xref: /linux/Documentation/driver-api/vfio.rst (revision 570f7e331f5febb30f1384817463c7e42b65ca7d)

==================================
VFIO - "Virtual Function I/O" [1]_
==================================

Many modern systems now provide DMA and interrupt remapping facilities
to help ensure I/O devices behave within the boundaries they've been
allotted.  This includes x86 hardware with AMD-Vi and Intel VT-d,
POWER systems with Partitionable Endpoints (PEs) and embedded PowerPC
systems such as Freescale PAMU.  The VFIO driver is an IOMMU/device
agnostic framework for exposing direct device access to userspace, in
a secure, IOMMU protected environment.  In other words, this allows
safe [2]_, non-privileged, userspace drivers.

Why do we want that?  Virtual machines often make use of direct device
access ("device assignment") when configured for the highest possible
I/O performance.  From a device and host perspective, this simply
turns the VM into a userspace driver, with the benefits of
significantly reduced latency, higher bandwidth, and direct use of
bare-metal device drivers [3]_.

Some applications, particularly in the high performance computing
field, also benefit from low-overhead, direct device access from
userspace.  Examples include network adapters (often non-TCP/IP based)
and compute accelerators.  Prior to VFIO, these drivers had to either
go through the full development cycle to become proper upstream
driver, be maintained out of tree, or make use of the UIO framework,
which has no notion of IOMMU protection, limited interrupt support,
and requires root privileges to access things like PCI configuration
space.

The VFIO driver framework intends to unify these, replacing both the
KVM PCI specific device assignment code as well as provide a more
secure, more featureful userspace driver environment than UIO.

Groups, Devices, and IOMMUs
---------------------------

Devices are the main target of any I/O driver.  Devices typically
create a programming interface made up of I/O access, interrupts,
and DMA.  Without going into the details of each of these, DMA is
by far the most critical aspect for maintaining a secure environment
as allowing a device read-write access to system memory imposes the
greatest risk to the overall system integrity.

To help mitigate this risk, many modern IOMMUs now incorporate
isolation properties into what was, in many cases, an interface only
meant for translation (ie. solving the addressing problems of devices
with limited address spaces).  With this, devices can now be isolated
from each other and from arbitrary memory access, thus allowing
things like secure direct assignment of devices into virtual machines.

This isolation is not always at the granularity of a single device
though.  Even when an IOMMU is capable of this, properties of devices,
interconnects, and IOMMU topologies can each reduce this isolation.
For instance, an individual device may be part of a larger multi-
function enclosure.  While the IOMMU may be able to distinguish
between devices within the enclosure, the enclosure may not require
transactions between devices to reach the IOMMU.  Examples of this
could be anything from a multi-function PCI device with backdoors
between functions to a non-PCI-ACS (Access Control Services) capable
bridge allowing redirection without reaching the IOMMU.  Topology
can also play a factor in terms of hiding devices.  A PCIe-to-PCI
bridge masks the devices behind it, making transaction appear as if
from the bridge itself.  Obviously IOMMU design plays a major factor
as well.

Therefore, while for the most part an IOMMU may have device level
granularity, any system is susceptible to reduced granularity.  The
IOMMU API therefore supports a notion of IOMMU groups.  A group is
a set of devices which is isolatable from all other devices in the
system.  Groups are therefore the unit of ownership used by VFIO.

While the group is the minimum granularity that must be used to
ensure secure user access, it's not necessarily the preferred
granularity.  In IOMMUs which make use of page tables, it may be
possible to share a set of page tables between different groups,
reducing the overhead both to the platform (reduced TLB thrashing,
reduced duplicate page tables), and to the user (programming only
a single set of translations).  For this reason, VFIO makes use of
a container class, which may hold one or more groups.  A container
is created by simply opening the /dev/vfio/vfio character device.

On its own, the container provides little functionality, with all
but a couple version and extension query interfaces locked away.
The user needs to add a group into the container for the next level
of functionality.  To do this, the user first needs to identify the
group associated with the desired device.  This can be done using
the sysfs links described in the example below.  By unbinding the
device from the host driver and binding it to a VFIO driver, a new
VFIO group will appear for the group as /dev/vfio/$GROUP, where
$GROUP is the IOMMU group number of which the device is a member.
If the IOMMU group contains multiple devices, each will need to
be bound to a VFIO driver before operations on the VFIO group
are allowed (it's also sufficient to only unbind the device from
host drivers if a VFIO driver is unavailable; this will make the
group available, but not that particular device).  TBD - interface
for disabling driver probing/locking a device.

