xref: /linux/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h (revision b2f1e6301efa4a80becdb0715416c3cbc693fbb4)
1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
2 #ifndef ARCH_X86_KVM_X86_H
3 #define ARCH_X86_KVM_X86_H
4 
5 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
6 #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
7 #include <asm/mce.h>
8 #include <asm/pvclock.h>
9 #include "regs.h"
10 #include "kvm_emulate.h"
11 #include "cpuid.h"
12 
13 #define KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS 32
14 
15 struct kvm_caps {
16 	/* control of guest tsc rate supported? */
17 	bool has_tsc_control;
18 	/* maximum supported tsc_khz for guests */
19 	u32  max_guest_tsc_khz;
20 	/* number of bits of the fractional part of the TSC scaling ratio */
21 	u8   tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits;
22 	/* maximum allowed value of TSC scaling ratio */
23 	u64  max_tsc_scaling_ratio;
24 	/* 1ull << kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits */
25 	u64  default_tsc_scaling_ratio;
26 	/* bus lock detection supported? */
27 	bool has_bus_lock_exit;
28 	/* notify VM exit supported? */
29 	bool has_notify_vmexit;
30 	/* bit mask of VM types */
31 	u32 supported_vm_types;
32 
33 	u64 supported_mce_cap;
34 	u64 supported_xcr0;
35 	u64 supported_xss;
36 	u64 supported_perf_cap;
37 
38 	u64 supported_quirks;
39 	u64 inapplicable_quirks;
40 };
41 
42 struct kvm_host_values {
43 	/*
44 	 * The host's raw MAXPHYADDR, i.e. the number of non-reserved physical
45 	 * address bits irrespective of features that repurpose legal bits,
46 	 * e.g. MKTME.
47 	 */
48 	u8 maxphyaddr;
49 
50 	u64 efer;
51 	u64 xcr0;
52 	u64 xss;
53 	u64 s_cet;
54 	u64 arch_capabilities;
55 };
56 
57 void kvm_spurious_fault(void);
58 
59 #define SIZE_OF_MEMSLOTS_HASHTABLE \
60 	(sizeof(((struct kvm_memslots *)0)->id_hash) * 2 * KVM_MAX_NR_ADDRESS_SPACES)
61 
62 /* Sanity check the size of the memslot hash tables. */
63 static_assert(SIZE_OF_MEMSLOTS_HASHTABLE ==
64 	      (1024 * (1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) * (1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM))));
65 
66 /*
67  * Assert that "struct kvm_{svm,vmx,tdx}" is an order-0 or order-1 allocation.
68  * Spilling over to an order-2 allocation isn't fundamentally problematic, but
69  * isn't expected to happen in the foreseeable future (O(years)).  Assert that
70  * the size is an order-0 allocation when ignoring the memslot hash tables, to
71  * help detect and debug unexpected size increases.
72  */
73 #define KVM_SANITY_CHECK_VM_STRUCT_SIZE(x)						\
74 do {											\
75 	BUILD_BUG_ON(get_order(sizeof(struct x) - SIZE_OF_MEMSLOTS_HASHTABLE) &&	\
76 		     !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN));	\
77 	BUILD_BUG_ON(get_order(sizeof(struct x)) > 1 &&					\
78 		     !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN));	\
79 } while (0)
80 
81 #define KVM_NESTED_VMENTER_CONSISTENCY_CHECK(consistency_check)		\
82 ({									\
83 	bool failed = (consistency_check);				\
84 	if (failed)							\
85 		trace_kvm_nested_vmenter_failed(#consistency_check, 0);	\
86 	failed;								\
87 })
88 
89 /*
90  * The first...last VMX feature MSRs that are emulated by KVM.  This may or may
91  * not cover all known VMX MSRs, as KVM doesn't emulate an MSR until there's an
92  * associated feature that KVM supports for nested virtualization.
93  */
94 #define KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR	MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC
95 #define KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR	MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC
96 
97 #define KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP		128
98 #define KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW	4096
99 #define KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_GROW	2
100 #define KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_SHRINK	0
101 #define KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX	UINT_MAX
102 #define KVM_SVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX	USHRT_MAX
103 #define KVM_SVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW	3000
104 
105 /*
106  * KVM's internal, non-ABI indices for synthetic MSRs. The values themselves
107  * are arbitrary and have no meaning, the only requirement is that they don't
108  * conflict with "real" MSRs that KVM supports. Use values at the upper end
109  * of KVM's reserved paravirtual MSR range to minimize churn, i.e. these values
110  * will be usable until KVM exhausts its supply of paravirtual MSR indices.
