1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
3 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook
4 * Copyright (c) 2018 Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io
5 */
6 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h>
7 #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h>
8 #include <linux/kernel.h>
9 #include <linux/types.h>
10 #include <linux/slab.h>
11 #include <linux/bpf.h>
12 #include <linux/btf.h>
13 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
14 #include <linux/filter.h>
15 #include <net/netlink.h>
16 #include <linux/file.h>
17 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
18 #include <linux/stringify.h>
19 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
20 #include <linux/sort.h>
21 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
22 #include <linux/ctype.h>
23 #include <linux/error-injection.h>
24 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
25 #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
26 #include <linux/poison.h>
27 #include <linux/module.h>
28 #include <linux/cpumask.h>
29 #include <linux/bpf_mem_alloc.h>
30 #include <net/xdp.h>
31 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
32 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
33
34 #include "disasm.h"
35
36 static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = {
37 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) \
38 [_id] = & _name ## _verifier_ops,
39 #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops)
40 #define BPF_LINK_TYPE(_id, _name)
41 #include <linux/bpf_types.h>
42 #undef BPF_PROG_TYPE
43 #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE
44 #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE
45 };
46
47 enum bpf_features {
48 BPF_FEAT_RDONLY_CAST_TO_VOID = 0,
49 BPF_FEAT_STREAMS = 1,
50 __MAX_BPF_FEAT,
51 };
52
53 struct bpf_mem_alloc bpf_global_percpu_ma;
54 static bool bpf_global_percpu_ma_set;
55
56 /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program
57 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state.
58 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn.
59 *
60 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG.
61 * It rejects the following programs:
62 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns
63 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge)
64 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
65 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps
66 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
67 * Since it's analyzing all paths through the program, the length of the
68 * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
69 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
70 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
71 *
72 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction
73 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics.
74 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is
75 * copied to R1.
76 *
77 * All registers are 64-bit.
78 * R0 - return register
79 * R1-R5 argument passing registers
80 * R6-R9 callee saved registers
81 * R10 - frame pointer read-only
82 *
83 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context
84 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX.
85 *
86 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case:
87 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
88 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20),
89 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1
90 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize
91 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack.
92 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK
93 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking).
94 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant.
95 *
96 * Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which
97 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer.
98 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type)
99 *
100 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register
101 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are
102 * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function.
103 *
104 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value'
105 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible.
106 *
107 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against
108 * function argument constraints.
109 *
110 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints.
111 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be
112 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as
113 * 'pointer to map element key'
114 *
115 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem():
116 * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL,
117 * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
118 * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
119 *
120 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null'
121 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and
122 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside
123 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key.
124 *
125 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like:
126 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
127 * {
128 * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1;
129 * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2;
130 * void *value;
131 *
132 * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that
133 * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on
134 * the stack of eBPF program.
135 * }
136 *
137 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like:
138 * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR
139 * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK
140 * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
141 * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
142 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees:
143 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok,
144 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes
145 *
146 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far,
147 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits
148 * and were initialized prior to this call.
149 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
150 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
151 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
152 * returns either pointer to map value or NULL.
153 *
154 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
155 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
156 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false
157 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op().
158 *
159 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5
160 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable.
161 *
162 * The following reference types represent a potential reference to a kernel
163 * resource which, after first being allocated, must be checked and freed by
164 * the BPF program:
165 * - PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, PTR_TO_SOCKET
166 *
167 * When the verifier sees a helper call return a reference type, it allocates a
168 * pointer id for the reference and stores it in the current function state.
169 * Similar to the way that PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL is converted into
170 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL becomes PTR_TO_SOCKET when the type
171 * passes through a NULL-check conditional. For the branch wherein the state is
172 * changed to CONST_IMM, the verifier releases the reference.
173 *
174 * For each helper function that allocates a reference, such as
175 * bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), there is a corresponding release function, such as
176 * bpf_sk_release(). When a reference type passes into the release function,
177 * the verifier also releases the reference. If any unchecked or unreleased
178 * reference remains at the end of the program, the verifier rejects it.
179 */
180
181 /* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */
182 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
183 /* verifier state is 'st'
184 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx'
185 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx'
186 */
187 struct bpf_verifier_state st;
188 int insn_idx;
189 int prev_insn_idx;
190 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next;
191 /* length of verifier log at the time this state was pushed on stack */
192 u32 log_pos;
193 };
194
195 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ 8192
196 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES 64
197
198 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON (1ULL << 63)
199 #define BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN (1ULL << 62)
200
201 #define BPF_GLOBAL_PERCPU_MA_MAX_SIZE 512
202
203 #define BPF_PRIV_STACK_MIN_SIZE 64
204
205 static int acquire_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx);
206 static int release_reference_nomark(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int ref_obj_id);
207 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id);
208 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
209 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
210 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
211 struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
212 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
213
bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data * aux)214 static bool bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
215 {
216 return aux->map_ptr_state.poison;
217 }
218
bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data * aux)219 static bool bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
220 {
221 return aux->map_ptr_state.unpriv;
222 }
223
bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data * aux,struct bpf_map * map,bool unpriv,bool poison)224 static void bpf_map_ptr_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
225 struct bpf_map *map,
226 bool unpriv, bool poison)
227 {
228 unpriv |= bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux);
229 aux->map_ptr_state.unpriv = unpriv;
230 aux->map_ptr_state.poison = poison;
231 aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr = map;
232 }
233
bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data * aux)234 static bool bpf_map_key_poisoned(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
235 {
236 return aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON;
237 }
238
bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data * aux)239 static bool bpf_map_key_unseen(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
240 {
241 return !(aux->map_key_state & BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN);
242 }
243
bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data * aux)244 static u64 bpf_map_key_immediate(const struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
245 {
246 return aux->map_key_state & ~(BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN | BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
247 }
248
bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data * aux,u64 state)249 static void bpf_map_key_store(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, u64 state)
250 {
251 bool poisoned = bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux);
252
253 aux->map_key_state = state | BPF_MAP_KEY_SEEN |
254 (poisoned ? BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON : 0ULL);
255 }
256
bpf_helper_call(const struct bpf_insn * insn)257 static bool bpf_helper_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
258 {
259 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
260 insn->src_reg == 0;
261 }
262
bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn * insn)263 static bool bpf_pseudo_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
264 {
265 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
266 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL;
267 }
268
bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn * insn)269 static bool bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
270 {
271 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
272 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL;
273 }
274
275 struct bpf_map_desc {
276 struct bpf_map *ptr;
277 int uid;
278 };
279
280 struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
281 struct bpf_map_desc map;
282 bool raw_mode;
283 bool pkt_access;
284 u8 release_regno;
285 int regno;
286 int access_size;
287 int mem_size;
288 u64 msize_max_value;
289 int ref_obj_id;
290 int dynptr_id;
291 int func_id;
292 struct btf *btf;
293 u32 btf_id;
294 struct btf *ret_btf;
295 u32 ret_btf_id;
296 u32 subprogno;
297 struct btf_field *kptr_field;
298 s64 const_map_key;
299 };
300
301 struct bpf_kfunc_meta {
302 struct btf *btf;
303 const struct btf_type *proto;
304 const char *name;
305 const u32 *flags;
306 s32 id;
307 };
308
309 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta {
310 /* In parameters */
311 struct btf *btf;
312 u32 func_id;
313 u32 kfunc_flags;
314 const struct btf_type *func_proto;
315 const char *func_name;
316 /* Out parameters */
317 u32 ref_obj_id;
318 u8 release_regno;
319 bool r0_rdonly;
320 u32 ret_btf_id;
321 u64 r0_size;
322 u32 subprogno;
323 struct {
324 u64 value;
325 bool found;
326 } arg_constant;
327
328 /* arg_{btf,btf_id,owning_ref} are used by kfunc-specific handling,
329 * generally to pass info about user-defined local kptr types to later
330 * verification logic
331 * bpf_obj_drop/bpf_percpu_obj_drop
332 * Record the local kptr type to be drop'd
333 * bpf_refcount_acquire (via KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR arg type)
334 * Record the local kptr type to be refcount_incr'd and use
335 * arg_owning_ref to determine whether refcount_acquire should be
336 * fallible
337 */
338 struct btf *arg_btf;
339 u32 arg_btf_id;
340 bool arg_owning_ref;
341 bool arg_prog;
342
343 struct {
344 struct btf_field *field;
345 } arg_list_head;
346 struct {
347 struct btf_field *field;
348 } arg_rbtree_root;
349 struct {
350 enum bpf_dynptr_type type;
351 u32 id;
352 u32 ref_obj_id;
353 } initialized_dynptr;
354 struct {
355 u8 spi;
356 u8 frameno;
357 } iter;
358 struct bpf_map_desc map;
359 u64 mem_size;
360 };
361
362 struct btf *btf_vmlinux;
363
btf_type_name(const struct btf * btf,u32 id)364 static const char *btf_type_name(const struct btf *btf, u32 id)
365 {
366 return btf_name_by_offset(btf, btf_type_by_id(btf, id)->name_off);
367 }
368
369 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
370 static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_percpu_ma_lock);
371
verbose(void * private_data,const char * fmt,...)372 __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...)
373 {
374 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = private_data;
375 va_list args;
376
377 if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log))
378 return;
379
380 va_start(args, fmt);
381 bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args);
382 va_end(args);
383 }
384
verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,struct bpf_retval_range range,const char * ctx,const char * reg_name)385 static void verbose_invalid_scalar(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
386 struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
387 struct bpf_retval_range range, const char *ctx,
388 const char *reg_name)
389 {
390 bool unknown = true;
391
392 verbose(env, "%s the register %s has", ctx, reg_name);
393 if (reg->smin_value > S64_MIN) {
394 verbose(env, " smin=%lld", reg->smin_value);
395 unknown = false;
396 }
397 if (reg->smax_value < S64_MAX) {
398 verbose(env, " smax=%lld", reg->smax_value);
399 unknown = false;
400 }
401 if (unknown)
402 verbose(env, " unknown scalar value");
403 verbose(env, " should have been in [%d, %d]\n", range.minval, range.maxval);
404 }
405
reg_not_null(const struct bpf_reg_state * reg)406 static bool reg_not_null(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
407 {
408 enum bpf_reg_type type;
409
410 type = reg->type;
411 if (type_may_be_null(type))
412 return false;
413
414 type = base_type(type);
415 return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
416 type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
417 type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
418 type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
419 type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
420 (type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && is_trusted_reg(reg)) ||
421 (type == PTR_TO_MEM && !(reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) ||
422 type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
423 }
424
reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state * reg)425 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
426 {
427 struct btf_record *rec = NULL;
428 struct btf_struct_meta *meta;
429
430 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
431 rec = reg->map_ptr->record;
432 } else if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) {
433 meta = btf_find_struct_meta(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
434 if (meta)
435 rec = meta->record;
436 }
437 return rec;
438 }
439
subprog_is_global(const struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int subprog)440 static bool subprog_is_global(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
441 {
442 struct bpf_func_info_aux *aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux;
443
444 return aux && aux[subprog].linkage == BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL;
445 }
446
subprog_name(const struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int subprog)447 static const char *subprog_name(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
448 {
449 struct bpf_func_info *info;
450
451 if (!env->prog->aux->func_info)
452 return "";
453
454 info = &env->prog->aux->func_info[subprog];
455 return btf_type_name(env->prog->aux->btf, info->type_id);
456 }
457
mark_subprog_exc_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int subprog)458 static void mark_subprog_exc_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
459 {
460 struct bpf_subprog_info *info = subprog_info(env, subprog);
461
462 info->is_cb = true;
463 info->is_async_cb = true;
464 info->is_exception_cb = true;
465 }
466
subprog_is_exc_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int subprog)467 static bool subprog_is_exc_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
468 {
469 return subprog_info(env, subprog)->is_exception_cb;
470 }
471
reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state * reg)472 static bool reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
473 {
474 return btf_record_has_field(reg_btf_record(reg), BPF_SPIN_LOCK | BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK);
475 }
476
type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type)477 static bool type_is_rdonly_mem(u32 type)
478 {
479 return type & MEM_RDONLY;
480 }
481
is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id,const struct bpf_map * map)482 static bool is_acquire_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id,
483 const struct bpf_map *map)
484 {
485 enum bpf_map_type map_type = map ? map->map_type : BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC;
486
487 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp ||
488 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_udp ||
489 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_lookup_tcp ||
490 func_id == BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve ||
491 func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg)
492 return true;
493
494 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
495 (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP ||
496 map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH))
497 return true;
498
499 return false;
500 }
501
is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)502 static bool is_ptr_cast_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
503 {
504 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock ||
505 func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock ||
506 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_sock ||
507 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp6_sock ||
508 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_udp6_sock ||
509 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_mptcp_sock ||
510 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_timewait_sock ||
511 func_id == BPF_FUNC_skc_to_tcp_request_sock;
512 }
513
is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)514 static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
515 {
516 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data;
517 }
518
519 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id);
520 static bool is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id);
521 static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id);
522 static bool is_bpf_throw_kfunc(struct bpf_insn *insn);
523
524 static bool is_bpf_wq_set_callback_kfunc(u32 btf_id);
525 static bool is_task_work_add_kfunc(u32 func_id);
526
is_sync_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)527 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
528 {
529 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem ||
530 func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma ||
531 func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop ||
532 func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain;
533 }
534
is_async_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)535 static bool is_async_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
536 {
537 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback;
538 }
539
is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)540 static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
541 {
542 return is_sync_callback_calling_function(func_id) ||
543 is_async_callback_calling_function(func_id);
544 }
545
is_sync_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn * insn)546 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
547 {
548 return (bpf_helper_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) ||
549 (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm));
550 }
551
is_async_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn * insn)552 static bool is_async_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
553 {
554 return (bpf_helper_call(insn) && is_async_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) ||
555 (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm));
556 }
557
is_async_cb_sleepable(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn)558 static bool is_async_cb_sleepable(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
559 {
560 /* bpf_timer callbacks are never sleepable. */
561 if (bpf_helper_call(insn) && insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback)
562 return false;
563
564 /* bpf_wq and bpf_task_work callbacks are always sleepable. */
565 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && insn->off == 0 &&
566 (is_bpf_wq_set_callback_kfunc(insn->imm) || is_task_work_add_kfunc(insn->imm)))
567 return true;
568
569 verifier_bug(env, "unhandled async callback in is_async_cb_sleepable");
570 return false;
571 }
572
is_may_goto_insn(struct bpf_insn * insn)573 static bool is_may_goto_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
574 {
575 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND) && insn->src_reg == BPF_MAY_GOTO;
576 }
577
is_may_goto_insn_at(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx)578 static bool is_may_goto_insn_at(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
579 {
580 return is_may_goto_insn(&env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]);
581 }
582
is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)583 static bool is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
584 {
585 return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get ||
586 func_id == BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get ||
587 func_id == BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get ||
588 func_id == BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get;
589 }
590
helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(enum bpf_func_id func_id,const struct bpf_map * map)591 static bool helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(enum bpf_func_id func_id,
592 const struct bpf_map *map)
593 {
594 int ref_obj_uses = 0;
595
596 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id))
597 ref_obj_uses++;
598 if (is_acquire_function(func_id, map))
599 ref_obj_uses++;
600 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id))
601 ref_obj_uses++;
602
603 return ref_obj_uses > 1;
604 }
605
is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn * insn)606 static bool is_cmpxchg_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
607 {
608 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
609 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC &&
610 insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG;
611 }
612
is_atomic_load_insn(const struct bpf_insn * insn)613 static bool is_atomic_load_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
614 {
615 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
616 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC &&
617 insn->imm == BPF_LOAD_ACQ;
618 }
619
__get_spi(s32 off)620 static int __get_spi(s32 off)
621 {
622 return (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
623 }
624
func(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg)625 static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
626 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
627 {
628 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
629
630 return cur->frame[reg->frameno];
631 }
632
is_spi_bounds_valid(struct bpf_func_state * state,int spi,int nr_slots)633 static bool is_spi_bounds_valid(struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi, int nr_slots)
634 {
635 int allocated_slots = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE;
636
637 /* We need to check that slots between [spi - nr_slots + 1, spi] are
638 * within [0, allocated_stack).
639 *
640 * Please note that the spi grows downwards. For example, a dynptr
641 * takes the size of two stack slots; the first slot will be at
642 * spi and the second slot will be at spi - 1.
643 */
644 return spi - nr_slots + 1 >= 0 && spi < allocated_slots;
645 }
646
stack_slot_obj_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,const char * obj_kind,int nr_slots)647 static int stack_slot_obj_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
648 const char *obj_kind, int nr_slots)
649 {
650 int off, spi;
651
652 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
653 verbose(env, "%s has to be at a constant offset\n", obj_kind);
654 return -EINVAL;
655 }
656
657 off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
658 if (off % BPF_REG_SIZE) {
659 verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off);
660 return -EINVAL;
661 }
662
663 spi = __get_spi(off);
664 if (spi + 1 < nr_slots) {
665 verbose(env, "cannot pass in %s at an offset=%d\n", obj_kind, off);
666 return -EINVAL;
667 }
668
669 if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(func(env, reg), spi, nr_slots))
670 return -ERANGE;
671 return spi;
672 }
673
dynptr_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)674 static int dynptr_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
675 {
676 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "dynptr", BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS);
677 }
678
iter_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int nr_slots)679 static int iter_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots)
680 {
681 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "iter", nr_slots);
682 }
683
irq_flag_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)684 static int irq_flag_get_spi(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
685 {
686 return stack_slot_obj_get_spi(env, reg, "irq_flag", 1);
687 }
688
arg_to_dynptr_type(enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)689 static enum bpf_dynptr_type arg_to_dynptr_type(enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
690 {
691 switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) {
692 case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL:
693 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL;
694 case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF:
695 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF;
696 case DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB:
697 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB;
698 case DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP:
699 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP;
700 case DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META:
701 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META;
702 case DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE:
703 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE;
704 default:
705 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID;
706 }
707 }
708
get_dynptr_type_flag(enum bpf_dynptr_type type)709 static enum bpf_type_flag get_dynptr_type_flag(enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
710 {
711 switch (type) {
712 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL:
713 return DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL;
714 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF:
715 return DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF;
716 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB:
717 return DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB;
718 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP:
719 return DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP;
720 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META:
721 return DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META;
722 case BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE:
723 return DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE;
724 default:
725 return 0;
726 }
727 }
728
dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type)729 static bool dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
730 {
731 return type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF || type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE;
732 }
733
734 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
735 enum bpf_dynptr_type type,
736 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id);
737
738 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
739 struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
740
mark_dynptr_stack_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * sreg1,struct bpf_reg_state * sreg2,enum bpf_dynptr_type type)741 static void mark_dynptr_stack_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
742 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg1,
743 struct bpf_reg_state *sreg2,
744 enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
745 {
746 int id = ++env->id_gen;
747
748 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg1, type, true, id);
749 __mark_dynptr_reg(sreg2, type, false, id);
750 }
751
mark_dynptr_cb_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,enum bpf_dynptr_type type)752 static void mark_dynptr_cb_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
753 struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
754 enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
755 {
756 __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, type, true, ++env->id_gen);
757 }
758
759 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
760 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi);
761
mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,int insn_idx,int clone_ref_obj_id)762 static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
763 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx, int clone_ref_obj_id)
764 {
765 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
766 enum bpf_dynptr_type type;
767 int spi, i, err;
768
769 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
770 if (spi < 0)
771 return spi;
772
773 /* We cannot assume both spi and spi - 1 belong to the same dynptr,
774 * hence we need to call destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot twice for both,
775 * to ensure that for the following example:
776 * [d1][d1][d2][d2]
777 * spi 3 2 1 0
778 * So marking spi = 2 should lead to destruction of both d1 and d2. In
779 * case they do belong to same dynptr, second call won't see slot_type
780 * as STACK_DYNPTR and will simply skip destruction.
781 */
782 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi);
783 if (err)
784 return err;
785 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi - 1);
786 if (err)
787 return err;
788
789 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
790 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR;
791 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_DYNPTR;
792 }
793
794 type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type);
795 if (type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID)
796 return -EINVAL;
797
798 mark_dynptr_stack_regs(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
799 &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, type);
800
801 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(type)) {
802 /* The id is used to track proper releasing */
803 int id;
804
805 if (clone_ref_obj_id)
806 id = clone_ref_obj_id;
807 else
808 id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx);
809
810 if (id < 0)
811 return id;
812
813 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id;
814 state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id;
815 }
816
817 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - 1) | BIT(spi));
818
819 return 0;
820 }
821
invalidate_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * state,int spi)822 static void invalidate_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi)
823 {
824 int i;
825
826 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
827 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
828 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
829 }
830
831 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
832 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr);
833
834 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - 1) | BIT(spi));
835 }
836
unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)837 static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
838 {
839 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
840 int spi, ref_obj_id, i;
841
842 /*
843 * This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot
844 * be released by any dynptr helper. Hence, unmark_stack_slots_dynptr
845 * is safe to do directly.
846 */
847 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) {
848 verifier_bug(env, "CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be released");
849 return -EFAULT;
850 }
851 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
852 if (spi < 0)
853 return spi;
854
855 if (!dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) {
856 invalidate_dynptr(env, state, spi);
857 return 0;
858 }
859
860 ref_obj_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id;
861
862 /* If the dynptr has a ref_obj_id, then we need to invalidate
863 * two things:
864 *
865 * 1) Any dynptrs with a matching ref_obj_id (clones)
866 * 2) Any slices derived from this dynptr.
867 */
868
869 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */
870 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, ref_obj_id));
871
872 /* Invalidate any dynptr clones */
873 for (i = 1; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
874 if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id != ref_obj_id)
875 continue;
876
877 /* it should always be the case that if the ref obj id
878 * matches then the stack slot also belongs to a
879 * dynptr
880 */
881 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) {
882 verifier_bug(env, "misconfigured ref_obj_id");
883 return -EFAULT;
884 }
885 if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot)
886 invalidate_dynptr(env, state, i);
887 }
888
889 return 0;
890 }
891
892 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
893 struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
894
mark_reg_invalid(const struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)895 static void mark_reg_invalid(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
896 {
897 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
898 __mark_reg_not_init(env, reg);
899 else
900 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg);
901 }
902
destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * state,int spi)903 static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
904 struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi)
905 {
906 struct bpf_func_state *fstate;
907 struct bpf_reg_state *dreg;
908 int i, dynptr_id;
909
910 /* We always ensure that STACK_DYNPTR is never set partially,
911 * hence just checking for slot_type[0] is enough. This is
912 * different for STACK_SPILL, where it may be only set for
913 * 1 byte, so code has to use is_spilled_reg.
914 */
915 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR)
916 return 0;
917
918 /* Reposition spi to first slot */
919 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot)
920 spi = spi + 1;
921
922 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) {
923 verbose(env, "cannot overwrite referenced dynptr\n");
924 return -EINVAL;
925 }
926
927 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
928 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - 1);
929
930 /* Writing partially to one dynptr stack slot destroys both. */
931 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
932 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
933 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
934 }
935
936 dynptr_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id;
937 /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */
938 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, fstate, dreg, ({
939 /* Dynptr slices are only PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL and PTR_TO_MEM */
940 if (dreg->type != (PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && dreg->type != PTR_TO_MEM)
941 continue;
942 if (dreg->dynptr_id == dynptr_id)
943 mark_reg_invalid(env, dreg);
944 }));
945
946 /* Do not release reference state, we are destroying dynptr on stack,
947 * not using some helper to release it. Just reset register.
948 */
949 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
950 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr);
951
952 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - 1) | BIT(spi));
953
954 return 0;
955 }
956
is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)957 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
958 {
959 int spi;
960
961 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
962 return false;
963
964 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
965
966 /* -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots) isn't an
967 * error because this just means the stack state hasn't been updated yet.
968 * We will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later.
969 */
970 if (spi < 0 && spi != -ERANGE)
971 return false;
972
973 /* We don't need to check if the stack slots are marked by previous
974 * dynptr initializations because we allow overwriting existing unreferenced
975 * STACK_DYNPTR slots, see mark_stack_slots_dynptr which calls
976 * destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot to ensure dynptr objects at the slots we are
977 * touching are completely destructed before we reinitialize them for a new
978 * one. For referenced ones, destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot returns an error early
979 * instead of delaying it until the end where the user will get "Unreleased
980 * reference" error.
981 */
982 return true;
983 }
984
is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)985 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
986 {
987 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
988 int i, spi;
989
990 /* This already represents first slot of initialized bpf_dynptr.
991 *
992 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR already has fixed and var_off as 0 due to
993 * check_func_arg_reg_off's logic, so we don't need to check its
994 * offset and alignment.
995 */
996 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
997 return true;
998
999 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
1000 if (spi < 0)
1001 return false;
1002 if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot)
1003 return false;
1004
1005 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
1006 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR ||
1007 state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] != STACK_DYNPTR)
1008 return false;
1009 }
1010
1011 return true;
1012 }
1013
is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)1014 static bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
1015 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
1016 {
1017 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1018 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type;
1019 int spi;
1020
1021 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR takes any type of dynptr */
1022 if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
1023 return true;
1024
1025 dynptr_type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type);
1026 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) {
1027 return reg->dynptr.type == dynptr_type;
1028 } else {
1029 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
1030 if (spi < 0)
1031 return false;
1032 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == dynptr_type;
1033 }
1034 }
1035
1036 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
1037
1038 static bool in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
1039
1040 static bool is_kfunc_rcu_protected(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta);
1041
mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int insn_idx,struct btf * btf,u32 btf_id,int nr_slots)1042 static int mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1043 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
1044 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int insn_idx,
1045 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots)
1046 {
1047 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1048 int spi, i, j, id;
1049
1050 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);
1051 if (spi < 0)
1052 return spi;
1053
1054 id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx);
1055 if (id < 0)
1056 return id;
1057
1058 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
1059 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i];
1060 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr;
1061
1062 __mark_reg_known_zero(st);
1063 st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */
1064 if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(meta)) {
1065 if (in_rcu_cs(env))
1066 st->type |= MEM_RCU;
1067 else
1068 st->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
1069 }
1070 st->ref_obj_id = i == 0 ? id : 0;
1071 st->iter.btf = btf;
1072 st->iter.btf_id = btf_id;
1073 st->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE;
1074 st->iter.depth = 0;
1075
1076 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
1077 slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_ITER;
1078
1079 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - i));
1080 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);
1081 }
1082
1083 return 0;
1084 }
1085
unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int nr_slots)1086 static int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1087 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots)
1088 {
1089 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1090 int spi, i, j;
1091
1092 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);
1093 if (spi < 0)
1094 return spi;
1095
1096 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
1097 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i];
1098 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr;
1099
1100 if (i == 0)
1101 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, st->ref_obj_id));
1102
1103 __mark_reg_not_init(env, st);
1104
1105 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
1106 slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID;
1107
1108 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - i));
1109 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);
1110 }
1111
1112 return 0;
1113 }
1114
is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int nr_slots)1115 static bool is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1116 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots)
1117 {
1118 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1119 int spi, i, j;
1120
1121 /* For -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots), we
1122 * will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later, so
1123 * return true for that case.
1124 */
1125 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);
1126 if (spi == -ERANGE)
1127 return true;
1128 if (spi < 0)
1129 return false;
1130
1131 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
1132 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i];
1133
1134 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
1135 if (slot->slot_type[j] == STACK_ITER)
1136 return false;
1137 }
1138
1139 return true;
1140 }
1141
is_iter_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,struct btf * btf,u32 btf_id,int nr_slots)1142 static int is_iter_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
1143 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots)
1144 {
1145 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1146 int spi, i, j;
1147
1148 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);
1149 if (spi < 0)
1150 return -EINVAL;
1151
1152 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
1153 struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i];
1154 struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr;
1155
1156 if (st->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)
1157 return -EPROTO;
1158 /* only main (first) slot has ref_obj_id set */
1159 if (i == 0 && !st->ref_obj_id)
1160 return -EINVAL;
1161 if (i != 0 && st->ref_obj_id)
1162 return -EINVAL;
1163 if (st->iter.btf != btf || st->iter.btf_id != btf_id)
1164 return -EINVAL;
1165
1166 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
1167 if (slot->slot_type[j] != STACK_ITER)
1168 return -EINVAL;
1169 }
1170
1171 return 0;
1172 }
1173
1174 static int acquire_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx);
1175 static int release_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int id);
1176
mark_stack_slot_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int insn_idx,int kfunc_class)1177 static int mark_stack_slot_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1178 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
1179 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int insn_idx,
1180 int kfunc_class)
1181 {
1182 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1183 struct bpf_stack_state *slot;
1184 struct bpf_reg_state *st;
1185 int spi, i, id;
1186
1187 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg);
1188 if (spi < 0)
1189 return spi;
1190
1191 id = acquire_irq_state(env, insn_idx);
1192 if (id < 0)
1193 return id;
1194
1195 slot = &state->stack[spi];
1196 st = &slot->spilled_ptr;
1197
1198 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, reg->frameno, BIT(spi));
1199 __mark_reg_known_zero(st);
1200 st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */
1201 st->ref_obj_id = id;
1202 st->irq.kfunc_class = kfunc_class;
1203
1204 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
1205 slot->slot_type[i] = STACK_IRQ_FLAG;
1206
1207 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
1208 return 0;
1209 }
1210
unmark_stack_slot_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int kfunc_class)1211 static int unmark_stack_slot_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
1212 int kfunc_class)
1213 {
1214 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1215 struct bpf_stack_state *slot;
1216 struct bpf_reg_state *st;
1217 int spi, i, err;
1218
1219 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg);
1220 if (spi < 0)
1221 return spi;
1222
1223 slot = &state->stack[spi];
1224 st = &slot->spilled_ptr;
1225
1226 if (st->irq.kfunc_class != kfunc_class) {
1227 const char *flag_kfunc = st->irq.kfunc_class == IRQ_NATIVE_KFUNC ? "native" : "lock";
1228 const char *used_kfunc = kfunc_class == IRQ_NATIVE_KFUNC ? "native" : "lock";
1229
1230 verbose(env, "irq flag acquired by %s kfuncs cannot be restored with %s kfuncs\n",
1231 flag_kfunc, used_kfunc);
1232 return -EINVAL;
1233 }
1234
1235 err = release_irq_state(env->cur_state, st->ref_obj_id);
1236 WARN_ON_ONCE(err && err != -EACCES);
1237 if (err) {
1238 int insn_idx = 0;
1239
1240 for (int i = 0; i < env->cur_state->acquired_refs; i++) {
1241 if (env->cur_state->refs[i].id == env->cur_state->active_irq_id) {
1242 insn_idx = env->cur_state->refs[i].insn_idx;
1243 break;
1244 }
1245 }
1246
1247 verbose(env, "cannot restore irq state out of order, expected id=%d acquired at insn_idx=%d\n",
1248 env->cur_state->active_irq_id, insn_idx);
1249 return err;
1250 }
1251
1252 __mark_reg_not_init(env, st);
1253
1254 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, reg->frameno, BIT(spi));
1255
1256 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
1257 slot->slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
1258
1259 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
1260 return 0;
1261 }
1262
is_irq_flag_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)1263 static bool is_irq_flag_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1264 {
1265 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1266 struct bpf_stack_state *slot;
1267 int spi, i;
1268
1269 /* For -ERANGE (i.e. spi not falling into allocated stack slots), we
1270 * will do check_mem_access to check and update stack bounds later, so
1271 * return true for that case.
1272 */
1273 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg);
1274 if (spi == -ERANGE)
1275 return true;
1276 if (spi < 0)
1277 return false;
1278
1279 slot = &state->stack[spi];
1280
1281 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
1282 if (slot->slot_type[i] == STACK_IRQ_FLAG)
1283 return false;
1284 return true;
1285 }
1286
is_irq_flag_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)1287 static int is_irq_flag_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
1288 {
1289 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
1290 struct bpf_stack_state *slot;
1291 struct bpf_reg_state *st;
1292 int spi, i;
1293
1294 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg);
1295 if (spi < 0)
1296 return -EINVAL;
1297
1298 slot = &state->stack[spi];
1299 st = &slot->spilled_ptr;
1300
1301 if (!st->ref_obj_id)
1302 return -EINVAL;
1303
1304 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
1305 if (slot->slot_type[i] != STACK_IRQ_FLAG)
1306 return -EINVAL;
1307 return 0;
1308 }
1309
1310 /* Check if given stack slot is "special":
1311 * - spilled register state (STACK_SPILL);
1312 * - dynptr state (STACK_DYNPTR);
1313 * - iter state (STACK_ITER).
1314 * - irq flag state (STACK_IRQ_FLAG)
1315 */
is_stack_slot_special(const struct bpf_stack_state * stack)1316 static bool is_stack_slot_special(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack)
1317 {
1318 enum bpf_stack_slot_type type = stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1];
1319
1320 switch (type) {
1321 case STACK_SPILL:
1322 case STACK_DYNPTR:
1323 case STACK_ITER:
1324 case STACK_IRQ_FLAG:
1325 return true;
1326 case STACK_INVALID:
1327 case STACK_MISC:
1328 case STACK_ZERO:
1329 return false;
1330 default:
1331 WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown stack slot type %d\n", type);
1332 return true;
1333 }
1334 }
1335
1336 /* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when
1337 * it was spilled to the stack.
1338 */
is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state * stack)1339 static bool is_spilled_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack)
1340 {
1341 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL;
1342 }
1343
is_spilled_scalar_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state * stack)1344 static bool is_spilled_scalar_reg(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack)
1345 {
1346 return stack->slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1] == STACK_SPILL &&
1347 stack->spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE;
1348 }
1349
is_spilled_scalar_reg64(const struct bpf_stack_state * stack)1350 static bool is_spilled_scalar_reg64(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack)
1351 {
1352 return stack->slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL &&
1353 stack->spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE;
1354 }
1355
1356 /* Mark stack slot as STACK_MISC, unless it is already STACK_INVALID, in which
1357 * case they are equivalent, or it's STACK_ZERO, in which case we preserve
1358 * more precise STACK_ZERO.
1359 * Regardless of allow_ptr_leaks setting (i.e., privileged or unprivileged
1360 * mode), we won't promote STACK_INVALID to STACK_MISC. In privileged case it is
1361 * unnecessary as both are considered equivalent when loading data and pruning,
1362 * in case of unprivileged mode it will be incorrect to allow reads of invalid
1363 * slots.
1364 */
mark_stack_slot_misc(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u8 * stype)1365 static void mark_stack_slot_misc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u8 *stype)
1366 {
1367 if (*stype == STACK_ZERO)
1368 return;
1369 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID)
1370 return;
1371 *stype = STACK_MISC;
1372 }
1373
scrub_spilled_slot(u8 * stype)1374 static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype)
1375 {
1376 if (*stype != STACK_INVALID)
1377 *stype = STACK_MISC;
1378 }
1379
1380 /* copy array src of length n * size bytes to dst. dst is reallocated if it's too
1381 * small to hold src. This is different from krealloc since we don't want to preserve
1382 * the contents of dst.
1383 *
1384 * Leaves dst untouched if src is NULL or length is zero. Returns NULL if memory could
1385 * not be allocated.
1386 */
copy_array(void * dst,const void * src,size_t n,size_t size,gfp_t flags)1387 static void *copy_array(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
1388 {
1389 size_t alloc_bytes;
1390 void *orig = dst;
1391 size_t bytes;
1392
1393 if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(src))
1394 goto out;
1395
1396 if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes)))
1397 return NULL;
1398
1399 alloc_bytes = max(ksize(orig), kmalloc_size_roundup(bytes));
1400 dst = krealloc(orig, alloc_bytes, flags);
1401 if (!dst) {
1402 kfree(orig);
1403 return NULL;
1404 }
1405
1406 memcpy(dst, src, bytes);
1407 out:
1408 return dst ? dst : ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
1409 }
1410
1411 /* resize an array from old_n items to new_n items. the array is reallocated if it's too
1412 * small to hold new_n items. new items are zeroed out if the array grows.
1413 *
1414 * Contrary to krealloc_array, does not free arr if new_n is zero.
1415 */
realloc_array(void * arr,size_t old_n,size_t new_n,size_t size)1416 static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size)
1417 {
1418 size_t alloc_size;
1419 void *new_arr;
1420
1421 if (!new_n || old_n == new_n)
1422 goto out;
1423
1424 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(new_n, size));
1425 new_arr = krealloc(arr, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1426 if (!new_arr) {
1427 kfree(arr);
1428 return NULL;
1429 }
1430 arr = new_arr;
1431
1432 if (new_n > old_n)
1433 memset(arr + old_n * size, 0, (new_n - old_n) * size);
1434
1435 out:
1436 return arr ? arr : ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
1437 }
1438
copy_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state * dst,const struct bpf_verifier_state * src)1439 static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst, const struct bpf_verifier_state *src)
1440 {
1441 dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs,
1442 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1443 if (!dst->refs)
1444 return -ENOMEM;
1445
1446 dst->acquired_refs = src->acquired_refs;
1447 dst->active_locks = src->active_locks;
1448 dst->active_preempt_locks = src->active_preempt_locks;
1449 dst->active_rcu_locks = src->active_rcu_locks;
1450 dst->active_irq_id = src->active_irq_id;
1451 dst->active_lock_id = src->active_lock_id;
1452 dst->active_lock_ptr = src->active_lock_ptr;
1453 return 0;
1454 }
1455
copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state * dst,const struct bpf_func_state * src)1456 static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_state *src)
1457 {
1458 size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE;
1459
1460 dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state),
1461 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1462 if (!dst->stack)
1463 return -ENOMEM;
1464
1465 dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack;
1466 return 0;
1467 }
1468
resize_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state * state,size_t n)1469 static int resize_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, size_t n)
1470 {
1471 state->refs = realloc_array(state->refs, state->acquired_refs, n,
1472 sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state));
1473 if (!state->refs)
1474 return -ENOMEM;
1475
1476 state->acquired_refs = n;
1477 return 0;
1478 }
1479
1480 /* Possibly update state->allocated_stack to be at least size bytes. Also
1481 * possibly update the function's high-water mark in its bpf_subprog_info.
1482 */
grow_stack_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * state,int size)1483 static int grow_stack_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *state, int size)
1484 {
1485 size_t old_n = state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE, n;
1486
1487 /* The stack size is always a multiple of BPF_REG_SIZE. */
1488 size = round_up(size, BPF_REG_SIZE);
1489 n = size / BPF_REG_SIZE;
1490
1491 if (old_n >= n)
1492 return 0;
1493
1494 state->stack = realloc_array(state->stack, old_n, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state));
1495 if (!state->stack)
1496 return -ENOMEM;
1497
1498 state->allocated_stack = size;
1499
1500 /* update known max for given subprogram */
1501 if (env->subprog_info[state->subprogno].stack_depth < size)
1502 env->subprog_info[state->subprogno].stack_depth = size;
1503
1504 return 0;
1505 }
1506
1507 /* Acquire a pointer id from the env and update the state->refs to include
1508 * this new pointer reference.
1509 * On success, returns a valid pointer id to associate with the register
1510 * On failure, returns a negative errno.
1511 */
acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx)1512 static struct bpf_reference_state *acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
1513 {
1514 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
1515 int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs;
1516 int err;
1517
1518 err = resize_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1);
1519 if (err)
1520 return NULL;
1521 state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx;
1522
1523 return &state->refs[new_ofs];
1524 }
1525
acquire_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx)1526 static int acquire_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
1527 {
1528 struct bpf_reference_state *s;
1529
1530 s = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
1531 if (!s)
1532 return -ENOMEM;
1533 s->type = REF_TYPE_PTR;
1534 s->id = ++env->id_gen;
1535 return s->id;
1536 }
1537
acquire_lock_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx,enum ref_state_type type,int id,void * ptr)1538 static int acquire_lock_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, enum ref_state_type type,
1539 int id, void *ptr)
1540 {
1541 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
1542 struct bpf_reference_state *s;
1543
1544 s = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
1545 if (!s)
1546 return -ENOMEM;
1547 s->type = type;
1548 s->id = id;
1549 s->ptr = ptr;
1550
1551 state->active_locks++;
1552 state->active_lock_id = id;
1553 state->active_lock_ptr = ptr;
1554 return 0;
1555 }
1556
acquire_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx)1557 static int acquire_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
1558 {
1559 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
1560 struct bpf_reference_state *s;
1561
1562 s = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
1563 if (!s)
1564 return -ENOMEM;
1565 s->type = REF_TYPE_IRQ;
1566 s->id = ++env->id_gen;
1567
1568 state->active_irq_id = s->id;
1569 return s->id;
1570 }
1571
release_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state * state,int idx)1572 static void release_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int idx)
1573 {
1574 int last_idx;
1575 size_t rem;
1576
1577 /* IRQ state requires the relative ordering of elements remaining the
1578 * same, since it relies on the refs array to behave as a stack, so that
1579 * it can detect out-of-order IRQ restore. Hence use memmove to shift
1580 * the array instead of swapping the final element into the deleted idx.
1581 */
1582 last_idx = state->acquired_refs - 1;
1583 rem = state->acquired_refs - idx - 1;
1584 if (last_idx && idx != last_idx)
1585 memmove(&state->refs[idx], &state->refs[idx + 1], sizeof(*state->refs) * rem);
1586 memset(&state->refs[last_idx], 0, sizeof(*state->refs));
1587 state->acquired_refs--;
1588 return;
1589 }
1590
find_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state * state,int ptr_id)1591 static bool find_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int ptr_id)
1592 {
1593 int i;
1594
1595 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++)
1596 if (state->refs[i].id == ptr_id)
1597 return true;
1598
1599 return false;
1600 }
1601
release_lock_state(struct bpf_verifier_state * state,int type,int id,void * ptr)1602 static int release_lock_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int type, int id, void *ptr)
1603 {
1604 void *prev_ptr = NULL;
1605 u32 prev_id = 0;
1606 int i;
1607
1608 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
1609 if (state->refs[i].type == type && state->refs[i].id == id &&
1610 state->refs[i].ptr == ptr) {
1611 release_reference_state(state, i);
1612 state->active_locks--;
1613 /* Reassign active lock (id, ptr). */
1614 state->active_lock_id = prev_id;
1615 state->active_lock_ptr = prev_ptr;
1616 return 0;
1617 }
1618 if (state->refs[i].type & REF_TYPE_LOCK_MASK) {
1619 prev_id = state->refs[i].id;
1620 prev_ptr = state->refs[i].ptr;
1621 }
1622 }
1623 return -EINVAL;
1624 }
1625
release_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_state * state,int id)1626 static int release_irq_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int id)
1627 {
1628 u32 prev_id = 0;
1629 int i;
1630
1631 if (id != state->active_irq_id)
1632 return -EACCES;
1633
1634 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
1635 if (state->refs[i].type != REF_TYPE_IRQ)
1636 continue;
1637 if (state->refs[i].id == id) {
1638 release_reference_state(state, i);
1639 state->active_irq_id = prev_id;
1640 return 0;
1641 } else {
1642 prev_id = state->refs[i].id;
1643 }
1644 }
1645 return -EINVAL;
1646 }
1647
find_lock_state(struct bpf_verifier_state * state,enum ref_state_type type,int id,void * ptr)1648 static struct bpf_reference_state *find_lock_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, enum ref_state_type type,
1649 int id, void *ptr)
1650 {
1651 int i;
1652
1653 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
1654 struct bpf_reference_state *s = &state->refs[i];
1655
1656 if (!(s->type & type))
1657 continue;
1658
1659 if (s->id == id && s->ptr == ptr)
1660 return s;
1661 }
1662 return NULL;
1663 }
1664
update_peak_states(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)1665 static void update_peak_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
1666 {
1667 u32 cur_states;
1668
1669 cur_states = env->explored_states_size + env->free_list_size + env->num_backedges;
1670 env->peak_states = max(env->peak_states, cur_states);
1671 }
1672
free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state * state)1673 static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state)
1674 {
1675 if (!state)
1676 return;
1677 kfree(state->stack);
1678 kfree(state);
1679 }
1680
clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state * state)1681 static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
1682 {
1683 kfree(state->jmp_history);
1684 state->jmp_history = NULL;
1685 state->jmp_history_cnt = 0;
1686 }
1687
free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state * state,bool free_self)1688 static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
1689 bool free_self)
1690 {
1691 int i;
1692
1693 for (i = 0; i <= state->curframe; i++) {
1694 free_func_state(state->frame[i]);
1695 state->frame[i] = NULL;
1696 }
1697 kfree(state->refs);
1698 clear_jmp_history(state);
1699 if (free_self)
1700 kfree(state);
1701 }
1702
1703 /* struct bpf_verifier_state->parent refers to states
1704 * that are in either of env->{expored_states,free_list}.
1705 * In both cases the state is contained in struct bpf_verifier_state_list.
1706 */
state_parent_as_list(struct bpf_verifier_state * st)1707 static struct bpf_verifier_state_list *state_parent_as_list(struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
1708 {
1709 if (st->parent)
1710 return container_of(st->parent, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, state);
1711 return NULL;
1712 }
1713
1714 static bool incomplete_read_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1715 struct bpf_verifier_state *st);
1716
1717 /* A state can be freed if it is no longer referenced:
1718 * - is in the env->free_list;
1719 * - has no children states;
1720 */
maybe_free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state_list * sl)1721 static void maybe_free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1722 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl)
1723 {
1724 if (!sl->in_free_list
1725 || sl->state.branches != 0
1726 || incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state))
1727 return;
1728 list_del(&sl->node);
1729 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
1730 kfree(sl);
1731 env->free_list_size--;
1732 }
1733
1734 /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space
1735 * when necessary to accommodate larger src stack
1736 */
copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state * dst,const struct bpf_func_state * src)1737 static int copy_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst,
1738 const struct bpf_func_state *src)
1739 {
1740 memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct bpf_func_state, stack));
1741 return copy_stack_state(dst, src);
1742 }
1743
copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state * dst_state,const struct bpf_verifier_state * src)1744 static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
1745 const struct bpf_verifier_state *src)
1746 {
1747 struct bpf_func_state *dst;
1748 int i, err;
1749
1750 dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history,
1751 src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(*dst_state->jmp_history),
1752 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1753 if (!dst_state->jmp_history)
1754 return -ENOMEM;
1755 dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt;
1756
1757 /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them, this is also
1758 * necessary in case of exceptional exits using bpf_throw.
1759 */
1760 for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) {
1761 free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]);
1762 dst_state->frame[i] = NULL;
1763 }
1764 err = copy_reference_state(dst_state, src);
1765 if (err)
1766 return err;
1767 dst_state->speculative = src->speculative;
1768 dst_state->in_sleepable = src->in_sleepable;
1769 dst_state->cleaned = src->cleaned;
1770 dst_state->curframe = src->curframe;
1771 dst_state->branches = src->branches;
1772 dst_state->parent = src->parent;
1773 dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx;
1774 dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx;
1775 dst_state->dfs_depth = src->dfs_depth;
1776 dst_state->callback_unroll_depth = src->callback_unroll_depth;
1777 dst_state->may_goto_depth = src->may_goto_depth;
1778 dst_state->equal_state = src->equal_state;
1779 for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) {
1780 dst = dst_state->frame[i];
1781 if (!dst) {
1782 dst = kzalloc_obj(*dst, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1783 if (!dst)
1784 return -ENOMEM;
1785 dst_state->frame[i] = dst;
1786 }
1787 err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]);
1788 if (err)
1789 return err;
1790 }
1791 return 0;
1792 }
1793
state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)1794 static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
1795 {
1796 return env->prog->len;
1797 }
1798
explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int idx)1799 static struct list_head *explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
1800 {
1801 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
1802 struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe];
1803
1804 return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)];
1805 }
1806
same_callsites(struct bpf_verifier_state * a,struct bpf_verifier_state * b)1807 static bool same_callsites(struct bpf_verifier_state *a, struct bpf_verifier_state *b)
1808 {
1809 int fr;
1810
1811 if (a->curframe != b->curframe)
1812 return false;
1813
1814 for (fr = a->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--)
1815 if (a->frame[fr]->callsite != b->frame[fr]->callsite)
1816 return false;
1817
1818 return true;
1819 }
1820
1821 /* Return IP for a given frame in a call stack */
frame_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state * st,u32 frame)1822 static u32 frame_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, u32 frame)
1823 {
1824 return frame == st->curframe
1825 ? st->insn_idx
1826 : st->frame[frame + 1]->callsite;
1827 }
1828
1829 /* For state @st look for a topmost frame with frame_insn_idx() in some SCC,
1830 * if such frame exists form a corresponding @callchain as an array of
1831 * call sites leading to this frame and SCC id.
1832 * E.g.:
1833 *
1834 * void foo() { A: loop {... SCC#1 ...}; }
1835 * void bar() { B: loop { C: foo(); ... SCC#2 ... }
1836 * D: loop { E: foo(); ... SCC#3 ... } }
1837 * void main() { F: bar(); }
1838 *
1839 * @callchain at (A) would be either (F,SCC#2) or (F,SCC#3) depending
1840 * on @st frame call sites being (F,C,A) or (F,E,A).
1841 */
compute_scc_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * st,struct bpf_scc_callchain * callchain)1842 static bool compute_scc_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1843 struct bpf_verifier_state *st,
1844 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain)
1845 {
1846 u32 i, scc, insn_idx;
1847
1848 memset(callchain, 0, sizeof(*callchain));
1849 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) {
1850 insn_idx = frame_insn_idx(st, i);
1851 scc = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].scc;
1852 if (scc) {
1853 callchain->scc = scc;
1854 break;
1855 } else if (i < st->curframe) {
1856 callchain->callsites[i] = insn_idx;
1857 } else {
1858 return false;
1859 }
1860 }
1861 return true;
1862 }
1863
1864 /* Check if bpf_scc_visit instance for @callchain exists. */
scc_visit_lookup(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_scc_callchain * callchain)1865 static struct bpf_scc_visit *scc_visit_lookup(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1866 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain)
1867 {
1868 struct bpf_scc_info *info = env->scc_info[callchain->scc];
1869 struct bpf_scc_visit *visits = info->visits;
1870 u32 i;
1871
1872 if (!info)
1873 return NULL;
1874 for (i = 0; i < info->num_visits; i++)
1875 if (memcmp(callchain, &visits[i].callchain, sizeof(*callchain)) == 0)
1876 return &visits[i];
1877 return NULL;
1878 }
1879
1880 /* Allocate a new bpf_scc_visit instance corresponding to @callchain.
1881 * Allocated instances are alive for a duration of the do_check_common()
1882 * call and are freed by free_states().
1883 */
scc_visit_alloc(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_scc_callchain * callchain)1884 static struct bpf_scc_visit *scc_visit_alloc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1885 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain)
1886 {
1887 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit;
1888 struct bpf_scc_info *info;
1889 u32 scc, num_visits;
1890 u64 new_sz;
1891
1892 scc = callchain->scc;
1893 info = env->scc_info[scc];
1894 num_visits = info ? info->num_visits : 0;
1895 new_sz = sizeof(*info) + sizeof(struct bpf_scc_visit) * (num_visits + 1);
1896 info = kvrealloc(env->scc_info[scc], new_sz, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1897 if (!info)
1898 return NULL;
1899 env->scc_info[scc] = info;
1900 info->num_visits = num_visits + 1;
1901 visit = &info->visits[num_visits];
1902 memset(visit, 0, sizeof(*visit));
1903 memcpy(&visit->callchain, callchain, sizeof(*callchain));
1904 return visit;
1905 }
1906
1907 /* Form a string '(callsite#1,callsite#2,...,scc)' in env->tmp_str_buf */
format_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_scc_callchain * callchain)1908 static char *format_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain)
1909 {
1910 char *buf = env->tmp_str_buf;
1911 int i, delta = 0;
1912
1913 delta += snprintf(buf + delta, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN - delta, "(");
1914 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(callchain->callsites); i++) {
1915 if (!callchain->callsites[i])
1916 break;
1917 delta += snprintf(buf + delta, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN - delta, "%u,",
1918 callchain->callsites[i]);
1919 }
1920 delta += snprintf(buf + delta, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN - delta, "%u)", callchain->scc);
1921 return env->tmp_str_buf;
1922 }
1923
1924 /* If callchain for @st exists (@st is in some SCC), ensure that
1925 * bpf_scc_visit instance for this callchain exists.
1926 * If instance does not exist or is empty, assign visit->entry_state to @st.
1927 */
maybe_enter_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * st)1928 static int maybe_enter_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
1929 {
1930 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf;
1931 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit;
1932
1933 if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain))
1934 return 0;
1935 visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain);
1936 visit = visit ?: scc_visit_alloc(env, callchain);
1937 if (!visit)
1938 return -ENOMEM;
1939 if (!visit->entry_state) {
1940 visit->entry_state = st;
1941 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
1942 verbose(env, "SCC enter %s\n", format_callchain(env, callchain));
1943 }
1944 return 0;
1945 }
1946
1947 static int propagate_backedges(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_scc_visit *visit);
1948
1949 /* If callchain for @st exists (@st is in some SCC), make it empty:
1950 * - set visit->entry_state to NULL;
1951 * - flush accumulated backedges.
1952 */
maybe_exit_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * st)1953 static int maybe_exit_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
1954 {
1955 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf;
1956 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit;
1957
1958 if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain))
1959 return 0;
1960 visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain);
1961 if (!visit) {
1962 /*
1963 * If path traversal stops inside an SCC, corresponding bpf_scc_visit
1964 * must exist for non-speculative paths. For non-speculative paths
1965 * traversal stops when:
1966 * a. Verification error is found, maybe_exit_scc() is not called.
1967 * b. Top level BPF_EXIT is reached. Top level BPF_EXIT is not a member
1968 * of any SCC.
1969 * c. A checkpoint is reached and matched. Checkpoints are created by
1970 * is_state_visited(), which calls maybe_enter_scc(), which allocates
1971 * bpf_scc_visit instances for checkpoints within SCCs.
1972 * (c) is the only case that can reach this point.
1973 */
1974 if (!st->speculative) {
1975 verifier_bug(env, "scc exit: no visit info for call chain %s",
1976 format_callchain(env, callchain));
1977 return -EFAULT;
1978 }
1979 return 0;
1980 }
1981 if (visit->entry_state != st)
1982 return 0;
1983 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
1984 verbose(env, "SCC exit %s\n", format_callchain(env, callchain));
1985 visit->entry_state = NULL;
1986 env->num_backedges -= visit->num_backedges;
1987 visit->num_backedges = 0;
1988 update_peak_states(env);
1989 return propagate_backedges(env, visit);
1990 }
1991
1992 /* Lookup an bpf_scc_visit instance corresponding to @st callchain
1993 * and add @backedge to visit->backedges. @st callchain must exist.
1994 */
add_scc_backedge(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * st,struct bpf_scc_backedge * backedge)1995 static int add_scc_backedge(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
1996 struct bpf_verifier_state *st,
1997 struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge)
1998 {
1999 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf;
2000 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit;
2001
2002 if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) {
2003 verifier_bug(env, "add backedge: no SCC in verification path, insn_idx %d",
2004 st->insn_idx);
2005 return -EFAULT;
2006 }
2007 visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain);
2008 if (!visit) {
2009 verifier_bug(env, "add backedge: no visit info for call chain %s",
2010 format_callchain(env, callchain));
2011 return -EFAULT;
2012 }
2013 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
2014 verbose(env, "SCC backedge %s\n", format_callchain(env, callchain));
2015 backedge->next = visit->backedges;
2016 visit->backedges = backedge;
2017 visit->num_backedges++;
2018 env->num_backedges++;
2019 update_peak_states(env);
2020 return 0;
2021 }
2022
2023 /* bpf_reg_state->live marks for registers in a state @st are incomplete,
2024 * if state @st is in some SCC and not all execution paths starting at this
2025 * SCC are fully explored.
2026 */
incomplete_read_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * st)2027 static bool incomplete_read_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2028 struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
2029 {
2030 struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf;
2031 struct bpf_scc_visit *visit;
2032
2033 if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain))
2034 return false;
2035 visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain);
2036 if (!visit)
2037 return false;
2038 return !!visit->backedges;
2039 }
2040
free_backedges(struct bpf_scc_visit * visit)2041 static void free_backedges(struct bpf_scc_visit *visit)
2042 {
2043 struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge, *next;
2044
2045 for (backedge = visit->backedges; backedge; backedge = next) {
2046 free_verifier_state(&backedge->state, false);
2047 next = backedge->next;
2048 kfree(backedge);
2049 }
2050 visit->backedges = NULL;
2051 }
2052
update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * st)2053 static int update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
2054 {
2055 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl = NULL, *parent_sl;
2056 struct bpf_verifier_state *parent;
2057 int err;
2058
2059 while (st) {
2060 u32 br = --st->branches;
2061
2062 /* verifier_bug_if(br > 1, ...) technically makes sense here,
2063 * but see comment in push_stack(), hence:
2064 */
2065 verifier_bug_if((int)br < 0, env, "%s:branches_to_explore=%d", __func__, br);
2066 if (br)
2067 break;
2068 err = maybe_exit_scc(env, st);
2069 if (err)
2070 return err;
2071 parent = st->parent;
2072 parent_sl = state_parent_as_list(st);
2073 if (sl)
2074 maybe_free_verifier_state(env, sl);
2075 st = parent;
2076 sl = parent_sl;
2077 }
2078 return 0;
2079 }
2080
pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int * prev_insn_idx,int * insn_idx,bool pop_log)2081 static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx,
2082 int *insn_idx, bool pop_log)
2083 {
2084 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
2085 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem, *head = env->head;
2086 int err;
2087
2088 if (env->head == NULL)
2089 return -ENOENT;
2090
2091 if (cur) {
2092 err = copy_verifier_state(cur, &head->st);
2093 if (err)
2094 return err;
2095 }
2096 if (pop_log)
2097 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, head->log_pos);
2098 if (insn_idx)
2099 *insn_idx = head->insn_idx;
2100 if (prev_insn_idx)
2101 *prev_insn_idx = head->prev_insn_idx;
2102 elem = head->next;
2103 free_verifier_state(&head->st, false);
2104 kfree(head);
2105 env->head = elem;
2106 env->stack_size--;
2107 return 0;
2108 }
2109
error_recoverable_with_nospec(int err)2110 static bool error_recoverable_with_nospec(int err)
2111 {
2112 /* Should only return true for non-fatal errors that are allowed to
2113 * occur during speculative verification. For these we can insert a
2114 * nospec and the program might still be accepted. Do not include
2115 * something like ENOMEM because it is likely to re-occur for the next
2116 * architectural path once it has been recovered-from in all speculative
2117 * paths.
2118 */
2119 return err == -EPERM || err == -EACCES || err == -EINVAL;
2120 }
2121
push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx,int prev_insn_idx,bool speculative)2122 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2123 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx,
2124 bool speculative)
2125 {
2126 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
2127 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
2128 int err;
2129
2130 elem = kzalloc_obj(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
2131 if (!elem)
2132 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
2133
2134 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
2135 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
2136 elem->next = env->head;
2137 elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos;
2138 env->head = elem;
2139 env->stack_size++;
2140 err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur);
2141 if (err)
2142 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
2143 elem->st.speculative |= speculative;
2144 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) {
2145 verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n",
2146 env->stack_size);
2147 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
2148 }
2149 if (elem->st.parent) {
2150 ++elem->st.parent->branches;
2151 /* WARN_ON(branches > 2) technically makes sense here,
2152 * but
2153 * 1. speculative states will bump 'branches' for non-branch
2154 * instructions
2155 * 2. is_state_visited() heuristics may decide not to create
2156 * a new state for a sequence of branches and all such current
2157 * and cloned states will be pointing to a single parent state
2158 * which might have large 'branches' count.
2159 */
2160 }
2161 return &elem->st;
2162 }
2163
2164 #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6
2165 static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = {
2166 BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5
2167 };
2168
2169 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */
___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u64 imm)2170 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
2171 {
2172 reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm);
2173 reg->smin_value = (s64)imm;
2174 reg->smax_value = (s64)imm;
2175 reg->umin_value = imm;
2176 reg->umax_value = imm;
2177
2178 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm;
2179 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm;
2180 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm;
2181 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm;
2182 }
2183
2184 /* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as
2185 * known to have the value @imm.
2186 */
__mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u64 imm)2187 static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
2188 {
2189 /* Clear off and union(map_ptr, range) */
2190 memset(((u8 *)reg) + sizeof(reg->type), 0,
2191 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off) - sizeof(reg->type));
2192 reg->id = 0;
2193 reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
2194 ___mark_reg_known(reg, imm);
2195 }
2196
__mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u64 imm)2197 static void __mark_reg32_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
2198 {
2199 reg->var_off = tnum_const_subreg(reg->var_off, imm);
2200 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)imm;
2201 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)imm;
2202 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)imm;
2203 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)imm;
2204 }
2205
2206 /* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be
2207 * used only on registers holding a pointer type.
2208 */
__mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2209 static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2210 {
2211 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
2212 }
2213
__mark_reg_const_zero(const struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2214 static void __mark_reg_const_zero(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2215 {
2216 __mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
2217 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
2218 /* all scalars are assumed imprecise initially (unless unprivileged,
2219 * in which case everything is forced to be precise)
2220 */
2221 reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable;
2222 }
2223
mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * regs,u32 regno)2224 static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2225 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
2226 {
2227 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
2228 verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno);
2229 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
2230 for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
2231 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
2232 return;
2233 }
2234 __mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno);
2235 }
2236
__mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state * reg,enum bpf_dynptr_type type,bool first_slot,int dynptr_id)2237 static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum bpf_dynptr_type type,
2238 bool first_slot, int dynptr_id)
2239 {
2240 /* reg->type has no meaning for STACK_DYNPTR, but when we set reg for
2241 * callback arguments, it does need to be CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, so simply
2242 * set it unconditionally as it is ignored for STACK_DYNPTR anyway.
2243 */
2244 __mark_reg_known_zero(reg);
2245 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR;
2246 /* Give each dynptr a unique id to uniquely associate slices to it. */
2247 reg->id = dynptr_id;
2248 reg->dynptr.type = type;
2249 reg->dynptr.first_slot = first_slot;
2250 }
2251
mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2252 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2253 {
2254 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
2255 const struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
2256
2257 if (map->inner_map_meta) {
2258 reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
2259 reg->map_ptr = map->inner_map_meta;
2260 /* transfer reg's id which is unique for every map_lookup_elem
2261 * as UID of the inner map.
2262 */
2263 if (btf_record_has_field(map->inner_map_meta->record,
2264 BPF_TIMER | BPF_WORKQUEUE | BPF_TASK_WORK)) {
2265 reg->map_uid = reg->id;
2266 }
2267 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP) {
2268 reg->type = PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK;
2269 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP ||
2270 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH) {
2271 reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET;
2272 } else {
2273 reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
2274 }
2275 return;
2276 }
2277
2278 reg->type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
2279 }
2280
mark_reg_graph_node(struct bpf_reg_state * regs,u32 regno,struct btf_field_graph_root * ds_head)2281 static void mark_reg_graph_node(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
2282 struct btf_field_graph_root *ds_head)
2283 {
2284 __mark_reg_known_zero(®s[regno]);
2285 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC;
2286 regs[regno].btf = ds_head->btf;
2287 regs[regno].btf_id = ds_head->value_btf_id;
2288 regs[regno].off = ds_head->node_offset;
2289 }
2290
reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2291 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2292 {
2293 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type);
2294 }
2295
reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2296 static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2297 {
2298 return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) ||
2299 reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
2300 }
2301
reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(const struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2302 static bool reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2303 {
2304 return base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM &&
2305 (reg->type &
2306 (DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB | DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP | DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META));
2307 }
2308
2309 /* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,enum bpf_reg_type which)2310 static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
2311 enum bpf_reg_type which)
2312 {
2313 /* The register can already have a range from prior markings.
2314 * This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its
2315 * origin.
2316 */
2317 return reg->type == which &&
2318 reg->id == 0 &&
2319 reg->off == 0 &&
2320 tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0);
2321 }
2322
2323 /* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */
__mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2324 static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2325 {
2326 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2327 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2328 reg->umin_value = 0;
2329 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
2330
2331 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
2332 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
2333 reg->u32_min_value = 0;
2334 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
2335 }
2336
__mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2337 static void __mark_reg64_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2338 {
2339 reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
2340 reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
2341 reg->umin_value = 0;
2342 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
2343 }
2344
__mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2345 static void __mark_reg32_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2346 {
2347 reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
2348 reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
2349 reg->u32_min_value = 0;
2350 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
2351 }
2352
reset_reg64_and_tnum(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2353 static void reset_reg64_and_tnum(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2354 {
2355 __mark_reg64_unbounded(reg);
2356 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown;
2357 }
2358
reset_reg32_and_tnum(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2359 static void reset_reg32_and_tnum(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2360 {
2361 __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg);
2362 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown;
2363 }
2364
__update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2365 static void __update_reg32_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2366 {
2367 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off);
2368
2369 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */
2370 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value,
2371 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MIN));
2372 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */
2373 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value,
2374 var32_off.value | (var32_off.mask & S32_MAX));
2375 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)var32_off.value);
2376 reg->u32_max_value = min(reg->u32_max_value,
2377 (u32)(var32_off.value | var32_off.mask));
2378 }
2379
__update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2380 static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2381 {
2382 u64 tnum_next, tmax;
2383 bool umin_in_tnum;
2384
2385 /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */
2386 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value,
2387 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN));
2388 /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */
2389 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value,
2390 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX));
2391 reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value);
2392 reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value,
2393 reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask);
2394
2395 /* Check if u64 and tnum overlap in a single value */
2396 tnum_next = tnum_step(reg->var_off, reg->umin_value);
2397 umin_in_tnum = (reg->umin_value & ~reg->var_off.mask) == reg->var_off.value;
2398 tmax = reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask;
2399 if (umin_in_tnum && tnum_next > reg->umax_value) {
2400 /* The u64 range and the tnum only overlap in umin.
