xref: /linux/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c (revision c4101e55974cc7d835fbd2d8e01553a3f61e9e75)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 /*
3  * Hyper-V Isolation VM interface with paravisor and hypervisor
4  *
5  * Author:
6  *  Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>
7  */
8 
9 #include <linux/bitfield.h>
10 #include <linux/hyperv.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/slab.h>
13 #include <asm/svm.h>
14 #include <asm/sev.h>
15 #include <asm/io.h>
16 #include <asm/coco.h>
17 #include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
18 #include <asm/mshyperv.h>
19 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
20 #include <asm/mtrr.h>
21 #include <asm/io_apic.h>
22 #include <asm/realmode.h>
23 #include <asm/e820/api.h>
24 #include <asm/desc.h>
25 #include <uapi/asm/vmx.h>
26 
27 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
28 
29 #define GHCB_USAGE_HYPERV_CALL	1
30 
31 union hv_ghcb {
32 	struct ghcb ghcb;
33 	struct {
34 		u64 hypercalldata[509];
35 		u64 outputgpa;
36 		union {
37 			union {
38 				struct {
39 					u32 callcode        : 16;
40 					u32 isfast          : 1;
41 					u32 reserved1       : 14;
42 					u32 isnested        : 1;
43 					u32 countofelements : 12;
44 					u32 reserved2       : 4;
45 					u32 repstartindex   : 12;
46 					u32 reserved3       : 4;
47 				};
48 				u64 asuint64;
49 			} hypercallinput;
50 			union {
51 				struct {
52 					u16 callstatus;
53 					u16 reserved1;
54 					u32 elementsprocessed : 12;
55 					u32 reserved2         : 20;
56 				};
57 				u64 asunit64;
58 			} hypercalloutput;
59 		};
60 		u64 reserved2;
61 	} hypercall;
62 } __packed __aligned(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
63 
64 /* Only used in an SNP VM with the paravisor */
65 static u16 hv_ghcb_version __ro_after_init;
66 
67 /* Functions only used in an SNP VM with the paravisor go here. */
68 u64 hv_ghcb_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output, u32 input_size)
69 {
70 	union hv_ghcb *hv_ghcb;
71 	void **ghcb_base;
72 	unsigned long flags;
73 	u64 status;
74 
75 	if (!hv_ghcb_pg)
76 		return -EFAULT;
77 
78 	WARN_ON(in_nmi());
79 
80 	local_irq_save(flags);
81 	ghcb_base = (void **)this_cpu_ptr(hv_ghcb_pg);
82 	hv_ghcb = (union hv_ghcb *)*ghcb_base;
83 	if (!hv_ghcb) {
84 		local_irq_restore(flags);
85 		return -EFAULT;
86 	}
87 
88 	hv_ghcb->ghcb.protocol_version = GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX;
89 	hv_ghcb->ghcb.ghcb_usage = GHCB_USAGE_HYPERV_CALL;
90 
91 	hv_ghcb->hypercall.outputgpa = (u64)output;
92 	hv_ghcb->hypercall.hypercallinput.asuint64 = 0;
93 	hv_ghcb->hypercall.hypercallinput.callcode = control;
94 
95 	if (input_size)
96 		memcpy(hv_ghcb->hypercall.hypercalldata, input, input_size);
97 
98 	VMGEXIT();
99 
100 	hv_ghcb->ghcb.ghcb_usage = 0xffffffff;
101 	memset(hv_ghcb->ghcb.save.valid_bitmap, 0,
102 	       sizeof(hv_ghcb->ghcb.save.valid_bitmap));
103 
104 	status = hv_ghcb->hypercall.hypercalloutput.callstatus;
105 
106 	local_irq_restore(flags);
107 
108 	return status;
109 }
110 
111 static inline u64 rd_ghcb_msr(void)
112 {
113 	return __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB);
114 }
115 