111  */
112 
113 #define MSR_KVM_INTERNAL_GUEST_SSP	0x4b564dff
114 
115 static inline unsigned int __grow_ple_window(unsigned int val,
116 		unsigned int base, unsigned int modifier, unsigned int max)
117 {
118 	u64 ret = val;
119 
120 	if (modifier < 1)
121 		return base;
122 
123 	if (modifier < base)
124 		ret *= modifier;
125 	else
126 		ret += modifier;
127 
128 	return min(ret, (u64)max);
129 }
130 
131 static inline unsigned int __shrink_ple_window(unsigned int val,
132 		unsigned int base, unsigned int modifier, unsigned int min)
133 {
134 	if (modifier < 1)
135 		return base;
136 
137 	if (modifier < base)
138 		val /= modifier;
139 	else
140 		val -= modifier;
141 
142 	return max(val, min);
143 }
144 
145 #define MSR_IA32_CR_PAT_DEFAULT	\
146 	PAT_VALUE(WB, WT, UC_MINUS, UC, WB, WT, UC_MINUS, UC)
147 
148 void kvm_service_local_tlb_flush_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
149 int kvm_check_nested_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
150 
151 /* Forcibly leave the nested mode in cases like a vCPU reset */
152 static inline void kvm_leave_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
153 {
154 	kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->leave_nested(vcpu);
155 }
156 
157 /*
158  * If IBRS is advertised to the vCPU, KVM must flush the indirect branch
159  * predictors when transitioning from L2 to L1, as L1 expects hardware (KVM in
160  * this case) to provide separate predictor modes.  Bare metal isolates the host
161  * from the guest, but doesn't isolate different guests from one another (in
162  * this case L1 and L2). The exception is if bare metal supports same mode IBRS,
163  * which offers protection within the same mode, and hence protects L1 from L2.
164  */
165 static inline void kvm_nested_vmexit_handle_ibrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
166 {
167 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS_SAME_MODE))
168 		return;
169 
170 	if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
171 	    guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
172 		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
173 }
174 
175 /*
176  * Disallow modifying CPUID and feature MSRs, which affect the core virtual CPU
177  * model exposed to the guest and virtualized by KVM, if the vCPU has already
178  * run or is in guest mode (L2).  In both cases, KVM has already consumed the
179  * current virtual CPU model, and doesn't support "unwinding" to react to the
180  * new model.
181  *
182  * Note, the only way is_guest_mode() can be true with 'last_vmentry_cpu == -1'
183  * is if userspace sets CPUID and feature MSRs (to enable VMX/SVM), then sets
184  * nested state, and then attempts to set CPUID and/or feature MSRs *again*.
185  */
186 static inline bool kvm_can_set_cpuid_and_feature_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
187 {
188 	return vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu == -1 && !is_guest_mode(vcpu);
189 }
190 
191 /*
192  * WARN if a nested VM-Enter is pending completion, and userspace hasn't gained
193  * control since the nested VM-Enter was initiated (in which case, userspace
194  * may have modified vCPU state to induce an architecturally invalid VM-Exit).