2401 * u64: ---[xxxxxx]-----
2402 * tnum: --xx----------x-
2403 */
2404 ___mark_reg_known(reg, reg->umin_value);
2405 } else if (!umin_in_tnum && tnum_next == tmax) {
2406 /* The u64 range and the tnum only overlap in the maximum value
2407 * represented by the tnum, called tmax.
2408 * u64: ---[xxxxxx]-----
2409 * tnum: xx-----x--------
2410 */
2411 ___mark_reg_known(reg, tmax);
2412 } else if (!umin_in_tnum && tnum_next <= reg->umax_value &&
2413 tnum_step(reg->var_off, tnum_next) > reg->umax_value) {
2414 /* The u64 range and the tnum only overlap in between umin
2415 * (excluded) and umax.
2416 * u64: ---[xxxxxx]-----
2417 * tnum: xx----x-------x-
2418 */
2419 ___mark_reg_known(reg, tnum_next);
2420 }
2421 }
2422
__update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2423 static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2424 {
2425 __update_reg32_bounds(reg);
2426 __update_reg64_bounds(reg);
2427 }
2428
2429 /* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */
__reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2430 static void __reg32_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2431 {
2432 /* If upper 32 bits of u64/s64 range don't change, we can use lower 32
2433 * bits to improve our u32/s32 boundaries.
2434 *
2435 * E.g., the case where we have upper 32 bits as zero ([10, 20] in
2436 * u64) is pretty trivial, it's obvious that in u32 we'll also have
2437 * [10, 20] range. But this property holds for any 64-bit range as
2438 * long as upper 32 bits in that entire range of values stay the same.
2439 *
2440 * E.g., u64 range [0x10000000A, 0x10000000F] ([4294967306, 4294967311]
2441 * in decimal) has the same upper 32 bits throughout all the values in
2442 * that range. As such, lower 32 bits form a valid [0xA, 0xF] ([10, 15])
2443 * range.
2444 *
2445 * Note also, that [0xA, 0xF] is a valid range both in u32 and in s32,
2446 * following the rules outlined below about u64/s64 correspondence
2447 * (which equally applies to u32 vs s32 correspondence). In general it
2448 * depends on actual hexadecimal values of 32-bit range. They can form
2449 * only valid u32, or only valid s32 ranges in some cases.
2450 *
2451 * So we use all these insights to derive bounds for subregisters here.
2452 */
2453 if ((reg->umin_value >> 32) == (reg->umax_value >> 32)) {
2454 /* u64 to u32 casting preserves validity of low 32 bits as
2455 * a range, if upper 32 bits are the same
2456 */
2457 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)reg->umin_value);
2458 reg->u32_max_value = min_t(u32, reg->u32_max_value, (u32)reg->umax_value);
2459
2460 if ((s32)reg->umin_value <= (s32)reg->umax_value) {
2461 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, (s32)reg->umin_value);
2462 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, (s32)reg->umax_value);
2463 }
2464 }
2465 if ((reg->smin_value >> 32) == (reg->smax_value >> 32)) {
2466 /* low 32 bits should form a proper u32 range */
2467 if ((u32)reg->smin_value <= (u32)reg->smax_value) {
2468 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, (u32)reg->smin_value);
2469 reg->u32_max_value = min_t(u32, reg->u32_max_value, (u32)reg->smax_value);
2470 }
2471 /* low 32 bits should form a proper s32 range */
2472 if ((s32)reg->smin_value <= (s32)reg->smax_value) {
2473 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, (s32)reg->smin_value);
2474 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, (s32)reg->smax_value);
2475 }
2476 }
2477 /* Special case where upper bits form a small sequence of two
2478 * sequential numbers (in 32-bit unsigned space, so 0xffffffff to
2479 * 0x00000000 is also valid), while lower bits form a proper s32 range
2480 * going from negative numbers to positive numbers. E.g., let's say we
2481 * have s64 range [-1, 1] ([0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0000000000000001]).
2482 * Possible s64 values are {-1, 0, 1} ({0xffffffffffffffff,
2483 * 0x0000000000000000, 0x00000000000001}). Ignoring upper 32 bits,
2484 * we still get a valid s32 range [-1, 1] ([0xffffffff, 0x00000001]).
2485 * Note that it doesn't have to be 0xffffffff going to 0x00000000 in
2486 * upper 32 bits. As a random example, s64 range
2487 * [0xfffffff0fffffff0; 0xfffffff100000010], forms a valid s32 range
2488 * [-16, 16] ([0xfffffff0; 0x00000010]) in its 32 bit subregister.
2489 */
2490 if ((u32)(reg->umin_value >> 32) + 1 == (u32)(reg->umax_value >> 32) &&
2491 (s32)reg->umin_value < 0 && (s32)reg->umax_value >= 0) {
2492 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, (s32)reg->umin_value);
2493 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, (s32)reg->umax_value);
2494 }
2495 if ((u32)(reg->smin_value >> 32) + 1 == (u32)(reg->smax_value >> 32) &&
2496 (s32)reg->smin_value < 0 && (s32)reg->smax_value >= 0) {
2497 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, (s32)reg->smin_value);
2498 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, (s32)reg->smax_value);
2499 }
2500 /* if u32 range forms a valid s32 range (due to matching sign bit),
2501 * try to learn from that
2502 */
2503 if ((s32)reg->u32_min_value <= (s32)reg->u32_max_value) {
2504 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value);
2505 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value);
2506 }
2507 /* If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds
2508 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g.
2509 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff.
2510 */
2511 if ((u32)reg->s32_min_value <= (u32)reg->s32_max_value) {
2512 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->s32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value);
2513 reg->u32_max_value = min_t(u32, reg->s32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value);
2514 } else {
2515 if (reg->u32_max_value < (u32)reg->s32_min_value) {
2516 /* See __reg64_deduce_bounds() for detailed explanation.
2517 * Refine ranges in the following situation:
2518 *
2519 * 0 U32_MAX
2520 * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u32 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] |
2521 * |----------------------------|----------------------------|
2522 * |xxxxx s32 range xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxx|
2523 * 0 S32_MAX S32_MIN -1
2524 */
2525 reg->s32_min_value = (s32)reg->u32_min_value;
2526 reg->u32_max_value = min_t(u32, reg->u32_max_value, reg->s32_max_value);
2527 } else if ((u32)reg->s32_max_value < reg->u32_min_value) {
2528 /*
2529 * 0 U32_MAX
2530 * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u32 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] |
2531 * |----------------------------|----------------------------|
2532 * |xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxxxxxxx s32 range |
2533 * 0 S32_MAX S32_MIN -1
2534 */
2535 reg->s32_max_value = (s32)reg->u32_max_value;
2536 reg->u32_min_value = max_t(u32, reg->u32_min_value, reg->s32_min_value);
2537 }
2538 }
2539 }
2540
__reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2541 static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2542 {
2543 /* If u64 range forms a valid s64 range (due to matching sign bit),
2544 * try to learn from that. Let's do a bit of ASCII art to see when
2545 * this is happening. Let's take u64 range first:
2546 *
2547 * 0 0x7fffffffffffffff 0x8000000000000000 U64_MAX
2548 * |-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
2549 *
2550 * Valid u64 range is formed when umin and umax are anywhere in the
2551 * range [0, U64_MAX], and umin <= umax. u64 case is simple and
2552 * straightforward. Let's see how s64 range maps onto the same range
2553 * of values, annotated below the line for comparison:
2554 *
2555 * 0 0x7fffffffffffffff 0x8000000000000000 U64_MAX
2556 * |-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
2557 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1
2558 *
2559 * So s64 values basically start in the middle and they are logically
2560 * contiguous to the right of it, wrapping around from -1 to 0, and
2561 * then finishing as S64_MAX (0x7fffffffffffffff) right before
2562 * S64_MIN. We can try drawing the continuity of u64 vs s64 values
2563 * more visually as mapped to sign-agnostic range of hex values.
2564 *
2565 * u64 start u64 end
2566 * _______________________________________________________________
2567 * / \
2568 * 0 0x7fffffffffffffff 0x8000000000000000 U64_MAX
2569 * |-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
2570 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1
2571 * / \
2572 * >------------------------------ ------------------------------->
2573 * s64 continues... s64 end s64 start s64 "midpoint"
2574 *
2575 * What this means is that, in general, we can't always derive
2576 * something new about u64 from any random s64 range, and vice versa.
2577 *
2578 * But we can do that in two particular cases. One is when entire
2579 * u64/s64 range is *entirely* contained within left half of the above
2580 * diagram or when it is *entirely* contained in the right half. I.e.:
2581 *
2582 * |-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
2583 * ^ ^ ^ ^
2584 * A B C D
2585 *
2586 * [A, B] and [C, D] are contained entirely in their respective halves
2587 * and form valid contiguous ranges as both u64 and s64 values. [A, B]
2588 * will be non-negative both as u64 and s64 (and in fact it will be
2589 * identical ranges no matter the signedness). [C, D] treated as s64
2590 * will be a range of negative values, while in u64 it will be
2591 * non-negative range of values larger than 0x8000000000000000.
2592 *
2593 * Now, any other range here can't be represented in both u64 and s64
2594 * simultaneously. E.g., [A, C], [A, D], [B, C], [B, D] are valid
2595 * contiguous u64 ranges, but they are discontinuous in s64. [B, C]
2596 * in s64 would be properly presented as [S64_MIN, C] and [B, S64_MAX],
2597 * for example. Similarly, valid s64 range [D, A] (going from negative
2598 * to positive values), would be two separate [D, U64_MAX] and [0, A]
2599 * ranges as u64. Currently reg_state can't represent two segments per
2600 * numeric domain, so in such situations we can only derive maximal
2601 * possible range ([0, U64_MAX] for u64, and [S64_MIN, S64_MAX] for s64).
2602 *
2603 * So we use these facts to derive umin/umax from smin/smax and vice
2604 * versa only if they stay within the same "half". This is equivalent
2605 * to checking sign bit: lower half will have sign bit as zero, upper
2606 * half have sign bit 1. Below in code we simplify this by just
2607 * casting umin/umax as smin/smax and checking if they form valid
2608 * range, and vice versa. Those are equivalent checks.
2609 */
2610 if ((s64)reg->umin_value <= (s64)reg->umax_value) {
2611 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, reg->umin_value);
2612 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, reg->umax_value);
2613 }
2614 /* If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds
2615 * are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g.
2616 * -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff.
2617 */
2618 if ((u64)reg->smin_value <= (u64)reg->smax_value) {
2619 reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, reg->umin_value);
2620 reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, reg->umax_value);
2621 } else {
2622 /* If the s64 range crosses the sign boundary, then it's split
2623 * between the beginning and end of the U64 domain. In that
2624 * case, we can derive new bounds if the u64 range overlaps
2625 * with only one end of the s64 range.
2626 *
2627 * In the following example, the u64 range overlaps only with
2628 * positive portion of the s64 range.
2629 *
2630 * 0 U64_MAX
2631 * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] |
2632 * |----------------------------|----------------------------|
2633 * |xxxxx s64 range xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxx|
2634 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1
2635 *
2636 * We can thus derive the following new s64 and u64 ranges.
2637 *
2638 * 0 U64_MAX
2639 * | [xxxxxx u64 range xxxxx] |
2640 * |----------------------------|----------------------------|
2641 * | [xxxxxx s64 range xxxxx] |
2642 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1
2643 *
2644 * If they overlap in two places, we can't derive anything
2645 * because reg_state can't represent two ranges per numeric
2646 * domain.
2647 *
2648 * 0 U64_MAX
2649 * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] |
2650 * |----------------------------|----------------------------|
2651 * |xxxxx s64 range xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxxxxx|
2652 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1
2653 *
2654 * The first condition below corresponds to the first diagram
2655 * above.
2656 */
2657 if (reg->umax_value < (u64)reg->smin_value) {
2658 reg->smin_value = (s64)reg->umin_value;
2659 reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->umax_value, reg->smax_value);
2660 } else if ((u64)reg->smax_value < reg->umin_value) {
2661 /* This second condition considers the case where the u64 range
2662 * overlaps with the negative portion of the s64 range:
2663 *
2664 * 0 U64_MAX
2665 * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] |
2666 * |----------------------------|----------------------------|
2667 * |xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxxxxxxx s64 range |
2668 * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1
2669 */
2670 reg->smax_value = (s64)reg->umax_value;
2671 reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->umin_value, reg->smin_value);
2672 }
2673 }
2674 }
2675
__reg_deduce_mixed_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2676 static void __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2677 {
2678 /* Try to tighten 64-bit bounds from 32-bit knowledge, using 32-bit
2679 * values on both sides of 64-bit range in hope to have tighter range.
2680 * E.g., if r1 is [0x1'00000000, 0x3'80000000], and we learn from
2681 * 32-bit signed > 0 operation that s32 bounds are now [1; 0x7fffffff].
2682 * With this, we can substitute 1 as low 32-bits of _low_ 64-bit bound
2683 * (0x100000000 -> 0x100000001) and 0x7fffffff as low 32-bits of
2684 * _high_ 64-bit bound (0x380000000 -> 0x37fffffff) and arrive at a
2685 * better overall bounds for r1 as [0x1'000000001; 0x3'7fffffff].
2686 * We just need to make sure that derived bounds we are intersecting
2687 * with are well-formed ranges in respective s64 or u64 domain, just
2688 * like we do with similar kinds of 32-to-64 or 64-to-32 adjustments.
2689 */
2690 __u64 new_umin, new_umax;
2691 __s64 new_smin, new_smax;
2692
2693 /* u32 -> u64 tightening, it's always well-formed */
2694 new_umin = (reg->umin_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | reg->u32_min_value;
2695 new_umax = (reg->umax_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | reg->u32_max_value;
2696 reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->umin_value, new_umin);
2697 reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->umax_value, new_umax);
2698 /* u32 -> s64 tightening, u32 range embedded into s64 preserves range validity */
2699 new_smin = (reg->smin_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | reg->u32_min_value;
2700 new_smax = (reg->smax_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | reg->u32_max_value;
2701 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, new_smin);
2702 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, new_smax);
2703
2704 /* Here we would like to handle a special case after sign extending load,
2705 * when upper bits for a 64-bit range are all 1s or all 0s.
2706 *
2707 * Upper bits are all 1s when register is in a range:
2708 * [0xffff_ffff_0000_0000, 0xffff_ffff_ffff_ffff]
2709 * Upper bits are all 0s when register is in a range:
2710 * [0x0000_0000_0000_0000, 0x0000_0000_ffff_ffff]
2711 * Together this forms are continuous range:
2712 * [0xffff_ffff_0000_0000, 0x0000_0000_ffff_ffff]
2713 *
2714 * Now, suppose that register range is in fact tighter:
2715 * [0xffff_ffff_8000_0000, 0x0000_0000_ffff_ffff] (R)
2716 * Also suppose that it's 32-bit range is positive,
2717 * meaning that lower 32-bits of the full 64-bit register
2718 * are in the range:
2719 * [0x0000_0000, 0x7fff_ffff] (W)
2720 *
2721 * If this happens, then any value in a range:
2722 * [0xffff_ffff_0000_0000, 0xffff_ffff_7fff_ffff]
2723 * is smaller than a lowest bound of the range (R):
2724 * 0xffff_ffff_8000_0000
2725 * which means that upper bits of the full 64-bit register
2726 * can't be all 1s, when lower bits are in range (W).
2727 *
2728 * Note that:
2729 * - 0xffff_ffff_8000_0000 == (s64)S32_MIN
2730 * - 0x0000_0000_7fff_ffff == (s64)S32_MAX
2731 * These relations are used in the conditions below.
2732 */
2733 if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && reg->smin_value >= S32_MIN && reg->smax_value <= S32_MAX) {
2734 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value;
2735 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value;
2736 reg->umin_value = reg->s32_min_value;
2737 reg->umax_value = reg->s32_max_value;
2738 reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off,
2739 tnum_range(reg->smin_value, reg->smax_value));
2740 }
2741 }
2742
__reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2743 static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2744 {
2745 __reg32_deduce_bounds(reg);
2746 __reg64_deduce_bounds(reg);
2747 __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds(reg);
2748 }
2749
2750 /* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */
__reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2751 static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2752 {
2753 struct tnum var64_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off,
2754 tnum_range(reg->umin_value,
2755 reg->umax_value));
2756 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(var64_off),
2757 tnum_range(reg->u32_min_value,
2758 reg->u32_max_value));
2759
2760 reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off);
2761 }
2762
reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2763 static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2764 {
2765 /* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */
2766 __update_reg_bounds(reg);
2767 /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */
2768 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
2769 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
2770 __reg_deduce_bounds(reg);
2771 /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
2772 __reg_bound_offset(reg);
2773 /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
2774 * slightly, e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
2775 * then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
2776 */
2777 __update_reg_bounds(reg);
2778 }
2779
reg_bounds_sanity_check(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,const char * ctx)2780 static int reg_bounds_sanity_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2781 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, const char *ctx)
2782 {
2783 const char *msg;
2784
2785 if (reg->umin_value > reg->umax_value ||
2786 reg->smin_value > reg->smax_value ||
2787 reg->u32_min_value > reg->u32_max_value ||
2788 reg->s32_min_value > reg->s32_max_value) {
2789 msg = "range bounds violation";
2790 goto out;
2791 }
2792
2793 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
2794 u64 uval = reg->var_off.value;
2795 s64 sval = (s64)uval;
2796
2797 if (reg->umin_value != uval || reg->umax_value != uval ||
2798 reg->smin_value != sval || reg->smax_value != sval) {
2799 msg = "const tnum out of sync with range bounds";
2800 goto out;
2801 }
2802 }
2803
2804 if (tnum_subreg_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
2805 u32 uval32 = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off).value;
2806 s32 sval32 = (s32)uval32;
2807
2808 if (reg->u32_min_value != uval32 || reg->u32_max_value != uval32 ||
2809 reg->s32_min_value != sval32 || reg->s32_max_value != sval32) {
2810 msg = "const subreg tnum out of sync with range bounds";
2811 goto out;
2812 }
2813 }
2814
2815 return 0;
2816 out:
2817 verifier_bug(env, "REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (%s): %s u64=[%#llx, %#llx] "
2818 "s64=[%#llx, %#llx] u32=[%#x, %#x] s32=[%#x, %#x] var_off=(%#llx, %#llx)",
2819 ctx, msg, reg->umin_value, reg->umax_value,
2820 reg->smin_value, reg->smax_value,
2821 reg->u32_min_value, reg->u32_max_value,
2822 reg->s32_min_value, reg->s32_max_value,
2823 reg->var_off.value, reg->var_off.mask);
2824 if (env->test_reg_invariants)
2825 return -EFAULT;
2826 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg);
2827 return 0;
2828 }
2829
__reg32_bound_s64(s32 a)2830 static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a)
2831 {
2832 return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX;
2833 }
2834
__reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2835 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2836 {
2837 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value;
2838 reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value;
2839
2840 /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must
2841 * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later
2842 * from tnum.
2843 */
2844 if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) &&
2845 __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) {
2846 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value;
2847 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value;
2848 } else {
2849 reg->smin_value = 0;
2850 reg->smax_value = U32_MAX;
2851 }
2852 }
2853
2854 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */
__mark_reg_unknown_imprecise(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2855 static void __mark_reg_unknown_imprecise(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2856 {
2857 /*
2858 * Clear type, off, and union(map_ptr, range) and
2859 * padding between 'type' and union
2860 */
2861 memset(reg, 0, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off));
2862 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
2863 reg->id = 0;
2864 reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
2865 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown;
2866 reg->frameno = 0;
2867 reg->precise = false;
2868 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg);
2869 }
2870
2871 /* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value,
2872 * initialize .precise as true when not bpf capable.
2873 */
__mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2874 static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2875 struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2876 {
2877 __mark_reg_unknown_imprecise(reg);
2878 reg->precise = !env->bpf_capable;
2879 }
2880
mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * regs,u32 regno)2881 static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2882 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
2883 {
2884 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
2885 verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno);
2886 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */
2887 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++)
2888 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
2889 return;
2890 }
2891 __mark_reg_unknown(env, regs + regno);
2892 }
2893
__mark_reg_s32_range(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * regs,u32 regno,s32 s32_min,s32 s32_max)2894 static int __mark_reg_s32_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2895 struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
2896 u32 regno,
2897 s32 s32_min,
2898 s32 s32_max)
2899 {
2900 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
2901
2902 reg->s32_min_value = max_t(s32, reg->s32_min_value, s32_min);
2903 reg->s32_max_value = min_t(s32, reg->s32_max_value, s32_max);
2904
2905 reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, s32_min);
2906 reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, s32_max);
2907
2908 reg_bounds_sync(reg);
2909
2910 return reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, reg, "s32_range");
2911 }
2912
__mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)2913 static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2914 struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
2915 {
2916 __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg);
2917 reg->type = NOT_INIT;
2918 }
2919
mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * regs,u32 regno)2920 static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2921 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
2922 {
2923 if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
2924 verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno);
2925 /* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs except FP */
2926 for (regno = 0; regno < BPF_REG_FP; regno++)
2927 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
2928 return;
2929 }
2930 __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
2931 }
2932
mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * regs,u32 regno,enum bpf_reg_type reg_type,struct btf * btf,u32 btf_id,enum bpf_type_flag flag)2933 static int mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2934 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
2935 enum bpf_reg_type reg_type,
2936 struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id,
2937 enum bpf_type_flag flag)
2938 {
2939 switch (reg_type) {
2940 case SCALAR_VALUE:
2941 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno);
2942 return 0;
2943 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
2944 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno);
2945 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag;
2946 regs[regno].btf = btf;
2947 regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id;
2948 if (type_may_be_null(flag))
2949 regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen;
2950 return 0;
2951 case PTR_TO_MEM:
2952 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno);
2953 regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_MEM | flag;
2954 regs[regno].mem_size = 0;
2955 return 0;
2956 default:
2957 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected reg_type %d in %s\n", reg_type, __func__);
2958 return -EFAULT;
2959 }
2960 }
2961
2962 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0)
init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * state)2963 static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2964 struct bpf_func_state *state)
2965 {
2966 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
2967 int i;
2968
2969 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
2970 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i);
2971 regs[i].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
2972 }
2973
2974 /* frame pointer */
2975 regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK;
2976 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP);
2977 regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno;
2978 }
2979
retval_range(s32 minval,s32 maxval)2980 static struct bpf_retval_range retval_range(s32 minval, s32 maxval)
2981 {
2982 return (struct bpf_retval_range){ minval, maxval };
2983 }
2984
2985 #define BPF_MAIN_FUNC (-1)
init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * state,int callsite,int frameno,int subprogno)2986 static void init_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2987 struct bpf_func_state *state,
2988 int callsite, int frameno, int subprogno)
2989 {
2990 state->callsite = callsite;
2991 state->frameno = frameno;
2992 state->subprogno = subprogno;
2993 state->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 0);
2994 init_reg_state(env, state);
2995 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env);
2996 }
2997
2998 /* Similar to push_stack(), but for async callbacks */
push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx,int prev_insn_idx,int subprog,bool is_sleepable)2999 static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3000 int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx,
3001 int subprog, bool is_sleepable)
3002 {
3003 struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
3004 struct bpf_func_state *frame;
3005
3006 elem = kzalloc_obj(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
3007 if (!elem)
3008 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3009
3010 elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
3011 elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
3012 elem->next = env->head;
3013 elem->log_pos = env->log.end_pos;
3014 env->head = elem;
3015 env->stack_size++;
3016 if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) {
3017 verbose(env,
3018 "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex for async cb.\n",
3019 env->stack_size);
3020 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
3021 }
3022 /* Unlike push_stack() do not copy_verifier_state().
3023 * The caller state doesn't matter.
3024 * This is async callback. It starts in a fresh stack.
3025 * Initialize it similar to do_check_common().
3026 */
3027 elem->st.branches = 1;
3028 elem->st.in_sleepable = is_sleepable;
3029 frame = kzalloc_obj(*frame, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
3030 if (!frame)
3031 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3032 init_func_state(env, frame,
3033 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */,
3034 0 /* frameno within this callchain */,
3035 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */);
3036 elem->st.frame[0] = frame;
3037 return &elem->st;
3038 }
3039
3040
3041 enum reg_arg_type {
3042 SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */
3043 DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */
3044 DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */
3045 };
3046
cmp_subprogs(const void * a,const void * b)3047 static int cmp_subprogs(const void *a, const void *b)
3048 {
3049 return ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)a)->start -
3050 ((struct bpf_subprog_info *)b)->start;
3051 }
3052
3053 /* Find subprogram that contains instruction at 'off' */
bpf_find_containing_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int off)3054 struct bpf_subprog_info *bpf_find_containing_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
3055 {
3056 struct bpf_subprog_info *vals = env->subprog_info;
3057 int l, r, m;
3058
3059 if (off >= env->prog->len || off < 0 || env->subprog_cnt == 0)
3060 return NULL;
3061
3062 l = 0;
3063 r = env->subprog_cnt - 1;
3064 while (l < r) {
3065 m = l + (r - l + 1) / 2;
3066 if (vals[m].start <= off)
3067 l = m;
3068 else
3069 r = m - 1;
3070 }
3071 return &vals[l];
3072 }
3073
3074 /* Find subprogram that starts exactly at 'off' */
find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int off)3075 static int find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
3076 {
3077 struct bpf_subprog_info *p;
3078
3079 p = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, off);
3080 if (!p || p->start != off)
3081 return -ENOENT;
3082 return p - env->subprog_info;
3083 }
3084
add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int off)3085 static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
3086 {
3087 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
3088 int ret;
3089
3090 if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) {
3091 verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n");
3092 return -EINVAL;
3093 }
3094 ret = find_subprog(env, off);
3095 if (ret >= 0)
3096 return ret;
3097 if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) {
3098 verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n");
3099 return -E2BIG;
3100 }
3101 /* determine subprog starts. The end is one before the next starts */
3102 env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off;
3103 sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt,
3104 sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL);
3105 return env->subprog_cnt - 1;
3106 }
3107
bpf_find_exception_callback_insn_off(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)3108 static int bpf_find_exception_callback_insn_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
3109 {
3110 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
3111 struct btf *btf = aux->btf;
3112 const struct btf_type *t;
3113 u32 main_btf_id, id;
3114 const char *name;
3115 int ret, i;
3116
3117 /* Non-zero func_info_cnt implies valid btf */
3118 if (!aux->func_info_cnt)
3119 return 0;
3120 main_btf_id = aux->func_info[0].type_id;
3121
3122 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, main_btf_id);
3123 if (!t) {
3124 verbose(env, "invalid btf id for main subprog in func_info\n");
3125 return -EINVAL;
3126 }
3127
3128 name = btf_find_decl_tag_value(btf, t, -1, "exception_callback:");
3129 if (IS_ERR(name)) {
3130 ret = PTR_ERR(name);
3131 /* If there is no tag present, there is no exception callback */
3132 if (ret == -ENOENT)
3133 ret = 0;
3134 else if (ret == -EEXIST)
3135 verbose(env, "multiple exception callback tags for main subprog\n");
3136 return ret;
3137 }
3138
3139 ret = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, name, BTF_KIND_FUNC);
3140 if (ret < 0) {
3141 verbose(env, "exception callback '%s' could not be found in BTF\n", name);
3142 return ret;
3143 }
3144 id = ret;
3145 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id);
3146 if (btf_func_linkage(t) != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) {
3147 verbose(env, "exception callback '%s' must have global linkage\n", name);
3148 return -EINVAL;
3149 }
3150 ret = 0;
3151 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) {
3152 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id != id)
3153 continue;
3154 ret = aux->func_info[i].insn_off;
3155 /* Further func_info and subprog checks will also happen
3156 * later, so assume this is the right insn_off for now.
3157 */
3158 if (!ret) {
3159 verbose(env, "invalid exception callback insn_off in func_info: 0\n");
3160 ret = -EINVAL;
3161 }
3162 }
3163 if (!ret) {
3164 verbose(env, "exception callback type id not found in func_info\n");
3165 ret = -EINVAL;
3166 }
3167 return ret;
3168 }
3169
3170 #define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256
3171 #define MAX_KFUNC_BTFS 256
3172
3173 struct bpf_kfunc_desc {
3174 struct btf_func_model func_model;
3175 u32 func_id;
3176 s32 imm;
3177 u16 offset;
3178 unsigned long addr;
3179 };
3180
3181 struct bpf_kfunc_btf {
3182 struct btf *btf;
3183 struct module *module;
3184 u16 offset;
3185 };
3186
3187 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab {
3188 /* Sorted by func_id (BTF ID) and offset (fd_array offset) during
3189 * verification. JITs do lookups by bpf_insn, where func_id may not be
3190 * available, therefore at the end of verification do_misc_fixups()
3191 * sorts this by imm and offset.
3192 */
3193 struct bpf_kfunc_desc descs[MAX_KFUNC_DESCS];
3194 u32 nr_descs;
3195 };
3196
3197 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab {
3198 struct bpf_kfunc_btf descs[MAX_KFUNC_BTFS];
3199 u32 nr_descs;
3200 };
3201
3202 static int specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc,
3203 int insn_idx);
3204
kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off(const void * a,const void * b)3205 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off(const void *a, const void *b)
3206 {
3207 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a;
3208 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b;
3209
3210 /* func_id is not greater than BTF_MAX_TYPE */
3211 return d0->func_id - d1->func_id ?: d0->offset - d1->offset;
3212 }
3213
kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off(const void * a,const void * b)3214 static int kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off(const void *a, const void *b)
3215 {
3216 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d0 = a;
3217 const struct bpf_kfunc_btf *d1 = b;
3218
3219 return d0->offset - d1->offset;
3220 }
3221
3222 static struct bpf_kfunc_desc *
find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog * prog,u32 func_id,u16 offset)3223 find_kfunc_desc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id, u16 offset)
3224 {
3225 struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = {
3226 .func_id = func_id,
3227 .offset = offset,
3228 };
3229 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
3230
3231 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
3232 return bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs,
3233 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off);
3234 }
3235
bpf_get_kfunc_addr(const struct bpf_prog * prog,u32 func_id,u16 btf_fd_idx,u8 ** func_addr)3236 int bpf_get_kfunc_addr(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 func_id,
3237 u16 btf_fd_idx, u8 **func_addr)
3238 {
3239 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc;
3240
3241 desc = find_kfunc_desc(prog, func_id, btf_fd_idx);
3242 if (!desc)
3243 return -EFAULT;
3244
3245 *func_addr = (u8 *)desc->addr;
3246 return 0;
3247 }
3248
__find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,s16 offset)3249 static struct btf *__find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3250 s16 offset)
3251 {
3252 struct bpf_kfunc_btf kf_btf = { .offset = offset };
3253 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab;
3254 struct bpf_kfunc_btf *b;
3255 struct module *mod;
3256 struct btf *btf;
3257 int btf_fd;
3258
3259 tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab;
3260 b = bsearch(&kf_btf, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs,
3261 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off);
3262 if (!b) {
3263 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_BTFS) {
3264 verbose(env, "too many different module BTFs\n");
3265 return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
3266 }
3267
3268 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) {
3269 verbose(env, "kfunc offset > 0 without fd_array is invalid\n");
3270 return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO);
3271 }
3272
3273 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&btf_fd, env->fd_array,
3274 offset * sizeof(btf_fd),
3275 sizeof(btf_fd)))
3276 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
3277
3278 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd);
3279 if (IS_ERR(btf)) {
3280 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF fd specified\n");
3281 return btf;
3282 }
3283
3284 if (!btf_is_module(btf)) {
3285 verbose(env, "BTF fd for kfunc is not a module BTF\n");
3286 btf_put(btf);
3287 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
3288 }
3289
3290 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf);
3291 if (!mod) {
3292 btf_put(btf);
3293 return ERR_PTR(-ENXIO);
3294 }
3295
3296 b = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++];
3297 b->btf = btf;
3298 b->module = mod;
3299 b->offset = offset;
3300
3301 /* sort() reorders entries by value, so b may no longer point
3302 * to the right entry after this
3303 */
3304 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]),
3305 kfunc_btf_cmp_by_off, NULL);
3306 } else {
3307 btf = b->btf;
3308 }
3309
3310 return btf;
3311 }
3312
bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab * tab)3313 void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab)
3314 {
3315 if (!tab)
3316 return;
3317
3318 while (tab->nr_descs--) {
3319 module_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].module);
3320 btf_put(tab->descs[tab->nr_descs].btf);
3321 }
3322 kfree(tab);
3323 }
3324
find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,s16 offset)3325 static struct btf *find_kfunc_desc_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s16 offset)
3326 {
3327 if (offset) {
3328 if (offset < 0) {
3329 /* In the future, this can be allowed to increase limit
3330 * of fd index into fd_array, interpreted as u16.
3331 */
3332 verbose(env, "negative offset disallowed for kernel module function call\n");
3333 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
3334 }
3335
3336 return __find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset);
3337 }
3338 return btf_vmlinux ?: ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
3339 }
3340
3341 #define KF_IMPL_SUFFIX "_impl"
3342
find_kfunc_impl_proto(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct btf * btf,const char * func_name)3343 static const struct btf_type *find_kfunc_impl_proto(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3344 struct btf *btf,
3345 const char *func_name)
3346 {
3347 char *buf = env->tmp_str_buf;
3348 const struct btf_type *func;
3349 s32 impl_id;
3350 int len;
3351
3352 len = snprintf(buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, "%s%s", func_name, KF_IMPL_SUFFIX);
3353 if (len < 0 || len >= TMP_STR_BUF_LEN) {
3354 verbose(env, "function name %s%s is too long\n", func_name, KF_IMPL_SUFFIX);
3355 return NULL;
3356 }
3357
3358 impl_id = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, buf, BTF_KIND_FUNC);
3359 if (impl_id <= 0) {
3360 verbose(env, "cannot find function %s in BTF\n", buf);
3361 return NULL;
3362 }
3363
3364 func = btf_type_by_id(btf, impl_id);
3365
3366 return btf_type_by_id(btf, func->type);
3367 }
3368
fetch_kfunc_meta(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,s32 func_id,s16 offset,struct bpf_kfunc_meta * kfunc)3369 static int fetch_kfunc_meta(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3370 s32 func_id,
3371 s16 offset,
3372 struct bpf_kfunc_meta *kfunc)
3373 {
3374 const struct btf_type *func, *func_proto;
3375 const char *func_name;
3376 u32 *kfunc_flags;
3377 struct btf *btf;
3378
3379 if (func_id <= 0) {
3380 verbose(env, "invalid kernel function btf_id %d\n", func_id);
3381 return -EINVAL;
3382 }
3383
3384 btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(env, offset);
3385 if (IS_ERR(btf)) {
3386 verbose(env, "failed to find BTF for kernel function\n");
3387 return PTR_ERR(btf);
3388 }
3389
3390 /*
3391 * Note that kfunc_flags may be NULL at this point, which
3392 * means that we couldn't find func_id in any relevant
3393 * kfunc_id_set. This most likely indicates an invalid kfunc
3394 * call. However we don't fail with an error here,
3395 * and let the caller decide what to do with NULL kfunc->flags.
3396 */
3397 kfunc_flags = btf_kfunc_flags(btf, func_id, env->prog);
3398
3399 func = btf_type_by_id(btf, func_id);
3400 if (!func || !btf_type_is_func(func)) {
3401 verbose(env, "kernel btf_id %d is not a function\n", func_id);
3402 return -EINVAL;
3403 }
3404
3405 func_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, func->name_off);
3406
3407 /*
3408 * An actual prototype of a kfunc with KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS flag
3409 * can be found through the counterpart _impl kfunc.
3410 */
3411 if (kfunc_flags && (*kfunc_flags & KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS))
3412 func_proto = find_kfunc_impl_proto(env, btf, func_name);
3413 else
3414 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, func->type);
3415
3416 if (!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)) {
3417 verbose(env, "kernel function btf_id %d does not have a valid func_proto\n",
3418 func_id);
3419 return -EINVAL;
3420 }
3421
3422 memset(kfunc, 0, sizeof(*kfunc));
3423 kfunc->btf = btf;
3424 kfunc->id = func_id;
3425 kfunc->name = func_name;
3426 kfunc->proto = func_proto;
3427 kfunc->flags = kfunc_flags;
3428
3429 return 0;
3430 }
3431
add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 func_id,s16 offset)3432 static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset)
3433 {
3434 struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *btf_tab;
3435 struct btf_func_model func_model;
3436 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
3437 struct bpf_prog_aux *prog_aux;
3438 struct bpf_kfunc_meta kfunc;
3439 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc;
3440 unsigned long addr;
3441 int err;
3442
3443 prog_aux = env->prog->aux;
3444 tab = prog_aux->kfunc_tab;
3445 btf_tab = prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab;
3446 if (!tab) {
3447 if (!btf_vmlinux) {
3448 verbose(env, "calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n");
3449 return -ENOTSUPP;
3450 }
3451
3452 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) {
3453 verbose(env, "JIT is required for calling kernel function\n");
3454 return -ENOTSUPP;
3455 }
3456
3457 if (!bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call()) {
3458 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kernel function\n");
3459 return -ENOTSUPP;
3460 }
3461
3462 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible) {
3463 verbose(env, "cannot call kernel function from non-GPL compatible program\n");
3464 return -EINVAL;
3465 }
3466
3467 tab = kzalloc_obj(*tab, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
3468 if (!tab)
3469 return -ENOMEM;
3470 prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab;
3471 }
3472
3473 /* func_id == 0 is always invalid, but instead of returning an error, be
3474 * conservative and wait until the code elimination pass before returning
3475 * error, so that invalid calls that get pruned out can be in BPF programs
3476 * loaded from userspace. It is also required that offset be untouched
3477 * for such calls.
3478 */
3479 if (!func_id && !offset)
3480 return 0;
3481
3482 if (!btf_tab && offset) {
3483 btf_tab = kzalloc_obj(*btf_tab, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
3484 if (!btf_tab)
3485 return -ENOMEM;
3486 prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab = btf_tab;
3487 }
3488
3489 if (find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, func_id, offset))
3490 return 0;
3491
3492 if (tab->nr_descs == MAX_KFUNC_DESCS) {
3493 verbose(env, "too many different kernel function calls\n");
3494 return -E2BIG;
3495 }
3496
3497 err = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, func_id, offset, &kfunc);
3498 if (err)
3499 return err;
3500
3501 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(kfunc.name);
3502 if (!addr) {
3503 verbose(env, "cannot find address for kernel function %s\n", kfunc.name);
3504 return -EINVAL;
3505 }
3506
3507 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) {
3508 err = bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_check(&env->log, prog_aux);
3509 if (err)
3510 return err;
3511 }
3512
3513 err = btf_distill_func_proto(&env->log, kfunc.btf, kfunc.proto, kfunc.name, &func_model);
3514 if (err)
3515 return err;
3516
3517 desc = &tab->descs[tab->nr_descs++];
3518 desc->func_id = func_id;
3519 desc->offset = offset;
3520 desc->addr = addr;
3521 desc->func_model = func_model;
3522 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]),
3523 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_id_off, NULL);
3524 return 0;
3525 }
3526
kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off(const void * a,const void * b)3527 static int kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off(const void *a, const void *b)
3528 {
3529 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d0 = a;
3530 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *d1 = b;
3531
3532 if (d0->imm != d1->imm)
3533 return d0->imm < d1->imm ? -1 : 1;
3534 if (d0->offset != d1->offset)
3535 return d0->offset < d1->offset ? -1 : 1;
3536 return 0;
3537 }
3538
set_kfunc_desc_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_kfunc_desc * desc)3539 static int set_kfunc_desc_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc)
3540 {
3541 unsigned long call_imm;
3542
3543 if (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()) {
3544 call_imm = desc->func_id;
3545 } else {
3546 call_imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr);
3547 /* Check whether the relative offset overflows desc->imm */
3548 if ((unsigned long)(s32)call_imm != call_imm) {
3549 verbose(env, "address of kernel func_id %u is out of range\n",
3550 desc->func_id);
3551 return -EINVAL;
3552 }
3553 }
3554 desc->imm = call_imm;
3555 return 0;
3556 }
3557
sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)3558 static int sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
3559 {
3560 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
3561 int i, err;
3562
3563 tab = env->prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
3564 if (!tab)
3565 return 0;
3566
3567 for (i = 0; i < tab->nr_descs; i++) {
3568 err = set_kfunc_desc_imm(env, &tab->descs[i]);
3569 if (err)
3570 return err;
3571 }
3572
3573 sort(tab->descs, tab->nr_descs, sizeof(tab->descs[0]),
3574 kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off, NULL);
3575 return 0;
3576 }
3577
bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog * prog)3578 bool bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
3579 {
3580 return !!prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
3581 }
3582
3583 const struct btf_func_model *
bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog * prog,const struct bpf_insn * insn)3584 bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
3585 const struct bpf_insn *insn)
3586 {
3587 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc desc = {
3588 .imm = insn->imm,
3589 .offset = insn->off,
3590 };
3591 const struct bpf_kfunc_desc *res;
3592 struct bpf_kfunc_desc_tab *tab;
3593
3594 tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
3595 res = bsearch(&desc, tab->descs, tab->nr_descs,
3596 sizeof(tab->descs[0]), kfunc_desc_cmp_by_imm_off);
3597
3598 return res ? &res->func_model : NULL;
3599 }
3600
add_kfunc_in_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,int cnt)3601 static int add_kfunc_in_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3602 struct bpf_insn *insn, int cnt)
3603 {
3604 int i, ret;
3605
3606 for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++, insn++) {
3607 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) {
3608 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off);
3609 if (ret < 0)
3610 return ret;
3611 }
3612 }
3613 return 0;
3614 }
3615
add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)3616 static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
3617 {
3618 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
3619 int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len, ex_cb_insn;
3620 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
3621
3622 /* Add entry function. */
3623 ret = add_subprog(env, 0);
3624 if (ret)
3625 return ret;
3626
3627 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
3628 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn) &&
3629 !bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn))
3630 continue;
3631
3632 if (!env->bpf_capable) {
3633 verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n");
3634 return -EPERM;
3635 }
3636
3637 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn) || bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
3638 ret = add_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
3639 else
3640 ret = add_kfunc_call(env, insn->imm, insn->off);
3641
3642 if (ret < 0)
3643 return ret;
3644 }
3645
3646 ret = bpf_find_exception_callback_insn_off(env);
3647 if (ret < 0)
3648 return ret;
3649 ex_cb_insn = ret;
3650
3651 /* If ex_cb_insn > 0, this means that the main program has a subprog
3652 * marked using BTF decl tag to serve as the exception callback.
3653 */
3654 if (ex_cb_insn) {
3655 ret = add_subprog(env, ex_cb_insn);
3656 if (ret < 0)
3657 return ret;
3658 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
3659 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != ex_cb_insn)
3660 continue;
3661 env->exception_callback_subprog = i;
3662 mark_subprog_exc_cb(env, i);
3663 break;
3664 }
3665 }
3666
3667 /* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration
3668 * logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased.
3669 */
3670 subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt;
3671
3672 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
3673 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
3674 verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start);
3675
3676 return 0;
3677 }
3678
check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)3679 static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
3680 {
3681 int i, subprog_start, subprog_end, off, cur_subprog = 0;
3682 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
3683 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
3684 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
3685
3686 /* now check that all jumps are within the same subprog */
3687 subprog_start = subprog[cur_subprog].start;
3688 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start;
3689 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
3690 u8 code = insn[i].code;
3691
3692 if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
3693 insn[i].src_reg == 0 &&
3694 insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
3695 subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true;
3696 subprog[cur_subprog].tail_call_reachable = true;
3697 }
3698 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_LD &&
3699 (BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IND))
3700 subprog[cur_subprog].has_ld_abs = true;
3701 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32)
3702 goto next;
3703 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL)
3704 goto next;
3705 if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT) {
3706 subprog[cur_subprog].exit_idx = i;
3707 goto next;
3708 }
3709 off = i + bpf_jmp_offset(&insn[i]) + 1;
3710 if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) {
3711 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off);
3712 return -EINVAL;
3713 }
3714 next:
3715 if (i == subprog_end - 1) {
3716 /* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another
3717 * the last insn of the subprog should be either exit
3718 * or unconditional jump back or bpf_throw call
3719 */
3720 if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) &&
3721 code != (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA) &&
3722 code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
3723 verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n");
3724 return -EINVAL;
3725 }
3726 subprog_start = subprog_end;
3727 cur_subprog++;
3728 if (cur_subprog < env->subprog_cnt)
3729 subprog_end = subprog[cur_subprog + 1].start;
3730 }
3731 }
3732 return 0;
3733 }
3734
mark_stack_slot_obj_read(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int spi,int nr_slots)3735 static int mark_stack_slot_obj_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
3736 int spi, int nr_slots)
3737 {
3738 int err, i;
3739
3740 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
3741 err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg->frameno, env->insn_idx, BIT(spi - i));
3742 if (err)
3743 return err;
3744 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);
3745 }
3746 return 0;
3747 }
3748
mark_dynptr_read(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)3749 static int mark_dynptr_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
3750 {
3751 int spi;
3752
3753 /* For CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, it must have already been done by
3754 * check_reg_arg in check_helper_call and mark_btf_func_reg_size in
3755 * check_kfunc_call.
3756 */
3757 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
3758 return 0;
3759 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
3760 if (spi < 0)
3761 return spi;
3762 /* Caller ensures dynptr is valid and initialized, which means spi is in
3763 * bounds and spi is the first dynptr slot. Simply mark stack slot as
3764 * read.
3765 */
3766 return mark_stack_slot_obj_read(env, reg, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS);
3767 }
3768
mark_iter_read(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int spi,int nr_slots)3769 static int mark_iter_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
3770 int spi, int nr_slots)
3771 {
3772 return mark_stack_slot_obj_read(env, reg, spi, nr_slots);
3773 }
3774
mark_irq_flag_read(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)3775 static int mark_irq_flag_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
3776 {
3777 int spi;
3778
3779 spi = irq_flag_get_spi(env, reg);
3780 if (spi < 0)
3781 return spi;
3782 return mark_stack_slot_obj_read(env, reg, spi, 1);
3783 }
3784
3785 /* This function is supposed to be used by the following 32-bit optimization
3786 * code only. It returns TRUE if the source or destination register operates
3787 * on 64-bit, otherwise return FALSE.
3788 */
is_reg64(struct bpf_insn * insn,u32 regno,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,enum reg_arg_type t)3789 static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_insn *insn,
3790 u32 regno, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum reg_arg_type t)
3791 {
3792 u8 code, class, op;
3793
3794 code = insn->code;
3795 class = BPF_CLASS(code);
3796 op = BPF_OP(code);
3797 if (class == BPF_JMP) {
3798 /* BPF_EXIT for "main" will reach here. Return TRUE
3799 * conservatively.
3800 */
3801 if (op == BPF_EXIT)
3802 return true;
3803 if (op == BPF_CALL) {
3804 /* BPF to BPF call will reach here because of marking
3805 * caller saved clobber with DST_OP_NO_MARK for which we
3806 * don't care the register def because they are anyway
3807 * marked as NOT_INIT already.
3808 */
3809 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
3810 return false;
3811 /* Helper call will reach here because of arg type
3812 * check, conservatively return TRUE.
3813 */
3814 if (t == SRC_OP)
3815 return true;
3816
3817 return false;
3818 }
3819 }
3820
3821 if (class == BPF_ALU64 && op == BPF_END && (insn->imm == 16 || insn->imm == 32))
3822 return false;
3823
3824 if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP ||
3825 (class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64))
3826 return true;
3827
3828 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_JMP32)
3829 return false;
3830
3831 if (class == BPF_LDX) {
3832 if (t != SRC_OP)
3833 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_MEMSX;
3834 /* LDX source must be ptr. */
3835 return true;
3836 }
3837
3838 if (class == BPF_STX) {
3839 /* BPF_STX (including atomic variants) has one or more source
3840 * operands, one of which is a ptr. Check whether the caller is
3841 * asking about it.
3842 */
3843 if (t == SRC_OP && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
3844 return true;
3845 return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW;
3846 }
3847
3848 if (class == BPF_LD) {
3849 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(code);
3850
3851 /* LD_IMM64 */
3852 if (mode == BPF_IMM)
3853 return true;
3854
3855 /* Both LD_IND and LD_ABS return 32-bit data. */
3856 if (t != SRC_OP)
3857 return false;
3858
3859 /* Implicit ctx ptr. */
3860 if (regno == BPF_REG_6)
3861 return true;
3862
3863 /* Explicit source could be any width. */
3864 return true;
3865 }
3866
3867 if (class == BPF_ST)
3868 /* The only source register for BPF_ST is a ptr. */
3869 return true;
3870
3871 /* Conservatively return true at default. */
3872 return true;
3873 }
3874
3875 /* Return the regno defined by the insn, or -1. */
insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn * insn)3876 static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
3877 {
3878 switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) {
3879 case BPF_JMP:
3880 case BPF_JMP32:
3881 case BPF_ST:
3882 return -1;
3883 case BPF_STX:
3884 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC ||
3885 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC) {
3886 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG)
3887 return BPF_REG_0;
3888 else if (insn->imm == BPF_LOAD_ACQ)
3889 return insn->dst_reg;
3890 else if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)
3891 return insn->src_reg;
3892 }
3893 return -1;
3894 default:
3895 return insn->dst_reg;
3896 }
3897 }
3898
3899 /* Return TRUE if INSN has defined any 32-bit value explicitly. */
insn_has_def32(struct bpf_insn * insn)3900 static bool insn_has_def32(struct bpf_insn *insn)
3901 {
3902 int dst_reg = insn_def_regno(insn);
3903
3904 if (dst_reg == -1)
3905 return false;
3906
3907 return !is_reg64(insn, dst_reg, NULL, DST_OP);
3908 }
3909
mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)3910 static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
3911 struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
3912 {
3913 s32 def_idx = reg->subreg_def;
3914
3915 if (def_idx == DEF_NOT_SUBREG)
3916 return;
3917
3918 env->insn_aux_data[def_idx - 1].zext_dst = true;
3919 /* The dst will be zero extended, so won't be sub-register anymore. */
3920 reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
3921 }
3922
__check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * regs,u32 regno,enum reg_arg_type t)3923 static int __check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
3924 enum reg_arg_type t)
3925 {
3926 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx;
3927 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
3928 bool rw64;
3929
3930 if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
3931 verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno);
3932 return -EINVAL;
3933 }
3934
3935 mark_reg_scratched(env, regno);
3936
3937 reg = ®s[regno];
3938 rw64 = is_reg64(insn, regno, reg, t);
3939 if (t == SRC_OP) {
3940 /* check whether register used as source operand can be read */
3941 if (reg->type == NOT_INIT) {
3942 verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
3943 return -EACCES;
3944 }
3945 /* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */
3946 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP)
3947 return 0;
3948
3949 if (rw64)
3950 mark_insn_zext(env, reg);
3951
3952 return 0;
3953 } else {
3954 /* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */
3955 if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) {
3956 verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n");
3957 return -EACCES;
3958 }
3959 reg->subreg_def = rw64 ? DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1;
3960 if (t == DST_OP)
3961 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno);
3962 }
3963 return 0;
3964 }
3965
check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 regno,enum reg_arg_type t)3966 static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
3967 enum reg_arg_type t)
3968 {
3969 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
3970 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
3971
3972 return __check_reg_arg(env, state->regs, regno, t);
3973 }
3974
insn_stack_access_flags(int frameno,int spi)3975 static int insn_stack_access_flags(int frameno, int spi)
3976 {
3977 return INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS | (spi << INSN_F_SPI_SHIFT) | frameno;
3978 }
3979
insn_stack_access_spi(int insn_flags)3980 static int insn_stack_access_spi(int insn_flags)
3981 {
3982 return (insn_flags >> INSN_F_SPI_SHIFT) & INSN_F_SPI_MASK;
3983 }
3984
insn_stack_access_frameno(int insn_flags)3985 static int insn_stack_access_frameno(int insn_flags)
3986 {
3987 return insn_flags & INSN_F_FRAMENO_MASK;
3988 }
3989
mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int idx)3990 static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
3991 {
3992 env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true;
3993 }
3994
is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx)3995 static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
3996 {
3997 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jmp_point;
3998 }
3999
4000 #define LR_FRAMENO_BITS 3
4001 #define LR_SPI_BITS 6
4002 #define LR_ENTRY_BITS (LR_SPI_BITS + LR_FRAMENO_BITS + 1)
4003 #define LR_SIZE_BITS 4
4004 #define LR_FRAMENO_MASK ((1ull << LR_FRAMENO_BITS) - 1)
4005 #define LR_SPI_MASK ((1ull << LR_SPI_BITS) - 1)
4006 #define LR_SIZE_MASK ((1ull << LR_SIZE_BITS) - 1)
4007 #define LR_SPI_OFF LR_FRAMENO_BITS
4008 #define LR_IS_REG_OFF (LR_SPI_BITS + LR_FRAMENO_BITS)
4009 #define LINKED_REGS_MAX 6
4010
4011 struct linked_reg {
4012 u8 frameno;
4013 union {
4014 u8 spi;
4015 u8 regno;
4016 };
4017 bool is_reg;
4018 };
4019
4020 struct linked_regs {
4021 int cnt;
4022 struct linked_reg entries[LINKED_REGS_MAX];
4023 };
4024
linked_regs_push(struct linked_regs * s)4025 static struct linked_reg *linked_regs_push(struct linked_regs *s)
4026 {
4027 if (s->cnt < LINKED_REGS_MAX)
4028 return &s->entries[s->cnt++];
4029
4030 return NULL;
4031 }
4032
4033 /* Use u64 as a vector of 6 10-bit values, use first 4-bits to track
4034 * number of elements currently in stack.
4035 * Pack one history entry for linked registers as 10 bits in the following format:
4036 * - 3-bits frameno
4037 * - 6-bits spi_or_reg
4038 * - 1-bit is_reg
4039 */
linked_regs_pack(struct linked_regs * s)4040 static u64 linked_regs_pack(struct linked_regs *s)
4041 {
4042 u64 val = 0;
4043 int i;
4044
4045 for (i = 0; i < s->cnt; ++i) {
4046 struct linked_reg *e = &s->entries[i];
4047 u64 tmp = 0;
4048
4049 tmp |= e->frameno;
4050 tmp |= e->spi << LR_SPI_OFF;
4051 tmp |= (e->is_reg ? 1 : 0) << LR_IS_REG_OFF;
4052
4053 val <<= LR_ENTRY_BITS;
4054 val |= tmp;
4055 }
4056 val <<= LR_SIZE_BITS;
4057 val |= s->cnt;
4058 return val;
4059 }
4060
linked_regs_unpack(u64 val,struct linked_regs * s)4061 static void linked_regs_unpack(u64 val, struct linked_regs *s)
4062 {
4063 int i;
4064
4065 s->cnt = val & LR_SIZE_MASK;
4066 val >>= LR_SIZE_BITS;
4067
4068 for (i = 0; i < s->cnt; ++i) {
4069 struct linked_reg *e = &s->entries[i];
4070
4071 e->frameno = val & LR_FRAMENO_MASK;
4072 e->spi = (val >> LR_SPI_OFF) & LR_SPI_MASK;
4073 e->is_reg = (val >> LR_IS_REG_OFF) & 0x1;
4074 val >>= LR_ENTRY_BITS;
4075 }
4076 }
4077
4078 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */
push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * cur,int insn_flags,u64 linked_regs)4079 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,
4080 int insn_flags, u64 linked_regs)
4081 {
4082 u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt;
4083 struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *p;
4084 size_t alloc_size;
4085
4086 /* combine instruction flags if we already recorded this instruction */
4087 if (env->cur_hist_ent) {
4088 /* atomic instructions push insn_flags twice, for READ and
4089 * WRITE sides, but they should agree on stack slot
4090 */
4091 verifier_bug_if((env->cur_hist_ent->flags & insn_flags) &&
4092 (env->cur_hist_ent->flags & insn_flags) != insn_flags,
4093 env, "insn history: insn_idx %d cur flags %x new flags %x",
4094 env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->flags, insn_flags);
4095 env->cur_hist_ent->flags |= insn_flags;
4096 verifier_bug_if(env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs != 0, env,
4097 "insn history: insn_idx %d linked_regs: %#llx",
4098 env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs);
4099 env->cur_hist_ent->linked_regs = linked_regs;
4100 return 0;
4101 }
4102
4103 cnt++;
4104 alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(cnt, sizeof(*p)));
4105 p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
4106 if (!p)
4107 return -ENOMEM;
4108 cur->jmp_history = p;
4109
4110 p = &cur->jmp_history[cnt - 1];
4111 p->idx = env->insn_idx;
4112 p->prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx;
4113 p->flags = insn_flags;
4114 p->linked_regs = linked_regs;
4115 cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt;
4116 env->cur_hist_ent = p;
4117
4118 return 0;
4119 }
4120
get_jmp_hist_entry(struct bpf_verifier_state * st,u32 hist_end,int insn_idx)4121 static struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *get_jmp_hist_entry(struct bpf_verifier_state *st,
4122 u32 hist_end, int insn_idx)
4123 {
4124 if (hist_end > 0 && st->jmp_history[hist_end - 1].idx == insn_idx)
4125 return &st->jmp_history[hist_end - 1];
4126 return NULL;
4127 }
4128
4129 /* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded
4130 * history then previous instruction came from straight line execution.
4131 * Return -ENOENT if we exhausted all instructions within given state.
4132 *
4133 * It's legal to have a bit of a looping with the same starting and ending
4134 * insn index within the same state, e.g.: 3->4->5->3, so just because current
4135 * instruction index is the same as state's first_idx doesn't mean we are
4136 * done. If there is still some jump history left, we should keep going. We
4137 * need to take into account that we might have a jump history between given
4138 * state's parent and itself, due to checkpointing. In this case, we'll have
4139 * history entry recording a jump from last instruction of parent state and
4140 * first instruction of given state.
4141 */
get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state * st,int i,u32 * history)4142 static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i,
4143 u32 *history)
4144 {
4145 u32 cnt = *history;
4146
4147 if (i == st->first_insn_idx) {
4148 if (cnt == 0)
4149 return -ENOENT;
4150 if (cnt == 1 && st->jmp_history[0].idx == i)
4151 return -ENOENT;
4152 }
4153
4154 if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) {
4155 i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx;
4156 (*history)--;
4157 } else {
4158 i--;
4159 }
4160 return i;
4161 }
4162
disasm_kfunc_name(void * data,const struct bpf_insn * insn)4163 static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
4164 {
4165 const struct btf_type *func;
4166 struct btf *desc_btf;
4167
4168 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL)
4169 return NULL;
4170
4171 desc_btf = find_kfunc_desc_btf(data, insn->off);
4172 if (IS_ERR(desc_btf))
4173 return "<error>";
4174
4175 func = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, insn->imm);
4176 return btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf, func->name_off);
4177 }
4178
verbose_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn)4179 static void verbose_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
4180 {
4181 const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
4182 .cb_call = disasm_kfunc_name,
4183 .cb_print = verbose,
4184 .private_data = env,
4185 };
4186
4187 print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
4188 }
4189
bt_init(struct backtrack_state * bt,u32 frame)4190 static inline void bt_init(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame)
4191 {
4192 bt->frame = frame;
4193 }
4194
bt_reset(struct backtrack_state * bt)4195 static inline void bt_reset(struct backtrack_state *bt)
4196 {
4197 struct bpf_verifier_env *env = bt->env;
4198
4199 memset(bt, 0, sizeof(*bt));
4200 bt->env = env;
4201 }
4202
bt_empty(struct backtrack_state * bt)4203 static inline u32 bt_empty(struct backtrack_state *bt)
4204 {
4205 u64 mask = 0;
4206 int i;
4207
4208 for (i = 0; i <= bt->frame; i++)
4209 mask |= bt->reg_masks[i] | bt->stack_masks[i];
4210
4211 return mask == 0;
4212 }
4213
bt_subprog_enter(struct backtrack_state * bt)4214 static inline int bt_subprog_enter(struct backtrack_state *bt)
4215 {
4216 if (bt->frame == MAX_CALL_FRAMES - 1) {
4217 verifier_bug(bt->env, "subprog enter from frame %d", bt->frame);
4218 return -EFAULT;
4219 }
4220 bt->frame++;
4221 return 0;
4222 }
4223
bt_subprog_exit(struct backtrack_state * bt)4224 static inline int bt_subprog_exit(struct backtrack_state *bt)
4225 {
4226 if (bt->frame == 0) {
4227 verifier_bug(bt->env, "subprog exit from frame 0");
4228 return -EFAULT;
4229 }
4230 bt->frame--;
4231 return 0;
4232 }
4233
bt_set_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state * bt,u32 frame,u32 reg)4234 static inline void bt_set_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg)
4235 {
4236 bt->reg_masks[frame] |= 1 << reg;
4237 }
4238
bt_clear_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state * bt,u32 frame,u32 reg)4239 static inline void bt_clear_frame_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg)
4240 {
4241 bt->reg_masks[frame] &= ~(1 << reg);
4242 }
4243
bt_set_reg(struct backtrack_state * bt,u32 reg)4244 static inline void bt_set_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg)
4245 {
4246 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg);
4247 }
4248
bt_clear_reg(struct backtrack_state * bt,u32 reg)4249 static inline void bt_clear_reg(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg)
4250 {
4251 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame, reg);
4252 }
4253
bt_set_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state * bt,u32 frame,u32 slot)4254 static inline void bt_set_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot)
4255 {
4256 bt->stack_masks[frame] |= 1ull << slot;
4257 }
4258
bt_clear_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state * bt,u32 frame,u32 slot)4259 static inline void bt_clear_frame_slot(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot)
4260 {
4261 bt->stack_masks[frame] &= ~(1ull << slot);
4262 }
4263
bt_frame_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state * bt,u32 frame)4264 static inline u32 bt_frame_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame)
4265 {
4266 return bt->reg_masks[frame];
4267 }
4268
bt_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state * bt)4269 static inline u32 bt_reg_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt)
4270 {
4271 return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame];
4272 }
4273
bt_frame_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state * bt,u32 frame)4274 static inline u64 bt_frame_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame)
4275 {
4276 return bt->stack_masks[frame];
4277 }
4278
bt_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state * bt)4279 static inline u64 bt_stack_mask(struct backtrack_state *bt)
4280 {
4281 return bt->stack_masks[bt->frame];
4282 }
4283
bt_is_reg_set(struct backtrack_state * bt,u32 reg)4284 static inline bool bt_is_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 reg)
4285 {
4286 return bt->reg_masks[bt->frame] & (1 << reg);
4287 }
4288
bt_is_frame_reg_set(struct backtrack_state * bt,u32 frame,u32 reg)4289 static inline bool bt_is_frame_reg_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 reg)
4290 {
4291 return bt->reg_masks[frame] & (1 << reg);
4292 }
4293
bt_is_frame_slot_set(struct backtrack_state * bt,u32 frame,u32 slot)4294 static inline bool bt_is_frame_slot_set(struct backtrack_state *bt, u32 frame, u32 slot)
4295 {
4296 return bt->stack_masks[frame] & (1ull << slot);
4297 }
4298
4299 /* format registers bitmask, e.g., "r0,r2,r4" for 0x15 mask */
fmt_reg_mask(char * buf,ssize_t buf_sz,u32 reg_mask)4300 static void fmt_reg_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u32 reg_mask)
4301 {
4302 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64);
4303 bool first = true;
4304 int i, n;
4305
4306 buf[0] = '\0';
4307
4308 bitmap_from_u64(mask, reg_mask);
4309 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) {
4310 n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%sr%d", first ? "" : ",", i);
4311 first = false;
4312 buf += n;
4313 buf_sz -= n;
4314 if (buf_sz < 0)
4315 break;
4316 }
4317 }
4318 /* format stack slots bitmask, e.g., "-8,-24,-40" for 0x15 mask */
bpf_fmt_stack_mask(char * buf,ssize_t buf_sz,u64 stack_mask)4319 void bpf_fmt_stack_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u64 stack_mask)
4320 {
4321 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64);
4322 bool first = true;
4323 int i, n;
4324
4325 buf[0] = '\0';
4326
4327 bitmap_from_u64(mask, stack_mask);
4328 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) {
4329 n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%s%d", first ? "" : ",", -(i + 1) * 8);
4330 first = false;
4331 buf += n;
4332 buf_sz -= n;
4333 if (buf_sz < 0)
4334 break;
4335 }
4336 }
4337
4338 /* If any register R in hist->linked_regs is marked as precise in bt,
4339 * do bt_set_frame_{reg,slot}(bt, R) for all registers in hist->linked_regs.
4340 */
bt_sync_linked_regs(struct backtrack_state * bt,struct bpf_jmp_history_entry * hist)4341 static void bt_sync_linked_regs(struct backtrack_state *bt, struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist)
4342 {
4343 struct linked_regs linked_regs;
4344 bool some_precise = false;
4345 int i;
4346
4347 if (!hist || hist->linked_regs == 0)
4348 return;
4349
4350 linked_regs_unpack(hist->linked_regs, &linked_regs);
4351 for (i = 0; i < linked_regs.cnt; ++i) {
4352 struct linked_reg *e = &linked_regs.entries[i];
4353
4354 if ((e->is_reg && bt_is_frame_reg_set(bt, e->frameno, e->regno)) ||
4355 (!e->is_reg && bt_is_frame_slot_set(bt, e->frameno, e->spi))) {
4356 some_precise = true;
4357 break;
4358 }
4359 }
4360
4361 if (!some_precise)
4362 return;
4363
4364 for (i = 0; i < linked_regs.cnt; ++i) {
4365 struct linked_reg *e = &linked_regs.entries[i];
4366
4367 if (e->is_reg)
4368 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, e->frameno, e->regno);
4369 else
4370 bt_set_frame_slot(bt, e->frameno, e->spi);
4371 }
4372 }
4373
4374 /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to
4375 * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and
4376 * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state.