Once the group is ready, it may be added to the container by opening
the VFIO group character device (/dev/vfio/$GROUP) and using the
VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER ioctl, passing the file descriptor of the
previously opened container file.  If desired and if the IOMMU driver
supports sharing the IOMMU context between groups, multiple groups may
be set to the same container.  If a group fails to set to a container
with existing groups, a new empty container will need to be used
instead.

With a group (or groups) attached to a container, the remaining
ioctls become available, enabling access to the VFIO IOMMU interfaces.
Additionally, it now becomes possible to get file descriptors for each
device within a group using an ioctl on the VFIO group file descriptor.

The VFIO device API includes ioctls for describing the device, the I/O
regions and their read/write/mmap offsets on the device descriptor, as
well as mechanisms for describing and registering interrupt
notifications.

VFIO Usage Example
------------------

Assume user wants to access PCI device 0000:06:0d.0::

	$ readlink /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group
	../../../../kernel/iommu_groups/26

This device is therefore in IOMMU group 26.  This device is on the
pci bus, therefore the user will make use of vfio-pci to manage the
group::

	# modprobe vfio-pci

Binding this device to the vfio-pci driver creates the VFIO group
character devices for this group::

	$ lspci -n -s 0000:06:0d.0
	06:0d.0 0401: 1102:0002 (rev 08)
	# echo 0000:06:0d.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/driver/unbind
	# echo 1102 0002 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/vfio-pci/new_id

Now we need to look at what other devices are in the group to free
it for use by VFIO::

	$ ls -l /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group/devices
	total 0
	lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:00:1e.0 ->
		../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0
	lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.0 ->
		../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.0
	lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.1 ->
		../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.1

This device is behind a PCIe-to-PCI bridge [4]_, therefore we also
need to add device 0000:06:0d.1 to the group following the same
procedure as above.  Device 0000:00:1e.0 is a bridge that does
not currently have a host driver, therefore it's not required to
bind this device to the vfio-pci driver (vfio-pci does not currently
support PCI bridges).

The final step is to provide the user with access to the group if
unprivileged operation is desired (note that /dev/vfio/vfio provides
no capabilities on its own and is therefore expected to be set to
mode 0666 by the system)::

	# chown user:user /dev/vfio/26

The user now has full access to all the devices and the iommu for this
group and can access them as follows::

	int container, group, device, i;
	struct vfio_group_status group_status =
					{ .argsz = sizeof(group_status) };
	struct vfio_iommu_type1_info iommu_info = { .argsz = sizeof(iommu_info) };
	struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_map dma_map = { .argsz = sizeof(dma_map) };
	struct vfio_device_info device_info = { .argsz = sizeof(device_info) };

	/* Create a new container */
	container = open("/dev/vfio/vfio", O_RDWR);

	if (ioctl(container, VFIO_GET_API_VERSION) != VFIO_API_VERSION)
		/* Unknown API version */

	if (!ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU))
		/* Doesn't support the IOMMU driver we want. */

	/* Open the group */
	group = open("/dev/vfio/26", O_RDWR);

	/* Test the group is viable and available */
	ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_STATUS, &group_status);

	if (!(group_status.flags & VFIO_GROUP_FLAGS_VIABLE))
		/* Group is not viable (ie, not all devices bound for vfio) */

	/* Add the group to the container */
	ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container);

	/* Enable the IOMMU model we want */
	ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU);

	/* Get addition IOMMU info */
	ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_GET_INFO, &iommu_info);

	/* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */
	dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
			     MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
	dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024;
	dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */
	dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE;

	ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map);

	/* Get a file descriptor for the device */
	device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0");

	/* Test and setup the device */
	ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_INFO, &device_info);

	for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_regions; i++) {
		struct vfio_region_info reg = { .argsz = sizeof(reg) };

		reg.index = i;

		ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO, &reg);

		/* Setup mappings... read/write offsets, mmaps
		 * For PCI devices, config space is a region */
	}

	for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_irqs; i++) {
		struct vfio_irq_info irq = { .argsz = sizeof(irq) };

		irq.index = i;

		ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO, &irq);

		/* Setup IRQs... eventfds, VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS */
	}

	/* Gratuitous device reset and go... */
	ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET);

IOMMUFD and vfio_iommu_type1
----------------------------

IOMMUFD is the new user API to manage I/O page tables from userspace.
It intends to be the portal of delivering advanced userspace DMA
features (nested translation [5]_, PASID [6]_, etc.) while also providing
a backwards compatibility interface for existing VFIO_TYPE1v2_IOMMU use
cases.  Eventually the vfio_iommu_type1 driver, as well as the legacy
vfio container and group model is intended to be deprecated.

