xref: /linux/crypto/dh.c (revision 6d9b262afe0ec1d6e0ef99321ca9d6b921310471)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2 /*  Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method [RFC2631]
3  *
4  * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
5  * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com>
6  */
7 
8 #include <linux/fips.h>
9 #include <linux/module.h>
10 #include <crypto/internal/kpp.h>
11 #include <crypto/kpp.h>
12 #include <crypto/dh.h>
13 #include <crypto/rng.h>
14 #include <linux/mpi.h>
15 
16 struct dh_ctx {
17 	MPI p;	/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
18 	MPI g;	/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
19 	MPI xa;	/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
20 };
21 
22 static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
23 {
24 	mpi_free(ctx->p);
25 	mpi_free(ctx->g);
26 	mpi_free(ctx->xa);
27 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
28 }
29 
30 /*
31  * If base is g we compute the public key
32  *	ya = g^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
33  * else if base if the counterpart public key we compute the shared secret
34  *	ZZ = yb^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
35  */
36 static int _compute_val(const struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI base, MPI val)
37 {
38 	/* val = base^xa mod p */
39 	return mpi_powm(val, base, ctx->xa, ctx->p);
40 }
41 
42 static inline struct dh_ctx *dh_get_ctx(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
43 {
44 	return kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
45 }
46 
47 static int dh_check_params_length(unsigned int p_len)
48 {
49 	if (fips_enabled)
50 		return (p_len < 2048) ? -EINVAL : 0;
51 
52 	return (p_len < 1536) ? -EINVAL : 0;
53 }
54 
55 static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params)
56 {
57 	if (dh_check_params_length(params->p_size << 3))
58 		return -EINVAL;
59 
60 	ctx->p = mpi_read_raw_data(params->p, params->p_size);
61 	if (!ctx->p)
62 		return -EINVAL;
63 
64 	ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size);
65 	if (!ctx->g)
66 		return -EINVAL;
67 
68 	return 0;
69 }
70 
71 static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
72 			 unsigned int len)
73 {
74 	struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
75 	struct dh params;
76 
77 	/* Free the old MPI key if any */
78 	dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
79 
80 	if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0)
81 		goto err_clear_ctx;
82 
83 	if (dh_set_params(ctx, &params) < 0)
84 		goto err_clear_ctx;
85 
86 	ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size);
87 	if (!ctx->xa)
88 		goto err_clear_ctx;
89 
90 	return 0;
91 
92 err_clear_ctx:
93 	dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
94 	return -EINVAL;
95 }
96 
97 /*
98  * SP800-56A public key verification:
99  *
100  * * For the safe-prime groups in FIPS mode, Q can be computed
101  *   trivially from P and a full validation according to SP800-56A
102  *   section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed.
103  *
104  * * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation
105  *   according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed.
106  */
107 static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y)
108 {
109 	MPI val, q;
110 	int ret;
111 
112 	if (!fips_enabled)
113 		return 0;
114 
115 	if (unlikely(!ctx->p))
116 		return -EINVAL;
117 
118 	/*
119 	 * Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2.
120 	 *
121 	 * The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1
122 	 * in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that
123 	 * p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and
124 	 * thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1.
125 	 */
126 	if (mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) < 1 || mpi_cmp(y, ctx->p) >= 0)
127 		return -EINVAL;
128 
129 	/*
130 	 * Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p
131 	 *
132 	 * For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2.
133 	 */
134 	val = mpi_alloc(0);
135 	if (!val)
136 		return -ENOMEM;
137 
138 	q = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(ctx->p));
139 	if (!q) {
140 		mpi_free(val);
141 		return -ENOMEM;
142 	}
143 
144 	/*
145 	 * ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one
146 	 * from it before shifting to the right.