4377 *
4378 * @idx is an index of the instruction we are currently processing;
4379 * @subseq_idx is an index of the subsequent instruction that:
4380 * - *would be* executed next, if jump history is viewed in forward order;
4381 * - *was* processed previously during backtracking.
4382 */
backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int idx,int subseq_idx,struct bpf_jmp_history_entry * hist,struct backtrack_state * bt)4383 static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx,
4384 struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist, struct backtrack_state *bt)
4385 {
4386 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx;
4387 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
4388 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
4389 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
4390 u32 dreg = insn->dst_reg;
4391 u32 sreg = insn->src_reg;
4392 u32 spi, i, fr;
4393
4394 if (insn->code == 0)
4395 return 0;
4396 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
4397 fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_reg_mask(bt));
4398 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: regs=%s ",
4399 bt->frame, env->tmp_str_buf);
4400 bpf_fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, bt_stack_mask(bt));
4401 verbose(env, "stack=%s before ", env->tmp_str_buf);
4402 verbose(env, "%d: ", idx);
4403 verbose_insn(env, insn);
4404 }
4405
4406 /* If there is a history record that some registers gained range at this insn,
4407 * propagate precision marks to those registers, so that bt_is_reg_set()
4408 * accounts for these registers.
4409 */
4410 bt_sync_linked_regs(bt, hist);
4411
4412 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
4413 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg))
4414 return 0;
4415 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
4416 /* sreg is reserved and unused
4417 * dreg still need precision before this insn
4418 */
4419 return 0;
4420 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
4421 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
4422 /* dreg = sreg or dreg = (s8, s16, s32)sreg
4423 * dreg needs precision after this insn
4424 * sreg needs precision before this insn
4425 */
4426 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg);
4427 if (sreg != BPF_REG_FP)
4428 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg);
4429 } else {
4430 /* dreg = K
4431 * dreg needs precision after this insn.
4432 * Corresponding register is already marked
4433 * as precise=true in this verifier state.
4434 * No further markings in parent are necessary
4435 */
4436 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg);
4437 }
4438 } else {
4439 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
4440 /* dreg += sreg
4441 * both dreg and sreg need precision
4442 * before this insn
4443 */
4444 if (sreg != BPF_REG_FP)
4445 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg);
4446 } /* else dreg += K
4447 * dreg still needs precision before this insn
4448 */
4449 }
4450 } else if (class == BPF_LDX || is_atomic_load_insn(insn)) {
4451 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg))
4452 return 0;
4453 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg);
4454
4455 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack w/o losing precision.
4456 * Load from any other memory can be zero extended.
4457 * The desire to keep that precision is already indicated
4458 * by 'precise' mark in corresponding register of this state.
4459 * No further tracking necessary.
4460 */
4461 if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS))
4462 return 0;
4463 /* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack.
4464 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be
4465 * tracked with precision
4466 */
4467 spi = insn_stack_access_spi(hist->flags);
4468 fr = insn_stack_access_frameno(hist->flags);
4469 bt_set_frame_slot(bt, fr, spi);
4470 } else if (class == BPF_STX || class == BPF_ST) {
4471 if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg))
4472 /* stx & st shouldn't be using _scalar_ dst_reg
4473 * to access memory. It means backtracking
4474 * encountered a case of pointer subtraction.
4475 */
4476 return -ENOTSUPP;
4477 /* scalars can only be spilled into stack */
4478 if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS))
4479 return 0;
4480 spi = insn_stack_access_spi(hist->flags);
4481 fr = insn_stack_access_frameno(hist->flags);
4482 if (!bt_is_frame_slot_set(bt, fr, spi))
4483 return 0;
4484 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, spi);
4485 if (class == BPF_STX)
4486 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg);
4487 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) {
4488 if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) {
4489 int subprog_insn_idx, subprog;
4490
4491 subprog_insn_idx = idx + insn->imm + 1;
4492 subprog = find_subprog(env, subprog_insn_idx);
4493 if (subprog < 0)
4494 return -EFAULT;
4495
4496 if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) {
4497 /* check that jump history doesn't have any
4498 * extra instructions from subprog; the next
4499 * instruction after call to global subprog
4500 * should be literally next instruction in
4501 * caller program
4502 */
4503 verifier_bug_if(idx + 1 != subseq_idx, env,
4504 "extra insn from subprog");
4505 /* r1-r5 are invalidated after subprog call,
4506 * so for global func call it shouldn't be set
4507 * anymore
4508 */
4509 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) {
4510 verifier_bug(env, "global subprog unexpected regs %x",
4511 bt_reg_mask(bt));
4512 return -EFAULT;
4513 }
4514 /* global subprog always sets R0 */
4515 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0);
4516 return 0;
4517 } else {
4518 /* static subprog call instruction, which
4519 * means that we are exiting current subprog,
4520 * so only r1-r5 could be still requested as
4521 * precise, r0 and r6-r10 or any stack slot in
4522 * the current frame should be zero by now
4523 */
4524 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) {
4525 verifier_bug(env, "static subprog unexpected regs %x",
4526 bt_reg_mask(bt));
4527 return -EFAULT;
4528 }
4529 /* we are now tracking register spills correctly,
4530 * so any instance of leftover slots is a bug
4531 */
4532 if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) {
4533 verifier_bug(env,
4534 "static subprog leftover stack slots %llx",
4535 bt_stack_mask(bt));
4536 return -EFAULT;
4537 }
4538 /* propagate r1-r5 to the caller */
4539 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) {
4540 if (bt_is_reg_set(bt, i)) {
4541 bt_clear_reg(bt, i);
4542 bt_set_frame_reg(bt, bt->frame - 1, i);
4543 }
4544 }
4545 if (bt_subprog_exit(bt))
4546 return -EFAULT;
4547 return 0;
4548 }
4549 } else if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn) && idx != subseq_idx - 1) {
4550 /* exit from callback subprog to callback-calling helper or
4551 * kfunc call. Use idx/subseq_idx check to discern it from
4552 * straight line code backtracking.
4553 * Unlike the subprog call handling above, we shouldn't
4554 * propagate precision of r1-r5 (if any requested), as they are
4555 * not actually arguments passed directly to callback subprogs
4556 */
4557 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) {
4558 verifier_bug(env, "callback unexpected regs %x",
4559 bt_reg_mask(bt));
4560 return -EFAULT;
4561 }
4562 if (bt_stack_mask(bt) != 0) {
4563 verifier_bug(env, "callback leftover stack slots %llx",
4564 bt_stack_mask(bt));
4565 return -EFAULT;
4566 }
4567 /* clear r1-r5 in callback subprog's mask */
4568 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++)
4569 bt_clear_reg(bt, i);
4570 if (bt_subprog_exit(bt))
4571 return -EFAULT;
4572 return 0;
4573 } else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
4574 /* kfunc with imm==0 is invalid and fixup_kfunc_call will
4575 * catch this error later. Make backtracking conservative
4576 * with ENOTSUPP.
4577 */
4578 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && insn->imm == 0)
4579 return -ENOTSUPP;
4580 /* regular helper call sets R0 */
4581 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0);
4582 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) {
4583 /* if backtracking was looking for registers R1-R5
4584 * they should have been found already.
4585 */
4586 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking call unexpected regs %x",
4587 bt_reg_mask(bt));
4588 return -EFAULT;
4589 }
4590 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call
4591 && subseq_idx - idx != 1) {
4592 if (bt_subprog_enter(bt))
4593 return -EFAULT;
4594 }
4595 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
4596 bool r0_precise;
4597
4598 /* Backtracking to a nested function call, 'idx' is a part of
4599 * the inner frame 'subseq_idx' is a part of the outer frame.
4600 * In case of a regular function call, instructions giving
4601 * precision to registers R1-R5 should have been found already.
4602 * In case of a callback, it is ok to have R1-R5 marked for
4603 * backtracking, as these registers are set by the function
4604 * invoking callback.
4605 */
4606 if (subseq_idx >= 0 && bpf_calls_callback(env, subseq_idx))
4607 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++)
4608 bt_clear_reg(bt, i);
4609 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) {
4610 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking exit unexpected regs %x",
4611 bt_reg_mask(bt));
4612 return -EFAULT;
4613 }
4614
4615 /* BPF_EXIT in subprog or callback always returns
4616 * right after the call instruction, so by checking
4617 * whether the instruction at subseq_idx-1 is subprog
4618 * call or not we can distinguish actual exit from
4619 * *subprog* from exit from *callback*. In the former
4620 * case, we need to propagate r0 precision, if
4621 * necessary. In the former we never do that.
4622 */
4623 r0_precise = subseq_idx - 1 >= 0 &&
4624 bpf_pseudo_call(&env->prog->insnsi[subseq_idx - 1]) &&
4625 bt_is_reg_set(bt, BPF_REG_0);
4626
4627 bt_clear_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0);
4628 if (bt_subprog_enter(bt))
4629 return -EFAULT;
4630
4631 if (r0_precise)
4632 bt_set_reg(bt, BPF_REG_0);
4633 /* r6-r9 and stack slots will stay set in caller frame
4634 * bitmasks until we return back from callee(s)
4635 */
4636 return 0;
4637 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
4638 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg) && !bt_is_reg_set(bt, sreg))
4639 return 0;
4640 /* dreg <cond> sreg
4641 * Both dreg and sreg need precision before
4642 * this insn. If only sreg was marked precise
4643 * before it would be equally necessary to
4644 * propagate it to dreg.
4645 */
4646 if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_SRC_REG_STACK))
4647 bt_set_reg(bt, sreg);
4648 if (!hist || !(hist->flags & INSN_F_DST_REG_STACK))
4649 bt_set_reg(bt, dreg);
4650 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
4651 /* dreg <cond> K
4652 * Only dreg still needs precision before
4653 * this insn, so for the K-based conditional
4654 * there is nothing new to be marked.
4655 */
4656 }
4657 } else if (class == BPF_LD) {
4658 if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg))
4659 return 0;
4660 bt_clear_reg(bt, dreg);
4661 /* It's ld_imm64 or ld_abs or ld_ind.
4662 * For ld_imm64 no further tracking of precision
4663 * into parent is necessary
4664 */
4665 if (mode == BPF_IND || mode == BPF_ABS)
4666 /* to be analyzed */
4667 return -ENOTSUPP;
4668 }
4669 /* Propagate precision marks to linked registers, to account for
4670 * registers marked as precise in this function.
4671 */
4672 bt_sync_linked_regs(bt, hist);
4673 return 0;
4674 }
4675
4676 /* the scalar precision tracking algorithm:
4677 * . at the start all registers have precise=false.
4678 * . scalar ranges are tracked as normal through alu and jmp insns.
4679 * . once precise value of the scalar register is used in:
4680 * . ptr + scalar alu
4681 * . if (scalar cond K|scalar)
4682 * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected
4683 * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and
4684 * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar registers
4685 * should be precise.
4686 * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots)
4687 * are equivalent if both are not precise.
4688 *
4689 * Note the verifier cannot simply walk register parentage chain,
4690 * since many different registers and stack slots could have been
4691 * used to compute single precise scalar.
4692 *
4693 * The approach of starting with precise=true for all registers and then
4694 * backtrack to mark a register as not precise when the verifier detects
4695 * that program doesn't care about specific value (e.g., when helper
4696 * takes register as ARG_ANYTHING parameter) is not safe.
4697 *
4698 * It's ok to walk single parentage chain of the verifier states.
4699 * It's possible that this backtracking will go all the way till 1st insn.
4700 * All other branches will be explored for needing precision later.
4701 *
4702 * The backtracking needs to deal with cases like:
4703 * R8=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0) R9_w=map_value(id=0,off=40,ks=4,vs=1952,imm=0)
4704 * r9 -= r8
4705 * r5 = r9
4706 * if r5 > 0x79f goto pc+7
4707 * R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1951,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ff))
4708 * r5 += 1
4709 * ...
4710 * call bpf_perf_event_output#25
4711 * where .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO
4712 *
4713 * and this case:
4714 * r6 = 1
4715 * call foo // uses callee's r6 inside to compute r0
4716 * r0 += r6
4717 * if r0 == 0 goto
4718 *
4719 * to track above reg_mask/stack_mask needs to be independent for each frame.
4720 *
4721 * Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started,
4722 * the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees
4723 * may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to
4724 * commit 7640ead93924 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences")
4725 *
4726 * For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking.
4727 */
mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * st)4728 static void mark_all_scalars_precise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4729 struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
4730 {
4731 struct bpf_func_state *func;
4732 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
4733 int i, j;
4734
4735 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
4736 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: falling back to forcing all scalars precise\n",
4737 st->curframe);
4738 }
4739
4740 /* big hammer: mark all scalars precise in this path.
4741 * pop_stack may still get !precise scalars.
4742 * We also skip current state and go straight to first parent state,
4743 * because precision markings in current non-checkpointed state are
4744 * not needed. See why in the comment in __mark_chain_precision below.
4745 */
4746 for (st = st->parent; st; st = st->parent) {
4747 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) {
4748 func = st->frame[i];
4749 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) {
4750 reg = &func->regs[j];
4751 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise)
4752 continue;
4753 reg->precise = true;
4754 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
4755 verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing r%d to be precise\n",
4756 i, j);
4757 }
4758 }
4759 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
4760 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j]))
4761 continue;
4762 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr;
4763 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg->precise)
4764 continue;
4765 reg->precise = true;
4766 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
4767 verbose(env, "force_precise: frame%d: forcing fp%d to be precise\n",
4768 i, -(j + 1) * 8);
4769 }
4770 }
4771 }
4772 }
4773 }
4774
mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * st)4775 static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
4776 {
4777 struct bpf_func_state *func;
4778 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
4779 int i, j;
4780
4781 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) {
4782 func = st->frame[i];
4783 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) {
4784 reg = &func->regs[j];
4785 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
4786 continue;
4787 reg->precise = false;
4788 }
4789 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
4790 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j]))
4791 continue;
4792 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr;
4793 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
4794 continue;
4795 reg->precise = false;
4796 }
4797 }
4798 }
4799
4800 /*
4801 * __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and
4802 * chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0)
4803 * and/or stack slot *spi* (if spi >= 0) are marked as precisely tracked
4804 * SCALARS, as well as any other registers and slots that contribute to
4805 * a tracked state of given registers/stack slots, depending on specific BPF
4806 * assembly instructions (see backtrack_insns() for exact instruction handling
4807 * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to
4808 * traverse entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the
4809 * necessary registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as
4810 * precise.
4811 *
4812 * One important and subtle aspect is that precise marks *do not matter* in
4813 * the currently verified state (current state). It is important to understand
4814 * why this is the case.
4815 *
4816 * First, note that current state is the state that is not yet "checkpointed",
4817 * i.e., it is not yet put into env->explored_states, and it has no children
4818 * states as well. It's ephemeral, and can end up either a) being discarded if
4819 * compatible explored state is found at some point or BPF_EXIT instruction is
4820 * reached or b) checkpointed and put into env->explored_states, branching out
4821 * into one or more children states.
4822 *
4823 * In the former case, precise markings in current state are completely
4824 * ignored by state comparison code (see regsafe() for details). Only
4825 * checkpointed ("old") state precise markings are important, and if old
4826 * state's register/slot is precise, regsafe() assumes current state's
4827 * register/slot as precise and checks value ranges exactly and precisely. If
4828 * states turn out to be compatible, current state's necessary precise
4829 * markings and any required parent states' precise markings are enforced
4830 * after the fact with propagate_precision() logic, after the fact. But it's
4831 * important to realize that in this case, even after marking current state
4832 * registers/slots as precise, we immediately discard current state. So what
4833 * actually matters is any of the precise markings propagated into current
4834 * state's parent states, which are always checkpointed (due to b) case above).
4835 * As such, for scenario a) it doesn't matter if current state has precise
4836 * markings set or not.
4837 *
4838 * Now, for the scenario b), checkpointing and forking into child(ren)
4839 * state(s). Note that before current state gets to checkpointing step, any
4840 * processed instruction always assumes precise SCALAR register/slot
4841 * knowledge: if precise value or range is useful to prune jump branch, BPF
4842 * verifier takes this opportunity enthusiastically. Similarly, when
4843 * register's value is used to calculate offset or memory address, exact
4844 * knowledge of SCALAR range is assumed, checked, and enforced. So, similar to
4845 * what we mentioned above about state comparison ignoring precise markings
4846 * during state comparison, BPF verifier ignores and also assumes precise
4847 * markings *at will* during instruction verification process. But as verifier
4848 * assumes precision, it also propagates any precision dependencies across
4849 * parent states, which are not yet finalized, so can be further restricted
4850 * based on new knowledge gained from restrictions enforced by their children
4851 * states. This is so that once those parent states are finalized, i.e., when
4852 * they have no more active children state, state comparison logic in
4853 * is_state_visited() would enforce strict and precise SCALAR ranges, if
4854 * required for correctness.
4855 *
4856 * To build a bit more intuition, note also that once a state is checkpointed,
4857 * the path we took to get to that state is not important. This is crucial
4858 * property for state pruning. When state is checkpointed and finalized at
4859 * some instruction index, it can be correctly and safely used to "short
4860 * circuit" any *compatible* state that reaches exactly the same instruction
4861 * index. I.e., if we jumped to that instruction from a completely different
4862 * code path than original finalized state was derived from, it doesn't
4863 * matter, current state can be discarded because from that instruction
4864 * forward having a compatible state will ensure we will safely reach the
4865 * exit. States describe preconditions for further exploration, but completely
4866 * forget the history of how we got here.
4867 *
4868 * This also means that even if we needed precise SCALAR range to get to
4869 * finalized state, but from that point forward *that same* SCALAR register is
4870 * never used in a precise context (i.e., it's precise value is not needed for
4871 * correctness), it's correct and safe to mark such register as "imprecise"
4872 * (i.e., precise marking set to false). This is what we rely on when we do
4873 * not set precise marking in current state. If no child state requires
4874 * precision for any given SCALAR register, it's safe to dictate that it can
4875 * be imprecise. If any child state does require this register to be precise,
4876 * we'll mark it precise later retroactively during precise markings
4877 * propagation from child state to parent states.
4878 *
4879 * Skipping precise marking setting in current state is a mild version of
4880 * relying on the above observation. But we can utilize this property even
4881 * more aggressively by proactively forgetting any precise marking in the
4882 * current state (which we inherited from the parent state), right before we
4883 * checkpoint it and branch off into new child state. This is done by
4884 * mark_all_scalars_imprecise() to hopefully get more permissive and generic
4885 * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states.
4886 */
__mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * starting_state,int regno,bool * changed)4887 static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
4888 struct bpf_verifier_state *starting_state,
4889 int regno,
4890 bool *changed)
4891 {
4892 struct bpf_verifier_state *st = starting_state;
4893 struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt;
4894 int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx;
4895 int last_idx = starting_state->insn_idx;
4896 int subseq_idx = -1;
4897 struct bpf_func_state *func;
4898 bool tmp, skip_first = true;
4899 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
4900 int i, fr, err;
4901
4902 if (!env->bpf_capable)
4903 return 0;
4904
4905 changed = changed ?: &tmp;
4906 /* set frame number from which we are starting to backtrack */
4907 bt_init(bt, starting_state->curframe);
4908
4909 /* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack
4910 * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision
4911 * tracking in the current state is unnecessary.
4912 */
4913 func = st->frame[bt->frame];
4914 if (regno >= 0) {
4915 reg = &func->regs[regno];
4916 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
4917 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking misuse");
4918 return -EFAULT;
4919 }
4920 bt_set_reg(bt, regno);
4921 }
4922
4923 if (bt_empty(bt))
4924 return 0;
4925
4926 for (;;) {
4927 DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64);
4928 u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt;
4929 struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist;
4930
4931 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
4932 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: last_idx %d first_idx %d subseq_idx %d \n",
4933 bt->frame, last_idx, first_idx, subseq_idx);
4934 }
4935
4936 if (last_idx < 0) {
4937 /* we are at the entry into subprog, which
4938 * is expected for global funcs, but only if
4939 * requested precise registers are R1-R5
4940 * (which are global func's input arguments)
4941 */
4942 if (st->curframe == 0 &&
4943 st->frame[0]->subprogno > 0 &&
4944 st->frame[0]->callsite == BPF_MAIN_FUNC &&
4945 bt_stack_mask(bt) == 0 &&
4946 (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) == 0) {
4947 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_reg_mask(bt));
4948 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) {
4949 reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i];
4950 bt_clear_reg(bt, i);
4951 if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
4952 reg->precise = true;
4953 *changed = true;
4954 }
4955 }
4956 return 0;
4957 }
4958
4959 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking func entry subprog %d reg_mask %x stack_mask %llx",
4960 st->frame[0]->subprogno, bt_reg_mask(bt), bt_stack_mask(bt));
4961 return -EFAULT;
4962 }
4963
4964 for (i = last_idx;;) {
4965 if (skip_first) {
4966 err = 0;
4967 skip_first = false;
4968 } else {
4969 hist = get_jmp_hist_entry(st, history, i);
4970 err = backtrack_insn(env, i, subseq_idx, hist, bt);
4971 }
4972 if (err == -ENOTSUPP) {
4973 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, starting_state);
4974 bt_reset(bt);
4975 return 0;
4976 } else if (err) {
4977 return err;
4978 }
4979 if (bt_empty(bt))
4980 /* Found assignment(s) into tracked register in this state.
4981 * Since this state is already marked, just return.
4982 * Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state.
4983 */
4984 return 0;
4985 subseq_idx = i;
4986 i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history);
4987 if (i == -ENOENT)
4988 break;
4989 if (i >= env->prog->len) {
4990 /* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0
4991 * and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask
4992 * to backtrack.
4993 * It means the backtracking missed the spot where
4994 * particular register was initialized with a constant.
4995 */
4996 verifier_bug(env, "backtracking idx %d", i);
4997 return -EFAULT;
4998 }
4999 }
5000 st = st->parent;
5001 if (!st)
5002 break;
5003
5004 for (fr = bt->frame; fr >= 0; fr--) {
5005 func = st->frame[fr];
5006 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr));
5007 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) {
5008 reg = &func->regs[i];
5009 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
5010 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i);
5011 continue;
5012 }
5013 if (reg->precise) {
5014 bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i);
5015 } else {
5016 reg->precise = true;
5017 *changed = true;
5018 }
5019 }
5020
5021 bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr));
5022 for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) {
5023 if (verifier_bug_if(i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE,
5024 env, "stack slot %d, total slots %d",
5025 i, func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE))
5026 return -EFAULT;
5027
5028 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) {
5029 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i);
5030 continue;
5031 }
5032 reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
5033 if (reg->precise) {
5034 bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i);
5035 } else {
5036 reg->precise = true;
5037 *changed = true;
5038 }
5039 }
5040 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
5041 fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN,
5042 bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr));
5043 verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: parent state regs=%s ",
5044 fr, env->tmp_str_buf);
5045 bpf_fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN,
5046 bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr));
5047 verbose(env, "stack=%s: ", env->tmp_str_buf);
5048 print_verifier_state(env, st, fr, true);
5049 }
5050 }
5051
5052 if (bt_empty(bt))
5053 return 0;
5054
5055 subseq_idx = first_idx;
5056 last_idx = st->last_insn_idx;
5057 first_idx = st->first_insn_idx;
5058 }
5059
5060 /* if we still have requested precise regs or slots, we missed
5061 * something (e.g., stack access through non-r10 register), so
5062 * fallback to marking all precise
5063 */
5064 if (!bt_empty(bt)) {
5065 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, starting_state);
5066 bt_reset(bt);
5067 }
5068
5069 return 0;
5070 }
5071
mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno)5072 int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
5073 {
5074 return __mark_chain_precision(env, env->cur_state, regno, NULL);
5075 }
5076
5077 /* mark_chain_precision_batch() assumes that env->bt is set in the caller to
5078 * desired reg and stack masks across all relevant frames
5079 */
mark_chain_precision_batch(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * starting_state)5080 static int mark_chain_precision_batch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5081 struct bpf_verifier_state *starting_state)
5082 {
5083 return __mark_chain_precision(env, starting_state, -1, NULL);
5084 }
5085
is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)5086 static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
5087 {
5088 switch (base_type(type)) {
5089 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
5090 case PTR_TO_STACK:
5091 case PTR_TO_CTX:
5092 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
5093 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
5094 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
5095 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
5096 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
5097 case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
5098 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
5099 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
5100 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
5101 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
5102 case PTR_TO_BUF:
5103 case PTR_TO_MEM:
5104 case PTR_TO_FUNC:
5105 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
5106 case PTR_TO_ARENA:
5107 return true;
5108 default:
5109 return false;
5110 }
5111 }
5112
5113 /* Does this register contain a constant zero? */
register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)5114 static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
5115 {
5116 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0);
5117 }
5118
5119 /* check if register is a constant scalar value */
is_reg_const(struct bpf_reg_state * reg,bool subreg32)5120 static bool is_reg_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, bool subreg32)
5121 {
5122 return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
5123 tnum_is_const(subreg32 ? tnum_subreg(reg->var_off) : reg->var_off);
5124 }
5125
5126 /* assuming is_reg_const() is true, return constant value of a register */
reg_const_value(struct bpf_reg_state * reg,bool subreg32)5127 static u64 reg_const_value(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, bool subreg32)
5128 {
5129 return subreg32 ? tnum_subreg(reg->var_off).value : reg->var_off.value;
5130 }
5131
__is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg)5132 static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
5133 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
5134 {
5135 if (allow_ptr_leaks)
5136 return false;
5137
5138 return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
5139 }
5140
assign_scalar_id_before_mov(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)5141 static void assign_scalar_id_before_mov(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5142 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
5143 {
5144 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
5145 return;
5146
5147 if (src_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) {
5148 /*
5149 * The verifier is processing rX = rY insn and
5150 * rY->id has special linked register already.
5151 * Cleared it, since multiple rX += const are not supported.
5152 */
5153 src_reg->id = 0;
5154 src_reg->off = 0;
5155 }
5156
5157 if (!src_reg->id && !tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off))
5158 /* Ensure that src_reg has a valid ID that will be copied to
5159 * dst_reg and then will be used by sync_linked_regs() to
5160 * propagate min/max range.
5161 */
5162 src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
5163 }
5164
5165 /* Copy src state preserving dst->parent and dst->live fields */
copy_register_state(struct bpf_reg_state * dst,const struct bpf_reg_state * src)5166 static void copy_register_state(struct bpf_reg_state *dst, const struct bpf_reg_state *src)
5167 {
5168 *dst = *src;
5169 }
5170
save_register_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * state,int spi,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int size)5171 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5172 struct bpf_func_state *state,
5173 int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
5174 int size)
5175 {
5176 int i;
5177
5178 copy_register_state(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, reg);
5179
5180 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE; i > BPF_REG_SIZE - size; i--)
5181 state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1] = STACK_SPILL;
5182
5183 /* size < 8 bytes spill */
5184 for (; i; i--)
5185 mark_stack_slot_misc(env, &state->stack[spi].slot_type[i - 1]);
5186 }
5187
is_bpf_st_mem(struct bpf_insn * insn)5188 static bool is_bpf_st_mem(struct bpf_insn *insn)
5189 {
5190 return BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ST && BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM;
5191 }
5192
get_reg_width(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)5193 static int get_reg_width(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
5194 {
5195 return fls64(reg->umax_value);
5196 }
5197
5198 /* See comment for mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call() */
check_fastcall_stack_contract(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * state,int insn_idx,int off)5199 static void check_fastcall_stack_contract(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5200 struct bpf_func_state *state, int insn_idx, int off)
5201 {
5202 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = &env->subprog_info[state->subprogno];
5203 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data;
5204 int i;
5205
5206 if (subprog->fastcall_stack_off <= off || aux[insn_idx].fastcall_pattern)
5207 return;
5208 /* access to the region [max_stack_depth .. fastcall_stack_off)
5209 * from something that is not a part of the fastcall pattern,
5210 * disable fastcall rewrites for current subprogram by setting
5211 * fastcall_stack_off to a value smaller than any possible offset.
5212 */
5213 subprog->fastcall_stack_off = S16_MIN;
5214 /* reset fastcall aux flags within subprogram,
5215 * happens at most once per subprogram
5216 */
5217 for (i = subprog->start; i < (subprog + 1)->start; ++i) {
5218 aux[i].fastcall_spills_num = 0;
5219 aux[i].fastcall_pattern = 0;
5220 }
5221 }
5222
5223 /* check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off functions track spill/fill of registers,
5224 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
5225 */
check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * state,int off,int size,int value_regno,int insn_idx)5226 static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5227 /* stack frame we're writing to */
5228 struct bpf_func_state *state,
5229 int off, int size, int value_regno,
5230 int insn_idx)
5231 {
5232 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
5233 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE, err;
5234 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
5235 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = NULL;
5236 int insn_flags = insn_stack_access_flags(state->frameno, spi);
5237
5238 /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
5239 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
5240 */
5241 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
5242 is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) &&
5243 !is_spilled_scalar_reg(&state->stack[spi]) &&
5244 size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
5245 verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
5246 return -EACCES;
5247 }
5248
5249 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
5250 if (value_regno >= 0)
5251 reg = &cur->regs[value_regno];
5252 if (!env->bypass_spec_v4) {
5253 bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type);
5254
5255 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
5256 u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i];
5257
5258 if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) {
5259 sanitize = true;
5260 break;
5261 }
5262 }
5263
5264 if (sanitize)
5265 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].nospec_result = true;
5266 }
5267
5268 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi);
5269 if (err)
5270 return err;
5271
5272 if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_REG_SIZE) {
5273 /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written
5274 * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon
5275 * when stack slots are partially written.
5276 * This heuristic means that read propagation will be
5277 * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks
5278 * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs
5279 * writes+reads less than 8 bytes
5280 */
5281 bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi));
5282 }
5283
5284 check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, insn_idx, off);
5285 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
5286 if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && env->bpf_capable) {
5287 bool reg_value_fits;
5288
5289 reg_value_fits = get_reg_width(reg) <= BITS_PER_BYTE * size;
5290 /* Make sure that reg had an ID to build a relation on spill. */
5291 if (reg_value_fits)
5292 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, reg);
5293 save_register_state(env, state, spi, reg, size);
5294 /* Break the relation on a narrowing spill. */
5295 if (!reg_value_fits)
5296 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = 0;
5297 } else if (!reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) &&
5298 env->bpf_capable) {
5299 struct bpf_reg_state *tmp_reg = &env->fake_reg[0];
5300
5301 memset(tmp_reg, 0, sizeof(*tmp_reg));
5302 __mark_reg_known(tmp_reg, insn->imm);
5303 tmp_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
5304 save_register_state(env, state, spi, tmp_reg, size);
5305 } else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) {
5306 /* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
5307 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
5308 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
5309 verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n");
5310 return -EACCES;
5311 }
5312 if (state != cur && reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
5313 verbose(env, "cannot spill pointers to stack into stack frame of the caller\n");
5314 return -EINVAL;
5315 }
5316 save_register_state(env, state, spi, reg, size);
5317 } else {
5318 u8 type = STACK_MISC;
5319
5320 /* regular write of data into stack destroys any spilled ptr */
5321 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
5322 /* Mark slots as STACK_MISC if they belonged to spilled ptr/dynptr/iter. */
5323 if (is_stack_slot_special(&state->stack[spi]))
5324 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
5325 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]);
5326
5327 /* when we zero initialize stack slots mark them as such */
5328 if ((reg && register_is_null(reg)) ||
5329 (!reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) {
5330 /* STACK_ZERO case happened because register spill
5331 * wasn't properly aligned at the stack slot boundary,
5332 * so it's not a register spill anymore; force
5333 * originating register to be precise to make
5334 * STACK_ZERO correct for subsequent states
5335 */
5336 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
5337 if (err)
5338 return err;
5339 type = STACK_ZERO;
5340 }
5341
5342 /* Mark slots affected by this stack write. */
5343 for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
5344 state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE] = type;
5345 insn_flags = 0; /* not a register spill */
5346 }
5347
5348 if (insn_flags)
5349 return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0);
5350 return 0;
5351 }
5352
5353 /* Write the stack: 'stack[ptr_regno + off] = value_regno'. 'ptr_regno' is
5354 * known to contain a variable offset.
5355 * This function checks whether the write is permitted and conservatively
5356 * tracks the effects of the write, considering that each stack slot in the
5357 * dynamic range is potentially written to.
5358 *
5359 * 'off' includes 'regno->off'.
5360 * 'value_regno' can be -1, meaning that an unknown value is being written to
5361 * the stack.
5362 *
5363 * Spilled pointers in range are not marked as written because we don't know
5364 * what's going to be actually written. This means that read propagation for
5365 * future reads cannot be terminated by this write.
5366 *
5367 * For privileged programs, uninitialized stack slots are considered
5368 * initialized by this write (even though we don't know exactly what offsets
5369 * are going to be written to). The idea is that we don't want the verifier to
5370 * reject future reads that access slots written to through variable offsets.
5371 */
check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * state,int ptr_regno,int off,int size,int value_regno,int insn_idx)5372 static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5373 /* func where register points to */
5374 struct bpf_func_state *state,
5375 int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
5376 int value_regno, int insn_idx)
5377 {
5378 struct bpf_func_state *cur; /* state of the current function */
5379 int min_off, max_off;
5380 int i, err;
5381 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, *value_reg = NULL;
5382 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
5383 bool writing_zero = false;
5384 /* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any
5385 * stack slots remain STACK_ZERO
5386 */
5387 bool zero_used = false;
5388
5389 cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
5390 ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno];
5391 min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off;
5392 max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size;
5393 if (value_regno >= 0)
5394 value_reg = &cur->regs[value_regno];
5395 if ((value_reg && register_is_null(value_reg)) ||
5396 (!value_reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0))
5397 writing_zero = true;
5398
5399 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
5400 int spi;
5401
5402 spi = __get_spi(i);
5403 err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi);
5404 if (err)
5405 return err;
5406 }
5407
5408 check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, insn_idx, min_off);
5409 /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */
5410 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
5411 u8 new_type, *stype;
5412 int slot, spi;
5413
5414 slot = -i - 1;
5415 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
5416 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
5417 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
5418
5419 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) {
5420 /* Reject the write if range we may write to has not
5421 * been initialized beforehand. If we didn't reject
5422 * here, the ptr status would be erased below (even
5423 * though not all slots are actually overwritten),
5424 * possibly opening the door to leaks.
5425 *
5426 * We do however catch STACK_INVALID case below, and
5427 * only allow reading possibly uninitialized memory
5428 * later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to
5429 * that slot.
5430 */
5431 verbose(env, "spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d",
5432 insn_idx, i);
5433 return -EINVAL;
5434 }
5435
5436 /* If writing_zero and the spi slot contains a spill of value 0,
5437 * maintain the spill type.
5438 */
5439 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_SPILL &&
5440 is_spilled_scalar_reg(&state->stack[spi])) {
5441 struct bpf_reg_state *spill_reg = &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
5442
5443 if (tnum_is_const(spill_reg->var_off) && spill_reg->var_off.value == 0) {
5444 zero_used = true;
5445 continue;
5446 }
5447 }
5448
5449 /* Erase all other spilled pointers. */
5450 state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type = NOT_INIT;
5451
5452 /* Update the slot type. */
5453 new_type = STACK_MISC;
5454 if (writing_zero && *stype == STACK_ZERO) {
5455 new_type = STACK_ZERO;
5456 zero_used = true;
5457 }
5458 /* If the slot is STACK_INVALID, we check whether it's OK to
5459 * pretend that it will be initialized by this write. The slot
5460 * might not actually be written to, and so if we mark it as
5461 * initialized future reads might leak uninitialized memory.
5462 * For privileged programs, we will accept such reads to slots
5463 * that may or may not be written because, if we're reject
5464 * them, the error would be too confusing.
5465 */
5466 if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) {
5467 verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d",
5468 insn_idx, i);
5469 return -EINVAL;
5470 }
5471 *stype = new_type;
5472 }
5473 if (zero_used) {
5474 /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
5475 err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
5476 if (err)
5477 return err;
5478 }
5479 return 0;
5480 }
5481
5482 /* When register 'dst_regno' is assigned some values from stack[min_off,
5483 * max_off), we set the register's type according to the types of the
5484 * respective stack slots. If all the stack values are known to be zeros, then
5485 * so is the destination reg. Otherwise, the register is considered to be
5486 * SCALAR. This function does not deal with register filling; the caller must
5487 * ensure that all spilled registers in the stack range have been marked as
5488 * read.
5489 */
mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * ptr_state,int min_off,int max_off,int dst_regno)5490 static void mark_reg_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5491 /* func where src register points to */
5492 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state,
5493 int min_off, int max_off, int dst_regno)
5494 {
5495 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
5496 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
5497 int i, slot, spi;
5498 u8 *stype;
5499 int zeros = 0;
5500
5501 for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
5502 slot = -i - 1;
5503 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
5504 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
5505 stype = ptr_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
5506 if (stype[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_ZERO)
5507 break;
5508 zeros++;
5509 }
5510 if (zeros == max_off - min_off) {
5511 /* Any access_size read into register is zero extended,
5512 * so the whole register == const_zero.
5513 */
5514 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, &state->regs[dst_regno]);
5515 } else {
5516 /* have read misc data from the stack */
5517 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
5518 }
5519 }
5520
5521 /* Read the stack at 'off' and put the results into the register indicated by
5522 * 'dst_regno'. It handles reg filling if the addressed stack slot is a
5523 * spilled reg.
5524 *
5525 * 'dst_regno' can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a
5526 * register.
5527 *
5528 * The access is assumed to be within the current stack bounds.
5529 */
check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * reg_state,int off,int size,int dst_regno)5530 static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5531 /* func where src register points to */
5532 struct bpf_func_state *reg_state,
5533 int off, int size, int dst_regno)
5534 {
5535 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
5536 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
5537 int i, slot = -off - 1, spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
5538 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
5539 u8 *stype, type;
5540 int insn_flags = insn_stack_access_flags(reg_state->frameno, spi);
5541 int err;
5542
5543 stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
5544 reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
5545
5546 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
5547 check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, env->insn_idx, off);
5548 err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg_state->frameno, env->insn_idx, BIT(spi));
5549 if (err)
5550 return err;
5551
5552 if (is_spilled_reg(®_state->stack[spi])) {
5553 u8 spill_size = 1;
5554
5555 for (i = BPF_REG_SIZE - 1; i > 0 && stype[i - 1] == STACK_SPILL; i--)
5556 spill_size++;
5557
5558 if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE || spill_size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
5559 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
5560 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
5561 verbose(env, "invalid size of register fill\n");
5562 return -EACCES;
5563 }
5564
5565 if (dst_regno < 0)
5566 return 0;
5567
5568 if (size <= spill_size &&
5569 bpf_stack_narrow_access_ok(off, size, spill_size)) {
5570 /* The earlier check_reg_arg() has decided the
5571 * subreg_def for this insn. Save it first.
5572 */
5573 s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def;
5574
5575 if (env->bpf_capable && size == 4 && spill_size == 4 &&
5576 get_reg_width(reg) <= 32)
5577 /* Ensure stack slot has an ID to build a relation
5578 * with the destination register on fill.
5579 */
5580 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, reg);
5581 copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg);
5582 state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def;
5583
5584 /* Break the relation on a narrowing fill.
5585 * coerce_reg_to_size will adjust the boundaries.
5586 */
5587 if (get_reg_width(reg) > size * BITS_PER_BYTE)
5588 state->regs[dst_regno].id = 0;
5589 } else {
5590 int spill_cnt = 0, zero_cnt = 0;
5591
5592 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
5593 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE];
5594 if (type == STACK_SPILL) {
5595 spill_cnt++;
5596 continue;
5597 }
5598 if (type == STACK_MISC)
5599 continue;
5600 if (type == STACK_ZERO) {
5601 zero_cnt++;
5602 continue;
5603 }
5604 if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)
5605 continue;
5606 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
5607 off, i, size);
5608 return -EACCES;
5609 }
5610
5611 if (spill_cnt == size &&
5612 tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) && reg->var_off.value == 0) {
5613 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, &state->regs[dst_regno]);
5614 /* this IS register fill, so keep insn_flags */
5615 } else if (zero_cnt == size) {
5616 /* similarly to mark_reg_stack_read(), preserve zeroes */
5617 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, &state->regs[dst_regno]);
5618 insn_flags = 0; /* not restoring original register state */
5619 } else {
5620 mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, dst_regno);
5621 insn_flags = 0; /* not restoring original register state */
5622 }
5623 }
5624 } else if (dst_regno >= 0) {
5625 /* restore register state from stack */
5626 if (env->bpf_capable)
5627 /* Ensure stack slot has an ID to build a relation
5628 * with the destination register on fill.
5629 */
5630 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, reg);
5631 copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg);
5632 /* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely
5633 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited()
5634 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions
5635 */
5636 } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) {
5637 /* If dst_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether
5638 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE
5639 * (e.g. for XADD).
5640 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that
5641 * with spilled pointers.
5642 */
5643 verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n",
5644 off);
5645 return -EACCES;
5646 }
5647 } else {
5648 for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
5649 type = stype[(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE];
5650 if (type == STACK_MISC)
5651 continue;
5652 if (type == STACK_ZERO)
5653 continue;
5654 if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)
5655 continue;
5656 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
5657 off, i, size);
5658 return -EACCES;
5659 }
5660 if (dst_regno >= 0)
5661 mark_reg_stack_read(env, reg_state, off, off + size, dst_regno);
5662 insn_flags = 0; /* we are not restoring spilled register */
5663 }
5664 if (insn_flags)
5665 return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0);
5666 return 0;
5667 }
5668
5669 enum bpf_access_src {
5670 ACCESS_DIRECT = 1, /* the access is performed by an instruction */
5671 ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */
5672 };
5673
5674 static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5675 int regno, int off, int access_size,
5676 bool zero_size_allowed,
5677 enum bpf_access_type type,
5678 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta);
5679
reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno)5680 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
5681 {
5682 return cur_regs(env) + regno;
5683 }
5684
5685 /* Read the stack at 'ptr_regno + off' and put the result into the register
5686 * 'dst_regno'.
5687 * 'off' includes the pointer register's fixed offset(i.e. 'ptr_regno.off'),
5688 * but not its variable offset.
5689 * 'size' is assumed to be <= reg size and the access is assumed to be aligned.
5690 *
5691 * As opposed to check_stack_read_fixed_off, this function doesn't deal with
5692 * filling registers (i.e. reads of spilled register cannot be detected when
5693 * the offset is not fixed). We conservatively mark 'dst_regno' as containing
5694 * SCALAR_VALUE. That's why we assert that the 'ptr_regno' has a variable
5695 * offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used
5696 * instead.
5697 */
check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int ptr_regno,int off,int size,int dst_regno)5698 static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5699 int ptr_regno, int off, int size, int dst_regno)
5700 {
5701 /* The state of the source register. */
5702 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
5703 struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state = func(env, reg);
5704 int err;
5705 int min_off, max_off;
5706
5707 /* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted.
5708 */
5709 err = check_stack_range_initialized(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
5710 false, BPF_READ, NULL);
5711 if (err)
5712 return err;
5713
5714 min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
5715 max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
5716 mark_reg_stack_read(env, ptr_state, min_off, max_off + size, dst_regno);
5717 check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, ptr_state, env->insn_idx, min_off);
5718 return 0;
5719 }
5720
5721 /* check_stack_read dispatches to check_stack_read_fixed_off or
5722 * check_stack_read_var_off.
5723 *
5724 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the allocated stack
5725 * bounds.
5726 *
5727 * 'dst_regno' is a register which will receive the value from the stack. It
5728 * can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register.
5729 */
check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int ptr_regno,int off,int size,int dst_regno)5730 static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5731 int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
5732 int dst_regno)
5733 {
5734 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
5735 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
5736 int err;
5737 /* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */
5738 bool var_off = !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
5739
5740 /* The offset is required to be static when reads don't go to a
5741 * register, in order to not leak pointers (see
5742 * check_stack_read_fixed_off).
5743 */
5744 if (dst_regno < 0 && var_off) {
5745 char tn_buf[48];
5746
5747 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
5748 verbose(env, "variable offset stack pointer cannot be passed into helper function; var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
5749 tn_buf, off, size);
5750 return -EACCES;
5751 }
5752 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity
5753 * since it requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack
5754 * ALU. See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). The check in
5755 * check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic() called by
5756 * adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() prevents users from creating stack pointers
5757 * with variable offsets, therefore no check is required here. Further,
5758 * just checking it here would be insufficient as speculative stack
5759 * writes could still lead to unsafe speculative behaviour.
5760 */
5761 if (!var_off) {
5762 off += reg->var_off.value;
5763 err = check_stack_read_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
5764 dst_regno);
5765 } else {
5766 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
5767 * than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this
5768 * branch.
5769 */
5770 err = check_stack_read_var_off(env, ptr_regno, off, size,
5771 dst_regno);
5772 }
5773 return err;
5774 }
5775
5776
5777 /* check_stack_write dispatches to check_stack_write_fixed_off or
5778 * check_stack_write_var_off.
5779 *
5780 * 'ptr_regno' is the register used as a pointer into the stack.
5781 * 'off' includes 'ptr_regno->off', but not its variable offset (if any).
5782 * 'value_regno' is the register whose value we're writing to the stack. It can
5783 * be -1, meaning that we're not writing from a register.
5784 *
5785 * The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size.
5786 */
check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int ptr_regno,int off,int size,int value_regno,int insn_idx)5787 static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5788 int ptr_regno, int off, int size,
5789 int value_regno, int insn_idx)
5790 {
5791 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, ptr_regno);
5792 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
5793 int err;
5794
5795 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
5796 off += reg->var_off.value;
5797 err = check_stack_write_fixed_off(env, state, off, size,
5798 value_regno, insn_idx);
5799 } else {
5800 /* Variable offset stack reads need more conservative handling
5801 * than fixed offset ones.
5802 */
5803 err = check_stack_write_var_off(env, state,
5804 ptr_regno, off, size,
5805 value_regno, insn_idx);
5806 }
5807 return err;
5808 }
5809
check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 regno,int off,int size,enum bpf_access_type type)5810 static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
5811 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type)
5812 {
5813 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
5814 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
5815 u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map);
5816
5817 if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) {
5818 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
5819 map->value_size, off, size);
5820 return -EACCES;
5821 }
5822
5823 if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) {
5824 verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
5825 map->value_size, off, size);
5826 return -EACCES;
5827 }
5828
5829 return 0;
5830 }
5831
5832 /* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */
__check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,int off,int size,u32 mem_size,bool zero_size_allowed)5833 static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
5834 int off, int size, u32 mem_size,
5835 bool zero_size_allowed)
5836 {
5837 bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed);
5838 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
5839
5840 if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size)
5841 return 0;
5842
5843 reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno];
5844 switch (reg->type) {
5845 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
5846 verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
5847 mem_size, off, size);
5848 break;
5849 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
5850 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
5851 mem_size, off, size);
5852 break;
5853 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
5854 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
5855 case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
5856 verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
5857 off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size);
5858 break;
5859 case PTR_TO_MEM:
5860 default:
5861 verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n",
5862 mem_size, off, size);
5863 }
5864
5865 return -EACCES;
5866 }
5867
5868 /* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */
check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 regno,int off,int size,u32 mem_size,bool zero_size_allowed)5869 static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
5870 int off, int size, u32 mem_size,
5871 bool zero_size_allowed)
5872 {
5873 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
5874 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
5875 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
5876 int err;
5877
5878 /* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we
5879 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off
5880 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe.
5881 *
5882 * The minimum value is only important with signed
5883 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
5884 * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
5885 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
5886 * will have a set floor within our range.
5887 */
5888 if (reg->smin_value < 0 &&
5889 (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN ||
5890 (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) ||
5891 reg->smin_value + off < 0)) {
5892 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
5893 regno);
5894 return -EACCES;
5895 }
5896 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size,
5897 mem_size, zero_size_allowed);
5898 if (err) {
5899 verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n",
5900 regno);
5901 return err;
5902 }
5903
5904 /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be
5905 * sure we won't do bad things.
5906 * If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too.
5907 */
5908 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
5909 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any such access\n",
5910 regno);
5911 return -EACCES;
5912 }
5913 err = __check_mem_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size,
5914 mem_size, zero_size_allowed);
5915 if (err) {
5916 verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n",
5917 regno);
5918 return err;
5919 }
5920
5921 return 0;
5922 }
5923
__check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int regno,bool fixed_off_ok)5924 static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5925 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno,
5926 bool fixed_off_ok)
5927 {
5928 /* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper
5929 * is only allowed in its original, unmodified form.
5930 */
5931
5932 if (reg->off < 0) {
5933 verbose(env, "negative offset %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n",
5934 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off);
5935 return -EACCES;
5936 }
5937
5938 if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) {
5939 verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n",
5940 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off);
5941 return -EACCES;
5942 }
5943
5944 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
5945 char tn_buf[48];
5946
5947 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
5948 verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n",
5949 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf);
5950 return -EACCES;
5951 }
5952
5953 return 0;
5954 }
5955
check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int regno)5956 static int check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5957 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno)
5958 {
5959 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false);
5960 }
5961
map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct btf_field * kptr_field,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 regno)5962 static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
5963 struct btf_field *kptr_field,
5964 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno)
5965 {
5966 const char *targ_name = btf_type_name(kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id);
5967 int perm_flags;
5968 const char *reg_name = "";
5969
5970 if (btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
5971 perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED | MEM_RCU;
5972
5973 /* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */
5974 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF)
5975 perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
5976 } else {
5977 perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_ALLOC;
5978 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU)
5979 perm_flags |= MEM_PERCPU;
5980 }
5981
5982 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags))
5983 goto bad_type;
5984
5985 /* We need to verify reg->type and reg->btf, before accessing reg->btf */
5986 reg_name = btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
5987
5988 /* For ref_ptr case, release function check should ensure we get one
5989 * referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and that its fixed offset is 0. For the
5990 * normal store of unreferenced kptr, we must ensure var_off is zero.
5991 * Since ref_ptr cannot be accessed directly by BPF insns, checks for
5992 * reg->off and reg->ref_obj_id are not needed here.
5993 */
5994 if (__check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true))
5995 return -EACCES;
5996
5997 /* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux, module or prog BTF, and
5998 * we also need to take into account the reg->off.
5999 *
6000 * We want to support cases like:
6001 *
6002 * struct foo {
6003 * struct bar br;
6004 * struct baz bz;
6005 * };
6006 *
6007 * struct foo *v;
6008 * v = func(); // PTR_TO_BTF_ID
6009 * val->foo = v; // reg->off is zero, btf and btf_id match type
6010 * val->bar = &v->br; // reg->off is still zero, but we need to retry with
6011 * // first member type of struct after comparison fails
6012 * val->baz = &v->bz; // reg->off is non-zero, so struct needs to be walked
6013 * // to match type
6014 *
6015 * In the kptr_ref case, check_func_arg_reg_off already ensures reg->off
6016 * is zero. We must also ensure that btf_struct_ids_match does not walk
6017 * the struct to match type against first member of struct, i.e. reject
6018 * second case from above. Hence, when type is BPF_KPTR_REF, we set
6019 * strict mode to true for type match.
6020 */
6021 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off,
6022 kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id,
6023 kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_UNREF))
6024 goto bad_type;
6025 return 0;
6026 bad_type:
6027 verbose(env, "invalid kptr access, R%d type=%s%s ", regno,
6028 reg_type_str(env, reg->type), reg_name);
6029 verbose(env, "expected=%s%s", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID), targ_name);
6030 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF)
6031 verbose(env, " or %s%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED),
6032 targ_name);
6033 else
6034 verbose(env, "\n");
6035 return -EINVAL;
6036 }
6037
in_sleepable(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)6038 static bool in_sleepable(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
6039 {
6040 return env->cur_state->in_sleepable;
6041 }
6042
6043 /* The non-sleepable programs and sleepable programs with explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock()
6044 * can dereference RCU protected pointers and result is PTR_TRUSTED.
6045 */
in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)6046 static bool in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
6047 {
6048 return env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks ||
6049 env->cur_state->active_locks ||
6050 !in_sleepable(env);
6051 }
6052
6053 /* Once GCC supports btf_type_tag the following mechanism will be replaced with tag check */
6054 BTF_SET_START(rcu_protected_types)
6055 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
BTF_ID(struct,prog_test_ref_kfunc)6056 BTF_ID(struct, prog_test_ref_kfunc)
6057 #endif
6058 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
6059 BTF_ID(struct, cgroup)
6060 #endif
6061 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT
6062 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_cpumask)
6063 #endif
6064 BTF_ID(struct, task_struct)
6065 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO
6066 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_crypto_ctx)
6067 #endif
6068 BTF_SET_END(rcu_protected_types)
6069
6070 static bool rcu_protected_object(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id)
6071 {
6072 if (!btf_is_kernel(btf))
6073 return true;
6074 return btf_id_set_contains(&rcu_protected_types, btf_id);
6075 }
6076
kptr_pointee_btf_record(struct btf_field * kptr_field)6077 static struct btf_record *kptr_pointee_btf_record(struct btf_field *kptr_field)
6078 {
6079 struct btf_struct_meta *meta;
6080
6081 if (btf_is_kernel(kptr_field->kptr.btf))
6082 return NULL;
6083
6084 meta = btf_find_struct_meta(kptr_field->kptr.btf,
6085 kptr_field->kptr.btf_id);
6086
6087 return meta ? meta->record : NULL;
6088 }
6089
rcu_safe_kptr(const struct btf_field * field)6090 static bool rcu_safe_kptr(const struct btf_field *field)
6091 {
6092 const struct btf_field_kptr *kptr = &field->kptr;
6093
6094 return field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU ||
6095 (field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF && rcu_protected_object(kptr->btf, kptr->btf_id));
6096 }
6097
btf_ld_kptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct btf_field * kptr_field)6098 static u32 btf_ld_kptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct btf_field *kptr_field)
6099 {
6100 struct btf_record *rec;
6101 u32 ret;
6102
6103 ret = PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
6104 if (rcu_safe_kptr(kptr_field) && in_rcu_cs(env)) {
6105 ret |= MEM_RCU;
6106 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU)
6107 ret |= MEM_PERCPU;
6108 else if (!btf_is_kernel(kptr_field->kptr.btf))
6109 ret |= MEM_ALLOC;
6110
6111 rec = kptr_pointee_btf_record(kptr_field);
6112 if (rec && btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_GRAPH_NODE))
6113 ret |= NON_OWN_REF;
6114 } else {
6115 ret |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
6116 }
6117
6118 return ret;
6119 }
6120
mark_uptr_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 regno,struct btf_field * field)6121 static int mark_uptr_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
6122 struct btf_field *field)
6123 {
6124 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
6125 const struct btf_type *t;
6126
6127 t = btf_type_by_id(field->kptr.btf, field->kptr.btf_id);
6128 mark_reg_known_zero(env, cur_regs(env), regno);
6129 reg = reg_state(env, regno);
6130 reg->type = PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
6131 reg->mem_size = t->size;
6132 reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
6133
6134 return 0;
6135 }
6136
check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 regno,int value_regno,int insn_idx,struct btf_field * kptr_field)6137 static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
6138 int value_regno, int insn_idx,
6139 struct btf_field *kptr_field)
6140 {
6141 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
6142 int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
6143 struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg;
6144 int ret;
6145
6146 /* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller:
6147 * - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr
6148 * - size of access (must be BPF_DW)
6149 * - tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)
6150 * - kptr_field->offset == off + reg->var_off.value
6151 */
6152 /* Only BPF_[LDX,STX,ST] | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW is supported */
6153 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
6154 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_MEM instruction mode\n");
6155 return -EACCES;
6156 }
6157
6158 /* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as
6159 * untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr.
6160 */
6161 if (class != BPF_LDX &&
6162 (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF || kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU)) {
6163 verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n");
6164 return -EACCES;
6165 }
6166 if (class != BPF_LDX && kptr_field->type == BPF_UPTR) {
6167 verbose(env, "store to uptr disallowed\n");
6168 return -EACCES;
6169 }
6170
6171 if (class == BPF_LDX) {
6172 if (kptr_field->type == BPF_UPTR)
6173 return mark_uptr_ld_reg(env, value_regno, kptr_field);
6174
6175 /* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer
6176 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type.
6177 */
6178 ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
6179 kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id,
6180 btf_ld_kptr_type(env, kptr_field));
6181 if (ret < 0)
6182 return ret;
6183 } else if (class == BPF_STX) {
6184 val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno);
6185 if (!register_is_null(val_reg) &&
6186 map_kptr_match_type(env, kptr_field, val_reg, value_regno))
6187 return -EACCES;
6188 } else if (class == BPF_ST) {
6189 if (insn->imm) {
6190 verbose(env, "BPF_ST imm must be 0 when storing to kptr at off=%u\n",
6191 kptr_field->offset);
6192 return -EACCES;
6193 }
6194 } else {
6195 verbose(env, "kptr in map can only be accessed using BPF_LDX/BPF_STX/BPF_ST\n");
6196 return -EACCES;
6197 }
6198 return 0;
6199 }
6200
6201 /*
6202 * Return the size of the memory region accessible from a pointer to map value.
6203 * For INSN_ARRAY maps whole bpf_insn_array->ips array is accessible.
6204 */
map_mem_size(const struct bpf_map * map)6205 static u32 map_mem_size(const struct bpf_map *map)
6206 {
6207 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY)
6208 return map->max_entries * sizeof(long);
6209
6210 return map->value_size;
6211 }
6212
6213 /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */
check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 regno,int off,int size,bool zero_size_allowed,enum bpf_access_src src)6214 static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
6215 int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed,
6216 enum bpf_access_src src)
6217 {
6218 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
6219 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
6220 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
6221 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
6222 u32 mem_size = map_mem_size(map);
6223 struct btf_record *rec;
6224 int err, i;
6225
6226 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, mem_size, zero_size_allowed);
6227 if (err)
6228 return err;
6229
6230 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record))
6231 return 0;
6232 rec = map->record;
6233 for (i = 0; i < rec->cnt; i++) {
6234 struct btf_field *field = &rec->fields[i];
6235 u32 p = field->offset;
6236
6237 /* If any part of a field can be touched by load/store, reject
6238 * this program. To check that [x1, x2) overlaps with [y1, y2),
6239 * it is sufficient to check x1 < y2 && y1 < x2.
6240 */
6241 if (reg->smin_value + off < p + field->size &&
6242 p < reg->umax_value + off + size) {
6243 switch (field->type) {
6244 case BPF_KPTR_UNREF:
6245 case BPF_KPTR_REF:
6246 case BPF_KPTR_PERCPU:
6247 case BPF_UPTR:
6248 if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) {
6249 verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n",
6250 btf_field_type_name(field->type));
6251 return -EACCES;
6252 }
6253 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
6254 verbose(env, "%s access cannot have variable offset\n",
6255 btf_field_type_name(field->type));
6256 return -EACCES;
6257 }
6258 if (p != off + reg->var_off.value) {
6259 verbose(env, "%s access misaligned expected=%u off=%llu\n",
6260 btf_field_type_name(field->type),
6261 p, off + reg->var_off.value);
6262 return -EACCES;
6263 }
6264 if (size != bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_DW)) {
6265 verbose(env, "%s access size must be BPF_DW\n",
6266 btf_field_type_name(field->type));
6267 return -EACCES;
6268 }
6269 break;
6270 default:
6271 verbose(env, "%s cannot be accessed directly by load/store\n",
6272 btf_field_type_name(field->type));
6273 return -EACCES;
6274 }
6275 }
6276 }
6277 return 0;
6278 }
6279
6280 #define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
6281
may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_call_arg_meta * meta,enum bpf_access_type t)6282 static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6283 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
6284 enum bpf_access_type t)
6285 {
6286 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
6287
6288 switch (prog_type) {
6289 /* Program types only with direct read access go here! */
6290 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN:
6291 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT:
6292 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL:
6293 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT:
6294 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR:
6295 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
6296 if (t == BPF_WRITE)
6297 return false;
6298 fallthrough;
6299
6300 /* Program types with direct read + write access go here! */
6301 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
6302 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
6303 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
6304 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT:
6305 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB:
6306 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG:
6307 if (meta)
6308 return meta->pkt_access;
6309
6310 env->seen_direct_write = true;
6311 return true;
6312
6313 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT:
6314 if (t == BPF_WRITE)
6315 env->seen_direct_write = true;
6316
6317 return true;
6318
6319 default:
6320 return false;
6321 }
6322 }
6323
check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 regno,int off,int size,bool zero_size_allowed)6324 static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
6325 int size, bool zero_size_allowed)
6326 {
6327 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
6328 int err;
6329
6330 /* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any
6331 * reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed
6332 * offset.
6333 */
6334
6335 /* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough
6336 * detail to prove they're safe.
6337 */
6338 if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
6339 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
6340 regno);
6341 return -EACCES;
6342 }
6343
6344 err = reg->range < 0 ? -EINVAL :
6345 __check_mem_access(env, regno, off, size, reg->range,
6346 zero_size_allowed);
6347 if (err) {
6348 verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno);
6349 return err;
6350 }
6351
6352 /* __check_mem_access has made sure "off + size - 1" is within u16.
6353 * reg->umax_value can't be bigger than MAX_PACKET_OFF which is 0xffff,
6354 * otherwise find_good_pkt_pointers would have refused to set range info
6355 * that __check_mem_access would have rejected this pkt access.
6356 * Therefore, "off + reg->umax_value + size - 1" won't overflow u32.
6357 */
6358 env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset =
6359 max_t(u32, env->prog->aux->max_pkt_offset,
6360 off + reg->umax_value + size - 1);
6361
6362 return err;
6363 }
6364
6365 /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */
check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx,int off,int size,enum bpf_access_type t,struct bpf_insn_access_aux * info)6366 static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size,
6367 enum bpf_access_type t, struct bpf_insn_access_aux *info)
6368 {
6369 if (env->ops->is_valid_access &&
6370 env->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, env->prog, info)) {
6371 /* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a
6372 * candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole
6373 * field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower
6374 * access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size
6375 * will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other
6376 * type of narrower access.
6377 */
6378 if (base_type(info->reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
6379 if (info->ref_obj_id &&
6380 !find_reference_state(env->cur_state, info->ref_obj_id)) {
6381 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d. Reference may already be released\n",
6382 off);
6383 return -EACCES;
6384 }
6385 } else {
6386 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info->ctx_field_size;
6387 }
6388 /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */
6389 if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size)
6390 env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size;
6391 return 0;
6392 }
6393
6394 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
6395 return -EACCES;
6396 }
6397
check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int off,int size)6398 static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off,
6399 int size)
6400 {
6401 if (size < 0 || off < 0 ||
6402 (u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) {
6403 verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n",
6404 off, size);
6405 return -EACCES;
6406 }
6407 return 0;
6408 }
6409
check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx,u32 regno,int off,int size,enum bpf_access_type t)6410 static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
6411 u32 regno, int off, int size,
6412 enum bpf_access_type t)
6413 {
6414 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
6415 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {};
6416 bool valid;
6417
6418 if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
6419 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
6420 regno);
6421 return -EACCES;
6422 }
6423
6424 switch (reg->type) {
6425 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
6426 valid = bpf_sock_common_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
6427 break;
6428 case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
6429 valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
6430 break;
6431 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
6432 valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
6433 break;
6434 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
6435 valid = bpf_xdp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info);
6436 break;
6437 default:
6438 valid = false;
6439 }
6440
6441
6442 if (valid) {
6443 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size =
6444 info.ctx_field_size;
6445 return 0;
6446 }
6447
6448 verbose(env, "R%d invalid %s access off=%d size=%d\n",
6449 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type), off, size);
6450
6451 return -EACCES;
6452 }
6453
is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno)6454 static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
6455 {
6456 return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg_state(env, regno));
6457 }
6458
is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno)6459 static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
6460 {
6461 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
6462
6463 return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX;
6464 }
6465
is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno)6466 static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
6467 {
6468 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
6469
6470 return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type);
6471 }
6472
is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno)6473 static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
6474 {
6475 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
6476
6477 return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type);
6478 }
6479
is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno)6480 static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
6481 {
6482 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
6483
6484 /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */
6485 return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS;
6486 }
6487
is_arena_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno)6488 static bool is_arena_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
6489 {
6490 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
6491
6492 return reg->type == PTR_TO_ARENA;
6493 }
6494
6495 /* Return false if @regno contains a pointer whose type isn't supported for
6496 * atomic instruction @insn.
6497 */
atomic_ptr_type_ok(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,struct bpf_insn * insn)6498 static bool atomic_ptr_type_ok(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
6499 struct bpf_insn *insn)
6500 {
6501 if (is_ctx_reg(env, regno))
6502 return false;
6503 if (is_pkt_reg(env, regno))
6504 return false;
6505 if (is_flow_key_reg(env, regno))
6506 return false;
6507 if (is_sk_reg(env, regno))
6508 return false;
6509 if (is_arena_reg(env, regno))
6510 return bpf_jit_supports_insn(insn, true);
6511
6512 return true;
6513 }
6514
6515 static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = {
6516 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
6517 [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK],
6518 [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON],
6519 [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_TCP],
6520 #endif
6521 [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = btf_bpf_map_id,
6522 };
6523
is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state * reg)6524 static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
6525 {
6526 /* A referenced register is always trusted. */
6527 if (reg->ref_obj_id)
6528 return true;
6529
6530 /* Types listed in the reg2btf_ids are always trusted */
6531 if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)] &&
6532 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type))
6533 return true;
6534
6535 /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the
6536 * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the
6537 * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in
6538 * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are
6539 * not.