The IOMMUFD backwards compatibility interface can be enabled two ways.
In the first method, the kernel can be configured with
CONFIG_IOMMUFD_VFIO_CONTAINER, in which case the IOMMUFD subsystem
transparently provides the entire infrastructure for the VFIO
container and IOMMU backend interfaces.  The compatibility mode can
also be accessed if the VFIO container interface, ie. /dev/vfio/vfio is
simply symlink'd to /dev/iommu.  Note that at the time of writing, the
compatibility mode is not entirely feature complete relative to
VFIO_TYPE1v2_IOMMU (ex. DMA mapping MMIO) and does not attempt to
provide compatibility to the VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU interface.  Therefore
it is not generally advisable at this time to switch from native VFIO
implementations to the IOMMUFD compatibility interfaces.

Long term, VFIO users should migrate to device access through the cdev
interface described below, and native access through the IOMMUFD
provided interfaces.

VFIO Device cdev
----------------

Traditionally user acquires a device fd via VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD
in a VFIO group.

With CONFIG_VFIO_DEVICE_CDEV=y the user can now acquire a device fd
by directly opening a character device /dev/vfio/devices/vfioX where
"X" is the number allocated uniquely by VFIO for registered devices.

The cdev only works with IOMMUFD.  Both VFIO drivers and applications
must adapt to the new cdev security model which requires using
VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD to claim DMA ownership before starting to
actually use the device.  Once BIND succeeds then a VFIO device can
be fully accessed by the user.

VFIO device cdev doesn't rely on VFIO group/container/iommu drivers.
Hence those modules can be fully compiled out in an environment
where no legacy VFIO application exists.

So far SPAPR does not support IOMMUFD yet.  So it cannot support device
cdev either.

vfio device cdev access is still bound by IOMMU group semantics, ie. there
can be only one DMA owner for the group.  Devices belonging to the same
group can not be bound to multiple iommufd_ctx or shared between native
kernel and vfio bus driver or other driver supporting the driver_managed_dma
flag.  A violation of this ownership requirement will fail at the
VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD ioctl, which gates full device access.

Device cdev Example
-------------------

Assume user wants to access PCI device 0000:6a:01.0::

	$ ls /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:6a:01.0/vfio-dev/
	vfio0

This device is therefore represented as vfio0.  The user can verify
its existence::

	$ ls -l /dev/vfio/devices/vfio0
	crw------- 1 root root 511, 0 Feb 16 01:22 /dev/vfio/devices/vfio0
	$ cat /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:6a:01.0/vfio-dev/vfio0/dev
	511:0
	$ ls -l /dev/char/511\:0
	lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 21 Feb 16 01:22 /dev/char/511:0 -> ../vfio/devices/vfio0

Then provide the user with access to the device if unprivileged
operation is desired::

	$ chown user:user /dev/vfio/devices/vfio0

Finally the user could get cdev fd by::

	cdev_fd = open("/dev/vfio/devices/vfio0", O_RDWR);

An opened cdev_fd doesn't give the user any permission of accessing
the device except binding the cdev_fd to an iommufd.  After that point
then the device is fully accessible including attaching it to an
IOMMUFD IOAS/HWPT to enable userspace DMA::

	struct vfio_device_bind_iommufd bind = {
		.argsz = sizeof(bind),
		.flags = 0,
	};
	struct iommu_ioas_alloc alloc_data  = {
		.size = sizeof(alloc_data),
		.flags = 0,
	};
	struct vfio_device_attach_iommufd_pt attach_data = {
		.argsz = sizeof(attach_data),
		.flags = 0,
	};
	struct iommu_ioas_map map = {
		.size = sizeof(map),
		.flags = IOMMU_IOAS_MAP_READABLE |
			 IOMMU_IOAS_MAP_WRITEABLE |
			 IOMMU_IOAS_MAP_FIXED_IOVA,
		.__reserved = 0,
	};

	iommufd = open("/dev/iommu", O_RDWR);

	bind.iommufd = iommufd;
	ioctl(cdev_fd, VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD, &bind);

	ioctl(iommufd, IOMMU_IOAS_ALLOC, &alloc_data);
	attach_data.pt_id = alloc_data.out_ioas_id;
	ioctl(cdev_fd, VFIO_DEVICE_ATTACH_IOMMUFD_PT, &attach_data);

