1 /* 2 BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux 3 Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies). 4 5 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 6 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as 7 published by the Free Software Foundation; 8 9 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS 10 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, 11 FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS. 12 IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY 13 CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES 14 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN 15 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF 16 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. 17 18 ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS, 19 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS 20 SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED. 21 */ 22 23 #include <linux/debugfs.h> 24 #include <linux/scatterlist.h> 25 #include <crypto/aes.h> 26 #include <crypto/hash.h> 27 #include <crypto/kpp.h> 28 #include <crypto/utils.h> 29 30 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h> 31 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h> 32 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h> 33 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h> 34 35 #include "ecdh_helper.h" 36 #include "smp.h" 37 38 #define SMP_DEV(hdev) \ 39 ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data) 40 41 /* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want 42 * accidentally in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys 43 * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions. 44 */ 45 #ifdef DEBUG 46 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \ 47 ##__VA_ARGS__) 48 #else 49 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \ 50 ##__VA_ARGS__) 51 #endif 52 53 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd) 54 55 /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */ 56 #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY) 57 58 #define SMP_TIMEOUT secs_to_jiffies(30) 59 60 #define ID_ADDR_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(200) 61 62 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \ 63 0x3f : 0x07) 64 #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07 65 66 /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */ 67 #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80 68 69 enum { 70 SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, 71 SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, 72 SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, 73 SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, 74 SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, 75 SMP_FLAG_SC, 76 SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, 77 SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, 78 SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, 79 SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, 80 SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, 81 SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, 82 SMP_FLAG_CT2, 83 }; 84 85 struct smp_dev { 86 /* Secure Connections OOB data */ 87 bool local_oob; 88 u8 local_pk[64]; 89 u8 local_rand[16]; 90 bool debug_key; 91 92 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; 93 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; 94 }; 95 96 struct smp_chan { 97 struct l2cap_conn *conn; 98 struct delayed_work security_timer; 99 unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */ 100 101 u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */ 102 u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */ 103 u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */ 104 u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */ 105 u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */ 106 u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */ 107 u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */ 108 u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */ 109 u8 enc_key_size; 110 u8 remote_key_dist; 111 bdaddr_t id_addr; 112 u8 id_addr_type; 113 u8 irk[16]; 114 struct smp_csrk *csrk; 115 struct smp_csrk *responder_csrk; 116 struct smp_ltk *ltk; 117 struct smp_ltk *responder_ltk; 118 struct smp_irk *remote_irk; 119 u8 *link_key; 120 unsigned long flags; 121 u8 method; 122 u8 passkey_round; 123 124 /* Secure Connections variables */ 125 u8 local_pk[64]; 126 u8 remote_pk[64]; 127 u8 dhkey[32]; 128 u8 mackey[16]; 129 130 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; 131 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; 132 }; 133 134 /* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core 135 * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the 136 * private debug key. 137 */ 138 static const u8 debug_pk[64] = { 139 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, 140 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, 141 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, 142 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20, 143 144 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74, 145 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76, 146 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63, 147 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc, 148 }; 149 150 static const u8 debug_sk[32] = { 151 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58, 152 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a, 153 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74, 154 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f, 155 }; 156 157 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len) 158 { 159 size_t i; 160 161 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 162 dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i]; 163 } 164 165 /* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions 166 * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6. 167 */ 168 169 static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, 170 size_t len, u8 mac[16]) 171 { 172 uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX]; 173 int err; 174 175 if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX) 176 return -EFBIG; 177 178 if (!tfm) { 179 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm); 180 return -EINVAL; 181 } 182 183 /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */ 184 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); 185 swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len); 186 187 SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m); 188 SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k); 189 190 err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16); 191 if (err) { 192 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); 193 return err; 194 } 195 196 err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, msg_msb, len, mac_msb); 197 if (err) { 198 BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err); 199 return err; 200 } 201 202 swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16); 203 204 SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac); 205 206 return 0; 207 } 208 209 static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], 210 const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16]) 211 { 212 u8 m[65]; 213 int err; 214 215 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u); 216 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v); 217 SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z); 218 219 m[0] = z; 220 memcpy(m + 1, v, 32); 221 memcpy(m + 33, u, 32); 222 223 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res); 224 if (err) 225 return err; 226 227 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); 228 229 return err; 230 } 231 232 static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32], 233 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7], 234 const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16]) 235 { 236 /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in 237 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII 238 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a 239 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little 240 * endian format. 241 */ 242 const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 }; 243 const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60, 244 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c }; 245 const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 }; 246 u8 m[53], t[16]; 247 int err; 248 249 SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w); 250 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2); 251 SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2); 252 253 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t); 254 if (err) 255 return err; 256 257 SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t); 258 259 memcpy(m, length, 2); 260 memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7); 261 memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7); 262 memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16); 263 memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16); 264 memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4); 265 266 m[52] = 0; /* Counter */ 267 268 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey); 269 if (err) 270 return err; 271 272 SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey); 273 274 m[52] = 1; /* Counter */ 275 276 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk); 277 if (err) 278 return err; 279 280 SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk); 281 282 return 0; 283 } 284 285 static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], 286 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16], 287 const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7], 288 u8 res[16]) 289 { 290 u8 m[65]; 291 int err; 292 293 SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w); 294 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2); 295 SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2); 296 297 memcpy(m, a2, 7); 298 memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7); 299 memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3); 300 memcpy(m + 17, r, 16); 301 memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16); 302 memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16); 303 304 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res); 305 if (err) 306 return err; 307 308 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); 309 310 return err; 311 } 312 313 static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32], 314 const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val) 315 { 316 u8 m[80], tmp[16]; 317 int err; 318 319 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u); 320 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v); 321 SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y); 322 323 memcpy(m, y, 16); 324 memcpy(m + 16, v, 32); 325 memcpy(m + 48, u, 32); 326 327 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp); 328 if (err) 329 return err; 330 331 *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp); 332 *val %= 1000000; 333 334 SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val); 335 336 return 0; 337 } 338 339 static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], 340 const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16]) 341 { 342 int err; 343 344 SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id); 345 346 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res); 347 if (err) 348 return err; 349 350 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); 351 352 return err; 353 } 354 355 static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], 356 const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16]) 357 { 358 int err; 359 360 SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt); 361 362 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res); 363 if (err) 364 return err; 365 366 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); 367 368 return err; 369 } 370 371 /* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1, 372 * s1 and ah. 373 */ 374 375 static int smp_e(const u8 *k, u8 *r) 376 { 377 struct aes_enckey aes; 378 uint8_t tmp[16], data[16]; 379 int err; 380 381 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r); 382 383 /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */ 384 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); 385 386 err = aes_prepareenckey(&aes, tmp, 16); 387 if (err) { 388 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); 389 return err; 390 } 391 392 /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */ 393 swap_buf(r, data, 16); 394 395 aes_encrypt(&aes, data, data); 396 397 /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */ 398 swap_buf(data, r, 16); 399 400 SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r); 401 402 memzero_explicit(&aes, sizeof(aes)); 403 return err; 404 } 405 406 static int smp_c1(const u8 k[16], 407 const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, 408 const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16]) 409 { 410 u8 p1[16], p2[16]; 411 int err; 412 413 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r); 414 SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra); 415 SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres); 416 417 memset(p1, 0, 16); 418 419 /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */ 420 p1[0] = _iat; 421 p1[1] = _rat; 422 memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7); 423 memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7); 424 425 SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1); 426 427 /* res = r XOR p1 */ 428 crypto_xor_cpy(res, r, p1, sizeof(p1)); 429 430 /* res = e(k, res) */ 431 err = smp_e(k, res); 432 if (err) { 433 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); 434 return err; 435 } 436 437 /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */ 438 memcpy(p2, ra, 6); 439 memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6); 440 memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4); 441 442 SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2); 443 444 /* res = res XOR p2 */ 445 crypto_xor(res, p2, sizeof(p2)); 446 447 /* res = e(k, res) */ 448 err = smp_e(k, res); 449 if (err) 450 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); 451 452 return err; 453 } 454 455 static int smp_s1(const u8 k[16], 456 const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16]) 457 { 458 int err; 459 460 /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */ 461 memcpy(_r, r2, 8); 462 memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8); 463 464 err = smp_e(k, _r); 465 if (err) 466 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); 467 468 return err; 469 } 470 471 static int smp_ah(const u8 irk[16], const u8 r[3], u8 res[3]) 472 { 473 u8 _res[16]; 474 int err; 475 476 /* r' = padding || r */ 477 memcpy(_res, r, 3); 478 memset(_res + 3, 0, 13); 479 480 err = smp_e(irk, _res); 481 if (err) { 482 BT_ERR("Encrypt error"); 483 return err; 484 } 485 486 /* The output of the random address function ah is: 487 * ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24 488 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits 489 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the 490 * result of ah. 491 */ 492 memcpy(res, _res, 3); 493 494 return 0; 495 } 496 497 bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], 498 const bdaddr_t *bdaddr) 499 { 500 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; 501 u8 hash[3]; 502 int err; 503 504 if (!chan || !chan->data) 505 return false; 506 507 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk); 508 509 err = smp_ah(irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash); 510 if (err) 511 return false; 512 513 return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3); 514 } 515 516 int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa) 517 { 518 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; 519 int err; 520 521 if (!chan || !chan->data) 522 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 523 524 get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3); 