116 static inline void wr_ghcb_msr(u64 val)
117 {
118 	native_wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB, val);
119 }
120 
121 static enum es_result hv_ghcb_hv_call(struct ghcb *ghcb, u64 exit_code,
122 				   u64 exit_info_1, u64 exit_info_2)
123 {
124 	/* Fill in protocol and format specifiers */
125 	ghcb->protocol_version = hv_ghcb_version;
126 	ghcb->ghcb_usage       = GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE;
127 
128 	ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, exit_code);
129 	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, exit_info_1);
130 	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, exit_info_2);
131 
132 	VMGEXIT();
133 
134 	if (ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1 & GENMASK_ULL(31, 0))
135 		return ES_VMM_ERROR;
136 	else
137 		return ES_OK;
138 }
139 
140 void __noreturn hv_ghcb_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason)
141 {
142 	u64 val = GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ;
143 
144 	/* Tell the hypervisor what went wrong. */
145 	val |= GHCB_SEV_TERM_REASON(set, reason);
146 
147 	/* Request Guest Termination from Hypervisor */
148 	wr_ghcb_msr(val);
149 	VMGEXIT();
150 
151 	while (true)
152 		asm volatile("hlt\n" : : : "memory");
153 }
154 
155 bool hv_ghcb_negotiate_protocol(void)
156 {
157 	u64 ghcb_gpa;
158 	u64 val;
159 
160 	/* Save ghcb page gpa. */
161 	ghcb_gpa = rd_ghcb_msr();
162 
163 	/* Do the GHCB protocol version negotiation */
164 	wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_REQ);
165 	VMGEXIT();
166 	val = rd_ghcb_msr();
167 
168 	if (GHCB_MSR_INFO(val) != GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_RESP)
169 		return false;
170 
171 	if (GHCB_MSR_PROTO_MAX(val) < GHCB_PROTOCOL_MIN ||
172 	    GHCB_MSR_PROTO_MIN(val) > GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX)
173 		return false;
174 
175 	hv_ghcb_version = min_t(size_t, GHCB_MSR_PROTO_MAX(val),
176 			     GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX);
177 
178 	/* Write ghcb page back after negotiating protocol. */
179 	wr_ghcb_msr(ghcb_gpa);
180 	VMGEXIT();
181 
182 	return true;
183 }
184 
185 static void hv_ghcb_msr_write(u64 msr, u64 value)
186 {
187 	union hv_ghcb *hv_ghcb;
188 	void **ghcb_base;
189 	unsigned long flags;
190 
191 	if (!hv_ghcb_pg)
192 		return;
193 
194 	WARN_ON(in_nmi());
195 
196 	local_irq_save(flags);
197 	ghcb_base = (void **)this_cpu_ptr(hv_ghcb_pg);
198 	hv_ghcb = (union hv_ghcb *)*ghcb_base;
199 	if (!hv_ghcb) {
200 		local_irq_restore(flags);
201 		return;
202 	}
203 
204 	ghcb_set_rcx(&hv_ghcb->ghcb, msr);
205 	ghcb_set_rax(&hv_ghcb->ghcb, lower_32_bits(value));
206 	ghcb_set_rdx(&hv_ghcb->ghcb, upper_32_bits(value));
207 
208 	if (hv_ghcb_hv_call(&hv_ghcb->ghcb, SVM_EXIT_MSR, 1, 0))
209 		pr_warn("Fail to write msr via ghcb %llx.\n", msr);
210 
211 	local_irq_restore(flags);
212 }
213 
214 static void hv_ghcb_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *value)
215 {
216 	union hv_ghcb *hv_ghcb;
217 	void **ghcb_base;
218 	unsigned long flags;
219 
220 	/* Check size of union hv_ghcb here. */
221 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(union hv_ghcb) != HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