6540 *
6541 * Eventually, we should make PTR_TRUSTED the single source of truth
6542 * for whether a register is trusted.
6543 */
6544 return type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS &&
6545 !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type);
6546 }
6547
is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state * reg)6548 static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
6549 {
6550 return reg->type & MEM_RCU;
6551 }
6552
clear_trusted_flags(enum bpf_type_flag * flag)6553 static void clear_trusted_flags(enum bpf_type_flag *flag)
6554 {
6555 *flag &= ~(BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS | MEM_RCU);
6556 }
6557
check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int off,int size,bool strict)6558 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6559 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
6560 int off, int size, bool strict)
6561 {
6562 struct tnum reg_off;
6563 int ip_align;
6564
6565 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
6566 if (!strict || size == 1)
6567 return 0;
6568
6569 /* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling
6570 * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of
6571 * NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms
6572 * that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get
6573 * to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate
6574 * the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an
6575 * unconditional IP align value of '2'.
6576 */
6577 ip_align = 2;
6578
6579 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off));
6580 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
6581 char tn_buf[48];
6582
6583 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
6584 verbose(env,
6585 "misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n",
6586 ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
6587 return -EACCES;
6588 }
6589
6590 return 0;
6591 }
6592
check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,const char * pointer_desc,int off,int size,bool strict)6593 static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6594 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
6595 const char *pointer_desc,
6596 int off, int size, bool strict)
6597 {
6598 struct tnum reg_off;
6599
6600 /* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
6601 if (!strict || size == 1)
6602 return 0;
6603
6604 reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off));
6605 if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
6606 char tn_buf[48];
6607
6608 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
6609 verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n",
6610 pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
6611 return -EACCES;
6612 }
6613
6614 return 0;
6615 }
6616
check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int off,int size,bool strict_alignment_once)6617 static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6618 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off,
6619 int size, bool strict_alignment_once)
6620 {
6621 bool strict = env->strict_alignment || strict_alignment_once;
6622 const char *pointer_desc = "";
6623
6624 switch (reg->type) {
6625 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
6626 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
6627 /* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits
6628 * right in front, treat it the very same way.
6629 */
6630 return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict);
6631 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
6632 pointer_desc = "flow keys ";
6633 break;
6634 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
6635 pointer_desc = "key ";
6636 break;
6637 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
6638 pointer_desc = "value ";
6639 if (reg->map_ptr->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY)
6640 strict = true;
6641 break;
6642 case PTR_TO_CTX:
6643 pointer_desc = "context ";
6644 break;
6645 case PTR_TO_STACK:
6646 pointer_desc = "stack ";
6647 /* The stack spill tracking logic in check_stack_write_fixed_off()
6648 * and check_stack_read_fixed_off() relies on stack accesses being
6649 * aligned.
6650 */
6651 strict = true;
6652 break;
6653 case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
6654 pointer_desc = "sock ";
6655 break;
6656 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
6657 pointer_desc = "sock_common ";
6658 break;
6659 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
6660 pointer_desc = "tcp_sock ";
6661 break;
6662 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
6663 pointer_desc = "xdp_sock ";
6664 break;
6665 case PTR_TO_ARENA:
6666 return 0;
6667 default:
6668 break;
6669 }
6670 return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size,
6671 strict);
6672 }
6673
bpf_enable_priv_stack(struct bpf_prog * prog)6674 static enum priv_stack_mode bpf_enable_priv_stack(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6675 {
6676 if (!bpf_jit_supports_private_stack())
6677 return NO_PRIV_STACK;
6678
6679 /* bpf_prog_check_recur() checks all prog types that use bpf trampoline
6680 * while kprobe/tp/perf_event/raw_tp don't use trampoline hence checked
6681 * explicitly.
6682 */
6683 switch (prog->type) {
6684 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE:
6685 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT:
6686 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT:
6687 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT:
6688 return PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE;
6689 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
6690 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
6691 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
6692 if (prog->aux->priv_stack_requested || bpf_prog_check_recur(prog))
6693 return PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE;
6694 fallthrough;
6695 default:
6696 break;
6697 }
6698
6699 return NO_PRIV_STACK;
6700 }
6701
round_up_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int stack_depth)6702 static int round_up_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int stack_depth)
6703 {
6704 if (env->prog->jit_requested)
6705 return round_up(stack_depth, 16);
6706
6707 /* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity
6708 * of interpreter stack size
6709 */
6710 return round_up(max_t(u32, stack_depth, 1), 32);
6711 }
6712
6713 /* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function
6714 * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call.
6715 * Ignore jump and exit insns.
6716 * Since recursion is prevented by check_cfg() this algorithm
6717 * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites
6718 */
check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int idx,bool priv_stack_supported)6719 static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,
6720 bool priv_stack_supported)
6721 {
6722 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
6723 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
6724 int depth = 0, frame = 0, i, subprog_end, subprog_depth;
6725 bool tail_call_reachable = false;
6726 int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
6727 int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
6728 int j;
6729
6730 i = subprog[idx].start;
6731 if (!priv_stack_supported)
6732 subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode = NO_PRIV_STACK;
6733 process_func:
6734 /* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when
6735 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack
6736 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario
6737 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 =
6738 * 8k).
6739 *
6740 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example:
6741 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128
6742 * subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256
6743 * tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256
6744 * func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320)
6745 * subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64
6746 * subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128
6747 * tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128
6748 * func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416)
6749 *
6750 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid
6751 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above.
6752 */
6753 if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) {
6754 verbose(env,
6755 "tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n",
6756 depth);
6757 return -EACCES;
6758 }
6759
6760 subprog_depth = round_up_stack_depth(env, subprog[idx].stack_depth);
6761 if (priv_stack_supported) {
6762 /* Request private stack support only if the subprog stack
6763 * depth is no less than BPF_PRIV_STACK_MIN_SIZE. This is to
6764 * avoid jit penalty if the stack usage is small.
6765 */
6766 if (subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_UNKNOWN &&
6767 subprog_depth >= BPF_PRIV_STACK_MIN_SIZE)
6768 subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode = PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE;
6769 }
6770
6771 if (subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE) {
6772 if (subprog_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) {
6773 verbose(env, "stack size of subprog %d is %d. Too large\n",
6774 idx, subprog_depth);
6775 return -EACCES;
6776 }
6777 } else {
6778 depth += subprog_depth;
6779 if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) {
6780 verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n",
6781 frame + 1, depth);
6782 return -EACCES;
6783 }
6784 }
6785 continue_func:
6786 subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start;
6787 for (; i < subprog_end; i++) {
6788 int next_insn, sidx;
6789
6790 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn + i) && !insn[i].off) {
6791 bool err = false;
6792
6793 if (!is_bpf_throw_kfunc(insn + i))
6794 continue;
6795 if (subprog[idx].is_cb)
6796 err = true;
6797 for (int c = 0; c < frame && !err; c++) {
6798 if (subprog[ret_prog[c]].is_cb) {
6799 err = true;
6800 break;
6801 }
6802 }
6803 if (!err)
6804 continue;
6805 verbose(env,
6806 "bpf_throw kfunc (insn %d) cannot be called from callback subprog %d\n",
6807 i, idx);
6808 return -EINVAL;
6809 }
6810
6811 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i))
6812 continue;
6813 /* remember insn and function to return to */
6814 ret_insn[frame] = i + 1;
6815 ret_prog[frame] = idx;
6816
6817 /* find the callee */
6818 next_insn = i + insn[i].imm + 1;
6819 sidx = find_subprog(env, next_insn);
6820 if (verifier_bug_if(sidx < 0, env, "callee not found at insn %d", next_insn))
6821 return -EFAULT;
6822 if (subprog[sidx].is_async_cb) {
6823 if (subprog[sidx].has_tail_call) {
6824 verifier_bug(env, "subprog has tail_call and async cb");
6825 return -EFAULT;
6826 }
6827 /* async callbacks don't increase bpf prog stack size unless called directly */
6828 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i))
6829 continue;
6830 if (subprog[sidx].is_exception_cb) {
6831 verbose(env, "insn %d cannot call exception cb directly", i);
6832 return -EINVAL;
6833 }
6834 }
6835 i = next_insn;
6836 idx = sidx;
6837 if (!priv_stack_supported)
6838 subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode = NO_PRIV_STACK;
6839
6840 if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call)
6841 tail_call_reachable = true;
6842
6843 frame++;
6844 if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) {
6845 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n",
6846 frame);
6847 return -E2BIG;
6848 }
6849 goto process_func;
6850 }
6851 /* if tail call got detected across bpf2bpf calls then mark each of the
6852 * currently present subprog frames as tail call reachable subprogs;
6853 * this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the
6854 * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls
6855 */
6856 if (tail_call_reachable)
6857 for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) {
6858 if (subprog[ret_prog[j]].is_exception_cb) {
6859 verbose(env, "cannot tail call within exception cb\n");
6860 return -EINVAL;
6861 }
6862 subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true;
6863 }
6864 if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable)
6865 env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true;
6866
6867 /* end of for() loop means the last insn of the 'subprog'
6868 * was reached. Doesn't matter whether it was JA or EXIT
6869 */
6870 if (frame == 0)
6871 return 0;
6872 if (subprog[idx].priv_stack_mode != PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE)
6873 depth -= round_up_stack_depth(env, subprog[idx].stack_depth);
6874 frame--;
6875 i = ret_insn[frame];
6876 idx = ret_prog[frame];
6877 goto continue_func;
6878 }
6879
check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)6880 static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
6881 {
6882 enum priv_stack_mode priv_stack_mode = PRIV_STACK_UNKNOWN;
6883 struct bpf_subprog_info *si = env->subprog_info;
6884 bool priv_stack_supported;
6885 int ret;
6886
6887 for (int i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
6888 if (si[i].has_tail_call) {
6889 priv_stack_mode = NO_PRIV_STACK;
6890 break;
6891 }
6892 }
6893
6894 if (priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_UNKNOWN)
6895 priv_stack_mode = bpf_enable_priv_stack(env->prog);
6896
6897 /* All async_cb subprogs use normal kernel stack. If a particular
6898 * subprog appears in both main prog and async_cb subtree, that
6899 * subprog will use normal kernel stack to avoid potential nesting.
6900 * The reverse subprog traversal ensures when main prog subtree is
6901 * checked, the subprogs appearing in async_cb subtrees are already
6902 * marked as using normal kernel stack, so stack size checking can
6903 * be done properly.
6904 */
6905 for (int i = env->subprog_cnt - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
6906 if (!i || si[i].is_async_cb) {
6907 priv_stack_supported = !i && priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE;
6908 ret = check_max_stack_depth_subprog(env, i, priv_stack_supported);
6909 if (ret < 0)
6910 return ret;
6911 }
6912 }
6913
6914 for (int i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
6915 if (si[i].priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE) {
6916 env->prog->aux->jits_use_priv_stack = true;
6917 break;
6918 }
6919 }
6920
6921 return 0;
6922 }
6923
6924 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_insn * insn,int idx)6925 static int get_callee_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6926 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx)
6927 {
6928 int start = idx + insn->imm + 1, subprog;
6929
6930 subprog = find_subprog(env, start);
6931 if (verifier_bug_if(subprog < 0, env, "get stack depth: no program at insn %d", start))
6932 return -EFAULT;
6933 return env->subprog_info[subprog].stack_depth;
6934 }
6935 #endif
6936
__check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const char * buf_info,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int regno,int off,int size)6937 static int __check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6938 const char *buf_info,
6939 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
6940 int regno, int off, int size)
6941 {
6942 if (off < 0) {
6943 verbose(env,
6944 "R%d invalid %s buffer access: off=%d, size=%d\n",
6945 regno, buf_info, off, size);
6946 return -EACCES;
6947 }
6948 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
6949 char tn_buf[48];
6950
6951 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
6952 verbose(env,
6953 "R%d invalid variable buffer offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n",
6954 regno, off, tn_buf);
6955 return -EACCES;
6956 }
6957
6958 return 0;
6959 }
6960
check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int regno,int off,int size)6961 static int check_tp_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6962 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
6963 int regno, int off, int size)
6964 {
6965 int err;
6966
6967 err = __check_buffer_access(env, "tracepoint", reg, regno, off, size);
6968 if (err)
6969 return err;
6970
6971 if (off + size > env->prog->aux->max_tp_access)
6972 env->prog->aux->max_tp_access = off + size;
6973
6974 return 0;
6975 }
6976
check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int regno,int off,int size,bool zero_size_allowed,u32 * max_access)6977 static int check_buffer_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
6978 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
6979 int regno, int off, int size,
6980 bool zero_size_allowed,
6981 u32 *max_access)
6982 {
6983 const char *buf_info = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type) ? "rdonly" : "rdwr";
6984 int err;
6985
6986 err = __check_buffer_access(env, buf_info, reg, regno, off, size);
6987 if (err)
6988 return err;
6989
6990 if (off + size > *max_access)
6991 *max_access = off + size;
6992
6993 return 0;
6994 }
6995
6996 /* BPF architecture zero extends alu32 ops into 64-bit registesr */
zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state * reg)6997 static void zext_32_to_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
6998 {
6999 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(reg->var_off);
7000 __reg_assign_32_into_64(reg);
7001 }
7002
7003 /* truncate register to smaller size (in bytes)
7004 * must be called with size < BPF_REG_SIZE
7005 */
coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int size)7006 static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
7007 {
7008 u64 mask;
7009
7010 /* clear high bits in bit representation */
7011 reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size);
7012
7013 /* fix arithmetic bounds */
7014 mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1;
7015 if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) {
7016 reg->umin_value &= mask;
7017 reg->umax_value &= mask;
7018 } else {
7019 reg->umin_value = 0;
7020 reg->umax_value = mask;
7021 }
7022 reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value;
7023 reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value;
7024
7025 /* If size is smaller than 32bit register the 32bit register
7026 * values are also truncated so we push 64-bit bounds into
7027 * 32-bit bounds. Above were truncated < 32-bits already.
7028 */
7029 if (size < 4)
7030 __mark_reg32_unbounded(reg);
7031
7032 reg_bounds_sync(reg);
7033 }
7034
set_sext64_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int size)7035 static void set_sext64_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
7036 {
7037 if (size == 1) {
7038 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S8_MIN;
7039 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S8_MAX;
7040 } else if (size == 2) {
7041 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S16_MIN;
7042 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S16_MAX;
7043 } else {
7044 /* size == 4 */
7045 reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
7046 reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
7047 }
7048 reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value = 0;
7049 reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
7050 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
7051 reg->var_off = tnum_unknown;
7052 }
7053
coerce_reg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int size)7054 static void coerce_reg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
7055 {
7056 s64 init_s64_max, init_s64_min, s64_max, s64_min, u64_cval;
7057 u64 top_smax_value, top_smin_value;
7058 u64 num_bits = size * 8;
7059
7060 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
7061 u64_cval = reg->var_off.value;
7062 if (size == 1)
7063 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s8)u64_cval);
7064 else if (size == 2)
7065 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s16)u64_cval);
7066 else
7067 /* size == 4 */
7068 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s32)u64_cval);
7069
7070 u64_cval = reg->var_off.value;
7071 reg->smax_value = reg->smin_value = u64_cval;
7072 reg->umax_value = reg->umin_value = u64_cval;
7073 reg->s32_max_value = reg->s32_min_value = u64_cval;
7074 reg->u32_max_value = reg->u32_min_value = u64_cval;
7075 return;
7076 }
7077
7078 top_smax_value = ((u64)reg->smax_value >> num_bits) << num_bits;
7079 top_smin_value = ((u64)reg->smin_value >> num_bits) << num_bits;
7080
7081 if (top_smax_value != top_smin_value)
7082 goto out;
7083
7084 /* find the s64_min and s64_min after sign extension */
7085 if (size == 1) {
7086 init_s64_max = (s8)reg->smax_value;
7087 init_s64_min = (s8)reg->smin_value;
7088 } else if (size == 2) {
7089 init_s64_max = (s16)reg->smax_value;
7090 init_s64_min = (s16)reg->smin_value;
7091 } else {
7092 init_s64_max = (s32)reg->smax_value;
7093 init_s64_min = (s32)reg->smin_value;
7094 }
7095
7096 s64_max = max(init_s64_max, init_s64_min);
7097 s64_min = min(init_s64_max, init_s64_min);
7098
7099 /* both of s64_max/s64_min positive or negative */
7100 if ((s64_max >= 0) == (s64_min >= 0)) {
7101 reg->s32_min_value = reg->smin_value = s64_min;
7102 reg->s32_max_value = reg->smax_value = s64_max;
7103 reg->u32_min_value = reg->umin_value = s64_min;
7104 reg->u32_max_value = reg->umax_value = s64_max;
7105 reg->var_off = tnum_range(s64_min, s64_max);
7106 return;
7107 }
7108
7109 out:
7110 set_sext64_default_val(reg, size);
7111 }
7112
set_sext32_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int size)7113 static void set_sext32_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
7114 {
7115 if (size == 1) {
7116 reg->s32_min_value = S8_MIN;
7117 reg->s32_max_value = S8_MAX;
7118 } else {
7119 /* size == 2 */
7120 reg->s32_min_value = S16_MIN;
7121 reg->s32_max_value = S16_MAX;
7122 }
7123 reg->u32_min_value = 0;
7124 reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
7125 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_unknown);
7126 }
7127
coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int size)7128 static void coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
7129 {
7130 s32 init_s32_max, init_s32_min, s32_max, s32_min, u32_val;
7131 u32 top_smax_value, top_smin_value;
7132 u32 num_bits = size * 8;
7133
7134 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
7135 u32_val = reg->var_off.value;
7136 if (size == 1)
7137 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s8)u32_val);
7138 else
7139 reg->var_off = tnum_const((s16)u32_val);
7140
7141 u32_val = reg->var_off.value;
7142 reg->s32_min_value = reg->s32_max_value = u32_val;
7143 reg->u32_min_value = reg->u32_max_value = u32_val;
7144 return;
7145 }
7146
7147 top_smax_value = ((u32)reg->s32_max_value >> num_bits) << num_bits;
7148 top_smin_value = ((u32)reg->s32_min_value >> num_bits) << num_bits;
7149
7150 if (top_smax_value != top_smin_value)
7151 goto out;
7152
7153 /* find the s32_min and s32_min after sign extension */
7154 if (size == 1) {
7155 init_s32_max = (s8)reg->s32_max_value;
7156 init_s32_min = (s8)reg->s32_min_value;
7157 } else {
7158 /* size == 2 */
7159 init_s32_max = (s16)reg->s32_max_value;
7160 init_s32_min = (s16)reg->s32_min_value;
7161 }
7162 s32_max = max(init_s32_max, init_s32_min);
7163 s32_min = min(init_s32_max, init_s32_min);
7164
7165 if ((s32_min >= 0) == (s32_max >= 0)) {
7166 reg->s32_min_value = s32_min;
7167 reg->s32_max_value = s32_max;
7168 reg->u32_min_value = (u32)s32_min;
7169 reg->u32_max_value = (u32)s32_max;
7170 reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_range(s32_min, s32_max));
7171 return;
7172 }
7173
7174 out:
7175 set_sext32_default_val(reg, size);
7176 }
7177
bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map * map)7178 static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map)
7179 {
7180 /* A map is considered read-only if the following condition are true:
7181 *
7182 * 1) BPF program side cannot change any of the map content. The
7183 * BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG flag is throughout the lifetime of a map
7184 * and was set at map creation time.
7185 * 2) The map value(s) have been initialized from user space by a
7186 * loader and then "frozen", such that no new map update/delete
7187 * operations from syscall side are possible for the rest of
7188 * the map's lifetime from that point onwards.
7189 * 3) Any parallel/pending map update/delete operations from syscall
7190 * side have been completed. Only after that point, it's safe to
7191 * assume that map value(s) are immutable.
7192 */
7193 return (map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) &&
7194 READ_ONCE(map->frozen) &&
7195 !bpf_map_write_active(map);
7196 }
7197
bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map * map,int off,int size,u64 * val,bool is_ldsx)7198 static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val,
7199 bool is_ldsx)
7200 {
7201 void *ptr;
7202 u64 addr;
7203 int err;
7204
7205 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off);
7206 if (err)
7207 return err;
7208 ptr = (void *)(long)addr + off;
7209
7210 switch (size) {
7211 case sizeof(u8):
7212 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s8 *)ptr : (u64)*(u8 *)ptr;
7213 break;
7214 case sizeof(u16):
7215 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s16 *)ptr : (u64)*(u16 *)ptr;
7216 break;
7217 case sizeof(u32):
7218 *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s32 *)ptr : (u64)*(u32 *)ptr;
7219 break;
7220 case sizeof(u64):
7221 *val = *(u64 *)ptr;
7222 break;
7223 default:
7224 return -EINVAL;
7225 }
7226 return 0;
7227 }
7228
7229 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu)
7230 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu_or_null)
7231 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted)
7232 #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted_or_null)
7233
7234 /*
7235 * Allow list few fields as RCU trusted or full trusted.
7236 * This logic doesn't allow mix tagging and will be removed once GCC supports
7237 * btf_type_tag.
7238 */
7239
7240 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and never NULL */
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct)7241 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct) {
7242 const cpumask_t *cpus_ptr;
7243 struct css_set __rcu *cgroups;
7244 struct task_struct __rcu *real_parent;
7245 struct task_struct *group_leader;
7246 };
7247
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup)7248 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup) {
7249 /* cgrp->kn is always accessible as documented in kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c */
7250 struct kernfs_node *kn;
7251 };
7252
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set)7253 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set) {
7254 struct cgroup *dfl_cgrp;
7255 };
7256
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup_subsys_state)7257 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup_subsys_state) {
7258 struct cgroup *cgroup;
7259 };
7260
7261 /* RCU trusted: these fields are trusted in RCU CS and can be NULL */
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct)7262 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct) {
7263 struct file __rcu *exe_file;
7264 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
7265 struct task_struct __rcu *owner;
7266 #endif
7267 };
7268
7269 /* skb->sk, req->sk are not RCU protected, but we mark them as such
7270 * because bpf prog accessible sockets are SOCK_RCU_FREE.
7271 */
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff)7272 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff) {
7273 struct sock *sk;
7274 };
7275
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock)7276 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock) {
7277 struct sock *sk;
7278 };
7279
7280 /* full trusted: these fields are trusted even outside of RCU CS and never NULL */
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta)7281 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta) {
7282 struct seq_file *seq;
7283 };
7284
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task)7285 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task) {
7286 struct bpf_iter_meta *meta;
7287 struct task_struct *task;
7288 };
7289
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm)7290 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm) {
7291 struct file *file;
7292 };
7293
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file)7294 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file) {
7295 struct inode *f_inode;
7296 };
7297
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry)7298 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry) {
7299 struct inode *d_inode;
7300 };
7301
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket)7302 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket) {
7303 struct sock *sk;
7304 };
7305
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct)7306 BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct) {
7307 struct mm_struct *vm_mm;
7308 struct file *vm_file;
7309 };
7310
type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,const char * field_name,u32 btf_id)7311 static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7312 struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
7313 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id)
7314 {
7315 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct task_struct));
7316 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup));
7317 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct css_set));
7318 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(struct cgroup_subsys_state));
7319
7320 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu");
7321 }
7322
type_is_rcu_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,const char * field_name,u32 btf_id)7323 static bool type_is_rcu_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7324 struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
7325 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id)
7326 {
7327 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct mm_struct));
7328 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct sk_buff));
7329 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(struct request_sock));
7330
7331 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_rcu_or_null");
7332 }
7333
type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,const char * field_name,u32 btf_id)7334 static bool type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7335 struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
7336 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id)
7337 {
7338 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter_meta));
7339 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task));
7340 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm));
7341 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file));
7342
7343 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_trusted");
7344 }
7345
type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,const char * field_name,u32 btf_id)7346 static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7347 struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
7348 const char *field_name, u32 btf_id)
7349 {
7350 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket));
7351 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry));
7352 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct));
7353
7354 return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id,
7355 "__safe_trusted_or_null");
7356 }
7357
check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * regs,int regno,int off,int size,enum bpf_access_type atype,int value_regno)7358 static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7359 struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
7360 int regno, int off, int size,
7361 enum bpf_access_type atype,
7362 int value_regno)
7363 {
7364 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
7365 const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
7366 const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off);
7367 const char *field_name = NULL;
7368 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0;
7369 u32 btf_id = 0;
7370 int ret;
7371
7372 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
7373 verbose(env,
7374 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n",
7375 tname);
7376 return -EPERM;
7377 }
7378 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
7379 verbose(env,
7380 "Cannot access kernel 'struct %s' from non-GPL compatible program\n",
7381 tname);
7382 return -EINVAL;
7383 }
7384 if (off < 0) {
7385 verbose(env,
7386 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n",
7387 regno, tname, off);
7388 return -EACCES;
7389 }
7390 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
7391 char tn_buf[48];
7392
7393 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
7394 verbose(env,
7395 "R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n",
7396 regno, tname, off, tn_buf);
7397 return -EACCES;
7398 }
7399
7400 if (reg->type & MEM_USER) {
7401 verbose(env,
7402 "R%d is ptr_%s access user memory: off=%d\n",
7403 regno, tname, off);
7404 return -EACCES;
7405 }
7406
7407 if (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU) {
7408 verbose(env,
7409 "R%d is ptr_%s access percpu memory: off=%d\n",
7410 regno, tname, off);
7411 return -EACCES;
7412 }
7413
7414 if (env->ops->btf_struct_access && !type_is_alloc(reg->type) && atype == BPF_WRITE) {
7415 if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
7416 verifier_bug(env, "reg->btf must be kernel btf");
7417 return -EFAULT;
7418 }
7419 ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size);
7420 } else {
7421 /* Writes are permitted with default btf_struct_access for
7422 * program allocated objects (which always have ref_obj_id > 0),
7423 * but not for untrusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC.
7424 */
7425 if (atype != BPF_READ && !type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) {
7426 verbose(env, "only read is supported\n");
7427 return -EACCES;
7428 }
7429
7430 if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) &&
7431 !(reg->type & MEM_RCU) && !reg->ref_obj_id) {
7432 verifier_bug(env, "ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero");
7433 return -EFAULT;
7434 }
7435
7436 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, &field_name);
7437 }
7438
7439 if (ret < 0)
7440 return ret;
7441
7442 if (ret != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
7443 /* just mark; */
7444
7445 } else if (type_flag(reg->type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED) {
7446 /* If this is an untrusted pointer, all pointers formed by walking it
7447 * also inherit the untrusted flag.
7448 */
7449 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED;
7450
7451 } else if (is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg)) {
7452 /* By default any pointer obtained from walking a trusted pointer is no
7453 * longer trusted, unless the field being accessed has explicitly been
7454 * marked as inheriting its parent's state of trust (either full or RCU).
7455 * For example:
7456 * 'cgroups' pointer is untrusted if task->cgroups dereference
7457 * happened in a sleepable program outside of bpf_rcu_read_lock()
7458 * section. In a non-sleepable program it's trusted while in RCU CS (aka MEM_RCU).
7459 * Note bpf_rcu_read_unlock() converts MEM_RCU pointers to PTR_UNTRUSTED.
7460 *
7461 * A regular RCU-protected pointer with __rcu tag can also be deemed
7462 * trusted if we are in an RCU CS. Such pointer can be NULL.
7463 */
7464 if (type_is_trusted(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) {
7465 flag |= PTR_TRUSTED;
7466 } else if (type_is_trusted_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) {
7467 flag |= PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
7468 } else if (in_rcu_cs(env) && !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
7469 if (type_is_rcu(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) {
7470 /* ignore __rcu tag and mark it MEM_RCU */
7471 flag |= MEM_RCU;
7472 } else if (flag & MEM_RCU ||
7473 type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) {
7474 /* __rcu tagged pointers can be NULL */
7475 flag |= MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
7476
7477 /* We always trust them */
7478 if (type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id) &&
7479 flag & PTR_UNTRUSTED)
7480 flag &= ~PTR_UNTRUSTED;
7481 } else if (flag & (MEM_PERCPU | MEM_USER)) {
7482 /* keep as-is */
7483 } else {
7484 /* walking unknown pointers yields old deprecated PTR_TO_BTF_ID */
7485 clear_trusted_flags(&flag);
7486 }
7487 } else {
7488 /*
7489 * If not in RCU CS or MEM_RCU pointer can be NULL then
7490 * aggressively mark as untrusted otherwise such
7491 * pointers will be plain PTR_TO_BTF_ID without flags
7492 * and will be allowed to be passed into helpers for
7493 * compat reasons.
7494 */
7495 flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED;
7496 }
7497 } else {
7498 /* Old compat. Deprecated */
7499 clear_trusted_flags(&flag);
7500 }
7501
7502 if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
7503 ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag);
7504 if (ret < 0)
7505 return ret;
7506 }
7507
7508 return 0;
7509 }
7510
check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * regs,int regno,int off,int size,enum bpf_access_type atype,int value_regno)7511 static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7512 struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
7513 int regno, int off, int size,
7514 enum bpf_access_type atype,
7515 int value_regno)
7516 {
7517 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
7518 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
7519 struct bpf_reg_state map_reg;
7520 enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0;
7521 const struct btf_type *t;
7522 const char *tname;
7523 u32 btf_id;
7524 int ret;
7525
7526 if (!btf_vmlinux) {
7527 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n");
7528 return -ENOTSUPP;
7529 }
7530
7531 if (!map->ops->map_btf_id || !*map->ops->map_btf_id) {
7532 verbose(env, "map_ptr access not supported for map type %d\n",
7533 map->map_type);
7534 return -ENOTSUPP;
7535 }
7536
7537 t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id);
7538 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off);
7539
7540 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
7541 verbose(env,
7542 "'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n",
7543 tname);
7544 return -EPERM;
7545 }
7546
7547 if (off < 0) {
7548 verbose(env, "R%d is %s invalid negative access: off=%d\n",
7549 regno, tname, off);
7550 return -EACCES;
7551 }
7552
7553 if (atype != BPF_READ) {
7554 verbose(env, "only read from %s is supported\n", tname);
7555 return -EACCES;
7556 }
7557
7558 /* Simulate access to a PTR_TO_BTF_ID */
7559 memset(&map_reg, 0, sizeof(map_reg));
7560 ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
7561 btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0);
7562 if (ret < 0)
7563 return ret;
7564 ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, &map_reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, NULL);
7565 if (ret < 0)
7566 return ret;
7567
7568 if (value_regno >= 0) {
7569 ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag);
7570 if (ret < 0)
7571 return ret;
7572 }
7573
7574 return 0;
7575 }
7576
7577 /* Check that the stack access at the given offset is within bounds. The
7578 * maximum valid offset is -1.
7579 *
7580 * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and
7581 * -state->allocated_stack for reads.
7582 */
check_stack_slot_within_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,s64 off,struct bpf_func_state * state,enum bpf_access_type t)7583 static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7584 s64 off,
7585 struct bpf_func_state *state,
7586 enum bpf_access_type t)
7587 {
7588 int min_valid_off;
7589
7590 if (t == BPF_WRITE || env->allow_uninit_stack)
7591 min_valid_off = -MAX_BPF_STACK;
7592 else
7593 min_valid_off = -state->allocated_stack;
7594
7595 if (off < min_valid_off || off > -1)
7596 return -EACCES;
7597 return 0;
7598 }
7599
7600 /* Check that the stack access at 'regno + off' falls within the maximum stack
7601 * bounds.
7602 *
7603 * 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any).
7604 */
check_stack_access_within_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,int off,int access_size,enum bpf_access_type type)7605 static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
7606 struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
7607 int regno, int off, int access_size,
7608 enum bpf_access_type type)
7609 {
7610 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
7611 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
7612 s64 min_off, max_off;
7613 int err;
7614 char *err_extra;
7615
7616 if (type == BPF_READ)
7617 err_extra = " read from";
7618 else
7619 err_extra = " write to";
7620
7621 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
7622 min_off = (s64)reg->var_off.value + off;
7623 max_off = min_off + access_size;
7624 } else {
7625 if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
7626 reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
7627 verbose(env, "invalid unbounded variable-offset%s stack R%d\n",
7628 err_extra, regno);
7629 return -EACCES;
7630 }
7631 min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
7632 max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size;
7633 }
7634
7635 err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(env, min_off, state, type);
7636 if (!err && max_off > 0)
7637 err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */
7638 if (!err && access_size < 0)
7639 /* access_size should not be negative (or overflow an int); others checks
7640 * along the way should have prevented such an access.
7641 */
7642 err = -EFAULT; /* invalid negative access size; integer overflow? */
7643
7644 if (err) {
7645 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
7646 verbose(env, "invalid%s stack R%d off=%d size=%d\n",
7647 err_extra, regno, off, access_size);
7648 } else {
7649 char tn_buf[48];
7650
7651 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
7652 verbose(env, "invalid variable-offset%s stack R%d var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
7653 err_extra, regno, tn_buf, off, access_size);
7654 }
7655 return err;
7656 }
7657
7658 /* Note that there is no stack access with offset zero, so the needed stack
7659 * size is -min_off, not -min_off+1.
7660 */
7661 return grow_stack_state(env, state, -min_off /* size */);
7662 }
7663
get_func_retval_range(struct bpf_prog * prog,struct bpf_retval_range * range)7664 static bool get_func_retval_range(struct bpf_prog *prog,
7665 struct bpf_retval_range *range)
7666 {
7667 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM &&
7668 prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_MAC &&
7669 !bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(prog, range)) {
7670 return true;
7671 }
7672 return false;
7673 }
7674
7675 /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
7676 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
7677 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory
7678 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory
7679 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory
7680 */
check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx,u32 regno,int off,int bpf_size,enum bpf_access_type t,int value_regno,bool strict_alignment_once,bool is_ldsx)7681 static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno,
7682 int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
7683 int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once, bool is_ldsx)
7684 {
7685 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
7686 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
7687 int size, err = 0;
7688
7689 size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size);
7690 if (size < 0)
7691 return size;
7692
7693 /* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */
7694 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict_alignment_once);
7695 if (err)
7696 return err;
7697
7698 /* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */
7699 off += reg->off;
7700
7701 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) {
7702 if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
7703 verbose(env, "write to change key R%d not allowed\n", regno);
7704 return -EACCES;
7705 }
7706
7707 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size,
7708 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false);
7709 if (err)
7710 return err;
7711 if (value_regno >= 0)
7712 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
7713 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
7714 struct btf_field *kptr_field = NULL;
7715
7716 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
7717 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
7718 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
7719 return -EACCES;
7720 }
7721 err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t);
7722 if (err)
7723 return err;
7724 err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false, ACCESS_DIRECT);
7725 if (err)
7726 return err;
7727 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
7728 kptr_field = btf_record_find(reg->map_ptr->record,
7729 off + reg->var_off.value, BPF_KPTR | BPF_UPTR);
7730 if (kptr_field) {
7731 err = check_map_kptr_access(env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field);
7732 } else if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
7733 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
7734
7735 /*
7736 * If map is read-only, track its contents as scalars,
7737 * unless it is an insn array (see the special case below)
7738 */
7739 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) &&
7740 bpf_map_is_rdonly(map) &&
7741 map->ops->map_direct_value_addr &&
7742 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) {
7743 int map_off = off + reg->var_off.value;
7744 u64 val = 0;
7745
7746 err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size,
7747 &val, is_ldsx);
7748 if (err)
7749 return err;
7750
7751 regs[value_regno].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
7752 __mark_reg_known(®s[value_regno], val);
7753 } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) {
7754 if (bpf_size != BPF_DW) {
7755 verbose(env, "Invalid read of %d bytes from insn_array\n",
7756 size);
7757 return -EACCES;
7758 }
7759 copy_register_state(®s[value_regno], reg);
7760 regs[value_regno].type = PTR_TO_INSN;
7761 } else {
7762 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
7763 }
7764 }
7765 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) {
7766 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type);
7767 bool rdonly_untrusted = rdonly_mem && (reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED);
7768
7769 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
7770 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno,
7771 reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
7772 return -EACCES;
7773 }
7774
7775 if (t == BPF_WRITE && rdonly_mem) {
7776 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
7777 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
7778 return -EACCES;
7779 }
7780
7781 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
7782 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
7783 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", value_regno);
7784 return -EACCES;
7785 }
7786
7787 /*
7788 * Accesses to untrusted PTR_TO_MEM are done through probe
7789 * instructions, hence no need to check bounds in that case.
7790 */
7791 if (!rdonly_untrusted)
7792 err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size,
7793 reg->mem_size, false);
7794 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem))
7795 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
7796 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
7797 struct bpf_retval_range range;
7798 struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {
7799 .reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE,
7800 .is_ldsx = is_ldsx,
7801 .log = &env->log,
7802 };
7803
7804 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
7805 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
7806 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
7807 return -EACCES;
7808 }
7809
7810 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno);
7811 if (err < 0)
7812 return err;
7813
7814 err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, &info);
7815 if (err)
7816 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
7817 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
7818 /* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a
7819 * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter
7820 * case, we know the offset is zero.
7821 */
7822 if (info.reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
7823 if (info.is_retval && get_func_retval_range(env->prog, &range)) {
7824 err = __mark_reg_s32_range(env, regs, value_regno,
7825 range.minval, range.maxval);
7826 if (err)
7827 return err;
7828 } else {
7829 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
7830 }
7831 } else {
7832 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs,
7833 value_regno);
7834 if (type_may_be_null(info.reg_type))
7835 regs[value_regno].id = ++env->id_gen;
7836 /* A load of ctx field could have different
7837 * actual load size with the one encoded in the
7838 * insn. When the dst is PTR, it is for sure not
7839 * a sub-register.
7840 */
7841 regs[value_regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
7842 if (base_type(info.reg_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
7843 regs[value_regno].btf = info.btf;
7844 regs[value_regno].btf_id = info.btf_id;
7845 regs[value_regno].ref_obj_id = info.ref_obj_id;
7846 }
7847 }
7848 regs[value_regno].type = info.reg_type;
7849 }
7850
7851 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
7852 /* Basic bounds checks. */
7853 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, size, t);
7854 if (err)
7855 return err;
7856
7857 if (t == BPF_READ)
7858 err = check_stack_read(env, regno, off, size,
7859 value_regno);
7860 else
7861 err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size,
7862 value_regno, insn_idx);
7863 } else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) {
7864 if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
7865 verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n");
7866 return -EACCES;
7867 }
7868 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
7869 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
7870 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n",
7871 value_regno);
7872 return -EACCES;
7873 }
7874 err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false);
7875 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
7876 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
7877 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS) {
7878 if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
7879 is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
7880 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into flow keys\n",
7881 value_regno);
7882 return -EACCES;
7883 }
7884
7885 err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size);
7886 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
7887 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
7888 } else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) {
7889 if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
7890 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
7891 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
7892 return -EACCES;
7893 }
7894 err = check_sock_access(env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t);
7895 if (!err && value_regno >= 0)
7896 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
7897 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER) {
7898 err = check_tp_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size);
7899 if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
7900 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
7901 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID &&
7902 !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) {
7903 err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t,
7904 value_regno);
7905 } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) {
7906 err = check_ptr_to_map_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t,
7907 value_regno);
7908 } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BUF) {
7909 bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type);
7910 u32 *max_access;
7911
7912 if (rdonly_mem) {
7913 if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
7914 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n",
7915 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
7916 return -EACCES;
7917 }
7918 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access;
7919 } else {
7920 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access;
7921 }
7922
7923 err = check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, off, size, false,
7924 max_access);
7925
7926 if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (rdonly_mem || t == BPF_READ))
7927 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
7928 } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_ARENA) {
7929 if (t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
7930 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
7931 } else {
7932 verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno,
7933 reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
7934 return -EACCES;
7935 }
7936
7937 if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ &&
7938 regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
7939 if (!is_ldsx)
7940 /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */
7941 coerce_reg_to_size(®s[value_regno], size);
7942 else
7943 coerce_reg_to_size_sx(®s[value_regno], size);
7944 }
7945 return err;
7946 }
7947
7948 static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type,
7949 bool allow_trust_mismatch);
7950
check_load_mem(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,bool strict_alignment_once,bool is_ldsx,bool allow_trust_mismatch,const char * ctx)7951 static int check_load_mem(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
7952 bool strict_alignment_once, bool is_ldsx,
7953 bool allow_trust_mismatch, const char *ctx)
7954 {
7955 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
7956 enum bpf_reg_type src_reg_type;
7957 int err;
7958
7959 /* check src operand */
7960 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
7961 if (err)
7962 return err;
7963
7964 /* check dst operand */
7965 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
7966 if (err)
7967 return err;
7968
7969 src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type;
7970
7971 /* Check if (src_reg + off) is readable. The state of dst_reg will be
7972 * updated by this call.
7973 */
7974 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off,
7975 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg,
7976 strict_alignment_once, is_ldsx);
7977 err = err ?: save_aux_ptr_type(env, src_reg_type,
7978 allow_trust_mismatch);
7979 err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, ®s[insn->dst_reg], ctx);
7980
7981 return err;
7982 }
7983
check_store_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,bool strict_alignment_once)7984 static int check_store_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
7985 bool strict_alignment_once)
7986 {
7987 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
7988 enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type;
7989 int err;
7990
7991 /* check src1 operand */
7992 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
7993 if (err)
7994 return err;
7995
7996 /* check src2 operand */
7997 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
7998 if (err)
7999 return err;
8000
8001 dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
8002
8003 /* Check if (dst_reg + off) is writeable. */
8004 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
8005 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg,
8006 strict_alignment_once, false);
8007 err = err ?: save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false);
8008
8009 return err;
8010 }
8011
check_atomic_rmw(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn)8012 static int check_atomic_rmw(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8013 struct bpf_insn *insn)
8014 {
8015 int load_reg;
8016 int err;
8017
8018 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
8019 verbose(env, "invalid atomic operand size\n");
8020 return -EINVAL;
8021 }
8022
8023 /* check src1 operand */
8024 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
8025 if (err)
8026 return err;
8027
8028 /* check src2 operand */
8029 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
8030 if (err)
8031 return err;
8032
8033 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) {
8034 /* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */
8035 const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0;
8036
8037 err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP);
8038 if (err)
8039 return err;
8040
8041 if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) {
8042 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg);
8043 return -EACCES;
8044 }
8045 }
8046
8047 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
8048 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
8049 return -EACCES;
8050 }
8051
8052 if (!atomic_ptr_type_ok(env, insn->dst_reg, insn)) {
8053 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
8054 insn->dst_reg,
8055 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type));
8056 return -EACCES;
8057 }
8058
8059 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH) {
8060 if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG)
8061 load_reg = BPF_REG_0;
8062 else
8063 load_reg = insn->src_reg;
8064
8065 /* check and record load of old value */
8066 err = check_reg_arg(env, load_reg, DST_OP);
8067 if (err)
8068 return err;
8069 } else {
8070 /* This instruction accesses a memory location but doesn't
8071 * actually load it into a register.
8072 */
8073 load_reg = -1;
8074 }
8075
8076 /* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch
8077 * case to simulate the register fill.
8078 */
8079 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
8080 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true, false);
8081 if (!err && load_reg >= 0)
8082 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
8083 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
8084 BPF_READ, load_reg, true, false);
8085 if (err)
8086 return err;
8087
8088 if (is_arena_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
8089 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, PTR_TO_ARENA, false);
8090 if (err)
8091 return err;
8092 }
8093 /* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */
8094 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
8095 BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true, false);
8096 if (err)
8097 return err;
8098 return 0;
8099 }
8100
check_atomic_load(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn)8101 static int check_atomic_load(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8102 struct bpf_insn *insn)
8103 {
8104 int err;
8105
8106 err = check_load_mem(env, insn, true, false, false, "atomic_load");
8107 if (err)
8108 return err;
8109
8110 if (!atomic_ptr_type_ok(env, insn->src_reg, insn)) {
8111 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC loads from R%d %s is not allowed\n",
8112 insn->src_reg,
8113 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->src_reg)->type));
8114 return -EACCES;
8115 }
8116
8117 return 0;
8118 }
8119
check_atomic_store(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn)8120 static int check_atomic_store(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8121 struct bpf_insn *insn)
8122 {
8123 int err;
8124
8125 err = check_store_reg(env, insn, true);
8126 if (err)
8127 return err;
8128
8129 if (!atomic_ptr_type_ok(env, insn->dst_reg, insn)) {
8130 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
8131 insn->dst_reg,
8132 reg_type_str(env, reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type));
8133 return -EACCES;
8134 }
8135
8136 return 0;
8137 }
8138
check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn)8139 static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
8140 {
8141 switch (insn->imm) {
8142 case BPF_ADD:
8143 case BPF_ADD | BPF_FETCH:
8144 case BPF_AND:
8145 case BPF_AND | BPF_FETCH:
8146 case BPF_OR:
8147 case BPF_OR | BPF_FETCH:
8148 case BPF_XOR:
8149 case BPF_XOR | BPF_FETCH:
8150 case BPF_XCHG:
8151 case BPF_CMPXCHG:
8152 return check_atomic_rmw(env, insn);
8153 case BPF_LOAD_ACQ:
8154 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW && BITS_PER_LONG != 64) {
8155 verbose(env,
8156 "64-bit load-acquires are only supported on 64-bit arches\n");
8157 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
8158 }
8159 return check_atomic_load(env, insn);
8160 case BPF_STORE_REL:
8161 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW && BITS_PER_LONG != 64) {
8162 verbose(env,
8163 "64-bit store-releases are only supported on 64-bit arches\n");
8164 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
8165 }
8166 return check_atomic_store(env, insn);
8167 default:
8168 verbose(env, "BPF_ATOMIC uses invalid atomic opcode %02x\n",
8169 insn->imm);
8170 return -EINVAL;
8171 }
8172 }
8173
8174 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through
8175 * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending
8176 * on the access type and privileges, that all elements of the stack are
8177 * initialized.
8178 *
8179 * 'off' includes 'regno->off', but not its dynamic part (if any).
8180 *
8181 * All registers that have been spilled on the stack in the slots within the
8182 * read offsets are marked as read.
8183 */
check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,int off,int access_size,bool zero_size_allowed,enum bpf_access_type type,struct bpf_call_arg_meta * meta)8184 static int check_stack_range_initialized(
8185 struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int off,
8186 int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
8187 enum bpf_access_type type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
8188 {
8189 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
8190 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
8191 int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi;
8192 /* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are
8193 * read-only.
8194 */
8195 bool clobber = false;
8196
8197 if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) {
8198 verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n");
8199 return -EACCES;
8200 }
8201
8202 if (type == BPF_WRITE)
8203 clobber = true;
8204
8205 err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size, type);
8206 if (err)
8207 return err;
8208
8209
8210 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
8211 min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
8212 } else {
8213 /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
8214 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
8215 * Spectre masking for stack ALU.
8216 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
8217 */
8218 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
8219 char tn_buf[48];
8220
8221 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
8222 verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
8223 regno, tn_buf);
8224 return -EACCES;
8225 }
8226 /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
8227 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to
8228 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on
8229 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may
8230 * cause uninitialized stack leaking.
8231 */
8232 if (meta && meta->raw_mode)
8233 meta = NULL;
8234
8235 min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
8236 max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
8237 }
8238
8239 if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
8240 /* Ensure we won't be overwriting dynptrs when simulating byte
8241 * by byte access in check_helper_call using meta.access_size.
8242 * This would be a problem if we have a helper in the future
8243 * which takes:
8244 *
8245 * helper(uninit_mem, len, dynptr)
8246 *
8247 * Now, uninint_mem may overlap with dynptr pointer. Hence, it
8248 * may end up writing to dynptr itself when touching memory from
8249 * arg 1. This can be relaxed on a case by case basis for known
8250 * safe cases, but reject due to the possibilitiy of aliasing by
8251 * default.
8252 */
8253 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) {
8254 int stack_off = -i - 1;
8255
8256 spi = __get_spi(i);
8257 /* raw_mode may write past allocated_stack */
8258 if (state->allocated_stack <= stack_off)
8259 continue;
8260 if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[stack_off % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_DYNPTR) {
8261 verbose(env, "potential write to dynptr at off=%d disallowed\n", i);
8262 return -EACCES;
8263 }
8264 }
8265 meta->access_size = access_size;
8266 meta->regno = regno;
8267 return 0;
8268 }
8269
8270 for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) {
8271 u8 *stype;
8272
8273 slot = -i - 1;
8274 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
8275 if (state->allocated_stack <= slot) {
8276 verbose(env, "allocated_stack too small\n");
8277 return -EFAULT;
8278 }
8279
8280 stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
8281 if (*stype == STACK_MISC)
8282 goto mark;
8283 if ((*stype == STACK_ZERO) ||
8284 (*stype == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)) {
8285 if (clobber) {
8286 /* helper can write anything into the stack */
8287 *stype = STACK_MISC;
8288 }
8289 goto mark;
8290 }
8291
8292 if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) &&
8293 (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE ||
8294 env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {
8295 if (clobber) {
8296 __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
8297 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
8298 scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]);
8299 }
8300 goto mark;
8301 }
8302
8303 if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
8304 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n",
8305 regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
8306 } else {
8307 char tn_buf[48];
8308
8309 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
8310 verbose(env, "invalid read from stack R%d var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
8311 regno, tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
8312 }
8313 return -EACCES;
8314 mark:
8315 /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause
8316 * the whole slot to be marked as 'read'
8317 */
8318 err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg->frameno, env->insn_idx, BIT(spi));
8319 if (err)
8320 return err;
8321 /* We do not call bpf_mark_stack_write(), as we can not
8322 * be sure that whether stack slot is written to or not. Hence,
8323 * we must still conservatively propagate reads upwards even if
8324 * helper may write to the entire memory range.
8325 */
8326 }
8327 return 0;
8328 }
8329
check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,int access_size,enum bpf_access_type access_type,bool zero_size_allowed,struct bpf_call_arg_meta * meta)8330 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
8331 int access_size, enum bpf_access_type access_type,
8332 bool zero_size_allowed,
8333 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
8334 {
8335 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[regno];
8336 u32 *max_access;
8337
8338 switch (base_type(reg->type)) {
8339 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
8340 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
8341 return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
8342 zero_size_allowed);
8343 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
8344 if (access_type == BPF_WRITE) {
8345 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno,
8346 reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
8347 return -EACCES;
8348 }
8349 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
8350 reg->map_ptr->key_size, false);
8351 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
8352 if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, access_type))
8353 return -EACCES;
8354 return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
8355 zero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER);
8356 case PTR_TO_MEM:
8357 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) {
8358 if (access_type == BPF_WRITE) {
8359 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno,
8360 reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
8361 return -EACCES;
8362 }
8363 }
8364 return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off,
8365 access_size, reg->mem_size,
8366 zero_size_allowed);
8367 case PTR_TO_BUF:
8368 if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) {
8369 if (access_type == BPF_WRITE) {
8370 verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno,
8371 reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
8372 return -EACCES;
8373 }
8374
8375 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access;
8376 } else {
8377 max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdwr_access;
8378 }
8379 return check_buffer_access(env, reg, regno, reg->off,
8380 access_size, zero_size_allowed,
8381 max_access);
8382 case PTR_TO_STACK:
8383 return check_stack_range_initialized(
8384 env,
8385 regno, reg->off, access_size,
8386 zero_size_allowed, access_type, meta);
8387 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
8388 return check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, reg->off,
8389 access_size, BPF_READ, -1);
8390 case PTR_TO_CTX:
8391 /* in case the function doesn't know how to access the context,
8392 * (because we are in a program of type SYSCALL for example), we
8393 * can not statically check its size.
8394 * Dynamically check it now.
8395 */
8396 if (!env->ops->convert_ctx_access) {
8397 int offset = access_size - 1;
8398
8399 /* Allow zero-byte read from PTR_TO_CTX */
8400 if (access_size == 0)
8401 return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
8402
8403 return check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, offset, BPF_B,
8404 access_type, -1, false, false);
8405 }
8406
8407 fallthrough;
8408 default: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */
8409 /* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
8410 if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
8411 register_is_null(reg))
8412 return 0;
8413
8414 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s ", regno,
8415 reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
8416 verbose(env, "expected=%s\n", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_STACK));
8417 return -EACCES;
8418 }
8419 }
8420
8421 /* verify arguments to helpers or kfuncs consisting of a pointer and an access
8422 * size.
8423 *
8424 * @regno is the register containing the access size. regno-1 is the register
8425 * containing the pointer.
8426 */
check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 regno,enum bpf_access_type access_type,bool zero_size_allowed,struct bpf_call_arg_meta * meta)8427 static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
8428 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
8429 enum bpf_access_type access_type,
8430 bool zero_size_allowed,
8431 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
8432 {
8433 int err;
8434
8435 /* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers
8436 * that enforce this value as an upper bound on return values.
8437 * See do_refine_retval_range() for helpers that can refine
8438 * the return value. C type of helper is u32 so we pull register
8439 * bound from umax_value however, if negative verifier errors
8440 * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an
8441 * int type and negative retvals are allowed.
8442 */
8443 meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value;
8444
8445 /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check happens using
8446 * its boundaries. For unprivileged variable accesses, disable
8447 * raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all
8448 * the memory that the helper could just partially fill up.
8449 */
8450 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
8451 meta = NULL;
8452
8453 if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
8454 verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n",
8455 regno);
8456 return -EACCES;
8457 }
8458
8459 if (reg->umin_value == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) {
8460 verbose(env, "R%d invalid zero-sized read: u64=[%lld,%lld]\n",
8461 regno, reg->umin_value, reg->umax_value);
8462 return -EACCES;
8463 }
8464
8465 if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) {
8466 verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n",
8467 regno);
8468 return -EACCES;
8469 }
8470 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, reg->umax_value,
8471 access_type, zero_size_allowed, meta);
8472 if (!err)
8473 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
8474 return err;
8475 }
8476
check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 regno,u32 mem_size)8477 static int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
8478 u32 regno, u32 mem_size)
8479 {
8480 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type);
8481 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg;
8482 int err;
8483
8484 if (register_is_null(reg))
8485 return 0;
8486
8487 /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory
8488 * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as
8489 * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller.
8490 */
8491 if (may_be_null) {
8492 saved_reg = *reg;
8493 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg);
8494 }
8495
8496 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, BPF_READ, true, NULL);
8497 err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, BPF_WRITE, true, NULL);
8498
8499 if (may_be_null)
8500 *reg = saved_reg;
8501
8502 return err;
8503 }
8504
check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 regno)8505 static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
8506 u32 regno)
8507 {
8508 struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1];
8509 bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type);
8510 struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg;
8511 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
8512 int err;
8513
8514 WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5);
8515
8516 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
8517
8518 if (may_be_null) {
8519 saved_reg = *mem_reg;
8520 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg);
8521 }
8522
8523 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, BPF_READ, true, &meta);
8524 err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, BPF_WRITE, true, &meta);
8525
8526 if (may_be_null)
8527 *mem_reg = saved_reg;
8528
8529 return err;
8530 }
8531
8532 enum {
8533 PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK = (1 << 0),
8534 PROCESS_RES_LOCK = (1 << 1),
8535 PROCESS_LOCK_IRQ = (1 << 2),
8536 };
8537
8538 /* Implementation details:
8539 * bpf_map_lookup returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL.
8540 * bpf_obj_new returns PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_MAYBE_NULL.
8541 * Two bpf_map_lookups (even with the same key) will have different reg->id.
8542 * Two separate bpf_obj_new will also have different reg->id.
8543 * For traditional PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC, the verifier
8544 * clears reg->id after value_or_null->value transition, since the verifier only
8545 * cares about the range of access to valid map value pointer and doesn't care
8546 * about actual address of the map element.
8547 * For maps with 'struct bpf_spin_lock' inside map value the verifier keeps
8548 * reg->id > 0 after value_or_null->value transition. By doing so
8549 * two bpf_map_lookups will be considered two different pointers that
8550 * point to different bpf_spin_locks. Likewise for pointers to allocated objects
8551 * returned from bpf_obj_new.
8552 * The verifier allows taking only one bpf_spin_lock at a time to avoid
8553 * dead-locks.
8554 * Since only one bpf_spin_lock is allowed the checks are simpler than
8555 * reg_is_refcounted() logic. The verifier needs to remember only
8556 * one spin_lock instead of array of acquired_refs.
8557 * env->cur_state->active_locks remembers which map value element or allocated
8558 * object got locked and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock.
8559 */
process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,int flags)8560 static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int flags)
8561 {
8562 bool is_lock = flags & PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK, is_res_lock = flags & PROCESS_RES_LOCK;
8563 const char *lock_str = is_res_lock ? "bpf_res_spin" : "bpf_spin";
8564 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
8565 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
8566 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
8567 bool is_irq = flags & PROCESS_LOCK_IRQ;
8568 u64 val = reg->var_off.value;
8569 struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
8570 struct btf *btf = NULL;
8571 struct btf_record *rec;
8572 u32 spin_lock_off;
8573 int err;
8574
8575 if (!is_const) {
8576 verbose(env,
8577 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s_lock has to be at the constant offset\n",
8578 regno, lock_str);
8579 return -EINVAL;
8580 }
8581 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
8582 map = reg->map_ptr;
8583 if (!map->btf) {
8584 verbose(env,
8585 "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use %s_lock\n",
8586 map->name, lock_str);
8587 return -EINVAL;
8588 }
8589 } else {
8590 btf = reg->btf;
8591 }
8592
8593 rec = reg_btf_record(reg);
8594 if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, is_res_lock ? BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK : BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) {
8595 verbose(env, "%s '%s' has no valid %s_lock\n", map ? "map" : "local",
8596 map ? map->name : "kptr", lock_str);
8597 return -EINVAL;
8598 }
8599 spin_lock_off = is_res_lock ? rec->res_spin_lock_off : rec->spin_lock_off;
8600 if (spin_lock_off != val + reg->off) {
8601 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct %s_lock' that is at %d\n",
8602 val + reg->off, lock_str, spin_lock_off);
8603 return -EINVAL;
8604 }
8605 if (is_lock) {
8606 void *ptr;
8607 int type;
8608
8609 if (map)
8610 ptr = map;
8611 else
8612 ptr = btf;
8613
8614 if (!is_res_lock && cur->active_locks) {
8615 if (find_lock_state(env->cur_state, REF_TYPE_LOCK, 0, NULL)) {
8616 verbose(env,
8617 "Locking two bpf_spin_locks are not allowed\n");
8618 return -EINVAL;
8619 }
8620 } else if (is_res_lock && cur->active_locks) {
8621 if (find_lock_state(env->cur_state, REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK | REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK_IRQ, reg->id, ptr)) {
8622 verbose(env, "Acquiring the same lock again, AA deadlock detected\n");
8623 return -EINVAL;
8624 }
8625 }
8626
8627 if (is_res_lock && is_irq)
8628 type = REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK_IRQ;
8629 else if (is_res_lock)
8630 type = REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK;
8631 else
8632 type = REF_TYPE_LOCK;
8633 err = acquire_lock_state(env, env->insn_idx, type, reg->id, ptr);
8634 if (err < 0) {
8635 verbose(env, "Failed to acquire lock state\n");
8636 return err;
8637 }
8638 } else {
8639 void *ptr;
8640 int type;
8641
8642 if (map)
8643 ptr = map;
8644 else
8645 ptr = btf;
8646
8647 if (!cur->active_locks) {
8648 verbose(env, "%s_unlock without taking a lock\n", lock_str);
8649 return -EINVAL;
8650 }
8651
8652 if (is_res_lock && is_irq)
8653 type = REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK_IRQ;
8654 else if (is_res_lock)
8655 type = REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK;
8656 else
8657 type = REF_TYPE_LOCK;
8658 if (!find_lock_state(cur, type, reg->id, ptr)) {
8659 verbose(env, "%s_unlock of different lock\n", lock_str);
8660 return -EINVAL;
8661 }
8662 if (reg->id != cur->active_lock_id || ptr != cur->active_lock_ptr) {
8663 verbose(env, "%s_unlock cannot be out of order\n", lock_str);
8664 return -EINVAL;
8665 }
8666 if (release_lock_state(cur, type, reg->id, ptr)) {
8667 verbose(env, "%s_unlock of different lock\n", lock_str);
8668 return -EINVAL;
8669 }
8670
8671 invalidate_non_owning_refs(env);
8672 }
8673 return 0;
8674 }
8675
8676 /* Check if @regno is a pointer to a specific field in a map value */
check_map_field_pointer(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 regno,enum btf_field_type field_type,struct bpf_map_desc * map_desc)8677 static int check_map_field_pointer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
8678 enum btf_field_type field_type,
8679 struct bpf_map_desc *map_desc)
8680 {
8681 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
8682 bool is_const = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
8683 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
8684 u64 val = reg->var_off.value;
8685 const char *struct_name = btf_field_type_name(field_type);
8686 int field_off = -1;
8687
8688 if (!is_const) {
8689 verbose(env,
8690 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n",
8691 regno, struct_name);
8692 return -EINVAL;
8693 }
8694 if (!map->btf) {
8695 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use %s\n", map->name,
8696 struct_name);
8697 return -EINVAL;
8698 }
8699 if (!btf_record_has_field(map->record, field_type)) {
8700 verbose(env, "map '%s' has no valid %s\n", map->name, struct_name);
8701 return -EINVAL;
8702 }
8703 switch (field_type) {
8704 case BPF_TIMER:
8705 field_off = map->record->timer_off;
8706 break;
8707 case BPF_TASK_WORK:
8708 field_off = map->record->task_work_off;
8709 break;
8710 case BPF_WORKQUEUE:
8711 field_off = map->record->wq_off;
8712 break;
8713 default:
8714 verifier_bug(env, "unsupported BTF field type: %s\n", struct_name);
8715 return -EINVAL;
8716 }
8717 if (field_off != val + reg->off) {
8718 verbose(env, "off %lld doesn't point to 'struct %s' that is at %d\n",
8719 val + reg->off, struct_name, field_off);
8720 return -EINVAL;
8721 }
8722 if (map_desc->ptr) {
8723 verifier_bug(env, "Two map pointers in a %s helper", struct_name);
8724 return -EFAULT;
8725 }
8726 map_desc->uid = reg->map_uid;
8727 map_desc->ptr = map;
8728 return 0;
8729 }
8730
process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,struct bpf_map_desc * map)8731 static int process_timer_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
8732 struct bpf_map_desc *map)
8733 {
8734 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT)) {
8735 verbose(env, "bpf_timer cannot be used for PREEMPT_RT.\n");
8736 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
8737 }
8738 return check_map_field_pointer(env, regno, BPF_TIMER, map);
8739 }
8740
process_timer_helper(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,struct bpf_call_arg_meta * meta)8741 static int process_timer_helper(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
8742 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
8743 {
8744 return process_timer_func(env, regno, &meta->map);
8745 }
8746
process_timer_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)8747 static int process_timer_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
8748 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
8749 {
8750 return process_timer_func(env, regno, &meta->map);
8751 }
8752
process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,struct bpf_call_arg_meta * meta)8753 static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
8754 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
8755 {
8756 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
8757 struct btf_field *kptr_field;
8758 struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
8759 struct btf_record *rec;
8760 u32 kptr_off;
8761
8762 if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) {
8763 rec = reg_btf_record(reg);
8764 } else { /* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE */
8765 map_ptr = reg->map_ptr;
8766 if (!map_ptr->btf) {
8767 verbose(env, "map '%s' has to have BTF in order to use bpf_kptr_xchg\n",
8768 map_ptr->name);
8769 return -EINVAL;
8770 }
8771 rec = map_ptr->record;
8772 meta->map.ptr = map_ptr;
8773 }
8774
8775 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
8776 verbose(env,
8777 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. kptr has to be at the constant offset\n",
8778 regno);
8779 return -EINVAL;
8780 }
8781
8782 if (!btf_record_has_field(rec, BPF_KPTR)) {
8783 verbose(env, "R%d has no valid kptr\n", regno);
8784 return -EINVAL;
8785 }
8786
8787 kptr_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
8788 kptr_field = btf_record_find(rec, kptr_off, BPF_KPTR);
8789 if (!kptr_field) {
8790 verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off);
8791 return -EACCES;
8792 }
8793 if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF && kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_PERCPU) {
8794 verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off);
8795 return -EACCES;
8796 }
8797 meta->kptr_field = kptr_field;
8798 return 0;
8799 }
8800
8801 /* There are two register types representing a bpf_dynptr, one is PTR_TO_STACK
8802 * which points to a stack slot, and the other is CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR.
8803 *
8804 * In both cases we deal with the first 8 bytes, but need to mark the next 8
8805 * bytes as STACK_DYNPTR in case of PTR_TO_STACK. In case of
8806 * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, we are guaranteed to get the beginning of the object.
8807 *
8808 * Mutability of bpf_dynptr is at two levels, one is at the level of struct
8809 * bpf_dynptr itself, i.e. whether the helper is receiving a pointer to struct
8810 * bpf_dynptr or pointer to const struct bpf_dynptr. In the former case, it can
8811 * mutate the view of the dynptr and also possibly destroy it. In the latter
8812 * case, it cannot mutate the bpf_dynptr itself but it can still mutate the
8813 * memory that dynptr points to.
8814 *
8815 * The verifier will keep track both levels of mutation (bpf_dynptr's in
8816 * reg->type and the memory's in reg->dynptr.type), but there is no support for
8817 * readonly dynptr view yet, hence only the first case is tracked and checked.