525 526 rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */ 527 rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */ 528 529 err = smp_ah(irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b); 530 if (err < 0) 531 return err; 532 533 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR", rpa); 534 535 return 0; 536 } 537 538 int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16]) 539 { 540 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; 541 struct smp_dev *smp; 542 int err; 543 544 if (!chan || !chan->data) 545 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 546 547 smp = chan->data; 548 549 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) { 550 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys"); 551 err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk); 552 if (err) 553 return err; 554 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64); 555 smp->debug_key = true; 556 } else { 557 while (true) { 558 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */ 559 err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk); 560 if (err) 561 return err; 562 563 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that 564 * we didn't accidentally generate a debug key. 565 */ 566 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64)) 567 break; 568 } 569 smp->debug_key = false; 570 } 571 572 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk); 573 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32); 574 575 get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16); 576 577 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk, 578 smp->local_rand, 0, hash); 579 if (err < 0) 580 return err; 581 582 memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16); 583 584 smp->local_oob = true; 585 586 return 0; 587 } 588 589 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data) 590 { 591 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 592 struct smp_chan *smp; 593 struct kvec iv[2]; 594 struct msghdr msg; 595 596 if (!chan) 597 return; 598 599 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "code 0x%2.2x", code); 600 601 iv[0].iov_base = &code; 602 iv[0].iov_len = 1; 603 604 iv[1].iov_base = data; 605 iv[1].iov_len = len; 606 607 memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); 608 609 iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_SOURCE, iv, 2, 1 + len); 610 611 l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len, NULL); 612 613 if (!chan->data) 614 return; 615 616 smp = chan->data; 617 618 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); 619 schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT); 620 } 621 622 static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq) 623 { 624 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) { 625 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC) 626 return BT_SECURITY_FIPS; 627 else 628 return BT_SECURITY_HIGH; 629 } else { 630 return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; 631 } 632 } 633 634 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level) 635 { 636 switch (sec_level) { 637 case BT_SECURITY_FIPS: 638 case BT_SECURITY_HIGH: 639 return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING; 640 case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM: 641 return SMP_AUTH_BONDING; 642 default: 643 return SMP_AUTH_NONE; 644 } 645 } 646 647 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, 648 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, 649 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq) 650 { 651 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 652 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 653 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 654 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 655 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; 656 657 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) { 658 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; 659 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; 660 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING; 661 } else { 662 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING; 663 } 664 665 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING)) 666 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; 667 668 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY)) 669 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; 670 671 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) && 672 (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) { 673 struct oob_data *oob_data; 674 u8 bdaddr_type; 675 676 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) { 677 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY; 678 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY; 679 } 680 681 if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC) 682 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC; 683 else 684 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM; 685 686 oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst, 687 bdaddr_type); 688 if (oob_data && oob_data->present) { 689 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags); 690 oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT; 691 memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16); 692 memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16); 693 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf); 694 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr); 695 } 696 697 } else { 698 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC; 699 } 700 701 if (rsp == NULL) { 702 req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; 703 req->oob_flag = oob_flag; 704 req->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size; 705 req->init_key_dist = local_dist; 706 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist; 707 req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev)); 708 709 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist; 710 return; 711 } 712 713 rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; 714 rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag; 715 rsp->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size; 716 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist; 717 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist; 718 rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev)); 719 720 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist; 721 } 722 723 static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size) 724 { 725 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 726 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; 727 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 728 729 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS && 730 max_key_size != SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) 731 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; 732 733 if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size || 734 max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) 735 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; 736 737 smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size; 738 739 return 0; 740 } 741 742 static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) 743 { 744 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 745 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 746 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 747 bool complete; 748 749 BUG_ON(!smp); 750 751 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); 752 753 complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); 754 mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete); 755 756 kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk); 757 kfree_sensitive(smp->responder_csrk); 758 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key); 759 760 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); 761 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh); 762 763 /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key 764 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled. 765 */ 766 if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG && 767 !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) { 768 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list); 769 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); 770 smp->ltk = NULL; 771 } 772 773 /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */ 774 if (!complete) { 775 if (smp->ltk) { 776 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list); 777 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); 778 } 779 780 if (smp->responder_ltk) { 781 list_del_rcu(&smp->responder_ltk->list); 782 kfree_rcu(smp->responder_ltk, rcu); 783 } 784 785 if (smp->remote_irk) { 786 list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list); 787 kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu); 788 } 789 } 790 791 chan->data = NULL; 792 kfree_sensitive(smp); 793 hci_conn_drop(hcon); 794 } 795 796 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason) 797 { 798 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 799 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 800 801 if (reason) 802 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason), 803 &reason); 804 805 mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); 806 807 if (chan->data) 808 smp_chan_destroy(conn); 809 } 810 811 #define JUST_WORKS 0x00 812 #define JUST_CFM 0x01 813 #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02 814 #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03 815 #define REQ_OOB 0x04 816 #define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05 817 #define OVERLAP 0xFF 818 819 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = { 820 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, 821 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, 822 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, 823 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM }, 824 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP }, 825 }; 826 827 static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = { 828 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, 829 { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, 830 { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY }, 831 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM }, 832 { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, 833 }; 834 835 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) 836 { 837 /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets 838 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators. 839 */ 840 if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY || 841 remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) 842 return JUST_CFM; 843 844 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) 845 return sc_method[remote_io][local_io]; 846 847 return gen_method[remote_io][local_io]; 848 } 849 850 static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, 851 u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) 852 { 853 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 854 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 855 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 856 u32 passkey = 0; 857 int ret; 858 859 /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */ 860 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); 861 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); 862 863 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "auth:%u lcl:%u rem:%u", auth, local_io, 864 remote_io); 865 866 /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming 867 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM 868 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this 869 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the 870 * table. 871 */ 872 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM)) 873 smp->method = JUST_CFM; 874 else 875 smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); 876 877 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ 878 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, 879 &smp->flags)) 880 smp->method = JUST_WORKS; 881 882 /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */ 883 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && 884 hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) 885 smp->method = JUST_WORKS; 886 887 /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK and ask user-space for 888 * confirmation */ 889 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) { 890 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, 891 hcon->type, 892 hcon->dst_type, 893 passkey, 1); 894 if (ret) 895 return ret; 896 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); 897 return 0; 898 } 899 900 /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we 901 * can only recover the just-works case. 902 */ 903 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) 904 return -EINVAL; 905 906 /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */ 907 if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) { 908 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags); 909 if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH) 910 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; 911 } 912 913 /* If both devices have Keyboard-Display I/O, the initiator 914 * Confirms and the responder Enters the passkey. 915 */ 916 if (smp->method == OVERLAP) { 917 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) 918 smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY; 919 else 920 smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY; 921 } 922 923 /* Generate random passkey. */ 924 if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) { 925 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); 926 get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey)); 927 passkey %= 1000000; 928 put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk); 929 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %u", passkey); 930 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); 931 } 932 933 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) 934 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, 935 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type); 936 else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM) 937 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, 938 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, 939 passkey, 1); 940 else 941 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, 942 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, 943 passkey, 0); 944 945 return ret; 946 } 947 948 static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) 949 { 950 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 951 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp; 952 int ret; 953 954 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); 955 956 ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, 957 conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr, 958 conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr, 959 cp.confirm_val); 960 if (ret) 961 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 962 963 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); 964 965 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp); 966 967 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) 968 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 969 else 970 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 971 972 return 0; 973 } 974 975 static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) 976 { 977 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 978 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 979 u8 confirm[16]; 980 int ret; 981 982 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, 983 test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags) ? "initiator" : 984 "responder"); 985 986 ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, 987 hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, 988 hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm); 989 if (ret) 990 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 991 992 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) { 993 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "pairing failed " 994 "(confirmation values mismatch)"); 995 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; 996 } 997 998 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 999 u8 stk[16]; 1000 __le64 rand = 0; 1001 __le16 ediv = 0; 1002 1003 smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk); 1004 1005 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) 1006 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1007 1008 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size); 1009 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; 1010 set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); 1011 } else { 1012 u8 stk[16], auth; 1013 __le64 rand = 0; 1014 __le16 ediv = 0; 1015 1016 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), 1017 smp->prnd); 1018 1019 smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk); 1020 1021 auth = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags) ? 