xref: /linux/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c (revision 7ec462100ef9142344ddbf86f2c3008b97acddbe)
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /*
3  * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation
4  * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation
5  */
6 
7 #include <linux/asn1_encoder.h>
8 #include <linux/oid_registry.h>
9 #include <linux/string.h>
10 #include <linux/err.h>
11 #include <linux/tpm.h>
12 #include <linux/tpm_command.h>
13 
14 #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
15 #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
16 
17 #include <linux/unaligned.h>
18 
19 #include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
20 
21 static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
22 	{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
23 	{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
24 	{HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384},
25 	{HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM_ALG_SHA512},
26 	{HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
27 };
28 
29 static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 };
30 
tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload * payload,struct trusted_key_options * options,u8 * src,u32 len)31 static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
32 			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
33 			   u8 *src, u32 len)
34 {
35 	const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
36 	u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
37 	u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
38 	u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE;
39 	u8 *priv, *pub;
40 	u16 priv_len, pub_len;
41 	int ret;
42 
43 	priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
44 	priv = src;
45 
46 	src += priv_len;
47 
48 	pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
49 	pub = src;
50 
51 	if (!scratch)
52 		return -ENOMEM;
53 
54 	work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
55 			       asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
56 
57 	if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
58 		unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
59 		/* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
60 		w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
61 		if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) {
62 			ret = PTR_ERR(w);
63 			goto err;
64 		}
65 		work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool);
66 	}
67 
68 	/*
69 	 * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length
70 	 *
71 	 * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never
72 	 * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on
73 	 */
74 	if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE,
75 		 "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) {
76 		ret = -EINVAL;
77 		goto err;
78 	}
79 
80 	work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
81 	work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
82 	work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
83 
84 	work1 = payload->blob;
85 	work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob),
86 				     scratch, work - scratch);
87 	if (IS_ERR(work1)) {
88 		ret = PTR_ERR(work1);
89 		pr_err("BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed with %d\n", ret);
90 		goto err;
91 	}
92 
93 	kfree(scratch);
94 	return work1 - payload->blob;
95 
96 err:
97 	kfree(scratch);
98 	return ret;
99 }
100 
101 struct tpm2_key_context {
102 	u32 parent;
103 	const u8 *pub;
104 	u32 pub_len;
105 	const u8 *priv;
106 	u32 priv_len;
107 };
108 
tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload * payload,struct trusted_key_options * options,u8 ** buf)109 static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
110 			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
111 			   u8 **buf)
112 {
113 	int ret;
114 	struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
115 	u8 *blob;
116 
117 	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
118 
119 	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob,
120 			       payload->blob_len);
121 	if (ret < 0)
122 		return ret;
123 
124 	if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
125 		return -EINVAL;
126 
127 	blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
128 	if (!blob)
129 		return -ENOMEM;
130 
131 	*buf = blob;
132 	options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
133 
134 	memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
135 	blob += ctx.priv_len;
136 
137 	memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len);
138 
139 	return 0;
140 }
141 
tpm2_key_parent(void * context,size_t hdrlen,unsigned char tag,const void * value,size_t vlen)142 int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
143 		  unsigned char tag,
144 		  const void *value, size_t vlen)
145 {
146 	struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
147 	const u8 *v = value;
148 	int i;
149 
150 	ctx->parent = 0;
151 	for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) {
152 		ctx->parent <<= 8;
153 		ctx->parent |= v[i];
154 	}
155 
156 	return 0;
157 }
158 
tpm2_key_type(void * context,size_t hdrlen,unsigned char tag,const void * value,size_t vlen)159 int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
160 		unsigned char tag,
161 		const void *value, size_t vlen)
162 {
163 	enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
164 
165 	if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) {
166 		char buffer[50];
167 
168 		sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
169 		pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n",
170 			 buffer);
171 		return -EINVAL;
172 	}
173 
174 	return 0;
175 }
176 
tpm2_key_pub(void * context,size_t hdrlen,unsigned char tag,const void * value,size_t vlen)177 int tpm2_key_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
178 	       unsigned char tag,
179 	       const void *value, size_t vlen)
180 {
181 	struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
182 
183 	ctx->pub = value;
184 	ctx->pub_len = vlen;
185 
186 	return 0;
187 }
188 
tpm2_key_priv(void * context,size_t hdrlen,unsigned char tag,const void * value,size_t vlen)189 int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
190 		unsigned char tag,
191 		const void *value, size_t vlen)
192 {
193 	struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
194 
195 	ctx->priv = value;
196 	ctx->priv_len = vlen;
197 
198 	return 0;
199 }
200 
201 /**
202  * tpm2_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer.