8818 *
8819 * This is consistent with how C applies the const modifier to a struct object,
8820 * where the pointer itself inside bpf_dynptr becomes const but not what it
8821 * points to.
8822 *
8823 * Helpers which do not mutate the bpf_dynptr set MEM_RDONLY in their argument
8824 * type, and declare it as 'const struct bpf_dynptr *' in their prototype.
8825 */
process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,int insn_idx,enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,int clone_ref_obj_id)8826 static int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx,
8827 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int clone_ref_obj_id)
8828 {
8829 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
8830 int err;
8831
8832 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK && reg->type != CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) {
8833 verbose(env,
8834 "arg#%d expected pointer to stack or const struct bpf_dynptr\n",
8835 regno - 1);
8836 return -EINVAL;
8837 }
8838
8839 /* MEM_UNINIT and MEM_RDONLY are exclusive, when applied to an
8840 * ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (or ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_*):
8841 */
8842 if ((arg_type & (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) == (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) {
8843 verifier_bug(env, "misconfigured dynptr helper type flags");
8844 return -EFAULT;
8845 }
8846
8847 /* MEM_UNINIT - Points to memory that is an appropriate candidate for
8848 * constructing a mutable bpf_dynptr object.
8849 *
8850 * Currently, this is only possible with PTR_TO_STACK
8851 * pointing to a region of at least 16 bytes which doesn't
8852 * contain an existing bpf_dynptr.
8853 *
8854 * MEM_RDONLY - Points to a initialized bpf_dynptr that will not be
8855 * mutated or destroyed. However, the memory it points to
8856 * may be mutated.
8857 *
8858 * None - Points to a initialized dynptr that can be mutated and
8859 * destroyed, including mutation of the memory it points
8860 * to.
8861 */
8862 if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) {
8863 int i;
8864
8865 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) {
8866 verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n");
8867 return -EINVAL;
8868 }
8869
8870 /* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */
8871 for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) {
8872 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno,
8873 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false);
8874 if (err)
8875 return err;
8876 }
8877
8878 err = mark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, reg, arg_type, insn_idx, clone_ref_obj_id);
8879 } else /* MEM_RDONLY and None case from above */ {
8880 /* For the reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK case, bpf_dynptr is never const */
8881 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR && !(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) {
8882 verbose(env, "cannot pass pointer to const bpf_dynptr, the helper mutates it\n");
8883 return -EINVAL;
8884 }
8885
8886 if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) {
8887 verbose(env,
8888 "Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #%d\n",
8889 regno - 1);
8890 return -EINVAL;
8891 }
8892
8893 /* Fold modifiers (in this case, MEM_RDONLY) when checking expected type */
8894 if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, arg_type & ~MEM_RDONLY)) {
8895 verbose(env,
8896 "Expected a dynptr of type %s as arg #%d\n",
8897 dynptr_type_str(arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type)), regno - 1);
8898 return -EINVAL;
8899 }
8900
8901 err = mark_dynptr_read(env, reg);
8902 }
8903 return err;
8904 }
8905
iter_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int spi)8906 static u32 iter_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int spi)
8907 {
8908 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
8909
8910 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id;
8911 }
8912
is_iter_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)8913 static bool is_iter_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
8914 {
8915 return meta->kfunc_flags & (KF_ITER_NEW | KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_ITER_DESTROY);
8916 }
8917
is_iter_new_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)8918 static bool is_iter_new_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
8919 {
8920 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEW;
8921 }
8922
is_iter_next_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)8923 static bool is_iter_next_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
8924 {
8925 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_NEXT;
8926 }
8927
is_iter_destroy_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)8928 static bool is_iter_destroy_kfunc(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
8929 {
8930 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ITER_DESTROY;
8931 }
8932
is_kfunc_arg_iter(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta,int arg_idx,const struct btf_param * arg)8933 static bool is_kfunc_arg_iter(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg_idx,
8934 const struct btf_param *arg)
8935 {
8936 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() guarantees that first argument of any iter
8937 * kfunc is iter state pointer
8938 */
8939 if (is_iter_kfunc(meta))
8940 return arg_idx == 0;
8941
8942 /* iter passed as an argument to a generic kfunc */
8943 return btf_param_match_suffix(meta->btf, arg, "__iter");
8944 }
8945
process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,int insn_idx,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)8946 static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_idx,
8947 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
8948 {
8949 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
8950 const struct btf_type *t;
8951 int spi, err, i, nr_slots, btf_id;
8952
8953 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
8954 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to an iterator on stack\n", regno - 1);
8955 return -EINVAL;
8956 }
8957
8958 /* For iter_{new,next,destroy} functions, btf_check_iter_kfuncs()
8959 * ensures struct convention, so we wouldn't need to do any BTF
8960 * validation here. But given iter state can be passed as a parameter
8961 * to any kfunc, if arg has "__iter" suffix, we need to be a bit more
8962 * conservative here.
8963 */
8964 btf_id = btf_check_iter_arg(meta->btf, meta->func_proto, regno - 1);
8965 if (btf_id < 0) {
8966 verbose(env, "expected valid iter pointer as arg #%d\n", regno - 1);
8967 return -EINVAL;
8968 }
8969 t = btf_type_by_id(meta->btf, btf_id);
8970 nr_slots = t->size / BPF_REG_SIZE;
8971
8972 if (is_iter_new_kfunc(meta)) {
8973 /* bpf_iter_<type>_new() expects pointer to uninit iter state */
8974 if (!is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg, nr_slots)) {
8975 verbose(env, "expected uninitialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n",
8976 iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno - 1);
8977 return -EINVAL;
8978 }
8979
8980 for (i = 0; i < nr_slots * 8; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
8981 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno,
8982 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false);
8983 if (err)
8984 return err;
8985 }
8986
8987 err = mark_stack_slots_iter(env, meta, reg, insn_idx, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots);
8988 if (err)
8989 return err;
8990 } else {
8991 /* iter_next() or iter_destroy(), as well as any kfunc
8992 * accepting iter argument, expect initialized iter state
8993 */
8994 err = is_iter_reg_valid_init(env, reg, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots);
8995 switch (err) {
8996 case 0:
8997 break;
8998 case -EINVAL:
8999 verbose(env, "expected an initialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n",
9000 iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno - 1);
9001 return err;
9002 case -EPROTO:
9003 verbose(env, "expected an RCU CS when using %s\n", meta->func_name);
9004 return err;
9005 default:
9006 return err;
9007 }
9008
9009 spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);
9010 if (spi < 0)
9011 return spi;
9012
9013 err = mark_iter_read(env, reg, spi, nr_slots);
9014 if (err)
9015 return err;
9016
9017 /* remember meta->iter info for process_iter_next_call() */
9018 meta->iter.spi = spi;
9019 meta->iter.frameno = reg->frameno;
9020 meta->ref_obj_id = iter_ref_obj_id(env, reg, spi);
9021
9022 if (is_iter_destroy_kfunc(meta)) {
9023 err = unmark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, nr_slots);
9024 if (err)
9025 return err;
9026 }
9027 }
9028
9029 return 0;
9030 }
9031
9032 /* Look for a previous loop entry at insn_idx: nearest parent state
9033 * stopped at insn_idx with callsites matching those in cur->frame.
9034 */
find_prev_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * cur,int insn_idx)9035 static struct bpf_verifier_state *find_prev_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9036 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,
9037 int insn_idx)
9038 {
9039 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
9040 struct bpf_verifier_state *st;
9041 struct list_head *pos, *head;
9042
9043 /* Explored states are pushed in stack order, most recent states come first */
9044 head = explored_state(env, insn_idx);
9045 list_for_each(pos, head) {
9046 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node);
9047 /* If st->branches != 0 state is a part of current DFS verification path,
9048 * hence cur & st for a loop.
9049 */
9050 st = &sl->state;
9051 if (st->insn_idx == insn_idx && st->branches && same_callsites(st, cur) &&
9052 st->dfs_depth < cur->dfs_depth)
9053 return st;
9054 }
9055
9056 return NULL;
9057 }
9058
9059 static void reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
9060 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
9061 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
9062 struct bpf_idmap *idmap);
9063
9064 /*
9065 * Check if scalar registers are exact for the purpose of not widening.
9066 * More lenient than regs_exact()
9067 */
scalars_exact_for_widen(const struct bpf_reg_state * rold,const struct bpf_reg_state * rcur)9068 static bool scalars_exact_for_widen(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
9069 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur)
9070 {
9071 return !memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id));
9072 }
9073
maybe_widen_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * rold,struct bpf_reg_state * rcur)9074 static void maybe_widen_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9075 struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur)
9076 {
9077 if (rold->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
9078 return;
9079 if (rold->type != rcur->type)
9080 return;
9081 if (rold->precise || rcur->precise || scalars_exact_for_widen(rold, rcur))
9082 return;
9083 __mark_reg_unknown(env, rcur);
9084 }
9085
widen_imprecise_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * old,struct bpf_verifier_state * cur)9086 static int widen_imprecise_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9087 struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
9088 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
9089 {
9090 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur;
9091 int i, fr, num_slots;
9092
9093 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) {
9094 fold = old->frame[fr];
9095 fcur = cur->frame[fr];
9096
9097 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
9098 maybe_widen_reg(env,
9099 &fold->regs[i],
9100 &fcur->regs[i]);
9101
9102 num_slots = min(fold->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE,
9103 fcur->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE);
9104 for (i = 0; i < num_slots; i++) {
9105 if (!is_spilled_reg(&fold->stack[i]) ||
9106 !is_spilled_reg(&fcur->stack[i]))
9107 continue;
9108
9109 maybe_widen_reg(env,
9110 &fold->stack[i].spilled_ptr,
9111 &fcur->stack[i].spilled_ptr);
9112 }
9113 }
9114 return 0;
9115 }
9116
get_iter_from_state(struct bpf_verifier_state * cur_st,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)9117 static struct bpf_reg_state *get_iter_from_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st,
9118 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
9119 {
9120 int iter_frameno = meta->iter.frameno;
9121 int iter_spi = meta->iter.spi;
9122
9123 return &cur_st->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr;
9124 }
9125
9126 /* process_iter_next_call() is called when verifier gets to iterator's next
9127 * "method" (e.g., bpf_iter_num_next() for numbers iterator) call. We'll refer
9128 * to it as just "iter_next()" in comments below.
9129 *
9130 * BPF verifier relies on a crucial contract for any iter_next()
9131 * implementation: it should *eventually* return NULL, and once that happens
9132 * it should keep returning NULL. That is, once iterator exhausts elements to
9133 * iterate, it should never reset or spuriously return new elements.
9134 *
9135 * With the assumption of such contract, process_iter_next_call() simulates
9136 * a fork in the verifier state to validate loop logic correctness and safety
9137 * without having to simulate infinite amount of iterations.
9138 *
9139 * In current state, we first assume that iter_next() returned NULL and
9140 * iterator state is set to DRAINED (BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED). In such
9141 * conditions we should not form an infinite loop and should eventually reach
9142 * exit.
9143 *
9144 * Besides that, we also fork current state and enqueue it for later
9145 * verification. In a forked state we keep iterator state as ACTIVE
9146 * (BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) and assume non-NULL return from iter_next(). We
9147 * also bump iteration depth to prevent erroneous infinite loop detection
9148 * later on (see iter_active_depths_differ() comment for details). In this
9149 * state we assume that we'll eventually loop back to another iter_next()
9150 * calls (it could be in exactly same location or in some other instruction,
9151 * it doesn't matter, we don't make any unnecessary assumptions about this,
9152 * everything revolves around iterator state in a stack slot, not which
9153 * instruction is calling iter_next()). When that happens, we either will come
9154 * to iter_next() with equivalent state and can conclude that next iteration
9155 * will proceed in exactly the same way as we just verified, so it's safe to
9156 * assume that loop converges. If not, we'll go on another iteration
9157 * simulation with a different input state, until all possible starting states
9158 * are validated or we reach maximum number of instructions limit.
9159 *
9160 * This way, we will either exhaustively discover all possible input states
9161 * that iterator loop can start with and eventually will converge, or we'll
9162 * effectively regress into bounded loop simulation logic and either reach
9163 * maximum number of instructions if loop is not provably convergent, or there
9164 * is some statically known limit on number of iterations (e.g., if there is
9165 * an explicit `if n > 100 then break;` statement somewhere in the loop).
9166 *
9167 * Iteration convergence logic in is_state_visited() relies on exact
9168 * states comparison, which ignores read and precision marks.
9169 * This is necessary because read and precision marks are not finalized
9170 * while in the loop. Exact comparison might preclude convergence for
9171 * simple programs like below:
9172 *
9173 * i = 0;
9174 * while(iter_next(&it))
9175 * i++;
9176 *
9177 * At each iteration step i++ would produce a new distinct state and
9178 * eventually instruction processing limit would be reached.
9179 *
9180 * To avoid such behavior speculatively forget (widen) range for
9181 * imprecise scalar registers, if those registers were not precise at the
9182 * end of the previous iteration and do not match exactly.
9183 *
9184 * This is a conservative heuristic that allows to verify wide range of programs,
9185 * however it precludes verification of programs that conjure an
9186 * imprecise value on the first loop iteration and use it as precise on a second.
9187 * For example, the following safe program would fail to verify:
9188 *
9189 * struct bpf_num_iter it;
9190 * int arr[10];
9191 * int i = 0, a = 0;
9192 * bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10);
9193 * while (bpf_iter_num_next(&it)) {
9194 * if (a == 0) {
9195 * a = 1;
9196 * i = 7; // Because i changed verifier would forget
9197 * // it's range on second loop entry.
9198 * } else {
9199 * arr[i] = 42; // This would fail to verify.
9200 * }
9201 * }
9202 * bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it);
9203 */
process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)9204 static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
9205 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
9206 {
9207 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st, *prev_st;
9208 struct bpf_func_state *cur_fr = cur_st->frame[cur_st->curframe], *queued_fr;
9209 struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter, *queued_iter;
9210
9211 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(struct bpf_iter);
9212
9213 cur_iter = get_iter_from_state(cur_st, meta);
9214
9215 if (cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE &&
9216 cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED) {
9217 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected iterator state %d (%s)",
9218 cur_iter->iter.state, iter_state_str(cur_iter->iter.state));
9219 return -EFAULT;
9220 }
9221
9222 if (cur_iter->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
9223 /* Because iter_next() call is a checkpoint is_state_visitied()
9224 * should guarantee parent state with same call sites and insn_idx.
9225 */
9226 if (!cur_st->parent || cur_st->parent->insn_idx != insn_idx ||
9227 !same_callsites(cur_st->parent, cur_st)) {
9228 verifier_bug(env, "bad parent state for iter next call");
9229 return -EFAULT;
9230 }
9231 /* Note cur_st->parent in the call below, it is necessary to skip
9232 * checkpoint created for cur_st by is_state_visited()
9233 * right at this instruction.
9234 */
9235 prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, cur_st->parent, insn_idx);
9236 /* branch out active iter state */
9237 queued_st = push_stack(env, insn_idx + 1, insn_idx, false);
9238 if (IS_ERR(queued_st))
9239 return PTR_ERR(queued_st);
9240
9241 queued_iter = get_iter_from_state(queued_st, meta);
9242 queued_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE;
9243 queued_iter->iter.depth++;
9244 if (prev_st)
9245 widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st);
9246
9247 queued_fr = queued_st->frame[queued_st->curframe];
9248 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&queued_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]);
9249 }
9250
9251 /* switch to DRAINED state, but keep the depth unchanged */
9252 /* mark current iter state as drained and assume returned NULL */
9253 cur_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED;
9254 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, &cur_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]);
9255
9256 return 0;
9257 }
9258
arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type)9259 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type)
9260 {
9261 return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
9262 type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO;
9263 }
9264
arg_type_is_raw_mem(enum bpf_arg_type type)9265 static bool arg_type_is_raw_mem(enum bpf_arg_type type)
9266 {
9267 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM &&
9268 type & MEM_UNINIT;
9269 }
9270
arg_type_is_release(enum bpf_arg_type type)9271 static bool arg_type_is_release(enum bpf_arg_type type)
9272 {
9273 return type & OBJ_RELEASE;
9274 }
9275
arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type)9276 static bool arg_type_is_dynptr(enum bpf_arg_type type)
9277 {
9278 return base_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR;
9279 }
9280
resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_call_arg_meta * meta,enum bpf_arg_type * arg_type)9281 static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9282 const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
9283 enum bpf_arg_type *arg_type)
9284 {
9285 if (!meta->map.ptr) {
9286 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
9287 verifier_bug(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type");
9288 return -EFAULT;
9289 }
9290
9291 switch (meta->map.ptr->map_type) {
9292 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
9293 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
9294 if (*arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
9295 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON;
9296 } else {
9297 verbose(env, "invalid arg_type for sockmap/sockhash\n");
9298 return -EINVAL;
9299 }
9300 break;
9301 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER:
9302 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem)
9303 *arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
9304 break;
9305 default:
9306 break;
9307 }
9308 return 0;
9309 }
9310
9311 struct bpf_reg_types {
9312 const enum bpf_reg_type types[10];
9313 u32 *btf_id;
9314 };
9315
9316 static const struct bpf_reg_types sock_types = {
9317 .types = {
9318 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON,
9319 PTR_TO_SOCKET,
9320 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK,
9321 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK,
9322 },
9323 };
9324
9325 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
9326 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_id_sock_common_types = {
9327 .types = {
9328 PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON,
9329 PTR_TO_SOCKET,
9330 PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK,
9331 PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK,
9332 PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
9333 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED,
9334 },
9335 .btf_id = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON],
9336 };
9337 #endif
9338
9339 static const struct bpf_reg_types mem_types = {
9340 .types = {
9341 PTR_TO_STACK,
9342 PTR_TO_PACKET,
9343 PTR_TO_PACKET_META,
9344 PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
9345 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
9346 PTR_TO_MEM,
9347 PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF,
9348 PTR_TO_BUF,
9349 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED,
9350 },
9351 };
9352
9353 static const struct bpf_reg_types spin_lock_types = {
9354 .types = {
9355 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
9356 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC,
9357 }
9358 };
9359
9360 static const struct bpf_reg_types fullsock_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_SOCKET } };
9361 static const struct bpf_reg_types scalar_types = { .types = { SCALAR_VALUE } };
9362 static const struct bpf_reg_types context_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_CTX } };
9363 static const struct bpf_reg_types ringbuf_mem_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF } };
9364 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_map_ptr_types = { .types = { CONST_PTR_TO_MAP } };
9365 static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = {
9366 .types = {
9367 PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
9368 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED,
9369 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU,
9370 },
9371 };
9372 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = {
9373 .types = {
9374 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU,
9375 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_RCU,
9376 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED,
9377 }
9378 };
9379 static const struct bpf_reg_types func_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_FUNC } };
9380 static const struct bpf_reg_types stack_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_STACK } };
9381 static const struct bpf_reg_types const_str_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } };
9382 static const struct bpf_reg_types timer_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } };
9383 static const struct bpf_reg_types kptr_xchg_dest_types = {
9384 .types = {
9385 PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
9386 PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC
9387 }
9388 };
9389 static const struct bpf_reg_types dynptr_types = {
9390 .types = {
9391 PTR_TO_STACK,
9392 CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR,
9393 }
9394 };
9395
9396 static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = {
9397 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY] = &mem_types,
9398 [ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = &mem_types,
9399 [ARG_CONST_SIZE] = &scalar_types,
9400 [ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types,
9401 [ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO] = &scalar_types,
9402 [ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR] = &const_map_ptr_types,
9403 [ARG_PTR_TO_CTX] = &context_types,
9404 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &sock_types,
9405 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
9406 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_id_sock_common_types,
9407 #endif
9408 [ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &fullsock_types,
9409 [ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID] = &btf_ptr_types,
9410 [ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK] = &spin_lock_types,
9411 [ARG_PTR_TO_MEM] = &mem_types,
9412 [ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM] = &ringbuf_mem_types,
9413 [ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID] = &percpu_btf_ptr_types,
9414 [ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC] = &func_ptr_types,
9415 [ARG_PTR_TO_STACK] = &stack_ptr_types,
9416 [ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR] = &const_str_ptr_types,
9417 [ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER] = &timer_types,
9418 [ARG_KPTR_XCHG_DEST] = &kptr_xchg_dest_types,
9419 [ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = &dynptr_types,
9420 };
9421
check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 regno,enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,const u32 * arg_btf_id,struct bpf_call_arg_meta * meta)9422 static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
9423 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
9424 const u32 *arg_btf_id,
9425 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
9426 {
9427 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
9428 enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type;
9429 const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible;
9430 int i, j;
9431
9432 compatible = compatible_reg_types[base_type(arg_type)];
9433 if (!compatible) {
9434 verifier_bug(env, "unsupported arg type %d", arg_type);
9435 return -EFAULT;
9436 }
9437
9438 /* ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY,
9439 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM and NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + RDONLY
9440 *
9441 * Same for MAYBE_NULL:
9442 *
9443 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL,
9444 * but ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible only with PTR_TO_MEM but NOT with PTR_TO_MEM + MAYBE_NULL
9445 *
9446 * ARG_PTR_TO_MEM is compatible with PTR_TO_MEM that is tagged with a dynptr type.
9447 *
9448 * Therefore we fold these flags depending on the arg_type before comparison.
9449 */
9450 if (arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)
9451 type &= ~MEM_RDONLY;
9452 if (arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL)
9453 type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
9454 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM)
9455 type &= ~DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK;
9456
9457 /* Local kptr types are allowed as the source argument of bpf_kptr_xchg */
9458 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && type_is_alloc(type) && regno == BPF_REG_2) {
9459 type &= ~MEM_ALLOC;
9460 type &= ~MEM_PERCPU;
9461 }
9462
9463 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) {
9464 expected = compatible->types[i];
9465 if (expected == NOT_INIT)
9466 break;
9467
9468 if (type == expected)
9469 goto found;
9470 }
9471
9472 verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=", regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
9473 for (j = 0; j + 1 < i; j++)
9474 verbose(env, "%s, ", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j]));
9475 verbose(env, "%s\n", reg_type_str(env, compatible->types[j]));
9476 return -EACCES;
9477
9478 found:
9479 if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
9480 return 0;
9481
9482 if (compatible == &mem_types) {
9483 if (!(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) {
9484 verbose(env,
9485 "%s() may write into memory pointed by R%d type=%s\n",
9486 func_id_name(meta->func_id),
9487 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
9488 return -EACCES;
9489 }
9490 return 0;
9491 }
9492
9493 switch ((int)reg->type) {
9494 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
9495 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED:
9496 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL:
9497 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU:
9498 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL:
9499 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU:
9500 {
9501 /* For bpf_sk_release, it needs to match against first member
9502 * 'struct sock_common', hence make an exception for it. This
9503 * allows bpf_sk_release to work for multiple socket types.
9504 */
9505 bool strict_type_match = arg_type_is_release(arg_type) &&
9506 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_release;
9507
9508 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) &&
9509 (!type_may_be_null(arg_type) || arg_type_is_release(arg_type))) {
9510 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper arg%d\n", regno);
9511 return -EACCES;
9512 }
9513
9514 if (!arg_btf_id) {
9515 if (!compatible->btf_id) {
9516 verifier_bug(env, "missing arg compatible BTF ID");
9517 return -EFAULT;
9518 }
9519 arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id;
9520 }
9521
9522 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) {
9523 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno))
9524 return -EACCES;
9525 } else {
9526 if (arg_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) {
9527 verbose(env, "verifier internal error:");
9528 verbose(env, "R%d has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON type\n",
9529 regno);
9530 return -EACCES;
9531 }
9532
9533 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off,
9534 btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id,
9535 strict_type_match)) {
9536 verbose(env, "R%d is of type %s but %s is expected\n",
9537 regno, btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id),
9538 btf_type_name(btf_vmlinux, *arg_btf_id));
9539 return -EACCES;
9540 }
9541 }
9542 break;
9543 }
9544 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC:
9545 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_ALLOC:
9546 if (meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_lock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock &&
9547 meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) {
9548 verifier_bug(env, "unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC");
9549 return -EFAULT;
9550 }
9551 /* Check if local kptr in src arg matches kptr in dst arg */
9552 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && regno == BPF_REG_2) {
9553 if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno))
9554 return -EACCES;
9555 }
9556 break;
9557 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU:
9558 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_RCU:
9559 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED:
9560 /* Handled by helper specific checks */
9561 break;
9562 default:
9563 verifier_bug(env, "invalid PTR_TO_BTF_ID register for type match");
9564 return -EFAULT;
9565 }
9566 return 0;
9567 }
9568
9569 static struct btf_field *
reg_find_field_offset(const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,s32 off,u32 fields)9570 reg_find_field_offset(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, s32 off, u32 fields)
9571 {
9572 struct btf_field *field;
9573 struct btf_record *rec;
9574
9575 rec = reg_btf_record(reg);
9576 if (!rec)
9577 return NULL;
9578
9579 field = btf_record_find(rec, off, fields);
9580 if (!field)
9581 return NULL;
9582
9583 return field;
9584 }
9585
check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int regno,enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)9586 static int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9587 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno,
9588 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
9589 {
9590 u32 type = reg->type;
9591
9592 /* When referenced register is passed to release function, its fixed
9593 * offset must be 0.
9594 *
9595 * We will check arg_type_is_release reg has ref_obj_id when storing
9596 * meta->release_regno.
9597 */
9598 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) {
9599 /* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR with OBJ_RELEASE is a bit special, as it
9600 * may not directly point to the object being released, but to
9601 * dynptr pointing to such object, which might be at some offset
9602 * on the stack. In that case, we simply to fallback to the
9603 * default handling.
9604 */
9605 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && type == PTR_TO_STACK)
9606 return 0;
9607
9608 /* Doing check_ptr_off_reg check for the offset will catch this
9609 * because fixed_off_ok is false, but checking here allows us
9610 * to give the user a better error message.
9611 */
9612 if (reg->off) {
9613 verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func or trusted arg to kfunc\n",
9614 regno);
9615 return -EINVAL;
9616 }
9617 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false);
9618 }
9619
9620 switch (type) {
9621 /* Pointer types where both fixed and variable offset is explicitly allowed: */
9622 case PTR_TO_STACK:
9623 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
9624 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
9625 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
9626 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
9627 case PTR_TO_MEM:
9628 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY:
9629 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RINGBUF:
9630 case PTR_TO_BUF:
9631 case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY:
9632 case PTR_TO_ARENA:
9633 case SCALAR_VALUE:
9634 return 0;
9635 /* All the rest must be rejected, except PTR_TO_BTF_ID which allows
9636 * fixed offset.
9637 */
9638 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
9639 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC:
9640 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED:
9641 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU:
9642 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF:
9643 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF | MEM_RCU:
9644 /* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function,
9645 * its fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset
9646 * can be non-zero. This was already checked above. So pass
9647 * fixed_off_ok as true to allow fixed offset for all other
9648 * cases. var_off always must be 0 for PTR_TO_BTF_ID, hence we
9649 * still need to do checks instead of returning.
9650 */
9651 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true);
9652 default:
9653 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false);
9654 }
9655 }
9656
get_dynptr_arg_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_func_proto * fn,struct bpf_reg_state * regs)9657 static struct bpf_reg_state *get_dynptr_arg_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9658 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn,
9659 struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
9660 {
9661 struct bpf_reg_state *state = NULL;
9662 int i;
9663
9664 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++)
9665 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[i])) {
9666 if (state) {
9667 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple dynptr args\n");
9668 return NULL;
9669 }
9670 state = ®s[BPF_REG_1 + i];
9671 }
9672
9673 if (!state)
9674 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr arg found\n");
9675
9676 return state;
9677 }
9678
dynptr_id(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)9679 static int dynptr_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
9680 {
9681 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
9682 int spi;
9683
9684 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
9685 return reg->id;
9686 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
9687 if (spi < 0)
9688 return spi;
9689 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id;
9690 }
9691
dynptr_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)9692 static int dynptr_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
9693 {
9694 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
9695 int spi;
9696
9697 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
9698 return reg->ref_obj_id;
9699 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
9700 if (spi < 0)
9701 return spi;
9702 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id;
9703 }
9704
dynptr_get_type(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)9705 static enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_get_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9706 struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
9707 {
9708 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
9709 int spi;
9710
9711 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
9712 return reg->dynptr.type;
9713
9714 spi = __get_spi(reg->off);
9715 if (spi < 0) {
9716 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: invalid spi when querying dynptr type\n");
9717 return BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID;
9718 }
9719
9720 return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type;
9721 }
9722
check_reg_const_str(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 regno)9723 static int check_reg_const_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9724 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno)
9725 {
9726 struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
9727 int err;
9728 int map_off;
9729 u64 map_addr;
9730 char *str_ptr;
9731
9732 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE)
9733 return -EINVAL;
9734
9735 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) {
9736 verbose(env, "R%d points to insn_array map which cannot be used as const string\n", regno);
9737 return -EACCES;
9738 }
9739
9740 if (!bpf_map_is_rdonly(map)) {
9741 verbose(env, "R%d does not point to a readonly map'\n", regno);
9742 return -EACCES;
9743 }
9744
9745 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
9746 verbose(env, "R%d is not a constant address'\n", regno);
9747 return -EACCES;
9748 }
9749
9750 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
9751 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n");
9752 return -EACCES;
9753 }
9754
9755 err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off,
9756 map->value_size - reg->off, false,
9757 ACCESS_HELPER);
9758 if (err)
9759 return err;
9760
9761 map_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
9762 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &map_addr, map_off);
9763 if (err) {
9764 verbose(env, "direct value access on string failed\n");
9765 return err;
9766 }
9767
9768 str_ptr = (char *)(long)(map_addr);
9769 if (!strnchr(str_ptr + map_off, map->value_size - map_off, 0)) {
9770 verbose(env, "string is not zero-terminated\n");
9771 return -EINVAL;
9772 }
9773 return 0;
9774 }
9775
9776 /* Returns constant key value in `value` if possible, else negative error */
get_constant_map_key(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * key,u32 key_size,s64 * value)9777 static int get_constant_map_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
9778 struct bpf_reg_state *key,
9779 u32 key_size,
9780 s64 *value)
9781 {
9782 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, key);
9783 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
9784 int slot, spi, off;
9785 int spill_size = 0;
9786 int zero_size = 0;
9787 int stack_off;
9788 int i, err;
9789 u8 *stype;
9790
9791 if (!env->bpf_capable)
9792 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
9793 if (key->type != PTR_TO_STACK)
9794 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
9795 if (!tnum_is_const(key->var_off))
9796 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
9797
9798 stack_off = key->off + key->var_off.value;
9799 slot = -stack_off - 1;
9800 spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
9801 off = slot % BPF_REG_SIZE;
9802 stype = state->stack[spi].slot_type;
9803
9804 /* First handle precisely tracked STACK_ZERO */
9805 for (i = off; i >= 0 && stype[i] == STACK_ZERO; i--)
9806 zero_size++;
9807 if (zero_size >= key_size) {
9808 *value = 0;
9809 return 0;
9810 }
9811
9812 /* Check that stack contains a scalar spill of expected size */
9813 if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&state->stack[spi]))
9814 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
9815 for (i = off; i >= 0 && stype[i] == STACK_SPILL; i--)
9816 spill_size++;
9817 if (spill_size != key_size)
9818 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
9819
9820 reg = &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
9821 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
9822 /* Stack value not statically known */
9823 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
9824
9825 /* We are relying on a constant value. So mark as precise
9826 * to prevent pruning on it.
9827 */
9828 bt_set_frame_slot(&env->bt, key->frameno, spi);
9829 err = mark_chain_precision_batch(env, env->cur_state);
9830 if (err < 0)
9831 return err;
9832
9833 *value = reg->var_off.value;
9834 return 0;
9835 }
9836
9837 static bool can_elide_value_nullness(enum bpf_map_type type);
9838
check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 arg,struct bpf_call_arg_meta * meta,const struct bpf_func_proto * fn,int insn_idx)9839 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
9840 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
9841 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn,
9842 int insn_idx)
9843 {
9844 u32 regno = BPF_REG_1 + arg;
9845 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
9846 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[arg];
9847 enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type;
9848 u32 *arg_btf_id = NULL;
9849 u32 key_size;
9850 int err = 0;
9851
9852 if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE)
9853 return 0;
9854
9855 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP);
9856 if (err)
9857 return err;
9858
9859 if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
9860 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
9861 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n",
9862 regno);
9863 return -EACCES;
9864 }
9865 return 0;
9866 }
9867
9868 if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) &&
9869 !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) {
9870 verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n");
9871 return -EACCES;
9872 }
9873
9874 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
9875 err = resolve_map_arg_type(env, meta, &arg_type);
9876 if (err)
9877 return err;
9878 }
9879
9880 if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg_type))
9881 /* A NULL register has a SCALAR_VALUE type, so skip
9882 * type checking.
9883 */
9884 goto skip_type_check;
9885
9886 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */
9887 if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID ||
9888 base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK)
9889 arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg];
9890
9891 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta);
9892 if (err)
9893 return err;
9894
9895 err = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type);
9896 if (err)
9897 return err;
9898
9899 skip_type_check:
9900 if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) {
9901 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) {
9902 struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
9903 int spi;
9904
9905 /* Only dynptr created on stack can be released, thus
9906 * the get_spi and stack state checks for spilled_ptr
9907 * should only be done before process_dynptr_func for
9908 * PTR_TO_STACK.
9909 */
9910 if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
9911 spi = dynptr_get_spi(env, reg);
9912 if (spi < 0 || !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id) {
9913 verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno);
9914 return -EINVAL;
9915 }
9916 } else {
9917 verbose(env, "cannot release unowned const bpf_dynptr\n");
9918 return -EINVAL;
9919 }
9920 } else if (!reg->ref_obj_id && !register_is_null(reg)) {
9921 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced when passed to release function\n",
9922 regno);
9923 return -EINVAL;
9924 }
9925 if (meta->release_regno) {
9926 verifier_bug(env, "more than one release argument");
9927 return -EFAULT;
9928 }
9929 meta->release_regno = regno;
9930 }
9931
9932 if (reg->ref_obj_id && base_type(arg_type) != ARG_KPTR_XCHG_DEST) {
9933 if (meta->ref_obj_id) {
9934 verbose(env, "more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u",
9935 regno, reg->ref_obj_id,
9936 meta->ref_obj_id);
9937 return -EACCES;
9938 }
9939 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id;
9940 }
9941
9942 switch (base_type(arg_type)) {
9943 case ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR:
9944 /* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */
9945 if (meta->map.ptr) {
9946 /* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject:
9947 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1)
9948 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2)
9949 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) {
9950 * timer = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1);
9951 * if (timer)
9952 * // mismatch would have been allowed
9953 * bpf_timer_init(timer, inner_map2);
9954 * }
9955 *
9956 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps.
9957 */
9958 if (meta->map.ptr != reg->map_ptr ||
9959 meta->map.uid != reg->map_uid) {
9960 verbose(env,
9961 "timer pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n",
9962 meta->map.uid, reg->map_uid);
9963 return -EINVAL;
9964 }
9965 }
9966 meta->map.ptr = reg->map_ptr;
9967 meta->map.uid = reg->map_uid;
9968 break;
9969 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
9970 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call:
9971 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within
9972 * stack limits and initialized
9973 */
9974 if (!meta->map.ptr) {
9975 /* in function declaration map_ptr must come before
9976 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before
9977 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means
9978 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier
9979 */
9980 verifier_bug(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key");
9981 return -EFAULT;
9982 }
9983 key_size = meta->map.ptr->key_size;
9984 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, key_size, BPF_READ, false, NULL);
9985 if (err)
9986 return err;
9987 if (can_elide_value_nullness(meta->map.ptr->map_type)) {
9988 err = get_constant_map_key(env, reg, key_size, &meta->const_map_key);
9989 if (err < 0) {
9990 meta->const_map_key = -1;
9991 if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
9992 err = 0;
9993 else
9994 return err;
9995 }
9996 }
9997 break;
9998 case ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
9999 if (type_may_be_null(arg_type) && register_is_null(reg))
10000 return 0;
10001
10002 /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call:
10003 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity
10004 */
10005 if (!meta->map.ptr) {
10006 /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
10007 verifier_bug(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value");
10008 return -EFAULT;
10009 }
10010 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT;
10011 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, meta->map.ptr->value_size,
10012 arg_type & MEM_WRITE ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ,
10013 false, meta);
10014 break;
10015 case ARG_PTR_TO_PERCPU_BTF_ID:
10016 if (!reg->btf_id) {
10017 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf_id in R%d\n", regno);
10018 return -EACCES;
10019 }
10020 meta->ret_btf = reg->btf;
10021 meta->ret_btf_id = reg->btf_id;
10022 break;
10023 case ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK:
10024 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) {
10025 verbose(env, "can't spin_{lock,unlock} in rbtree cb\n");
10026 return -EACCES;
10027 }
10028 if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) {
10029 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK);
10030 if (err)
10031 return err;
10032 } else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) {
10033 err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, 0);
10034 if (err)
10035 return err;
10036 } else {
10037 verifier_bug(env, "spin lock arg on unexpected helper");
10038 return -EFAULT;
10039 }
10040 break;
10041 case ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER:
10042 err = process_timer_helper(env, regno, meta);
10043 if (err)
10044 return err;
10045 break;
10046 case ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC:
10047 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno;
10048 break;
10049 case ARG_PTR_TO_MEM:
10050 /* The access to this pointer is only checked when we hit the
10051 * next is_mem_size argument below.
10052 */
10053 meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT;
10054 if (arg_type & MEM_FIXED_SIZE) {
10055 err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, fn->arg_size[arg],
10056 arg_type & MEM_WRITE ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ,
10057 false, meta);
10058 if (err)
10059 return err;
10060 if (arg_type & MEM_ALIGNED)
10061 err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, 0, fn->arg_size[arg], true);
10062 }
10063 break;
10064 case ARG_CONST_SIZE:
10065 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno,
10066 fn->arg_type[arg - 1] & MEM_WRITE ?
10067 BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ,
10068 false, meta);
10069 break;
10070 case ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO:
10071 err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno,
10072 fn->arg_type[arg - 1] & MEM_WRITE ?
10073 BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ,
10074 true, meta);
10075 break;
10076 case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR:
10077 err = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, arg_type, 0);
10078 if (err)
10079 return err;
10080 break;
10081 case ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO:
10082 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
10083 verbose(env, "R%d is not a known constant'\n",
10084 regno);
10085 return -EACCES;
10086 }
10087 meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value;
10088 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
10089 if (err)
10090 return err;
10091 break;
10092 case ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR:
10093 {
10094 err = check_reg_const_str(env, reg, regno);
10095 if (err)
10096 return err;
10097 break;
10098 }
10099 case ARG_KPTR_XCHG_DEST:
10100 err = process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta);
10101 if (err)
10102 return err;
10103 break;
10104 }
10105
10106 return err;
10107 }
10108
may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int func_id)10109 static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id)
10110 {
10111 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type;
10112 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
10113
10114 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem &&
10115 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem)
10116 return false;
10117
10118 /* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these
10119 * contexts, so updating is safe.
10120 */
10121 switch (type) {
10122 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
10123 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER)
10124 return true;
10125 break;
10126 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS:
10127 /* map_update allowed only via dedicated helpers with event type checks */
10128 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem)
10129 return true;
10130 break;
10131 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
10132 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
10133 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
10134 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
10135 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT:
10136 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR:
10137 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP:
10138 return true;
10139 default:
10140 break;
10141 }
10142
10143 verbose(env, "cannot update sockmap in this context\n");
10144 return false;
10145 }
10146
allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)10147 static bool allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
10148 {
10149 return env->prog->jit_requested &&
10150 bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls();
10151 }
10152
check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_map * map,int func_id)10153 static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10154 struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
10155 {
10156 if (!map)
10157 return 0;
10158
10159 /* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
10160 switch (map->map_type) {
10161 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
10162 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
10163 goto error;
10164 break;
10165 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
10166 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
10167 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output &&
10168 func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_output &&
10169 func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value &&
10170 func_id != BPF_FUNC_xdp_output)
10171 goto error;
10172 break;
10173 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF:
10174 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output &&
10175 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve &&
10176 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query &&
10177 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr &&
10178 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr &&
10179 func_id != BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr)
10180 goto error;
10181 break;
10182 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF:
10183 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain)
10184 goto error;
10185 break;
10186 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
10187 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
10188 goto error;
10189 break;
10190 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
10191 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup &&
10192 func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup)
10193 goto error;
10194 break;
10195 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE:
10196 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE:
10197 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage)
10198 goto error;
10199 break;
10200 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
10201 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH:
10202 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map &&
10203 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
10204 goto error;
10205 break;
10206 /* Restrict bpf side of cpumap and xskmap, open when use-cases
10207 * appear.
10208 */
10209 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP:
10210 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
10211 goto error;
10212 break;
10213 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
10214 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map &&
10215 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
10216 goto error;
10217 break;
10218 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
10219 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
10220 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
10221 goto error;
10222 break;
10223 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
10224 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map &&
10225 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update &&
10226 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map &&
10227 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport &&
10228 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
10229 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id))
10230 goto error;
10231 break;
10232 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
10233 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash &&
10234 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update &&
10235 func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash &&
10236 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport &&
10237 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
10238 !may_update_sockmap(env, func_id))
10239 goto error;
10240 break;
10241 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY:
10242 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport)
10243 goto error;
10244 break;
10245 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE:
10246 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK:
10247 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem &&
10248 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem &&
10249 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem)
10250 goto error;
10251 break;
10252 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE:
10253 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get &&
10254 func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete &&
10255 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg)
10256 goto error;
10257 break;
10258 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE:
10259 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get &&
10260 func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete &&
10261 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg)
10262 goto error;
10263 break;
10264 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE:
10265 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get &&
10266 func_id != BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete &&
10267 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg)
10268 goto error;
10269 break;
10270 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE:
10271 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get &&
10272 func_id != BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete &&
10273 func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg)
10274 goto error;
10275 break;
10276 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER:
10277 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem &&
10278 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem)
10279 goto error;
10280 break;
10281 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY:
10282 goto error;
10283 default:
10284 break;
10285 }
10286
10287 /* ... and second from the function itself. */
10288 switch (func_id) {
10289 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
10290 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
10291 goto error;
10292 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && !allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env)) {
10293 verbose(env, "mixing of tail_calls and bpf-to-bpf calls is not supported\n");
10294 return -EINVAL;
10295 }
10296 break;
10297 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
10298 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
10299 case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value:
10300 case BPF_FUNC_skb_output:
10301 case BPF_FUNC_xdp_output:
10302 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
10303 goto error;
10304 break;
10305 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output:
10306 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve:
10307 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_query:
10308 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr:
10309 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_submit_dynptr:
10310 case BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_discard_dynptr:
10311 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF)
10312 goto error;
10313 break;
10314 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain:
10315 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF)
10316 goto error;
10317 break;
10318 case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
10319 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
10320 goto error;
10321 break;
10322 case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup:
10323 case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup:
10324 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY)
10325 goto error;
10326 break;
10327 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
10328 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP &&
10329 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH &&
10330 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP &&
10331 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP)
10332 goto error;
10333 break;
10334 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map:
10335 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map:
10336 case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update:
10337 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
10338 goto error;
10339 break;
10340 case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash:
10341 case BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash:
10342 case BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update:
10343 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)
10344 goto error;
10345 break;
10346 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage:
10347 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE &&
10348 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE)
10349 goto error;
10350 break;
10351 case BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport:
10352 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY &&
10353 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP &&
10354 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH)
10355 goto error;
10356 break;
10357 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem:
10358 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE &&
10359 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK)
10360 goto error;
10361 break;
10362 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem:
10363 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem:
10364 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE &&
10365 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK &&
10366 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER)
10367 goto error;
10368 break;
10369 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem:
10370 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY &&
10371 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH &&
10372 map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH)
10373 goto error;
10374 break;
10375 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get:
10376 case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete:
10377 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE)
10378 goto error;
10379 break;
10380 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_get:
10381 case BPF_FUNC_inode_storage_delete:
10382 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE)
10383 goto error;
10384 break;
10385 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_get:
10386 case BPF_FUNC_task_storage_delete:
10387 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE)
10388 goto error;
10389 break;
10390 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_get:
10391 case BPF_FUNC_cgrp_storage_delete:
10392 if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE)
10393 goto error;
10394 break;
10395 default:
10396 break;
10397 }
10398
10399 return 0;
10400 error:
10401 verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
10402 map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
10403 return -EINVAL;
10404 }
10405
check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto * fn)10406 static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
10407 {
10408 int count = 0;
10409
10410 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg1_type))
10411 count++;
10412 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg2_type))
10413 count++;
10414 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg3_type))
10415 count++;
10416 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg4_type))
10417 count++;
10418 if (arg_type_is_raw_mem(fn->arg5_type))
10419 count++;
10420
10421 /* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment,
10422 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have
10423 * right now.
10424 */
10425 return count <= 1;
10426 }
10427
check_args_pair_invalid(const struct bpf_func_proto * fn,int arg)10428 static bool check_args_pair_invalid(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, int arg)
10429 {
10430 bool is_fixed = fn->arg_type[arg] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE;
10431 bool has_size = fn->arg_size[arg] != 0;
10432 bool is_next_size = false;
10433
10434 if (arg + 1 < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type))
10435 is_next_size = arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg_type[arg + 1]);
10436
10437 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[arg]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM)
10438 return is_next_size;
10439
10440 return has_size == is_next_size || is_next_size == is_fixed;
10441 }
10442
check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto * fn)10443 static bool check_arg_pair_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
10444 {
10445 /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len'
10446 * bytes from memory 'buf'. Both arg types need
10447 * to be paired, so make sure there's no buggy
10448 * helper function specification.
10449 */
10450 if (arg_type_is_mem_size(fn->arg1_type) ||
10451 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 0) ||
10452 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 1) ||
10453 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 2) ||
10454 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 3) ||
10455 check_args_pair_invalid(fn, 4))
10456 return false;
10457
10458 return true;
10459 }
10460
check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto * fn)10461 static bool check_btf_id_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
10462 {
10463 int i;
10464
10465 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) {
10466 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
10467 return !!fn->arg_btf_id[i];
10468 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK)
10469 return fn->arg_btf_id[i] == BPF_PTR_POISON;
10470 if (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID && fn->arg_btf_id[i] &&
10471 /* arg_btf_id and arg_size are in a union. */
10472 (base_type(fn->arg_type[i]) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM ||
10473 !(fn->arg_type[i] & MEM_FIXED_SIZE)))
10474 return false;
10475 }
10476
10477 return true;
10478 }
10479
check_mem_arg_rw_flag_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto * fn)10480 static bool check_mem_arg_rw_flag_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
10481 {
10482 int i;
10483
10484 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); i++) {
10485 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = fn->arg_type[i];
10486
10487 if (base_type(arg_type) != ARG_PTR_TO_MEM)
10488 continue;
10489 if (!(arg_type & (MEM_WRITE | MEM_RDONLY)))
10490 return false;
10491 }
10492
10493 return true;
10494 }
10495
check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto * fn)10496 static int check_func_proto(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
10497 {
10498 return check_raw_mode_ok(fn) &&
10499 check_arg_pair_ok(fn) &&
10500 check_mem_arg_rw_flag_ok(fn) &&
10501 check_btf_id_ok(fn) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
10502 }
10503
10504 /* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]
10505 * are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE.
10506 *
10507 * This also applies to dynptr slices belonging to skb and xdp dynptrs,
10508 * since these slices point to packet data.
10509 */
clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)10510 static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
10511 {
10512 struct bpf_func_state *state;
10513 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
10514
10515 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({
10516 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg) || reg_is_dynptr_slice_pkt(reg))
10517 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg);
10518 }));
10519 }
10520
10521 enum {
10522 AT_PKT_END = -1,
10523 BEYOND_PKT_END = -2,
10524 };
10525
mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state * vstate,int regn,bool range_open)10526 static void mark_pkt_end(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, int regn, bool range_open)
10527 {
10528 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
10529 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regn];
10530
10531 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET)
10532 /* PTR_TO_PACKET_META is not supported yet */
10533 return;
10534
10535 /* The 'reg' is pkt > pkt_end or pkt >= pkt_end.
10536 * How far beyond pkt_end it goes is unknown.
10537 * if (!range_open) it's the case of pkt >= pkt_end
10538 * if (range_open) it's the case of pkt > pkt_end
10539 * hence this pointer is at least 1 byte bigger than pkt_end
10540 */
10541 if (range_open)
10542 reg->range = BEYOND_PKT_END;
10543 else
10544 reg->range = AT_PKT_END;
10545 }
10546
release_reference_nomark(struct bpf_verifier_state * state,int ref_obj_id)10547 static int release_reference_nomark(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int ref_obj_id)
10548 {
10549 int i;
10550
10551 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
10552 if (state->refs[i].type != REF_TYPE_PTR)
10553 continue;
10554 if (state->refs[i].id == ref_obj_id) {
10555 release_reference_state(state, i);
10556 return 0;
10557 }
10558 }
10559 return -EINVAL;
10560 }
10561
10562 /* The pointer with the specified id has released its reference to kernel
10563 * resources. Identify all copies of the same pointer and clear the reference.
10564 *
10565 * This is the release function corresponding to acquire_reference(). Idempotent.
10566 */
release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int ref_obj_id)10567 static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id)
10568 {
10569 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
10570 struct bpf_func_state *state;
10571 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
10572 int err;
10573
10574 err = release_reference_nomark(vstate, ref_obj_id);
10575 if (err)
10576 return err;
10577
10578 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({
10579 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id)
10580 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg);
10581 }));
10582
10583 return 0;
10584 }
10585
invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)10586 static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
10587 {
10588 struct bpf_func_state *unused;
10589 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
10590
10591 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({
10592 if (type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type))
10593 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg);
10594 }));
10595 }
10596
clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * regs)10597 static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10598 struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
10599 {
10600 int i;
10601
10602 /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */
10603 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
10604 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
10605 __check_reg_arg(env, regs, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
10606 }
10607 }
10608
10609 typedef int (*set_callee_state_fn)(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10610 struct bpf_func_state *caller,
10611 struct bpf_func_state *callee,
10612 int insn_idx);
10613
10614 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10615 struct bpf_func_state *caller,
10616 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx);
10617
setup_func_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int subprog,int callsite,set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb,struct bpf_verifier_state * state)10618 static int setup_func_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, int callsite,
10619 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb,
10620 struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
10621 {
10622 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee;
10623 int err;
10624
10625 if (state->curframe + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) {
10626 verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep\n",
10627 state->curframe + 2);
10628 return -E2BIG;
10629 }
10630
10631 if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) {
10632 verifier_bug(env, "Frame %d already allocated", state->curframe + 1);
10633 return -EFAULT;
10634 }
10635
10636 caller = state->frame[state->curframe];
10637 callee = kzalloc_obj(*callee, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
10638 if (!callee)
10639 return -ENOMEM;
10640 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee;
10641
10642 /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write
10643 * into its own stack before reading from it.
10644 * callee can read/write into caller's stack
10645 */
10646 init_func_state(env, callee,
10647 /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */
10648 callsite,
10649 state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */,
10650 subprog /* subprog number within this prog */);
10651 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, callsite);
10652 if (err)
10653 goto err_out;
10654
10655 /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */
10656 state->curframe++;
10657
10658 return 0;
10659
10660 err_out:
10661 free_func_state(callee);
10662 state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL;
10663 return err;
10664 }
10665
btf_check_func_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int subprog,const struct btf * btf,struct bpf_reg_state * regs)10666 static int btf_check_func_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog,
10667 const struct btf *btf,
10668 struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
10669 {
10670 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub = subprog_info(env, subprog);
10671 struct bpf_verifier_log *log = &env->log;
10672 u32 i;
10673 int ret;
10674
10675 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog);
10676 if (ret)
10677 return ret;
10678
10679 /* check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the
10680 * verifier sees.
10681 */
10682 for (i = 0; i < sub->arg_cnt; i++) {
10683 u32 regno = i + 1;
10684 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno];
10685 struct bpf_subprog_arg_info *arg = &sub->args[i];
10686
10687 if (arg->arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
10688 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
10689 bpf_log(log, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno);
10690 return -EINVAL;
10691 }
10692 } else if (arg->arg_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) {
10693 /*
10694 * Anything is allowed for untrusted arguments, as these are
10695 * read-only and probe read instructions would protect against
10696 * invalid memory access.
10697 */
10698 } else if (arg->arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
10699 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, ARG_DONTCARE);
10700 if (ret < 0)
10701 return ret;
10702 /* If function expects ctx type in BTF check that caller
10703 * is passing PTR_TO_CTX.
10704 */
10705 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
10706 bpf_log(log, "arg#%d expects pointer to ctx\n", i);
10707 return -EINVAL;
10708 }
10709 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) {
10710 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, ARG_DONTCARE);
10711 if (ret < 0)
10712 return ret;
10713 if (check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, arg->mem_size))
10714 return -EINVAL;
10715 if (!(arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && (reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL)) {
10716 bpf_log(log, "arg#%d is expected to be non-NULL\n", i);
10717 return -EINVAL;
10718 }
10719 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_ARENA) {
10720 /*
10721 * Can pass any value and the kernel won't crash, but
10722 * only PTR_TO_ARENA or SCALAR make sense. Everything
10723 * else is a bug in the bpf program. Point it out to
10724 * the user at the verification time instead of
10725 * run-time debug nightmare.
10726 */
10727 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_ARENA && reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
10728 bpf_log(log, "R%d is not a pointer to arena or scalar.\n", regno);
10729 return -EINVAL;
10730 }
10731 } else if (arg->arg_type == (ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY)) {
10732 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR);
10733 if (ret)
10734 return ret;
10735
10736 ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, -1, arg->arg_type, 0);
10737 if (ret)
10738 return ret;
10739 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
10740 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
10741 int err;
10742
10743 if (register_is_null(reg) && type_may_be_null(arg->arg_type))
10744 continue;
10745
10746 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); /* leave func_id as zero */
10747 err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg->arg_type, &arg->btf_id, &meta);
10748 err = err ?: check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg->arg_type);
10749 if (err)
10750 return err;
10751 } else {
10752 verifier_bug(env, "unrecognized arg#%d type %d", i, arg->arg_type);
10753 return -EFAULT;
10754 }
10755 }
10756
10757 return 0;
10758 }
10759
10760 /* Compare BTF of a function call with given bpf_reg_state.
10761 * Returns:
10762 * EFAULT - there is a verifier bug. Abort verification.
10763 * EINVAL - there is a type mismatch or BTF is not available.
10764 * 0 - BTF matches with what bpf_reg_state expects.
10765 * Only PTR_TO_CTX and SCALAR_VALUE states are recognized.
10766 */
btf_check_subprog_call(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int subprog,struct bpf_reg_state * regs)10767 static int btf_check_subprog_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog,
10768 struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
10769 {
10770 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
10771 struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf;
10772 u32 btf_id;
10773 int err;
10774
10775 if (!prog->aux->func_info)
10776 return -EINVAL;
10777
10778 btf_id = prog->aux->func_info[subprog].type_id;
10779 if (!btf_id)
10780 return -EFAULT;
10781
10782 if (prog->aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable)
10783 return -EINVAL;
10784
10785 err = btf_check_func_arg_match(env, subprog, btf, regs);
10786 /* Compiler optimizations can remove arguments from static functions
10787 * or mismatched type can be passed into a global function.
10788 * In such cases mark the function as unreliable from BTF point of view.
10789 */
10790 if (err)
10791 prog->aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable = true;
10792 return err;
10793 }
10794
push_callback_call(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,int insn_idx,int subprog,set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb)10795 static int push_callback_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
10796 int insn_idx, int subprog,
10797 set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb)
10798 {
10799 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *callback_state;
10800 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee;
10801 int err;
10802
10803 caller = state->frame[state->curframe];
10804 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs);
10805 if (err == -EFAULT)
10806 return err;
10807
10808 /* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are
10809 * interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as
10810 * callbacks
10811 */
10812 env->subprog_info[subprog].is_cb = true;
10813 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) &&
10814 !is_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)) {
10815 verifier_bug(env, "kfunc %s#%d not marked as callback-calling",
10816 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
10817 return -EFAULT;
10818 } else if (!bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) &&
10819 !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { /* helper */
10820 verifier_bug(env, "helper %s#%d not marked as callback-calling",
10821 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
10822 return -EFAULT;
10823 }
10824
10825 if (is_async_callback_calling_insn(insn)) {
10826 struct bpf_verifier_state *async_cb;
10827
10828 /* there is no real recursion here. timer and workqueue callbacks are async */
10829 env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true;
10830 async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start,
10831 insn_idx, subprog,
10832 is_async_cb_sleepable(env, insn));
10833 if (IS_ERR(async_cb))
10834 return PTR_ERR(async_cb);
10835 callee = async_cb->frame[0];
10836 callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1;
10837
10838 /* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */
10839 err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, insn_idx);
10840 if (err)
10841 return err;
10842
10843 return 0;
10844 }
10845
10846 /* for callback functions enqueue entry to callback and
10847 * proceed with next instruction within current frame.
10848 */
10849 callback_state = push_stack(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, insn_idx, false);
10850 if (IS_ERR(callback_state))
10851 return PTR_ERR(callback_state);
10852
10853 err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, insn_idx, set_callee_state_cb,
10854 callback_state);
10855 if (err)
10856 return err;
10857
10858 callback_state->callback_unroll_depth++;
10859 callback_state->frame[callback_state->curframe - 1]->callback_depth++;
10860 caller->callback_depth = 0;
10861 return 0;
10862 }
10863
check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,int * insn_idx)10864 static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
10865 int *insn_idx)
10866 {
10867 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
10868 struct bpf_func_state *caller;
10869 int err, subprog, target_insn;
10870
10871 target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1;
10872 subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn);
10873 if (verifier_bug_if(subprog < 0, env, "target of func call at insn %d is not a program",
10874 target_insn))
10875 return -EFAULT;
10876
10877 caller = state->frame[state->curframe];
10878 err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs);
10879 if (err == -EFAULT)
10880 return err;
10881 if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) {
10882 const char *sub_name = subprog_name(env, subprog);
10883
10884 if (env->cur_state->active_locks) {
10885 verbose(env, "global function calls are not allowed while holding a lock,\n"
10886 "use static function instead\n");
10887 return -EINVAL;
10888 }
10889
10890 if (env->subprog_info[subprog].might_sleep &&
10891 (env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks || env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks ||
10892 env->cur_state->active_irq_id || !in_sleepable(env))) {
10893 verbose(env, "global functions that may sleep are not allowed in non-sleepable context,\n"
10894 "i.e., in a RCU/IRQ/preempt-disabled section, or in\n"
10895 "a non-sleepable BPF program context\n");
10896 return -EINVAL;
10897 }
10898
10899 if (err) {
10900 verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d ('%s')\n",
10901 subprog, sub_name);
10902 return err;
10903 }
10904
10905 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
10906 verbose(env, "Func#%d ('%s') is global and assumed valid.\n",
10907 subprog, sub_name);
10908 if (env->subprog_info[subprog].changes_pkt_data)
10909 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
10910 /* mark global subprog for verifying after main prog */
10911 subprog_aux(env, subprog)->called = true;
10912 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
10913
10914 /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */
10915 mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0);
10916 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
10917
10918 /* continue with next insn after call */
10919 return 0;
10920 }
10921
10922 /* for regular function entry setup new frame and continue
10923 * from that frame.
10924 */
10925 err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, *insn_idx, set_callee_state, state);
10926 if (err)
10927 return err;
10928
10929 clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
10930
10931 /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */
10932 *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1;
10933
10934 bpf_reset_live_stack_callchain(env);
10935
10936 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
10937 verbose(env, "caller:\n");
10938 print_verifier_state(env, state, caller->frameno, true);
10939 verbose(env, "callee:\n");
10940 print_verifier_state(env, state, state->curframe, true);
10941 }
10942
10943 return 0;
10944 }
10945
map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * caller,struct bpf_func_state * callee)10946 int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10947 struct bpf_func_state *caller,
10948 struct bpf_func_state *callee)
10949 {
10950 /* bpf_for_each_map_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn,
10951 * void *callback_ctx, u64 flags);
10952 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
10953 * void *callback_ctx);
10954 */
10955 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1];
10956
10957 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY;
10958 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
10959 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr;
10960
10961 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
10962 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
10963 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr;
10964
10965 /* pointer to stack or null */
10966 callee->regs[BPF_REG_4] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3];
10967
10968 /* unused */
10969 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
10970 return 0;
10971 }
10972
set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * caller,struct bpf_func_state * callee,int insn_idx)10973 static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10974 struct bpf_func_state *caller,
10975 struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx)
10976 {
10977 int i;
10978
10979 /* copy r1 - r5 args that callee can access. The copy includes parent
10980 * pointers, which connects us up to the liveness chain
10981 */
10982 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++)
10983 callee->regs[i] = caller->regs[i];
10984 return 0;
10985 }
10986
set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * caller,struct bpf_func_state * callee,int insn_idx)10987 static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
10988 struct bpf_func_state *caller,
10989 struct bpf_func_state *callee,
10990 int insn_idx)
10991 {
10992 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
10993 struct bpf_map *map;
10994 int err;
10995
10996 /* valid map_ptr and poison value does not matter */
10997 map = insn_aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr;
10998 if (!map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args ||
10999 !map->ops->map_for_each_callback) {
11000 verbose(env, "callback function not allowed for map\n");
11001 return -ENOTSUPP;
11002 }
11003
11004 err = map->ops->map_set_for_each_callback_args(env, caller, callee);
11005 if (err)
11006 return err;
11007
11008 callee->in_callback_fn = true;
11009 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1);
11010 return 0;
11011 }
11012
set_loop_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * caller,struct bpf_func_state * callee,int insn_idx)11013 static int set_loop_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11014 struct bpf_func_state *caller,
11015 struct bpf_func_state *callee,
11016 int insn_idx)
11017 {
11018 /* bpf_loop(u32 nr_loops, void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx,
11019 * u64 flags);
11020 * callback_fn(u64 index, void *callback_ctx);
11021 */
11022 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
11023 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3];
11024
11025 /* unused */
11026 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
11027 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
11028 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
11029
11030 callee->in_callback_fn = true;
11031 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1);
11032 return 0;
11033 }
11034
set_timer_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * caller,struct bpf_func_state * callee,int insn_idx)11035 static int set_timer_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11036 struct bpf_func_state *caller,
11037 struct bpf_func_state *callee,
11038 int insn_idx)
11039 {
11040 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr;
11041
11042 /* bpf_timer_set_callback(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *callback_fn);
11043 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value);
11044 */
11045 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
11046 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]);
11047 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr;
11048
11049 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY;
11050 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
11051 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr;
11052
11053 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
11054 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
11055 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr;
11056
11057 /* unused */
11058 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
11059 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
11060 callee->in_async_callback_fn = true;
11061 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 0);
11062 return 0;
11063 }
11064
set_find_vma_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * caller,struct bpf_func_state * callee,int insn_idx)11065 static int set_find_vma_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11066 struct bpf_func_state *caller,
11067 struct bpf_func_state *callee,
11068 int insn_idx)
11069 {
11070 /* bpf_find_vma(struct task_struct *task, u64 addr,
11071 * void *callback_fn, void *callback_ctx, u64 flags)
11072 * (callback_fn)(struct task_struct *task,
11073 * struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *callback_ctx);
11074 */
11075 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_1];
11076
11077 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
11078 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
11079 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf = btf_vmlinux;
11080 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_VMA];
11081
11082 /* pointer to stack or null */
11083 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_4];
11084
11085 /* unused */
11086 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
11087 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
11088 callee->in_callback_fn = true;
11089 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1);
11090 return 0;
11091 }
11092
set_user_ringbuf_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * caller,struct bpf_func_state * callee,int insn_idx)11093 static int set_user_ringbuf_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11094 struct bpf_func_state *caller,
11095 struct bpf_func_state *callee,
11096 int insn_idx)
11097 {
11098 /* bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void
11099 * callback_ctx, u64 flags);
11100 * callback_fn(const struct bpf_dynptr_t* dynptr, void *callback_ctx);
11101 */
11102 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]);
11103 mark_dynptr_cb_reg(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1], BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL);
11104 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3];
11105
11106 /* unused */
11107 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
11108 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
11109 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
11110
11111 callee->in_callback_fn = true;
11112 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1);
11113 return 0;
11114 }
11115
set_rbtree_add_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * caller,struct bpf_func_state * callee,int insn_idx)11116 static int set_rbtree_add_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11117 struct bpf_func_state *caller,
11118 struct bpf_func_state *callee,
11119 int insn_idx)
11120 {
11121 /* void bpf_rbtree_add_impl(struct bpf_rb_root *root, struct bpf_rb_node *node,
11122 * bool (less)(struct bpf_rb_node *a, const struct bpf_rb_node *b));
11123 *
11124 * 'struct bpf_rb_node *node' arg to bpf_rbtree_add_impl is the same PTR_TO_BTF_ID w/ offset
11125 * that 'less' callback args will be receiving. However, 'node' arg was release_reference'd
11126 * by this point, so look at 'root'
11127 */
11128 struct btf_field *field;
11129
11130 field = reg_find_field_offset(&caller->regs[BPF_REG_1], caller->regs[BPF_REG_1].off,
11131 BPF_RB_ROOT);
11132 if (!field || !field->graph_root.value_btf_id)
11133 return -EFAULT;
11134
11135 mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_1, &field->graph_root);
11136 ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]);
11137 mark_reg_graph_node(callee->regs, BPF_REG_2, &field->graph_root);
11138 ref_set_non_owning(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
11139
11140 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
11141 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
11142 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
11143 callee->in_callback_fn = true;
11144 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(0, 1);
11145 return 0;
11146 }
11147
set_task_work_schedule_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * caller,struct bpf_func_state * callee,int insn_idx)11148 static int set_task_work_schedule_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11149 struct bpf_func_state *caller,
11150 struct bpf_func_state *callee,
11151 int insn_idx)
11152 {
11153 struct bpf_map *map_ptr = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr;
11154
11155 /*
11156 * callback_fn(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value);
11157 */
11158 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
11159 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]);
11160 callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].map_ptr = map_ptr;
11161
11162 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].type = PTR_TO_MAP_KEY;
11163 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_2]);
11164 callee->regs[BPF_REG_2].map_ptr = map_ptr;
11165
11166 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
11167 __mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_3]);
11168 callee->regs[BPF_REG_3].map_ptr = map_ptr;
11169
11170 /* unused */
11171 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_4]);
11172 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_5]);
11173 callee->in_async_callback_fn = true;
11174 callee->callback_ret_range = retval_range(S32_MIN, S32_MAX);
11175 return 0;
11176 }
11177
11178 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id);
11179
11180 /* Are we currently verifying the callback for a rbtree helper that must
11181 * be called with lock held? If so, no need to complain about unreleased
11182 * lock
11183 */
in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)11184 static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11185 {
11186 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
11187 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
11188 struct bpf_func_state *callee;
11189 int kfunc_btf_id;
11190
11191 if (!state->curframe)
11192 return false;
11193
11194 callee = state->frame[state->curframe];
11195
11196 if (!callee->in_callback_fn)
11197 return false;
11198
11199 kfunc_btf_id = insn[callee->callsite].imm;
11200 return is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id);
11201 }
11202
retval_range_within(struct bpf_retval_range range,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,bool return_32bit)11203 static bool retval_range_within(struct bpf_retval_range range, const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
11204 bool return_32bit)
11205 {
11206 if (return_32bit)
11207 return range.minval <= reg->s32_min_value && reg->s32_max_value <= range.maxval;
11208 else
11209 return range.minval <= reg->smin_value && reg->smax_value <= range.maxval;
11210 }
11211
prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int * insn_idx)11212 static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx)
11213 {
11214 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *prev_st;
11215 struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee;
11216 struct bpf_reg_state *r0;
11217 bool in_callback_fn;
11218 int err;
11219
11220 err = bpf_update_live_stack(env);
11221 if (err)
11222 return err;
11223
11224 callee = state->frame[state->curframe];
11225 r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0];
11226 if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
11227 /* technically it's ok to return caller's stack pointer
11228 * (or caller's caller's pointer) back to the caller,
11229 * since these pointers are valid. Only current stack
11230 * pointer will be invalid as soon as function exits,
11231 * but let's be conservative
11232 */
11233 verbose(env, "cannot return stack pointer to the caller\n");
11234 return -EINVAL;
11235 }
11236
11237 caller = state->frame[state->curframe - 1];
11238 if (callee->in_callback_fn) {
11239 if (r0->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
11240 verbose(env, "R0 not a scalar value\n");
11241 return -EACCES;
11242 }
11243
11244 /* we are going to rely on register's precise value */
11245 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_0);
11246 if (err)
11247 return err;
11248
11249 /* enforce R0 return value range, and bpf_callback_t returns 64bit */
11250 if (!retval_range_within(callee->callback_ret_range, r0, false)) {
11251 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, callee->callback_ret_range,
11252 "At callback return", "R0");
11253 return -EINVAL;
11254 }
11255 if (!bpf_calls_callback(env, callee->callsite)) {
11256 verifier_bug(env, "in callback at %d, callsite %d !calls_callback",
11257 *insn_idx, callee->callsite);
11258 return -EFAULT;
11259 }
11260 } else {
11261 /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */
11262 caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0;
11263 }
11264
11265 /* for callbacks like bpf_loop or bpf_for_each_map_elem go back to callsite,
11266 * there function call logic would reschedule callback visit. If iteration
11267 * converges is_state_visited() would prune that visit eventually.
