xref: /linux/arch/x86/entry/calling.h (revision 69bfec7548f4c1595bac0e3ddfc0458a5af31f4c)
1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
2 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
3 #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
4 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
5 #include <asm/page_types.h>
6 #include <asm/percpu.h>
7 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
8 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
9 #include <asm/ptrace-abi.h>
10 #include <asm/msr.h>
11 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
12 
13 /*
14 
15  x86 function call convention, 64-bit:
16  -------------------------------------
17   arguments           |  callee-saved      | extra caller-saved | return
18  [callee-clobbered]   |                    | [callee-clobbered] |
19  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20  rdi rsi rdx rcx r8-9 | rbx rbp [*] r12-15 | r10-11             | rax, rdx [**]
21 
22  ( rsp is obviously invariant across normal function calls. (gcc can 'merge'
23    functions when it sees tail-call optimization possibilities) rflags is
24    clobbered. Leftover arguments are passed over the stack frame.)
25 
26  [*]  In the frame-pointers case rbp is fixed to the stack frame.
27 
28  [**] for struct return values wider than 64 bits the return convention is a
29       bit more complex: up to 128 bits width we return small structures
30       straight in rax, rdx. For structures larger than that (3 words or
31       larger) the caller puts a pointer to an on-stack return struct
32       [allocated in the caller's stack frame] into the first argument - i.e.
33       into rdi. All other arguments shift up by one in this case.
34       Fortunately this case is rare in the kernel.
35 
36 For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
37 -mregparm=3 and -freg-struct-return:
38 
39  x86 function calling convention, 32-bit:
40  ----------------------------------------
41   arguments         | callee-saved        | extra caller-saved | return
42  [callee-clobbered] |                     | [callee-clobbered] |
43  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
44  eax edx ecx        | ebx edi esi ebp [*] | <none>             | eax, edx [**]
45 
46  ( here too esp is obviously invariant across normal function calls. eflags
47    is clobbered. Leftover arguments are passed over the stack frame. )
48 
49  [*]  In the frame-pointers case ebp is fixed to the stack frame.
50 
51  [**] We build with -freg-struct-return, which on 32-bit means similar
52       semantics as on 64-bit: edx can be used for a second return value
53       (i.e. covering integer and structure sizes up to 64 bits) - after that
54       it gets more complex and more expensive: 3-word or larger struct returns
55       get done in the caller's frame and the pointer to the return struct goes
56       into regparm0, i.e. eax - the other arguments shift up and the
57       function's register parameters degenerate to regparm=2 in essence.
58 
59 */
60 
61 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
62 
63 /*
64  * 64-bit system call stack frame layout defines and helpers,
65  * for assembly code:
66  */
67 
68 .macro PUSH_REGS rdx=%rdx rcx=%rcx rax=%rax save_ret=0
69 	.if \save_ret
70 	pushq	%rsi		/* pt_regs->si */
71 	movq	8(%rsp), %rsi	/* temporarily store the return address in %rsi */
72 	movq	%rdi, 8(%rsp)	/* pt_regs->di (overwriting original return address) */
73 	.else
74 	pushq   %rdi		/* pt_regs->di */
75 	pushq   %rsi		/* pt_regs->si */
76 	.endif
77 	pushq	\rdx		/* pt_regs->dx */
78 	pushq   \rcx		/* pt_regs->cx */
79 	pushq   \rax		/* pt_regs->ax */
80 	pushq   %r8		/* pt_regs->r8 */
81 	pushq   %r9		/* pt_regs->r9 */
82 	pushq   %r10		/* pt_regs->r10 */
83 	pushq   %r11		/* pt_regs->r11 */
84 	pushq	%rbx		/* pt_regs->rbx */
85 	pushq	%rbp		/* pt_regs->rbp */
86 	pushq	%r12		/* pt_regs->r12 */
87 	pushq	%r13		/* pt_regs->r13 */
88 	pushq	%r14		/* pt_regs->r14 */
89 	pushq	%r15		/* pt_regs->r15 */
90 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS
91 
92 	.if \save_ret
93 	pushq	%rsi		/* return address on top of stack */
94 	.endif
95 .endm
96 
97 .macro CLEAR_REGS
98 	/*
99 	 * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack might
100 	 * otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are likely clobbered
101 	 * well before they could be put to use in a speculative execution
102 	 * gadget.
