1 /* 2 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Mellanox Technologies. All rights reserved. 3 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>. All rights reserved. 4 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Lance Chao <lancerchao@fb.com>. All rights reserved. 5 * Copyright (c) 2016, Fridolin Pokorny <fridolin.pokorny@gmail.com>. All rights reserved. 6 * Copyright (c) 2016, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>. All rights reserved. 7 * Copyright (c) 2018, Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io 8 * 9 * This software is available to you under a choice of one of two 10 * licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU 11 * General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file 12 * COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the 13 * OpenIB.org BSD license below: 14 * 15 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or 16 * without modification, are permitted provided that the following 17 * conditions are met: 18 * 19 * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above 20 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following 21 * disclaimer. 22 * 23 * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above 24 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following 25 * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials 26 * provided with the distribution. 27 * 28 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, 29 * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF 30 * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND 31 * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS 32 * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN 33 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN 34 * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE 35 * SOFTWARE. 36 */ 37 38 #include <linux/bug.h> 39 #include <linux/sched/signal.h> 40 #include <linux/module.h> 41 #include <linux/kernel.h> 42 #include <linux/splice.h> 43 #include <crypto/aead.h> 44 45 #include <net/strparser.h> 46 #include <net/tls.h> 47 #include <trace/events/sock.h> 48 49 #include "tls.h" 50 51 struct tls_decrypt_arg { 52 struct_group(inargs, 53 bool zc; 54 bool async; 55 bool async_done; 56 u8 tail; 57 ); 58 59 struct sk_buff *skb; 60 }; 61 62 struct tls_decrypt_ctx { 63 struct sock *sk; 64 u8 iv[TLS_MAX_IV_SIZE]; 65 u8 aad[TLS_MAX_AAD_SIZE]; 66 u8 tail; 67 bool free_sgout; 68 struct scatterlist sg[]; 69 }; 70 71 noinline void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err) 72 { 73 WARN_ON_ONCE(err >= 0); 74 /* sk->sk_err should contain a positive error code. */ 75 WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, -err); 76 /* Paired with smp_rmb() in tcp_poll() */ 77 smp_wmb(); 78 sk_error_report(sk); 79 } 80 81 static int __skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len, 82 unsigned int recursion_level) 83 { 84 int start = skb_headlen(skb); 85 int i, chunk = start - offset; 86 struct sk_buff *frag_iter; 87 int elt = 0; 88 89 if (unlikely(recursion_level >= 24)) 90 return -EMSGSIZE; 91 92 if (chunk > 0) { 93 if (chunk > len) 94 chunk = len; 95 elt++; 96 len -= chunk; 97 if (len == 0) 98 return elt; 99 offset += chunk; 100 } 101 102 for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) { 103 int end; 104 105 WARN_ON(start > offset + len); 106 107 end = start + skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]); 108 chunk = end - offset; 109 if (chunk > 0) { 110 if (chunk > len) 111 chunk = len; 112 elt++; 113 len -= chunk; 114 if (len == 0) 115 return elt; 116 offset += chunk; 117 } 118 start = end; 119 } 120 121 if (unlikely(skb_has_frag_list(skb))) { 122 skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) { 123 int end, ret; 124 125 WARN_ON(start > offset + len); 126 127 end = start + frag_iter->len; 128 chunk = end - offset; 129 if (chunk > 0) { 130 if (chunk > len) 131 chunk = len; 132 ret = __skb_nsg(frag_iter, offset - start, chunk, 133 recursion_level + 1); 134 if (unlikely(ret < 0)) 135 return ret; 136 elt += ret; 137 len -= chunk; 138 if (len == 0) 139 return elt; 140 offset += chunk; 141 } 142 start = end; 143 } 144 } 145 BUG_ON(len); 146 return elt; 147 } 148 149 /* Return the number of scatterlist elements required to completely map the 150 * skb, or -EMSGSIZE if the recursion depth is exceeded. 151 */ 152 static int skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len) 153 { 154 return __skb_nsg(skb, offset, len, 0); 155 } 156 157 static int tls_padding_length(struct tls_prot_info *prot, struct sk_buff *skb, 158 struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) 159 { 160 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); 161 struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb); 162 int sub = 0; 163 164 /* Determine zero-padding length */ 165 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) { 166 int offset = rxm->full_len - TLS_TAG_SIZE - 1; 167 char content_type = darg->zc ? darg->tail : 0; 168 int err; 169 170 while (content_type == 0) { 171 if (offset < prot->prepend_size) 172 return -EBADMSG; 173 err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + offset, 174 &content_type, 1); 175 if (err) 176 return err; 177 if (content_type) 178 break; 179 sub++; 180 offset--; 181 } 182 tlm->control = content_type; 183 } 184 return sub; 185 } 186 187 static void tls_decrypt_done(void *data, int err) 188 { 189 struct aead_request *aead_req = data; 190 struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(aead_req); 191 struct scatterlist *sgout = aead_req->dst; 192 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx; 193 struct tls_decrypt_ctx *dctx; 194 struct tls_context *tls_ctx; 195 struct scatterlist *sg; 196 unsigned int pages; 197 struct sock *sk; 198 int aead_size; 199 200 /* If requests get too backlogged crypto API returns -EBUSY and calls 201 * ->complete(-EINPROGRESS) immediately followed by ->complete(0) 202 * to make waiting for backlog to flush with crypto_wait_req() easier. 203 * First wait converts -EBUSY -> -EINPROGRESS, and the second one 204 * -EINPROGRESS -> 0. 205 * We have a single struct crypto_async_request per direction, this 206 * scheme doesn't help us, so just ignore the first ->complete(). 207 */ 208 if (err == -EINPROGRESS) 209 return; 210 211 aead_size = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(aead); 212 aead_size = ALIGN(aead_size, __alignof__(*dctx)); 213 dctx = (void *)((u8 *)aead_req + aead_size); 214 215 sk = dctx->sk; 216 tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 217 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 218 219 /* Propagate if there was an err */ 220 if (err) { 221 if (err == -EBADMSG) 222 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR); 223 ctx->async_wait.err = err; 224 tls_err_abort(sk, err); 225 } 226 227 /* Free the destination pages if skb was not decrypted inplace */ 228 if (dctx->free_sgout) { 229 /* Skip the first S/G entry as it points to AAD */ 230 for_each_sg(sg_next(sgout), sg, UINT_MAX, pages) { 231 if (!sg) 232 break; 233 put_page(sg_page(sg)); 234 } 235 } 236 237 kfree(aead_req); 238 239 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->decrypt_pending)) 240 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion); 241 } 242 243 static int tls_decrypt_async_wait(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx) 244 { 245 if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->decrypt_pending)) 246 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait); 247 atomic_inc(&ctx->decrypt_pending); 248 249 __skb_queue_purge(&ctx->async_hold); 250 return ctx->async_wait.err; 251 } 252 253 static int tls_do_decryption(struct sock *sk, 254 struct scatterlist *sgin, 255 struct scatterlist *sgout, 256 char *iv_recv, 257 size_t data_len, 258 struct aead_request *aead_req, 259 struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) 260 { 261 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 262 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 263 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 264 int ret; 265 266 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_recv); 267 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size); 268 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sgin, sgout, 269 data_len + prot->tag_size, 270 (u8 *)iv_recv); 271 272 if (darg->async) { 273 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, 274 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, 275 tls_decrypt_done, aead_req); 276 DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending) < 1); 277 atomic_inc(&ctx->decrypt_pending); 278 } else { 279 DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); 280 281 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, 282 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, 283 crypto_req_done, &wait); 284 ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); 285 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS || ret == -EBUSY) 286 ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &wait); 287 return ret; 288 } 289 290 ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); 291 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) 292 return 0; 293 294 if (ret == -EBUSY) { 295 ret = tls_decrypt_async_wait(ctx); 296 darg->async_done = true; 297 /* all completions have run, we're not doing async anymore */ 298 darg->async = false; 299 return ret; 300 } 301 302 atomic_dec(&ctx->decrypt_pending); 303 darg->async = false; 304 305 return ret; 306 } 307 308 static void tls_trim_both_msgs(struct sock *sk, int target_size) 309 { 310 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 311 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 312 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 313 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec; 314 315 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext, target_size); 316 if (target_size > 0) 317 target_size += prot->overhead_size; 318 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted, target_size); 319 } 320 321 static int tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(struct sock *sk, int len) 322 { 323 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 324 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 325 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec; 326 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 327 328 return sk_msg_alloc(sk, msg_en, len, 0); 329 } 330 331 static int tls_clone_plaintext_msg(struct sock *sk, int required) 332 { 333 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 334 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 335 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 336 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec; 337 struct sk_msg *msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 338 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 339 int skip, len; 340 341 /* We add page references worth len bytes from encrypted sg 342 * at the end of plaintext sg. It is guaranteed that msg_en 343 * has enough required room (ensured by caller). 