147 	 */
148 	mpi_rshift(q, ctx->p, 1);
149 
150 	ret = mpi_powm(val, y, q, ctx->p);
151 	mpi_free(q);
152 	if (ret) {
153 		mpi_free(val);
154 		return ret;
155 	}
156 
157 	ret = mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1);
158 
159 	mpi_free(val);
160 
161 	if (ret != 0)
162 		return -EINVAL;
163 
164 	return 0;
165 }
166 
167 static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
168 {
169 	struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req);
170 	struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
171 	MPI base, val = mpi_alloc(0);
172 	int ret = 0;
173 	int sign;
174 
175 	if (!val)
176 		return -ENOMEM;
177 
178 	if (unlikely(!ctx->xa)) {
179 		ret = -EINVAL;
180 		goto err_free_val;
181 	}
182 
183 	if (req->src) {
184 		base = mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(req->src, req->src_len);
185 		if (!base) {
186 			ret = -EINVAL;
187 			goto err_free_val;
188 		}
189 		ret = dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, base);
190 		if (ret)
191 			goto err_free_base;
192 	} else {
193 		base = ctx->g;
194 	}
195 
196 	ret = _compute_val(ctx, base, val);
197 	if (ret)
198 		goto err_free_base;
199 
200 	if (fips_enabled) {
201 		/* SP800-56A rev3 5.7.1.1 check: Validation of shared secret */
202 		if (req->src) {
203 			MPI pone;
204 
205 			/* z <= 1 */
206 			if (mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1) < 1) {
207 				ret = -EBADMSG;
208 				goto err_free_base;
209 			}
210 
211 			/* z == p - 1 */
212 			pone = mpi_alloc(0);
213 
214 			if (!pone) {
215 				ret = -ENOMEM;
216 				goto err_free_base;
217 			}
218 
219 			ret = mpi_sub_ui(pone, ctx->p, 1);
220 			if (!ret && !mpi_cmp(pone, val))
221 				ret = -EBADMSG;
222 
223 			mpi_free(pone);
224 
225 			if (ret)
226 				goto err_free_base;
227 
228 		/* SP800-56A rev 3 5.6.2.1.3 key check */
229 		} else {
230 			if (dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, val)) {
231 				ret = -EAGAIN;
232 				goto err_free_val;
233 			}
234 		}
235 	}
236 
237 	ret = mpi_write_to_sgl(val, req->dst, req->dst_len, &sign);
238 	if (ret)
239 		goto err_free_base;
240 
241 	if (sign < 0)
242 		ret = -EBADMSG;
243 err_free_base:
244 	if (req->src)
245 		mpi_free(base);
246 err_free_val:
247 	mpi_free(val);
248 	return ret;
249 }
250 
251 static unsigned int dh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
252 {
253 	struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
254 
255 	return mpi_get_size(ctx->p);
256 }
257 
258 static void dh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
259 {
260 	struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
261 
262 	dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
263 }
264 
265 static struct kpp_alg dh = {
266 	.set_secret = dh_set_secret,
267 	.generate_public_key = dh_compute_value,
268 	.compute_shared_secret = dh_compute_value,
269 	.max_size = dh_max_size,
270 	.exit = dh_exit_tfm,
271 	.base = {
272 		.cra_name = "dh",
273 		.cra_driver_name = "dh-generic",
274 		.cra_priority = 100,
275 		.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
276 		.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_ctx),
277 	},
278 };
279 
280 
281 struct dh_safe_prime {
282 	unsigned int max_strength;
283 	unsigned int p_size;
284 	const char *p;
285 };
286 
287 static const char safe_prime_g[]  = { 2 };
288 
289 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx {
290 	struct crypto_kpp_spawn dh_spawn;
291 	const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime;
292 };
293 
294 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx {
295 	struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm;
296 };
297 
298 static void dh_safe_prime_free_instance(struct kpp_instance *inst)
299 {
300 	struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst);
301 
302 	crypto_drop_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn);
303 	kfree(inst);
304 }
305 
306 static inline struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(
307 	struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
308 {
309 	return kpp_instance_ctx(kpp_alg_instance(tfm));
310 }
311 
312 static int dh_safe_prime_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
313 {
314 	struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx =
315 		dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm);
316 	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
317 
318 	tfm_ctx->dh_tfm = crypto_spawn_kpp(&inst_ctx->dh_spawn);
319 	if (IS_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm))
320 		return PTR_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
321 
322 	kpp_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct kpp_request) +
323 			     crypto_kpp_reqsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm));
324 
325 	return 0;
326 }
327 
328 static void dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
329 {
330 	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
331 
332 	crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
333 }
334 
335 static u64 __add_u64_to_be(__be64 *dst, unsigned int n, u64 val)
336 {
337 	unsigned int i;
338 
339 	for (i = n; val && i > 0; --i) {
340 		u64 tmp = be64_to_cpu(dst[i - 1]);
341 
342 		tmp += val;
343 		val = tmp >= val ? 0 : 1;
344 		dst[i - 1] = cpu_to_be64(tmp);
345 	}
346 
347 	return val;
348 }
349 
350 static void *dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime,
351 				       unsigned int *key_size)
352 {
353 	unsigned int n, oversampling_size;
354 	__be64 *key;
355 	int err;
356 	u64 h, o;
357 
358 	/*
359 	 * Generate a private key following NIST SP800-56Ar3,
360 	 * sec. 5.6.1.1.1 and 5.6.1.1.3 resp..