1 : 0; 1022 1023 /* Even though there's no _RESPONDER suffix this is the 1024 * responder STK we're adding for later lookup (the initiator 1025 * STK never needs to be stored). 1026 */ 1027 hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, 1028 SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); 1029 } 1030 1031 return 0; 1032 } 1033 1034 static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) 1035 { 1036 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 1037 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 1038 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 1039 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 1040 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; 1041 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; 1042 bool persistent; 1043 1044 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { 1045 if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) 1046 persistent = false; 1047 else 1048 persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY, 1049 &hcon->flags); 1050 } else { 1051 /* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if 1052 * both sides had the bonding bit set in their 1053 * authentication requests. 1054 */ 1055 persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & 1056 SMP_AUTH_BONDING); 1057 } 1058 1059 if (smp->remote_irk) { 1060 mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent); 1061 1062 /* Now that user space can be considered to know the 1063 * identity address track the connection based on it 1064 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link). 1065 */ 1066 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) { 1067 bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr); 1068 hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type; 1069 /* Use a short delay to make sure the new address is 1070 * propagated _before_ the channels. 1071 */ 1072 queue_delayed_work(hdev->workqueue, 1073 &conn->id_addr_timer, 1074 ID_ADDR_TIMEOUT); 1075 } 1076 } 1077 1078 if (smp->csrk) { 1079 smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; 1080 bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); 1081 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); 1082 } 1083 1084 if (smp->responder_csrk) { 1085 smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; 1086 bacpy(&smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); 1087 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->responder_csrk, persistent); 1088 } 1089 1090 if (smp->ltk) { 1091 smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; 1092 bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); 1093 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); 1094 } 1095 1096 if (smp->responder_ltk) { 1097 smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; 1098 bacpy(&smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); 1099 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->responder_ltk, persistent); 1100 } 1101 1102 if (smp->link_key) { 1103 struct link_key *key; 1104 u8 type; 1105 1106 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags)) 1107 type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION; 1108 else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) 1109 type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256; 1110 else 1111 type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256; 1112 1113 key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst, 1114 smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent); 1115 if (key) { 1116 mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent); 1117 1118 /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant 1119 * flag is not set. 1120 */ 1121 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) && 1122 key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) { 1123 list_del_rcu(&key->list); 1124 kfree_rcu(key, rcu); 1125 } 1126 } 1127 } 1128 } 1129 1130 static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp) 1131 { 1132 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; 1133 u8 key_type, auth; 1134 1135 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags)) 1136 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG; 1137 else 1138 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256; 1139 1140 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) 1141 auth = 1; 1142 else 1143 auth = 0; 1144 1145 smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, 1146 key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, 1147 0, 0); 1148 } 1149 1150 static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp) 1151 { 1152 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */ 1153 const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c }; 1154 1155 smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL); 1156 if (!smp->link_key) 1157 return; 1158 1159 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) { 1160 /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7031 */ 1161 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; 1162 1163 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) { 1164 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key); 1165 smp->link_key = NULL; 1166 return; 1167 } 1168 } else { 1169 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */ 1170 const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; 1171 1172 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) { 1173 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key); 1174 smp->link_key = NULL; 1175 return; 1176 } 1177 } 1178 1179 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) { 1180 kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key); 1181 smp->link_key = NULL; 1182 return; 1183 } 1184 } 1185 1186 static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp) 1187 { 1188 /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs 1189 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive 1190 * them in the correct order. 1191 */ 1192 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) 1193 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO); 1194 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) 1195 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); 1196 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) 1197 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); 1198 } 1199 1200 static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp) 1201 { 1202 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */ 1203 const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 }; 1204 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; 1205 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 1206 struct link_key *key; 1207 1208 key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst); 1209 if (!key) { 1210 bt_dev_err(hdev, "no Link Key found to generate LTK"); 1211 return; 1212 } 1213 1214 if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) 1215 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); 1216 1217 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) { 1218 /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7032 */ 1219 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; 1220 1221 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk)) 1222 return; 1223 } else { 1224 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */ 1225 const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; 1226 1227 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk)) 1228 return; 1229 } 1230 1231 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk)) 1232 return; 1233 1234 sc_add_ltk(smp); 1235 } 1236 1237 static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) 1238 { 1239 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; 1240 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1241 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 1242 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 1243 __u8 *keydist; 1244 1245 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); 1246 1247 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; 1248 1249 /* The responder sends its keys first */ 1250 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags) && 1251 (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) { 1252 smp_allow_key_dist(smp); 1253 return; 1254 } 1255 1256 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; 1257 1258 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 1259 keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; 1260 *keydist &= req->init_key_dist; 1261 } else { 1262 keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist; 1263 *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist; 1264 } 1265 1266 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { 1267 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY)) 1268 sc_generate_link_key(smp); 1269 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)) 1270 sc_generate_ltk(smp); 1271 1272 /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */ 1273 *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; 1274 } 1275 1276 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "keydist 0x%x", *keydist); 1277 1278 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { 1279 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; 1280 struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident ident; 1281 struct smp_ltk *ltk; 1282 u8 authenticated; 1283 __le16 ediv; 1284 __le64 rand; 1285 1286 /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of 1287 * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest 1288 * of the value to zeroes. 1289 */ 1290 get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size); 1291 memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, 1292 sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size); 1293 1294 get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); 1295 get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand)); 1296 1297 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); 1298 1299 authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; 1300 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, 1301 SMP_LTK_RESPONDER, authenticated, enc.ltk, 1302 smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); 1303 smp->responder_ltk = ltk; 1304 1305 ident.ediv = ediv; 1306 ident.rand = rand; 1307 1308 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT, sizeof(ident), 1309 &ident); 1310 1311 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; 1312 } 1313 1314 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) { 1315 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; 1316 struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; 1317 1318 memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); 1319 1320 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); 1321 1322 /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address 1323 * after the connection has been established. 1324 * 1325 * This is true even when the connection has been 1326 * established using a resolvable random address. 1327 */ 1328 bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src); 1329 addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type; 1330 1331 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), 1332 &addrinfo); 1333 1334 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; 1335 } 1336 1337 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { 1338 struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; 1339 struct smp_csrk *csrk; 1340 1341 /* Generate a new random key */ 1342 get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); 1343 1344 csrk = kzalloc_obj(*csrk); 1345 if (csrk) { 1346 if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) 1347 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED; 1348 else 1349 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED; 1350 memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); 1351 } 1352 smp->responder_csrk = csrk; 1353 1354 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); 1355 1356 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; 1357 } 1358 1359 /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */ 1360 if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) { 1361 smp_allow_key_dist(smp); 1362 return; 1363 } 1364 1365 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); 1366 smp_notify_keys(conn); 1367 1368 smp_chan_destroy(conn); 1369 } 1370 1371 static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work) 1372 { 1373 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, 1374 security_timer.work); 1375 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1376 1377 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); 1378 1379 hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); 1380 } 1381 1382 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) 1383 { 1384 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 1385 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 1386 struct smp_chan *smp; 1387 1388 smp = kzalloc_obj(*smp, GFP_ATOMIC); 1389 if (!smp) 1390 return NULL; 1391 1392 smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); 1393 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) { 1394 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); 1395 goto zfree_smp; 1396 } 1397 1398 smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0); 1399 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) { 1400 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); 1401 goto free_shash; 1402 } 1403 1404 smp->conn = conn; 1405 chan->data = smp; 1406 1407 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL); 1408 1409 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout); 1410 1411 hci_conn_hold(hcon); 1412 1413 return smp; 1414 1415 free_shash: 1416 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); 1417 zfree_smp: 1418 kfree_sensitive(smp); 1419 return NULL; 1420 } 1421 1422 static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16]) 1423 { 1424 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; 1425 u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7]; 1426 1427 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 1428 na = smp->prnd; 1429 nb = smp->rrnd; 1430 } else { 1431 na = smp->rrnd; 1432 nb = smp->prnd; 1433 } 1434 1435 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); 1436 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); 1437 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; 1438 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; 1439 1440 return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk); 1441 } 1442 1443 static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp) 1444 { 1445 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; 1446 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check; 1447 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr; 1448 u8 io_cap[3], r[16]; 1449 1450 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); 1451 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); 1452 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; 1453 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; 1454 1455 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 1456 local_addr = a; 1457 remote_addr = b; 1458 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3); 