195  */
196 static inline void kvm_warn_on_nested_run_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
197 {
198 	WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.nested_run_pending == KVM_NESTED_RUN_PENDING);
199 }
200 
201 static inline void kvm_set_mp_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mp_state)
202 {
203 	vcpu->arch.mp_state = mp_state;
204 	if (mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE)
205 		vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted = false;
206 }
207 
208 static inline bool kvm_is_exception_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
209 {
210 	return vcpu->arch.exception.pending ||
211 	       vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending ||
212 	       kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
213 }
214 
215 static inline void kvm_clear_exception_queue(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
216 {
217 	vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
218 	vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
219 	vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending = false;
220 }
221 
222 static inline void kvm_queue_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector,
223 	bool soft)
224 {
225 	vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected = true;
226 	vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft = soft;
227 	vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr = vector;
228 }
229 
230 static inline void kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
231 {
232 	vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected = false;
233 }
234 
235 static inline bool kvm_event_needs_reinjection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
236 {
237 	return vcpu->arch.exception.injected || vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected ||
238 		vcpu->arch.nmi_injected;
239 }
240 
241 static inline bool kvm_exception_is_soft(unsigned int nr)
242 {
243 	return (nr == BP_VECTOR) || (nr == OF_VECTOR);
244 }
245 
246 static inline bool x86_exception_has_error_code(unsigned int vector)
247 {
248 	static u32 exception_has_error_code = BIT(DF_VECTOR) | BIT(TS_VECTOR) |
249 			BIT(NP_VECTOR) | BIT(SS_VECTOR) | BIT(GP_VECTOR) |
250 			BIT(PF_VECTOR) | BIT(AC_VECTOR);
251 
252 	return (1U << vector) & exception_has_error_code;
253 }
254 
255 static inline bool mmu_is_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
256 {
257 	return vcpu->arch.mmu == &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu;
258 }
259 
260 static inline u8 vcpu_virt_addr_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
261 {
262 	return kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_LA57) ? 57 : 48;
263 }
264 
265 static inline u8 max_host_virt_addr_bits(void)
266 {
267 	return kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_LA57) ? 57 : 48;
268 }
269 
270 /*
271  * x86 MSRs which contain linear addresses, x86 hidden segment bases, and
272  * IDT/GDT bases have static canonicality checks, the size of which depends
273  * only on the CPU's support for 5-level paging, rather than on the state of
274  * CR4.LA57.  This applies to both WRMSR and to other instructions that set
275  * their values, e.g. SGDT.
276  *
277  * KVM passes through most of these MSRS and also doesn't intercept the
278  * instructions that set the hidden segment bases.
279  *
280  * Because of this, to be consistent with hardware, even if the guest doesn't
281  * have LA57 enabled in its CPUID, perform canonicality checks based on *host*
282  * support for 5 level paging.
283  *
284  * Finally, instructions which are related to MMU invalidation of a given
285  * linear address, also have a similar static canonical check on address.
286  * This allows for example to invalidate 5-level addresses of a guest from a
287  * host which uses 4-level paging.
288  */
289 static inline bool is_noncanonical_address(u64 la, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
290 					   unsigned int flags)
291 {
292 	if (flags & (X86EMUL_F_INVLPG | X86EMUL_F_MSR | X86EMUL_F_DT_LOAD))
293 		return !__is_canonical_address(la, max_host_virt_addr_bits());
294 	else
295 		return !__is_canonical_address(la, vcpu_virt_addr_bits(vcpu));
296 }
297 
298 static inline bool is_noncanonical_msr_address(u64 la, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
299 {
300 	return is_noncanonical_address(la, vcpu, X86EMUL_F_MSR);
301 }
302 
303 static inline bool is_noncanonical_base_address(u64 la, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
304 {
305 	return is_noncanonical_address(la, vcpu, X86EMUL_F_DT_LOAD);
306 }
307 
308 static inline bool is_noncanonical_invlpg_address(u64 la, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
309 {
310 	return is_noncanonical_address(la, vcpu, X86EMUL_F_INVLPG);
311 }
312 
313 static inline void vcpu_cache_mmio_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
314 					gva_t gva, gfn_t gfn, unsigned access)
315 {
316 	u64 gen = kvm_memslots(vcpu->kvm)->generation;
317 
318 	if (unlikely(gen & KVM_MEMSLOT_GEN_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS))
319 		return;
320 
321 	/*
322 	 * If this is a shadow nested page table, the "GVA" is
323 	 * actually a nGPA.
324 	 */
325 	vcpu->arch.mmio_gva = mmu_is_nested(vcpu) ? 0 : gva & PAGE_MASK;
326 	vcpu->arch.mmio_access = access;
327 	vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn = gfn;
328 	vcpu->arch.mmio_gen = gen;
329 }
330 
331 static inline bool vcpu_match_mmio_gen(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
332 {
333 	return vcpu->arch.mmio_gen == kvm_memslots(vcpu->kvm)->generation;
334 }
335 
336 /*
337  * Clear the mmio cache info for the given gva. If gva is MMIO_GVA_ANY, we
338  * clear all mmio cache info.