203  *
204  * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance
205  * @session_handle: session handle
206  * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used
207  * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used
208  * @attributes: the session attributes
209  * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used
210  * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used
211  */
tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf * buf,u32 session_handle,const u8 * nonce,u16 nonce_len,u8 attributes,const u8 * hmac,u16 hmac_len)212 static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle,
213 				 const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len,
214 				 u8 attributes,
215 				 const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len)
216 {
217 	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len);
218 	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle);
219 	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len);
220 
221 	if (nonce && nonce_len)
222 		tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len);
223 
224 	tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes);
225 	tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len);
226 
227 	if (hmac && hmac_len)
228 		tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len);
229 }
230 
231 /**
232  * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key
233  *
234  * @chip: TPM chip to use
235  * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
236  * @options: authentication values and other options
237  *
238  * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success.
239  */
tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip * chip,struct trusted_key_payload * payload,struct trusted_key_options * options)240 int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
241 		      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
242 		      struct trusted_key_options *options)
243 {
244 	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
245 	struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
246 	int blob_len = 0;
247 	u32 hash;
248 	u32 flags;
249 	int i;
250 	int rc;
251 
252 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) {
253 		if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) {
254 			hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id;
255 			break;
256 		}
257 	}
258 
259 	if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
260 		return -EINVAL;
261 
262 	if (!options->keyhandle)
263 		return -EINVAL;
264 
265 	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
266 	if (rc)
267 		return rc;
268 
269 	rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
270 	if (rc)
271 		goto out_put;
272 
273 	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
274 	if (rc) {
275 		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
276 		goto out_put;
277 	}
278 
279 	rc = tpm_buf_init_sized(&sized);
280 	if (rc) {
281 		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
282 		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
283 		goto out_put;
284 	}
285 
286 	tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
287 	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
288 				    options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
289 
290 	/* sensitive */
291 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len);
292 
293 	if (options->blobauth_len)
294 		tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
295 
296 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len);
297 	tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
298 	tpm_buf_append(&buf, sized.data, sized.length);
299 
300 	/* public */
301 	tpm_buf_reset_sized(&sized);
302 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
303 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, hash);
304 
305 	/* key properties */
306 	flags = 0;
307 	flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
308 	flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
309 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags);
310 
311 	/* policy */
312 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len);
313 	if (options->policydigest_len)
314 		tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
315 
316 	/* public parameters */
317 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
318 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, 0);
319 
320 	tpm_buf_append(&buf, sized.data, sized.length);
321 
322 	/* outside info */
323 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
324 
325 	/* creation PCR */
326 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
327 
328 	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
329 		rc = -E2BIG;
330 		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
331 		goto out;
332 	}
333 
334 	tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
335 	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data");
336 	rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
337 	if (rc)
338 		goto out;
339 
340 	blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset);
341 	if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) {
342 		rc = -E2BIG;
343 		goto out;
344 	}
345 	if (buf.length - offset < blob_len) {
346 		rc = -EFAULT;
347 		goto out;
348 	}
349 
350 	blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf.data[offset], blob_len);
351 
352 out:
353 	tpm_buf_destroy(&sized);
354 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
355 
356 	if (rc > 0) {
357 		if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH)
358 			rc = -EINVAL;
359 		else
360 			rc = -EPERM;
361 	}
362 	if (blob_len < 0)
363 		rc = blob_len;
364 	else
365 		payload->blob_len = blob_len;
366 
367 out_put:
368 	tpm_put_ops(chip);
369 	return rc;
370 }
371 
372 /**
373  * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command
374  *
375  * @chip: TPM chip to use
376  * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
377  * @options: authentication values and other options
378  * @blob_handle: returned blob handle
379  *
380  * Return: 0 on success.
381  *        -E2BIG on wrong payload size.
382  *        -EPERM on tpm error status.
383  *        < 0 error from tpm_send.