	/* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */
	map.user_va = (int64_t)mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
				    MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
	map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */
	map.length = 1024 * 1024;
	map.ioas_id = alloc_data.out_ioas_id;

	ioctl(iommufd, IOMMU_IOAS_MAP, &map);

	/* Other device operations as stated in "VFIO Usage Example" */

VFIO NOIOMMU mode
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VFIO also supports a no-IOMMU mode, intended for usages where unsafe DMA can
be performed by userspace drivers w/o physical IOMMU protection. This mode
is controlled by the parameter:

/sys/module/vfio/parameters/enable_unsafe_noiommu_mode

Upon enabling this mode, with an assigned device, the user will be presented
with a VFIO group and device file, e.g.::

  /dev/vfio/
  |-- devices
  |   `-- noiommu-vfioX	/* VFIO device cdev */
  |-- noiommu-Y		/* VFIO group */
  `-- vfio

The capabilities vary depending on the device programming interface and kernel
configuration used. The following table summarizes the differences ("Yes" means
the UAPI is accessible and functional in noiommu mode, "No" means the UAPI is
not supported):

+-------------------+---------------------+----------------------+
| Feature           | VFIO group          | VFIO device cdev     |
+===================+=====================+======================+
| VFIO device UAPI  | Yes                 | Yes                  |
+-------------------+---------------------+----------------------+
| VFIO container    | No                  | No                   |
+-------------------+---------------------+----------------------+
| IOMMUFD IOAS      | No                  | Yes*                 |
+-------------------+---------------------+----------------------+

Note that the VFIO container case includes IOMMUFD provided VFIO compatibility
interfaces when either CONFIG_VFIO_CONTAINER or CONFIG_IOMMUFD_VFIO_CONTAINER is
enabled.

* IOMMUFD UAPI is available for VFIO device cdev to pin and map user memory with
  the ability to retrieve physical addresses for DMA command submission.

Kconfig Support Matrix
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The visibility of CONFIG_VFIO_NOIOMMU depends on the combination of
CONFIG_VFIO_GROUP, CONFIG_VFIO_DEVICE_CDEV, and whether a container backend
(CONFIG_VFIO_CONTAINER or CONFIG_IOMMUFD_VFIO_CONTAINER) is configured.  The
Kconfig dependencies enforce the following constraints:

- At least one access path (group or cdev) must be available.
- If VFIO_GROUP is enabled, a container backend is required; otherwise the
  group node would be unusable in noiommu mode.
- The cdev noiommu path requires CONFIG_GENERIC_ATOMIC64=n because it depends
  on CONFIG_IOMMUFD_NOIOMMU.

The resulting support matrix:

+------+-------+-----------+------+---------+---------------------------+
| Case | GROUP | Container | CDEV | NOIOMMU | Notes                     |
+======+=======+===========+======+=========+===========================+
|  1   |   y   |     y     |  n   |   yes   | Group noiommu works       |
+------+-------+-----------+------+---------+---------------------------+
|  2   |   y   |     n     |  n   |   no    | Blocked - no container    |
+------+-------+-----------+------+---------+---------------------------+
|  3   |   y   |     y     |  y   |   yes   | Both paths work [#cdev]_  |
+------+-------+-----------+------+---------+---------------------------+
|  4   |   y   |     n     |  y   |   no    | Blocked - no container    |
+------+-------+-----------+------+---------+---------------------------+
|  5   |   n   |     -     |  y   |   yes   | Cdev-only works [#cdev]_  |
+------+-------+-----------+------+---------+---------------------------+
|  6   |   n   |     -     |  n   |   no    | No access path            |
+------+-------+-----------+------+---------+---------------------------+

Container = CONFIG_VFIO_CONTAINER or CONFIG_IOMMUFD_VFIO_CONTAINER (either
suffices).  Case 4 is intentionally blocked: allowing NOIOMMU with GROUP
enabled but no container would create unusable group nodes.  Users who want
cdev-only noiommu should set CONFIG_VFIO_GROUP=n (case 5).