103 	 */
104 	xorl	%esi,  %esi	/* nospec si  */
105 	xorl	%edx,  %edx	/* nospec dx  */
106 	xorl	%ecx,  %ecx	/* nospec cx  */
107 	xorl	%r8d,  %r8d	/* nospec r8  */
108 	xorl	%r9d,  %r9d	/* nospec r9  */
109 	xorl	%r10d, %r10d	/* nospec r10 */
110 	xorl	%r11d, %r11d	/* nospec r11 */
111 	xorl	%ebx,  %ebx	/* nospec rbx */
112 	xorl	%ebp,  %ebp	/* nospec rbp */
113 	xorl	%r12d, %r12d	/* nospec r12 */
114 	xorl	%r13d, %r13d	/* nospec r13 */
115 	xorl	%r14d, %r14d	/* nospec r14 */
116 	xorl	%r15d, %r15d	/* nospec r15 */
117 
118 .endm
119 
120 .macro PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=%rdx rcx=%rcx rax=%rax save_ret=0
121 	PUSH_REGS rdx=\rdx, rcx=\rcx, rax=\rax, save_ret=\save_ret
122 	CLEAR_REGS
123 .endm
124 
125 .macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1
126 	popq %r15
127 	popq %r14
128 	popq %r13
129 	popq %r12
130 	popq %rbp
131 	popq %rbx
132 	popq %r11
133 	popq %r10
134 	popq %r9
135 	popq %r8
136 	popq %rax
137 	popq %rcx
138 	popq %rdx
139 	popq %rsi
140 	.if \pop_rdi
141 	popq %rdi
142 	.endif
143 .endm
144 
145 #ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
146 
147 /*
148  * PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION PGDs are 8k.  Flip bit 12 to switch between the two
149  * halves:
150  */
151 #define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT		PAGE_SHIFT
152 #define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_MASK		(1 << PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT)
153 #define PTI_USER_PCID_BIT		X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT
154 #define PTI_USER_PCID_MASK		(1 << PTI_USER_PCID_BIT)
155 #define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_AND_PCID_MASK  (PTI_USER_PCID_MASK | PTI_USER_PGTABLE_MASK)
156 
157 .macro SET_NOFLUSH_BIT	reg:req
158 	bts	$X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT, \reg
159 .endm
160 
161 .macro ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 reg:req
162 	ALTERNATIVE "", "SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \reg", X86_FEATURE_PCID
163 	/* Clear PCID and "PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bit", point CR3 at kernel pagetables: */
164 	andq    $(~PTI_USER_PGTABLE_AND_PCID_MASK), \reg
165 .endm
166 
167 .macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req
168 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
169 	mov	%cr3, \scratch_reg
170 	ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 \scratch_reg
171 	mov	\scratch_reg, %cr3
172 .Lend_\@:
173 .endm
174 
175 #define THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask   \
176 	PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tlbstate) + TLB_STATE_user_pcid_flush_mask
177 
178 .macro SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_NOSTACK scratch_reg:req scratch_reg2:req
179 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
180 	mov	%cr3, \scratch_reg
181 
182 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lwrcr3_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PCID
183 
184 	/*
185 	 * Test if the ASID needs a flush.
186 	 */
187 	movq	\scratch_reg, \scratch_reg2
188 	andq	$(0x7FF), \scratch_reg		/* mask ASID */
189 	bt	\scratch_reg, THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask
190 	jnc	.Lnoflush_\@
191 
192 	/* Flush needed, clear the bit */
193 	btr	\scratch_reg, THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask
194 	movq	\scratch_reg2, \scratch_reg
195 	jmp	.Lwrcr3_pcid_\@
196 
197 .Lnoflush_\@:
198 	movq	\scratch_reg2, \scratch_reg
199 	SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \scratch_reg
200 
201 .Lwrcr3_pcid_\@:
202 	/* Flip the ASID to the user version */
203 	orq	$(PTI_USER_PCID_MASK), \scratch_reg
204 
205 .Lwrcr3_\@:
206 	/* Flip the PGD to the user version */
207 	orq     $(PTI_USER_PGTABLE_MASK), \scratch_reg
208 	mov	\scratch_reg, %cr3
209 .Lend_\@:
210 .endm
211 
212 .macro SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK	scratch_reg:req
213 	pushq	%rax
214 	SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_NOSTACK scratch_reg=\scratch_reg scratch_reg2=%rax
215 	popq	%rax
216 .endm
217 
218 .macro SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req save_reg:req
219 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Ldone_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
220 	movq	%cr3, \scratch_reg
221 	movq	\scratch_reg, \save_reg
222 	/*
223 	 * Test the user pagetable bit. If set, then the user page tables
224 	 * are active. If clear CR3 already has the kernel page table
225 	 * active.
226 	 */
227 	bt	$PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT, \scratch_reg
228 	jnc	.Ldone_\@
229 
230 	ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 \scratch_reg
231 	movq	\scratch_reg, %cr3
232 
233 .Ldone_\@:
234 .endm
235 
236 .macro RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg:req save_reg:req
237 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
238 
239 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lwrcr3_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PCID
240 
241 	/*
242 	 * KERNEL pages can always resume with NOFLUSH as we do
243 	 * explicit flushes.
244 	 */
245 	bt	$PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT, \save_reg
246 	jnc	.Lnoflush_\@
247 
248 	/*
249 	 * Check if there's a pending flush for the user ASID we're
250 	 * about to set.