339  */
340 #define MMIO_GVA_ANY (~(gva_t)0)
341 
342 static inline void vcpu_clear_mmio_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva)
343 {
344 	if (gva != MMIO_GVA_ANY && vcpu->arch.mmio_gva != (gva & PAGE_MASK))
345 		return;
346 
347 	vcpu->arch.mmio_gva = 0;
348 }
349 
350 static inline bool vcpu_match_mmio_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva)
351 {
352 	if (vcpu_match_mmio_gen(vcpu) && vcpu->arch.mmio_gva &&
353 	      vcpu->arch.mmio_gva == (gva & PAGE_MASK))
354 		return true;
355 
356 	return false;
357 }
358 
359 static inline bool vcpu_match_mmio_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa)
360 {
361 	if (vcpu_match_mmio_gen(vcpu) && vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn &&
362 	      vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn == gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT)
363 		return true;
364 
365 	return false;
366 }
367 
368 static inline bool kvm_check_has_quirk(struct kvm *kvm, u64 quirk)
369 {
370 	return !(kvm->arch.disabled_quirks & quirk);
371 }
372 
373 static __always_inline void kvm_request_l1tf_flush_l1d(void)
374 {
375 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
376 	/*
377 	 * Use a raw write to set the per-CPU flag, as KVM will ensure a flush
378 	 * even if preemption is currently enabled..  If the current vCPU task
379 	 * is migrated to a different CPU (or userspace runs the vCPU on a
380 	 * different task) before the next VM-Entry, then kvm_arch_vcpu_load()
381 	 * will request a flush on the new CPU.
382 	 */
383 	raw_cpu_write(irq_stat.kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d, 1);
384 #endif
385 }
386 
387 void kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int irq, int inc_eip);
388 
389 u64 get_kvmclock_ns(struct kvm *kvm);
390 uint64_t kvm_get_wall_clock_epoch(struct kvm *kvm);
391 bool kvm_get_monotonic_and_clockread(s64 *kernel_ns, u64 *tsc_timestamp);
392 int kvm_guest_time_update(struct kvm_vcpu *v);
393 
394 int kvm_read_guest_virt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
395 	gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
396 	struct x86_exception *exception);
397 
398 int kvm_write_guest_virt_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
399 	gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
400 	struct x86_exception *exception);
401 
402 int handle_ud(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
403 
404 void kvm_deliver_exception_payload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
405 				   struct kvm_queued_exception *ex);
406 
407 int kvm_mtrr_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data);
408 int kvm_mtrr_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata);
409 void kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, u16 error_code);
410 int x86_decode_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type,
411 				    void *insn, int insn_len);
412 int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
413 			    int emulation_type, void *insn, int insn_len);
414 fastpath_t handle_fastpath_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
415 fastpath_t handle_fastpath_wrmsr_imm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int reg);
416 fastpath_t handle_fastpath_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
417 fastpath_t handle_fastpath_invd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
418 
419 extern struct kvm_caps kvm_caps;
420 extern struct kvm_host_values kvm_host;
421 
422 void kvm_setup_xss_caps(void);
423 
424 /*
425  * Get a filtered version of KVM's supported XCR0 that strips out dynamic
426  * features for which the current process doesn't (yet) have permission to use.
427  * This is intended to be used only when enumerating support to userspace,
428  * e.g. in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID and KVM_CAP_XSAVE2, it does NOT need to be
429  * used to check/restrict guest behavior as KVM rejects KVM_SET_CPUID{2} if
430  * userspace attempts to enable unpermitted features.
431  */
432 static inline u64 kvm_get_filtered_xcr0(void)
433 {
434 	u64 permitted_xcr0 = kvm_caps.supported_xcr0;
435 
436 	BUILD_BUG_ON(XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC != XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA);
437 
438 	if (permitted_xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC) {
439 		permitted_xcr0 &= xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
440 
441 		/*
442 		 * Treat XTILE_CFG as unsupported if the current process isn't
443 		 * allowed to use XTILE_DATA, as attempting to set XTILE_CFG in
444 		 * XCR0 without setting XTILE_DATA is architecturally illegal.