.. [#cdev] The cdev noiommu path requires CONFIG_GENERIC_ATOMIC64=n.  When
   CONFIG_VFIO_GROUP=y, CONFIG_VFIO_DEVICE_CDEV=y, and
   CONFIG_GENERIC_ATOMIC64=y, CONFIG_VFIO_NOIOMMU remains selectable for the
   group path, but no noiommu device cdev is registered.  Cdev-only noiommu is
   not selectable on those platforms.

A new IOMMUFD ioctl IOMMU_IOAS_NOIOMMU_GET_PA is added to retrieve the physical
address for a given IOVA. Although there is no physical DMA remapping hardware,
IOMMU_IOAS_MAP_FIXED_IOVA is still used to establish IOVA-to-PA mappings in the
software page table for later IOMMU_IOAS_NOIOMMU_GET_PA lookups.

VFIO User API
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Please see include/uapi/linux/vfio.h for complete API documentation.

VFIO bus driver API
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VFIO bus drivers, such as vfio-pci make use of only a few interfaces
into VFIO core.  When devices are bound and unbound to the driver,
Following interfaces are called when devices are bound to and
unbound from the driver::

	int vfio_register_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device);
	int vfio_register_emulated_iommu_dev(struct vfio_device *device);
	void vfio_unregister_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device);

The driver should embed the vfio_device in its own structure and use
vfio_alloc_device() to allocate the structure, and can register
@init/@release callbacks to manage any private state wrapping the
vfio_device::

	vfio_alloc_device(dev_struct, member, dev, ops);
	void vfio_put_device(struct vfio_device *device);

vfio_register_group_dev() indicates to the core to begin tracking the
iommu_group of the specified dev and register the dev as owned by a VFIO bus
driver. Once vfio_register_group_dev() returns it is possible for userspace to
start accessing the driver, thus the driver should ensure it is completely
ready before calling it. The driver provides an ops structure for callbacks
similar to a file operations structure::

	struct vfio_device_ops {
		char	*name;
		int	(*init)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
		void	(*release)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
		int	(*bind_iommufd)(struct vfio_device *vdev,
					struct iommufd_ctx *ictx, u32 *out_device_id);
		void	(*unbind_iommufd)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
		int	(*attach_ioas)(struct vfio_device *vdev, u32 *pt_id);
		void	(*detach_ioas)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
		int	(*open_device)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
		void	(*close_device)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
		ssize_t	(*read)(struct vfio_device *vdev, char __user *buf,
				size_t count, loff_t *ppos);
		ssize_t	(*write)(struct vfio_device *vdev, const char __user *buf,
			 size_t count, loff_t *size);
		long	(*ioctl)(struct vfio_device *vdev, unsigned int cmd,
				 unsigned long arg);
		int	(*mmap)(struct vfio_device *vdev, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
		void	(*request)(struct vfio_device *vdev, unsigned int count);
		int	(*match)(struct vfio_device *vdev, char *buf);
		void	(*dma_unmap)(struct vfio_device *vdev, u64 iova, u64 length);
		int	(*device_feature)(struct vfio_device *device, u32 flags,
					  void __user *arg, size_t argsz);
	};

Each function is passed the vdev that was originally registered
in the vfio_register_group_dev() or vfio_register_emulated_iommu_dev()
call above. This allows the bus driver to obtain its private data using
container_of().

::

	- The init/release callbacks are issued when vfio_device is initialized
	  and released.

	- The open/close device callbacks are issued when the first
	  instance of a file descriptor for the device is created (eg.
	  via VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD) for a user session.

	- The ioctl callback provides a direct pass through for some VFIO_DEVICE_*
	  ioctls.

	- The [un]bind_iommufd callbacks are issued when the device is bound to
	  and unbound from iommufd.

	- The [de]attach_ioas callback is issued when the device is attached to
	  and detached from an IOAS managed by the bound iommufd. However, the
	  attached IOAS can also be automatically detached when the device is
	  unbound from iommufd.

	- The read/write/mmap callbacks implement the device region access defined
	  by the device's own VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO ioctl.