361 	 *
362 	 * 5.6.1.1.1: choose key length N such that
363 	 * 2 * ->max_strength <= N <= log2(q) + 1 = ->p_size * 8 - 1
364 	 * with q = (p - 1) / 2 for the safe-prime groups.
365 	 * Choose the lower bound's next power of two for N in order to
366 	 * avoid excessively large private keys while still
367 	 * maintaining some extra reserve beyond the bare minimum in
368 	 * most cases. Note that for each entry in safe_prime_groups[],
369 	 * the following holds for such N:
370 	 * - N >= 256, in particular it is a multiple of 2^6 = 64
371 	 *   bits and
372 	 * - N < log2(q) + 1, i.e. N respects the upper bound.
373 	 */
374 	n = roundup_pow_of_two(2 * safe_prime->max_strength);
375 	WARN_ON_ONCE(n & ((1u << 6) - 1));
376 	n >>= 6; /* Convert N into units of u64. */
377 
378 	/*
379 	 * Reserve one extra u64 to hold the extra random bits
380 	 * required as per 5.6.1.1.3.
381 	 */
382 	oversampling_size = (n + 1) * sizeof(__be64);
383 	key = kmalloc(oversampling_size, GFP_KERNEL);
384 	if (!key)
385 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
386 
387 	/*
388 	 * 5.6.1.1.3, step 3 (and implicitly step 4): obtain N + 64
389 	 * random bits and interpret them as a big endian integer.
390 	 */
391 	err = -EFAULT;
392 	if (crypto_get_default_rng())
393 		goto out_err;
394 
395 	err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, (u8 *)key,
396 				   oversampling_size);
397 	crypto_put_default_rng();
398 	if (err)
399 		goto out_err;
400 
401 	/*
402 	 * 5.6.1.1.3, step 5 is implicit: 2^N < q and thus,
403 	 * M = min(2^N, q) = 2^N.
404 	 *
405 	 * For step 6, calculate
406 	 * key = (key[] mod (M - 1)) + 1 = (key[] mod (2^N - 1)) + 1.
407 	 *
408 	 * In order to avoid expensive divisions, note that
409 	 * 2^N mod (2^N - 1) = 1 and thus, for any integer h,
410 	 * 2^N * h mod (2^N - 1) = h mod (2^N - 1) always holds.
411 	 * The big endian integer key[] composed of n + 1 64bit words
412 	 * may be written as key[] = h * 2^N + l, with h = key[0]
413 	 * representing the 64 most significant bits and l
414 	 * corresponding to the remaining 2^N bits. With the remark
415 	 * from above,
416 	 * h * 2^N + l mod (2^N - 1) = l + h mod (2^N - 1).
417 	 * As both, l and h are less than 2^N, their sum after
418 	 * this first reduction is guaranteed to be <= 2^(N + 1) - 2.
419 	 * Or equivalently, that their sum can again be written as
420 	 * h' * 2^N + l' with h' now either zero or one and if one,
421 	 * then l' <= 2^N - 2. Thus, all bits at positions >= N will
422 	 * be zero after a second reduction:
423 	 * h' * 2^N + l' mod (2^N - 1) = l' + h' mod (2^N - 1).
424 	 * At this point, it is still possible that
425 	 * l' + h' = 2^N - 1, i.e. that l' + h' mod (2^N - 1)
426 	 * is zero. This condition will be detected below by means of
427 	 * the final increment overflowing in this case.
428 	 */
429 	h = be64_to_cpu(key[0]);
430 	h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h);
431 	h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h);
432 	WARN_ON_ONCE(h);
433 
434 	/* Increment to obtain the final result. */
435 	o = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, 1);
436 	/*
437 	 * The overflow bit o from the increment is either zero or
438 	 * one. If zero, key[1:n] holds the final result in big-endian
439 	 * order. If one, key[1:n] is zero now, but needs to be set to
440 	 * one, c.f. above.