251 	 */
252 	movq	\save_reg, \scratch_reg
253 	andq	$(0x7FF), \scratch_reg
254 	bt	\scratch_reg, THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask
255 	jnc	.Lnoflush_\@
256 
257 	btr	\scratch_reg, THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask
258 	jmp	.Lwrcr3_\@
259 
260 .Lnoflush_\@:
261 	SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \save_reg
262 
263 .Lwrcr3_\@:
264 	/*
265 	 * The CR3 write could be avoided when not changing its value,
266 	 * but would require a CR3 read *and* a scratch register.
267 	 */
268 	movq	\save_reg, %cr3
269 .Lend_\@:
270 .endm
271 
272 #else /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=n: */
273 
274 .macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req
275 .endm
276 .macro SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_NOSTACK scratch_reg:req scratch_reg2:req
277 .endm
278 .macro SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK scratch_reg:req
279 .endm
280 .macro SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req save_reg:req
281 .endm
282 .macro RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg:req save_reg:req
283 .endm
284 
285 #endif
286 
287 /*
288  * IBRS kernel mitigation for Spectre_v2.
289  *
290  * Assumes full context is established (PUSH_REGS, CR3 and GS) and it clobbers
291  * the regs it uses (AX, CX, DX). Must be called before the first RET
292  * instruction (NOTE! UNTRAIN_RET includes a RET instruction)
293  *
294  * The optional argument is used to save/restore the current value,
295  * which is used on the paranoid paths.
296  *
297  * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set.
298  */
299 .macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg
300 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
301 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
302 	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
303 
304 .ifnb \save_reg
305 	rdmsr
306 	shl	$32, %rdx
307 	or	%rdx, %rax
308 	mov	%rax, \save_reg
309 	test	$SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, %eax
310 	jz	.Ldo_wrmsr_\@
311 	lfence
312 	jmp	.Lend_\@
313 .Ldo_wrmsr_\@:
314 .endif
315 
316 	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
317 	movl	%edx, %eax
318 	shr	$32, %rdx
319 	wrmsr
320 .Lend_\@:
321 #endif
322 .endm
323 
324 /*
325  * Similar to IBRS_ENTER, requires KERNEL GS,CR3 and clobbers (AX, CX, DX)
326  * regs. Must be called after the last RET.
327  */
328 .macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg
329 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
330 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
331 	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
332 
333 .ifnb \save_reg
334 	mov	\save_reg, %rdx
335 .else
336 	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
337 	andl	$(~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS), %edx
338 .endif
339 
340 	movl	%edx, %eax
341 	shr	$32, %rdx
342 	wrmsr
343 .Lend_\@:
344 #endif
345 .endm
346 
347 /*
348  * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths.
349  *
350  * FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY is used in the user entry swapgs code path, to
351  * prevent a speculative swapgs when coming from kernel space.
352  *
353  * FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY is used in the kernel entry non-swapgs code path,
354  * to prevent the swapgs from getting speculatively skipped when coming from
355  * user space.
356  */
357 .macro FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
358 	ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER
359 .endm
360 .macro FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
361 	ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL
362 .endm
363 
364 .macro STACKLEAK_ERASE_NOCLOBBER
365 #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
366 	PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
367 	call stackleak_erase
368 	POP_REGS
369 #endif
370 .endm
371 
372 .macro SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg:req save_reg:req
373 	rdgsbase \save_reg
374 	GET_PERCPU_BASE \scratch_reg
375 	wrgsbase \scratch_reg
376 .endm
377 
378 #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
379 # undef		UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
380 # define	UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
381 #endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
382 
383 .macro STACKLEAK_ERASE
384 #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
385 	call stackleak_erase
386 #endif
387 .endm
388 
389 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
390 
391 /*
392  * CPU/node NR is loaded from the limit (size) field of a special segment
393  * descriptor entry in GDT.
394  */
395 .macro LOAD_CPU_AND_NODE_SEG_LIMIT reg:req
396 	movq	$__CPUNODE_SEG, \reg
397 	lsl	\reg, \reg
398 .endm
399 
400 /*
401  * Fetch the per-CPU GSBASE value for this processor and put it in @reg.
402  * We normally use %gs for accessing per-CPU data, but we are setting up
403  * %gs here and obviously can not use %gs itself to access per-CPU data.
404  *
405  * Do not use RDPID, because KVM loads guest's TSC_AUX on vm-entry and
406  * may not restore the host's value until the CPU returns to userspace.
407  * Thus the kernel would consume a guest's TSC_AUX if an NMI arrives
408  * while running KVM's run loop.
409  */
410 .macro GET_PERCPU_BASE reg:req
411 	LOAD_CPU_AND_NODE_SEG_LIMIT \reg
412 	andq	$VDSO_CPUNODE_MASK, \reg
413 	movq	__per_cpu_offset(, \reg, 8), \reg
414 .endm
415 
416 #else
417 
418 .macro GET_PERCPU_BASE reg:req
419 	movq	pcpu_unit_offsets(%rip), \reg
420 .endm
421 
422 #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
423