384  */
tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip * chip,struct trusted_key_payload * payload,struct trusted_key_options * options,u32 * blob_handle)385 static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
386 			 struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
387 			 struct trusted_key_options *options,
388 			 u32 *blob_handle)
389 {
390 	struct tpm_buf buf;
391 	unsigned int private_len;
392 	unsigned int public_len;
393 	unsigned int blob_len;
394 	u8 *blob, *pub;
395 	int rc;
396 	u32 attrs;
397 
398 	rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
399 	if (rc) {
400 		/* old form */
401 		blob = payload->blob;
402 		payload->old_format = 1;
403 	}
404 
405 	/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
406 	if (!options->keyhandle)
407 		return -EINVAL;
408 
409 	/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
410 	if (payload->blob_len < 4)
411 		return -EINVAL;
412 
413 	private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob);
414 
415 	/* must be big enough for following public_len */
416 	if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len))
417 		return -E2BIG;
418 
419 	public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len);
420 	if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len)
421 		return -E2BIG;
422 
423 	pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2;
424 	/* key attributes are always at offset 4 */
425 	attrs = get_unaligned_be32(pub + 4);
426 
427 	if ((attrs & (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) ==
428 	    (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT))
429 		payload->migratable = 0;
430 	else
431 		payload->migratable = 1;
432 
433 	blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4;
434 	if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
435 		return -E2BIG;
436 
437 	rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
438 	if (rc)
439 		return rc;
440 
441 	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
442 	if (rc) {
443 		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
444 		return rc;
445 	}
446 
447 	tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
448 	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth,
449 				    TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
450 
451 	tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
452 
453 	if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
454 		rc = -E2BIG;
455 		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
456 		goto out;
457 	}
458 
459 	tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
460 	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob");
461 	rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
462 	if (!rc)
463 		*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
464 			(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
465 
466 out:
467 	if (blob != payload->blob)
468 		kfree(blob);
469 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
470 
471 	if (rc > 0)
472 		rc = -EPERM;
473 
474 	return rc;
475 }
476 
477 /**
478  * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command
479  *
480  * @chip: TPM chip to use
481  * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
482  * @options: authentication values and other options
483  * @blob_handle: blob handle
484  *
485  * Return: 0 on success
486  *         -EPERM on tpm error status
487  *         < 0 error from tpm_send
488  */
tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip * chip,struct trusted_key_payload * payload,struct trusted_key_options * options,u32 blob_handle)489 static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
490 			   struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
491 			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
492 			   u32 blob_handle)
493 {
494 	struct tpm_buf buf;
495 	u16 data_len;
496 	u8 *data;
497 	int rc;
498 
499 	rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
500 	if (rc)
501 		return rc;
502 
503 	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL);
504 	if (rc) {
505 		tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
506 		return rc;
507 	}
508 
509 	tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL);
510 
511 	if (!options->policyhandle) {
512 		tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
513 					    options->blobauth,
514 					    options->blobauth_len);
515 	} else {
516 		/*
517 		 * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
518 		 * kernel so we don't known the nonce and thus can't
519 		 * calculate a HMAC on it.  Therefore, the user can
520 		 * only really use TPM2_PolicyPassword and we must
521 		 * send down the plain text password, which could be
522 		 * intercepted.  We can still encrypt the returned
523 		 * key, but that's small comfort since the interposer
524 		 * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
525 		 * password.
526 		 */
527 		tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
528 				     NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
529 				     options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
530 		tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
531 						NULL, 0);
532 	}
533 
534 	tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
535 	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing");
536 	rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
537 	if (rc > 0)
538 		rc = -EPERM;
539 
540 	if (!rc) {
541 		data_len = be16_to_cpup(
542 			(__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]);
543 		if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE ||  data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
544 			rc = -EFAULT;
545 			goto out;
546 		}
547 
548 		if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + data_len) {
549 			rc = -EFAULT;
550 			goto out;
551 		}
552 		data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6];
553 
554 		if (payload->old_format) {
555 			/* migratable flag is at the end of the key */
556 			memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1);
557 			payload->key_len = data_len - 1;
558 			payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1];
559 		} else {
560 			/*
561 			 * migratable flag already collected from key
562 			 * attributes
563 			 */
564 			memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len);
565 			payload->key_len = data_len;
566 		}
567 	}
568 
569 out:
570 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
571 	return rc;
572 }
573 
574 /**
575  * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key
576  *
577  * @chip: TPM chip to use
578  * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
579  * @options: authentication values and other options
580  *
581  * Return: Same as with tpm_send.
582  */
tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip * chip,struct trusted_key_payload * payload,struct trusted_key_options * options)583 int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
584 			struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
585 			struct trusted_key_options *options)
586 {
587 	u32 blob_handle;
588 	int rc;
589 
590 	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
591 	if (rc)
592 		return rc;
593 
594 	rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
595 	if (rc)
596 		goto out;
597 
598 	rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
599 	tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
600 
601 out:
602 	tpm_put_ops(chip);
603 
604 	return rc;
605 }
606