441 	 */
442 	if (o)
443 		key[n] = cpu_to_be64(1);
444 
445 	/* n is in units of u64, convert to bytes. */
446 	*key_size = n << 3;
447 	/* Strip the leading extra __be64, which is (virtually) zero by now. */
448 	memmove(key, &key[1], *key_size);
449 
450 	return key;
451 
452 out_err:
453 	kfree_sensitive(key);
454 	return ERR_PTR(err);
455 }
456 
457 static int dh_safe_prime_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buffer,
458 				    unsigned int len)
459 {
460 	struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx =
461 		dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm);
462 	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
463 	struct dh params = {};
464 	void *buf = NULL, *key = NULL;
465 	unsigned int buf_size;
466 	int err;
467 
468 	if (buffer) {
469 		err = __crypto_dh_decode_key(buffer, len, &params);
470 		if (err)
471 			return err;
472 		if (params.p_size || params.g_size)
473 			return -EINVAL;
474 	}
475 
476 	params.p = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p;
477 	params.p_size = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p_size;
478 	params.g = safe_prime_g;
479 	params.g_size = sizeof(safe_prime_g);
480 
481 	if (!params.key_size) {
482 		key = dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(inst_ctx->safe_prime,
483 						&params.key_size);
484 		if (IS_ERR(key))
485 			return PTR_ERR(key);
486 		params.key = key;
487 	}
488 
489 	buf_size = crypto_dh_key_len(&params);
490 	buf = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
491 	if (!buf) {
492 		err = -ENOMEM;
493 		goto out;
494 	}
495 
496 	err = crypto_dh_encode_key(buf, buf_size, &params);
497 	if (err)
498 		goto out;
499 
500 	err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm, buf, buf_size);
501 out:
502 	kfree_sensitive(buf);
503 	kfree_sensitive(key);
504 	return err;
505 }
506 
507 static void dh_safe_prime_complete_req(void *data, int err)
508 {
509 	struct kpp_request *req = data;
510 
511 	kpp_request_complete(req, err);
512 }
513 
514 static struct kpp_request *dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(struct kpp_request *req)
515 {
516 	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx =
517 		kpp_tfm_ctx(crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req));
518 	struct kpp_request *dh_req = kpp_request_ctx(req);
519 
520 	kpp_request_set_tfm(dh_req, tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
521 	kpp_request_set_callback(dh_req, req->base.flags,
522 				 dh_safe_prime_complete_req, req);
523 
524 	kpp_request_set_input(dh_req, req->src, req->src_len);
525 	kpp_request_set_output(dh_req, req->dst, req->dst_len);
526 
527 	return dh_req;
528 }
529 
530 static int dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key(struct kpp_request *req)
531 {
532 	struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req);
533 
534 	return crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(dh_req);
535 }
536 
537 static int dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret(struct kpp_request *req)
538 {
539 	struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req);
540 
541 	return crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(dh_req);
542 }
543 
544 static unsigned int dh_safe_prime_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm)
545 {
546 	struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm);
547 
548 	return crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm);
549 }
550 
551 static int __maybe_unused __dh_safe_prime_create(
552 	struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb,
553 	const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime)
554 {
555 	struct kpp_instance *inst;
556 	struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx;
557 	const char *dh_name;
558 	struct kpp_alg *dh_alg;
559 	u32 mask;
560 	int err;
561 
562 	err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, &mask);
563 	if (err)
564 		return err;
565 
566 	dh_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
567 	if (IS_ERR(dh_name))
568 		return PTR_ERR(dh_name);
569 
570 	inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
571 	if (!inst)
572 		return -ENOMEM;
573 
574 	ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst);
575 
576 	err = crypto_grab_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn, kpp_crypto_instance(inst),
577 			      dh_name, 0, mask);
578 	if (err)
579 		goto err_free_inst;
580 
581 	err = -EINVAL;
582 	dh_alg = crypto_spawn_kpp_alg(&ctx->dh_spawn);
583 	if (strcmp(dh_alg->base.cra_name, "dh"))
584 		goto err_free_inst;
585 
586 	ctx->safe_prime = safe_prime;
587 
588 	err = crypto_inst_setname(kpp_crypto_instance(inst),
589 				  tmpl->name, &dh_alg->base);
590 	if (err)
591 		goto err_free_inst;
592 
593 	inst->alg.set_secret = dh_safe_prime_set_secret;
594 	inst->alg.generate_public_key = dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key;
595 	inst->alg.compute_shared_secret = dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret;
596 	inst->alg.max_size = dh_safe_prime_max_size;
597 	inst->alg.init = dh_safe_prime_init_tfm;
598 	inst->alg.exit = dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm;
599 	inst->alg.base.cra_priority = dh_alg->base.cra_priority;
600 	inst->alg.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
601 	inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx);
602 
603 	inst->free = dh_safe_prime_free_instance;
604 
605 	err = kpp_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
606 	if (err)
607 		goto err_free_inst;
608 
609 	return 0;
610 
611 err_free_inst:
612 	dh_safe_prime_free_instance(inst);
613 
614 	return err;
615 }
616 
617 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS
618 
619 static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe2048_prime = {
620 	.max_strength = 112,
621 	.p_size = 256,
622 	.p =
623 	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
624 	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
625 	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
626 	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
627 	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
628 	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
629 	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
630 	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
631 	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
632 	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
633 	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
634 	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
635 	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
636 	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
637 	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
638 	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x28\x5c\x97\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
639 };
640 
641 static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe3072_prime = {
642 	.max_strength = 128,
643 	.p_size = 384,