222 
223 	if (!hv_ghcb_pg)
224 		return;
225 
226 	WARN_ON(in_nmi());
227 
228 	local_irq_save(flags);
229 	ghcb_base = (void **)this_cpu_ptr(hv_ghcb_pg);
230 	hv_ghcb = (union hv_ghcb *)*ghcb_base;
231 	if (!hv_ghcb) {
232 		local_irq_restore(flags);
233 		return;
234 	}
235 
236 	ghcb_set_rcx(&hv_ghcb->ghcb, msr);
237 	if (hv_ghcb_hv_call(&hv_ghcb->ghcb, SVM_EXIT_MSR, 0, 0))
238 		pr_warn("Fail to read msr via ghcb %llx.\n", msr);
239 	else
240 		*value = (u64)lower_32_bits(hv_ghcb->ghcb.save.rax)
241 			| ((u64)lower_32_bits(hv_ghcb->ghcb.save.rdx) << 32);
242 	local_irq_restore(flags);
243 }
244 
245 /* Only used in a fully enlightened SNP VM, i.e. without the paravisor */
246 static u8 ap_start_input_arg[PAGE_SIZE] __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
247 static u8 ap_start_stack[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
248 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_save_area *, hv_sev_vmsa);
249 
250 /* Functions only used in an SNP VM without the paravisor go here. */
251 
252 #define hv_populate_vmcb_seg(seg, gdtr_base)			\
253 do {								\
254 	if (seg.selector) {					\
255 		seg.base = 0;					\
256 		seg.limit = HV_AP_SEGMENT_LIMIT;		\
257 		seg.attrib = *(u16 *)(gdtr_base + seg.selector + 5);	\
258 		seg.attrib = (seg.attrib & 0xFF) | ((seg.attrib >> 4) & 0xF00); \
259 	}							\
260 } while (0)							\
261 
262 static int snp_set_vmsa(void *va, bool vmsa)
263 {
264 	u64 attrs;
265 
266 	/*
267 	 * Running at VMPL0 allows the kernel to change the VMSA bit for a page
268 	 * using the RMPADJUST instruction. However, for the instruction to
269 	 * succeed it must target the permissions of a lesser privileged
270 	 * (higher numbered) VMPL level, so use VMPL1 (refer to the RMPADJUST
271 	 * instruction in the AMD64 APM Volume 3).
272 	 */
273 	attrs = 1;
274 	if (vmsa)
275 		attrs |= RMPADJUST_VMSA_PAGE_BIT;
276 
277 	return rmpadjust((unsigned long)va, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, attrs);
278 }
279 
280 static void snp_cleanup_vmsa(struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa)
281 {
282 	int err;
283 
284 	err = snp_set_vmsa(vmsa, false);
285 	if (err)
286 		pr_err("clear VMSA page failed (%u), leaking page\n", err);
287 	else
288 		free_page((unsigned long)vmsa);
289 }
290 
291 int hv_snp_boot_ap(u32 cpu, unsigned long start_ip)
292 {
293 	struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)
294 		__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
295 	struct sev_es_save_area *cur_vmsa;
296 	struct desc_ptr gdtr;
297 	u64 ret, retry = 5;
298 	struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *start_vp_input;
299 	unsigned long flags;
300 
301 	if (!vmsa)
302 		return -ENOMEM;
303 
304 	native_store_gdt(&gdtr);
305 
306 	vmsa->gdtr.base = gdtr.address;
307 	vmsa->gdtr.limit = gdtr.size;
308 
309 	asm volatile("movl %%es, %%eax;" : "=a" (vmsa->es.selector));
310 	hv_populate_vmcb_seg(vmsa->es, vmsa->gdtr.base);
311 
312 	asm volatile("movl %%cs, %%eax;" : "=a" (vmsa->cs.selector));
313 	hv_populate_vmcb_seg(vmsa->cs, vmsa->gdtr.base);
314 
315 	asm volatile("movl %%ss, %%eax;" : "=a" (vmsa->ss.selector));
316 	hv_populate_vmcb_seg(vmsa->ss, vmsa->gdtr.base);