344 */ 345 len = required - msg_pl->sg.size; 346 347 /* Skip initial bytes in msg_en's data to be able to use 348 * same offset of both plain and encrypted data. 349 */ 350 skip = prot->prepend_size + msg_pl->sg.size; 351 352 return sk_msg_clone(sk, msg_pl, msg_en, skip, len); 353 } 354 355 static struct tls_rec *tls_get_rec(struct sock *sk) 356 { 357 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 358 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 359 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 360 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en; 361 struct tls_rec *rec; 362 int mem_size; 363 364 mem_size = sizeof(struct tls_rec) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_send); 365 366 rec = kzalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation); 367 if (!rec) 368 return NULL; 369 370 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 371 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 372 373 sk_msg_init(msg_pl); 374 sk_msg_init(msg_en); 375 376 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_in, 2); 377 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_in[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size); 378 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_in[1]); 379 380 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_out, 2); 381 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_out[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size); 382 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_out[1]); 383 384 rec->sk = sk; 385 386 return rec; 387 } 388 389 static void tls_free_rec(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *rec) 390 { 391 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted); 392 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext); 393 kfree(rec); 394 } 395 396 static void tls_free_open_rec(struct sock *sk) 397 { 398 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 399 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 400 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec; 401 402 if (rec) { 403 tls_free_rec(sk, rec); 404 ctx->open_rec = NULL; 405 } 406 } 407 408 int tls_tx_records(struct sock *sk, int flags) 409 { 410 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 411 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 412 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp; 413 struct sk_msg *msg_en; 414 int tx_flags, rc = 0; 415 416 if (tls_is_partially_sent_record(tls_ctx)) { 417 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list, 418 struct tls_rec, list); 419 420 if (flags == -1) 421 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags; 422 else 423 tx_flags = flags; 424 425 rc = tls_push_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx, tx_flags); 426 if (rc) 427 goto tx_err; 428 429 /* Full record has been transmitted. 430 * Remove the head of tx_list 431 */ 432 list_del(&rec->list); 433 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext); 434 kfree(rec); 435 } 436 437 /* Tx all ready records */ 438 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) { 439 if (READ_ONCE(rec->tx_ready)) { 440 if (flags == -1) 441 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags; 442 else 443 tx_flags = flags; 444 445 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 446 rc = tls_push_sg(sk, tls_ctx, 447 &msg_en->sg.data[msg_en->sg.curr], 448 0, tx_flags); 449 if (rc) 450 goto tx_err; 451 452 list_del(&rec->list); 453 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext); 454 kfree(rec); 455 } else { 456 break; 457 } 458 } 459 460 tx_err: 461 if (rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN) 462 tls_err_abort(sk, rc); 463 464 return rc; 465 } 466 467 static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err) 468 { 469 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx; 470 struct tls_context *tls_ctx; 471 struct tls_prot_info *prot; 472 struct tls_rec *rec = data; 473 struct scatterlist *sge; 474 struct sk_msg *msg_en; 475 struct sock *sk; 476 477 if (err == -EINPROGRESS) /* see the comment in tls_decrypt_done() */ 478 return; 479 480 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 481 482 sk = rec->sk; 483 tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 484 prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 485 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 486 487 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, msg_en->sg.curr); 488 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size; 489 sge->length += prot->prepend_size; 490 491 /* Check if error is previously set on socket */ 492 if (err || sk->sk_err) { 493 rec = NULL; 494 495 /* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */ 496 if (sk->sk_err) { 497 ctx->async_wait.err = -sk->sk_err; 498 } else { 499 ctx->async_wait.err = err; 500 tls_err_abort(sk, err); 501 } 502 } 503 504 if (rec) { 505 struct tls_rec *first_rec; 506 507 /* Mark the record as ready for transmission */ 508 smp_store_mb(rec->tx_ready, true); 509 510 /* If received record is at head of tx_list, schedule tx */ 511 first_rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list, 512 struct tls_rec, list); 513 if (rec == first_rec) { 514 /* Schedule the transmission */ 515 if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, 516 &ctx->tx_bitmask)) 517 schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, 1); 518 } 519 } 520 521 if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->encrypt_pending)) 522 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion); 523 } 524 525 static int tls_encrypt_async_wait(struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx) 526 { 527 if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->encrypt_pending)) 528 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait); 529 atomic_inc(&ctx->encrypt_pending); 530 531 return ctx->async_wait.err; 532 } 533 534 static int tls_do_encryption(struct sock *sk, 535 struct tls_context *tls_ctx, 536 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx, 537 struct aead_request *aead_req, 538 size_t data_len, u32 start) 539 { 540 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 541 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec; 542 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 543 struct scatterlist *sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, start); 544 int rc, iv_offset = 0; 545 546 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of IV is a constant */ 547 switch (prot->cipher_type) { 548 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128: 549 rec->iv_data[0] = TLS_AES_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE; 550 iv_offset = 1; 551 break; 552 case TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM: 553 rec->iv_data[0] = TLS_SM4_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE; 554 iv_offset = 1; 555 break; 556 } 557 558 memcpy(&rec->iv_data[iv_offset], tls_ctx->tx.iv, 559 prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size); 560 561 tls_xor_iv_with_seq(prot, rec->iv_data + iv_offset, 562 tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq); 563 564 sge->offset += prot->prepend_size; 565 sge->length -= prot->prepend_size; 566 567 msg_en->sg.curr = start; 568 569 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_send); 570 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size); 571 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, rec->sg_aead_in, 572 rec->sg_aead_out, 573 data_len, rec->iv_data); 574 575 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, 576 tls_encrypt_done, rec); 577 578 /* Add the record in tx_list */ 579 list_add_tail((struct list_head *)&rec->list, &ctx->tx_list); 580 DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending) < 1); 581 atomic_inc(&ctx->encrypt_pending); 582 583 rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); 584 if (rc == -EBUSY) { 585 rc = tls_encrypt_async_wait(ctx); 586 rc = rc ?: -EINPROGRESS; 587 } 588 if (!rc || rc != -EINPROGRESS) { 589 atomic_dec(&ctx->encrypt_pending); 590 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size; 591 sge->length += prot->prepend_size; 592 } 593 594 if (!rc) { 595 WRITE_ONCE(rec->tx_ready, true); 596 } else if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) { 597 list_del(&rec->list); 598 return rc; 599 } 600 601 /* Unhook the record from context if encryption is not failure */ 602 ctx->open_rec = NULL; 603 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->tx); 604 return rc; 605 } 606 607 static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from, 608 struct tls_rec **to, struct sk_msg *msg_opl, 609 struct sk_msg *msg_oen, u32 split_point, 610 u32 tx_overhead_size, u32 *orig_end) 611 { 612 u32 i, j, bytes = 0, apply = msg_opl->apply_bytes; 613 struct scatterlist *sge, *osge, *nsge; 614 u32 orig_size = msg_opl->sg.size; 615 struct scatterlist tmp = { }; 616 struct sk_msg *msg_npl; 617 struct tls_rec *new; 618 int ret; 619 620 new = tls_get_rec(sk); 621 if (!new) 622 return -ENOMEM; 623 ret = sk_msg_alloc(sk, &new->msg_encrypted, msg_opl->sg.size + 624 tx_overhead_size, 0); 625 if (ret < 0) { 626 tls_free_rec(sk, new); 627 return ret; 628 } 629 630 *orig_end = msg_opl->sg.end; 631 i = msg_opl->sg.start; 632 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i); 633 while (apply && sge->length) { 634 if (sge->length > apply) { 635 u32 len = sge->length - apply; 636 637 get_page(sg_page(sge)); 638 sg_set_page(&tmp, sg_page(sge), len, 639 sge->offset + apply); 640 sge->length = apply; 641 bytes += apply; 642 apply = 0; 643 } else { 644 apply -= sge->length; 645 bytes += sge->length; 646 } 647 648 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); 649 if (i == msg_opl->sg.end) 650 break; 651 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i); 652 } 653 654 msg_opl->sg.end = i; 655 msg_opl->sg.curr = i; 656 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0; 657 msg_opl->apply_bytes = 0; 658 msg_opl->sg.size = bytes; 659 660 msg_npl = &new->msg_plaintext; 661 msg_npl->apply_bytes = apply; 662 msg_npl->sg.size = orig_size - bytes; 663 664 j = msg_npl->sg.start; 665 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j); 666 if (tmp.length) { 667 memcpy(nsge, &tmp, sizeof(*nsge)); 668 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j); 669 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j); 670 } 671 672 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i); 673 while (osge->length) { 674 memcpy(nsge, osge, sizeof(*nsge)); 675 sg_unmark_end(nsge); 676 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); 677 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j); 678 if (i == *orig_end) 679 break; 680 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i); 681 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j); 682 } 683 684 msg_npl->sg.end = j; 685 msg_npl->sg.curr = j; 686 msg_npl->sg.copybreak = 0; 687 688 *to = new; 689 return 0; 690 } 691 692 static void tls_merge_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *to, 693 struct tls_rec *from, u32 orig_end) 694 { 695 struct sk_msg *msg_npl = &from->msg_plaintext; 696 struct sk_msg *msg_opl = &to->msg_plaintext; 697 struct scatterlist *osge, *nsge; 698 u32 i, j; 699 700 i = msg_opl->sg.end; 701 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i); 702 j = msg_npl->sg.start; 703 704 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i); 705 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j); 706 707 if (sg_page(osge) == sg_page(nsge) && 708 osge->offset + osge->length == nsge->offset) { 709 osge->length += nsge->length; 710 put_page(sg_page(nsge)); 711 } 712 713 msg_opl->sg.end = orig_end; 714 msg_opl->sg.curr = orig_end; 715 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0; 716 msg_opl->apply_bytes = msg_opl->sg.size + msg_npl->sg.size; 717 msg_opl->sg.size += msg_npl->sg.size; 718 719 sk_msg_free(sk, &to->msg_encrypted); 720 sk_msg_xfer_full(&to->msg_encrypted, &from->msg_encrypted); 721 722 kfree(from); 723 } 724 725 static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags, 726 unsigned char record_type) 727 { 728 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 729 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 730 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 731 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec, *tmp = NULL; 732 u32 i, split_point, orig_end; 733 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en; 734 struct aead_request *req; 735 bool split; 736 int rc; 737 738 if (!rec) 739 return 0; 740 741 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 742 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 743 744 split_point = msg_pl->apply_bytes; 745 split = split_point && split_point < msg_pl->sg.size; 746 if (unlikely((!split && 747 msg_pl->sg.size + 748 prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size) || 749 (split && 750 split_point + 751 prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size))) { 752 split = true; 753 split_point = msg_en->sg.size; 754 } 755 if (split) { 756 rc = tls_split_open_record(sk, rec, &tmp, msg_pl, msg_en, 757 split_point, prot->overhead_size, 758 &orig_end); 759 if (rc < 0) 760 return rc; 761 /* This can happen if above tls_split_open_record allocates 762 * a single large encryption buffer instead of two smaller 763 * ones. In this case adjust pointers and continue without 764 * split. 765 */ 766 if (!msg_pl->sg.size) { 767 tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end); 768 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 769 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 770 split = false; 771 } 772 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size + 773 prot->overhead_size); 774 } 775 776 rec->tx_flags = flags; 777 req = &rec->aead_req; 778 779 i = msg_pl->sg.end; 780 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i); 781 782 rec->content_type = record_type; 783 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) { 784 /* Add content type to end of message. No padding added */ 785 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_content_type, &rec->content_type, 1); 786 sg_mark_end(&rec->sg_content_type); 787 sg_chain(msg_pl->sg.data, msg_pl->sg.end + 1, 788 &rec->sg_content_type); 789 } else { 790 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_pl, i)); 791 } 792 793 if (msg_pl->sg.end < msg_pl->sg.start) { 794 sg_chain(&msg_pl->sg.data[msg_pl->sg.start], 795 MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl->sg.start + 1, 796 msg_pl->sg.data); 797 } 798 799 i = msg_pl->sg.start; 800 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_in, 2, &msg_pl->sg.data[i]); 801 802 i = msg_en->sg.end; 803 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i); 804 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_en, i)); 805 806 i = msg_en->sg.start; 807 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_out, 2, &msg_en->sg.data[i]); 808 809 tls_make_aad(rec->aad_space, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, 810 tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq, record_type, prot); 811 812 tls_fill_prepend(tls_ctx, 813 page_address(sg_page(&msg_en->sg.data[i])) + 814 msg_en->sg.data[i].offset, 815 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, 816 record_type); 817 818 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = false; 819 820 rc = tls_do_encryption(sk, tls_ctx, ctx, req, 821 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, i); 822 if (rc < 0) { 823 if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) { 824 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); 825 if (split) { 826 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true; 827 tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end); 828 } 829 } 830 ctx->async_capable = 1; 831 return rc; 832 } else if (split) { 833 msg_pl = &tmp->msg_plaintext; 834 msg_en = &tmp->msg_encrypted; 835 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size); 836 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true; 837 ctx->open_rec = tmp; 838 } 839 840 return tls_tx_records(sk, flags); 841 } 842 843 static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk, 844 bool full_record, u8 record_type, 845 ssize_t *copied, int flags) 846 { 847 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 848 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 849 struct sk_msg msg_redir = { }; 850 struct sk_psock *psock; 851 struct sock *sk_redir; 852 struct tls_rec *rec; 853 bool enospc, policy, redir_ingress; 854 int err = 0, send; 855 u32 delta = 0; 856 857 policy = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY); 858 psock = sk_psock_get(sk); 859 if (!psock || !policy) { 860 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type); 861 if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) { 862 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg); 863 tls_free_open_rec(sk); 864 err = -sk->sk_err; 865 } 866 if (psock) 867 sk_psock_put(sk, psock); 868 return err; 869 } 870 more_data: 871 enospc = sk_msg_full(msg); 872 if (psock->eval == __SK_NONE) { 873 delta = msg->sg.size; 874 psock->eval = sk_psock_msg_verdict(sk, psock, msg); 875 delta -= msg->sg.size; 876 877 if ((s32)delta > 0) { 878 /* It indicates that we executed bpf_msg_pop_data(), 879 * causing the plaintext data size to decrease. 880 * Therefore the encrypted data size also needs to 881 * correspondingly decrease. We only need to subtract 882 * delta to calculate the new ciphertext length since 883 * ktls does not support block encryption. 884 */ 885 struct sk_msg *enc = &ctx->open_rec->msg_encrypted; 886 887 sk_msg_trim(sk, enc, enc->sg.size - delta); 888 } 889 } 890 if (msg->cork_bytes && msg->cork_bytes > msg->sg.size && 891 !enospc && !full_record) { 892 err = -ENOSPC; 893 goto out_err; 894 } 895 msg->cork_bytes = 0; 896 send = msg->sg.size; 897 if (msg->apply_bytes && msg->apply_bytes < send) 898 send = msg->apply_bytes; 899 900 switch (psock->eval) { 901 case __SK_PASS: 902 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type); 903 if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) { 904 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg); 905 tls_free_open_rec(sk); 906 err = -sk->sk_err; 907 goto out_err; 908 } 909 break; 910 case __SK_REDIRECT: 911 redir_ingress = psock->redir_ingress; 912 sk_redir = psock->sk_redir; 913 memcpy(&msg_redir, msg, sizeof(*msg)); 914 if (msg->apply_bytes < send) 915 msg->apply_bytes = 0; 916 else 917 msg->apply_bytes -= send; 918 sk_msg_return_zero(sk, msg, send); 919 msg->sg.size -= send; 920 release_sock(sk); 921 err = tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir, redir_ingress, 922 &msg_redir, send, flags); 923 lock_sock(sk); 924 if (err < 0) { 925 /* Regardless of whether the data represented by 926 * msg_redir is sent successfully, we have already 927 * uncharged it via sk_msg_return_zero(). The 928 * msg->sg.size represents the remaining unprocessed 929 * data, which needs to be uncharged here. 930 */ 931 sk_mem_uncharge(sk, msg->sg.size); 932 *copied -= sk_msg_free_nocharge(sk, &msg_redir); 933 msg->sg.size = 0; 934 } 935 if (msg->sg.size == 0) 936 tls_free_open_rec(sk); 937 break; 938 case __SK_DROP: 939 default: 940 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, send); 941 if (msg->apply_bytes < send) 942 msg->apply_bytes = 0; 943 else 944 msg->apply_bytes -= send; 945 if (msg->sg.size == 0) 946 tls_free_open_rec(sk); 947 *copied -= (send + delta); 948 err = -EACCES; 949 } 950 951 if (likely(!err)) { 952 bool reset_eval = !ctx->open_rec; 953 954 rec = ctx->open_rec; 955 if (rec) { 956 msg = &rec->msg_plaintext; 957 if (!msg->apply_bytes) 958 reset_eval = true; 959 } 960 if (reset_eval) { 961 psock->eval = __SK_NONE; 962 if (psock->sk_redir) { 963 sock_put(psock->sk_redir); 964 psock->sk_redir = NULL; 965 } 966 } 967 if (rec) 968 goto more_data; 969 } 970 out_err: 971 sk_psock_put(sk, psock); 972 return err; 973 } 974 975 static int tls_sw_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags) 976 { 977 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 978 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 979 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec; 980 struct sk_msg *msg_pl; 981 size_t copied; 982 983 if (!rec) 984 return 0; 985 986 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 987 copied = msg_pl->sg.size; 988 if (!copied) 989 return 0; 990 991 return bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, true, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA, 992 &copied, flags); 993 } 994 995 static int tls_sw_sendmsg_splice(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, 996 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, size_t try_to_copy, 997 ssize_t *copied) 998 { 999 struct page *page = NULL, **pages = &page; 1000 1001 do { 1002 ssize_t part; 1003 size_t off; 1004 1005 part = iov_iter_extract_pages(&msg->msg_iter, &pages, 1006 try_to_copy, 1, 0, &off); 1007 if (part <= 0) 1008 return part ?: -EIO; 1009 1010 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sendpage_ok(page))) { 1011 iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, part); 1012 return -EIO; 1013 } 1014 1015 sk_msg_page_add(msg_pl, page, part, off); 1016 msg_pl->sg.copybreak = 0; 1017 msg_pl->sg.curr = msg_pl->sg.end; 1018 sk_mem_charge(sk, part); 1019 *copied += part; 1020 try_to_copy -= part; 1021 } while (try_to_copy && !sk_msg_full(msg_pl)); 1022 1023 return 0; 1024 } 1025 1026 static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, 1027 size_t size) 1028 { 1029 long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT); 1030 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 1031 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 1032 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 1033 bool async_capable = ctx->async_capable; 1034 unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA; 1035 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter); 1036 bool eor = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE); 1037 size_t try_to_copy; 1038 ssize_t copied = 0; 1039 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en; 1040 struct tls_rec *rec; 1041 int required_size; 1042 int num_async = 0; 1043 bool full_record; 1044 int record_room; 1045 int num_zc = 0; 1046 int orig_size; 1047 int ret = 0; 1048 1049 if (!eor && (msg->msg_flags & MSG_EOR)) 1050 return -EINVAL; 1051 1052 if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen)) { 1053 ret = tls_process_cmsg(sk, msg, &record_type); 1054 if (ret) { 1055 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) 1056 num_async++; 1057 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) 1058 goto end; 1059 } 1060 } 1061 1062 while (msg_data_left(msg)) { 1063 if (sk->sk_err) { 1064 ret = -sk->sk_err; 1065 goto send_end; 1066 } 1067 1068 if (ctx->open_rec) 1069 rec = ctx->open_rec; 1070 else 1071 rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk); 1072 if (!rec) { 1073 ret = -ENOMEM; 1074 goto send_end; 1075 } 1076 1077 