11268 */
11269 in_callback_fn = callee->in_callback_fn;
11270 if (in_callback_fn)
11271 *insn_idx = callee->callsite;
11272 else
11273 *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1;
11274
11275 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
11276 verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n");
11277 print_verifier_state(env, state, callee->frameno, true);
11278 verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx);
11279 print_verifier_state(env, state, caller->frameno, true);
11280 }
11281 /* clear everything in the callee. In case of exceptional exits using
11282 * bpf_throw, this will be done by copy_verifier_state for extra frames. */
11283 free_func_state(callee);
11284 state->frame[state->curframe--] = NULL;
11285
11286 /* for callbacks widen imprecise scalars to make programs like below verify:
11287 *
11288 * struct ctx { int i; }
11289 * void cb(int idx, struct ctx *ctx) { ctx->i++; ... }
11290 * ...
11291 * struct ctx = { .i = 0; }
11292 * bpf_loop(100, cb, &ctx, 0);
11293 *
11294 * This is similar to what is done in process_iter_next_call() for open
11295 * coded iterators.
11296 */
11297 prev_st = in_callback_fn ? find_prev_entry(env, state, *insn_idx) : NULL;
11298 if (prev_st) {
11299 err = widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, state);
11300 if (err)
11301 return err;
11302 }
11303 return 0;
11304 }
11305
do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * regs,int ret_type,int func_id,struct bpf_call_arg_meta * meta)11306 static int do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11307 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type,
11308 int func_id,
11309 struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
11310 {
11311 struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0];
11312
11313 if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER)
11314 return 0;
11315
11316 switch (func_id) {
11317 case BPF_FUNC_get_stack:
11318 case BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack:
11319 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str:
11320 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str:
11321 case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str:
11322 ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value;
11323 ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value;
11324 ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
11325 ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
11326 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg);
11327 break;
11328 case BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id:
11329 ret_reg->umax_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1;
11330 ret_reg->u32_max_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1;
11331 ret_reg->smax_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1;
11332 ret_reg->s32_max_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1;
11333 ret_reg->umin_value = 0;
11334 ret_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
11335 ret_reg->smin_value = 0;
11336 ret_reg->s32_min_value = 0;
11337 reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg);
11338 break;
11339 }
11340
11341 return reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, ret_reg, "retval");
11342 }
11343
11344 static int
record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_call_arg_meta * meta,int func_id,int insn_idx)11345 record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
11346 int func_id, int insn_idx)
11347 {
11348 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
11349 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map.ptr;
11350
11351 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call &&
11352 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
11353 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem &&
11354 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem &&
11355 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem &&
11356 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem &&
11357 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem &&
11358 func_id != BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem &&
11359 func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map &&
11360 func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)
11361 return 0;
11362
11363 if (map == NULL) {
11364 verifier_bug(env, "expected map for helper call");
11365 return -EFAULT;
11366 }
11367
11368 /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions
11369 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the
11370 * state of the map from program side.
11371 */
11372 if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) &&
11373 (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem ||
11374 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem ||
11375 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem ||
11376 func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) {
11377 verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n");
11378 return -EACCES;
11379 }
11380
11381 if (!aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr)
11382 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map.ptr,
11383 !meta->map.ptr->bypass_spec_v1, false);
11384 else if (aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr != meta->map.ptr)
11385 bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map.ptr,
11386 !meta->map.ptr->bypass_spec_v1, true);
11387 return 0;
11388 }
11389
11390 static int
record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_call_arg_meta * meta,int func_id,int insn_idx)11391 record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
11392 int func_id, int insn_idx)
11393 {
11394 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
11395 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
11396 struct bpf_map *map = meta->map.ptr;
11397 u64 val, max;
11398 int err;
11399
11400 if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
11401 return 0;
11402 if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) {
11403 verbose(env, "expected prog array map for tail call");
11404 return -EINVAL;
11405 }
11406
11407 reg = reg_state(env, BPF_REG_3);
11408 val = reg->var_off.value;
11409 max = map->max_entries;
11410
11411 if (!(is_reg_const(reg, false) && val < max)) {
11412 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
11413 return 0;
11414 }
11415
11416 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3);
11417 if (err)
11418 return err;
11419 if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux))
11420 bpf_map_key_store(aux, val);
11421 else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) &&
11422 bpf_map_key_immediate(aux) != val)
11423 bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON);
11424 return 0;
11425 }
11426
check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,bool exception_exit)11427 static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool exception_exit)
11428 {
11429 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
11430 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
11431 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, BPF_REG_0);
11432 bool refs_lingering = false;
11433 int i;
11434
11435 if (!exception_exit && cur_func(env)->frameno)
11436 return 0;
11437
11438 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
11439 if (state->refs[i].type != REF_TYPE_PTR)
11440 continue;
11441 /* Allow struct_ops programs to return a referenced kptr back to
11442 * kernel. Type checks are performed later in check_return_code.
11443 */
11444 if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS && !exception_exit &&
11445 reg->ref_obj_id == state->refs[i].id)
11446 continue;
11447 verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n",
11448 state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx);
11449 refs_lingering = true;
11450 }
11451 return refs_lingering ? -EINVAL : 0;
11452 }
11453
check_resource_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,bool exception_exit,bool check_lock,const char * prefix)11454 static int check_resource_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool exception_exit, bool check_lock, const char *prefix)
11455 {
11456 int err;
11457
11458 if (check_lock && env->cur_state->active_locks) {
11459 verbose(env, "%s cannot be used inside bpf_spin_lock-ed region\n", prefix);
11460 return -EINVAL;
11461 }
11462
11463 err = check_reference_leak(env, exception_exit);
11464 if (err) {
11465 verbose(env, "%s would lead to reference leak\n", prefix);
11466 return err;
11467 }
11468
11469 if (check_lock && env->cur_state->active_irq_id) {
11470 verbose(env, "%s cannot be used inside bpf_local_irq_save-ed region\n", prefix);
11471 return -EINVAL;
11472 }
11473
11474 if (check_lock && env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks) {
11475 verbose(env, "%s cannot be used inside bpf_rcu_read_lock-ed region\n", prefix);
11476 return -EINVAL;
11477 }
11478
11479 if (check_lock && env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks) {
11480 verbose(env, "%s cannot be used inside bpf_preempt_disable-ed region\n", prefix);
11481 return -EINVAL;
11482 }
11483
11484 return 0;
11485 }
11486
check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * regs)11487 static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
11488 struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
11489 {
11490 struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3];
11491 struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_5];
11492 struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr;
11493 struct bpf_bprintf_data data = {};
11494 int err, fmt_map_off, num_args;
11495 u64 fmt_addr;
11496 char *fmt;
11497
11498 /* data must be an array of u64 */
11499 if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8)
11500 return -EINVAL;
11501 num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8;
11502
11503 /* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const
11504 * and map_direct_value_addr is set.
11505 */
11506 fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value;
11507 err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr,
11508 fmt_map_off);
11509 if (err) {
11510 verbose(env, "failed to retrieve map value address\n");
11511 return -EFAULT;
11512 }
11513 fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off;
11514
11515 /* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we
11516 * can focus on validating the format specifiers.
11517 */
11518 err = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, num_args, &data);
11519 if (err < 0)
11520 verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n");
11521
11522 return err;
11523 }
11524
check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)11525 static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11526 {
11527 enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
11528 int func_id = BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip;
11529
11530 if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) {
11531 if (!bpf_prog_has_trampoline(env->prog)) {
11532 verbose(env, "func %s#%d supported only for fentry/fexit/fmod_ret programs\n",
11533 func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
11534 return -ENOTSUPP;
11535 }
11536 return 0;
11537 } else if (type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE) {
11538 return 0;
11539 }
11540
11541 verbose(env, "func %s#%d not supported for program type %d\n",
11542 func_id_name(func_id), func_id, type);
11543 return -ENOTSUPP;
11544 }
11545
cur_aux(const struct bpf_verifier_env * env)11546 static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11547 {
11548 return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
11549 }
11550
loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)11551 static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11552 {
11553 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, BPF_REG_4);
11554 bool reg_is_null = register_is_null(reg);
11555
11556 if (reg_is_null)
11557 mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_4);
11558
11559 return reg_is_null;
11560 }
11561
update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 subprogno)11562 static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno)
11563 {
11564 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *state = &cur_aux(env)->loop_inline_state;
11565
11566 if (!state->initialized) {
11567 state->initialized = 1;
11568 state->fit_for_inline = loop_flag_is_zero(env);
11569 state->callback_subprogno = subprogno;
11570 return;
11571 }
11572
11573 if (!state->fit_for_inline)
11574 return;
11575
11576 state->fit_for_inline = (loop_flag_is_zero(env) &&
11577 state->callback_subprogno == subprogno);
11578 }
11579
11580 /* Returns whether or not the given map type can potentially elide
11581 * lookup return value nullness check. This is possible if the key
11582 * is statically known.
11583 */
can_elide_value_nullness(enum bpf_map_type type)11584 static bool can_elide_value_nullness(enum bpf_map_type type)
11585 {
11586 switch (type) {
11587 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY:
11588 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY:
11589 return true;
11590 default:
11591 return false;
11592 }
11593 }
11594
get_helper_proto(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int func_id,const struct bpf_func_proto ** ptr)11595 static int get_helper_proto(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id,
11596 const struct bpf_func_proto **ptr)
11597 {
11598 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID)
11599 return -ERANGE;
11600
11601 if (!env->ops->get_func_proto)
11602 return -EINVAL;
11603
11604 *ptr = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog);
11605 return *ptr && (*ptr)->func ? 0 : -EINVAL;
11606 }
11607
11608 /* Check if we're in a sleepable context. */
in_sleepable_context(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)11609 static inline bool in_sleepable_context(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
11610 {
11611 return !env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks &&
11612 !env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks &&
11613 !env->cur_state->active_locks &&
11614 !env->cur_state->active_irq_id &&
11615 in_sleepable(env);
11616 }
11617
check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,int * insn_idx_p)11618 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
11619 int *insn_idx_p)
11620 {
11621 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
11622 bool returns_cpu_specific_alloc_ptr = false;
11623 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
11624 enum bpf_return_type ret_type;
11625 enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag;
11626 struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
11627 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
11628 int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p;
11629 bool changes_data;
11630 int i, err, func_id;
11631
11632 /* find function prototype */
11633 func_id = insn->imm;
11634 err = get_helper_proto(env, insn->imm, &fn);
11635 if (err == -ERANGE) {
11636 verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
11637 return -EINVAL;
11638 }
11639
11640 if (err) {
11641 verbose(env, "program of this type cannot use helper %s#%d\n",
11642 func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
11643 return err;
11644 }
11645
11646 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
11647 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
11648 verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n");
11649 return -EINVAL;
11650 }
11651
11652 if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) {
11653 verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n");
11654 return -EINVAL;
11655 }
11656
11657 if (!in_sleepable(env) && fn->might_sleep) {
11658 verbose(env, "helper call might sleep in a non-sleepable prog\n");
11659 return -EINVAL;
11660 }
11661
11662 /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */
11663 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(func_id);
11664 if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
11665 verifier_bug(env, "func %s#%d: r1 != ctx", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
11666 return -EFAULT;
11667 }
11668
11669 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
11670 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
11671
11672 err = check_func_proto(fn);
11673 if (err) {
11674 verifier_bug(env, "incorrect func proto %s#%d", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
11675 return err;
11676 }
11677
11678 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks) {
11679 if (fn->might_sleep) {
11680 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in rcu_read_lock region\n",
11681 func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
11682 return -EINVAL;
11683 }
11684 }
11685
11686 if (env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks) {
11687 if (fn->might_sleep) {
11688 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in non-preemptible region\n",
11689 func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
11690 return -EINVAL;
11691 }
11692 }
11693
11694 if (env->cur_state->active_irq_id) {
11695 if (fn->might_sleep) {
11696 verbose(env, "sleepable helper %s#%d in IRQ-disabled region\n",
11697 func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
11698 return -EINVAL;
11699 }
11700 }
11701
11702 /* Track non-sleepable context for helpers. */
11703 if (!in_sleepable_context(env))
11704 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].non_sleepable = true;
11705
11706 meta.func_id = func_id;
11707 /* check args */
11708 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) {
11709 err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn, insn_idx);
11710 if (err)
11711 return err;
11712 }
11713
11714 err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx);
11715 if (err)
11716 return err;
11717
11718 err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx);
11719 if (err)
11720 return err;
11721
11722 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
11723 * is inferred from register state.
11724 */
11725 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
11726 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B,
11727 BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false);
11728 if (err)
11729 return err;
11730 }
11731
11732 regs = cur_regs(env);
11733
11734 if (meta.release_regno) {
11735 err = -EINVAL;
11736 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1])) {
11737 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.release_regno]);
11738 } else if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && meta.ref_obj_id) {
11739 u32 ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id;
11740 bool in_rcu = in_rcu_cs(env);
11741 struct bpf_func_state *state;
11742 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
11743
11744 err = release_reference_nomark(env->cur_state, ref_obj_id);
11745 if (!err) {
11746 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({
11747 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) {
11748 if (in_rcu && (reg->type & MEM_ALLOC) && (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU)) {
11749 reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
11750 reg->type &= ~MEM_ALLOC;
11751 reg->type |= MEM_RCU;
11752 } else {
11753 mark_reg_invalid(env, reg);
11754 }
11755 }
11756 }));
11757 }
11758 } else if (meta.ref_obj_id) {
11759 err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id);
11760 } else if (register_is_null(®s[meta.release_regno])) {
11761 /* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be
11762 * released is NULL, which must be > R0.
11763 */
11764 err = 0;
11765 }
11766 if (err) {
11767 verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
11768 func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
11769 return err;
11770 }
11771 }
11772
11773 switch (func_id) {
11774 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
11775 err = check_resource_leak(env, false, true, "tail_call");
11776 if (err)
11777 return err;
11778 break;
11779 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage:
11780 /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0,
11781 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error.
11782 */
11783 if (!register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) {
11784 verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n");
11785 return -EINVAL;
11786 }
11787 break;
11788 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem:
11789 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
11790 set_map_elem_callback_state);
11791 break;
11792 case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback:
11793 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
11794 set_timer_callback_state);
11795 break;
11796 case BPF_FUNC_find_vma:
11797 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
11798 set_find_vma_callback_state);
11799 break;
11800 case BPF_FUNC_snprintf:
11801 err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs);
11802 break;
11803 case BPF_FUNC_loop:
11804 update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno);
11805 /* Verifier relies on R1 value to determine if bpf_loop() iteration
11806 * is finished, thus mark it precise.
11807 */
11808 err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_1);
11809 if (err)
11810 return err;
11811 if (cur_func(env)->callback_depth < regs[BPF_REG_1].umax_value) {
11812 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
11813 set_loop_callback_state);
11814 } else {
11815 cur_func(env)->callback_depth = 0;
11816 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
11817 verbose(env, "frame%d bpf_loop iteration limit reached\n",
11818 env->cur_state->curframe);
11819 }
11820 break;
11821 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem:
11822 if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
11823 verbose(env, "Unsupported reg type %s for bpf_dynptr_from_mem data\n",
11824 reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type));
11825 return -EACCES;
11826 }
11827 break;
11828 case BPF_FUNC_set_retval:
11829 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM &&
11830 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) {
11831 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) {
11832 /* Make sure programs that attach to void
11833 * hooks don't try to modify return value.
11834 */
11835 verbose(env, "BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n");
11836 return -EINVAL;
11837 }
11838 }
11839 break;
11840 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data:
11841 {
11842 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
11843 int id, ref_obj_id;
11844
11845 reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs);
11846 if (!reg)
11847 return -EFAULT;
11848
11849
11850 if (meta.dynptr_id) {
11851 verifier_bug(env, "meta.dynptr_id already set");
11852 return -EFAULT;
11853 }
11854 if (meta.ref_obj_id) {
11855 verifier_bug(env, "meta.ref_obj_id already set");
11856 return -EFAULT;
11857 }
11858
11859 id = dynptr_id(env, reg);
11860 if (id < 0) {
11861 verifier_bug(env, "failed to obtain dynptr id");
11862 return id;
11863 }
11864
11865 ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg);
11866 if (ref_obj_id < 0) {
11867 verifier_bug(env, "failed to obtain dynptr ref_obj_id");
11868 return ref_obj_id;
11869 }
11870
11871 meta.dynptr_id = id;
11872 meta.ref_obj_id = ref_obj_id;
11873
11874 break;
11875 }
11876 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_write:
11877 {
11878 enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type;
11879 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
11880
11881 reg = get_dynptr_arg_reg(env, fn, regs);
11882 if (!reg)
11883 return -EFAULT;
11884
11885 dynptr_type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg);
11886 if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID)
11887 return -EFAULT;
11888
11889 if (dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB ||
11890 dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META)
11891 /* this will trigger clear_all_pkt_pointers(), which will
11892 * invalidate all dynptr slices associated with the skb
11893 */
11894 changes_data = true;
11895
11896 break;
11897 }
11898 case BPF_FUNC_per_cpu_ptr:
11899 case BPF_FUNC_this_cpu_ptr:
11900 {
11901 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[BPF_REG_1];
11902 const struct btf_type *type;
11903
11904 if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) {
11905 type = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
11906 if (!type || !btf_type_is_struct(type)) {
11907 verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf/btf_id in R1\n");
11908 return -EFAULT;
11909 }
11910 returns_cpu_specific_alloc_ptr = true;
11911 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].call_with_percpu_alloc_ptr = true;
11912 }
11913 break;
11914 }
11915 case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain:
11916 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
11917 set_user_ringbuf_callback_state);
11918 break;
11919 }
11920
11921 if (err)
11922 return err;
11923
11924 /* reset caller saved regs */
11925 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
11926 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
11927 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
11928 }
11929
11930 /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */
11931 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
11932
11933 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */
11934 ret_type = fn->ret_type;
11935 ret_flag = type_flag(ret_type);
11936
11937 switch (base_type(ret_type)) {
11938 case RET_INTEGER:
11939 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */
11940 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
11941 break;
11942 case RET_VOID:
11943 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
11944 break;
11945 case RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
11946 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
11947 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
11948 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
11949 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
11950 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
11951 */
11952 if (meta.map.ptr == NULL) {
11953 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected null map_ptr");
11954 return -EFAULT;
11955 }
11956
11957 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
11958 can_elide_value_nullness(meta.map.ptr->map_type) &&
11959 meta.const_map_key >= 0 &&
11960 meta.const_map_key < meta.map.ptr->max_entries)
11961 ret_flag &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
11962
11963 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map.ptr;
11964 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map.uid;
11965 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag;
11966 if (!type_may_be_null(ret_flag) &&
11967 btf_record_has_field(meta.map.ptr->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK | BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK)) {
11968 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
11969 }
11970 break;
11971 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET:
11972 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
11973 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET | ret_flag;
11974 break;
11975 case RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
11976 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
11977 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | ret_flag;
11978 break;
11979 case RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
11980 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
11981 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | ret_flag;
11982 break;
11983 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM:
11984 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
11985 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag;
11986 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size;
11987 break;
11988 case RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID:
11989 {
11990 const struct btf_type *t;
11991
11992 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
11993 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL);
11994 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) {
11995 u32 tsize;
11996 const struct btf_type *ret;
11997 const char *tname;
11998
11999 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */
12000 ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize);
12001 if (IS_ERR(ret)) {
12002 tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off);
12003 verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n",
12004 tname, PTR_ERR(ret));
12005 return -EINVAL;
12006 }
12007 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag;
12008 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize;
12009 } else {
12010 if (returns_cpu_specific_alloc_ptr) {
12011 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | MEM_RCU;
12012 } else {
12013 /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it
12014 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise
12015 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in
12016 * check_mem_access().
12017 */
12018 ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY;
12019 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag;
12020 }
12021
12022 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf;
12023 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id;
12024 }
12025 break;
12026 }
12027 case RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
12028 {
12029 struct btf *ret_btf;
12030 int ret_btf_id;
12031
12032 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
12033 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag;
12034 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) {
12035 ret_btf = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf;
12036 ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf_id;
12037 if (!btf_is_kernel(ret_btf)) {
12038 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_ALLOC;
12039 if (meta.kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU)
12040 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_PERCPU;
12041 }
12042 } else {
12043 if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) {
12044 verifier_bug(env, "func %s has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON return type",
12045 func_id_name(func_id));
12046 return -EFAULT;
12047 }
12048 ret_btf = btf_vmlinux;
12049 ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id;
12050 }
12051 if (ret_btf_id == 0) {
12052 verbose(env, "invalid return type %u of func %s#%d\n",
12053 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id),
12054 func_id);
12055 return -EINVAL;
12056 }
12057 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf;
12058 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id;
12059 break;
12060 }
12061 default:
12062 verbose(env, "unknown return type %u of func %s#%d\n",
12063 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
12064 return -EINVAL;
12065 }
12066
12067 if (type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type))
12068 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
12069
12070 if (helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(func_id, meta.map.ptr)) {
12071 verifier_bug(env, "func %s#%d sets ref_obj_id more than once",
12072 func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
12073 return -EFAULT;
12074 }
12075
12076 if (is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id))
12077 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta.dynptr_id;
12078
12079 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id) || is_dynptr_ref_function(func_id)) {
12080 /* For release_reference() */
12081 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id;
12082 } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map.ptr)) {
12083 int id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx);
12084
12085 if (id < 0)
12086 return id;
12087 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */
12088 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id;
12089 /* For release_reference() */
12090 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id;
12091 }
12092
12093 err = do_refine_retval_range(env, regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta);
12094 if (err)
12095 return err;
12096
12097 err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map.ptr, func_id);
12098 if (err)
12099 return err;
12100
12101 if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack ||
12102 func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) &&
12103 !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) {
12104 const char *err_str;
12105
12106 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
12107 err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack);
12108 err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n";
12109 #else
12110 err = -ENOTSUPP;
12111 err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n";
12112 #endif
12113 if (err) {
12114 verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
12115 return err;
12116 }
12117
12118 env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true;
12119 }
12120
12121 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stackid || func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack)
12122 env->prog->call_get_stack = true;
12123
12124 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) {
12125 if (check_get_func_ip(env))
12126 return -ENOTSUPP;
12127 env->prog->call_get_func_ip = true;
12128 }
12129
12130 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
12131 if (env->cur_state->curframe) {
12132 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch;
12133
12134 mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0);
12135 branch = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, false);
12136 if (IS_ERR(branch))
12137 return PTR_ERR(branch);
12138 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
12139 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
12140 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx);
12141 if (err)
12142 return err;
12143 env->insn_idx--;
12144 } else {
12145 changes_data = false;
12146 }
12147 }
12148
12149 if (changes_data)
12150 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
12151 return 0;
12152 }
12153
12154 /* mark_btf_func_reg_size() is used when the reg size is determined by
12155 * the BTF func_proto's return value size and argument.
12156 */
__mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * regs,u32 regno,size_t reg_size)12157 static void __mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
12158 u32 regno, size_t reg_size)
12159 {
12160 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno];
12161
12162 if (regno == BPF_REG_0) {
12163 /* Function return value */
12164 reg->subreg_def = reg_size == sizeof(u64) ?
12165 DEF_NOT_SUBREG : env->insn_idx + 1;
12166 } else if (reg_size == sizeof(u64)) {
12167 /* Function argument */
12168 mark_insn_zext(env, reg);
12169 }
12170 }
12171
mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 regno,size_t reg_size)12172 static void mark_btf_func_reg_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
12173 size_t reg_size)
12174 {
12175 return __mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, cur_regs(env), regno, reg_size);
12176 }
12177
is_kfunc_acquire(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12178 static bool is_kfunc_acquire(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12179 {
12180 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_ACQUIRE;
12181 }
12182
is_kfunc_release(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12183 static bool is_kfunc_release(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12184 {
12185 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RELEASE;
12186 }
12187
is_kfunc_sleepable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12188 static bool is_kfunc_sleepable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12189 {
12190 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_SLEEPABLE;
12191 }
12192
is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12193 static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12194 {
12195 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE;
12196 }
12197
is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12198 static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12199 {
12200 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU;
12201 }
12202
is_kfunc_rcu_protected(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12203 static bool is_kfunc_rcu_protected(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12204 {
12205 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU_PROTECTED;
12206 }
12207
is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg)12208 static bool is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(const struct btf *btf,
12209 const struct btf_param *arg,
12210 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
12211 {
12212 const struct btf_type *t;
12213
12214 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL);
12215 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
12216 return false;
12217
12218 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__sz");
12219 }
12220
is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg)12221 static bool is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(const struct btf *btf,
12222 const struct btf_param *arg,
12223 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
12224 {
12225 const struct btf_type *t;
12226
12227 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL);
12228 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(t) || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
12229 return false;
12230
12231 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__szk");
12232 }
12233
is_kfunc_arg_constant(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12234 static bool is_kfunc_arg_constant(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12235 {
12236 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__k");
12237 }
12238
is_kfunc_arg_ignore(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12239 static bool is_kfunc_arg_ignore(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12240 {
12241 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__ign");
12242 }
12243
is_kfunc_arg_map(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12244 static bool is_kfunc_arg_map(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12245 {
12246 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__map");
12247 }
12248
is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12249 static bool is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12250 {
12251 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__alloc");
12252 }
12253
is_kfunc_arg_uninit(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12254 static bool is_kfunc_arg_uninit(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12255 {
12256 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__uninit");
12257 }
12258
is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12259 static bool is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12260 {
12261 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__refcounted_kptr");
12262 }
12263
is_kfunc_arg_nullable(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12264 static bool is_kfunc_arg_nullable(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12265 {
12266 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__nullable");
12267 }
12268
is_kfunc_arg_const_str(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12269 static bool is_kfunc_arg_const_str(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12270 {
12271 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__str");
12272 }
12273
is_kfunc_arg_irq_flag(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12274 static bool is_kfunc_arg_irq_flag(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12275 {
12276 return btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__irq_flag");
12277 }
12278
is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg,const char * name)12279 static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf *btf,
12280 const struct btf_param *arg,
12281 const char *name)
12282 {
12283 int len, target_len = strlen(name);
12284 const char *param_name;
12285
12286 param_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, arg->name_off);
12287 if (str_is_empty(param_name))
12288 return false;
12289 len = strlen(param_name);
12290 if (len != target_len)
12291 return false;
12292 if (strcmp(param_name, name))
12293 return false;
12294
12295 return true;
12296 }
12297
12298 enum {
12299 KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID,
12300 KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID,
12301 KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID,
12302 KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID,
12303 KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID,
12304 KF_ARG_WORKQUEUE_ID,
12305 KF_ARG_RES_SPIN_LOCK_ID,
12306 KF_ARG_TASK_WORK_ID,
12307 KF_ARG_PROG_AUX_ID,
12308 KF_ARG_TIMER_ID
12309 };
12310
12311 BTF_ID_LIST(kf_arg_btf_ids)
BTF_ID(struct,bpf_dynptr)12312 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_dynptr)
12313 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_head)
12314 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_list_node)
12315 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_root)
12316 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_rb_node)
12317 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_wq)
12318 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_res_spin_lock)
12319 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_task_work)
12320 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_prog_aux)
12321 BTF_ID(struct, bpf_timer)
12322
12323 static bool __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(const struct btf *btf,
12324 const struct btf_param *arg, int type)
12325 {
12326 const struct btf_type *t;
12327 u32 res_id;
12328
12329 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, arg->type, NULL);
12330 if (!t)
12331 return false;
12332 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t))
12333 return false;
12334 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &res_id);
12335 if (!t)
12336 return false;
12337 return btf_types_are_same(btf, res_id, btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[type]);
12338 }
12339
is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12340 static bool is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12341 {
12342 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_DYNPTR_ID);
12343 }
12344
is_kfunc_arg_list_head(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12345 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_head(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12346 {
12347 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_HEAD_ID);
12348 }
12349
is_kfunc_arg_list_node(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12350 static bool is_kfunc_arg_list_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12351 {
12352 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID);
12353 }
12354
is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12355 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12356 {
12357 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_ROOT_ID);
12358 }
12359
is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12360 static bool is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12361 {
12362 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID);
12363 }
12364
is_kfunc_arg_timer(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12365 static bool is_kfunc_arg_timer(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12366 {
12367 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_TIMER_ID);
12368 }
12369
is_kfunc_arg_wq(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12370 static bool is_kfunc_arg_wq(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12371 {
12372 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_WORKQUEUE_ID);
12373 }
12374
is_kfunc_arg_task_work(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12375 static bool is_kfunc_arg_task_work(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12376 {
12377 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_TASK_WORK_ID);
12378 }
12379
is_kfunc_arg_res_spin_lock(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12380 static bool is_kfunc_arg_res_spin_lock(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12381 {
12382 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_RES_SPIN_LOCK_ID);
12383 }
12384
is_rbtree_node_type(const struct btf_type * t)12385 static bool is_rbtree_node_type(const struct btf_type *t)
12386 {
12387 return t == btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[KF_ARG_RB_NODE_ID]);
12388 }
12389
is_list_node_type(const struct btf_type * t)12390 static bool is_list_node_type(const struct btf_type *t)
12391 {
12392 return t == btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, kf_arg_btf_ids[KF_ARG_LIST_NODE_ID]);
12393 }
12394
is_kfunc_arg_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12395 static bool is_kfunc_arg_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct btf *btf,
12396 const struct btf_param *arg)
12397 {
12398 const struct btf_type *t;
12399
12400 t = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf, arg->type, NULL);
12401 if (!t)
12402 return false;
12403
12404 return true;
12405 }
12406
is_kfunc_arg_prog_aux(const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_param * arg)12407 static bool is_kfunc_arg_prog_aux(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
12408 {
12409 return __is_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(btf, arg, KF_ARG_PROG_AUX_ID);
12410 }
12411
12412 /* Returns true if struct is composed of scalars, 4 levels of nesting allowed */
__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct btf * btf,const struct btf_type * t,int rec)12413 static bool __btf_type_is_scalar_struct(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
12414 const struct btf *btf,
12415 const struct btf_type *t, int rec)
12416 {
12417 const struct btf_type *member_type;
12418 const struct btf_member *member;
12419 u32 i;
12420
12421 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t))
12422 return false;
12423
12424 for_each_member(i, t, member) {
12425 const struct btf_array *array;
12426
12427 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, member->type, NULL);
12428 if (btf_type_is_struct(member_type)) {
12429 if (rec >= 3) {
12430 verbose(env, "max struct nesting depth exceeded\n");
12431 return false;
12432 }
12433 if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, btf, member_type, rec + 1))
12434 return false;
12435 continue;
12436 }
12437 if (btf_type_is_array(member_type)) {
12438 array = btf_array(member_type);
12439 if (!array->nelems)
12440 return false;
12441 member_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, array->type, NULL);
12442 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type))
12443 return false;
12444 continue;
12445 }
12446 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(member_type))
12447 return false;
12448 }
12449 return true;
12450 }
12451
12452 enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type {
12453 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
12454 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID, /* Allocated object */
12455 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR, /* Refcounted local kptr */
12456 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR,
12457 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER,
12458 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD,
12459 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE,
12460 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID, /* Also covers reg2btf_ids conversions */
12461 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
12462 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE, /* Size derived from next argument, skip it */
12463 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK,
12464 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT,
12465 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE,
12466 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL,
12467 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR,
12468 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MAP,
12469 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER,
12470 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE,
12471 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_IRQ_FLAG,
12472 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK,
12473 KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TASK_WORK,
12474 };
12475
12476 enum special_kfunc_type {
12477 KF_bpf_obj_new_impl,
12478 KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl,
12479 KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl,
12480 KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl,
12481 KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl,
12482 KF_bpf_list_pop_front,
12483 KF_bpf_list_pop_back,
12484 KF_bpf_list_front,
12485 KF_bpf_list_back,
12486 KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx,
12487 KF_bpf_rdonly_cast,
12488 KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock,
12489 KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock,
12490 KF_bpf_rbtree_remove,
12491 KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl,
12492 KF_bpf_rbtree_first,
12493 KF_bpf_rbtree_root,
12494 KF_bpf_rbtree_left,
12495 KF_bpf_rbtree_right,
12496 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb,
12497 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp,
12498 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb_meta,
12499 KF_bpf_xdp_pull_data,
12500 KF_bpf_dynptr_slice,
12501 KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr,
12502 KF_bpf_dynptr_clone,
12503 KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl,
12504 KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl,
12505 KF_bpf_throw,
12506 KF_bpf_wq_set_callback,
12507 KF_bpf_preempt_disable,
12508 KF_bpf_preempt_enable,
12509 KF_bpf_iter_css_task_new,
12510 KF_bpf_session_cookie,
12511 KF_bpf_get_kmem_cache,
12512 KF_bpf_local_irq_save,
12513 KF_bpf_local_irq_restore,
12514 KF_bpf_iter_num_new,
12515 KF_bpf_iter_num_next,
12516 KF_bpf_iter_num_destroy,
12517 KF_bpf_set_dentry_xattr,
12518 KF_bpf_remove_dentry_xattr,
12519 KF_bpf_res_spin_lock,
12520 KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock,
12521 KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave,
12522 KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore,
12523 KF_bpf_dynptr_from_file,
12524 KF_bpf_dynptr_file_discard,
12525 KF___bpf_trap,
12526 KF_bpf_task_work_schedule_signal,
12527 KF_bpf_task_work_schedule_resume,
12528 KF_bpf_arena_alloc_pages,
12529 KF_bpf_arena_free_pages,
12530 KF_bpf_arena_reserve_pages,
12531 KF_bpf_session_is_return,
12532 KF_bpf_stream_vprintk,
12533 KF_bpf_stream_print_stack,
12534 };
12535
12536 BTF_ID_LIST(special_kfunc_list)
BTF_ID(func,bpf_obj_new_impl)12537 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_new_impl)
12538 BTF_ID(func, bpf_obj_drop_impl)
12539 BTF_ID(func, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl)
12540 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_front_impl)
12541 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_push_back_impl)
12542 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_front)
12543 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_pop_back)
12544 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_front)
12545 BTF_ID(func, bpf_list_back)
12546 BTF_ID(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx)
12547 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rdonly_cast)
12548 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_lock)
12549 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rcu_read_unlock)
12550 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_remove)
12551 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_add_impl)
12552 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_first)
12553 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_root)
12554 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_left)
12555 BTF_ID(func, bpf_rbtree_right)
12556 #ifdef CONFIG_NET
12557 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb)
12558 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp)
12559 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb_meta)
12560 BTF_ID(func, bpf_xdp_pull_data)
12561 #else
12562 BTF_ID_UNUSED
12563 BTF_ID_UNUSED
12564 BTF_ID_UNUSED
12565 BTF_ID_UNUSED
12566 #endif
12567 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice)
12568 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr)
12569 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone)
12570 BTF_ID(func, bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl)
12571 BTF_ID(func, bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl)
12572 BTF_ID(func, bpf_throw)
12573 BTF_ID(func, bpf_wq_set_callback)
12574 BTF_ID(func, bpf_preempt_disable)
12575 BTF_ID(func, bpf_preempt_enable)
12576 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
12577 BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_css_task_new)
12578 #else
12579 BTF_ID_UNUSED
12580 #endif
12581 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_EVENTS
12582 BTF_ID(func, bpf_session_cookie)
12583 #else
12584 BTF_ID_UNUSED
12585 #endif
12586 BTF_ID(func, bpf_get_kmem_cache)
12587 BTF_ID(func, bpf_local_irq_save)
12588 BTF_ID(func, bpf_local_irq_restore)
12589 BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_num_new)
12590 BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_num_next)
12591 BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_num_destroy)
12592 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM
12593 BTF_ID(func, bpf_set_dentry_xattr)
12594 BTF_ID(func, bpf_remove_dentry_xattr)
12595 #else
12596 BTF_ID_UNUSED
12597 BTF_ID_UNUSED
12598 #endif
12599 BTF_ID(func, bpf_res_spin_lock)
12600 BTF_ID(func, bpf_res_spin_unlock)
12601 BTF_ID(func, bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave)
12602 BTF_ID(func, bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore)
12603 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_file)
12604 BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_file_discard)
12605 BTF_ID(func, __bpf_trap)
12606 BTF_ID(func, bpf_task_work_schedule_signal)
12607 BTF_ID(func, bpf_task_work_schedule_resume)
12608 BTF_ID(func, bpf_arena_alloc_pages)
12609 BTF_ID(func, bpf_arena_free_pages)
12610 BTF_ID(func, bpf_arena_reserve_pages)
12611 BTF_ID(func, bpf_session_is_return)
12612 BTF_ID(func, bpf_stream_vprintk)
12613 BTF_ID(func, bpf_stream_print_stack)
12614
12615 static bool is_task_work_add_kfunc(u32 func_id)
12616 {
12617 return func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_task_work_schedule_signal] ||
12618 func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_task_work_schedule_resume];
12619 }
12620
is_kfunc_ret_null(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12621 static bool is_kfunc_ret_null(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12622 {
12623 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] &&
12624 meta->arg_owning_ref) {
12625 return false;
12626 }
12627
12628 return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RET_NULL;
12629 }
12630
is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12631 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12632 {
12633 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_lock];
12634 }
12635
is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12636 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12637 {
12638 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rcu_read_unlock];
12639 }
12640
is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_disable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12641 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_disable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12642 {
12643 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_preempt_disable];
12644 }
12645
is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_enable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12646 static bool is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_enable(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12647 {
12648 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_preempt_enable];
12649 }
12650
is_kfunc_pkt_changing(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12651 static bool is_kfunc_pkt_changing(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12652 {
12653 return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_xdp_pull_data];
12654 }
12655
12656 static enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type
get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta,const struct btf_type * t,const struct btf_type * ref_t,const char * ref_tname,const struct btf_param * args,int argno,int nargs)12657 get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
12658 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
12659 const struct btf_type *t, const struct btf_type *ref_t,
12660 const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args,
12661 int argno, int nargs)
12662 {
12663 u32 regno = argno + 1;
12664 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
12665 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno];
12666 bool arg_mem_size = false;
12667
12668 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] ||
12669 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_session_is_return] ||
12670 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_session_cookie])
12671 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX;
12672
12673 if (argno + 1 < nargs &&
12674 (is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1]) ||
12675 is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], ®s[regno + 1])))
12676 arg_mem_size = true;
12677
12678 /* In this function, we verify the kfunc's BTF as per the argument type,
12679 * leaving the rest of the verification with respect to the register
12680 * type to our caller. When a set of conditions hold in the BTF type of
12681 * arguments, we resolve it to a known kfunc_ptr_arg_type.
12682 */
12683 if (btf_is_prog_ctx_type(&env->log, meta->btf, t, resolve_prog_type(env->prog), argno))
12684 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX;
12685
12686 if (is_kfunc_arg_nullable(meta->btf, &args[argno]) && register_is_null(reg) &&
12687 !arg_mem_size)
12688 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL;
12689
12690 if (is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12691 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID;
12692
12693 if (is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12694 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR;
12695
12696 if (is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12697 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR;
12698
12699 if (is_kfunc_arg_iter(meta, argno, &args[argno]))
12700 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER;
12701
12702 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_head(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12703 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD;
12704
12705 if (is_kfunc_arg_list_node(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12706 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE;
12707
12708 if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_root(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12709 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT;
12710
12711 if (is_kfunc_arg_rbtree_node(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12712 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE;
12713
12714 if (is_kfunc_arg_const_str(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12715 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR;
12716
12717 if (is_kfunc_arg_map(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12718 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MAP;
12719
12720 if (is_kfunc_arg_wq(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12721 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE;
12722
12723 if (is_kfunc_arg_timer(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12724 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER;
12725
12726 if (is_kfunc_arg_task_work(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12727 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TASK_WORK;
12728
12729 if (is_kfunc_arg_irq_flag(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12730 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_IRQ_FLAG;
12731
12732 if (is_kfunc_arg_res_spin_lock(meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12733 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK;
12734
12735 if ((base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID || reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])) {
12736 if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) {
12737 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d pointer type %s %s is not supported\n",
12738 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname);
12739 return -EINVAL;
12740 }
12741 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
12742 }
12743
12744 if (is_kfunc_arg_callback(env, meta->btf, &args[argno]))
12745 return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK;
12746
12747 /* This is the catch all argument type of register types supported by
12748 * check_helper_mem_access. However, we only allow when argument type is
12749 * pointer to scalar, or struct composed (recursively) of scalars. When
12750 * arg_mem_size is true, the pointer can be void *.
12751 */
12752 if (!btf_type_is_scalar(ref_t) && !__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, meta->btf, ref_t, 0) &&
12753 (arg_mem_size ? !btf_type_is_void(ref_t) : 1)) {
12754 verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s must point to %sscalar, or struct with scalar\n",
12755 argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, arg_mem_size ? "void, " : "");
12756 return -EINVAL;
12757 }
12758 return arg_mem_size ? KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE : KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM;
12759 }
12760
process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,const struct btf_type * ref_t,const char * ref_tname,u32 ref_id,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta,int argno)12761 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
12762 struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
12763 const struct btf_type *ref_t,
12764 const char *ref_tname, u32 ref_id,
12765 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
12766 int argno)
12767 {
12768 const struct btf_type *reg_ref_t;
12769 bool strict_type_match = false;
12770 const struct btf *reg_btf;
12771 const char *reg_ref_tname;
12772 bool taking_projection;
12773 bool struct_same;
12774 u32 reg_ref_id;
12775
12776 if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
12777 reg_btf = reg->btf;
12778 reg_ref_id = reg->btf_id;
12779 } else {
12780 reg_btf = btf_vmlinux;
12781 reg_ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)];
12782 }
12783
12784 /* Enforce strict type matching for calls to kfuncs that are acquiring
12785 * or releasing a reference, or are no-cast aliases. We do _not_
12786 * enforce strict matching for kfuncs by default,
12787 * as we want to enable BPF programs to pass types that are bitwise
12788 * equivalent without forcing them to explicitly cast with something
12789 * like bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx().
12790 *
12791 * For example, say we had a type like the following:
12792 *
12793 * struct bpf_cpumask {
12794 * cpumask_t cpumask;
12795 * refcount_t usage;
12796 * };
12797 *
12798 * Note that as specified in <linux/cpumask.h>, cpumask_t is typedef'ed
12799 * to a struct cpumask, so it would be safe to pass a struct
12800 * bpf_cpumask * to a kfunc expecting a struct cpumask *.
12801 *
12802 * The philosophy here is similar to how we allow scalars of different
12803 * types to be passed to kfuncs as long as the size is the same. The
12804 * only difference here is that we're simply allowing
12805 * btf_struct_ids_match() to walk the struct at the 0th offset, and
12806 * resolve types.
12807 */
12808 if ((is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) ||
12809 btf_type_ids_nocast_alias(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, meta->btf, ref_id))
12810 strict_type_match = true;
12811
12812 WARN_ON_ONCE(is_kfunc_release(meta) &&
12813 (reg->off || !tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) ||
12814 reg->var_off.value));
12815
12816 reg_ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(reg_btf, reg_ref_id, ®_ref_id);
12817 reg_ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(reg_btf, reg_ref_t->name_off);
12818 struct_same = btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg_btf, reg_ref_id, reg->off, meta->btf, ref_id, strict_type_match);
12819 /* If kfunc is accepting a projection type (ie. __sk_buff), it cannot
12820 * actually use it -- it must cast to the underlying type. So we allow
12821 * caller to pass in the underlying type.
12822 */
12823 taking_projection = btf_is_projection_of(ref_tname, reg_ref_tname);
12824 if (!taking_projection && !struct_same) {
12825 verbose(env, "kernel function %s args#%d expected pointer to %s %s but R%d has a pointer to %s %s\n",
12826 meta->func_name, argno, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, argno + 1,
12827 btf_type_str(reg_ref_t), reg_ref_tname);
12828 return -EINVAL;
12829 }
12830 return 0;
12831 }
12832
process_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)12833 static int process_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
12834 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
12835 {
12836 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
12837 int err, kfunc_class = IRQ_NATIVE_KFUNC;
12838 bool irq_save;
12839
12840 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_local_irq_save] ||
12841 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave]) {
12842 irq_save = true;
12843 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave])
12844 kfunc_class = IRQ_LOCK_KFUNC;
12845 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_local_irq_restore] ||
12846 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore]) {
12847 irq_save = false;
12848 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore])
12849 kfunc_class = IRQ_LOCK_KFUNC;
12850 } else {
12851 verifier_bug(env, "unknown irq flags kfunc");
12852 return -EFAULT;
12853 }
12854
12855 if (irq_save) {
12856 if (!is_irq_flag_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) {
12857 verbose(env, "expected uninitialized irq flag as arg#%d\n", regno - 1);
12858 return -EINVAL;
12859 }
12860
12861 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, 0, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false);
12862 if (err)
12863 return err;
12864
12865 err = mark_stack_slot_irq_flag(env, meta, reg, env->insn_idx, kfunc_class);
12866 if (err)
12867 return err;
12868 } else {
12869 err = is_irq_flag_reg_valid_init(env, reg);
12870 if (err) {
12871 verbose(env, "expected an initialized irq flag as arg#%d\n", regno - 1);
12872 return err;
12873 }
12874
12875 err = mark_irq_flag_read(env, reg);
12876 if (err)
12877 return err;
12878
12879 err = unmark_stack_slot_irq_flag(env, reg, kfunc_class);
12880 if (err)
12881 return err;
12882 }
12883 return 0;
12884 }
12885
12886
ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)12887 static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
12888 {
12889 struct btf_record *rec = reg_btf_record(reg);
12890
12891 if (!env->cur_state->active_locks) {
12892 verifier_bug(env, "%s w/o active lock", __func__);
12893 return -EFAULT;
12894 }
12895
12896 if (type_flag(reg->type) & NON_OWN_REF) {
12897 verifier_bug(env, "NON_OWN_REF already set");
12898 return -EFAULT;
12899 }
12900
12901 reg->type |= NON_OWN_REF;
12902 if (rec->refcount_off >= 0)
12903 reg->type |= MEM_RCU;
12904
12905 return 0;
12906 }
12907
ref_convert_owning_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 ref_obj_id)12908 static int ref_convert_owning_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 ref_obj_id)
12909 {
12910 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
12911 struct bpf_func_state *unused;
12912 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
12913 int i;
12914
12915 if (!ref_obj_id) {
12916 verifier_bug(env, "ref_obj_id is zero for owning -> non-owning conversion");
12917 return -EFAULT;
12918 }
12919
12920 for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
12921 if (state->refs[i].id != ref_obj_id)
12922 continue;
12923
12924 /* Clear ref_obj_id here so release_reference doesn't clobber
12925 * the whole reg
12926 */
12927 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, unused, reg, ({
12928 if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) {
12929 reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
12930 ref_set_non_owning(env, reg);
12931 }
12932 }));
12933 return 0;
12934 }
12935
12936 verifier_bug(env, "ref state missing for ref_obj_id");
12937 return -EFAULT;
12938 }
12939
12940 /* Implementation details:
12941 *
12942 * Each register points to some region of memory, which we define as an
12943 * allocation. Each allocation may embed a bpf_spin_lock which protects any
12944 * special BPF objects (bpf_list_head, bpf_rb_root, etc.) part of the same
12945 * allocation. The lock and the data it protects are colocated in the same
12946 * memory region.
12947 *
12948 * Hence, everytime a register holds a pointer value pointing to such
12949 * allocation, the verifier preserves a unique reg->id for it.
12950 *
12951 * The verifier remembers the lock 'ptr' and the lock 'id' whenever
12952 * bpf_spin_lock is called.
12953 *
12954 * To enable this, lock state in the verifier captures two values:
12955 * active_lock.ptr = Register's type specific pointer
12956 * active_lock.id = A unique ID for each register pointer value
12957 *
12958 * Currently, PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC are the two
12959 * supported register types.
12960 *
12961 * The active_lock.ptr in case of map values is the reg->map_ptr, and in case of
12962 * allocated objects is the reg->btf pointer.
12963 *
12964 * The active_lock.id is non-unique for maps supporting direct_value_addr, as we
12965 * can establish the provenance of the map value statically for each distinct
12966 * lookup into such maps. They always contain a single map value hence unique
12967 * IDs for each pseudo load pessimizes the algorithm and rejects valid programs.
12968 *
12969 * So, in case of global variables, they use array maps with max_entries = 1,
12970 * hence their active_lock.ptr becomes map_ptr and id = 0 (since they all point
12971 * into the same map value as max_entries is 1, as described above).
12972 *
12973 * In case of inner map lookups, the inner map pointer has same map_ptr as the
12974 * outer map pointer (in verifier context), but each lookup into an inner map
12975 * assigns a fresh reg->id to the lookup, so while lookups into distinct inner
12976 * maps from the same outer map share the same map_ptr as active_lock.ptr, they
12977 * will get different reg->id assigned to each lookup, hence different
12978 * active_lock.id.
12979 *
12980 * In case of allocated objects, active_lock.ptr is the reg->btf, and the
12981 * reg->id is a unique ID preserved after the NULL pointer check on the pointer
12982 * returned from bpf_obj_new. Each allocation receives a new reg->id.
12983 */
check_reg_allocation_locked(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg)12984 static int check_reg_allocation_locked(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
12985 {
12986 struct bpf_reference_state *s;
12987 void *ptr;
12988 u32 id;
12989
12990 switch ((int)reg->type) {
12991 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
12992 ptr = reg->map_ptr;
12993 break;
12994 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC:
12995 ptr = reg->btf;
12996 break;
12997 default:
12998 verifier_bug(env, "unknown reg type for lock check");
12999 return -EFAULT;
13000 }
13001 id = reg->id;
13002
13003 if (!env->cur_state->active_locks)
13004 return -EINVAL;
13005 s = find_lock_state(env->cur_state, REF_TYPE_LOCK_MASK, id, ptr);
13006 if (!s) {
13007 verbose(env, "held lock and object are not in the same allocation\n");
13008 return -EINVAL;
13009 }
13010 return 0;
13011 }
13012
is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id)13013 static bool is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
13014 {
13015 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] ||
13016 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] ||
13017 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_front] ||
13018 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_pop_back] ||
13019 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_front] ||
13020 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_back];
13021 }
13022
is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id)13023 static bool is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
13024 {
13025 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl] ||
13026 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] ||
13027 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_first] ||
13028 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_root] ||
13029 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_left] ||
13030 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_right];
13031 }
13032
is_bpf_iter_num_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id)13033 static bool is_bpf_iter_num_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
13034 {
13035 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_num_new] ||
13036 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_num_next] ||
13037 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_num_destroy];
13038 }
13039
is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id)13040 static bool is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
13041 {
13042 return is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(btf_id) || is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id) ||
13043 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl];
13044 }
13045
is_bpf_res_spin_lock_kfunc(u32 btf_id)13046 static bool is_bpf_res_spin_lock_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
13047 {
13048 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] ||
13049 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock] ||
13050 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave] ||
13051 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore];
13052 }
13053
is_bpf_arena_kfunc(u32 btf_id)13054 static bool is_bpf_arena_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
13055 {
13056 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_arena_alloc_pages] ||
13057 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_arena_free_pages] ||
13058 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_arena_reserve_pages];
13059 }
13060
is_bpf_stream_kfunc(u32 btf_id)13061 static bool is_bpf_stream_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
13062 {
13063 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_stream_vprintk] ||
13064 btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_stream_print_stack];
13065 }
13066
kfunc_spin_allowed(u32 btf_id)13067 static bool kfunc_spin_allowed(u32 btf_id)
13068 {
13069 return is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(btf_id) || is_bpf_iter_num_api_kfunc(btf_id) ||
13070 is_bpf_res_spin_lock_kfunc(btf_id) || is_bpf_arena_kfunc(btf_id) ||
13071 is_bpf_stream_kfunc(btf_id);
13072 }
13073
is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id)13074 static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
13075 {
13076 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl];
13077 }
13078
is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id)13079 static bool is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
13080 {
13081 return is_bpf_wq_set_callback_kfunc(btf_id) ||
13082 is_task_work_add_kfunc(btf_id);
13083 }
13084
is_bpf_throw_kfunc(struct bpf_insn * insn)13085 static bool is_bpf_throw_kfunc(struct bpf_insn *insn)
13086 {
13087 return bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && insn->off == 0 &&
13088 insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_throw];
13089 }
13090
is_bpf_wq_set_callback_kfunc(u32 btf_id)13091 static bool is_bpf_wq_set_callback_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
13092 {
13093 return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_wq_set_callback];
13094 }
13095
is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id)13096 static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
13097 {
13098 return is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(btf_id) ||
13099 is_async_callback_calling_kfunc(btf_id);
13100 }
13101
is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id)13102 static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
13103 {
13104 return is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id);
13105 }
13106
check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,enum btf_field_type head_field_type,u32 kfunc_btf_id)13107 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13108 enum btf_field_type head_field_type,
13109 u32 kfunc_btf_id)
13110 {
13111 bool ret;
13112
13113 switch (head_field_type) {
13114 case BPF_LIST_HEAD:
13115 ret = is_bpf_list_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id);
13116 break;
13117 case BPF_RB_ROOT:
13118 ret = is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(kfunc_btf_id);
13119 break;
13120 default:
13121 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph root argument type %s\n",
13122 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type));
13123 return false;
13124 }
13125
13126 if (!ret)
13127 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s head arg for unknown kfunc\n",
13128 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type));
13129 return ret;
13130 }
13131
check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,enum btf_field_type node_field_type,u32 kfunc_btf_id)13132 static bool check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13133 enum btf_field_type node_field_type,
13134 u32 kfunc_btf_id)
13135 {
13136 bool ret;
13137
13138 switch (node_field_type) {
13139 case BPF_LIST_NODE:
13140 ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] ||
13141 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl]);
13142 break;
13143 case BPF_RB_NODE:
13144 ret = (kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_remove] ||
13145 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl] ||
13146 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_left] ||
13147 kfunc_btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_right]);
13148 break;
13149 default:
13150 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected graph node argument type %s\n",
13151 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type));
13152 return false;
13153 }
13154
13155 if (!ret)
13156 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: %s node arg for unknown kfunc\n",
13157 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type));
13158 return ret;
13159 }
13160
13161 static int
__process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 regno,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta,enum btf_field_type head_field_type,struct btf_field ** head_field)13162 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13163 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
13164 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
13165 enum btf_field_type head_field_type,
13166 struct btf_field **head_field)
13167 {
13168 const char *head_type_name;
13169 struct btf_field *field;
13170 struct btf_record *rec;
13171 u32 head_off;
13172
13173 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) {
13174 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call");
13175 return -EFAULT;
13176 }
13177
13178 if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_root_api(env, head_field_type, meta->func_id))
13179 return -EFAULT;
13180
13181 head_type_name = btf_field_type_name(head_field_type);
13182 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
13183 verbose(env,
13184 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n",
13185 regno, head_type_name);
13186 return -EINVAL;
13187 }
13188
13189 rec = reg_btf_record(reg);
13190 head_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
13191 field = btf_record_find(rec, head_off, head_field_type);
13192 if (!field) {
13193 verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", head_type_name, head_off);
13194 return -EINVAL;
13195 }
13196
13197 /* All functions require bpf_list_head to be protected using a bpf_spin_lock */
13198 if (check_reg_allocation_locked(env, reg)) {
13199 verbose(env, "bpf_spin_lock at off=%d must be held for %s\n",
13200 rec->spin_lock_off, head_type_name);
13201 return -EINVAL;
13202 }
13203
13204 if (*head_field) {
13205 verifier_bug(env, "repeating %s arg", head_type_name);
13206 return -EFAULT;
13207 }
13208 *head_field = field;
13209 return 0;
13210 }
13211
process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 regno,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)13212 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13213 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
13214 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
13215 {
13216 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_LIST_HEAD,
13217 &meta->arg_list_head.field);
13218 }
13219
process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 regno,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)13220 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13221 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
13222 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
13223 {
13224 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(env, reg, regno, meta, BPF_RB_ROOT,
13225 &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field);
13226 }
13227
13228 static int
__process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 regno,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta,enum btf_field_type head_field_type,enum btf_field_type node_field_type,struct btf_field ** node_field)13229 __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13230 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
13231 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
13232 enum btf_field_type head_field_type,
13233 enum btf_field_type node_field_type,
13234 struct btf_field **node_field)
13235 {
13236 const char *node_type_name;
13237 const struct btf_type *et, *t;
13238 struct btf_field *field;
13239 u32 node_off;
13240
13241 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) {
13242 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call");
13243 return -EFAULT;
13244 }
13245
13246 if (!check_kfunc_is_graph_node_api(env, node_field_type, meta->func_id))
13247 return -EFAULT;
13248
13249 node_type_name = btf_field_type_name(node_field_type);
13250 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
13251 verbose(env,
13252 "R%d doesn't have constant offset. %s has to be at the constant offset\n",
13253 regno, node_type_name);
13254 return -EINVAL;
13255 }
13256
13257 node_off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
13258 field = reg_find_field_offset(reg, node_off, node_field_type);
13259 if (!field) {
13260 verbose(env, "%s not found at offset=%u\n", node_type_name, node_off);
13261 return -EINVAL;
13262 }
13263
13264 field = *node_field;
13265
13266 et = btf_type_by_id(field->graph_root.btf, field->graph_root.value_btf_id);
13267 t = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
13268 if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, 0, field->graph_root.btf,
13269 field->graph_root.value_btf_id, true)) {
13270 verbose(env, "operation on %s expects arg#1 %s at offset=%d "
13271 "in struct %s, but arg is at offset=%d in struct %s\n",
13272 btf_field_type_name(head_field_type),
13273 btf_field_type_name(node_field_type),
13274 field->graph_root.node_offset,
13275 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off),
13276 node_off, btf_name_by_offset(reg->btf, t->name_off));
13277 return -EINVAL;
13278 }
13279 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf;
13280 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id;
13281
13282 if (node_off != field->graph_root.node_offset) {
13283 verbose(env, "arg#1 offset=%d, but expected %s at offset=%d in struct %s\n",
13284 node_off, btf_field_type_name(node_field_type),
13285 field->graph_root.node_offset,
13286 btf_name_by_offset(field->graph_root.btf, et->name_off));
13287 return -EINVAL;
13288 }
13289
13290 return 0;
13291 }
13292
process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 regno,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)13293 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13294 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
13295 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
13296 {
13297 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta,
13298 BPF_LIST_HEAD, BPF_LIST_NODE,
13299 &meta->arg_list_head.field);
13300 }
13301
process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 regno,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)13302 static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13303 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno,
13304 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
13305 {
13306 return __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(env, reg, regno, meta,
13307 BPF_RB_ROOT, BPF_RB_NODE,
13308 &meta->arg_rbtree_root.field);
13309 }
13310
13311 /*
13312 * css_task iter allowlist is needed to avoid dead locking on css_set_lock.
13313 * LSM hooks and iters (both sleepable and non-sleepable) are safe.
13314 * Any sleepable progs are also safe since bpf_check_attach_target() enforce
13315 * them can only be attached to some specific hook points.
13316 */
check_css_task_iter_allowlist(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)13317 static bool check_css_task_iter_allowlist(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
13318 {
13319 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
13320
13321 switch (prog_type) {
13322 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
13323 return true;
13324 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
13325 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER)
13326 return true;
13327 fallthrough;
13328 default:
13329 return in_sleepable(env);
13330 }
13331 }
13332
check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta,int insn_idx)13333 static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
13334 int insn_idx)
13335 {
13336 const char *func_name = meta->func_name, *ref_tname;
13337 const struct btf *btf = meta->btf;
13338 const struct btf_param *args;
13339 struct btf_record *rec;
13340 u32 i, nargs;
13341 int ret;
13342
13343 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta->func_proto + 1);
13344 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta->func_proto);
13345 if (nargs > MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) {
13346 verbose(env, "Function %s has %d > %d args\n", func_name, nargs,
13347 MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS);
13348 return -EINVAL;
13349 }
13350
13351 /* Check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the
13352 * verifier sees.