317 
318 	asm volatile("movl %%ds, %%eax;" : "=a" (vmsa->ds.selector));
319 	hv_populate_vmcb_seg(vmsa->ds, vmsa->gdtr.base);
320 
321 	vmsa->efer = native_read_msr(MSR_EFER);
322 
323 	asm volatile("movq %%cr4, %%rax;" : "=a" (vmsa->cr4));
324 	asm volatile("movq %%cr3, %%rax;" : "=a" (vmsa->cr3));
325 	asm volatile("movq %%cr0, %%rax;" : "=a" (vmsa->cr0));
326 
327 	vmsa->xcr0 = 1;
328 	vmsa->g_pat = HV_AP_INIT_GPAT_DEFAULT;
329 	vmsa->rip = (u64)secondary_startup_64_no_verify;
330 	vmsa->rsp = (u64)&ap_start_stack[PAGE_SIZE];
331 
332 	/*
333 	 * Set the SNP-specific fields for this VMSA:
334 	 *   VMPL level
335 	 *   SEV_FEATURES (matches the SEV STATUS MSR right shifted 2 bits)
336 	 */
337 	vmsa->vmpl = 0;
338 	vmsa->sev_features = sev_status >> 2;
339 
340 	ret = snp_set_vmsa(vmsa, true);
341 	if (!ret) {
342 		pr_err("RMPADJUST(%llx) failed: %llx\n", (u64)vmsa, ret);
343 		free_page((u64)vmsa);
344 		return ret;
345 	}
346 
347 	local_irq_save(flags);
348 	start_vp_input = (struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *)ap_start_input_arg;
349 	memset(start_vp_input, 0, sizeof(*start_vp_input));
350 	start_vp_input->partition_id = -1;
351 	start_vp_input->vp_index = cpu;
352 	start_vp_input->target_vtl.target_vtl = ms_hyperv.vtl;
353 	*(u64 *)&start_vp_input->vp_context = __pa(vmsa) | 1;
354 
355 	do {
356 		ret = hv_do_hypercall(HVCALL_START_VP,
357 				      start_vp_input, NULL);
358 	} while (hv_result(ret) == HV_STATUS_TIME_OUT && retry--);
359 
360 	local_irq_restore(flags);
361 
362 	if (!hv_result_success(ret)) {
363 		pr_err("HvCallStartVirtualProcessor failed: %llx\n", ret);
364 		snp_cleanup_vmsa(vmsa);
365 		vmsa = NULL;
366 	}
367 
368 	cur_vmsa = per_cpu(hv_sev_vmsa, cpu);
369 	/* Free up any previous VMSA page */
370 	if (cur_vmsa)
371 		snp_cleanup_vmsa(cur_vmsa);
372 
373 	/* Record the current VMSA page */
374 	per_cpu(hv_sev_vmsa, cpu) = vmsa;
375 
376 	return ret;
377 }
378 
379 #else
380 static inline void hv_ghcb_msr_write(u64 msr, u64 value) {}
381 static inline void hv_ghcb_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *value) {}
382 #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
383 
384 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
385 static void hv_tdx_msr_write(u64 msr, u64 val)
386 {
387 	struct tdx_module_args args = {
388 		.r10 = TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD,
389 		.r11 = EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE,
390 		.r12 = msr,
391 		.r13 = val,
392 	};
393 
394 	u64 ret = __tdx_hypercall(&args);
395 
396 	WARN_ONCE(ret, "Failed to emulate MSR write: %lld\n", ret);
397 }
398 
399 static void hv_tdx_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *val)
400 {
401 	struct tdx_module_args args = {
402 		.r10 = TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD,
403 		.r11 = EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ,
404 		.r12 = msr,
405 	};
406 
407 	u64 ret = __tdx_hypercall(&args);
408 
409 	if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "Failed to emulate MSR read: %lld\n", ret))
410 		*val = 0;
411 	else
412 		*val = args.r11;
413 }
414 
415 u64 hv_tdx_hypercall(u64 control, u64 param1, u64 param2)
416 {