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 1078 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted; 1079 1080 orig_size = msg_pl->sg.size; 1081 full_record = false; 1082 try_to_copy = msg_data_left(msg); 1083 record_room = tls_ctx->tx_max_payload_len - msg_pl->sg.size; 1084 if (try_to_copy >= record_room) { 1085 try_to_copy = record_room; 1086 full_record = true; 1087 } 1088 1089 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy + 1090 prot->overhead_size; 1091 1092 if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk)) 1093 goto wait_for_sndbuf; 1094 1095 alloc_encrypted: 1096 ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size); 1097 if (ret) { 1098 if (ret != -ENOSPC) 1099 goto wait_for_memory; 1100 1101 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was 1102 * actually allocated. The difference is due 1103 * to max sg elements limit 1104 */ 1105 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_en->sg.size; 1106 full_record = true; 1107 } 1108 1109 if (try_to_copy && (msg->msg_flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES)) { 1110 ret = tls_sw_sendmsg_splice(sk, msg, msg_pl, 1111 try_to_copy, &copied); 1112 if (ret < 0) 1113 goto send_end; 1114 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true; 1115 1116 if (sk_msg_full(msg_pl)) { 1117 full_record = true; 1118 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, 1119 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size); 1120 } 1121 1122 if (full_record || eor) 1123 goto copied; 1124 continue; 1125 } 1126 1127 if (!is_kvec && (full_record || eor) && !async_capable) { 1128 u32 first = msg_pl->sg.end; 1129 1130 ret = sk_msg_zerocopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter, 1131 msg_pl, try_to_copy); 1132 if (ret) 1133 goto fallback_to_reg_send; 1134 1135 num_zc++; 1136 copied += try_to_copy; 1137 1138 sk_msg_sg_copy_set(msg_pl, first); 1139 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record, 1140 record_type, &copied, 1141 msg->msg_flags); 1142 if (ret) { 1143 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) 1144 num_async++; 1145 else if (ret == -ENOMEM) 1146 goto wait_for_memory; 1147 else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC) { 1148 if (msg_pl->cork_bytes) { 1149 ret = 0; 1150 goto send_end; 1151 } 1152 goto rollback_iter; 1153 } else if (ret != -EAGAIN) 1154 goto send_end; 1155 } 1156 1157 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */ 1158 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) { 1159 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work); 1160 tls_tx_records(sk, msg->msg_flags); 1161 } 1162 1163 continue; 1164 rollback_iter: 1165 copied -= try_to_copy; 1166 sk_msg_sg_copy_clear(msg_pl, first); 1167 iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, 1168 msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size); 1169 fallback_to_reg_send: 1170 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_pl, orig_size); 1171 } 1172 1173 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy; 1174 1175 ret = tls_clone_plaintext_msg(sk, required_size); 1176 if (ret) { 1177 if (ret != -ENOSPC) 1178 goto send_end; 1179 1180 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was 1181 * actually allocated. The difference is due 1182 * to max sg elements limit 1183 */ 1184 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size; 1185 full_record = true; 1186 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, 1187 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size); 1188 } 1189 1190 if (try_to_copy) { 1191 ret = sk_msg_memcopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter, 1192 msg_pl, try_to_copy); 1193 if (ret < 0) 1194 goto trim_sgl; 1195 } 1196 1197 /* Open records defined only if successfully copied, otherwise 1198 * we would trim the sg but not reset the open record frags. 1199 */ 1200 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true; 1201 copied += try_to_copy; 1202 copied: 1203 if (full_record || eor) { 1204 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record, 1205 record_type, &copied, 1206 msg->msg_flags); 1207 if (ret) { 1208 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) 1209 num_async++; 1210 else if (ret == -ENOMEM) 1211 goto wait_for_memory; 1212 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) { 1213 if (ret == -ENOSPC) 1214 ret = 0; 1215 goto send_end; 1216 } 1217 } 1218 1219 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */ 1220 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) { 1221 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work); 1222 tls_tx_records(sk, msg->msg_flags); 1223 } 1224 } 1225 1226 continue; 1227 1228 wait_for_sndbuf: 1229 set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags); 1230 wait_for_memory: 1231 ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo); 1232 if (ret) { 1233 trim_sgl: 1234 if (ctx->open_rec) 1235 tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, orig_size); 1236 goto send_end; 1237 } 1238 1239 if (ctx->open_rec && msg_en->sg.size < required_size) 1240 goto alloc_encrypted; 1241 } 1242 1243 send_end: 1244 if (!num_async) { 1245 goto end; 1246 } else if (num_zc || eor) { 1247 int err; 1248 1249 /* Wait for pending encryptions to get completed */ 1250 err = tls_encrypt_async_wait(ctx); 1251 if (err) { 1252 ret = err; 1253 copied = 0; 1254 } 1255 } 1256 1257 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */ 1258 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) { 1259 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work); 1260 tls_tx_records(sk, msg->msg_flags); 1261 } 1262 1263 end: 1264 ret = sk_stream_error(sk, msg->msg_flags, ret); 1265 return copied > 0 ? copied : ret; 1266 } 1267 1268 int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) 1269 { 1270 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 1271 int ret; 1272 1273 if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL | 1274 MSG_CMSG_COMPAT | MSG_SPLICE_PAGES | MSG_EOR | 1275 MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY)) 1276 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 1277 1278 ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&tls_ctx->tx_lock); 1279 if (ret) 1280 return ret; 1281 lock_sock(sk); 1282 ret = tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(sk, msg, size); 1283 release_sock(sk); 1284 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock); 1285 return ret; 1286 } 1287 1288 /* 1289 * Handle unexpected EOF during splice without SPLICE_F_MORE set. 1290 */ 1291 void tls_sw_splice_eof(struct socket *sock) 1292 { 1293 struct sock *sk = sock->sk; 1294 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 1295 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 1296 struct tls_rec *rec; 1297 struct sk_msg *msg_pl; 1298 ssize_t copied = 0; 1299 bool retrying = false; 1300 int ret = 0; 1301 1302 if (!ctx->open_rec) 1303 return; 1304 1305 mutex_lock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock); 1306 lock_sock(sk); 1307 1308 retry: 1309 /* same checks as in tls_sw_push_pending_record() */ 1310 rec = ctx->open_rec; 1311 if (!rec) 1312 goto unlock; 1313 1314 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext; 1315 if (msg_pl->sg.size == 0) 1316 goto unlock; 1317 1318 /* Check the BPF advisor and perform transmission. */ 1319 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, false, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA, 1320 &copied, 0); 1321 switch (ret) { 1322 case 0: 1323 case -EAGAIN: 1324 if (retrying) 1325 goto unlock; 1326 retrying = true; 1327 goto retry; 1328 case -EINPROGRESS: 1329 break; 1330 default: 1331 goto unlock; 1332 } 1333 1334 /* Wait for pending encryptions to get completed */ 1335 if (tls_encrypt_async_wait(ctx)) 1336 goto unlock; 1337 1338 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */ 1339 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) { 1340 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work); 1341 tls_tx_records(sk, 0); 1342 } 1343 1344 unlock: 1345 release_sock(sk); 1346 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock); 1347 } 1348 1349 static int 1350 tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock, 1351 bool released) 1352 { 1353 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 1354 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 1355 DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function); 1356 int ret = 0; 1357 long timeo; 1358 1359 /* a rekey is pending, let userspace deal with it */ 1360 if (unlikely(ctx->key_update_pending)) 1361 return -EKEYEXPIRED; 1362 1363 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock); 1364 1365 while (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) { 1366 if (!sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) 1367 return 0; 1368 1369 if (sk->sk_err) 1370 return sock_error(sk); 1371 1372 if (ret < 0) 1373 return ret; 1374 1375 if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) { 1376 tls_strp_check_rcv(&ctx->strp); 1377 if (tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) 1378 break; 1379 } 1380 1381 if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) 1382 return 0; 1383 1384 if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE)) 1385 return 0; 1386 1387 if (!timeo) 1388 return -EAGAIN; 1389 1390 released = true; 1391 add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); 1392 sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); 1393 ret = sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo, 1394 tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx) || 1395 !sk_psock_queue_empty(psock), 1396 &wait); 1397 sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk); 1398 remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait); 1399 1400 /* Handle signals */ 1401 if (signal_pending(current)) 1402 return sock_intr_errno(timeo); 1403 } 1404 1405 if (unlikely(!tls_strp_msg_load(&ctx->strp, released))) 1406 return tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, nonblock, false); 1407 1408 return 1; 1409 } 1410 1411 static int tls_setup_from_iter(struct iov_iter *from, 1412 int length, int *pages_used, 1413 struct scatterlist *to, 1414 int to_max_pages) 1415 { 1416 int rc = 0, i = 0, num_elem = *pages_used, maxpages; 1417 struct page *pages[MAX_SKB_FRAGS]; 1418 unsigned int size = 0; 1419 ssize_t copied, use; 1420 size_t offset; 1421 1422 while (length > 0) { 1423 i = 0; 1424 maxpages = to_max_pages - num_elem; 1425 if (maxpages == 0) { 1426 rc = -EFAULT; 1427 goto out; 1428 } 1429 copied = iov_iter_get_pages2(from, pages, 1430 length, 1431 maxpages, &offset); 1432 if (copied <= 0) { 1433 rc = -EFAULT; 1434 goto out; 1435 } 1436 1437 length -= copied; 1438 size += copied; 1439 while (copied) { 1440 use = min_t(int, copied, PAGE_SIZE - offset); 1441 1442 sg_set_page(&to[num_elem], 1443 pages[i], use, offset); 1444 sg_unmark_end(&to[num_elem]); 1445 /* We do not uncharge memory from this API */ 1446 1447 offset = 0; 1448 copied -= use; 1449 1450 i++; 1451 num_elem++; 1452 } 1453 } 1454 /* Mark the end in the last sg entry if newly added */ 1455 if (num_elem > *pages_used) 1456 sg_mark_end(&to[num_elem - 1]); 1457 out: 1458 if (rc) 1459 iov_iter_revert(from, size); 1460 *pages_used = num_elem; 1461 1462 return rc; 1463 } 1464 1465 static struct sk_buff * 1466 tls_alloc_clrtxt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, 1467 unsigned int full_len) 1468 { 1469 struct strp_msg *clr_rxm; 1470 struct sk_buff *clr_skb; 1471 int err; 1472 1473 clr_skb = alloc_skb_with_frags(0, full_len, TLS_PAGE_ORDER, 1474 &err, sk->sk_allocation); 1475 if (!clr_skb) 1476 return NULL; 1477 1478 skb_copy_header(clr_skb, skb); 1479 clr_skb->len = full_len; 1480 clr_skb->data_len = full_len; 1481 1482 clr_rxm = strp_msg(clr_skb); 1483 clr_rxm->offset = 0; 1484 1485 return clr_skb; 1486 } 1487 1488 /* Decrypt handlers 1489 * 1490 * tls_decrypt_sw() and tls_decrypt_device() are decrypt handlers. 