	- The request callback is issued when device is going to be unregistered,
	  such as when trying to unbind the device from the vfio bus driver.

	- The dma_unmap callback is issued when a range of iovas are unmapped
	  in the container or IOAS attached by the device. Drivers which make
	  use of the vfio page pinning interface must implement this callback in
	  order to unpin pages within the dma_unmap range. Drivers must tolerate
	  this callback even before calls to open_device().

PPC64 sPAPR implementation note
-------------------------------

This implementation has some specifics:

1) On older systems (POWER7 with P5IOC2/IODA1) only one IOMMU group per
   container is supported as an IOMMU table is allocated at the boot time,
   one table per a IOMMU group which is a Partitionable Endpoint (PE)
   (PE is often a PCI domain but not always).

   Newer systems (POWER8 with IODA2) have improved hardware design which allows
   to remove this limitation and have multiple IOMMU groups per a VFIO
   container.

2) The hardware supports so called DMA windows - the PCI address range
   within which DMA transfer is allowed, any attempt to access address space
   out of the window leads to the whole PE isolation.

3) PPC64 guests are paravirtualized but not fully emulated. There is an API
   to map/unmap pages for DMA, and it normally maps 1..32 pages per call and
   currently there is no way to reduce the number of calls. In order to make
   things faster, the map/unmap handling has been implemented in real mode
   which provides an excellent performance which has limitations such as
   inability to do locked pages accounting in real time.

4) According to sPAPR specification, A Partitionable Endpoint (PE) is an I/O
   subtree that can be treated as a unit for the purposes of partitioning and
   error recovery. A PE may be a single or multi-function IOA (IO Adapter), a
   function of a multi-function IOA, or multiple IOAs (possibly including
   switch and bridge structures above the multiple IOAs). PPC64 guests detect
   PCI errors and recover from them via EEH RTAS services, which works on the
   basis of additional ioctl commands.

   So 4 additional ioctls have been added:

	VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO
		returns the size and the start of the DMA window on the PCI bus.

	VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE
		enables the container. The locked pages accounting
		is done at this point. This lets user first to know what
		the DMA window is and adjust rlimit before doing any real job.

	VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE
		disables the container.

	VFIO_EEH_PE_OP
		provides an API for EEH setup, error detection and recovery.

   The code flow from the example above should be slightly changed::

	struct vfio_eeh_pe_op pe_op = { .argsz = sizeof(pe_op), .flags = 0 };

	.....
	/* Add the group to the container */
	ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container);

	/* Enable the IOMMU model we want */
	ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU)

	/* Get addition sPAPR IOMMU info */
	vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info spapr_iommu_info;
	ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO, &spapr_iommu_info);

	if (ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE))
		/* Cannot enable container, may be low rlimit */

	/* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */
	dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
			     MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);

	dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024;
	dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */
	dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE;

	/* Check here is .iova/.size are within DMA window from spapr_iommu_info */
	ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map);

	/* Get a file descriptor for the device */
	device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0");

	....

	/* Gratuitous device reset and go... */
	ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET);

	/* Make sure EEH is supported */
	ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_EEH);

	/* Enable the EEH functionality on the device */
	pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_ENABLE;
	ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);

	/* You're suggested to create additional data struct to represent
	 * PE, and put child devices belonging to same IOMMU group to the
	 * PE instance for later reference.
	 */

	/* Check the PE's state and make sure it's in functional state */
	pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_GET_STATE;
	ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);

	/* Save device state using pci_save_state().
	 * EEH should be enabled on the specified device.
	 */

	....

	/* Inject EEH error, which is expected to be caused by 32-bits
	 * config load.
	 */
	pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_INJECT_ERR;
	pe_op.err.type = EEH_ERR_TYPE_32;
	pe_op.err.func = EEH_ERR_FUNC_LD_CFG_ADDR;
	pe_op.err.addr = 0ul;
	pe_op.err.mask = 0ul;
	ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);

	....