13353 */
13354 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) {
13355 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = ®s[i + 1];
13356 const struct btf_type *t, *ref_t, *resolve_ret;
13357 enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = ARG_DONTCARE;
13358 u32 regno = i + 1, ref_id, type_size;
13359 bool is_ret_buf_sz = false;
13360 int kf_arg_type;
13361
13362 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, args[i].type, NULL);
13363
13364 if (is_kfunc_arg_ignore(btf, &args[i]))
13365 continue;
13366
13367 if (is_kfunc_arg_prog_aux(btf, &args[i])) {
13368 /* Reject repeated use bpf_prog_aux */
13369 if (meta->arg_prog) {
13370 verifier_bug(env, "Only 1 prog->aux argument supported per-kfunc");
13371 return -EFAULT;
13372 }
13373 meta->arg_prog = true;
13374 cur_aux(env)->arg_prog = regno;
13375 continue;
13376 }
13377
13378 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) {
13379 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
13380 verbose(env, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno);
13381 return -EINVAL;
13382 }
13383
13384 if (is_kfunc_arg_constant(meta->btf, &args[i])) {
13385 if (meta->arg_constant.found) {
13386 verifier_bug(env, "only one constant argument permitted");
13387 return -EFAULT;
13388 }
13389 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
13390 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno);
13391 return -EINVAL;
13392 }
13393 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
13394 if (ret < 0)
13395 return ret;
13396 meta->arg_constant.found = true;
13397 meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value;
13398 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdonly_buf_size")) {
13399 meta->r0_rdonly = true;
13400 is_ret_buf_sz = true;
13401 } else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(btf, &args[i], "rdwr_buf_size")) {
13402 is_ret_buf_sz = true;
13403 }
13404
13405 if (is_ret_buf_sz) {
13406 if (meta->r0_size) {
13407 verbose(env, "2 or more rdonly/rdwr_buf_size parameters for kfunc");
13408 return -EINVAL;
13409 }
13410
13411 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
13412 verbose(env, "R%d is not a const\n", regno);
13413 return -EINVAL;
13414 }
13415
13416 meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value;
13417 ret = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
13418 if (ret)
13419 return ret;
13420 }
13421 continue;
13422 }
13423
13424 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t)) {
13425 verbose(env, "Unrecognized arg#%d type %s\n", i, btf_type_str(t));
13426 return -EINVAL;
13427 }
13428
13429 if ((register_is_null(reg) || type_may_be_null(reg->type)) &&
13430 !is_kfunc_arg_nullable(meta->btf, &args[i])) {
13431 verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg%d\n", i);
13432 return -EACCES;
13433 }
13434
13435 if (reg->ref_obj_id) {
13436 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) {
13437 verifier_bug(env, "more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u",
13438 regno, reg->ref_obj_id,
13439 meta->ref_obj_id);
13440 return -EFAULT;
13441 }
13442 meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id;
13443 if (is_kfunc_release(meta))
13444 meta->release_regno = regno;
13445 }
13446
13447 ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, &ref_id);
13448 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off);
13449
13450 kf_arg_type = get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(env, meta, t, ref_t, ref_tname, args, i, nargs);
13451 if (kf_arg_type < 0)
13452 return kf_arg_type;
13453
13454 switch (kf_arg_type) {
13455 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL:
13456 continue;
13457 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MAP:
13458 if (!reg->map_ptr) {
13459 verbose(env, "pointer in R%d isn't map pointer\n", regno);
13460 return -EINVAL;
13461 }
13462 if (meta->map.ptr && (reg->map_ptr->record->wq_off >= 0 ||
13463 reg->map_ptr->record->task_work_off >= 0)) {
13464 /* Use map_uid (which is unique id of inner map) to reject:
13465 * inner_map1 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key1)
13466 * inner_map2 = bpf_map_lookup_elem(outer_map, key2)
13467 * if (inner_map1 && inner_map2) {
13468 * wq = bpf_map_lookup_elem(inner_map1);
13469 * if (wq)
13470 * // mismatch would have been allowed
13471 * bpf_wq_init(wq, inner_map2);
13472 * }
13473 *
13474 * Comparing map_ptr is enough to distinguish normal and outer maps.
13475 */
13476 if (meta->map.ptr != reg->map_ptr ||
13477 meta->map.uid != reg->map_uid) {
13478 if (reg->map_ptr->record->task_work_off >= 0) {
13479 verbose(env,
13480 "bpf_task_work pointer in R2 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R3 map_uid=%d\n",
13481 meta->map.uid, reg->map_uid);
13482 return -EINVAL;
13483 }
13484 verbose(env,
13485 "workqueue pointer in R1 map_uid=%d doesn't match map pointer in R2 map_uid=%d\n",
13486 meta->map.uid, reg->map_uid);
13487 return -EINVAL;
13488 }
13489 }
13490 meta->map.ptr = reg->map_ptr;
13491 meta->map.uid = reg->map_uid;
13492 fallthrough;
13493 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID:
13494 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
13495 if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) {
13496 if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) {
13497 verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno);
13498 return -EINVAL;
13499 }
13500 if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) {
13501 verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno);
13502 return -EINVAL;
13503 }
13504 }
13505 fallthrough;
13506 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX:
13507 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR:
13508 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER:
13509 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD:
13510 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE:
13511 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT:
13512 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE:
13513 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM:
13514 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE:
13515 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK:
13516 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR:
13517 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR:
13518 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE:
13519 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER:
13520 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TASK_WORK:
13521 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_IRQ_FLAG:
13522 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK:
13523 break;
13524 default:
13525 verifier_bug(env, "unknown kfunc arg type %d", kf_arg_type);
13526 return -EFAULT;
13527 }
13528
13529 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id)
13530 arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE;
13531 ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type);
13532 if (ret < 0)
13533 return ret;
13534
13535 switch (kf_arg_type) {
13536 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX:
13537 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
13538 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to ctx, but got %s\n",
13539 i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
13540 return -EINVAL;
13541 }
13542
13543 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) {
13544 ret = get_kern_ctx_btf_id(&env->log, resolve_prog_type(env->prog));
13545 if (ret < 0)
13546 return -EINVAL;
13547 meta->ret_btf_id = ret;
13548 }
13549 break;
13550 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID:
13551 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
13552 if (meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) {
13553 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected for bpf_obj_drop_impl()\n", i);
13554 return -EINVAL;
13555 }
13556 } else if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | MEM_PERCPU)) {
13557 if (meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl]) {
13558 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected for bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl()\n", i);
13559 return -EINVAL;
13560 }
13561 } else {
13562 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i);
13563 return -EINVAL;
13564 }
13565 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) {
13566 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n");
13567 return -EINVAL;
13568 }
13569 if (meta->btf == btf_vmlinux) {
13570 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf;
13571 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id;
13572 }
13573 break;
13574 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR:
13575 {
13576 enum bpf_arg_type dynptr_arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR;
13577 int clone_ref_obj_id = 0;
13578
13579 if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
13580 dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_RDONLY;
13581
13582 if (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, &args[i]))
13583 dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT;
13584
13585 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) {
13586 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB;
13587 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp]) {
13588 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP;
13589 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb_meta]) {
13590 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META;
13591 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_file]) {
13592 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE;
13593 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_file_discard]) {
13594 dynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE;
13595 meta->release_regno = regno;
13596 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_clone] &&
13597 (dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) {
13598 enum bpf_dynptr_type parent_type = meta->initialized_dynptr.type;
13599
13600 if (parent_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) {
13601 verifier_bug(env, "no dynptr type for parent of clone");
13602 return -EFAULT;
13603 }
13604
13605 dynptr_arg_type |= (unsigned int)get_dynptr_type_flag(parent_type);
13606 clone_ref_obj_id = meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id;
13607 if (dynptr_type_refcounted(parent_type) && !clone_ref_obj_id) {
13608 verifier_bug(env, "missing ref obj id for parent of clone");
13609 return -EFAULT;
13610 }
13611 }
13612
13613 ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, dynptr_arg_type, clone_ref_obj_id);
13614 if (ret < 0)
13615 return ret;
13616
13617 if (!(dynptr_arg_type & MEM_UNINIT)) {
13618 int id = dynptr_id(env, reg);
13619
13620 if (id < 0) {
13621 verifier_bug(env, "failed to obtain dynptr id");
13622 return id;
13623 }
13624 meta->initialized_dynptr.id = id;
13625 meta->initialized_dynptr.type = dynptr_get_type(env, reg);
13626 meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg);
13627 }
13628
13629 break;
13630 }
13631 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER:
13632 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_css_task_new]) {
13633 if (!check_css_task_iter_allowlist(env)) {
13634 verbose(env, "css_task_iter is only allowed in bpf_lsm, bpf_iter and sleepable progs\n");
13635 return -EINVAL;
13636 }
13637 }
13638 ret = process_iter_arg(env, regno, insn_idx, meta);
13639 if (ret < 0)
13640 return ret;
13641 break;
13642 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD:
13643 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
13644 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
13645 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i);
13646 return -EINVAL;
13647 }
13648 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) {
13649 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n");
13650 return -EINVAL;
13651 }
13652 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_head(env, reg, regno, meta);
13653 if (ret < 0)
13654 return ret;
13655 break;
13656 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT:
13657 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
13658 reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
13659 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to map value or allocated object\n", i);
13660 return -EINVAL;
13661 }
13662 if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC) && !reg->ref_obj_id) {
13663 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n");
13664 return -EINVAL;
13665 }
13666 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_root(env, reg, regno, meta);
13667 if (ret < 0)
13668 return ret;
13669 break;
13670 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE:
13671 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
13672 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i);
13673 return -EINVAL;
13674 }
13675 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) {
13676 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n");
13677 return -EINVAL;
13678 }
13679 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_list_node(env, reg, regno, meta);
13680 if (ret < 0)
13681 return ret;
13682 break;
13683 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE:
13684 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) {
13685 if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
13686 verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i);
13687 return -EINVAL;
13688 }
13689 if (!reg->ref_obj_id) {
13690 verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n");
13691 return -EINVAL;
13692 }
13693 } else {
13694 if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) && !reg->ref_obj_id) {
13695 verbose(env, "%s can only take non-owning or refcounted bpf_rb_node pointer\n", func_name);
13696 return -EINVAL;
13697 }
13698 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) {
13699 verbose(env, "%s not allowed in rbtree cb\n", func_name);
13700 return -EINVAL;
13701 }
13702 }
13703
13704 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(env, reg, regno, meta);
13705 if (ret < 0)
13706 return ret;
13707 break;
13708 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MAP:
13709 /* If argument has '__map' suffix expect 'struct bpf_map *' */
13710 ref_id = *reg2btf_ids[CONST_PTR_TO_MAP];
13711 ref_t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, ref_id);
13712 ref_tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, ref_t->name_off);
13713 fallthrough;
13714 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
13715 /* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */
13716 if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID ||
13717 (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) &&
13718 !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) {
13719 verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
13720 verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n",
13721 reg_type_str(env, base_type(reg->type) |
13722 (type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS)));
13723 return -EINVAL;
13724 }
13725 ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, ref_id, meta, i);
13726 if (ret < 0)
13727 return ret;
13728 break;
13729 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM:
13730 resolve_ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, ref_t, &type_size);
13731 if (IS_ERR(resolve_ret)) {
13732 verbose(env, "arg#%d reference type('%s %s') size cannot be determined: %ld\n",
13733 i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname, PTR_ERR(resolve_ret));
13734 return -EINVAL;
13735 }
13736 ret = check_mem_reg(env, reg, regno, type_size);
13737 if (ret < 0)
13738 return ret;
13739 break;
13740 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE:
13741 {
13742 struct bpf_reg_state *buff_reg = ®s[regno];
13743 const struct btf_param *buff_arg = &args[i];
13744 struct bpf_reg_state *size_reg = ®s[regno + 1];
13745 const struct btf_param *size_arg = &args[i + 1];
13746
13747 if (!register_is_null(buff_reg) || !is_kfunc_arg_nullable(meta->btf, buff_arg)) {
13748 ret = check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(env, size_reg, regno + 1);
13749 if (ret < 0) {
13750 verbose(env, "arg#%d arg#%d memory, len pair leads to invalid memory access\n", i, i + 1);
13751 return ret;
13752 }
13753 }
13754
13755 if (is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, size_arg, size_reg)) {
13756 if (meta->arg_constant.found) {
13757 verifier_bug(env, "only one constant argument permitted");
13758 return -EFAULT;
13759 }
13760 if (!tnum_is_const(size_reg->var_off)) {
13761 verbose(env, "R%d must be a known constant\n", regno + 1);
13762 return -EINVAL;
13763 }
13764 meta->arg_constant.found = true;
13765 meta->arg_constant.value = size_reg->var_off.value;
13766 }
13767
13768 /* Skip next '__sz' or '__szk' argument */
13769 i++;
13770 break;
13771 }
13772 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK:
13773 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_FUNC) {
13774 verbose(env, "arg%d expected pointer to func\n", i);
13775 return -EINVAL;
13776 }
13777 meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno;
13778 break;
13779 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR:
13780 if (!type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) {
13781 verbose(env, "arg#%d is neither owning or non-owning ref\n", i);
13782 return -EINVAL;
13783 }
13784 if (!type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type))
13785 meta->arg_owning_ref = true;
13786
13787 rec = reg_btf_record(reg);
13788 if (!rec) {
13789 verifier_bug(env, "Couldn't find btf_record");
13790 return -EFAULT;
13791 }
13792
13793 if (rec->refcount_off < 0) {
13794 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a type with bpf_refcount field\n", i);
13795 return -EINVAL;
13796 }
13797
13798 meta->arg_btf = reg->btf;
13799 meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id;
13800 break;
13801 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR:
13802 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
13803 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a const string\n", i);
13804 return -EINVAL;
13805 }
13806 ret = check_reg_const_str(env, reg, regno);
13807 if (ret)
13808 return ret;
13809 break;
13810 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE:
13811 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
13812 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a map value\n", i);
13813 return -EINVAL;
13814 }
13815 ret = check_map_field_pointer(env, regno, BPF_WORKQUEUE, &meta->map);
13816 if (ret < 0)
13817 return ret;
13818 break;
13819 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER:
13820 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
13821 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a map value\n", i);
13822 return -EINVAL;
13823 }
13824 ret = process_timer_kfunc(env, regno, meta);
13825 if (ret < 0)
13826 return ret;
13827 break;
13828 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TASK_WORK:
13829 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
13830 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a map value\n", i);
13831 return -EINVAL;
13832 }
13833 ret = check_map_field_pointer(env, regno, BPF_TASK_WORK, &meta->map);
13834 if (ret < 0)
13835 return ret;
13836 break;
13837 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_IRQ_FLAG:
13838 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
13839 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to an irq flag on stack\n", i);
13840 return -EINVAL;
13841 }
13842 ret = process_irq_flag(env, regno, meta);
13843 if (ret < 0)
13844 return ret;
13845 break;
13846 case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK:
13847 {
13848 int flags = PROCESS_RES_LOCK;
13849
13850 if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
13851 verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to map value or allocated object\n", i);
13852 return -EINVAL;
13853 }
13854
13855 if (!is_bpf_res_spin_lock_kfunc(meta->func_id))
13856 return -EFAULT;
13857 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] ||
13858 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave])
13859 flags |= PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK;
13860 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave] ||
13861 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore])
13862 flags |= PROCESS_LOCK_IRQ;
13863 ret = process_spin_lock(env, regno, flags);
13864 if (ret < 0)
13865 return ret;
13866 break;
13867 }
13868 }
13869 }
13870
13871 if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && !meta->release_regno) {
13872 verbose(env, "release kernel function %s expects refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n",
13873 func_name);
13874 return -EINVAL;
13875 }
13876
13877 return 0;
13878 }
13879
fetch_kfunc_arg_meta(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,s32 func_id,s16 offset,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta)13880 static int fetch_kfunc_arg_meta(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
13881 s32 func_id,
13882 s16 offset,
13883 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
13884 {
13885 struct bpf_kfunc_meta kfunc;
13886 int err;
13887
13888 err = fetch_kfunc_meta(env, func_id, offset, &kfunc);
13889 if (err)
13890 return err;
13891
13892 memset(meta, 0, sizeof(*meta));
13893 meta->btf = kfunc.btf;
13894 meta->func_id = kfunc.id;
13895 meta->func_proto = kfunc.proto;
13896 meta->func_name = kfunc.name;
13897
13898 if (!kfunc.flags || !btf_kfunc_is_allowed(kfunc.btf, kfunc.id, env->prog))
13899 return -EACCES;
13900
13901 meta->kfunc_flags = *kfunc.flags;
13902
13903 return 0;
13904 }
13905
13906 /* check special kfuncs and return:
13907 * 1 - not fall-through to 'else' branch, continue verification
13908 * 0 - fall-through to 'else' branch
13909 * < 0 - not fall-through to 'else' branch, return error
13910 */
check_special_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta * meta,struct bpf_reg_state * regs,struct bpf_insn_aux_data * insn_aux,const struct btf_type * ptr_type,struct btf * desc_btf)13911 static int check_special_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
13912 struct bpf_reg_state *regs, struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux,
13913 const struct btf_type *ptr_type, struct btf *desc_btf)
13914 {
13915 const struct btf_type *ret_t;
13916 int err = 0;
13917
13918 if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux)
13919 return 0;
13920
13921 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] ||
13922 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) {
13923 struct btf_struct_meta *struct_meta;
13924 struct btf *ret_btf;
13925 u32 ret_btf_id;
13926
13927 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] && !bpf_global_ma_set)
13928 return -ENOMEM;
13929
13930 if (((u64)(u32)meta->arg_constant.value) != meta->arg_constant.value) {
13931 verbose(env, "local type ID argument must be in range [0, U32_MAX]\n");
13932 return -EINVAL;
13933 }
13934
13935 ret_btf = env->prog->aux->btf;
13936 ret_btf_id = meta->arg_constant.value;
13937
13938 /* This may be NULL due to user not supplying a BTF */
13939 if (!ret_btf) {
13940 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new/bpf_percpu_obj_new requires prog BTF\n");
13941 return -EINVAL;
13942 }
13943
13944 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(ret_btf, ret_btf_id);
13945 if (!ret_t || !__btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) {
13946 verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new/bpf_percpu_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct\n");
13947 return -EINVAL;
13948 }
13949
13950 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) {
13951 if (ret_t->size > BPF_GLOBAL_PERCPU_MA_MAX_SIZE) {
13952 verbose(env, "bpf_percpu_obj_new type size (%d) is greater than %d\n",
13953 ret_t->size, BPF_GLOBAL_PERCPU_MA_MAX_SIZE);
13954 return -EINVAL;
13955 }
13956
13957 if (!bpf_global_percpu_ma_set) {
13958 mutex_lock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock);
13959 if (!bpf_global_percpu_ma_set) {
13960 /* Charge memory allocated with bpf_global_percpu_ma to
13961 * root memcg. The obj_cgroup for root memcg is NULL.
13962 */
13963 err = bpf_mem_alloc_percpu_init(&bpf_global_percpu_ma, NULL);
13964 if (!err)
13965 bpf_global_percpu_ma_set = true;
13966 }
13967 mutex_unlock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock);
13968 if (err)
13969 return err;
13970 }
13971
13972 mutex_lock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock);
13973 err = bpf_mem_alloc_percpu_unit_init(&bpf_global_percpu_ma, ret_t->size);
13974 mutex_unlock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock);
13975 if (err)
13976 return err;
13977 }
13978
13979 struct_meta = btf_find_struct_meta(ret_btf, ret_btf_id);
13980 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) {
13981 if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, ret_btf, ret_t, 0)) {
13982 verbose(env, "bpf_percpu_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct of scalars\n");
13983 return -EINVAL;
13984 }
13985
13986 if (struct_meta) {
13987 verbose(env, "bpf_percpu_obj_new type ID argument must not contain special fields\n");
13988 return -EINVAL;
13989 }
13990 }
13991
13992 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
13993 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC;
13994 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf;
13995 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id;
13996 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl])
13997 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_PERCPU;
13998
13999 insn_aux->obj_new_size = ret_t->size;
14000 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = struct_meta;
14001 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) {
14002 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
14003 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC;
14004 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta->arg_btf;
14005 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta->arg_btf_id;
14006
14007 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta =
14008 btf_find_struct_meta(meta->arg_btf,
14009 meta->arg_btf_id);
14010 } else if (is_list_node_type(ptr_type)) {
14011 struct btf_field *field = meta->arg_list_head.field;
14012
14013 mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root);
14014 } else if (is_rbtree_node_type(ptr_type)) {
14015 struct btf_field *field = meta->arg_rbtree_root.field;
14016
14017 mark_reg_graph_node(regs, BPF_REG_0, &field->graph_root);
14018 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx]) {
14019 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
14020 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED;
14021 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf;
14022 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta->ret_btf_id;
14023 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) {
14024 ret_t = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, meta->arg_constant.value);
14025 if (!ret_t) {
14026 verbose(env, "Unknown type ID %lld passed to kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast\n",
14027 meta->arg_constant.value);
14028 return -EINVAL;
14029 } else if (btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) {
14030 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
14031 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED;
14032 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf;
14033 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta->arg_constant.value;
14034 } else if (btf_type_is_void(ret_t)) {
14035 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
14036 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED;
14037 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = 0;
14038 } else {
14039 verbose(env,
14040 "kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast type ID argument must be of a struct or void\n");
14041 return -EINVAL;
14042 }
14043 } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice] ||
14044 meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr]) {
14045 enum bpf_type_flag type_flag = get_dynptr_type_flag(meta->initialized_dynptr.type);
14046
14047 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
14048
14049 if (!meta->arg_constant.found) {
14050 verifier_bug(env, "bpf_dynptr_slice(_rdwr) no constant size");
14051 return -EFAULT;
14052 }
14053
14054 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta->arg_constant.value;
14055
14056 /* PTR_MAYBE_NULL will be added when is_kfunc_ret_null is checked */
14057 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | type_flag;
14058
14059 if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice]) {
14060 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY;
14061 } else {
14062 /* this will set env->seen_direct_write to true */
14063 if (!may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE)) {
14064 verbose(env, "the prog does not allow writes to packet data\n");
14065 return -EINVAL;
14066 }
14067 }
14068
14069 if (!meta->initialized_dynptr.id) {
14070 verifier_bug(env, "no dynptr id");
14071 return -EFAULT;
14072 }
14073 regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta->initialized_dynptr.id;
14074
14075 /* we don't need to set BPF_REG_0's ref obj id
14076 * because packet slices are not refcounted (see
14077 * dynptr_type_refcounted)
14078 */
14079 } else {
14080 return 0;
14081 }
14082
14083 return 1;
14084 }
14085
14086 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, const char *reg_name);
14087
check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,int * insn_idx_p)14088 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
14089 int *insn_idx_p)
14090 {
14091 bool sleepable, rcu_lock, rcu_unlock, preempt_disable, preempt_enable;
14092 u32 i, nargs, ptr_type_id, release_ref_obj_id;
14093 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
14094 const char *func_name, *ptr_type_name;
14095 const struct btf_type *t, *ptr_type;
14096 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta;
14097 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;
14098 int err, insn_idx = *insn_idx_p;
14099 const struct btf_param *args;
14100 struct btf *desc_btf;
14101
14102 /* skip for now, but return error when we find this in fixup_kfunc_call */
14103 if (!insn->imm)
14104 return 0;
14105
14106 err = fetch_kfunc_arg_meta(env, insn->imm, insn->off, &meta);
14107 if (err == -EACCES && meta.func_name)
14108 verbose(env, "calling kernel function %s is not allowed\n", meta.func_name);
14109 if (err)
14110 return err;
14111 desc_btf = meta.btf;
14112 func_name = meta.func_name;
14113 insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
14114
14115 insn_aux->is_iter_next = is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta);
14116
14117 if (!insn->off &&
14118 (insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] ||
14119 insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave])) {
14120 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch;
14121 struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
14122
14123 branch = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, false);
14124 if (IS_ERR(branch)) {
14125 verbose(env, "failed to push state for failed lock acquisition\n");
14126 return PTR_ERR(branch);
14127 }
14128
14129 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs;
14130
14131 /* Clear r0-r5 registers in forked state */
14132 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++)
14133 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
14134
14135 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
14136 err = __mark_reg_s32_range(env, regs, BPF_REG_0, -MAX_ERRNO, -1);
14137 if (err) {
14138 verbose(env, "failed to mark s32 range for retval in forked state for lock\n");
14139 return err;
14140 }
14141 __mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regs, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(u32));
14142 } else if (!insn->off && insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF___bpf_trap]) {
14143 verbose(env, "unexpected __bpf_trap() due to uninitialized variable?\n");
14144 return -EFAULT;
14145 }
14146
14147 if (is_kfunc_destructive(&meta) && !capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) {
14148 verbose(env, "destructive kfunc calls require CAP_SYS_BOOT capability\n");
14149 return -EACCES;
14150 }
14151
14152 sleepable = is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta);
14153 if (sleepable && !in_sleepable(env)) {
14154 verbose(env, "program must be sleepable to call sleepable kfunc %s\n", func_name);
14155 return -EACCES;
14156 }
14157
14158 /* Track non-sleepable context for kfuncs, same as for helpers. */
14159 if (!in_sleepable_context(env))
14160 insn_aux->non_sleepable = true;
14161
14162 /* Check the arguments */
14163 err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta, insn_idx);
14164 if (err < 0)
14165 return err;
14166
14167 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) {
14168 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
14169 set_rbtree_add_callback_state);
14170 if (err) {
14171 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n",
14172 func_name, meta.func_id);
14173 return err;
14174 }
14175 }
14176
14177 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_session_cookie]) {
14178 meta.r0_size = sizeof(u64);
14179 meta.r0_rdonly = false;
14180 }
14181
14182 if (is_bpf_wq_set_callback_kfunc(meta.func_id)) {
14183 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
14184 set_timer_callback_state);
14185 if (err) {
14186 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n",
14187 func_name, meta.func_id);
14188 return err;
14189 }
14190 }
14191
14192 if (is_task_work_add_kfunc(meta.func_id)) {
14193 err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
14194 set_task_work_schedule_callback_state);
14195 if (err) {
14196 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n",
14197 func_name, meta.func_id);
14198 return err;
14199 }
14200 }
14201
14202 rcu_lock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(&meta);
14203 rcu_unlock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(&meta);
14204
14205 preempt_disable = is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_disable(&meta);
14206 preempt_enable = is_kfunc_bpf_preempt_enable(&meta);
14207
14208 if (rcu_lock) {
14209 env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks++;
14210 } else if (rcu_unlock) {
14211 struct bpf_func_state *state;
14212 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
14213 u32 clear_mask = (1 << STACK_SPILL) | (1 << STACK_ITER);
14214
14215 if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks == 0) {
14216 verbose(env, "unmatched rcu read unlock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name);
14217 return -EINVAL;
14218 }
14219 if (--env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks == 0) {
14220 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate_mask(env->cur_state, state, reg, clear_mask, ({
14221 if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) {
14222 reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL);
14223 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
14224 }
14225 }));
14226 }
14227 } else if (sleepable && env->cur_state->active_rcu_locks) {
14228 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within rcu_read_lock region\n", func_name);
14229 return -EACCES;
14230 }
14231
14232 if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env) && (rcu_lock || rcu_unlock)) {
14233 verbose(env, "Calling bpf_rcu_read_{lock,unlock} in unnecessary rbtree callback\n");
14234 return -EACCES;
14235 }
14236
14237 if (env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks) {
14238 if (preempt_disable) {
14239 env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks++;
14240 } else if (preempt_enable) {
14241 env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks--;
14242 } else if (sleepable) {
14243 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within non-preemptible region\n", func_name);
14244 return -EACCES;
14245 }
14246 } else if (preempt_disable) {
14247 env->cur_state->active_preempt_locks++;
14248 } else if (preempt_enable) {
14249 verbose(env, "unmatched attempt to enable preemption (kernel function %s)\n", func_name);
14250 return -EINVAL;
14251 }
14252
14253 if (env->cur_state->active_irq_id && sleepable) {
14254 verbose(env, "kernel func %s is sleepable within IRQ-disabled region\n", func_name);
14255 return -EACCES;
14256 }
14257
14258 if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(&meta) && !in_rcu_cs(env)) {
14259 verbose(env, "kernel func %s requires RCU critical section protection\n", func_name);
14260 return -EACCES;
14261 }
14262
14263 /* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted
14264 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now.
14265 */
14266 if (meta.release_regno) {
14267 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[meta.release_regno];
14268
14269 if (meta.initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id) {
14270 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, reg);
14271 } else {
14272 err = release_reference(env, reg->ref_obj_id);
14273 if (err)
14274 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
14275 func_name, meta.func_id);
14276 }
14277 if (err)
14278 return err;
14279 }
14280
14281 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] ||
14282 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] ||
14283 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) {
14284 release_ref_obj_id = regs[BPF_REG_2].ref_obj_id;
14285 insn_aux->insert_off = regs[BPF_REG_2].off;
14286 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, meta.arg_btf_id);
14287 err = ref_convert_owning_non_owning(env, release_ref_obj_id);
14288 if (err) {
14289 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d conversion of owning ref to non-owning failed\n",
14290 func_name, meta.func_id);
14291 return err;
14292 }
14293
14294 err = release_reference(env, release_ref_obj_id);
14295 if (err) {
14296 verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
14297 func_name, meta.func_id);
14298 return err;
14299 }
14300 }
14301
14302 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_throw]) {
14303 if (!bpf_jit_supports_exceptions()) {
14304 verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kfunc %s#%d\n",
14305 func_name, meta.func_id);
14306 return -ENOTSUPP;
14307 }
14308 env->seen_exception = true;
14309
14310 /* In the case of the default callback, the cookie value passed
14311 * to bpf_throw becomes the return value of the program.
14312 */
14313 if (!env->exception_callback_subprog) {
14314 err = check_return_code(env, BPF_REG_1, "R1");
14315 if (err < 0)
14316 return err;
14317 }
14318 }
14319
14320 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
14321 u32 regno = caller_saved[i];
14322
14323 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, regno);
14324 regs[regno].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
14325 }
14326
14327 /* Check return type */
14328 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, meta.func_proto->type, NULL);
14329
14330 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta) && !btf_type_is_struct_ptr(meta.btf, t)) {
14331 /* Only exception is bpf_obj_new_impl */
14332 if (meta.btf != btf_vmlinux ||
14333 (meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] &&
14334 meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl] &&
14335 meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl])) {
14336 verbose(env, "acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n");
14337 return -EINVAL;
14338 }
14339 }
14340
14341 if (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) {
14342 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
14343 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] ||
14344 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave]))
14345 __mark_reg_const_zero(env, ®s[BPF_REG_0]);
14346 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, t->size);
14347 } else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) {
14348 ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t->type, &ptr_type_id);
14349 err = check_special_kfunc(env, &meta, regs, insn_aux, ptr_type, desc_btf);
14350 if (err) {
14351 if (err < 0)
14352 return err;
14353 } else if (btf_type_is_void(ptr_type)) {
14354 /* kfunc returning 'void *' is equivalent to returning scalar */
14355 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
14356 } else if (!__btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) {
14357 if (!meta.r0_size) {
14358 __u32 sz;
14359
14360 if (!IS_ERR(btf_resolve_size(desc_btf, ptr_type, &sz))) {
14361 meta.r0_size = sz;
14362 meta.r0_rdonly = true;
14363 }
14364 }
14365 if (!meta.r0_size) {
14366 ptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf,
14367 ptr_type->name_off);
14368 verbose(env,
14369 "kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\n",
14370 func_name,
14371 btf_type_str(ptr_type),
14372 ptr_type_name);
14373 return -EINVAL;
14374 }
14375
14376 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
14377 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM;
14378 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size;
14379
14380 if (meta.r0_rdonly)
14381 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY;
14382
14383 /* Ensures we don't access the memory after a release_reference() */
14384 if (meta.ref_obj_id)
14385 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id;
14386
14387 if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(&meta))
14388 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RCU;
14389 } else {
14390 enum bpf_reg_type type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
14391
14392 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_get_kmem_cache])
14393 type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
14394 else if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(&meta) ||
14395 (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta) &&
14396 (get_iter_from_state(env->cur_state, &meta)
14397 ->type & MEM_RCU))) {
14398 /*
14399 * If the iterator's constructor (the _new
14400 * function e.g., bpf_iter_task_new) has been
14401 * annotated with BPF kfunc flag
14402 * KF_RCU_PROTECTED and was called within a RCU
14403 * read-side critical section, also propagate
14404 * the MEM_RCU flag to the pointer returned from
14405 * the iterator's next function (e.g.,
14406 * bpf_iter_task_next).
14407 */
14408 type |= MEM_RCU;
14409 } else {
14410 /*
14411 * Any PTR_TO_BTF_ID that is returned from a BPF
14412 * kfunc should by default be treated as
14413 * implicitly trusted.
14414 */
14415 type |= PTR_TRUSTED;
14416 }
14417
14418 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
14419 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf;
14420 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = type;
14421 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ptr_type_id;
14422 }
14423
14424 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta)) {
14425 regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
14426 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg, see 93c230e3f5bd6 */
14427 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
14428 }
14429 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, BPF_REG_0, sizeof(void *));
14430 if (is_kfunc_acquire(&meta)) {
14431 int id = acquire_reference(env, insn_idx);
14432
14433 if (id < 0)
14434 return id;
14435 if (is_kfunc_ret_null(&meta))
14436 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id;
14437 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id;
14438 } else if (is_rbtree_node_type(ptr_type) || is_list_node_type(ptr_type)) {
14439 ref_set_non_owning(env, ®s[BPF_REG_0]);
14440 }
14441
14442 if (reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(®s[BPF_REG_0]) && !regs[BPF_REG_0].id)
14443 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
14444 } else if (btf_type_is_void(t)) {
14445 if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux) {
14446 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl] ||
14447 meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl]) {
14448 insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta =
14449 btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf,
14450 meta.arg_btf_id);
14451 }
14452 }
14453 }
14454
14455 if (is_kfunc_pkt_changing(&meta))
14456 clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
14457
14458 nargs = btf_type_vlen(meta.func_proto);
14459 args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta.func_proto + 1);
14460 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) {
14461 u32 regno = i + 1;
14462
14463 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, args[i].type, NULL);
14464 if (btf_type_is_ptr(t))
14465 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, sizeof(void *));
14466 else
14467 /* scalar. ensured by btf_check_kfunc_arg_match() */
14468 mark_btf_func_reg_size(env, regno, t->size);
14469 }
14470
14471 if (is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) {
14472 err = process_iter_next_call(env, insn_idx, &meta);
14473 if (err)
14474 return err;
14475 }
14476
14477 if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_session_cookie])
14478 env->prog->call_session_cookie = true;
14479
14480 return 0;
14481 }
14482
check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,enum bpf_reg_type type)14483 static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14484 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
14485 enum bpf_reg_type type)
14486 {
14487 bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
14488 s64 val = reg->var_off.value;
14489 s64 smin = reg->smin_value;
14490
14491 if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) {
14492 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n",
14493 reg_type_str(env, type), val);
14494 return false;
14495 }
14496
14497 if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
14498 verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n",
14499 reg_type_str(env, type), reg->off);
14500 return false;
14501 }
14502
14503 if (smin == S64_MIN) {
14504 verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n",
14505 reg_type_str(env, type));
14506 return false;
14507 }
14508
14509 if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
14510 verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n",
14511 smin, reg_type_str(env, type));
14512 return false;
14513 }
14514
14515 return true;
14516 }
14517
14518 enum {
14519 REASON_BOUNDS = -1,
14520 REASON_TYPE = -2,
14521 REASON_PATHS = -3,
14522 REASON_LIMIT = -4,
14523 REASON_STACK = -5,
14524 };
14525
retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state * ptr_reg,u32 * alu_limit,bool mask_to_left)14526 static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
14527 u32 *alu_limit, bool mask_to_left)
14528 {
14529 u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
14530
14531 switch (ptr_reg->type) {
14532 case PTR_TO_STACK:
14533 /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
14534 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar
14535 * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is
14536 * currently prohibited for unprivileged.
14537 */
14538 max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
14539 ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off);
14540 break;
14541 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
14542 max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
14543 ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ?
14544 ptr_reg->smin_value :
14545 ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off;
14546 break;
14547 default:
14548 return REASON_TYPE;
14549 }
14550
14551 if (ptr_limit >= max)
14552 return REASON_LIMIT;
14553 *alu_limit = ptr_limit;
14554 return 0;
14555 }
14556
can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_insn * insn)14557 static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14558 const struct bpf_insn *insn)
14559 {
14560 return env->bypass_spec_v1 ||
14561 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K ||
14562 cur_aux(env)->nospec;
14563 }
14564
update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data * aux,u32 alu_state,u32 alu_limit)14565 static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
14566 u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit)
14567 {
14568 /* If we arrived here from different branches with different
14569 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work.
14570 */
14571 if (aux->alu_state &&
14572 (aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
14573 aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
14574 return REASON_PATHS;
14575
14576 /* Corresponding fixup done in do_misc_fixups(). */
14577 aux->alu_state = alu_state;
14578 aux->alu_limit = alu_limit;
14579 return 0;
14580 }
14581
sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn)14582 static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14583 struct bpf_insn *insn)
14584 {
14585 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
14586
14587 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
14588 return 0;
14589
14590 return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0);
14591 }
14592
sanitize_needed(u8 opcode)14593 static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode)
14594 {
14595 return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB;
14596 }
14597
14598 struct bpf_sanitize_info {
14599 struct bpf_insn_aux_data aux;
14600 bool mask_to_left;
14601 };
14602
sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_insn * insn,u32 next_idx,u32 curr_idx)14603 static int sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14604 const struct bpf_insn *insn,
14605 u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx)
14606 {
14607 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch;
14608 struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
14609
14610 branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true);
14611 if (!IS_ERR(branch) && insn) {
14612 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs;
14613 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
14614 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
14615 } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
14616 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
14617 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg);
14618 }
14619 }
14620 return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(branch);
14621 }
14622
sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,const struct bpf_reg_state * ptr_reg,const struct bpf_reg_state * off_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_sanitize_info * info,const bool commit_window)14623 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14624 struct bpf_insn *insn,
14625 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
14626 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
14627 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
14628 struct bpf_sanitize_info *info,
14629 const bool commit_window)
14630 {
14631 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : &info->aux;
14632 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
14633 bool off_is_imm = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
14634 bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
14635 bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
14636 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
14637 u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
14638 struct bpf_reg_state tmp;
14639 int err;
14640
14641 if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
14642 return 0;
14643
14644 /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative
14645 * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care
14646 * to explore bad access from here.
14647 */
14648 if (vstate->speculative)
14649 goto do_sim;
14650
14651 if (!commit_window) {
14652 if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
14653 (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
14654 return REASON_BOUNDS;
14655
14656 info->mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) ||
14657 (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
14658 }
14659
14660 err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, info->mask_to_left);
14661 if (err < 0)
14662 return err;
14663
14664 if (commit_window) {
14665 /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on
14666 * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation.
14667 */
14668 alu_state = info->aux.alu_state;
14669 alu_limit = abs(info->aux.alu_limit - alu_limit);
14670 } else {
14671 alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
14672 alu_state |= off_is_imm ? BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE : 0;
14673 alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
14674 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
14675
14676 /* Limit pruning on unknown scalars to enable deep search for
14677 * potential masking differences from other program paths.
14678 */
14679 if (!off_is_imm)
14680 env->explore_alu_limits = true;
14681 }
14682
14683 err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit);
14684 if (err < 0)
14685 return err;
14686 do_sim:
14687 /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already
14688 * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification
14689 * stack.
14690 *
14691 * Also, when register is a known constant, we rewrite register-based
14692 * operation to immediate-based, and thus do not need masking (and as
14693 * a consequence, do not need to simulate the zero-truncation either).
14694 */
14695 if (commit_window || off_is_imm)
14696 return 0;
14697
14698 /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
14699 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of
14700 * masking when off was not within expected range. If off
14701 * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there
14702 * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example,
14703 * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction
14704 * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore
14705 * bad access.
14706 */
14707 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) {
14708 tmp = *dst_reg;
14709 copy_register_state(dst_reg, ptr_reg);
14710 }
14711 err = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx);
14712 if (err < 0)
14713 return REASON_STACK;
14714 if (!ptr_is_dst_reg)
14715 *dst_reg = tmp;
14716 return 0;
14717 }
14718
sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)14719 static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
14720 {
14721 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
14722
14723 /* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the
14724 * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in
14725 * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still
14726 * rewrite/sanitize them.
14727 */
14728 if (!vstate->speculative)
14729 env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
14730 }
14731
sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_insn * insn,int reason,const struct bpf_reg_state * off_reg,const struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg)14732 static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14733 const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
14734 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
14735 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
14736 {
14737 static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root";
14738 const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub";
14739 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
14740
14741 switch (reason) {
14742 case REASON_BOUNDS:
14743 verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n",
14744 off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err);
14745 break;
14746 case REASON_TYPE:
14747 verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n",
14748 off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err);
14749 break;
14750 case REASON_PATHS:
14751 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n",
14752 dst, op, err);
14753 break;
14754 case REASON_LIMIT:
14755 verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n",
14756 dst, op, err);
14757 break;
14758 case REASON_STACK:
14759 verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n",
14760 dst, err);
14761 return -ENOMEM;
14762 default:
14763 verifier_bug(env, "unknown reason (%d)", reason);
14764 break;
14765 }
14766
14767 return -EACCES;
14768 }
14769
14770 /* check that stack access falls within stack limits and that 'reg' doesn't
14771 * have a variable offset.
14772 *
14773 * Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for simplicity since it
14774 * requires corresponding support in Spectre masking for stack ALU. See also
14775 * retrieve_ptr_limit().
14776 *
14777 *
14778 * 'off' includes 'reg->off'.
14779 */
check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,const struct bpf_reg_state * reg,int off)14780 static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(
14781 struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14782 int regno,
14783 const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
14784 int off)
14785 {
14786 if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
14787 char tn_buf[48];
14788
14789 tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
14790 verbose(env, "R%d variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s off=%d\n",
14791 regno, tn_buf, off);
14792 return -EACCES;
14793 }
14794
14795 if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
14796 verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
14797 "prohibited for !root; off=%d\n", regno, off);
14798 return -EACCES;
14799 }
14800
14801 return 0;
14802 }
14803
sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_insn * insn,const struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg)14804 static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14805 const struct bpf_insn *insn,
14806 const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
14807 {
14808 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
14809
14810 /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
14811 * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
14812 */
14813 if (env->bypass_spec_v1)
14814 return 0;
14815
14816 switch (dst_reg->type) {
14817 case PTR_TO_STACK:
14818 if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg,
14819 dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value))
14820 return -EACCES;
14821 break;
14822 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
14823 if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false, ACCESS_HELPER)) {
14824 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
14825 "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
14826 return -EACCES;
14827 }
14828 break;
14829 default:
14830 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
14831 }
14832
14833 return 0;
14834 }
14835
14836 /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
14837 * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
14838 * If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
14839 * scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks.
14840 */
adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,const struct bpf_reg_state * ptr_reg,const struct bpf_reg_state * off_reg)14841 static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
14842 struct bpf_insn *insn,
14843 const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
14844 const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg)
14845 {
14846 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
14847 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
14848 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg;
14849 bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
14850 s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value,
14851 smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
14852 u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
14853 umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
14854 struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {};
14855 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
14856 u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
14857 int ret, bounds_ret;
14858
14859 dst_reg = ®s[dst];
14860
14861 if ((known && (smin_val != smax_val || umin_val != umax_val)) ||
14862 smin_val > smax_val || umin_val > umax_val) {
14863 /* Taint dst register if offset had invalid bounds derived from
14864 * e.g. dead branches.
14865 */
14866 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
14867 return 0;
14868 }
14869
14870 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
14871 /* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
14872 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
14873 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
14874 return 0;
14875 }
14876
14877 verbose(env,
14878 "R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
14879 dst);
14880 return -EACCES;
14881 }
14882
14883 if (ptr_reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) {
14884 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n",
14885 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type));
14886 return -EACCES;
14887 }
14888
14889 /*
14890 * Accesses to untrusted PTR_TO_MEM are done through probe
14891 * instructions, hence no need to track offsets.
14892 */
14893 if (base_type(ptr_reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && (ptr_reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED))
14894 return 0;
14895
14896 switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) {
14897 case PTR_TO_CTX:
14898 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
14899 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
14900 case PTR_TO_STACK:
14901 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
14902 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
14903 case PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER:
14904 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
14905 case PTR_TO_MEM:
14906 case PTR_TO_BUF:
14907 case PTR_TO_FUNC:
14908 case CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR:
14909 break;
14910 case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
14911 if (known)
14912 break;
14913 fallthrough;
14914 case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
14915 /* smin_val represents the known value */
14916 if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD)
14917 break;
14918 fallthrough;
14919 default:
14920 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n",
14921 dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type));
14922 return -EACCES;
14923 }
14924
14925 /* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id.
14926 * The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.
14927 */
14928 dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type;
14929 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
14930
14931 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) ||
14932 !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type))
14933 return -EINVAL;
14934
14935 /* pointer types do not carry 32-bit bounds at the moment. */
14936 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
14937
14938 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
14939 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
14940 &info, false);
14941 if (ret < 0)
14942 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
14943 }
14944
14945 switch (opcode) {
14946 case BPF_ADD:
14947 /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
14948 * the s32 'off' field
14949 */
14950 if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val ==
14951 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) {
14952 /* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */
14953 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
14954 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
14955 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
14956 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
14957 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
14958 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val;
14959 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
14960 break;
14961 }
14962 /* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off
14963 * == 0, since it's a scalar.
14964 * dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive
14965 * integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id'
14966 * if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET.
14967 * this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets
14968 * added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset
14969 * from ptr_reg.
14970 */
14971 if (check_add_overflow(smin_ptr, smin_val, &dst_reg->smin_value) ||
14972 check_add_overflow(smax_ptr, smax_val, &dst_reg->smax_value)) {
14973 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
14974 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
14975 }
14976 if (check_add_overflow(umin_ptr, umin_val, &dst_reg->umin_value) ||
14977 check_add_overflow(umax_ptr, umax_val, &dst_reg->umax_value)) {
14978 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
14979 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
14980 }
14981 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
14982 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
14983 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
14984 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
14985 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
14986 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
14987 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw));
14988 }
14989 break;
14990 case BPF_SUB:
14991 if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
14992 /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
14993 verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
14994 dst);
14995 return -EACCES;
14996 }
14997 /* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to
14998 * test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not
14999 * be able to deal with it.
15000 */
15001 if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
15002 verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
15003 dst);
15004 return -EACCES;
15005 }
15006 if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val ==
15007 (s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) {
15008 /* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */
15009 dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
15010 dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
15011 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
15012 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
15013 dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
15014 dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
15015 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val;
15016 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
15017 break;
15018 }
15019 /* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known
15020 * nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good.
15021 */
15022 if (check_sub_overflow(smin_ptr, smax_val, &dst_reg->smin_value) ||
15023 check_sub_overflow(smax_ptr, smin_val, &dst_reg->smax_value)) {
15024 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
15025 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
15026 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
15027 }
15028 if (umin_ptr < umax_val) {
15029 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
15030 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
15031 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
15032 } else {
15033 /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
15034 dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val;
15035 dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val;
15036 }
15037 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
15038 dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
15039 dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw;
15040 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
15041 dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
15042 /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
15043 if (smin_val < 0)
15044 memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw));
15045 }
15046 break;
15047 case BPF_AND:
15048 case BPF_OR:
15049 case BPF_XOR:
15050 /* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit. */
15051 verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
15052 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
15053 return -EACCES;
15054 default:
15055 /* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
15056 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
15057 dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
15058 return -EACCES;
15059 }
15060
15061 if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type))
15062 return -EINVAL;
15063 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg);
15064 bounds_ret = sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg);
15065 if (bounds_ret == -EACCES)
15066 return bounds_ret;
15067 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
15068 ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
15069 &info, true);
15070 if (verifier_bug_if(!can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn)
15071 && !env->cur_state->speculative
15072 && bounds_ret
15073 && !ret,
15074 env, "Pointer type unsupported by sanitize_check_bounds() not rejected by retrieve_ptr_limit() as required")) {
15075 return -EFAULT;
15076 }
15077 if (ret < 0)
15078 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
15079 }
15080
15081 return 0;
15082 }
15083
scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15084 static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15085 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15086 {
15087 s32 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->s32_min_value;
15088 s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value;
15089 u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value;
15090 u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value;
15091 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
15092 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
15093 bool min_overflow, max_overflow;
15094
15095 if (check_add_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_min_value, dst_smin) ||
15096 check_add_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_max_value, dst_smax)) {
15097 *dst_smin = S32_MIN;
15098 *dst_smax = S32_MAX;
15099 }
15100
15101 /* If either all additions overflow or no additions overflow, then
15102 * it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin + src_umin, dst_umax =
15103 * dst_umax + src_umax. Otherwise (some additions overflow), set
15104 * the output bounds to unbounded.
15105 */
15106 min_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umin, umin_val, dst_umin);
15107 max_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umax, umax_val, dst_umax);
15108
15109 if (!min_overflow && max_overflow) {
15110 *dst_umin = 0;
15111 *dst_umax = U32_MAX;
15112 }
15113 }
15114
scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15115 static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15116 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15117 {
15118 s64 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->smin_value;
15119 s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value;
15120 u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value;
15121 u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value;
15122 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
15123 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
15124 bool min_overflow, max_overflow;
15125
15126 if (check_add_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smin_value, dst_smin) ||
15127 check_add_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smax_value, dst_smax)) {
15128 *dst_smin = S64_MIN;
15129 *dst_smax = S64_MAX;
15130 }
15131
15132 /* If either all additions overflow or no additions overflow, then
15133 * it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin + src_umin, dst_umax =
15134 * dst_umax + src_umax. Otherwise (some additions overflow), set
15135 * the output bounds to unbounded.
15136 */
15137 min_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umin, umin_val, dst_umin);
15138 max_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umax, umax_val, dst_umax);
15139
15140 if (!min_overflow && max_overflow) {
15141 *dst_umin = 0;
15142 *dst_umax = U64_MAX;
15143 }
15144 }
15145
scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15146 static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15147 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15148 {
15149 s32 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->s32_min_value;
15150 s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value;
15151 u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value;
15152 u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value;
15153 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
15154 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
15155 bool min_underflow, max_underflow;
15156
15157 if (check_sub_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_max_value, dst_smin) ||
15158 check_sub_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_min_value, dst_smax)) {
15159 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
15160 *dst_smin = S32_MIN;
15161 *dst_smax = S32_MAX;
15162 }
15163
15164 /* If either all subtractions underflow or no subtractions
15165 * underflow, it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin - src_umax,
15166 * dst_umax = dst_umax - src_umin. Otherwise (some subtractions
15167 * underflow), set the output bounds to unbounded.
15168 */
15169 min_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umin, umax_val, dst_umin);
15170 max_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umax, umin_val, dst_umax);
15171
15172 if (min_underflow && !max_underflow) {
15173 *dst_umin = 0;
15174 *dst_umax = U32_MAX;
15175 }
15176 }
15177
scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15178 static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15179 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15180 {
15181 s64 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->smin_value;
15182 s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value;
15183 u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value;
15184 u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value;
15185 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
15186 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
15187 bool min_underflow, max_underflow;
15188
15189 if (check_sub_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smax_value, dst_smin) ||
15190 check_sub_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smin_value, dst_smax)) {
15191 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
15192 *dst_smin = S64_MIN;
15193 *dst_smax = S64_MAX;
15194 }
15195
15196 /* If either all subtractions underflow or no subtractions
15197 * underflow, it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin - src_umax,
15198 * dst_umax = dst_umax - src_umin. Otherwise (some subtractions
15199 * underflow), set the output bounds to unbounded.
15200 */
15201 min_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umin, umax_val, dst_umin);
15202 max_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umax, umin_val, dst_umax);
15203
15204 if (min_underflow && !max_underflow) {
15205 *dst_umin = 0;
15206 *dst_umax = U64_MAX;
15207 }
15208 }
15209
scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15210 static void scalar32_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15211 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15212 {
15213 s32 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->s32_min_value;
15214 s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value;
15215 u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value;
15216 u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value;
15217 s32 tmp_prod[4];
15218
15219 if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_umax, src_reg->u32_max_value, dst_umax) ||
15220 check_mul_overflow(*dst_umin, src_reg->u32_min_value, dst_umin)) {
15221 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
15222 *dst_umin = 0;
15223 *dst_umax = U32_MAX;
15224 }
15225 if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_min_value, &tmp_prod[0]) ||
15226 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_max_value, &tmp_prod[1]) ||
15227 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_min_value, &tmp_prod[2]) ||
15228 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_max_value, &tmp_prod[3])) {
15229 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
15230 *dst_smin = S32_MIN;
15231 *dst_smax = S32_MAX;
15232 } else {
15233 *dst_smin = min_array(tmp_prod, 4);
15234 *dst_smax = max_array(tmp_prod, 4);
15235 }
15236 }
15237
scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15238 static void scalar_min_max_mul(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15239 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15240 {
15241 s64 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->smin_value;
15242 s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value;
15243 u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value;
15244 u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value;
15245 s64 tmp_prod[4];
15246
15247 if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_umax, src_reg->umax_value, dst_umax) ||
15248 check_mul_overflow(*dst_umin, src_reg->umin_value, dst_umin)) {
15249 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
15250 *dst_umin = 0;
15251 *dst_umax = U64_MAX;
15252 }
15253 if (check_mul_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smin_value, &tmp_prod[0]) ||
15254 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smax_value, &tmp_prod[1]) ||
15255 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smin_value, &tmp_prod[2]) ||
15256 check_mul_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smax_value, &tmp_prod[3])) {
15257 /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
15258 *dst_smin = S64_MIN;
15259 *dst_smax = S64_MAX;
15260 } else {
15261 *dst_smin = min_array(tmp_prod, 4);
15262 *dst_smax = max_array(tmp_prod, 4);
15263 }
15264 }
15265
scalar32_min_max_udiv(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15266 static void scalar32_min_max_udiv(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15267 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15268 {
15269 u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value;
15270 u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value;
15271 u32 src_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; /* non-zero, const divisor */
15272
15273 *dst_umin = *dst_umin / src_val;
15274 *dst_umax = *dst_umax / src_val;
15275
15276 /* Reset other ranges/tnum to unbounded/unknown. */
15277 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
15278 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
15279 reset_reg64_and_tnum(dst_reg);
15280 }
15281
scalar_min_max_udiv(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15282 static void scalar_min_max_udiv(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15283 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15284 {
15285 u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value;
15286 u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value;
15287 u64 src_val = src_reg->umin_value; /* non-zero, const divisor */
15288
15289 *dst_umin = div64_u64(*dst_umin, src_val);
15290 *dst_umax = div64_u64(*dst_umax, src_val);
15291
15292 /* Reset other ranges/tnum to unbounded/unknown. */
15293 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
15294 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
15295 reset_reg32_and_tnum(dst_reg);
15296 }
15297
scalar32_min_max_sdiv(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15298 static void scalar32_min_max_sdiv(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15299 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15300 {
15301 s32 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->s32_min_value;
15302 s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value;
15303 s32 src_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; /* non-zero, const divisor */
15304 s32 res1, res2;
15305
15306 /* BPF div specification: S32_MIN / -1 = S32_MIN */
15307 if (*dst_smin == S32_MIN && src_val == -1) {
15308 /*
15309 * If the dividend range contains more than just S32_MIN,
15310 * we cannot precisely track the result, so it becomes unbounded.
15311 * e.g., [S32_MIN, S32_MIN+10]/(-1),
15312 * = {S32_MIN} U [-(S32_MIN+10), -(S32_MIN+1)]
15313 * = {S32_MIN} U [S32_MAX-9, S32_MAX] = [S32_MIN, S32_MAX]
15314 * Otherwise (if dividend is exactly S32_MIN), result remains S32_MIN.
15315 */
15316 if (*dst_smax != S32_MIN) {
15317 *dst_smin = S32_MIN;
15318 *dst_smax = S32_MAX;
15319 }
15320 goto reset;
15321 }
15322
15323 res1 = *dst_smin / src_val;
15324 res2 = *dst_smax / src_val;
15325 *dst_smin = min(res1, res2);
15326 *dst_smax = max(res1, res2);
15327
15328 reset:
15329 /* Reset other ranges/tnum to unbounded/unknown. */
15330 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
15331 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
15332 reset_reg64_and_tnum(dst_reg);
15333 }
15334
scalar_min_max_sdiv(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15335 static void scalar_min_max_sdiv(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15336 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15337 {
15338 s64 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->smin_value;
15339 s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value;
15340 s64 src_val = src_reg->smin_value; /* non-zero, const divisor */
15341 s64 res1, res2;
15342
15343 /* BPF div specification: S64_MIN / -1 = S64_MIN */
15344 if (*dst_smin == S64_MIN && src_val == -1) {
15345 /*
15346 * If the dividend range contains more than just S64_MIN,
15347 * we cannot precisely track the result, so it becomes unbounded.
15348 * e.g., [S64_MIN, S64_MIN+10]/(-1),
15349 * = {S64_MIN} U [-(S64_MIN+10), -(S64_MIN+1)]
15350 * = {S64_MIN} U [S64_MAX-9, S64_MAX] = [S64_MIN, S64_MAX]
15351 * Otherwise (if dividend is exactly S64_MIN), result remains S64_MIN.
15352 */
15353 if (*dst_smax != S64_MIN) {
15354 *dst_smin = S64_MIN;
15355 *dst_smax = S64_MAX;
15356 }
15357 goto reset;
15358 }
15359
15360 res1 = div64_s64(*dst_smin, src_val);
15361 res2 = div64_s64(*dst_smax, src_val);
15362 *dst_smin = min(res1, res2);
15363 *dst_smax = max(res1, res2);
15364
15365 reset:
15366 /* Reset other ranges/tnum to unbounded/unknown. */
15367 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
15368 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
15369 reset_reg32_and_tnum(dst_reg);
15370 }
15371
scalar32_min_max_umod(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15372 static void scalar32_min_max_umod(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15373 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15374 {
15375 u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value;
15376 u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value;
15377 u32 src_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; /* non-zero, const divisor */
15378 u32 res_max = src_val - 1;
15379
15380 /*
15381 * If dst_umax <= res_max, the result remains unchanged.
15382 * e.g., [2, 5] % 10 = [2, 5].
15383 */
15384 if (*dst_umax <= res_max)
15385 return;
15386
15387 *dst_umin = 0;
15388 *dst_umax = min(*dst_umax, res_max);
15389
15390 /* Reset other ranges/tnum to unbounded/unknown. */
15391 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
15392 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
15393 reset_reg64_and_tnum(dst_reg);
15394 }
15395
scalar_min_max_umod(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15396 static void scalar_min_max_umod(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15397 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15398 {
15399 u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value;
15400 u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value;
15401 u64 src_val = src_reg->umin_value; /* non-zero, const divisor */
15402 u64 res_max = src_val - 1;
15403
15404 /*
15405 * If dst_umax <= res_max, the result remains unchanged.
15406 * e.g., [2, 5] % 10 = [2, 5].
15407 */
15408 if (*dst_umax <= res_max)
15409 return;
15410
15411 *dst_umin = 0;
15412 *dst_umax = min(*dst_umax, res_max);
15413
15414 /* Reset other ranges/tnum to unbounded/unknown. */
15415 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
15416 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
15417 reset_reg32_and_tnum(dst_reg);
15418 }
15419
scalar32_min_max_smod(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15420 static void scalar32_min_max_smod(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15421 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15422 {
15423 s32 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->s32_min_value;
15424 s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value;
15425 s32 src_val = src_reg->s32_min_value; /* non-zero, const divisor */
15426
15427 /*
15428 * Safe absolute value calculation:
15429 * If src_val == S32_MIN (-2147483648), src_abs becomes 2147483648.
15430 * Here use unsigned integer to avoid overflow.
15431 */
15432 u32 src_abs = (src_val > 0) ? (u32)src_val : -(u32)src_val;
15433
15434 /*
15435 * Calculate the maximum possible absolute value of the result.
15436 * Even if src_abs is 2147483648 (S32_MIN), subtracting 1 gives
15437 * 2147483647 (S32_MAX), which fits perfectly in s32.
15438 */
15439 s32 res_max_abs = src_abs - 1;
15440
15441 /*
15442 * If the dividend is already within the result range,
15443 * the result remains unchanged. e.g., [-2, 5] % 10 = [-2, 5].
15444 */
15445 if (*dst_smin >= -res_max_abs && *dst_smax <= res_max_abs)
15446 return;
15447
15448 /* General case: result has the same sign as the dividend. */
15449 if (*dst_smin >= 0) {
15450 *dst_smin = 0;
15451 *dst_smax = min(*dst_smax, res_max_abs);
15452 } else if (*dst_smax <= 0) {
15453 *dst_smax = 0;
15454 *dst_smin = max(*dst_smin, -res_max_abs);
15455 } else {
15456 *dst_smin = -res_max_abs;
15457 *dst_smax = res_max_abs;
15458 }
15459
15460 /* Reset other ranges/tnum to unbounded/unknown. */
15461 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
15462 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
15463 reset_reg64_and_tnum(dst_reg);
15464 }
15465
scalar_min_max_smod(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15466 static void scalar_min_max_smod(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15467 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15468 {
15469 s64 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->smin_value;
15470 s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value;
15471 s64 src_val = src_reg->smin_value; /* non-zero, const divisor */
15472
15473 /*
15474 * Safe absolute value calculation:
15475 * If src_val == S64_MIN (-2^63), src_abs becomes 2^63.
15476 * Here use unsigned integer to avoid overflow.
15477 */
15478 u64 src_abs = (src_val > 0) ? (u64)src_val : -(u64)src_val;
15479
15480 /*
15481 * Calculate the maximum possible absolute value of the result.
15482 * Even if src_abs is 2^63 (S64_MIN), subtracting 1 gives
15483 * 2^63 - 1 (S64_MAX), which fits perfectly in s64.
15484 */
15485 s64 res_max_abs = src_abs - 1;
15486
15487 /*
15488 * If the dividend is already within the result range,
15489 * the result remains unchanged. e.g., [-2, 5] % 10 = [-2, 5].
15490 */
15491 if (*dst_smin >= -res_max_abs && *dst_smax <= res_max_abs)
15492 return;
15493
15494 /* General case: result has the same sign as the dividend. */
15495 if (*dst_smin >= 0) {
15496 *dst_smin = 0;
15497 *dst_smax = min(*dst_smax, res_max_abs);
15498 } else if (*dst_smax <= 0) {
15499 *dst_smax = 0;
15500 *dst_smin = max(*dst_smin, -res_max_abs);
15501 } else {
15502 *dst_smin = -res_max_abs;
15503 *dst_smax = res_max_abs;
15504 }
15505
15506 /* Reset other ranges/tnum to unbounded/unknown. */
15507 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
15508 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
15509 reset_reg32_and_tnum(dst_reg);
15510 }
15511
scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15512 static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15513 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15514 {
15515 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
15516 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
15517 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
15518 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
15519
15520 if (src_known && dst_known) {
15521 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value);
15522 return;
15523 }
15524
15525 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
15526 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
15527 */
15528 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value;
15529 dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val);
15530
15531 /* Safe to set s32 bounds by casting u32 result into s32 when u32
15532 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s32 bounds to unbounded.
15533 */
15534 if ((s32)dst_reg->u32_min_value <= (s32)dst_reg->u32_max_value) {
15535 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
15536 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
15537 } else {
15538 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
15539 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
15540 }
15541 }
15542
scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15543 static void scalar_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15544 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15545 {
15546 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
15547 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
15548 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
15549
15550 if (src_known && dst_known) {
15551 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value);
15552 return;
15553 }
15554
15555 /* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
15556 * bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
15557 */
15558 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
15559 dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
15560
15561 /* Safe to set s64 bounds by casting u64 result into s64 when u64
15562 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s64 bounds to unbounded.
15563 */
15564 if ((s64)dst_reg->umin_value <= (s64)dst_reg->umax_value) {
15565 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
15566 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
15567 } else {
15568 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
15569 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
15570 }
15571 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */
15572 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
15573 }
15574
scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15575 static void scalar32_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15576 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15577 {
15578 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
15579 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
15580 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
15581 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
15582
15583 if (src_known && dst_known) {
15584 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value);
15585 return;
15586 }
15587
15588 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
15589 * maximum of the operands' minima
15590 */
15591 dst_reg->u32_min_value = max(dst_reg->u32_min_value, umin_val);
15592 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask;
15593
15594 /* Safe to set s32 bounds by casting u32 result into s32 when u32
15595 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s32 bounds to unbounded.
15596 */
15597 if ((s32)dst_reg->u32_min_value <= (s32)dst_reg->u32_max_value) {
15598 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
15599 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
15600 } else {
15601 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
15602 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
15603 }
15604 }
15605
scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15606 static void scalar_min_max_or(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15607 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15608 {
15609 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
15610 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
15611 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
15612
15613 if (src_known && dst_known) {
15614 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value);
15615 return;
15616 }
15617
15618 /* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
15619 * maximum of the operands' minima
15620 */
15621 dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
15622 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask;
15623
15624 /* Safe to set s64 bounds by casting u64 result into s64 when u64
15625 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s64 bounds to unbounded.
15626 */
15627 if ((s64)dst_reg->umin_value <= (s64)dst_reg->umax_value) {
15628 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
15629 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
15630 } else {
15631 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
15632 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
15633 }
15634 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */
15635 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
15636 }
15637
scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15638 static void scalar32_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15639 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15640 {
15641 bool src_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
15642 bool dst_known = tnum_subreg_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
15643 struct tnum var32_off = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
15644
15645 if (src_known && dst_known) {
15646 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, var32_off.value);
15647 return;
15648 }
15649
15650 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var32_off. */
15651 dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value;
15652 dst_reg->u32_max_value = var32_off.value | var32_off.mask;
15653
15654 /* Safe to set s32 bounds by casting u32 result into s32 when u32
15655 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s32 bounds to unbounded.
15656 */
15657 if ((s32)dst_reg->u32_min_value <= (s32)dst_reg->u32_max_value) {
15658 dst_reg->s32_min_value = dst_reg->u32_min_value;
15659 dst_reg->s32_max_value = dst_reg->u32_max_value;
15660 } else {
15661 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
15662 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
15663 }
15664 }
15665
scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15666 static void scalar_min_max_xor(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15667 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15668 {
15669 bool src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
15670 bool dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
15671
15672 if (src_known && dst_known) {
15673 /* dst_reg->var_off.value has been updated earlier */
15674 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value);
15675 return;
15676 }
15677
15678 /* We get both minimum and maximum from the var_off. */
15679 dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
15680 dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value | dst_reg->var_off.mask;
15681
15682 /* Safe to set s64 bounds by casting u64 result into s64 when u64
15683 * doesn't cross sign boundary. Otherwise set s64 bounds to unbounded.