1459 } else { 1460 local_addr = b; 1461 remote_addr = a; 1462 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3); 1463 } 1464 1465 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); 1466 1467 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) 1468 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r); 1469 1470 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) 1471 memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16); 1472 1473 smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap, 1474 local_addr, remote_addr, check.e); 1475 1476 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check); 1477 } 1478 1479 static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) 1480 { 1481 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1482 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 1483 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm; 1484 u8 r; 1485 1486 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01); 1487 r |= 0x80; 1488 1489 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); 1490 1491 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r, 1492 cfm.confirm_val)) 1493 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1494 1495 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm); 1496 1497 return 0; 1498 } 1499 1500 static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op) 1501 { 1502 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1503 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 1504 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 1505 u8 cfm[16], r; 1506 1507 /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */ 1508 if (smp->passkey_round >= 20) 1509 return 0; 1510 1511 switch (smp_op) { 1512 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: 1513 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01); 1514 r |= 0x80; 1515 1516 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk, 1517 smp->rrnd, r, cfm)) 1518 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1519 1520 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16)) 1521 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; 1522 1523 smp->passkey_round++; 1524 1525 if (smp->passkey_round == 20) { 1526 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */ 1527 if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk)) 1528 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1529 } 1530 1531 /* The round is only complete when the initiator 1532 * receives pairing random. 1533 */ 1534 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 1535 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, 1536 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); 1537 if (smp->passkey_round == 20) 1538 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); 1539 else 1540 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 1541 return 0; 1542 } 1543 1544 /* Start the next round */ 1545 if (smp->passkey_round != 20) 1546 return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0); 1547 1548 /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */ 1549 sc_dhkey_check(smp); 1550 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); 1551 1552 break; 1553 1554 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: 1555 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) { 1556 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); 1557 return 0; 1558 } 1559 1560 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 1561 1562 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 1563 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, 1564 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); 1565 return 0; 1566 } 1567 1568 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp); 1569 1570 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY: 1571 default: 1572 /* Initiating device starts the round */ 1573 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) 1574 return 0; 1575 1576 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Starting passkey round %u", 1577 smp->passkey_round + 1); 1578 1579 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 1580 1581 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp); 1582 } 1583 1584 return 0; 1585 } 1586 1587 static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) 1588 { 1589 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1590 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 1591 u8 smp_op; 1592 1593 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); 1594 1595 switch (mgmt_op) { 1596 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY: 1597 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); 1598 return 0; 1599 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY: 1600 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED); 1601 return 0; 1602 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: 1603 hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey); 1604 smp->passkey_round = 0; 1605 1606 if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) 1607 smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM; 1608 else 1609 smp_op = 0; 1610 1611 if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op)) 1612 return -EIO; 1613 1614 return 0; 1615 } 1616 1617 /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */ 1618 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 1619 sc_dhkey_check(smp); 1620 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); 1621 } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) { 1622 sc_dhkey_check(smp); 1623 sc_add_ltk(smp); 1624 } 1625 1626 return 0; 1627 } 1628 1629 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) 1630 { 1631 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; 1632 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 1633 struct smp_chan *smp; 1634 u32 value; 1635 int err; 1636 1637 if (!conn) 1638 return -ENOTCONN; 1639 1640 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, ""); 1641 1642 chan = conn->smp; 1643 if (!chan) 1644 return -ENOTCONN; 1645 1646 l2cap_chan_lock(chan); 1647 if (!chan->data) { 1648 err = -ENOTCONN; 1649 goto unlock; 1650 } 1651 1652 smp = chan->data; 1653 1654 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { 1655 err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey); 1656 goto unlock; 1657 } 1658 1659 switch (mgmt_op) { 1660 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: 1661 value = le32_to_cpu(passkey); 1662 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); 1663 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %u", value); 1664 put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk); 1665 fallthrough; 1666 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY: 1667 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); 1668 break; 1669 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY: 1670 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY: 1671 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); 1672 err = 0; 1673 goto unlock; 1674 default: 1675 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); 1676 err = -EOPNOTSUPP; 1677 goto unlock; 1678 } 1679 1680 err = 0; 1681 1682 /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */ 1683 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) { 1684 u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp); 1685 if (rsp) 1686 smp_failure(conn, rsp); 1687 } 1688 1689 unlock: 1690 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); 1691 return err; 1692 } 1693 1694 static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp, 1695 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, 1696 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp) 1697 { 1698 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 1699 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; 1700 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0; 1701 1702 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) { 1703 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; 1704 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; 1705 } 1706 1707 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING)) 1708 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; 1709 1710 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY)) 1711 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; 1712 1713 if (!rsp) { 1714 memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req)); 1715 1716 req->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2; 1717 req->init_key_dist = local_dist; 1718 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist; 1719 req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size; 1720 1721 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist; 1722 1723 return; 1724 } 1725 1726 memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp)); 1727 1728 rsp->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2; 1729 rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size; 1730 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist; 1731 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist; 1732 1733 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist; 1734 } 1735 1736 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 1737 { 1738 struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data; 1739 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 1740 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; 1741 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 1742 u8 key_size, auth, sec_level; 1743 int ret; 1744 1745 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); 1746 1747 if (skb->len < sizeof(*req)) 1748 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 1749 1750 if (smp && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) 1751 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; 1752 1753 if (!smp) { 1754 smp = smp_chan_create(conn); 1755 if (!smp) 1756 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1757 } 1758 1759 /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */ 1760 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); 1761 1762 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) && 1763 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) 1764 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; 1765 1766 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) 1767 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; 1768 1769 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; 1770 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req)); 1771 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req)); 1772 1773 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has 1774 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the 1775 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use. 1776 */ 1777 if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob) 1778 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags); 1779 1780 /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */ 1781 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { 1782 /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */ 1783 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) && 1784 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) 1785 return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED; 1786 1787 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); 1788 1789 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp); 1790 1791 if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) 1792 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags); 1793 1794 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size); 1795 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) 1796 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; 1797 1798 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ 1799 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; 1800 1801 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; 1802 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp)); 1803 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp); 1804 1805 smp_distribute_keys(smp); 1806 return 0; 1807 } 1808 1809 build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth); 1810 1811 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) { 1812 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); 1813 1814 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) 1815 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags); 1816 } 1817 1818 if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) 1819 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; 1820 else 1821 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); 1822 1823 if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level) 1824 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; 1825 1826 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved. */ 1827 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { 1828 u8 method; 1829 1830 method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability, 1831 req->io_capability); 1832 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) 1833 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; 1834 1835 /* Force MITM bit if it isn't set by the initiator. */ 1836 auth |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; 1837 rsp.auth_req |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; 1838 } 1839 1840 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size); 1841 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) 1842 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; 1843 1844 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); 1845 1846 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; 1847 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp)); 1848 1849 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp); 1850 1851 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); 1852 1853 /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the 1854 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth 1855 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false 1856 * positive SC enablement. 1857 */ 1858 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 1859 1860 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { 1861 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); 1862 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ 1863 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; 1864 /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */ 1865 return 0; 1866 } 1867 1868 /* Request setup of TK */ 1869 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability); 1870 if (ret) 1871 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1872 1873 return 0; 1874 } 1875 1876 static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp) 1877 { 1878 struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev; 1879 1880 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, ""); 1881 1882 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) { 1883 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; 1884 struct smp_dev *smp_dev; 1885 1886 if (!chan || !chan->data) 1887 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1888 1889 smp_dev = chan->data; 1890 1891 memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64); 1892 memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16); 1893 1894 if (smp_dev->debug_key) 1895 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); 1896 1897 goto done; 1898 } 1899 1900 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) { 1901 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys"); 1902 if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk)) 1903 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1904 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64); 1905 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); 1906 } else { 1907 while (true) { 1908 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */ 1909 if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk)) 1910 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 1911 1912 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that 1913 * we didn't accidentally generate a debug key. 1914 */ 1915 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64)) 1916 break; 1917 } 1918 } 1919 1920 done: 1921 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk); 1922 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32); 1923 1924 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk); 1925 1926 return 0; 1927 } 1928 1929 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 1930 { 1931 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data; 1932 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 1933 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 1934 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; 1935 u8 key_size, auth; 1936 int ret; 1937 1938 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); 1939 1940 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp)) 1941 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 1942 1943 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) 1944 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; 1945 1946 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp)); 1947 1948 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; 1949 1950 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size); 1951 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) 1952 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; 1953 1954 auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); 1955 1956 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) 1957 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; 1958 1959 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has 1960 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the 1961 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use. 1962 */ 1963 if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob) 1964 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags); 1965 1966 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; 1967 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp)); 1968 1969 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared 1970 * some bits that we had enabled in our request. 