1491 * They must transform the darg in/out argument are as follows: 1492 * | Input | Output 1493 * ------------------------------------------------------------------- 1494 * zc | Zero-copy decrypt allowed | Zero-copy performed 1495 * async | Async decrypt allowed | Async crypto used / in progress 1496 * skb | * | Output skb 1497 * 1498 * If ZC decryption was performed darg.skb will point to the input skb. 1499 */ 1500 1501 /* This function decrypts the input skb into either out_iov or in out_sg 1502 * or in skb buffers itself. The input parameter 'darg->zc' indicates if 1503 * zero-copy mode needs to be tried or not. With zero-copy mode, either 1504 * out_iov or out_sg must be non-NULL. In case both out_iov and out_sg are 1505 * NULL, then the decryption happens inside skb buffers itself, i.e. 1506 * zero-copy gets disabled and 'darg->zc' is updated. 1507 */ 1508 static int tls_decrypt_sg(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *out_iov, 1509 struct scatterlist *out_sg, 1510 struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) 1511 { 1512 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 1513 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 1514 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 1515 int n_sgin, n_sgout, aead_size, err, pages = 0; 1516 struct sk_buff *skb = tls_strp_msg(ctx); 1517 const struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); 1518 const struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb); 1519 struct aead_request *aead_req; 1520 struct scatterlist *sgin = NULL; 1521 struct scatterlist *sgout = NULL; 1522 const int data_len = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size; 1523 int tail_pages = !!prot->tail_size; 1524 struct tls_decrypt_ctx *dctx; 1525 struct sk_buff *clear_skb; 1526 int iv_offset = 0; 1527 u8 *mem; 1528 1529 n_sgin = skb_nsg(skb, rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size, 1530 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size); 1531 if (n_sgin < 1) 1532 return n_sgin ?: -EBADMSG; 1533 1534 if (darg->zc && (out_iov || out_sg)) { 1535 clear_skb = NULL; 1536 1537 if (out_iov) 1538 n_sgout = 1 + tail_pages + 1539 iov_iter_npages_cap(out_iov, INT_MAX, data_len); 1540 else 1541 n_sgout = sg_nents(out_sg); 1542 } else { 1543 darg->zc = false; 1544 1545 clear_skb = tls_alloc_clrtxt_skb(sk, skb, rxm->full_len); 1546 if (!clear_skb) 1547 return -ENOMEM; 1548 1549 n_sgout = 1 + skb_shinfo(clear_skb)->nr_frags; 1550 } 1551 1552 /* Increment to accommodate AAD */ 1553 n_sgin = n_sgin + 1; 1554 1555 /* Allocate a single block of memory which contains 1556 * aead_req || tls_decrypt_ctx. 1557 * Both structs are variable length. 1558 */ 1559 aead_size = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_recv); 1560 aead_size = ALIGN(aead_size, __alignof__(*dctx)); 1561 mem = kmalloc(aead_size + struct_size(dctx, sg, size_add(n_sgin, n_sgout)), 1562 sk->sk_allocation); 1563 if (!mem) { 1564 err = -ENOMEM; 1565 goto exit_free_skb; 1566 } 1567 1568 /* Segment the allocated memory */ 1569 aead_req = (struct aead_request *)mem; 1570 dctx = (struct tls_decrypt_ctx *)(mem + aead_size); 1571 dctx->sk = sk; 1572 sgin = &dctx->sg[0]; 1573 sgout = &dctx->sg[n_sgin]; 1574 1575 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of nonce+iv is a constant */ 1576 switch (prot->cipher_type) { 1577 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128: 1578 dctx->iv[0] = TLS_AES_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE; 1579 iv_offset = 1; 1580 break; 1581 case TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM: 1582 dctx->iv[0] = TLS_SM4_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE; 1583 iv_offset = 1; 1584 break; 1585 } 1586 1587 /* Prepare IV */ 1588 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION || 1589 prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { 1590 memcpy(&dctx->iv[iv_offset], tls_ctx->rx.iv, 1591 prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size); 1592 } else { 1593 err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + TLS_HEADER_SIZE, 1594 &dctx->iv[iv_offset] + prot->salt_size, 1595 prot->iv_size); 1596 if (err < 0) 1597 goto exit_free; 1598 memcpy(&dctx->iv[iv_offset], tls_ctx->rx.iv, prot->salt_size); 1599 } 1600 tls_xor_iv_with_seq(prot, &dctx->iv[iv_offset], tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq); 1601 1602 /* Prepare AAD */ 1603 tls_make_aad(dctx->aad, rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size + 1604 prot->tail_size, 1605 tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, tlm->control, prot); 1606 1607 /* Prepare sgin */ 1608 sg_init_table(sgin, n_sgin); 1609 sg_set_buf(&sgin[0], dctx->aad, prot->aad_size); 1610 err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, &sgin[1], 1611 rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size, 1612 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size); 1613 if (err < 0) 1614 goto exit_free; 1615 1616 if (clear_skb) { 1617 sg_init_table(sgout, n_sgout); 1618 sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], dctx->aad, prot->aad_size); 1619 1620 err = skb_to_sgvec(clear_skb, &sgout[1], prot->prepend_size, 1621 data_len + prot->tail_size); 1622 if (err < 0) 1623 goto exit_free; 1624 } else if (out_iov) { 1625 sg_init_table(sgout, n_sgout); 1626 sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], dctx->aad, prot->aad_size); 1627 1628 err = tls_setup_from_iter(out_iov, data_len, &pages, &sgout[1], 1629 (n_sgout - 1 - tail_pages)); 1630 if (err < 0) 1631 goto exit_free_pages; 1632 1633 if (prot->tail_size) { 1634 sg_unmark_end(&sgout[pages]); 1635 sg_set_buf(&sgout[pages + 1], &dctx->tail, 1636 prot->tail_size); 1637 sg_mark_end(&sgout[pages + 1]); 1638 } 1639 } else if (out_sg) { 1640 memcpy(sgout, out_sg, n_sgout * sizeof(*sgout)); 1641 } 1642 dctx->free_sgout = !!pages; 1643 1644 /* Prepare and submit AEAD request */ 1645 err = tls_do_decryption(sk, sgin, sgout, dctx->iv, 1646 data_len + prot->tail_size, aead_req, darg); 1647 if (err) { 1648 if (darg->async_done) 1649 goto exit_free_skb; 1650 goto exit_free_pages; 1651 } 1652 1653 darg->skb = clear_skb ?: tls_strp_msg(ctx); 1654 clear_skb = NULL; 1655 1656 if (unlikely(darg->async)) { 1657 err = tls_strp_msg_hold(&ctx->strp, &ctx->async_hold); 1658 if (err) { 1659 err = tls_decrypt_async_wait(ctx); 1660 darg->async = false; 1661 } 1662 return err; 1663 } 1664 1665 if (unlikely(darg->async_done)) 1666 return 0; 1667 1668 if (prot->tail_size) 1669 darg->tail = dctx->tail; 1670 1671 exit_free_pages: 1672 /* Release the pages in case iov was mapped to pages */ 1673 for (; pages > 0; pages--) 1674 put_page(sg_page(&sgout[pages])); 1675 exit_free: 1676 kfree(mem); 1677 exit_free_skb: 1678 consume_skb(clear_skb); 1679 return err; 1680 } 1681 1682 static int 1683 tls_decrypt_sw(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx, 1684 struct msghdr *msg, struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) 1685 { 1686 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 1687 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 1688 struct strp_msg *rxm; 1689 int pad, err; 1690 1691 err = tls_decrypt_sg(sk, &msg->msg_iter, NULL, darg); 1692 if (err < 0) { 1693 if (err == -EBADMSG) 1694 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR); 1695 return err; 1696 } 1697 /* keep going even for ->async, the code below is TLS 1.3 */ 1698 1699 /* If opportunistic TLS 1.3 ZC failed retry without ZC */ 1700 if (unlikely(darg->zc && prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION && 1701 darg->tail != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)) { 1702 darg->zc = false; 1703 if (!darg->tail) 1704 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXNOPADVIOL); 1705 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTRETRY); 1706 return tls_decrypt_sw(sk, tls_ctx, msg, darg); 1707 } 1708 1709 pad = tls_padding_length(prot, darg->skb, darg); 1710 if (pad < 0) { 1711 if (darg->skb != tls_strp_msg(ctx)) 1712 consume_skb(darg->skb); 1713 return pad; 1714 } 1715 1716 rxm = strp_msg(darg->skb); 1717 rxm->full_len -= pad; 1718 1719 return 0; 1720 } 1721 1722 static int 1723 tls_decrypt_device(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, 1724 struct tls_context *tls_ctx, struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) 1725 { 1726 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 1727 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 1728 struct strp_msg *rxm; 1729 int pad, err; 1730 1731 if (tls_ctx->rx_conf != TLS_HW) 1732 return 0; 1733 1734 err = tls_device_decrypted(sk, tls_ctx); 1735 if (err <= 0) 1736 return err; 1737 1738 pad = tls_padding_length(prot, tls_strp_msg(ctx), darg); 1739 if (pad < 0) 1740 return pad; 1741 1742 darg->async = false; 1743 darg->skb = tls_strp_msg(ctx); 1744 /* ->zc downgrade check, in case TLS 1.3 gets here */ 1745 darg->zc &= !(prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION && 1746 tls_msg(darg->skb)->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA); 1747 1748 rxm = strp_msg(darg->skb); 1749 rxm->full_len -= pad; 1750 1751 if (!darg->zc) { 1752 /* Non-ZC case needs a real skb */ 1753 darg->skb = tls_strp_msg_detach(ctx); 1754 if (!darg->skb) 1755 return -ENOMEM; 1756 } else { 1757 unsigned int off, len; 1758 1759 /* In ZC case nobody cares about the output skb. 1760 * Just copy the data here. Note the skb is not fully trimmed. 1761 */ 1762 off = rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size; 1763 len = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size; 1764 1765 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(darg->skb, off, msg, len); 1766 if (err) 1767 return err; 1768 } 1769 return 1; 1770 } 1771 1772 static int tls_check_pending_rekey(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, 1773 struct sk_buff *skb) 1774 { 1775 const struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); 1776 const struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb); 1777 char hs_type; 1778 int err; 1779 1780 if (likely(tlm->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE)) 1781 return 0; 1782 1783 if (rxm->full_len < 1) 1784 return 0; 1785 1786 err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, &hs_type, 1); 1787 if (err < 0) { 1788 DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(1); 1789 return err; 1790 } 1791 1792 if (hs_type == TLS_HANDSHAKE_KEYUPDATE) { 1793 struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = ctx->priv_ctx_rx; 1794 1795 WRITE_ONCE(rx_ctx->key_update_pending, true); 1796 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXREKEYRECEIVED); 1797 } 1798 1799 return 0; 1800 } 1801 1802 static int tls_rx_one_record(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, 1803 struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) 1804 { 1805 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 1806 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 1807 struct strp_msg *rxm; 1808 int err; 1809 1810 err = tls_decrypt_device(sk, msg, tls_ctx, darg); 1811 if (!err) 1812 err = tls_decrypt_sw(sk, tls_ctx, msg, darg); 1813 if (err < 0) 1814 return err; 1815 1816 rxm = strp_msg(darg->skb); 1817 rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size; 1818 rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size; 1819 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->rx); 1820 1821 return tls_check_pending_rekey(sk, tls_ctx, darg->skb); 1822 } 1823 1824 int decrypt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct scatterlist *sgout) 1825 { 1826 struct tls_decrypt_arg darg = { .zc = true, }; 1827 1828 return tls_decrypt_sg(sk, NULL, sgout, &darg); 1829 } 1830 1831 /* All records returned from a recvmsg() call must have the same type. 1832 * 0 is not a valid content type. Use it as "no type reported, yet". 