417 	struct tdx_module_args args = { };
418 
419 	args.r10 = control;
420 	args.rdx = param1;
421 	args.r8  = param2;
422 
423 	(void)__tdx_hypercall(&args);
424 
425 	return args.r11;
426 }
427 
428 #else
429 static inline void hv_tdx_msr_write(u64 msr, u64 value) {}
430 static inline void hv_tdx_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *value) {}
431 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST */
432 
433 #if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) || defined(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST)
434 void hv_ivm_msr_write(u64 msr, u64 value)
435 {
436 	if (!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present)
437 		return;
438 
439 	if (hv_isolation_type_tdx())
440 		hv_tdx_msr_write(msr, value);
441 	else if (hv_isolation_type_snp())
442 		hv_ghcb_msr_write(msr, value);
443 }
444 
445 void hv_ivm_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *value)
446 {
447 	if (!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present)
448 		return;
449 
450 	if (hv_isolation_type_tdx())
451 		hv_tdx_msr_read(msr, value);
452 	else if (hv_isolation_type_snp())
453 		hv_ghcb_msr_read(msr, value);
454 }
455 
456 /*
457  * hv_mark_gpa_visibility - Set pages visible to host via hvcall.
458  *
459  * In Isolation VM, all guest memory is encrypted from host and guest
460  * needs to set memory visible to host via hvcall before sharing memory
461  * with host.
462  */
463 static int hv_mark_gpa_visibility(u16 count, const u64 pfn[],
464 			   enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility)
465 {
466 	struct hv_gpa_range_for_visibility *input;
467 	u16 pages_processed;
468 	u64 hv_status;
469 	unsigned long flags;
470 
471 	/* no-op if partition isolation is not enabled */
472 	if (!hv_is_isolation_supported())
473 		return 0;
474 
475 	if (count > HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT) {
476 		pr_err("Hyper-V: GPA count:%d exceeds supported:%lu\n", count,
477 			HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT);
478 		return -EINVAL;
479 	}
480 
481 	local_irq_save(flags);
482 	input = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
483 
484 	if (unlikely(!input)) {
485 		local_irq_restore(flags);
486 		return -EINVAL;
487 	}
488 
489 	input->partition_id = HV_PARTITION_ID_SELF;
490 	input->host_visibility = visibility;
491 	input->reserved0 = 0;
492 	input->reserved1 = 0;
493 	memcpy((void *)input->gpa_page_list, pfn, count * sizeof(*pfn));
494 	hv_status = hv_do_rep_hypercall(
495 			HVCALL_MODIFY_SPARSE_GPA_PAGE_HOST_VISIBILITY, count,
496 			0, input, &pages_processed);
497 	local_irq_restore(flags);
498 
499 	if (hv_result_success(hv_status))
500 		return 0;
501 	else
502 		return -EFAULT;
503 }
504 
505 /*
506  * hv_vtom_set_host_visibility - Set specified memory visible to host.
507  *
508  * In Isolation VM, all guest memory is encrypted from host and guest
509  * needs to set memory visible to host via hvcall before sharing memory
510  * with host. This function works as wrap of hv_mark_gpa_visibility()
511  * with memory base and size.
512  */
513 static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
514 {
515 	enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility = enc ?