1971 */ 1972 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; 1973 1974 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2)) 1975 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags); 1976 1977 /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */ 1978 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { 1979 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ 1980 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; 1981 smp_distribute_keys(smp); 1982 return 0; 1983 } 1984 1985 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) 1986 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); 1987 else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH) 1988 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; 1989 1990 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ 1991 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { 1992 u8 method; 1993 1994 method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability, 1995 rsp->io_capability); 1996 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) 1997 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; 1998 } 1999 2000 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); 2001 2002 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared 2003 * some bits that we had enabled in our request. 2004 */ 2005 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; 2006 2007 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { 2008 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ 2009 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; 2010 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); 2011 return sc_send_public_key(smp); 2012 } 2013 2014 auth |= req->auth_req; 2015 2016 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability); 2017 if (ret) 2018 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2019 2020 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); 2021 2022 /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */ 2023 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) 2024 return smp_confirm(smp); 2025 2026 return 0; 2027 } 2028 2029 static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) 2030 { 2031 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 2032 2033 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, ""); 2034 2035 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) 2036 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 2037 2038 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 2039 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), 2040 smp->prnd); 2041 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 2042 } 2043 2044 return 0; 2045 } 2046 2047 /* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits 2048 * from our security request and thereby create the impression that 2049 * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it. 2050 */ 2051 static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp) 2052 { 2053 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; 2054 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2055 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 2056 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; 2057 u8 auth; 2058 2059 /* The issue is only observed when we're in responder role */ 2060 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) 2061 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2062 2063 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) { 2064 bt_dev_err(hdev, "refusing legacy fallback in SC-only mode"); 2065 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2066 } 2067 2068 bt_dev_err(hdev, "trying to fall back to legacy SMP"); 2069 2070 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; 2071 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; 2072 2073 /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */ 2074 smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist); 2075 2076 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); 2077 2078 if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) { 2079 bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to fall back to legacy SMP"); 2080 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2081 } 2082 2083 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); 2084 2085 return 0; 2086 } 2087 2088 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2089 { 2090 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2091 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2092 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2093 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 2094 2095 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, 2096 test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags) ? "initiator" : 2097 "responder"); 2098 2099 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf)) 2100 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2101 2102 memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); 2103 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); 2104 2105 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { 2106 int ret; 2107 2108 /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */ 2109 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags)) 2110 return sc_check_confirm(smp); 2111 2112 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm"); 2113 2114 ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp); 2115 if (ret) 2116 return ret; 2117 } 2118 2119 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 2120 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), 2121 smp->prnd); 2122 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 2123 return 0; 2124 } 2125 2126 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) 2127 return smp_confirm(smp); 2128 2129 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); 2130 2131 return 0; 2132 } 2133 2134 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2135 { 2136 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2137 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2138 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2139 u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb, confirm_hint; 2140 u32 passkey = 0; 2141 int err; 2142 2143 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); 2144 2145 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd)) 2146 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2147 2148 memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); 2149 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); 2150 2151 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) 2152 return smp_random(smp); 2153 2154 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 2155 pkax = smp->local_pk; 2156 pkbx = smp->remote_pk; 2157 na = smp->prnd; 2158 nb = smp->rrnd; 2159 } else { 2160 pkax = smp->remote_pk; 2161 pkbx = smp->local_pk; 2162 na = smp->rrnd; 2163 nb = smp->prnd; 2164 } 2165 2166 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) { 2167 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) 2168 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, 2169 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); 2170 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); 2171 goto mackey_and_ltk; 2172 } 2173 2174 /* Passkey entry has special treatment */ 2175 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) 2176 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 2177 2178 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 2179 u8 cfm[16]; 2180 2181 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk, 2182 smp->rrnd, 0, cfm); 2183 if (err) 2184 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2185 2186 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16)) 2187 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; 2188 } else { 2189 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), 2190 smp->prnd); 2191 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); 2192 } 2193 2194 mackey_and_ltk: 2195 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */ 2196 err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk); 2197 if (err) 2198 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2199 2200 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) { 2201 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 2202 sc_dhkey_check(smp); 2203 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); 2204 } 2205 return 0; 2206 } 2207 2208 err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey); 2209 if (err) 2210 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2211 2212 /* Always require user confirmation for Just-Works pairing to prevent 2213 * impersonation attacks, or in case of a legitimate device that is 2214 * repairing use the confirmation as acknowledgment to proceed with the 2215 * creation of new keys. 2216 */ 2217 confirm_hint = smp->method == JUST_WORKS ? 1 : 0; 2218 2219 err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, 2220 hcon->dst_type, passkey, confirm_hint); 2221 if (err) 2222 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2223 2224 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); 2225 2226 return 0; 2227 } 2228 2229 static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) 2230 { 2231 struct smp_ltk *key; 2232 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2233 2234 key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role); 2235 if (!key) 2236 return false; 2237 2238 if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level) 2239 return false; 2240 2241 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) 2242 return true; 2243 2244 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size); 2245 hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size; 2246 2247 /* We never store STKs for initiator role, so clear this flag */ 2248 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); 2249 2250 return true; 2251 } 2252 2253 bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level, 2254 enum smp_key_pref key_pref) 2255 { 2256 if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) 2257 return true; 2258 2259 /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using 2260 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the 2261 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK 2262 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we 2263 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits). 2264 */ 2265 if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK && 2266 test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && 2267 hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role)) 2268 return false; 2269 2270 if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level) 2271 return true; 2272 2273 return false; 2274 } 2275 2276 static void smp_send_pairing_req(struct smp_chan *smp, __u8 auth) 2277 { 2278 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; 2279 2280 if (smp->conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) 2281 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &cp, NULL); 2282 else 2283 build_pairing_cmd(smp->conn, &cp, NULL, auth); 2284 2285 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; 2286 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); 2287 2288 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); 2289 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); 2290 2291 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); 2292 } 2293 2294 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2295 { 2296 struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data; 2297 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2298 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 2299 struct smp_chan *smp; 2300 u8 sec_level, auth; 2301 2302 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); 2303 2304 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) 2305 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2306 2307 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) 2308 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; 2309 2310 auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); 2311 2312 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) 2313 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; 2314 2315 if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) 2316 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; 2317 else 2318 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); 2319 2320 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) { 2321 /* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we 2322 * still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3, 2323 * Part H 2.4.6 2324 */ 2325 smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level); 2326 return 0; 2327 } 2328 2329 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) 2330 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; 2331 2332 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) 2333 return 0; 2334 2335 smp = smp_chan_create(conn); 2336 if (!smp) 2337 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2338 2339 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) && 2340 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) 2341 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; 2342 2343 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); 2344 2345 smp_send_pairing_req(smp, auth); 2346 2347 return 0; 2348 } 2349 2350 static void smp_send_security_req(struct smp_chan *smp, __u8 auth) 2351 { 2352 struct smp_cmd_security_req cp; 2353 2354 cp.auth_req = auth; 2355 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); 2356 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ); 2357 2358 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); 2359 } 2360 2361 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) 2362 { 2363 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; 2364 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 2365 struct smp_chan *smp; 2366 __u8 authreq; 2367 int ret; 2368 2369 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, 2370 sec_level); 2371 2372 /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */ 2373 if (!conn) 2374 return 1; 2375 2376 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) 2377 return 1; 2378 2379 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) 2380 return 1; 2381 2382 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) 2383 