644 	.p =
645 	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
646 	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
647 	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
648 	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
649 	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
650 	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
651 	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
652 	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
653 	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
654 	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
655 	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
656 	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
657 	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
658 	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
659 	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
660 	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
661 	"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
662 	"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
663 	"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
664 	"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
665 	"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
666 	"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
667 	"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
668 	"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\xc6\x2e\x37\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
669 };
670 
671 static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe4096_prime = {
672 	.max_strength = 152,
673 	.p_size = 512,
674 	.p =
675 	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
676 	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
677 	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
678 	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
679 	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
680 	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
681 	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
682 	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
683 	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
684 	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
685 	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
686 	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
687 	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
688 	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
689 	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
690 	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
691 	"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
692 	"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
693 	"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
694 	"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
695 	"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
696 	"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
697 	"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
698 	"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
699 	"\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
700 	"\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
701 	"\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
702 	"\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
703 	"\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
704 	"\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
705 	"\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
706 	"\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x65\x5f\x6a\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
707 };
708 
709 static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe6144_prime = {
710 	.max_strength = 176,
711 	.p_size = 768,
712 	.p =
713 	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
714 	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
715 	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
716 	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
717 	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
718 	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
719 	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
720 	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
721 	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
722 	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
723 	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
724 	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
725 	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
726 	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
727 	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
728 	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
729 	"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
730 	"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
731 	"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
732 	"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
733 	"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
734 	"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
735 	"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
736 	"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
737 	"\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
738 	"\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
739 	"\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
740 	"\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
741 	"\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
742 	"\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
743 	"\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
744 	"\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a"
745 	"\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6"
746 	"\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c"
747 	"\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71"
748 	"\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77"
749 	"\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8"
750 	"\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e"
751 	"\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4"
752 	"\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92"
753 	"\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82"
754 	"\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c"
755 	"\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46"
756 	"\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17"
757 	"\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04"
758 	"\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69"
759 	"\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4"
760 	"\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xd0\xe4\x0e\x65\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
761 };
762 
763 static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe8192_prime = {
764 	.max_strength = 200,
765 	.p_size = 1024,
766 	.p =
767 	"\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a"
768 	"\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95"