1833 */ 1834 static int tls_record_content_type(struct msghdr *msg, struct tls_msg *tlm, 1835 u8 *control) 1836 { 1837 int err; 1838 1839 if (!*control) { 1840 *control = tlm->control; 1841 if (!*control) 1842 return -EBADMSG; 1843 1844 err = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE, 1845 sizeof(*control), control); 1846 if (*control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) { 1847 if (err || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) 1848 return -EIO; 1849 } 1850 } else if (*control != tlm->control) { 1851 return 0; 1852 } 1853 1854 return 1; 1855 } 1856 1857 static void tls_rx_rec_done(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx) 1858 { 1859 tls_strp_msg_done(&ctx->strp); 1860 } 1861 1862 /* This function traverses the rx_list in tls receive context to copies the 1863 * decrypted records into the buffer provided by caller zero copy is not 1864 * true. Further, the records are removed from the rx_list if it is not a peek 1865 * case and the record has been consumed completely. 1866 */ 1867 static int process_rx_list(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx, 1868 struct msghdr *msg, 1869 u8 *control, 1870 size_t skip, 1871 size_t len, 1872 bool is_peek, 1873 bool *more) 1874 { 1875 struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&ctx->rx_list); 1876 struct tls_msg *tlm; 1877 ssize_t copied = 0; 1878 int err; 1879 1880 while (skip && skb) { 1881 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); 1882 tlm = tls_msg(skb); 1883 1884 err = tls_record_content_type(msg, tlm, control); 1885 if (err <= 0) 1886 goto more; 1887 1888 if (skip < rxm->full_len) 1889 break; 1890 1891 skip = skip - rxm->full_len; 1892 skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list); 1893 } 1894 1895 while (len && skb) { 1896 struct sk_buff *next_skb; 1897 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); 1898 int chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len - skip, len); 1899 1900 tlm = tls_msg(skb); 1901 1902 err = tls_record_content_type(msg, tlm, control); 1903 if (err <= 0) 1904 goto more; 1905 1906 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset + skip, 1907 msg, chunk); 1908 if (err < 0) 1909 goto more; 1910 1911 len = len - chunk; 1912 copied = copied + chunk; 1913 1914 /* Consume the data from record if it is non-peek case*/ 1915 if (!is_peek) { 1916 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk; 1917 rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk; 1918 1919 /* Return if there is unconsumed data in the record */ 1920 if (rxm->full_len - skip) 1921 break; 1922 } 1923 1924 /* The remaining skip-bytes must lie in 1st record in rx_list. 1925 * So from the 2nd record, 'skip' should be 0. 1926 */ 1927 skip = 0; 1928 1929 if (msg) 1930 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR; 1931 1932 next_skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list); 1933 1934 if (!is_peek) { 1935 __skb_unlink(skb, &ctx->rx_list); 1936 consume_skb(skb); 1937 } 1938 1939 skb = next_skb; 1940 } 1941 err = 0; 1942 1943 out: 1944 return copied ? : err; 1945 more: 1946 if (more) 1947 *more = true; 1948 goto out; 1949 } 1950 1951 static bool 1952 tls_read_flush_backlog(struct sock *sk, struct tls_prot_info *prot, 1953 size_t len_left, size_t decrypted, ssize_t done, 1954 size_t *flushed_at) 1955 { 1956 size_t max_rec; 1957 1958 if (len_left <= decrypted) 1959 return false; 1960 1961 max_rec = prot->overhead_size - prot->tail_size + TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE; 1962 if (done - *flushed_at < SZ_128K && tcp_inq(sk) > max_rec) 1963 return false; 1964 1965 *flushed_at = done; 1966 return sk_flush_backlog(sk); 1967 } 1968 1969 static int tls_rx_reader_acquire(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx, 1970 bool nonblock) 1971 { 1972 long timeo; 1973 int ret; 1974 1975 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock); 1976 1977 while (unlikely(ctx->reader_present)) { 1978 DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function); 1979 1980 ctx->reader_contended = 1; 1981 1982 add_wait_queue(&ctx->wq, &wait); 1983 ret = sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo, 1984 !READ_ONCE(ctx->reader_present), &wait); 1985 remove_wait_queue(&ctx->wq, &wait); 1986 1987 if (timeo <= 0) 1988 return -EAGAIN; 1989 if (signal_pending(current)) 1990 return sock_intr_errno(timeo); 1991 if (ret < 0) 1992 return ret; 1993 } 1994 1995 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->reader_present, 1); 1996 1997 return 0; 1998 } 1999 2000 static int tls_rx_reader_lock(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx, 2001 bool nonblock) 2002 { 2003 int err; 2004 2005 lock_sock(sk); 2006 err = tls_rx_reader_acquire(sk, ctx, nonblock); 2007 if (err) 2008 release_sock(sk); 2009 return err; 2010 } 2011 2012 static void tls_rx_reader_release(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx) 2013 { 2014 if (unlikely(ctx->reader_contended)) { 2015 if (wq_has_sleeper(&ctx->wq)) 2016 wake_up(&ctx->wq); 2017 else 2018 ctx->reader_contended = 0; 2019 2020 WARN_ON_ONCE(!ctx->reader_present); 2021 } 2022 2023 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->reader_present, 0); 2024 } 2025 2026 static void tls_rx_reader_unlock(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx) 2027 { 2028 tls_rx_reader_release(sk, ctx); 2029 release_sock(sk); 2030 } 2031 2032 int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, 2033 struct msghdr *msg, 2034 size_t len, 2035 int flags, 2036 int *addr_len) 2037 { 2038 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2039 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2040 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 2041 ssize_t decrypted = 0, async_copy_bytes = 0; 2042 struct sk_psock *psock; 2043 unsigned char control = 0; 2044 size_t flushed_at = 0; 2045 struct strp_msg *rxm; 2046 struct tls_msg *tlm; 2047 ssize_t copied = 0; 2048 ssize_t peeked = 0; 2049 bool async = false; 2050 int target, err; 2051 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter); 2052 bool is_peek = flags & MSG_PEEK; 2053 bool rx_more = false; 2054 bool released = true; 2055 bool bpf_strp_enabled; 2056 bool zc_capable; 2057 2058 if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)) 2059 return sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR); 2060 2061 err = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT); 2062 if (err < 0) 2063 return err; 2064 psock = sk_psock_get(sk); 2065 bpf_strp_enabled = sk_psock_strp_enabled(psock); 2066 2067 /* If crypto failed the connection is broken */ 2068 err = ctx->async_wait.err; 2069 if (err) 2070 goto end; 2071 2072 /* Process pending decrypted records. It must be non-zero-copy */ 2073 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, 0, len, is_peek, &rx_more); 2074 if (err < 0) 2075 goto end; 2076 2077 /* process_rx_list() will set @control if it processed any records */ 2078 copied = err; 2079 if (len <= copied || rx_more || 2080 (control && control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)) 2081 goto end; 2082 2083 target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len); 2084 len = len - copied; 2085 2086 zc_capable = !bpf_strp_enabled && !is_kvec && !is_peek && 2087 ctx->zc_capable; 2088 decrypted = 0; 2089 while (len && (decrypted + copied < target || tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx))) { 2090 struct tls_decrypt_arg darg; 2091 int to_decrypt, chunk; 2092 2093 err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, 2094 released); 2095 if (err <= 0) { 2096 if (psock) { 2097 chunk = sk_msg_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len, 2098 flags); 2099 if (chunk > 0) { 2100 decrypted += chunk; 2101 len -= chunk; 2102 continue; 2103 } 2104 } 2105 goto recv_end; 2106 } 2107 2108 memset(&darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs)); 2109 2110 rxm = strp_msg(tls_strp_msg(ctx)); 2111 tlm = tls_msg(tls_strp_msg(ctx)); 2112 2113 to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size; 2114 2115 if (zc_capable && to_decrypt <= len && 2116 tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) 2117 darg.zc = true; 2118 2119 /* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */ 2120 if (tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA && !bpf_strp_enabled) 2121 darg.async = ctx->async_capable; 2122 else 2123 darg.async = false; 2124 2125 err = tls_rx_one_record(sk, msg, &darg); 2126 if (err < 0) { 2127 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); 2128 goto recv_end; 2129 } 2130 2131 async |= darg.async; 2132 2133 /* If the type of records being processed is not known yet, 2134 * set it to record type just dequeued. If it is already known, 2135 * but does not match the record type just dequeued, go to end. 2136 * We always get record type here since for tls1.2, record type 2137 * is known just after record is dequeued from stream parser. 2138 * For tls1.3, we disable async. 