xref: /linux/Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst (revision c532de5a67a70f8533d495f8f2aaa9a0491c3ad0)
1.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2
3==================================
4Introduction of non-executable mfd
5==================================
6:Author:
7    Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
8    Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
9
10:Contributor:
11	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
12
13Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfds have always had their
14execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting
15it differently.
16
17However, in a secure-by-default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all
18executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by verified
19boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass
20and enables “confused deputy attack”.  E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm
21process created a memfd to share the content with an external process,
22however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code
23and root escalation. [2] lists more VRP of this kind.
24
25On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use: runc uses memfd’s
26seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then
27execute them. For such a system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's
28use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3].
29
30To address those above:
31 - Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time.
32 - Let memfd be sealed for modifying X bit when NX is set.
33 - Add a new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to help applications in
34   migrating and enforcing non-executable MFD.
35
36User API
37========
38``int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)``
39
40``MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL``
41	When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL bit is set in the ``flags``, memfd is created
42	with NX. F_SEAL_EXEC is set and the memfd can't be modified to
43	add X later. MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is also implied.
44	This is the most common case for the application to use memfd.
45
46``MFD_EXEC``
47	When MFD_EXEC bit is set in the ``flags``, memfd is created with X.
48
49Note:
50	``MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL`` implies ``MFD_ALLOW_SEALING``. In case that
51	an app doesn't want sealing, it can add F_SEAL_SEAL after creation.
52
53
54Sysctl:
55========
56``pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec``
57
58The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values:
59
60 - 0: MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC
61	memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like
62	MFD_EXEC was set.
63
64 - 1: MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL
65	memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like
66	MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set.
67
68 - 2: MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_ENFORCED
69	memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected.
70
71The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old software that
72doesn't set the executable bit; for example, a container with
73vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old software will create non-executable memfd
74by default while new software can create executable memfd by setting
75MFD_EXEC.
76
77The value of vm.memfd_noexec is passed to child namespace at creation
78time. In addition, the setting is hierarchical, i.e. during memfd_create,
79we will search from current ns to root ns and use the most restrictive
80setting.
81
82[1] https://crbug.com/1305267
83
84[2] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=type%3Dbug-security%20memfd%20escalation&can=1
85
86[3] https://lwn.net/Articles/781013/
87