769 	"\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9"
770 	"\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a"
771 	"\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0"
772 	"\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35"
773 	"\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72"
774 	"\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a"
775 	"\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb"
776 	"\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4"
777 	"\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70"
778 	"\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61"
779 	"\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83"
780 	"\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05"
781 	"\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa"
782 	"\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b"
783 	"\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07"
784 	"\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c"
785 	"\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44"
786 	"\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff"
787 	"\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d"
788 	"\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e"
789 	"\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c"
790 	"\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb"
791 	"\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18"
792 	"\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a"
793 	"\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32"
794 	"\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38"
795 	"\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c"
796 	"\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf"
797 	"\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1"
798 	"\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a"
799 	"\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6"
800 	"\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c"
801 	"\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71"
802 	"\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77"
803 	"\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8"
804 	"\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e"
805 	"\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4"
806 	"\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92"
807 	"\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82"
808 	"\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c"
809 	"\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46"
810 	"\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17"
811 	"\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04"
812 	"\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69"
813 	"\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4"
814 	"\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xcf\xf4\x6a\xaa\x36\xad\x00\x4c\xf6\x00\xc8\x38"
815 	"\x1e\x42\x5a\x31\xd9\x51\xae\x64\xfd\xb2\x3f\xce\xc9\x50\x9d\x43"
816 	"\x68\x7f\xeb\x69\xed\xd1\xcc\x5e\x0b\x8c\xc3\xbd\xf6\x4b\x10\xef"
817 	"\x86\xb6\x31\x42\xa3\xab\x88\x29\x55\x5b\x2f\x74\x7c\x93\x26\x65"
818 	"\xcb\x2c\x0f\x1c\xc0\x1b\xd7\x02\x29\x38\x88\x39\xd2\xaf\x05\xe4"
819 	"\x54\x50\x4a\xc7\x8b\x75\x82\x82\x28\x46\xc0\xba\x35\xc3\x5f\x5c"
820 	"\x59\x16\x0c\xc0\x46\xfd\x82\x51\x54\x1f\xc6\x8c\x9c\x86\xb0\x22"
821 	"\xbb\x70\x99\x87\x6a\x46\x0e\x74\x51\xa8\xa9\x31\x09\x70\x3f\xee"
822 	"\x1c\x21\x7e\x6c\x38\x26\xe5\x2c\x51\xaa\x69\x1e\x0e\x42\x3c\xfc"
823 	"\x99\xe9\xe3\x16\x50\xc1\x21\x7b\x62\x48\x16\xcd\xad\x9a\x95\xf9"
824 	"\xd5\xb8\x01\x94\x88\xd9\xc0\xa0\xa1\xfe\x30\x75\xa5\x77\xe2\x31"
825 	"\x83\xf8\x1d\x4a\x3f\x2f\xa4\x57\x1e\xfc\x8c\xe0\xba\x8a\x4f\xe8"
826 	"\xb6\x85\x5d\xfe\x72\xb0\xa6\x6e\xde\xd2\xfb\xab\xfb\xe5\x8a\x30"
827 	"\xfa\xfa\xbe\x1c\x5d\x71\xa8\x7e\x2f\x74\x1e\xf8\xc1\xfe\x86\xfe"
828 	"\xa6\xbb\xfd\xe5\x30\x67\x7f\x0d\x97\xd1\x1d\x49\xf7\xa8\x44\x3d"
829 	"\x08\x22\xe5\x06\xa9\xf4\x61\x4e\x01\x1e\x2a\x94\x83\x8f\xf8\x8c"
830 	"\xd6\x8c\x8b\xb7\xc5\xc6\x42\x4c\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
831 };
832 
833 static int dh_ffdhe2048_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
834 			       struct rtattr **tb)
835 {
836 	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe2048_prime);
837 }
838 
839 static int dh_ffdhe3072_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
840 			       struct rtattr **tb)
841 {
842 	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe3072_prime);
843 }
844 
845 static int dh_ffdhe4096_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
846 			       struct rtattr **tb)
847 {
848 	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe4096_prime);
849 }
850 
851 static int dh_ffdhe6144_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
852 			       struct rtattr **tb)
853 {
854 	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe6144_prime);
855 }
856 
857 static int dh_ffdhe8192_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
858 			       struct rtattr **tb)
859 {
860 	return  __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe8192_prime);
861 }
862 
863 static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {
864 	{
865 		.name = "ffdhe2048",
866 		.create = dh_ffdhe2048_create,
867 		.module = THIS_MODULE,
868 	},
869 	{
870 		.name = "ffdhe3072",
871 		.create = dh_ffdhe3072_create,
872 		.module = THIS_MODULE,
873 	},
874 	{
875 		.name = "ffdhe4096",
876 		.create = dh_ffdhe4096_create,
877 		.module = THIS_MODULE,
878 	},
879 	{
880 		.name = "ffdhe6144",
881 		.create = dh_ffdhe6144_create,
882 		.module = THIS_MODULE,
883 	},
884 	{
885 		.name = "ffdhe8192",
886 		.create = dh_ffdhe8192_create,
887 		.module = THIS_MODULE,
888 	},
889 };
890 
891 #else /* ! CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */
892 
893 static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {};
894 
895 #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */
896 
897 
898 static int __init dh_init(void)
899 {
900 	int err;
901 
902 	err = crypto_register_kpp(&dh);
903 	if (err)
904 		return err;
905 
906 	err = crypto_register_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates,
907 					ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates));
908 	if (err) {
909 		crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh);
910 		return err;
911 	}
912 
913 	return 0;
914 }
915 
916 static void __exit dh_exit(void)
917 {
918 	crypto_unregister_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates,
919 				    ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates));
920 	crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh);
921 }
922 
923 subsys_initcall(dh_init);
924 module_exit(dh_exit);
925 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("dh");
926 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
927 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DH generic algorithm");
928