445 		 */
446 		if (!(permitted_xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA))
447 			permitted_xcr0 &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_CFG;
448 	}
449 	return permitted_xcr0;
450 }
451 
452 static inline bool kvm_mpx_supported(void)
453 {
454 	return (kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 & (XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR))
455 		== (XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR);
456 }
457 
458 extern unsigned int min_timer_period_us;
459 
460 extern bool enable_vmware_backdoor;
461 
462 extern int pi_inject_timer;
463 
464 extern bool report_ignored_msrs;
465 
466 extern bool eager_page_split;
467 
468 static inline void kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
469 {
470 	if (report_ignored_msrs)
471 		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "Unhandled WRMSR(0x%x) = 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
472 }
473 
474 static inline void kvm_pr_unimpl_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
475 {
476 	if (report_ignored_msrs)
477 		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "Unhandled RDMSR(0x%x)\n", msr);
478 }
479 
480 static inline u64 nsec_to_cycles(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 nsec)
481 {
482 	return pvclock_scale_delta(nsec, vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_mult,
483 				   vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_shift);
484 }
485 
486 /* Same "calling convention" as do_div:
487  * - divide (n << 32) by base
488  * - put result in n
489  * - return remainder
490  */
491 #define do_shl32_div32(n, base)					\
492 	({							\
493 	    u32 __quot, __rem;					\
494 	    asm("divl %2" : "=a" (__quot), "=d" (__rem)		\
495 			: "rm" (base), "0" (0), "1" ((u32) n));	\
496 	    n = __quot;						\
497 	    __rem;						\
498 	 })
499 
500 static inline void kvm_disable_exits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 mask)
501 {
502 	kvm->arch.disabled_exits |= mask;
503 }
504 
505 static inline bool kvm_mwait_in_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
506 {
507 	return kvm->arch.disabled_exits & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT;
508 }
509 
510 static inline bool kvm_hlt_in_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
511 {
512 	return kvm->arch.disabled_exits & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT;
513 }
514 
515 static inline bool kvm_pause_in_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
516 {
517 	return kvm->arch.disabled_exits & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE;
518 }
519 
520 static inline bool kvm_cstate_in_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
521 {
522 	return kvm->arch.disabled_exits & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE;
523 }
524 
525 static inline bool kvm_aperfmperf_in_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
526 {
527 	return kvm->arch.disabled_exits & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_APERFMPERF;
528 }
529 
530 static inline bool kvm_notify_vmexit_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
531 {
532 	return kvm->arch.notify_vmexit_flags & KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_ENABLED;
533 }
534 
535 static __always_inline void kvm_before_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
536 						 enum kvm_intr_type intr)
537 {
538 	WRITE_ONCE(vcpu->arch.handling_intr_from_guest, (u8)intr);
539 }
540 
541 static __always_inline void kvm_after_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
542 {
543 	WRITE_ONCE(vcpu->arch.handling_intr_from_guest, 0);
544 }
545 
546 static inline bool kvm_handling_nmi_from_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
547 {
548 	return vcpu->arch.handling_intr_from_guest == KVM_HANDLING_NMI;
549 }
550 
551 static inline bool kvm_pat_valid(u64 data)
552 {
553 	if (data & 0xF8F8F8F8F8F8F8F8ull)
554 		return false;
555 	/* 0, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 are valid values.  */
556 	return (data | ((data & 0x0202020202020202ull) << 1)) == data;
557 }
558 
559 static inline bool __kvm_pv_async_pf_enabled(u64 data)
560 {
561 	u64 mask = KVM_ASYNC_PF_ENABLED | KVM_ASYNC_PF_DELIVERY_AS_INT;
562 
563 	return (data & mask) == mask;
564 }
565 
566 static inline bool kvm_pv_async_pf_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
567 {
568 	return __kvm_pv_async_pf_enabled(vcpu->arch.apf.msr_en_val);
569 }
570 
571 static inline void kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
572 {
573 	int i;
574 	for (i = 0; i < ASYNC_PF_PER_VCPU; i++)
575 		vcpu->arch.apf.gfns[i] = ~0;
576 }
577 
578 /*
579  * Trigger machine check on the host. We assume all the MSRs are already set up
580  * by the CPU and that we still run on the same CPU as the MCE occurred on.
581  * We pass a fake environment to the machine check handler because we want
582  * the guest to be always treated like user space, no matter what context
583  * it used internally.