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; 2384 2385 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) 2386 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) 2387 return 0; 2388 2389 chan = conn->smp; 2390 if (!chan) { 2391 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "security requested but not available"); 2392 return 1; 2393 } 2394 2395 l2cap_chan_lock(chan); 2396 2397 /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */ 2398 if (chan->data) { 2399 ret = 0; 2400 goto unlock; 2401 } 2402 2403 smp = smp_chan_create(conn); 2404 if (!smp) { 2405 ret = 1; 2406 goto unlock; 2407 } 2408 2409 authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level); 2410 2411 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) { 2412 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC; 2413 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) 2414 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2; 2415 } 2416 2417 /* Don't attempt to set MITM if setting is overridden by debugfs 2418 * Needed to pass certification test SM/MAS/PKE/BV-01-C 2419 */ 2420 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM)) { 2421 /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level 2422 * requires it. 2423 */ 2424 if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT || 2425 hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) 2426 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; 2427 } 2428 2429 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) 2430 smp_send_pairing_req(smp, authreq); 2431 else 2432 smp_send_security_req(smp, authreq); 2433 2434 ret = 0; 2435 2436 unlock: 2437 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); 2438 return ret; 2439 } 2440 2441 int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, 2442 u8 addr_type) 2443 { 2444 struct hci_conn *hcon; 2445 struct l2cap_conn *conn; 2446 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 2447 struct smp_chan *smp; 2448 int err; 2449 2450 err = hci_remove_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type); 2451 hci_remove_irk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type); 2452 2453 hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type); 2454 if (!hcon) 2455 goto done; 2456 2457 conn = hcon->l2cap_data; 2458 if (!conn) 2459 goto done; 2460 2461 chan = conn->smp; 2462 if (!chan) 2463 goto done; 2464 2465 l2cap_chan_lock(chan); 2466 2467 smp = chan->data; 2468 if (smp) { 2469 /* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to 2470 * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */ 2471 smp->ltk = NULL; 2472 smp->responder_ltk = NULL; 2473 smp->remote_irk = NULL; 2474 2475 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags)) 2476 smp_failure(conn, 0); 2477 else 2478 smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED); 2479 err = 0; 2480 } 2481 2482 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); 2483 2484 done: 2485 return err; 2486 } 2487 2488 static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2489 { 2490 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; 2491 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2492 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2493 2494 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); 2495 2496 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) 2497 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2498 2499 /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */ 2500 if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_LTK, 2501 rp->ltk)) { 2502 bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev, 2503 "LTK blocked for %pMR", 2504 &conn->hcon->dst); 2505 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2506 } 2507 2508 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT); 2509 2510 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); 2511 2512 memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk)); 2513 2514 return 0; 2515 } 2516 2517 static int smp_cmd_initiator_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2518 { 2519 struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident *rp = (void *)skb->data; 2520 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2521 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2522 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; 2523 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2524 struct smp_ltk *ltk; 2525 u8 authenticated; 2526 2527 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); 2528 2529 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) 2530 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2531 2532 /* Mark the information as received */ 2533 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; 2534 2535 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) 2536 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); 2537 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) 2538 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); 2539 2540 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); 2541 2542 authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH); 2543 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK, 2544 authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, 2545 rp->ediv, rp->rand); 2546 smp->ltk = ltk; 2547 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) 2548 smp_distribute_keys(smp); 2549 2550 return 0; 2551 } 2552 2553 static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2554 { 2555 struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data; 2556 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2557 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2558 2559 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, ""); 2560 2561 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) 2562 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2563 2564 /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */ 2565 if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_IRK, 2566 info->irk)) { 2567 bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev, 2568 "Identity key blocked for %pMR", 2569 &conn->hcon->dst); 2570 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2571 } 2572 2573 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO); 2574 2575 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); 2576 2577 memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16); 2578 2579 return 0; 2580 } 2581 2582 static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, 2583 struct sk_buff *skb) 2584 { 2585 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data; 2586 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2587 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2588 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2589 bdaddr_t rpa; 2590 2591 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, ""); 2592 2593 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) 2594 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2595 2596 /* Mark the information as received */ 2597 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; 2598 2599 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) 2600 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); 2601 2602 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); 2603 2604 /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending 2605 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK 2606 * as "identity information". However, since such 2607 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over 2608 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never 2609 * received an IRK for such a device. 2610 * 2611 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public 2612 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for. 2613 */ 2614 if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) || 2615 !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) { 2616 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "ignoring IRK with no identity address"); 2617 goto distribute; 2618 } 2619 2620 /* Drop IRK if peer is using identity address during pairing but is 2621 * providing different address as identity information. 2622 * 2623 * Microsoft Surface Precision Mouse is known to have this bug. 2624 */ 2625 if (hci_is_identity_address(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type) && 2626 (bacmp(&info->bdaddr, &hcon->dst) || 2627 info->addr_type != hcon->dst_type)) { 2628 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, 2629 "ignoring IRK with invalid identity address"); 2630 goto distribute; 2631 } 2632 2633 bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr); 2634 smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type; 2635 2636 if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type)) 2637 bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst); 2638 else 2639 bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY); 2640 2641 smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr, 2642 smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa); 2643 2644 distribute: 2645 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) 2646 smp_distribute_keys(smp); 2647 2648 return 0; 2649 } 2650 2651 static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2652 { 2653 struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; 2654 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2655 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2656 struct smp_csrk *csrk; 2657 2658 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); 2659 2660 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) 2661 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2662 2663 /* Mark the information as received */ 2664 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; 2665 2666 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); 2667 2668 csrk = kzalloc_obj(*csrk); 2669 if (csrk) { 2670 if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) 2671 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED; 2672 else 2673 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED; 2674 memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); 2675 } 2676 smp->csrk = csrk; 2677 smp_distribute_keys(smp); 2678 2679 return 0; 2680 } 2681 2682 static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp) 2683 { 2684 struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote; 2685 u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method; 2686 2687 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) || 2688 test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) 2689 return REQ_OOB; 2690 2691 /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs 2692 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get 2693 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the 2694 * first byte which contains the opcode. 2695 */ 2696 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 2697 local = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; 2698 remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; 2699 } else { 2700 local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; 2701 remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; 2702 } 2703 2704 local_io = local->io_capability; 2705 remote_io = remote->io_capability; 2706 2707 local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM); 2708 remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM); 2709 2710 /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table, 2711 * otherwise use JUST WORKS. 2712 */ 2713 if (local_mitm || remote_mitm) 2714 method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); 2715 else 2716 method = JUST_WORKS; 2717 2718 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ 2719 if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) 2720 method = JUST_WORKS; 2721 2722 return method; 2723 } 2724 2725 static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2726 { 2727 struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data; 2728 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2729 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2730 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2731 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 2732 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; 2733 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm; 2734 int err; 2735 2736 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); 2737 2738 if (skb->len < sizeof(*key)) 2739 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2740 2741 /* Check if remote and local public keys are the same and debug key is 2742 * not in use. 2743 */ 2744 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags) && 2745 !crypto_memneq(key, smp->local_pk, 64)) { 2746 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Remote and local public keys are identical"); 2747 return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED; 2748 } 2749 2750 memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64); 2751 2752 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) { 2753 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk, 2754 smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val); 2755 if (err) 2756 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2757 2758 if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16)) 2759 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; 2760 } 2761 2762 /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving 2763 * the key from the initiating device. 2764 */ 2765 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 2766 err = sc_send_public_key(smp); 2767 if (err) 2768 return err; 2769 } 2770 2771 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk); 2772 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32); 2773 2774 /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private 2775 * key was set/generated. 2776 */ 2777 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) { 2778 struct l2cap_chan *hchan = hdev->smp_data; 2779 struct smp_dev *smp_dev; 2780 2781 if (!hchan || !hchan->data) 2782 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2783 2784 smp_dev = hchan->data; 2785 2786 tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh; 2787 } else { 2788 tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh; 2789 } 2790 2791 if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey)) 2792 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2793 2794 SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey); 2795 2796 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags); 2797 2798 smp->method = sc_select_method(smp); 2799 2800 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "selected method 0x%02x", smp->method); 2801 2802 /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */ 2803 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM) 2804 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; 2805 else 2806 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS; 2807 2808 if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64)) 2809 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); 2810 2811 if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) { 2812 get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify, 2813 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify)); 2814 hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000; 2815 hcon->passkey_entered = 0; 2816 smp->passkey_round = 0; 2817 if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, 2818 hcon->dst_type, 2819 hcon->passkey_notify, 2820 hcon->passkey_entered)) 2821 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2822 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 2823 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); 2824 } 2825 2826 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) { 2827 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) 2828 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, 2829 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); 2830 2831 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 2832 2833 return 0; 2834 } 2835 2836 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) 2837 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 2838 2839 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) { 2840 if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, 2841 hcon->dst_type)) 2842 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2843 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); 2844 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); 2845 return 0; 2846 } 2847 2848 /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to 2849 * send the confirm value. 