	/* When 0xFF's returned from reading PCI config space or IO BARs
	 * of the PCI device. Check the PE's state to see if that has been
	 * frozen.
	 */
	ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);

	/* Waiting for pending PCI transactions to be completed and don't
	 * produce any more PCI traffic from/to the affected PE until
	 * recovery is finished.
	 */

	/* Enable IO for the affected PE and collect logs. Usually, the
	 * standard part of PCI config space, AER registers are dumped
	 * as logs for further analysis.
	 */
	pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_UNFREEZE_IO;
	ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);

	/*
	 * Issue PE reset: hot or fundamental reset. Usually, hot reset
	 * is enough. However, the firmware of some PCI adapters would
	 * require fundamental reset.
	 */
	pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_RESET_HOT;
	ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
	pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_RESET_DEACTIVATE;
	ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);

	/* Configure the PCI bridges for the affected PE */
	pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_CONFIGURE;
	ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);

	/* Restored state we saved at initialization time. pci_restore_state()
	 * is good enough as an example.
	 */

	/* Hopefully, error is recovered successfully. Now, you can resume to
	 * start PCI traffic to/from the affected PE.
	 */

	....

5) There is v2 of SPAPR TCE IOMMU. It deprecates VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE/
   VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE and implements 2 new ioctls:
   VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_REGISTER_MEMORY and VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_UNREGISTER_MEMORY
   (which are unsupported in v1 IOMMU).

   PPC64 paravirtualized guests generate a lot of map/unmap requests,
   and the handling of those includes pinning/unpinning pages and updating
   mm::locked_vm counter to make sure we do not exceed the rlimit.
   The v2 IOMMU splits accounting and pinning into separate operations:

   - VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_REGISTER_MEMORY/VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_UNREGISTER_MEMORY ioctls
     receive a user space address and size of the block to be pinned.
     Bisecting is not supported and VFIO_IOMMU_UNREGISTER_MEMORY is expected to
     be called with the exact address and size used for registering
     the memory block. The userspace is not expected to call these often.
     The ranges are stored in a linked list in a VFIO container.

   - VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA/VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA ioctls only update the actual
     IOMMU table and do not do pinning; instead these check that the userspace
     address is from pre-registered range.

   This separation helps in optimizing DMA for guests.

6) sPAPR specification allows guests to have an additional DMA window(s) on
   a PCI bus with a variable page size. Two ioctls have been added to support
   this: VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_CREATE and VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_REMOVE.
   The platform has to support the functionality or error will be returned to
   the userspace. The existing hardware supports up to 2 DMA windows, one is
   2GB long, uses 4K pages and called "default 32bit window"; the other can
   be as big as entire RAM, use different page size, it is optional - guests
   create those in run-time if the guest driver supports 64bit DMA.

   VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_CREATE receives a page shift, a DMA window size and
   a number of TCE table levels (if a TCE table is going to be big enough and
   the kernel may not be able to allocate enough of physically contiguous
   memory). It creates a new window in the available slot and returns the bus
   address where the new window starts. Due to hardware limitation, the user
   space cannot choose the location of DMA windows.

   VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_REMOVE receives the bus start address of the window
   and removes it.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

.. [1] VFIO was originally an acronym for "Virtual Function I/O" in its
   initial implementation by Tom Lyon while as Cisco.  We've since
   outgrown the acronym, but it's catchy.

.. [2] "safe" also depends upon a device being "well behaved".  It's
   possible for multi-function devices to have backdoors between
   functions and even for single function devices to have alternative
   access to things like PCI config space through MMIO registers.  To
   guard against the former we can include additional precautions in the
   IOMMU driver to group multi-function PCI devices together
   (iommu=group_mf).  The latter we can't prevent, but the IOMMU should
   still provide isolation.  For PCI, SR-IOV Virtual Functions are the
   best indicator of "well behaved", as these are designed for
   virtualization usage models.

.. [3] As always there are trade-offs to virtual machine device
   assignment that are beyond the scope of VFIO.  It's expected that
   future IOMMU technologies will reduce some, but maybe not all, of
   these trade-offs.

.. [4] In this case the device is below a PCI bridge, so transactions
   from either function of the device are indistinguishable to the iommu::

	-[0000:00]-+-1e.0-[06]--+-0d.0
				\-0d.1

	00:1e.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation 82801 PCI Bridge (rev 90)

.. [5] Nested translation is an IOMMU feature which supports two stage
   address translations.  This improves the address translation efficiency
   in IOMMU virtualization.

.. [6] PASID stands for Process Address Space ID, introduced by PCI
   Express.  It is a prerequisite for Shared Virtual Addressing (SVA)
   and Scalable I/O Virtualization (Scalable IOV).