516 			VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE : VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE;
517 	u64 *pfn_array;
518 	int ret = 0;
519 	bool result = true;
520 	int i, pfn;
521 
522 	pfn_array = kmalloc(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
523 	if (!pfn_array)
524 		return false;
525 
526 	for (i = 0, pfn = 0; i < pagecount; i++) {
527 		pfn_array[pfn] = virt_to_hvpfn((void *)kbuffer + i * HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
528 		pfn++;
529 
530 		if (pfn == HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT || i == pagecount - 1) {
531 			ret = hv_mark_gpa_visibility(pfn, pfn_array,
532 						     visibility);
533 			if (ret) {
534 				result = false;
535 				goto err_free_pfn_array;
536 			}
537 			pfn = 0;
538 		}
539 	}
540 
541  err_free_pfn_array:
542 	kfree(pfn_array);
543 	return result;
544 }
545 
546 static bool hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required(bool private)
547 {
548 	return true;
549 }
550 
551 static bool hv_vtom_cache_flush_required(void)
552 {
553 	return false;
554 }
555 
556 static bool hv_is_private_mmio(u64 addr)
557 {
558 	/*
559 	 * Hyper-V always provides a single IO-APIC in a guest VM.
560 	 * When a paravisor is used, it is emulated by the paravisor
561 	 * in the guest context and must be mapped private.
562 	 */
563 	if (addr >= HV_IOAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS &&
564 	    addr < (HV_IOAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS + PAGE_SIZE))
565 		return true;
566 
567 	/* Same with a vTPM */
568 	if (addr >= VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS &&
569 	    addr < (VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS + PAGE_SIZE))
570 		return true;
571 
572 	return false;
573 }
574 
575 void __init hv_vtom_init(void)
576 {
577 	enum hv_isolation_type type = hv_get_isolation_type();
578 
579 	switch (type) {
580 	case HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_VBS:
581 		fallthrough;
582 	/*
583 	 * By design, a VM using vTOM doesn't see the SEV setting,
584 	 * so SEV initialization is bypassed and sev_status isn't set.
585 	 * Set it here to indicate a vTOM VM.
586 	 *
587 	 * Note: if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is not set, sev_status is
588 	 * defined as 0ULL, to which we can't assigned a value.
589 	 */
590 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
591 	case HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP:
592 		sev_status = MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM;
593 		cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD;
594 		break;
595 #endif
596 
597 	case HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_TDX:
598 		cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_INTEL;
599 		break;
600 
601 	default:
602 		panic("hv_vtom_init: unsupported isolation type %d\n", type);
603 	}
604 
605 	cc_set_mask(ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary);
606 	physical_mask &= ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary - 1;
607 
608 	x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio = hv_is_private_mmio;
609 	x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = hv_vtom_cache_flush_required;
610 	x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required;
611 	x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = hv_vtom_set_host_visibility;
612 
613 	/* Set WB as the default cache mode. */
614 	mtrr_overwrite_state(NULL, 0, MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK);
615 }
616 
617 #endif /* defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) || defined(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) */
618 
619 enum hv_isolation_type hv_get_isolation_type(void)
620 {
621 	if (!(ms_hyperv.priv_high & HV_ISOLATION))
622 		return HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE;
623 	return FIELD_GET(HV_ISOLATION_TYPE, ms_hyperv.isolation_config_b);
624 }
625 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_get_isolation_type);
626 
627 /*
628  * hv_is_isolation_supported - Check system runs in the Hyper-V
629  * isolation VM.
630  */
631 bool hv_is_isolation_supported(void)
632 {
633 	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
634 		return false;
635 
636 	if (!hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_MS_HYPERV))
637 		return false;
638 
639 	return hv_get_isolation_type() != HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE;
640 }
641 
642 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(isolation_type_snp);
643 
644 /*
645  * hv_isolation_type_snp - Check if the system runs in an AMD SEV-SNP based
646  * isolation VM.
647  */
648 bool hv_isolation_type_snp(void)
649 {
650 	return static_branch_unlikely(&isolation_type_snp);
651 }
652 
653 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(isolation_type_tdx);
654 /*
655  * hv_isolation_type_tdx - Check if the system runs in an Intel TDX based
656  * isolated VM.
657  */
658 bool hv_isolation_type_tdx(void)
659 {
660 	return static_branch_unlikely(&isolation_type_tdx);
661 }
662