2850 */ 2851 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) 2852 return 0; 2853 2854 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, 2855 0, cfm.confirm_val); 2856 if (err) 2857 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2858 2859 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm); 2860 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); 2861 2862 return 0; 2863 } 2864 2865 static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) 2866 { 2867 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data; 2868 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; 2869 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2870 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 2871 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr; 2872 u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16]; 2873 int err; 2874 2875 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); 2876 2877 if (skb->len < sizeof(*check)) 2878 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; 2879 2880 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); 2881 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); 2882 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; 2883 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; 2884 2885 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 2886 local_addr = a; 2887 remote_addr = b; 2888 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3); 2889 } else { 2890 local_addr = b; 2891 remote_addr = a; 2892 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3); 2893 } 2894 2895 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); 2896 2897 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) 2898 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r); 2899 else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) 2900 memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16); 2901 2902 err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r, 2903 io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e); 2904 if (err) 2905 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; 2906 2907 if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16)) 2908 return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED; 2909 2910 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 2911 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) { 2912 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags); 2913 return 0; 2914 } 2915 2916 /* Responder sends DHKey check as response to initiator */ 2917 sc_dhkey_check(smp); 2918 } 2919 2920 sc_add_ltk(smp); 2921 2922 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) { 2923 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size); 2924 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; 2925 } 2926 2927 return 0; 2928 } 2929 2930 static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn, 2931 struct sk_buff *skb) 2932 { 2933 struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data; 2934 2935 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "value 0x%02x", kp->value); 2936 2937 return 0; 2938 } 2939 2940 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) 2941 { 2942 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; 2943 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 2944 struct smp_chan *smp; 2945 __u8 code, reason; 2946 int err = 0; 2947 2948 if (skb->len < 1) 2949 return -EILSEQ; 2950 2951 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) { 2952 reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; 2953 goto done; 2954 } 2955 2956 code = skb->data[0]; 2957 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code)); 2958 2959 smp = chan->data; 2960 2961 if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX) 2962 goto drop; 2963 2964 if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)) { 2965 /* If there is a context and the command is not allowed consider 2966 * it a failure so the session is cleanup properly. 2967 */ 2968 switch (code) { 2969 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: 2970 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: 2971 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: 2972 /* 3.6.1. Key distribution and generation 2973 * 2974 * A device may reject a distributed key by sending the 2975 * Pairing Failed command with the reason set to 2976 * "Key Rejected". 2977 */ 2978 smp_failure(conn, SMP_KEY_REJECTED); 2979 break; 2980 } 2981 goto drop; 2982 } 2983 2984 /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are 2985 * pairing request and security request. 2986 */ 2987 if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ) 2988 goto drop; 2989 2990 switch (code) { 2991 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ: 2992 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb); 2993 break; 2994 2995 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL: 2996 smp_failure(conn, 0); 2997 err = -EPERM; 2998 break; 2999 3000 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP: 3001 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb); 3002 break; 3003 3004 case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ: 3005 reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb); 3006 break; 3007 3008 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: 3009 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb); 3010 break; 3011 3012 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: 3013 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb); 3014 break; 3015 3016 case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO: 3017 reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); 3018 break; 3019 3020 case SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT: 3021 reason = smp_cmd_initiator_ident(conn, skb); 3022 break; 3023 3024 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: 3025 reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb); 3026 break; 3027 3028 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: 3029 reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb); 3030 break; 3031 3032 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: 3033 reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb); 3034 break; 3035 3036 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY: 3037 reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb); 3038 break; 3039 3040 case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK: 3041 reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb); 3042 break; 3043 3044 case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY: 3045 reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb); 3046 break; 3047 3048 default: 3049 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); 3050 reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; 3051 goto done; 3052 } 3053 3054 done: 3055 if (!err) { 3056 if (reason) 3057 smp_failure(conn, reason); 3058 kfree_skb(skb); 3059 } 3060 3061 return err; 3062 3063 drop: 3064 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", 3065 code, &hcon->dst); 3066 kfree_skb(skb); 3067 return 0; 3068 } 3069 3070 static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) 3071 { 3072 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; 3073 3074 bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); 3075 3076 if (chan->data) 3077 smp_chan_destroy(conn); 3078 3079 conn->smp = NULL; 3080 l2cap_chan_put(chan); 3081 } 3082 3083 static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan) 3084 { 3085 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; 3086 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 3087 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; 3088 struct smp_chan *smp; 3089 3090 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "chan %p", chan); 3091 3092 /* Only new pairings are interesting */ 3093 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags)) 3094 return; 3095 3096 /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */ 3097 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) 3098 return; 3099 3100 /* Only initiator may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */ 3101 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) 3102 return; 3103 3104 /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */ 3105 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) 3106 return; 3107 3108 /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */ 3109 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) && 3110 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) 3111 return; 3112 3113 /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */ 3114 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) 3115 return; 3116 3117 /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */ 3118 if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon)) 3119 return; 3120 3121 /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */ 3122 if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR)) 3123 return; 3124 3125 /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */ 3126 if (chan->data) 3127 return; 3128 3129 smp = smp_chan_create(conn); 3130 if (!smp) { 3131 bt_dev_err(hdev, "unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR"); 3132 return; 3133 } 3134 3135 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); 3136 3137 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "starting SMP over BR/EDR"); 3138 3139 smp_send_pairing_req(smp, 0x00); 3140 } 3141 3142 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) 3143 { 3144 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 3145 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; 3146 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 3147 3148 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); 3149 3150 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { 3151 bredr_pairing(chan); 3152 return; 3153 } 3154 3155 if (!smp) 3156 return; 3157 3158 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) 3159 return; 3160 3161 cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer); 3162 3163 smp_distribute_keys(smp); 3164 } 3165 3166 static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) 3167 { 3168 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; 3169 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; 3170 3171 bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); 3172 3173 /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own 3174 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the 3175 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in 3176 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function won't 3177 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called. 3178 */ 3179 conn->smp = chan; 3180 3181 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) 3182 bredr_pairing(chan); 3183 } 3184 3185 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) 3186 { 3187 int err; 3188 3189 bt_dev_dbg(chan->conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); 3190 3191 err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb); 3192 if (err) { 3193 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; 3194 3195 if (smp) 3196 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); 3197 3198 hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); 3199 } 3200 3201 return err; 3202 } 3203 3204 static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, 3205 unsigned long hdr_len, 3206 unsigned long len, int nb) 3207 { 3208 struct sk_buff *skb; 3209 3210 skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL); 3211 if (!skb) 3212 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 3213 3214 skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX; 3215 bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan; 3216 3217 return skb; 3218 } 3219 3220 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = { 3221 .name = "Security Manager", 3222 .ready = smp_ready_cb, 3223 .recv = smp_recv_cb, 3224 .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb, 3225 .teardown = smp_teardown_cb, 3226 .resume = smp_resume_cb, 3227 3228 .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection, 3229 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, 3230 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, 3231 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, 3232 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, 3233 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, 3234 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, 3235 }; 3236 3237 static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) 3238 { 3239 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 3240 3241 BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan); 3242 3243 chan = l2cap_chan_create(); 3244 if (!chan) 3245 return NULL; 3246 3247 chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type; 3248 chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops; 3249 chan->scid = pchan->scid; 3250 chan->dcid = chan->scid; 3251 chan->imtu = pchan->imtu; 3252 chan->omtu = pchan->omtu; 3253 chan->mode = pchan->mode; 3254 3255 /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to 3256 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel 3257 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep 3258 * warnings. 3259 */ 3260 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP); 3261 3262 BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan); 3263 3264 return chan; 3265 } 3266 3267 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = { 3268 .name = "Security Manager Root", 3269 .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb, 3270 3271 /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */ 3272 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close, 3273 .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb, 3274 .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv, 3275 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, 3276 .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown, 3277 .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready, 3278 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, 3279 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, 3280 .