584  */
585 static inline void kvm_machine_check(void)
586 {
587 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_MCE)
588 	struct pt_regs regs = {
589 		.cs = 3, /* Fake ring 3 no matter what the guest ran on */
590 		.flags = X86_EFLAGS_IF,
591 	};
592 
593 	do_machine_check(&regs);
594 #endif
595 }
596 
597 int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(u64 value);
598 int kvm_handle_memory_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int r,
599 			      struct x86_exception *e);
600 int kvm_handle_invpcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long type, gva_t gva);
601 bool kvm_msr_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u32 type);
602 
603 enum kvm_msr_access {
604 	MSR_TYPE_R	= BIT(0),
605 	MSR_TYPE_W	= BIT(1),
606 	MSR_TYPE_RW	= MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W,
607 };
608 
609 /*
610  * Internal error codes that are used to indicate that MSR emulation encountered
611  * an error that should result in #GP in the guest, unless userspace handles it.
612  * Note, '1', '0', and negative numbers are off limits, as they are used by KVM
613  * as part of KVM's lightly documented internal KVM_RUN return codes.
614  *
615  * UNSUPPORTED	- The MSR isn't supported, either because it is completely
616  *		  unknown to KVM, or because the MSR should not exist according
617  *		  to the vCPU model.
618  *
619  * FILTERED	- Access to the MSR is denied by a userspace MSR filter.
620  */
621 #define  KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED	2
622 #define  KVM_MSR_RET_FILTERED		3
623 
624 int kvm_sev_es_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool is_write, gpa_t gpa,
625 		    unsigned int bytes, void *data);
626 int kvm_sev_es_string_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int size,
627 			 unsigned int port, void *data,  unsigned int count,
628 			 int in);
629 
630 static inline void __kvm_prepare_emulated_mmio_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
631 						    gpa_t gpa, unsigned int len,
632 						    const void *data,
633 						    bool is_write)
634 {
635 	struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
636 
637 	KVM_BUG_ON(len > 8, vcpu->kvm);
638 
639 	run->mmio.len = len;
640 	run->mmio.is_write = is_write;
641 	run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
642 	run->mmio.phys_addr = gpa;
643 	if (is_write)
644 		memcpy(run->mmio.data, data, len);
645 }
646 
647 static inline void kvm_prepare_emulated_mmio_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
648 						  struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag)
649 {
650 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->mmio_needed || !vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments);
651 
652 	__kvm_prepare_emulated_mmio_exit(vcpu, frag->gpa, min(8u, frag->len),
653 					 frag->data, vcpu->mmio_is_write);
654 }
655 
656 static inline bool kvm_is_valid_map_gpa_range_ret(u64 hypercall_ret)
657 {
658 	return !hypercall_ret || hypercall_ret == EINVAL ||
659 	       hypercall_ret == EAGAIN;
660 }
661 
662 static inline bool user_exit_on_hypercall(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long hc_nr)
663 {
664 	return kvm->arch.hypercall_exit_enabled & BIT(hc_nr);
665 }
666 
667 int ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpl,
668 			      int (*complete_hypercall)(struct kvm_vcpu *));
669 
670 #define __kvm_emulate_hypercall(_vcpu, cpl, complete_hypercall)			\
671 ({										\
672 	int __ret;								\
673 	__ret = ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(_vcpu, cpl, complete_hypercall);	\
674 										\
675 	if (__ret > 0)								\
676 		__ret = complete_hypercall(_vcpu);				\
677 	__ret;									\
678 })
679 
680 int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
681 
682 #define CET_US_RESERVED_BITS		GENMASK(9, 6)
683 #define CET_US_SHSTK_MASK_BITS		GENMASK(1, 0)
684 #define CET_US_IBT_MASK_BITS		(GENMASK_ULL(5, 2) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 10))
685 #define CET_US_LEGACY_BITMAP_BASE(data)	((data) >> 12)
686 
687 static inline bool kvm_is_valid_u_s_cet(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
688 {
689 	if (data & CET_US_RESERVED_BITS)
690 		return false;
691 	if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
692 	    (data & CET_US_SHSTK_MASK_BITS))
693 		return false;
694 	if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT) &&
695 	    (data & CET_US_IBT_MASK_BITS))
696 		return false;
697 	if (!IS_ALIGNED(CET_US_LEGACY_BITMAP_BASE(data), 4))
698 		return false;
699 	/* IBT can be suppressed iff the TRACKER isn't WAIT_ENDBR. */
700 	if ((data & CET_SUPPRESS) && (data & CET_WAIT_ENDBR))
701 		return false;
702 
703 	return true;
704 }
705 #endif
706