xref: /linux/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm (revision 6beeaf48db6c548fcfc2ad32739d33af2fef3a5b)
1What:		security/evm
2Date:		March 2011
3Contact:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
4Description:
5		EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs)
6		against integrity attacks. The initial method maintains an
7		HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the
8		value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
9
10		EVM supports two classes of security.evm. The first is
11		an HMAC-sha1 generated locally with a
12		trusted/encrypted key stored in the Kernel Key
13		Retention System. The second is a digital signature
14		generated either locally or remotely using an
15		asymmetric key. These keys are loaded onto root's
16		keyring using keyctl, and EVM is then enabled by
17		echoing a value to <securityfs>/evm made up of the
18		following bits:
19
20		===	  ==================================================
21		Bit	  Effect
22		===	  ==================================================
23		0	  Enable HMAC validation and creation
24		1	  Enable digital signature validation
25		2	  Permit modification of EVM-protected metadata at
26			  runtime. Not supported if HMAC validation and
27			  creation is enabled (deprecated).
28		31	  Disable further runtime modification of EVM policy
29		===	  ==================================================
30
31		For example::
32
33		  echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm
34
35		will enable HMAC validation and creation
36
37		::
38
39		  echo 0x80000003 ><securityfs>/evm
40
41		will enable HMAC and digital signature validation and
42		HMAC creation and disable all further modification of policy.
43
44		::
45
46		  echo 0x80000006 ><securityfs>/evm
47
48		will enable digital signature validation, permit
49		modification of EVM-protected metadata and
50		disable all further modification of policy. This option is now
51		deprecated in favor of::
52
53		  echo 0x80000002 ><securityfs>/evm
54
55		as the outstanding issues that prevent the usage of EVM portable
56		signatures have been solved.
57
58		Echoing a value is additive, the new value is added to the
59		existing initialization flags.
60
61		For example, after::
62
63		  echo 2 ><securityfs>/evm
64
65		another echo can be performed::
66
67		  echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm
68
69		and the resulting value will be 3.
70
71		Note that once an HMAC key has been loaded, it will no longer
72		be possible to enable metadata modification. Signaling that an
73		HMAC key has been loaded will clear the corresponding flag.
74		For example, if the current value is 6 (2 and 4 set)::
75
76		  echo 1 ><securityfs>/evm
77
78		will set the new value to 3 (4 cleared).
79
80		Loading an HMAC key is the only way to disable metadata
81		modification.
82
83		Until key loading has been signaled EVM can not create
84		or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns
85		INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.  Loading keys and signaling EVM
86		should be done as early as possible.  Normally this is
87		done in the initramfs, which has already been measured
88		as part of the trusted boot.  For more information on
89		creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys,
90		refer to:
91		Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. Both
92		dracut (via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via
93		core/ima-setup) have support for loading keys at boot
94		time.
95
96What:		security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
97Date:		April 2018
98Contact:	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
99Description:
100		Shows the set of extended attributes used to calculate or
101		validate the EVM signature, and allows additional attributes
102		to be added at runtime. Any signatures generated after
103		additional attributes are added (and on files possessing those
104		additional attributes) will only be valid if the same
105		additional attributes are configured on system boot. Writing
106		a single period (.) will lock the xattr list from any further
107		modification.
108