2139 */ 2140 err = tls_record_content_type(msg, tls_msg(darg.skb), &control); 2141 if (err <= 0) { 2142 DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(darg.zc); 2143 tls_rx_rec_done(ctx); 2144 put_on_rx_list_err: 2145 __skb_queue_tail(&ctx->rx_list, darg.skb); 2146 goto recv_end; 2147 } 2148 2149 /* periodically flush backlog, and feed strparser */ 2150 released = tls_read_flush_backlog(sk, prot, len, to_decrypt, 2151 decrypted + copied, 2152 &flushed_at); 2153 2154 /* TLS 1.3 may have updated the length by more than overhead */ 2155 rxm = strp_msg(darg.skb); 2156 chunk = rxm->full_len; 2157 tls_rx_rec_done(ctx); 2158 2159 if (!darg.zc) { 2160 bool partially_consumed = chunk > len; 2161 struct sk_buff *skb = darg.skb; 2162 2163 DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(darg.skb == ctx->strp.anchor); 2164 2165 if (async) { 2166 /* TLS 1.2-only, to_decrypt must be text len */ 2167 chunk = min_t(int, to_decrypt, len); 2168 async_copy_bytes += chunk; 2169 put_on_rx_list: 2170 decrypted += chunk; 2171 len -= chunk; 2172 __skb_queue_tail(&ctx->rx_list, skb); 2173 if (unlikely(control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)) 2174 break; 2175 continue; 2176 } 2177 2178 if (bpf_strp_enabled) { 2179 released = true; 2180 err = sk_psock_tls_strp_read(psock, skb); 2181 if (err != __SK_PASS) { 2182 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + rxm->full_len; 2183 rxm->full_len = 0; 2184 if (err == __SK_DROP) 2185 consume_skb(skb); 2186 continue; 2187 } 2188 } 2189 2190 if (partially_consumed) 2191 chunk = len; 2192 2193 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset, 2194 msg, chunk); 2195 if (err < 0) 2196 goto put_on_rx_list_err; 2197 2198 if (is_peek) { 2199 peeked += chunk; 2200 goto put_on_rx_list; 2201 } 2202 2203 if (partially_consumed) { 2204 rxm->offset += chunk; 2205 rxm->full_len -= chunk; 2206 goto put_on_rx_list; 2207 } 2208 2209 consume_skb(skb); 2210 } 2211 2212 decrypted += chunk; 2213 len -= chunk; 2214 2215 /* Return full control message to userspace before trying 2216 * to parse another message type 2217 */ 2218 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR; 2219 if (control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) 2220 break; 2221 } 2222 2223 recv_end: 2224 if (async) { 2225 int ret; 2226 2227 /* Wait for all previously submitted records to be decrypted */ 2228 ret = tls_decrypt_async_wait(ctx); 2229 2230 if (ret) { 2231 if (err >= 0 || err == -EINPROGRESS) 2232 err = ret; 2233 goto end; 2234 } 2235 2236 /* Drain records from the rx_list & copy if required */ 2237 if (is_peek) 2238 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, copied + peeked, 2239 decrypted - peeked, is_peek, NULL); 2240 else 2241 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, 0, 2242 async_copy_bytes, is_peek, NULL); 2243 2244 /* we could have copied less than we wanted, and possibly nothing */ 2245 decrypted += max(err, 0) - async_copy_bytes; 2246 } 2247 2248 copied += decrypted; 2249 2250 end: 2251 tls_rx_reader_unlock(sk, ctx); 2252 if (psock) 2253 sk_psock_put(sk, psock); 2254 return copied ? : err; 2255 } 2256 2257 ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos, 2258 struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, 2259 size_t len, unsigned int flags) 2260 { 2261 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sock->sk); 2262 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2263 struct strp_msg *rxm = NULL; 2264 struct sock *sk = sock->sk; 2265 struct tls_msg *tlm; 2266 struct sk_buff *skb; 2267 ssize_t copied = 0; 2268 int chunk; 2269 int err; 2270 2271 err = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK); 2272 if (err < 0) 2273 return err; 2274 2275 if (!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list)) { 2276 skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list); 2277 } else { 2278 struct tls_decrypt_arg darg; 2279 2280 err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK, 2281 true); 2282 if (err <= 0) 2283 goto splice_read_end; 2284 2285 memset(&darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs)); 2286 2287 err = tls_rx_one_record(sk, NULL, &darg); 2288 if (err < 0) { 2289 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); 2290 goto splice_read_end; 2291 } 2292 2293 tls_rx_rec_done(ctx); 2294 skb = darg.skb; 2295 } 2296 2297 rxm = strp_msg(skb); 2298 tlm = tls_msg(skb); 2299 2300 /* splice does not support reading control messages */ 2301 if (tlm->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) { 2302 err = -EINVAL; 2303 goto splice_requeue; 2304 } 2305 2306 chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len); 2307 copied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm->offset, pipe, chunk, flags); 2308 if (copied < 0) 2309 goto splice_requeue; 2310 2311 if (chunk < rxm->full_len) { 2312 rxm->offset += len; 2313 rxm->full_len -= len; 2314 goto splice_requeue; 2315 } 2316 2317 consume_skb(skb); 2318 2319 splice_read_end: 2320 tls_rx_reader_unlock(sk, ctx); 2321 return copied ? : err; 2322 2323 splice_requeue: 2324 __skb_queue_head(&ctx->rx_list, skb); 2325 goto splice_read_end; 2326 } 2327 2328 int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc, 2329 sk_read_actor_t read_actor) 2330 { 2331 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2332 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2333 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 2334 struct strp_msg *rxm = NULL; 2335 struct sk_buff *skb = NULL; 2336 struct sk_psock *psock; 2337 size_t flushed_at = 0; 2338 bool released = true; 2339 struct tls_msg *tlm; 2340 ssize_t copied = 0; 2341 ssize_t decrypted; 2342 int err, used; 2343 2344 psock = sk_psock_get(sk); 2345 if (psock) { 2346 sk_psock_put(sk, psock); 2347 return -EINVAL; 2348 } 2349 err = tls_rx_reader_acquire(sk, ctx, true); 2350 if (err < 0) 2351 return err; 2352 2353 /* If crypto failed the connection is broken */ 2354 err = ctx->async_wait.err; 2355 if (err) 2356 goto read_sock_end; 2357 2358 decrypted = 0; 2359 do { 2360 if (!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list)) { 2361 skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list); 2362 rxm = strp_msg(skb); 2363 tlm = tls_msg(skb); 2364 } else { 2365 struct tls_decrypt_arg darg; 2366 2367 err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, true, released); 2368 if (err <= 0) 2369 goto read_sock_end; 2370 2371 memset(&darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs)); 2372 2373 err = tls_rx_one_record(sk, NULL, &darg); 2374 if (err < 0) { 2375 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); 2376 goto read_sock_end; 2377 } 2378 2379 released = tls_read_flush_backlog(sk, prot, INT_MAX, 2380 0, decrypted, 2381 &flushed_at); 2382 skb = darg.skb; 2383 rxm = strp_msg(skb); 2384 tlm = tls_msg(skb); 2385 decrypted += rxm->full_len; 2386 2387 tls_rx_rec_done(ctx); 2388 } 2389 2390 /* read_sock does not support reading control messages */ 2391 if (tlm->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) { 2392 err = -EINVAL; 2393 goto read_sock_requeue; 2394 } 2395 2396 used = read_actor(desc, skb, rxm->offset, rxm->full_len); 2397 if (used <= 0) { 2398 if (!copied) 2399 err = used; 2400 goto read_sock_requeue; 2401 } 2402 copied += used; 2403 if (used < rxm->full_len) { 2404 rxm->offset += used; 2405 rxm->full_len -= used; 2406 if (!desc->count) 2407 goto read_sock_requeue; 2408 } else { 2409 consume_skb(skb); 2410 if (!desc->count) 2411 skb = NULL; 2412 } 2413 } while (skb); 2414 2415 read_sock_end: 2416 tls_rx_reader_release(sk, ctx); 2417 return copied ? : err; 2418 2419 read_sock_requeue: 2420 __skb_queue_head(&ctx->rx_list, skb); 2421 goto read_sock_end; 2422 } 2423 2424 bool tls_sw_sock_is_readable(struct sock *sk) 2425 { 2426 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2427 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2428 bool ingress_empty = true; 2429 struct sk_psock *psock; 2430 2431 rcu_read_lock(); 2432 psock = sk_psock(sk); 2433 if (psock) 2434 ingress_empty = list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg); 2435 rcu_read_unlock(); 2436 2437 return !ingress_empty || tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx) || 2438 !skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list); 2439 } 2440 2441 int tls_rx_msg_size(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb) 2442 { 2443 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk); 2444 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info; 2445 char header[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + TLS_MAX_IV_SIZE]; 2446 size_t cipher_overhead; 2447 size_t data_len = 0; 2448 int ret; 2449 2450 /* Verify that we have a full TLS header, or wait for more data */ 2451 if (strp->stm.offset + prot->prepend_size > skb->len) 2452 return 0; 2453 2454 /* Sanity-check size of on-stack buffer. */ 2455 if (WARN_ON(prot->prepend_size > sizeof(header))) { 2456 ret = -EINVAL; 2457 goto read_failure; 2458 } 2459 2460 /* Linearize header to local buffer */ 2461 ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, strp->stm.offset, header, prot->prepend_size); 2462 if (ret < 0) 2463 goto read_failure; 2464 2465 strp->mark = header[0]; 2466 2467 data_len = ((header[4] & 0xFF) | (header[3] << 8)); 2468 2469 cipher_overhead = prot->tag_size; 2470 if (prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION && 2471 prot->cipher_type != TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) 2472 cipher_overhead += prot->iv_size; 2473 2474 if (data_len > TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE + cipher_overhead + 2475 prot->tail_size) { 2476 ret = -EMSGSIZE; 2477 goto read_failure; 2478 } 2479 if (data_len < cipher_overhead) { 2480 ret = -EBADMSG; 2481 goto read_failure; 2482 } 2483 2484 /* Note that both TLS1.3 and TLS1.2 use TLS_1_2 version here */ 2485 if (header[1] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MINOR || 2486 header[2] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MAJOR) { 2487 ret = -EINVAL; 2488 goto read_failure; 2489 } 2490 2491 tls_device_rx_resync_new_rec(strp->sk, data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE, 2492 TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + strp->stm.offset); 2493 return data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE; 2494 2495 read_failure: 2496 tls_strp_abort_strp(strp, ret); 2497 return ret; 2498 } 2499 2500 void tls_rx_msg_ready(struct tls_strparser *strp) 2501 { 2502 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx; 2503 2504 ctx = container_of(strp, struct tls_sw_context_rx, strp); 2505 ctx->saved_data_ready(strp->sk); 2506 } 2507 2508 static void tls_data_ready(struct sock *sk) 2509 { 2510 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2511 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2512 struct sk_psock *psock; 2513 gfp_t alloc_save; 2514 2515 trace_sk_data_ready(sk); 2516 2517 alloc_save = sk->sk_allocation; 2518 sk->sk_allocation = GFP_ATOMIC; 2519 tls_strp_data_ready(&ctx->strp); 2520 sk->sk_allocation = alloc_save; 2521 2522 psock = sk_psock_get(sk); 2523 if (psock) { 2524 if (!list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg)) 2525 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk); 2526 sk_psock_put(sk, psock); 2527 } 2528 } 2529 2530 void tls_sw_cancel_work_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2531 { 2532 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 2533 2534 set_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask); 2535 set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask); 2536 disable_delayed_work_sync(&ctx->tx_work.work); 2537 } 2538 2539 void tls_sw_release_resources_tx(struct sock *sk) 2540 { 2541 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2542 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 2543 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp; 2544 2545 /* Wait for any pending async encryptions to complete */ 2546 tls_encrypt_async_wait(ctx); 2547 2548 tls_tx_records(sk, -1); 2549 2550 /* Free up un-sent records in tx_list. First, free 2551 * the partially sent record if any at head of tx_list. 2552 */ 2553 if (tls_ctx->partially_sent_record) { 2554 tls_free_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx); 2555 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list, 2556 struct tls_rec, list); 2557 list_del(&rec->list); 2558 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext); 2559 kfree(rec); 2560 } 2561 2562 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) { 2563 list_del(&rec->list); 2564 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted); 2565 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext); 2566 kfree(rec); 2567 } 2568 2569 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_send); 2570 tls_free_open_rec(sk); 2571 } 2572 2573 void tls_sw_free_ctx_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2574 { 2575 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 2576 2577 kfree(ctx); 2578 } 2579 2580 void tls_sw_release_resources_rx(struct sock *sk) 2581 { 2582 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2583 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2584 2585 if (ctx->aead_recv) { 2586 __skb_queue_purge(&ctx->rx_list); 2587 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_recv); 2588 tls_strp_stop(&ctx->strp); 2589 /* If tls_sw_strparser_arm() was not called (cleanup paths) 2590 * we still want to tls_strp_stop(), but sk->sk_data_ready was 2591 * never swapped. 