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume, 3281 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, 3282 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, 3283 }; 3284 3285 static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid) 3286 { 3287 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 3288 struct smp_dev *smp; 3289 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; 3290 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; 3291 3292 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) { 3293 smp = NULL; 3294 goto create_chan; 3295 } 3296 3297 smp = kzalloc_obj(*smp); 3298 if (!smp) 3299 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 3300 3301 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); 3302 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) { 3303 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); 3304 kfree_sensitive(smp); 3305 return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac); 3306 } 3307 3308 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0); 3309 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) { 3310 bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); 3311 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac); 3312 kfree_sensitive(smp); 3313 return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh); 3314 } 3315 3316 smp->local_oob = false; 3317 smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac; 3318 smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh; 3319 3320 create_chan: 3321 chan = l2cap_chan_create(); 3322 if (!chan) { 3323 if (smp) { 3324 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); 3325 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh); 3326 kfree_sensitive(smp); 3327 } 3328 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 3329 } 3330 3331 chan->data = smp; 3332 3333 l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid); 3334 3335 l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan); 3336 3337 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) { 3338 u8 bdaddr_type; 3339 3340 hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type); 3341 3342 if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC) 3343 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC; 3344 else 3345 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM; 3346 } else { 3347 bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr); 3348 chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR; 3349 } 3350 3351 chan->state = BT_LISTEN; 3352 chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC; 3353 chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU; 3354 chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops; 3355 3356 /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */ 3357 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT); 3358 3359 return chan; 3360 } 3361 3362 static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan) 3363 { 3364 struct smp_dev *smp; 3365 3366 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); 3367 3368 smp = chan->data; 3369 if (smp) { 3370 chan->data = NULL; 3371 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); 3372 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh); 3373 kfree_sensitive(smp); 3374 } 3375 3376 l2cap_chan_put(chan); 3377 } 3378 3379 int smp_force_bredr(struct hci_dev *hdev, bool enable) 3380 { 3381 if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) 3382 return -EALREADY; 3383 3384 if (enable) { 3385 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 3386 3387 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR); 3388 if (IS_ERR(chan)) 3389 return PTR_ERR(chan); 3390 3391 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan; 3392 } else { 3393 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 3394 3395 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data; 3396 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL; 3397 smp_del_chan(chan); 3398 } 3399 3400 hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP); 3401 3402 return 0; 3403 } 3404 3405 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev) 3406 { 3407 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 3408 3409 bt_dev_dbg(hdev, ""); 3410 3411 /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then 3412 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel. 3413 */ 3414 if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev)) 3415 return 0; 3416 3417 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) { 3418 chan = hdev->smp_data; 3419 hdev->smp_data = NULL; 3420 smp_del_chan(chan); 3421 } 3422 3423 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP); 3424 if (IS_ERR(chan)) 3425 return PTR_ERR(chan); 3426 3427 hdev->smp_data = chan; 3428 3429 if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) { 3430 /* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */ 3431 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) 3432 return 0; 3433 } 3434 3435 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) { 3436 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data; 3437 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL; 3438 smp_del_chan(chan); 3439 } 3440 3441 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR); 3442 if (IS_ERR(chan)) { 3443 int err = PTR_ERR(chan); 3444 chan = hdev->smp_data; 3445 hdev->smp_data = NULL; 3446 smp_del_chan(chan); 3447 return err; 3448 } 3449 3450 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan; 3451 3452 return 0; 3453 } 3454 3455 void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev) 3456 { 3457 struct l2cap_chan *chan; 3458 3459 if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) { 3460 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data; 3461 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL; 3462 smp_del_chan(chan); 3463 } 3464 3465 if (hdev->smp_data) { 3466 chan = hdev->smp_data; 3467 hdev->smp_data = NULL; 3468 smp_del_chan(chan); 3469 } 3470 } 3471 3472 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP) 3473 3474 static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh) 3475 { 3476 u8 pk[64]; 3477 int err; 3478 3479 err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk); 3480 if (err) 3481 return err; 3482 3483 err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk); 3484 if (err) 3485 return err; 3486 3487 if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64)) 3488 return -EINVAL; 3489 3490 return 0; 3491 } 3492 3493 static int __init test_ah(void) 3494 { 3495 const u8 irk[16] = { 3496 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34, 3497 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec }; 3498 const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 }; 3499 const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d }; 3500 u8 res[3]; 3501 int err; 3502 3503 err = smp_ah(irk, r, res); 3504 if (err) 3505 return err; 3506 3507 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3)) 3508 return -EINVAL; 3509 3510 return 0; 3511 } 3512 3513 static int __init test_c1(void) 3514 { 3515 const u8 k[16] = { 3516 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 3517 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; 3518 const u8 r[16] = { 3519 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63, 3520 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 }; 3521 const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 }; 3522 const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 }; 3523 const u8 _iat = 0x01; 3524 const u8 _rat = 0x00; 3525 const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } }; 3526 const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } }; 3527 const u8 exp[16] = { 3528 0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2, 3529 0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e }; 3530 u8 res[16]; 3531 int err; 3532 3533 err = smp_c1(k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res); 3534 if (err) 3535 return err; 3536 3537 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) 3538 return -EINVAL; 3539 3540 return 0; 3541 } 3542 3543 static int __init test_s1(void) 3544 { 3545 const u8 k[16] = { 3546 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 3547 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; 3548 const u8 r1[16] = { 3549 0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 }; 3550 const u8 r2[16] = { 3551 0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 }; 3552 const u8 exp[16] = { 3553 0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b, 3554 0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a }; 3555 u8 res[16]; 3556 int err; 3557 3558 err = smp_s1(k, r1, r2, res); 3559 if (err) 3560 return err; 3561 3562 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) 3563 return -EINVAL; 3564 3565 return 0; 3566 } 3567 3568 static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) 3569 { 3570 const u8 u[32] = { 3571 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, 3572 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, 3573 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, 3574 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 }; 3575 const u8 v[32] = { 3576 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b, 3577 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59, 3578 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90, 3579 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 }; 3580 const u8 x[16] = { 3581 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, 3582 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; 3583 const u8 z = 0x00; 3584 const u8 exp[16] = { 3585 0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1, 3586 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 }; 3587 u8 res[16]; 3588 int err; 3589 3590 err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res); 3591 if (err) 3592 return err; 3593 3594 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) 3595 return -EINVAL; 3596 3597 return 0; 3598 } 3599 3600 static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) 3601 { 3602 const u8 w[32] = { 3603 0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86, 3604 0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99, 3605 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34, 3606 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec }; 3607 const u8 n1[16] = { 3608 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, 3609 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; 3610 const u8 n2[16] = { 3611 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21, 3612 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 }; 3613 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 }; 3614 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 }; 3615 const u8 exp_ltk[16] = { 3616 0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98, 3617 0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 }; 3618 const u8 exp_mackey[16] = { 3619 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd, 3620 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 }; 3621 u8 mackey[16], ltk[16]; 3622 int err; 3623 3624 err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk); 3625 if (err) 3626 return err; 3627 3628 if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16)) 3629 return -EINVAL; 3630 3631 if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16)) 3632 return -EINVAL; 3633 3634 return 0; 3635 } 3636 3637 static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) 3638 { 3639 const u8 w[16] = { 3640 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd, 3641 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 }; 3642 const u8 n1[16] = { 3643 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, 3644 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; 3645 const u8 n2[16] = { 3646 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21, 3647 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 }; 3648 const u8 r[16] = { 3649 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08, 3650 0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 }; 3651 const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 }; 3652 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 }; 3653 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 }; 3654 const u8 exp[16] = { 3655 0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2, 3656 0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 }; 3657 u8 res[16]; 3658 int err; 3659 3660 err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res); 3661 if (err) 3662 return err; 3663 3664 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) 3665 return -EINVAL; 3666 3667 return 0; 3668 } 3669 3670 static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) 3671 { 3672 const u8 u[32] = { 3673 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, 3674 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, 3675 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, 3676 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 }; 3677 const u8 v[32] = { 3678 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b, 3679 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59, 3680 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90, 3681 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 }; 3682 const u8 x[16] = { 3683 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, 3684 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; 3685 const u8 y[16] = { 3686 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21, 3687 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 }; 3688 const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000; 3689 u32 val; 3690 int err; 3691 3692 err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val); 3693 if (err) 3694 return err; 3695 3696 if (val != exp_val) 3697 return -EINVAL; 3698 3699 return 0; 3700 } 3701 3702 static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) 3703 { 3704 const u8 w[16] = { 3705 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34, 3706 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec }; 3707 const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c }; 3708 const u8 exp[16] = { 3709 0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8, 3710 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d }; 3711 u8 res[16]; 3712 int err; 3713 3714 err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res); 3715 if (err) 3716 return err; 3717 3718 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) 3719 return -EINVAL; 3720 3721 return 0; 3722 } 3723 3724 static char test_smp_buffer[32]; 3725 3726 static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf, 3727 size_t count, loff_t *ppos) 3728 { 3729 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer, 3730 strlen(test_smp_buffer)); 3731 } 3732 3733 static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = { 3734 .open = simple_open, 3735 .read = test_smp_read, 3736 .llseek = default_llseek, 3737 }; 3738 3739 static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, 3740 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh) 3741 { 3742 ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime; 3743 unsigned long long duration; 3744 int err; 3745 3746 calltime = ktime_get(); 3747 3748 err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh); 3749 if (err) { 3750 BT_ERR("debug_key test failed"); 3751 goto done; 3752 } 3753 3754 err = test_ah(); 3755 if (err) { 3756 BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed"); 3757 goto done; 3758 } 3759 3760 err = test_c1(); 3761 if (err) { 3762 BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed"); 3763 goto done; 3764 } 3765 3766 err = test_s1(); 3767 if (err) { 3768 BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed"); 3769 goto done; 3770 } 3771 3772 err = test_f4(tfm_cmac); 3773 if (err) { 3774 BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed"); 3775 goto done; 3776 } 3777 3778 err = test_f5(tfm_cmac); 3779 if (err) { 3780 BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed"); 3781 goto done; 3782 } 3783 3784 err = test_f6(tfm_cmac); 3785 if (err) { 3786 BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed"); 3787 goto done; 3788 } 3789 3790 err = test_g2(tfm_cmac); 3791 if (err) { 3792 BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed"); 3793 goto done; 3794 } 3795 3796 err = test_h6(tfm_cmac); 3797 if (err) { 3798 BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed"); 3799 goto done; 3800 } 3801 3802 rettime = ktime_get(); 3803 delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime); 3804 duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10; 3805 3806 BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration); 3807 3808 done: 3809 if (!err) 3810 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), 3811 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration); 3812 else 3813 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n"); 3814 3815 debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL, 3816 &test_smp_fops); 3817 3818 return err; 3819 } 3820 3821 int __init bt_selftest_smp(void) 3822 { 3823 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; 3824 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; 3825 int err; 3826 3827 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); 3828 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) { 3829 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); 3830 return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac); 3831 } 3832 3833 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0); 3834 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) { 3835 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); 3836 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac); 3837 return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh); 3838 } 3839 3840 err = run_selftests(tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh); 3841 3842 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac); 3843 crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh); 3844 3845 return err; 3846 } 3847 3848 #endif 3849