.name = "ffdhe2048",
866  		.create = dh_ffdhe2048_create,
867  		.module = THIS_MODULE,
868  	},
869  	{
870  		.name = "ffdhe3072",
871  		.create = dh_ffdhe3072_create,
872  		.module = THIS_MODULE,
873  	},
874  	{
875  		.name = "ffdhe4096",
876  		.create = dh_ffdhe4096_create,
877  		.module = THIS_MODULE,
878  	},
879  	{
880  		.name = "ffdhe6144",
881  		.create = dh_ffdhe6144_create,
882  		.module = THIS_MODULE,
883  	},
884  	{
885  		.name = "ffdhe8192",
886  		.create = dh_ffdhe8192_create,
887  		.module = THIS_MODULE,
888  	},
889  };
890  
891  #else /* ! CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */
892  
893  static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {};
894  
895  #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */
896  
897  
898  static int __init dh_init(void)
899  {
900  	int err;
901  
902  	err = crypto_register_kpp(&dh);
903  	if (err)
904  		return err;
905  
906  	err = crypto_register_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates,
907  					ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates));
908  	if (err) {
909  		crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh);
910  		return err;
911  	}
912  
913  	return 0;
914  }
915  
916  static void __exit dh_exit(void)
917  {
918  	crypto_unregister_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates,
919  				    ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates));
920  	crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh);
921  }
922  
923  subsys_initcall(dh_init);
924  module_exit(dh_exit);
925  MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("dh");
926  MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
927  MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DH generic algorithm");
928