2592 */ 2593 if (ctx->saved_data_ready) { 2594 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); 2595 sk->sk_data_ready = ctx->saved_data_ready; 2596 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); 2597 } 2598 } 2599 } 2600 2601 void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2602 { 2603 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2604 2605 tls_strp_done(&ctx->strp); 2606 } 2607 2608 void tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2609 { 2610 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2611 2612 kfree(ctx); 2613 } 2614 2615 void tls_sw_free_resources_rx(struct sock *sk) 2616 { 2617 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2618 2619 tls_sw_release_resources_rx(sk); 2620 tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2621 } 2622 2623 /* The work handler to transmitt the encrypted records in tx_list */ 2624 static void tx_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) 2625 { 2626 struct delayed_work *delayed_work = to_delayed_work(work); 2627 struct tx_work *tx_work = container_of(delayed_work, 2628 struct tx_work, work); 2629 struct sock *sk = tx_work->sk; 2630 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2631 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx; 2632 2633 if (unlikely(!tls_ctx)) 2634 return; 2635 2636 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx); 2637 if (test_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) 2638 return; 2639 2640 if (!test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) 2641 return; 2642 2643 if (mutex_trylock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock)) { 2644 lock_sock(sk); 2645 tls_tx_records(sk, -1); 2646 release_sock(sk); 2647 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock); 2648 } else if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) { 2649 /* Someone is holding the tx_lock, they will likely run Tx 2650 * and cancel the work on their way out of the lock section. 2651 * Schedule a long delay just in case. 2652 */ 2653 schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, msecs_to_jiffies(10)); 2654 } 2655 } 2656 2657 static bool tls_is_tx_ready(struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx) 2658 { 2659 struct tls_rec *rec; 2660 2661 rec = list_first_entry_or_null(&ctx->tx_list, struct tls_rec, list); 2662 if (!rec) 2663 return false; 2664 2665 return READ_ONCE(rec->tx_ready); 2666 } 2667 2668 void tls_sw_write_space(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx) 2669 { 2670 struct tls_sw_context_tx *tx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx); 2671 2672 /* Schedule the transmission if tx list is ready */ 2673 if (tls_is_tx_ready(tx_ctx) && 2674 !test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &tx_ctx->tx_bitmask)) 2675 schedule_delayed_work(&tx_ctx->tx_work.work, 0); 2676 } 2677 2678 void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2679 { 2680 struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2681 2682 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); 2683 rx_ctx->saved_data_ready = sk->sk_data_ready; 2684 sk->sk_data_ready = tls_data_ready; 2685 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); 2686 } 2687 2688 void tls_update_rx_zc_capable(struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2689 { 2690 struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); 2691 2692 rx_ctx->zc_capable = tls_ctx->rx_no_pad || 2693 tls_ctx->prot_info.version != TLS_1_3_VERSION; 2694 } 2695 2696 static struct tls_sw_context_tx *init_ctx_tx(struct tls_context *ctx, struct sock *sk) 2697 { 2698 struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx_tx; 2699 2700 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_tx) { 2701 sw_ctx_tx = kzalloc_obj(*sw_ctx_tx); 2702 if (!sw_ctx_tx) 2703 return NULL; 2704 } else { 2705 sw_ctx_tx = ctx->priv_ctx_tx; 2706 } 2707 2708 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_tx->async_wait); 2709 atomic_set(&sw_ctx_tx->encrypt_pending, 1); 2710 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_list); 2711 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.work, tx_work_handler); 2712 sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.sk = sk; 2713 2714 return sw_ctx_tx; 2715 } 2716 2717 static struct tls_sw_context_rx *init_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *ctx) 2718 { 2719 struct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx_rx; 2720 2721 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_rx) { 2722 sw_ctx_rx = kzalloc_obj(*sw_ctx_rx); 2723 if (!sw_ctx_rx) 2724 return NULL; 2725 } else { 2726 sw_ctx_rx = ctx->priv_ctx_rx; 2727 } 2728 2729 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_rx->async_wait); 2730 atomic_set(&sw_ctx_rx->decrypt_pending, 1); 2731 init_waitqueue_head(&sw_ctx_rx->wq); 2732 skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->rx_list); 2733 skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->async_hold); 2734 2735 return sw_ctx_rx; 2736 } 2737 2738 int init_prot_info(struct tls_prot_info *prot, 2739 const struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info, 2740 const struct tls_cipher_desc *cipher_desc) 2741 { 2742 u16 nonce_size = cipher_desc->nonce; 2743 2744 if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) { 2745 nonce_size = 0; 2746 prot->aad_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE; 2747 prot->tail_size = 1; 2748 } else { 2749 prot->aad_size = TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE; 2750 prot->tail_size = 0; 2751 } 2752 2753 /* Sanity-check the sizes for stack allocations. */ 2754 if (nonce_size > TLS_MAX_IV_SIZE || prot->aad_size > TLS_MAX_AAD_SIZE) 2755 return -EINVAL; 2756 2757 prot->version = crypto_info->version; 2758 prot->cipher_type = crypto_info->cipher_type; 2759 prot->prepend_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + nonce_size; 2760 prot->tag_size = cipher_desc->tag; 2761 prot->overhead_size = prot->prepend_size + prot->tag_size + prot->tail_size; 2762 prot->iv_size = cipher_desc->iv; 2763 prot->salt_size = cipher_desc->salt; 2764 prot->rec_seq_size = cipher_desc->rec_seq; 2765 2766 return 0; 2767 } 2768 2769 static void tls_finish_key_update(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx) 2770 { 2771 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_ctx->priv_ctx_rx; 2772 2773 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->key_update_pending, false); 2774 /* wake-up pre-existing poll() */ 2775 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk); 2776 } 2777 2778 int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx, 2779 struct tls_crypto_info *new_crypto_info) 2780 { 2781 struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info, *src_crypto_info; 2782 struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx_tx = NULL; 2783 struct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx_rx = NULL; 2784 const struct tls_cipher_desc *cipher_desc; 2785 char *iv, *rec_seq, *key, *salt; 2786 struct cipher_context *cctx; 2787 struct tls_prot_info *prot; 2788 struct crypto_aead **aead; 2789 struct tls_context *ctx; 2790 struct crypto_tfm *tfm; 2791 int rc = 0; 2792 2793 ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); 2794 prot = &ctx->prot_info; 2795 2796 /* new_crypto_info != NULL means rekey */ 2797 if (!new_crypto_info) { 2798 if (tx) { 2799 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = init_ctx_tx(ctx, sk); 2800 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_tx) 2801 return -ENOMEM; 2802 } else { 2803 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = init_ctx_rx(ctx); 2804 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_rx) 2805 return -ENOMEM; 2806 } 2807 } 2808 2809 if (tx) { 2810 sw_ctx_tx = ctx->priv_ctx_tx; 2811 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info; 2812 cctx = &ctx->tx; 2813 aead = &sw_ctx_tx->aead_send; 2814 } else { 2815 sw_ctx_rx = ctx->priv_ctx_rx; 2816 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_recv.info; 2817 cctx = &ctx->rx; 2818 aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv; 2819 } 2820 2821 src_crypto_info = new_crypto_info ?: crypto_info; 2822 2823 cipher_desc = get_cipher_desc(src_crypto_info->cipher_type); 2824 if (!cipher_desc) { 2825 rc = -EINVAL; 2826 goto free_priv; 2827 } 2828 2829 rc = init_prot_info(prot, src_crypto_info, cipher_desc); 2830 if (rc) 2831 goto free_priv; 2832 2833 iv = crypto_info_iv(src_crypto_info, cipher_desc); 2834 key = crypto_info_key(src_crypto_info, cipher_desc); 2835 salt = crypto_info_salt(src_crypto_info, cipher_desc); 2836 rec_seq = crypto_info_rec_seq(src_crypto_info, cipher_desc); 2837 2838 if (!*aead) { 2839 *aead = crypto_alloc_aead(cipher_desc->cipher_name, 0, 0); 2840 if (IS_ERR(*aead)) { 2841 rc = PTR_ERR(*aead); 2842 *aead = NULL; 2843 goto free_priv; 2844 } 2845 } 2846 2847 ctx->push_pending_record = tls_sw_push_pending_record; 2848 2849 /* setkey is the last operation that could fail during a 2850 * rekey. if it succeeds, we can start modifying the 2851 * context. 2852 */ 2853 rc = crypto_aead_setkey(*aead, key, cipher_desc->key); 2854 if (rc) { 2855 if (new_crypto_info) 2856 goto out; 2857 else 2858 goto free_aead; 2859 } 2860 2861 if (!new_crypto_info) { 2862 rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(*aead, prot->tag_size); 2863 if (rc) 2864 goto free_aead; 2865 } 2866 2867 if (!tx && !new_crypto_info) { 2868 tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv); 2869 2870 tls_update_rx_zc_capable(ctx); 2871 sw_ctx_rx->async_capable = 2872 src_crypto_info->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION && 2873 !!(tfm->__crt_alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); 2874 2875 rc = tls_strp_init(&sw_ctx_rx->strp, sk); 2876 if (rc) 2877 goto free_aead; 2878 } 2879 2880 memcpy(cctx->iv, salt, cipher_desc->salt); 2881 memcpy(cctx->iv + cipher_desc->salt, iv, cipher_desc->iv); 2882 memcpy(cctx->rec_seq, rec_seq, cipher_desc->rec_seq); 2883 2884 if (new_crypto_info) { 2885 unsafe_memcpy(crypto_info, new_crypto_info, 2886 cipher_desc->crypto_info, 2887 /* size was checked in do_tls_setsockopt_conf */); 2888 memzero_explicit(new_crypto_info, cipher_desc->crypto_info); 2889 if (!tx) 2890 tls_finish_key_update(sk, ctx); 2891 } 2892 2893 goto out; 2894 2895 free_aead: 2896 crypto_free_aead(*aead); 2897 *aead = NULL; 2898 free_priv: 2899 if (!new_crypto_info) { 2900 if (tx) { 2901 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_tx); 2902 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = NULL; 2903 } else { 2904 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_rx); 2905 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = NULL; 2906 } 2907 } 2908 out: 2909 return rc; 2910 } 2911