15684 */
15685 if ((s64)dst_reg->umin_value <= (s64)dst_reg->umax_value) {
15686 dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
15687 dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
15688 } else {
15689 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
15690 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
15691 }
15692
15693 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
15694 }
15695
__scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,u64 umin_val,u64 umax_val)15696 static void __scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15697 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val)
15698 {
15699 /* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
15700 * up from var_off)
15701 */
15702 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
15703 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
15704 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
15705 if (umax_val > 31 || dst_reg->u32_max_value > 1ULL << (31 - umax_val)) {
15706 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
15707 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
15708 } else {
15709 dst_reg->u32_min_value <<= umin_val;
15710 dst_reg->u32_max_value <<= umax_val;
15711 }
15712 }
15713
scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15714 static void scalar32_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15715 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15716 {
15717 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
15718 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
15719 /* u32 alu operation will zext upper bits */
15720 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
15721
15722 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val);
15723 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_subreg(tnum_lshift(subreg, umin_val));
15724 /* Not required but being careful mark reg64 bounds as unknown so
15725 * that we are forced to pick them up from tnum and zext later and
15726 * if some path skips this step we are still safe.
15727 */
15728 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
15729 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg);
15730 }
15731
__scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,u64 umin_val,u64 umax_val)15732 static void __scalar64_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15733 u64 umin_val, u64 umax_val)
15734 {
15735 /* Special case <<32 because it is a common compiler pattern to sign
15736 * extend subreg by doing <<32 s>>32. smin/smax assignments are correct
15737 * because s32 bounds don't flip sign when shifting to the left by
15738 * 32bits.
15739 */
15740 if (umin_val == 32 && umax_val == 32) {
15741 dst_reg->smax_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_max_value << 32;
15742 dst_reg->smin_value = (s64)dst_reg->s32_min_value << 32;
15743 } else {
15744 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
15745 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
15746 }
15747
15748 /* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
15749 if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
15750 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
15751 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
15752 } else {
15753 dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
15754 dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
15755 }
15756 }
15757
scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15758 static void scalar_min_max_lsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15759 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15760 {
15761 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
15762 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
15763
15764 /* scalar64 calc uses 32bit unshifted bounds so must be called first */
15765 __scalar64_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val);
15766 __scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, umin_val, umax_val);
15767
15768 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
15769 /* We may learn something more from the var_off */
15770 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
15771 }
15772
scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15773 static void scalar32_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15774 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15775 {
15776 struct tnum subreg = tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off);
15777 u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value;
15778 u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
15779
15780 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might
15781 * be negative, then either:
15782 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
15783 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
15784 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
15785 * signed bounds
15786 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
15787 * about the result
15788 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
15789 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds.
15790 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
15791 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
15792 * var_off of the result.
15793 */
15794 dst_reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
15795 dst_reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
15796
15797 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(subreg, umin_val);
15798 dst_reg->u32_min_value >>= umax_val;
15799 dst_reg->u32_max_value >>= umin_val;
15800
15801 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
15802 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg);
15803 }
15804
scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15805 static void scalar_min_max_rsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15806 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15807 {
15808 u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value;
15809 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
15810
15811 /* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might
15812 * be negative, then either:
15813 * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
15814 * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
15815 * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
15816 * signed bounds
15817 * 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
15818 * about the result
15819 * If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
15820 * unsigned bounds capture the signed bounds.
15821 * Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
15822 * and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
15823 * var_off of the result.
15824 */
15825 dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
15826 dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
15827 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
15828 dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
15829 dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
15830
15831 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends
15832 * on bits being shifted in. Take easy way out and mark unbounded
15833 * so we can recalculate later from tnum.
15834 */
15835 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
15836 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
15837 }
15838
scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15839 static void scalar32_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15840 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15841 {
15842 u64 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value;
15843
15844 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and
15845 * umax_val is equal to umin_val.
15846 */
15847 dst_reg->s32_min_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_min_value) >> umin_val);
15848 dst_reg->s32_max_value = (u32)(((s32)dst_reg->s32_max_value) >> umin_val);
15849
15850 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(tnum_subreg(dst_reg->var_off), umin_val, 32);
15851
15852 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on
15853 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result.
15854 */
15855 dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
15856 dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
15857
15858 __mark_reg64_unbounded(dst_reg);
15859 __update_reg32_bounds(dst_reg);
15860 }
15861
scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15862 static void scalar_min_max_arsh(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
15863 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15864 {
15865 u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value;
15866
15867 /* Upon reaching here, src_known is true and umax_val is equal
15868 * to umin_val.
15869 */
15870 dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val;
15871 dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val;
15872
15873 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val, 64);
15874
15875 /* blow away the dst_reg umin_value/umax_value and rely on
15876 * dst_reg var_off to refine the result.
15877 */
15878 dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
15879 dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
15880
15881 /* Its not easy to operate on alu32 bounds here because it depends
15882 * on bits being shifted in from upper 32-bits. Take easy way out
15883 * and mark unbounded so we can recalculate later from tnum.
15884 */
15885 __mark_reg32_unbounded(dst_reg);
15886 __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
15887 }
15888
scalar_byte_swap(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_insn * insn)15889 static void scalar_byte_swap(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, struct bpf_insn *insn)
15890 {
15891 /*
15892 * Byte swap operation - update var_off using tnum_bswap.
15893 * Three cases:
15894 * 1. bswap(16|32|64): opcode=0xd7 (BPF_END | BPF_ALU64 | BPF_TO_LE)
15895 * unconditional swap
15896 * 2. to_le(16|32|64): opcode=0xd4 (BPF_END | BPF_ALU | BPF_TO_LE)
15897 * swap on big-endian, truncation or no-op on little-endian
15898 * 3. to_be(16|32|64): opcode=0xdc (BPF_END | BPF_ALU | BPF_TO_BE)
15899 * swap on little-endian, truncation or no-op on big-endian
15900 */
15901
15902 bool alu64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64;
15903 bool to_le = BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_TO_LE;
15904 bool is_big_endian;
15905 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
15906 is_big_endian = true;
15907 #else
15908 is_big_endian = false;
15909 #endif
15910 /* Apply bswap if alu64 or switch between big-endian and little-endian machines */
15911 bool need_bswap = alu64 || (to_le == is_big_endian);
15912
15913 /*
15914 * If the register is mutated, manually reset its scalar ID to break
15915 * any existing ties and avoid incorrect bounds propagation.
15916 */
15917 if (need_bswap || insn->imm == 16 || insn->imm == 32)
15918 dst_reg->id = 0;
15919
15920 if (need_bswap) {
15921 if (insn->imm == 16)
15922 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_bswap16(dst_reg->var_off);
15923 else if (insn->imm == 32)
15924 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_bswap32(dst_reg->var_off);
15925 else if (insn->imm == 64)
15926 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_bswap64(dst_reg->var_off);
15927 /*
15928 * Byteswap scrambles the range, so we must reset bounds.
15929 * Bounds will be re-derived from the new tnum later.
15930 */
15931 __mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
15932 }
15933 /* For bswap16/32, truncate dst register to match the swapped size */
15934 if (insn->imm == 16 || insn->imm == 32)
15935 coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, insn->imm / 8);
15936 }
15937
is_safe_to_compute_dst_reg_range(struct bpf_insn * insn,const struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg)15938 static bool is_safe_to_compute_dst_reg_range(struct bpf_insn *insn,
15939 const struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
15940 {
15941 bool src_is_const = false;
15942 u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
15943
15944 if (insn_bitness == 32) {
15945 if (tnum_subreg_is_const(src_reg->var_off)
15946 && src_reg->s32_min_value == src_reg->s32_max_value
15947 && src_reg->u32_min_value == src_reg->u32_max_value)
15948 src_is_const = true;
15949 } else {
15950 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off)
15951 && src_reg->smin_value == src_reg->smax_value
15952 && src_reg->umin_value == src_reg->umax_value)
15953 src_is_const = true;
15954 }
15955
15956 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) {
15957 case BPF_ADD:
15958 case BPF_SUB:
15959 case BPF_NEG:
15960 case BPF_AND:
15961 case BPF_XOR:
15962 case BPF_OR:
15963 case BPF_MUL:
15964 case BPF_END:
15965 return true;
15966
15967 /*
15968 * Division and modulo operators range is only safe to compute when the
15969 * divisor is a constant.
15970 */
15971 case BPF_DIV:
15972 case BPF_MOD:
15973 return src_is_const;
15974
15975 /* Shift operators range is only computable if shift dimension operand
15976 * is a constant. Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined. This
15977 * includes shifts by a negative number.
15978 */
15979 case BPF_LSH:
15980 case BPF_RSH:
15981 case BPF_ARSH:
15982 return (src_is_const && src_reg->umax_value < insn_bitness);
15983 default:
15984 return false;
15985 }
15986 }
15987
maybe_fork_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg)15988 static int maybe_fork_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
15989 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
15990 {
15991 struct bpf_verifier_state *branch;
15992 struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
15993 bool alu32;
15994
15995 if (dst_reg->smin_value == -1 && dst_reg->smax_value == 0)
15996 alu32 = false;
15997 else if (dst_reg->s32_min_value == -1 && dst_reg->s32_max_value == 0)
15998 alu32 = true;
15999 else
16000 return 0;
16001
16002 branch = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx, env->insn_idx, false);
16003 if (IS_ERR(branch))
16004 return PTR_ERR(branch);
16005
16006 regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs;
16007 if (alu32) {
16008 __mark_reg32_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], 0);
16009 __mark_reg32_known(dst_reg, -1ull);
16010 } else {
16011 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], 0);
16012 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, -1ull);
16013 }
16014 return 0;
16015 }
16016
16017 /* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual
16018 * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts
16019 * need extra checks in the 32-bit case.
16020 */
adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)16021 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
16022 struct bpf_insn *insn,
16023 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
16024 struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
16025 {
16026 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
16027 s16 off = insn->off;
16028 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64);
16029 int ret;
16030
16031 if (!is_safe_to_compute_dst_reg_range(insn, &src_reg)) {
16032 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
16033 return 0;
16034 }
16035
16036 if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
16037 ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
16038 if (ret < 0)
16039 return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
16040 }
16041
16042 /* Calculate sign/unsigned bounds and tnum for alu32 and alu64 bit ops.
16043 * There are two classes of instructions: The first class we track both
16044 * alu32 and alu64 sign/unsigned bounds independently this provides the
16045 * greatest amount of precision when alu operations are mixed with jmp32
16046 * operations. These operations are BPF_ADD, BPF_SUB, BPF_MUL, BPF_ADD,
16047 * and BPF_OR. This is possible because these ops have fairly easy to
16048 * understand and calculate behavior in both 32-bit and 64-bit alu ops.
16049 * See alu32 verifier tests for examples. The second class of
16050 * operations, BPF_LSH, BPF_RSH, and BPF_ARSH, however are not so easy
16051 * with regards to tracking sign/unsigned bounds because the bits may
16052 * cross subreg boundaries in the alu64 case. When this happens we mark
16053 * the reg unbounded in the subreg bound space and use the resulting
16054 * tnum to calculate an approximation of the sign/unsigned bounds.
16055 */
16056 switch (opcode) {
16057 case BPF_ADD:
16058 scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16059 scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16060 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
16061 break;
16062 case BPF_SUB:
16063 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16064 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16065 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
16066 break;
16067 case BPF_NEG:
16068 env->fake_reg[0] = *dst_reg;
16069 __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, 0);
16070 scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[0]);
16071 scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[0]);
16072 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_neg(env->fake_reg[0].var_off);
16073 break;
16074 case BPF_MUL:
16075 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
16076 scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16077 scalar_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16078 break;
16079 case BPF_DIV:
16080 /* BPF div specification: x / 0 = 0 */
16081 if ((alu32 && src_reg.u32_min_value == 0) || (!alu32 && src_reg.umin_value == 0)) {
16082 ___mark_reg_known(dst_reg, 0);
16083 break;
16084 }
16085 if (alu32)
16086 if (off == 1)
16087 scalar32_min_max_sdiv(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16088 else
16089 scalar32_min_max_udiv(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16090 else
16091 if (off == 1)
16092 scalar_min_max_sdiv(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16093 else
16094 scalar_min_max_udiv(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16095 break;
16096 case BPF_MOD:
16097 /* BPF mod specification: x % 0 = x */
16098 if ((alu32 && src_reg.u32_min_value == 0) || (!alu32 && src_reg.umin_value == 0))
16099 break;
16100 if (alu32)
16101 if (off == 1)
16102 scalar32_min_max_smod(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16103 else
16104 scalar32_min_max_umod(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16105 else
16106 if (off == 1)
16107 scalar_min_max_smod(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16108 else
16109 scalar_min_max_umod(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16110 break;
16111 case BPF_AND:
16112 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off)) {
16113 ret = maybe_fork_scalars(env, insn, dst_reg);
16114 if (ret)
16115 return ret;
16116 }
16117 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
16118 scalar32_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16119 scalar_min_max_and(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16120 break;
16121 case BPF_OR:
16122 if (tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off)) {
16123 ret = maybe_fork_scalars(env, insn, dst_reg);
16124 if (ret)
16125 return ret;
16126 }
16127 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
16128 scalar32_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16129 scalar_min_max_or(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16130 break;
16131 case BPF_XOR:
16132 dst_reg->var_off = tnum_xor(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
16133 scalar32_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16134 scalar_min_max_xor(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16135 break;
16136 case BPF_LSH:
16137 if (alu32)
16138 scalar32_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16139 else
16140 scalar_min_max_lsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16141 break;
16142 case BPF_RSH:
16143 if (alu32)
16144 scalar32_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16145 else
16146 scalar_min_max_rsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16147 break;
16148 case BPF_ARSH:
16149 if (alu32)
16150 scalar32_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16151 else
16152 scalar_min_max_arsh(dst_reg, &src_reg);
16153 break;
16154 case BPF_END:
16155 scalar_byte_swap(dst_reg, insn);
16156 break;
16157 default:
16158 break;
16159 }
16160
16161 /*
16162 * ALU32 ops are zero extended into 64bit register.
16163 *
16164 * BPF_END is already handled inside the helper (truncation),
16165 * so skip zext here to avoid unexpected zero extension.
16166 * e.g., le64: opcode=(BPF_END|BPF_ALU|BPF_TO_LE), imm=0x40
16167 * This is a 64bit byte swap operation with alu32==true,
16168 * but we should not zero extend the result.
16169 */
16170 if (alu32 && opcode != BPF_END)
16171 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
16172 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg);
16173 return 0;
16174 }
16175
16176 /* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max
16177 * and var_off.
16178 */
adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn)16179 static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
16180 struct bpf_insn *insn)
16181 {
16182 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
16183 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
16184 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg;
16185 struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0};
16186 bool alu32 = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64);
16187 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
16188 int err;
16189
16190 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg];
16191 src_reg = NULL;
16192
16193 if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_ARENA) {
16194 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
16195
16196 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64)
16197 /*
16198 * 32-bit operations zero upper bits automatically.
16199 * 64-bit operations need to be converted to 32.
16200 */
16201 aux->needs_zext = true;
16202
16203 /* Any arithmetic operations are allowed on arena pointers */
16204 return 0;
16205 }
16206
16207 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
16208 ptr_reg = dst_reg;
16209
16210 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
16211 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg];
16212 if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
16213 if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
16214 /* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields
16215 * an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except
16216 * pointer subtraction
16217 */
16218 if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
16219 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
16220 return 0;
16221 }
16222 verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
16223 insn->dst_reg,
16224 bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
16225 return -EACCES;
16226 } else {
16227 /* scalar += pointer
16228 * This is legal, but we have to reverse our
16229 * src/dest handling in computing the range
16230 */
16231 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg);
16232 if (err)
16233 return err;
16234 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
16235 src_reg, dst_reg);
16236 }
16237 } else if (ptr_reg) {
16238 /* pointer += scalar */
16239 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg);
16240 if (err)
16241 return err;
16242 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
16243 dst_reg, src_reg);
16244 } else if (dst_reg->precise) {
16245 /* if dst_reg is precise, src_reg should be precise as well */
16246 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg);
16247 if (err)
16248 return err;
16249 }
16250 } else {
16251 /* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only
16252 * need to be able to read from this state.
16253 */
16254 off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
16255 __mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm);
16256 src_reg = &off_reg;
16257 if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */
16258 return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
16259 ptr_reg, src_reg);
16260 }
16261
16262 /* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */
16263 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) {
16264 print_verifier_state(env, vstate, vstate->curframe, true);
16265 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n");
16266 return -EFAULT;
16267 }
16268 if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) {
16269 print_verifier_state(env, vstate, vstate->curframe, true);
16270 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n");
16271 return -EFAULT;
16272 }
16273 /*
16274 * For alu32 linked register tracking, we need to check dst_reg's
16275 * umax_value before the ALU operation. After adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(),
16276 * alu32 ops will have zero-extended the result, making umax_value <= U32_MAX.
16277 */
16278 u64 dst_umax = dst_reg->umax_value;
16279
16280 err = adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
16281 if (err)
16282 return err;
16283 /*
16284 * Compilers can generate the code
16285 * r1 = r2
16286 * r1 += 0x1
16287 * if r2 < 1000 goto ...
16288 * use r1 in memory access
16289 * So remember constant delta between r2 and r1 and update r1 after
16290 * 'if' condition.
16291 */
16292 if (env->bpf_capable &&
16293 (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD || BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_SUB) &&
16294 dst_reg->id && is_reg_const(src_reg, alu32)) {
16295 u64 val = reg_const_value(src_reg, alu32);
16296 s32 off;
16297
16298 if (!alu32 && ((s64)val < S32_MIN || (s64)val > S32_MAX))
16299 goto clear_id;
16300
16301 if (alu32 && (dst_umax > U32_MAX))
16302 goto clear_id;
16303
16304 off = (s32)val;
16305
16306 if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_SUB) {
16307 /* Negating S32_MIN would overflow */
16308 if (off == S32_MIN)
16309 goto clear_id;
16310 off = -off;
16311 }
16312
16313 if (dst_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) {
16314 /*
16315 * If the register already went through rX += val
16316 * we cannot accumulate another val into rx->off.
16317 */
16318 clear_id:
16319 dst_reg->off = 0;
16320 dst_reg->id = 0;
16321 } else {
16322 if (alu32)
16323 dst_reg->id |= BPF_ADD_CONST32;
16324 else
16325 dst_reg->id |= BPF_ADD_CONST64;
16326 dst_reg->off = off;
16327 }
16328 } else {
16329 /*
16330 * Make sure ID is cleared otherwise dst_reg min/max could be
16331 * incorrectly propagated into other registers by sync_linked_regs()
16332 */
16333 dst_reg->id = 0;
16334 }
16335 return 0;
16336 }
16337
16338 /* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */
check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn)16339 static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
16340 {
16341 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
16342 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
16343 int err;
16344
16345 if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
16346 if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
16347 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
16348 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
16349 insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
16350 verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
16351 return -EINVAL;
16352 }
16353 } else {
16354 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
16355 (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
16356 (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
16357 BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_TO_LE)) {
16358 verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
16359 return -EINVAL;
16360 }
16361 }
16362
16363 /* check src operand */
16364 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
16365 if (err)
16366 return err;
16367
16368 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
16369 verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
16370 insn->dst_reg);
16371 return -EACCES;
16372 }
16373
16374 /* check dest operand */
16375 if ((opcode == BPF_NEG || opcode == BPF_END) &&
16376 regs[insn->dst_reg].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
16377 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
16378 err = err ?: adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn,
16379 ®s[insn->dst_reg],
16380 regs[insn->dst_reg]);
16381 } else {
16382 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
16383 }
16384 if (err)
16385 return err;
16386
16387 } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
16388
16389 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
16390 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU) {
16391 if ((insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 8 && insn->off != 16) ||
16392 insn->imm) {
16393 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
16394 return -EINVAL;
16395 }
16396 } else if (insn->off == BPF_ADDR_SPACE_CAST) {
16397 if (insn->imm != 1 && insn->imm != 1u << 16) {
16398 verbose(env, "addr_space_cast insn can only convert between address space 1 and 0\n");
16399 return -EINVAL;
16400 }
16401 if (!env->prog->aux->arena) {
16402 verbose(env, "addr_space_cast insn can only be used in a program that has an associated arena\n");
16403 return -EINVAL;
16404 }
16405 } else {
16406 if ((insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 8 && insn->off != 16 &&
16407 insn->off != 32) || insn->imm) {
16408 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
16409 return -EINVAL;
16410 }
16411 }
16412
16413 /* check src operand */
16414 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
16415 if (err)
16416 return err;
16417 } else {
16418 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
16419 verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
16420 return -EINVAL;
16421 }
16422 }
16423
16424 /* check dest operand, mark as required later */
16425 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
16426 if (err)
16427 return err;
16428
16429 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
16430 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg;
16431 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg;
16432
16433 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
16434 if (insn->imm) {
16435 /* off == BPF_ADDR_SPACE_CAST */
16436 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
16437 if (insn->imm == 1) { /* cast from as(1) to as(0) */
16438 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_ARENA;
16439 /* PTR_TO_ARENA is 32-bit */
16440 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
16441 }
16442 } else if (insn->off == 0) {
16443 /* case: R1 = R2
16444 * copy register state to dest reg
16445 */
16446 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, src_reg);
16447 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
16448 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
16449 } else {
16450 /* case: R1 = (s8, s16 s32)R2 */
16451 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
16452 verbose(env,
16453 "R%d sign-extension part of pointer\n",
16454 insn->src_reg);
16455 return -EACCES;
16456 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
16457 bool no_sext;
16458
16459 no_sext = src_reg->umax_value < (1ULL << (insn->off - 1));
16460 if (no_sext)
16461 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, src_reg);
16462 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
16463 if (!no_sext)
16464 dst_reg->id = 0;
16465 coerce_reg_to_size_sx(dst_reg, insn->off >> 3);
16466 dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
16467 } else {
16468 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
16469 }
16470 }
16471 } else {
16472 /* R1 = (u32) R2 */
16473 if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
16474 verbose(env,
16475 "R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
16476 insn->src_reg);
16477 return -EACCES;
16478 } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
16479 if (insn->off == 0) {
16480 bool is_src_reg_u32 = get_reg_width(src_reg) <= 32;
16481
16482 if (is_src_reg_u32)
16483 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, src_reg);
16484 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
16485 /* Make sure ID is cleared if src_reg is not in u32
16486 * range otherwise dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly
16487 * propagated into src_reg by sync_linked_regs()
16488 */
16489 if (!is_src_reg_u32)
16490 dst_reg->id = 0;
16491 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
16492 } else {
16493 /* case: W1 = (s8, s16)W2 */
16494 bool no_sext = src_reg->umax_value < (1ULL << (insn->off - 1));
16495
16496 if (no_sext)
16497 assign_scalar_id_before_mov(env, src_reg);
16498 copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
16499 if (!no_sext)
16500 dst_reg->id = 0;
16501 dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
16502 coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(dst_reg, insn->off >> 3);
16503 }
16504 } else {
16505 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs,
16506 insn->dst_reg);
16507 }
16508 zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
16509 reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg);
16510 }
16511 } else {
16512 /* case: R = imm
16513 * remember the value we stored into this reg
16514 */
16515 /* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */
16516 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
16517 regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
16518 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
16519 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
16520 insn->imm);
16521 } else {
16522 __mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
16523 (u32)insn->imm);
16524 }
16525 }
16526
16527 } else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
16528 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
16529 return -EINVAL;
16530
16531 } else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
16532
16533 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
16534 if (insn->imm != 0 || (insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 1) ||
16535 (insn->off == 1 && opcode != BPF_MOD && opcode != BPF_DIV)) {
16536 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
16537 return -EINVAL;
16538 }
16539 /* check src1 operand */
16540 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
16541 if (err)
16542 return err;
16543 } else {
16544 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || (insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 1) ||
16545 (insn->off == 1 && opcode != BPF_MOD && opcode != BPF_DIV)) {
16546 verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
16547 return -EINVAL;
16548 }
16549 }
16550
16551 /* check src2 operand */
16552 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
16553 if (err)
16554 return err;
16555
16556 if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
16557 BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
16558 verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
16559 return -EINVAL;
16560 }
16561
16562 if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
16563 opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
16564 int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
16565
16566 if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
16567 verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
16568 return -EINVAL;
16569 }
16570 }
16571
16572 /* check dest operand */
16573 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
16574 err = err ?: adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
16575 if (err)
16576 return err;
16577 }
16578
16579 return reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, ®s[insn->dst_reg], "alu");
16580 }
16581
find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state * vstate,struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,enum bpf_reg_type type,bool range_right_open)16582 static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
16583 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
16584 enum bpf_reg_type type,
16585 bool range_right_open)
16586 {
16587 struct bpf_func_state *state;
16588 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
16589 int new_range;
16590
16591 if (dst_reg->off < 0 ||
16592 (dst_reg->off == 0 && range_right_open))
16593 /* This doesn't give us any range */
16594 return;
16595
16596 if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF ||
16597 dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF)
16598 /* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less
16599 * than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt.
16600 */
16601 return;
16602
16603 new_range = dst_reg->off;
16604 if (range_right_open)
16605 new_range++;
16606
16607 /* Examples for register markings:
16608 *
16609 * pkt_data in dst register:
16610 *
16611 * r2 = r3;
16612 * r2 += 8;
16613 * if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception>
16614 * <access okay>
16615 *
16616 * r2 = r3;
16617 * r2 += 8;
16618 * if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay>
16619 * <handle exception>
16620 *
16621 * Where:
16622 * r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg
16623 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
16624 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
16625 *
16626 * pkt_data in src register:
16627 *
16628 * r2 = r3;
16629 * r2 += 8;
16630 * if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay>
16631 * <handle exception>
16632 *
16633 * r2 = r3;
16634 * r2 += 8;
16635 * if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception>
16636 * <access okay>
16637 *
16638 * Where:
16639 * pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg
16640 * r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
16641 * r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
16642 *
16643 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8)
16644 * or r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8-1), so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8)
16645 * and [r3, r3 + 8-1) respectively is safe to access depending on
16646 * the check.
16647 */
16648
16649 /* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we
16650 * don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big
16651 * the range won't allow anything.
16652 * dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16.
16653 */
16654 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({
16655 if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
16656 /* keep the maximum range already checked */
16657 reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range);
16658 }));
16659 }
16660
16661 /*
16662 * <reg1> <op> <reg2>, currently assuming reg2 is a constant
16663 */
is_scalar_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state * reg1,struct bpf_reg_state * reg2,u8 opcode,bool is_jmp32)16664 static int is_scalar_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state *reg2,
16665 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32)
16666 {
16667 struct tnum t1 = is_jmp32 ? tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off) : reg1->var_off;
16668 struct tnum t2 = is_jmp32 ? tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off) : reg2->var_off;
16669 u64 umin1 = is_jmp32 ? (u64)reg1->u32_min_value : reg1->umin_value;
16670 u64 umax1 = is_jmp32 ? (u64)reg1->u32_max_value : reg1->umax_value;
16671 s64 smin1 = is_jmp32 ? (s64)reg1->s32_min_value : reg1->smin_value;
16672 s64 smax1 = is_jmp32 ? (s64)reg1->s32_max_value : reg1->smax_value;
16673 u64 umin2 = is_jmp32 ? (u64)reg2->u32_min_value : reg2->umin_value;
16674 u64 umax2 = is_jmp32 ? (u64)reg2->u32_max_value : reg2->umax_value;
16675 s64 smin2 = is_jmp32 ? (s64)reg2->s32_min_value : reg2->smin_value;
16676 s64 smax2 = is_jmp32 ? (s64)reg2->s32_max_value : reg2->smax_value;
16677
16678 if (reg1 == reg2) {
16679 switch (opcode) {
16680 case BPF_JGE:
16681 case BPF_JLE:
16682 case BPF_JSGE:
16683 case BPF_JSLE:
16684 case BPF_JEQ:
16685 return 1;
16686 case BPF_JGT:
16687 case BPF_JLT:
16688 case BPF_JSGT:
16689 case BPF_JSLT:
16690 case BPF_JNE:
16691 return 0;
16692 case BPF_JSET:
16693 if (tnum_is_const(t1))
16694 return t1.value != 0;
16695 else
16696 return (smin1 <= 0 && smax1 >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
16697 default:
16698 return -1;
16699 }
16700 }
16701
16702 switch (opcode) {
16703 case BPF_JEQ:
16704 /* constants, umin/umax and smin/smax checks would be
16705 * redundant in this case because they all should match
16706 */
16707 if (tnum_is_const(t1) && tnum_is_const(t2))
16708 return t1.value == t2.value;
16709 if (!tnum_overlap(t1, t2))
16710 return 0;
16711 /* non-overlapping ranges */
16712 if (umin1 > umax2 || umax1 < umin2)
16713 return 0;
16714 if (smin1 > smax2 || smax1 < smin2)
16715 return 0;
16716 if (!is_jmp32) {
16717 /* if 64-bit ranges are inconclusive, see if we can
16718 * utilize 32-bit subrange knowledge to eliminate
16719 * branches that can't be taken a priori
16720 */
16721 if (reg1->u32_min_value > reg2->u32_max_value ||
16722 reg1->u32_max_value < reg2->u32_min_value)
16723 return 0;
16724 if (reg1->s32_min_value > reg2->s32_max_value ||
16725 reg1->s32_max_value < reg2->s32_min_value)
16726 return 0;
16727 }
16728 break;
16729 case BPF_JNE:
16730 /* constants, umin/umax and smin/smax checks would be
16731 * redundant in this case because they all should match
16732 */
16733 if (tnum_is_const(t1) && tnum_is_const(t2))
16734 return t1.value != t2.value;
16735 if (!tnum_overlap(t1, t2))
16736 return 1;
16737 /* non-overlapping ranges */
16738 if (umin1 > umax2 || umax1 < umin2)
16739 return 1;
16740 if (smin1 > smax2 || smax1 < smin2)
16741 return 1;
16742 if (!is_jmp32) {
16743 /* if 64-bit ranges are inconclusive, see if we can
16744 * utilize 32-bit subrange knowledge to eliminate
16745 * branches that can't be taken a priori
16746 */
16747 if (reg1->u32_min_value > reg2->u32_max_value ||
16748 reg1->u32_max_value < reg2->u32_min_value)
16749 return 1;
16750 if (reg1->s32_min_value > reg2->s32_max_value ||
16751 reg1->s32_max_value < reg2->s32_min_value)
16752 return 1;
16753 }
16754 break;
16755 case BPF_JSET:
16756 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) {
16757 swap(reg1, reg2);
16758 swap(t1, t2);
16759 }
16760 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32))
16761 return -1;
16762 if ((~t1.mask & t1.value) & t2.value)
16763 return 1;
16764 if (!((t1.mask | t1.value) & t2.value))
16765 return 0;
16766 break;
16767 case BPF_JGT:
16768 if (umin1 > umax2)
16769 return 1;
16770 else if (umax1 <= umin2)
16771 return 0;
16772 break;
16773 case BPF_JSGT:
16774 if (smin1 > smax2)
16775 return 1;
16776 else if (smax1 <= smin2)
16777 return 0;
16778 break;
16779 case BPF_JLT:
16780 if (umax1 < umin2)
16781 return 1;
16782 else if (umin1 >= umax2)
16783 return 0;
16784 break;
16785 case BPF_JSLT:
16786 if (smax1 < smin2)
16787 return 1;
16788 else if (smin1 >= smax2)
16789 return 0;
16790 break;
16791 case BPF_JGE:
16792 if (umin1 >= umax2)
16793 return 1;
16794 else if (umax1 < umin2)
16795 return 0;
16796 break;
16797 case BPF_JSGE:
16798 if (smin1 >= smax2)
16799 return 1;
16800 else if (smax1 < smin2)
16801 return 0;
16802 break;
16803 case BPF_JLE:
16804 if (umax1 <= umin2)
16805 return 1;
16806 else if (umin1 > umax2)
16807 return 0;
16808 break;
16809 case BPF_JSLE:
16810 if (smax1 <= smin2)
16811 return 1;
16812 else if (smin1 > smax2)
16813 return 0;
16814 break;
16815 }
16816
16817 return -1;
16818 }
16819
flip_opcode(u32 opcode)16820 static int flip_opcode(u32 opcode)
16821 {
16822 /* How can we transform "a <op> b" into "b <op> a"? */
16823 static const u8 opcode_flip[16] = {
16824 /* these stay the same */
16825 [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = BPF_JEQ,
16826 [BPF_JNE >> 4] = BPF_JNE,
16827 [BPF_JSET >> 4] = BPF_JSET,
16828 /* these swap "lesser" and "greater" (L and G in the opcodes) */
16829 [BPF_JGE >> 4] = BPF_JLE,
16830 [BPF_JGT >> 4] = BPF_JLT,
16831 [BPF_JLE >> 4] = BPF_JGE,
16832 [BPF_JLT >> 4] = BPF_JGT,
16833 [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = BPF_JSLE,
16834 [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = BPF_JSLT,
16835 [BPF_JSLE >> 4] = BPF_JSGE,
16836 [BPF_JSLT >> 4] = BPF_JSGT
16837 };
16838 return opcode_flip[opcode >> 4];
16839 }
16840
is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg,u8 opcode)16841 static int is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
16842 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
16843 u8 opcode)
16844 {
16845 struct bpf_reg_state *pkt;
16846
16847 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
16848 pkt = dst_reg;
16849 } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
16850 pkt = src_reg;
16851 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode);
16852 } else {
16853 return -1;
16854 }
16855
16856 if (pkt->range >= 0)
16857 return -1;
16858
16859 switch (opcode) {
16860 case BPF_JLE:
16861 /* pkt <= pkt_end */
16862 fallthrough;
16863 case BPF_JGT:
16864 /* pkt > pkt_end */
16865 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END)
16866 /* pkt has at last one extra byte beyond pkt_end */
16867 return opcode == BPF_JGT;
16868 break;
16869 case BPF_JLT:
16870 /* pkt < pkt_end */
16871 fallthrough;
16872 case BPF_JGE:
16873 /* pkt >= pkt_end */
16874 if (pkt->range == BEYOND_PKT_END || pkt->range == AT_PKT_END)
16875 return opcode == BPF_JGE;
16876 break;
16877 }
16878 return -1;
16879 }
16880
16881 /* compute branch direction of the expression "if (<reg1> opcode <reg2>) goto target;"
16882 * and return:
16883 * 1 - branch will be taken and "goto target" will be executed
16884 * 0 - branch will not be taken and fall-through to next insn
16885 * -1 - unknown. Example: "if (reg1 < 5)" is unknown when register value
16886 * range [0,10]
16887 */
is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state * reg1,struct bpf_reg_state * reg2,u8 opcode,bool is_jmp32)16888 static int is_branch_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state *reg2,
16889 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32)
16890 {
16891 if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg1) && reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg2) && !is_jmp32)
16892 return is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken(reg1, reg2, opcode);
16893
16894 if (__is_pointer_value(false, reg1) || __is_pointer_value(false, reg2)) {
16895 u64 val;
16896
16897 /* arrange that reg2 is a scalar, and reg1 is a pointer */
16898 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) {
16899 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode);
16900 swap(reg1, reg2);
16901 }
16902 /* and ensure that reg2 is a constant */
16903 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32))
16904 return -1;
16905
16906 if (!reg_not_null(reg1))
16907 return -1;
16908
16909 /* If pointer is valid tests against zero will fail so we can
16910 * use this to direct branch taken.
16911 */
16912 val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32);
16913 if (val != 0)
16914 return -1;
16915
16916 switch (opcode) {
16917 case BPF_JEQ:
16918 return 0;
16919 case BPF_JNE:
16920 return 1;
16921 default:
16922 return -1;
16923 }
16924 }
16925
16926 /* now deal with two scalars, but not necessarily constants */
16927 return is_scalar_branch_taken(reg1, reg2, opcode, is_jmp32);
16928 }
16929
16930 /* Opcode that corresponds to a *false* branch condition.
16931 * E.g., if r1 < r2, then reverse (false) condition is r1 >= r2
16932 */
rev_opcode(u8 opcode)16933 static u8 rev_opcode(u8 opcode)
16934 {
16935 switch (opcode) {
16936 case BPF_JEQ: return BPF_JNE;
16937 case BPF_JNE: return BPF_JEQ;
16938 /* JSET doesn't have it's reverse opcode in BPF, so add
16939 * BPF_X flag to denote the reverse of that operation
16940 */
16941 case BPF_JSET: return BPF_JSET | BPF_X;
16942 case BPF_JSET | BPF_X: return BPF_JSET;
16943 case BPF_JGE: return BPF_JLT;
16944 case BPF_JGT: return BPF_JLE;
16945 case BPF_JLE: return BPF_JGT;
16946 case BPF_JLT: return BPF_JGE;
16947 case BPF_JSGE: return BPF_JSLT;
16948 case BPF_JSGT: return BPF_JSLE;
16949 case BPF_JSLE: return BPF_JSGT;
16950 case BPF_JSLT: return BPF_JSGE;
16951 default: return 0;
16952 }
16953 }
16954
16955 /* Refine range knowledge for <reg1> <op> <reg>2 conditional operation. */
regs_refine_cond_op(struct bpf_reg_state * reg1,struct bpf_reg_state * reg2,u8 opcode,bool is_jmp32)16956 static void regs_refine_cond_op(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state *reg2,
16957 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32)
16958 {
16959 struct tnum t;
16960 u64 val;
16961
16962 /* In case of GE/GT/SGE/JST, reuse LE/LT/SLE/SLT logic from below */
16963 switch (opcode) {
16964 case BPF_JGE:
16965 case BPF_JGT:
16966 case BPF_JSGE:
16967 case BPF_JSGT:
16968 opcode = flip_opcode(opcode);
16969 swap(reg1, reg2);
16970 break;
16971 default:
16972 break;
16973 }
16974
16975 switch (opcode) {
16976 case BPF_JEQ:
16977 if (is_jmp32) {
16978 reg1->u32_min_value = max(reg1->u32_min_value, reg2->u32_min_value);
16979 reg1->u32_max_value = min(reg1->u32_max_value, reg2->u32_max_value);
16980 reg1->s32_min_value = max(reg1->s32_min_value, reg2->s32_min_value);
16981 reg1->s32_max_value = min(reg1->s32_max_value, reg2->s32_max_value);
16982 reg2->u32_min_value = reg1->u32_min_value;
16983 reg2->u32_max_value = reg1->u32_max_value;
16984 reg2->s32_min_value = reg1->s32_min_value;
16985 reg2->s32_max_value = reg1->s32_max_value;
16986
16987 t = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off));
16988 reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t);
16989 reg2->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg2->var_off, t);
16990 } else {
16991 reg1->umin_value = max(reg1->umin_value, reg2->umin_value);
16992 reg1->umax_value = min(reg1->umax_value, reg2->umax_value);
16993 reg1->smin_value = max(reg1->smin_value, reg2->smin_value);
16994 reg1->smax_value = min(reg1->smax_value, reg2->smax_value);
16995 reg2->umin_value = reg1->umin_value;
16996 reg2->umax_value = reg1->umax_value;
16997 reg2->smin_value = reg1->smin_value;
16998 reg2->smax_value = reg1->smax_value;
16999
17000 reg1->var_off = tnum_intersect(reg1->var_off, reg2->var_off);
17001 reg2->var_off = reg1->var_off;
17002 }
17003 break;
17004 case BPF_JNE:
17005 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32))
17006 swap(reg1, reg2);
17007 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32))
17008 break;
17009
17010 /* try to recompute the bound of reg1 if reg2 is a const and
17011 * is exactly the edge of reg1.
17012 */
17013 val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32);
17014 if (is_jmp32) {
17015 /* u32_min_value is not equal to 0xffffffff at this point,
17016 * because otherwise u32_max_value is 0xffffffff as well,
17017 * in such a case both reg1 and reg2 would be constants,
17018 * jump would be predicted and reg_set_min_max() won't
17019 * be called.
17020 *
17021 * Same reasoning works for all {u,s}{min,max}{32,64} cases
17022 * below.
17023 */
17024 if (reg1->u32_min_value == (u32)val)
17025 reg1->u32_min_value++;
17026 if (reg1->u32_max_value == (u32)val)
17027 reg1->u32_max_value--;
17028 if (reg1->s32_min_value == (s32)val)
17029 reg1->s32_min_value++;
17030 if (reg1->s32_max_value == (s32)val)
17031 reg1->s32_max_value--;
17032 } else {
17033 if (reg1->umin_value == (u64)val)
17034 reg1->umin_value++;
17035 if (reg1->umax_value == (u64)val)
17036 reg1->umax_value--;
17037 if (reg1->smin_value == (s64)val)
17038 reg1->smin_value++;
17039 if (reg1->smax_value == (s64)val)
17040 reg1->smax_value--;
17041 }
17042 break;
17043 case BPF_JSET:
17044 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32))
17045 swap(reg1, reg2);
17046 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32))
17047 break;
17048 val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32);
17049 /* BPF_JSET (i.e., TRUE branch, *not* BPF_JSET | BPF_X)
17050 * requires single bit to learn something useful. E.g., if we
17051 * know that `r1 & 0x3` is true, then which bits (0, 1, or both)
17052 * are actually set? We can learn something definite only if
17053 * it's a single-bit value to begin with.
17054 *
17055 * BPF_JSET | BPF_X (i.e., negation of BPF_JSET) doesn't have
17056 * this restriction. I.e., !(r1 & 0x3) means neither bit 0 nor
17057 * bit 1 is set, which we can readily use in adjustments.
17058 */
17059 if (!is_power_of_2(val))
17060 break;
17061 if (is_jmp32) {
17062 t = tnum_or(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_const(val));
17063 reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t);
17064 } else {
17065 reg1->var_off = tnum_or(reg1->var_off, tnum_const(val));
17066 }
17067 break;
17068 case BPF_JSET | BPF_X: /* reverse of BPF_JSET, see rev_opcode() */
17069 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32))
17070 swap(reg1, reg2);
17071 if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32))
17072 break;
17073 val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32);
17074 /* Forget the ranges before narrowing tnums, to avoid invariant
17075 * violations if we're on a dead branch.
17076 */
17077 __mark_reg_unbounded(reg1);
17078 if (is_jmp32) {
17079 t = tnum_and(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_const(~val));
17080 reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t);
17081 } else {
17082 reg1->var_off = tnum_and(reg1->var_off, tnum_const(~val));
17083 }
17084 break;
17085 case BPF_JLE:
17086 if (is_jmp32) {
17087 reg1->u32_max_value = min(reg1->u32_max_value, reg2->u32_max_value);
17088 reg2->u32_min_value = max(reg1->u32_min_value, reg2->u32_min_value);
17089 } else {
17090 reg1->umax_value = min(reg1->umax_value, reg2->umax_value);
17091 reg2->umin_value = max(reg1->umin_value, reg2->umin_value);
17092 }
17093 break;
17094 case BPF_JLT:
17095 if (is_jmp32) {
17096 reg1->u32_max_value = min(reg1->u32_max_value, reg2->u32_max_value - 1);
17097 reg2->u32_min_value = max(reg1->u32_min_value + 1, reg2->u32_min_value);
17098 } else {
17099 reg1->umax_value = min(reg1->umax_value, reg2->umax_value - 1);
17100 reg2->umin_value = max(reg1->umin_value + 1, reg2->umin_value);
17101 }
17102 break;
17103 case BPF_JSLE:
17104 if (is_jmp32) {
17105 reg1->s32_max_value = min(reg1->s32_max_value, reg2->s32_max_value);
17106 reg2->s32_min_value = max(reg1->s32_min_value, reg2->s32_min_value);
17107 } else {
17108 reg1->smax_value = min(reg1->smax_value, reg2->smax_value);
17109 reg2->smin_value = max(reg1->smin_value, reg2->smin_value);
17110 }
17111 break;
17112 case BPF_JSLT:
17113 if (is_jmp32) {
17114 reg1->s32_max_value = min(reg1->s32_max_value, reg2->s32_max_value - 1);
17115 reg2->s32_min_value = max(reg1->s32_min_value + 1, reg2->s32_min_value);
17116 } else {
17117 reg1->smax_value = min(reg1->smax_value, reg2->smax_value - 1);
17118 reg2->smin_value = max(reg1->smin_value + 1, reg2->smin_value);
17119 }
17120 break;
17121 default:
17122 return;
17123 }
17124 }
17125
17126 /* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg and
17127 * src_reg are both SCALAR_VALUE registers (or we are simply doing a BPF_K
17128 * check, in which case we have a fake SCALAR_VALUE representing insn->imm).
17129 * Technically we can do similar adjustments for pointers to the same object,
17130 * but we don't support that right now.
17131 */
reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * true_reg1,struct bpf_reg_state * true_reg2,struct bpf_reg_state * false_reg1,struct bpf_reg_state * false_reg2,u8 opcode,bool is_jmp32)17132 static int reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
17133 struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg1,
17134 struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg2,
17135 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg1,
17136 struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg2,
17137 u8 opcode, bool is_jmp32)
17138 {
17139 int err;
17140
17141 /* If either register is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its
17142 * variable offset from the compare (unless they were a pointer into
17143 * the same object, but we don't bother with that).
17144 */
17145 if (false_reg1->type != SCALAR_VALUE || false_reg2->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
17146 return 0;
17147
17148 /* We compute branch direction for same SCALAR_VALUE registers in
17149 * is_scalar_branch_taken(). For unknown branch directions (e.g., BPF_JSET)
17150 * on the same registers, we don't need to adjust the min/max values.
17151 */
17152 if (false_reg1 == false_reg2)
17153 return 0;
17154
17155 /* fallthrough (FALSE) branch */
17156 regs_refine_cond_op(false_reg1, false_reg2, rev_opcode(opcode), is_jmp32);
17157 reg_bounds_sync(false_reg1);
17158 reg_bounds_sync(false_reg2);
17159
17160 /* jump (TRUE) branch */
17161 regs_refine_cond_op(true_reg1, true_reg2, opcode, is_jmp32);
17162 reg_bounds_sync(true_reg1);
17163 reg_bounds_sync(true_reg2);
17164
17165 err = reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, true_reg1, "true_reg1");
17166 err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, true_reg2, "true_reg2");
17167 err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, false_reg1, "false_reg1");
17168 err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, false_reg2, "false_reg2");
17169 return err;
17170 }
17171
mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state * state,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 id,bool is_null)17172 static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state,
17173 struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id,
17174 bool is_null)
17175 {
17176 if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id &&
17177 (is_rcu_reg(reg) || !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id))) {
17178 /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been
17179 * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on
17180 * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't
17181 * convert the register.
17182 *
17183 * But in some cases, some helpers that return local kptrs
17184 * advance offset for the returned pointer. In those cases, it
17185 * is fine to expect to see reg->off.
17186 */
17187 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value || !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0)))
17188 return;
17189 if (!(type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type) || type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type)) &&
17190 WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->off))
17191 return;
17192
17193 if (is_null) {
17194 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
17195 /* We don't need id and ref_obj_id from this point
17196 * onwards anymore, thus we should better reset it,
17197 * so that state pruning has chances to take effect.
17198 */
17199 reg->id = 0;
17200 reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
17201
17202 return;
17203 }
17204
17205 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg);
17206
17207 if (!reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg)) {
17208 /* For not-NULL ptr, reg->ref_obj_id will be reset
17209 * in release_reference().
17210 *
17211 * reg->id is still used by spin_lock ptr. Other
17212 * than spin_lock ptr type, reg->id can be reset.
17213 */
17214 reg->id = 0;
17215 }
17216 }
17217 }
17218
17219 /* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually
17220 * be folded together at some point.
17221 */
mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state * vstate,u32 regno,bool is_null)17222 static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno,
17223 bool is_null)
17224 {
17225 struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
17226 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
17227 u32 ref_obj_id = regs[regno].ref_obj_id;
17228 u32 id = regs[regno].id;
17229
17230 if (ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id && is_null)
17231 /* regs[regno] is in the " == NULL" branch.
17232 * No one could have freed the reference state before
17233 * doing the NULL check.
17234 */
17235 WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference_nomark(vstate, id));
17236
17237 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({
17238 mark_ptr_or_null_reg(state, reg, id, is_null);
17239 }));
17240 }
17241
try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn * insn,struct bpf_reg_state * dst_reg,struct bpf_reg_state * src_reg,struct bpf_verifier_state * this_branch,struct bpf_verifier_state * other_branch)17242 static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn,
17243 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
17244 struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
17245 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch,
17246 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch)
17247 {
17248 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X)
17249 return false;
17250
17251 /* Pointers are always 64-bit. */
17252 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32)
17253 return false;
17254
17255 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) {
17256 case BPF_JGT:
17257 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
17258 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
17259 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
17260 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
17261 /* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */
17262 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg,
17263 dst_reg->type, false);
17264 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, true);
17265 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
17266 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
17267 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
17268 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
17269 /* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */
17270 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg,
17271 src_reg->type, true);
17272 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, false);
17273 } else {
17274 return false;
17275 }
17276 break;
17277 case BPF_JLT:
17278 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
17279 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
17280 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
17281 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
17282 /* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */
17283 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg,
17284 dst_reg->type, true);
17285 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, false);
17286 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
17287 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
17288 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
17289 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
17290 /* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */
17291 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg,
17292 src_reg->type, false);
17293 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, true);
17294 } else {
17295 return false;
17296 }
17297 break;
17298 case BPF_JGE:
17299 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
17300 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
17301 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
17302 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
17303 /* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */
17304 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg,
17305 dst_reg->type, true);
17306 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, false);
17307 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
17308 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
17309 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
17310 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
17311 /* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */
17312 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg,
17313 src_reg->type, false);
17314 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->src_reg, true);
17315 } else {
17316 return false;
17317 }
17318 break;
17319 case BPF_JLE:
17320 if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
17321 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
17322 (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
17323 reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
17324 /* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */
17325 find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg,
17326 dst_reg->type, false);
17327 mark_pkt_end(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, true);
17328 } else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
17329 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
17330 (reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
17331 src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
17332 /* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */
17333 find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg,
17334 src_reg->type, true);
17335 mark_pkt_end(other_branch, insn->src_reg, false);
17336 } else {
17337 return false;
17338 }
17339 break;
17340 default:
17341 return false;
17342 }
17343
17344 return true;
17345 }
17346
__collect_linked_regs(struct linked_regs * reg_set,struct bpf_reg_state * reg,u32 id,u32 frameno,u32 spi_or_reg,bool is_reg)17347 static void __collect_linked_regs(struct linked_regs *reg_set, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
17348 u32 id, u32 frameno, u32 spi_or_reg, bool is_reg)
17349 {
17350 struct linked_reg *e;
17351
17352 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || (reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST) != id)
17353 return;
17354
17355 e = linked_regs_push(reg_set);
17356 if (e) {
17357 e->frameno = frameno;
17358 e->is_reg = is_reg;
17359 e->regno = spi_or_reg;
17360 } else {
17361 reg->id = 0;
17362 }
17363 }
17364
17365 /* For all R being scalar registers or spilled scalar registers
17366 * in verifier state, save R in linked_regs if R->id == id.
17367 * If there are too many Rs sharing same id, reset id for leftover Rs.
17368 */
collect_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * vstate,u32 id,struct linked_regs * linked_regs)17369 static void collect_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
17370 struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
17371 u32 id,
17372 struct linked_regs *linked_regs)
17373 {
17374 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data;
17375 struct bpf_func_state *func;
17376 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
17377 u16 live_regs;
17378 int i, j;
17379
17380 id = id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST;
17381 for (i = vstate->curframe; i >= 0; i--) {
17382 live_regs = aux[frame_insn_idx(vstate, i)].live_regs_before;
17383 func = vstate->frame[i];
17384 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_FP; j++) {
17385 if (!(live_regs & BIT(j)))
17386 continue;
17387 reg = &func->regs[j];
17388 __collect_linked_regs(linked_regs, reg, id, i, j, true);
17389 }
17390 for (j = 0; j < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
17391 if (!is_spilled_reg(&func->stack[j]))
17392 continue;
17393 reg = &func->stack[j].spilled_ptr;
17394 __collect_linked_regs(linked_regs, reg, id, i, j, false);
17395 }
17396 }
17397 }
17398
17399 /* For all R in linked_regs, copy known_reg range into R
17400 * if R->id == known_reg->id.
17401 */
sync_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * vstate,struct bpf_reg_state * known_reg,struct linked_regs * linked_regs)17402 static void sync_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
17403 struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg, struct linked_regs *linked_regs)
17404 {
17405 struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg;
17406 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
17407 struct linked_reg *e;
17408 int i;
17409
17410 for (i = 0; i < linked_regs->cnt; ++i) {
17411 e = &linked_regs->entries[i];
17412 reg = e->is_reg ? &vstate->frame[e->frameno]->regs[e->regno]
17413 : &vstate->frame[e->frameno]->stack[e->spi].spilled_ptr;
17414 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE || reg == known_reg)
17415 continue;
17416 if ((reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST) != (known_reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST))
17417 continue;
17418 /*
17419 * Skip mixed 32/64-bit links: the delta relationship doesn't
17420 * hold across different ALU widths.
17421 */
17422 if (((reg->id ^ known_reg->id) & BPF_ADD_CONST) == BPF_ADD_CONST)
17423 continue;
17424 if ((!(reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) && !(known_reg->id & BPF_ADD_CONST)) ||
17425 reg->off == known_reg->off) {
17426 s32 saved_subreg_def = reg->subreg_def;
17427
17428 copy_register_state(reg, known_reg);
17429 reg->subreg_def = saved_subreg_def;
17430 } else {
17431 s32 saved_subreg_def = reg->subreg_def;
17432 s32 saved_off = reg->off;
17433 u32 saved_id = reg->id;
17434
17435 fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
17436 __mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, (s64)reg->off - (s64)known_reg->off);
17437
17438 /* reg = known_reg; reg += delta */
17439 copy_register_state(reg, known_reg);
17440 /*
17441 * Must preserve off, id and subreg_def flag,
17442 * otherwise another sync_linked_regs() will be incorrect.
17443 */
17444 reg->off = saved_off;
17445 reg->id = saved_id;
17446 reg->subreg_def = saved_subreg_def;
17447
17448 scalar32_min_max_add(reg, &fake_reg);
17449 scalar_min_max_add(reg, &fake_reg);
17450 reg->var_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, fake_reg.var_off);
17451 if ((reg->id | known_reg->id) & BPF_ADD_CONST32)
17452 zext_32_to_64(reg);
17453 reg_bounds_sync(reg);
17454 }
17455 if (e->is_reg)
17456 mark_reg_scratched(env, e->regno);
17457 else
17458 mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, e->spi);
17459 }
17460 }
17461
check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,int * insn_idx)17462 static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
17463 struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
17464 {
17465 struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state;
17466 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch;
17467 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs;
17468 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL;
17469 struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs;
17470 struct linked_regs linked_regs = {};
17471 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
17472 int insn_flags = 0;
17473 bool is_jmp32;
17474 int pred = -1;
17475 int err;
17476
17477 /* Only conditional jumps are expected to reach here. */
17478 if (opcode == BPF_JA || opcode > BPF_JCOND) {
17479 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP/JMP32 opcode %x\n", opcode);
17480 return -EINVAL;
17481 }
17482
17483 if (opcode == BPF_JCOND) {
17484 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st, *prev_st;
17485 int idx = *insn_idx;
17486
17487 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND) ||
17488 insn->src_reg != BPF_MAY_GOTO ||
17489 insn->dst_reg || insn->imm) {
17490 verbose(env, "invalid may_goto imm %d\n", insn->imm);
17491 return -EINVAL;
17492 }
17493 prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, cur_st->parent, idx);
17494
17495 /* branch out 'fallthrough' insn as a new state to explore */
17496 queued_st = push_stack(env, idx + 1, idx, false);
17497 if (IS_ERR(queued_st))
17498 return PTR_ERR(queued_st);
17499
17500 queued_st->may_goto_depth++;
17501 if (prev_st)
17502 widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st);
17503 *insn_idx += insn->off;
17504 return 0;
17505 }
17506
17507 /* check src2 operand */
17508 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
17509 if (err)
17510 return err;
17511
17512 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg];
17513 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
17514 if (insn->imm != 0) {
17515 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
17516 return -EINVAL;
17517 }
17518
17519 /* check src1 operand */
17520 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
17521 if (err)
17522 return err;
17523
17524 src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg];
17525 if (!(reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg)) &&
17526 is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
17527 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
17528 insn->src_reg);
17529 return -EACCES;
17530 }
17531
17532 if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK)
17533 insn_flags |= INSN_F_SRC_REG_STACK;
17534 if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK)
17535 insn_flags |= INSN_F_DST_REG_STACK;
17536 } else {
17537 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
17538 verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
17539 return -EINVAL;
17540 }
17541 src_reg = &env->fake_reg[0];
17542 memset(src_reg, 0, sizeof(*src_reg));
17543 src_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
17544 __mark_reg_known(src_reg, insn->imm);
17545
17546 if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK)
17547 insn_flags |= INSN_F_DST_REG_STACK;
17548 }
17549
17550 if (insn_flags) {
17551 err = push_jmp_history(env, this_branch, insn_flags, 0);
17552 if (err)
17553 return err;
17554 }
17555
17556 is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32;
17557 pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg, opcode, is_jmp32);
17558 if (pred >= 0) {
17559 /* If we get here with a dst_reg pointer type it is because
17560 * above is_branch_taken() special cased the 0 comparison.
17561 */
17562 if (!__is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg))
17563 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->dst_reg);
17564 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && !err &&
17565 !__is_pointer_value(false, src_reg))
17566 err = mark_chain_precision(env, insn->src_reg);
17567 if (err)
17568 return err;
17569 }
17570
17571 if (pred == 1) {
17572 /* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push
17573 * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative
17574 * execution.
17575 */
17576 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
17577 err = sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1, *insn_idx);
17578 if (err < 0)
17579 return err;
17580 }
17581 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
17582 print_insn_state(env, this_branch, this_branch->curframe);
17583 *insn_idx += insn->off;
17584 return 0;
17585 } else if (pred == 0) {
17586 /* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the
17587 * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for
17588 * simulation under speculative execution.
17589 */
17590 if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
17591 err = sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1,
17592 *insn_idx);
17593 if (err < 0)
17594 return err;
17595 }
17596 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
17597 print_insn_state(env, this_branch, this_branch->curframe);
17598 return 0;
17599 }
17600
17601 /* Push scalar registers sharing same ID to jump history,
17602 * do this before creating 'other_branch', so that both
17603 * 'this_branch' and 'other_branch' share this history
17604 * if parent state is created.
17605 */
17606 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && src_reg->id)
17607 collect_linked_regs(env, this_branch, src_reg->id, &linked_regs);
17608 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id)
17609 collect_linked_regs(env, this_branch, dst_reg->id, &linked_regs);
17610 if (linked_regs.cnt > 1) {
17611 err = push_jmp_history(env, this_branch, 0, linked_regs_pack(&linked_regs));
17612 if (err)
17613 return err;
17614 }
17615
17616 other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx, false);
17617 if (IS_ERR(other_branch))
17618 return PTR_ERR(other_branch);
17619 other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs;
17620
17621 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
17622 err = reg_set_min_max(env,
17623 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
17624 &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
17625 dst_reg, src_reg, opcode, is_jmp32);
17626 } else /* BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K */ {
17627 /* reg_set_min_max() can mangle the fake_reg. Make a copy
17628 * so that these are two different memory locations. The
17629 * src_reg is not used beyond here in context of K.
17630 */
17631 memcpy(&env->fake_reg[1], &env->fake_reg[0],
17632 sizeof(env->fake_reg[0]));
17633 err = reg_set_min_max(env,
17634 &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
17635 &env->fake_reg[0],
17636 dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[1],
17637 opcode, is_jmp32);
17638 }
17639 if (err)
17640 return err;
17641
17642 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
17643 src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && src_reg->id &&
17644 !WARN_ON_ONCE(src_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg].id)) {
17645 sync_linked_regs(env, this_branch, src_reg, &linked_regs);
17646 sync_linked_regs(env, other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
17647 &linked_regs);
17648 }
17649 if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id &&
17650 !WARN_ON_ONCE(dst_reg->id != other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg].id)) {
17651 sync_linked_regs(env, this_branch, dst_reg, &linked_regs);
17652 sync_linked_regs(env, other_branch, &other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
17653 &linked_regs);
17654 }
17655
17656 /* if one pointer register is compared to another pointer
17657 * register check if PTR_MAYBE_NULL could be lifted.
17658 * E.g. register A - maybe null
17659 * register B - not null
17660 * for JNE A, B, ... - A is not null in the false branch;
17661 * for JEQ A, B, ... - A is not null in the true branch.
17662 *
17663 * Since PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to a kernel struct that does
17664 * not need to be null checked by the BPF program, i.e.,
17665 * could be null even without PTR_MAYBE_NULL marking, so
17666 * only propagate nullness when neither reg is that type.
17667 */
17668 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
17669 __is_pointer_value(false, src_reg) && __is_pointer_value(false, dst_reg) &&
17670 type_may_be_null(src_reg->type) != type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type) &&
17671 base_type(src_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID &&
17672 base_type(dst_reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
17673 eq_branch_regs = NULL;
17674 switch (opcode) {
17675 case BPF_JEQ:
17676 eq_branch_regs = other_branch_regs;
17677 break;
17678 case BPF_JNE:
17679 eq_branch_regs = regs;
17680 break;
17681 default:
17682 /* do nothing */
17683 break;
17684 }
17685 if (eq_branch_regs) {
17686 if (type_may_be_null(src_reg->type))
17687 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->src_reg]);
17688 else
17689 mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&eq_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg]);
17690 }
17691 }
17692
17693 /* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem().
17694 * NOTE: these optimizations below are related with pointer comparison
17695 * which will never be JMP32.
17696 */
17697 if (!is_jmp32 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
17698 insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
17699 type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) {
17700 /* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either
17701 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
17702 */
17703 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg,
17704 opcode == BPF_JNE);
17705 mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg,
17706 opcode == BPF_JEQ);
17707 } else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg],
17708 this_branch, other_branch) &&
17709 is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
17710 verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
17711 insn->dst_reg);
17712 return -EACCES;
17713 }
17714 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
17715 print_insn_state(env, this_branch, this_branch->curframe);
17716 return 0;
17717 }
17718
17719 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn)17720 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
17721 {
17722 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
17723 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
17724 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg;
17725 struct bpf_map *map;
17726 int err;
17727
17728 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
17729 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
17730 return -EINVAL;
17731 }
17732 if (insn->off != 0) {
17733 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
17734 return -EINVAL;
17735 }
17736
17737 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
17738 if (err)
17739 return err;
17740
17741 dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg];
17742 if (insn->src_reg == 0) {
17743 u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
17744
17745 dst_reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
17746 __mark_reg_known(®s[insn->dst_reg], imm);
17747 return 0;
17748 }
17749
17750 /* All special src_reg cases are listed below. From this point onwards
17751 * we either succeed and assign a corresponding dst_reg->type after
17752 * zeroing the offset, or fail and reject the program.
17753 */
17754 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
17755
17756 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) {
17757 dst_reg->type = aux->btf_var.reg_type;
17758 switch (base_type(dst_reg->type)) {
17759 case PTR_TO_MEM:
17760 dst_reg->mem_size = aux->btf_var.mem_size;
17761 break;
17762 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
17763 dst_reg->btf = aux->btf_var.btf;
17764 dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id;
17765 break;
17766 default:
17767 verifier_bug(env, "pseudo btf id: unexpected dst reg type");
17768 return -EFAULT;
17769 }
17770 return 0;
17771 }
17772
17773 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) {
17774 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
17775 u32 subprogno = find_subprog(env,
17776 env->insn_idx + insn->imm + 1);
17777
17778 if (!aux->func_info) {
17779 verbose(env, "missing btf func_info\n");
17780 return -EINVAL;
17781 }
17782 if (aux->func_info_aux[subprogno].linkage != BTF_FUNC_STATIC) {
17783 verbose(env, "callback function not static\n");
17784 return -EINVAL;
17785 }
17786
17787 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_FUNC;
17788 dst_reg->subprogno = subprogno;
17789 return 0;
17790 }
17791
17792 map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index];
17793 dst_reg->map_ptr = map;
17794
17795 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE ||
17796 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE) {
17797 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA) {
17798 __mark_reg_unknown(env, dst_reg);
17799 return 0;
17800 }
17801 dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
17802 dst_reg->off = aux->map_off;
17803 WARN_ON_ONCE(map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY &&
17804 map->max_entries != 1);
17805 /* We want reg->id to be same (0) as map_value is not distinct */
17806 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD ||
17807 insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) {
17808 dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
17809 } else {
17810 verifier_bug(env, "unexpected src reg value for ldimm64");
17811 return -EFAULT;
17812 }
17813
17814 return 0;
17815 }
17816
may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type)17817 static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type)
17818 {
17819 switch (type) {
17820 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
17821 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
17822 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
17823 return true;
17824 default:
17825 return false;
17826 }
17827 }
17828
17829 /* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions:
17830 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb
17831 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers,
17832 * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0
17833 *
17834 * Implicit input:
17835 * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX
17836 *
17837 * Explicit input:
17838 * SRC == any register
17839 * IMM == 32-bit immediate
17840 *
17841 * Output:
17842 * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness
17843 */
check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn)17844 static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
17845 {
17846 struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
17847 static const int ctx_reg = BPF_REG_6;
17848 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
17849 int i, err;
17850
17851 if (!may_access_skb(resolve_prog_type(env->prog))) {
17852 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
17853 return -EINVAL;
17854 }
17855
17856 if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) {
17857 verifier_bug(env, "gen_ld_abs is null");
17858 return -EFAULT;
17859 }
17860
17861 if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
17862 BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW ||
17863 (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
17864 verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n");
17865 return -EINVAL;
17866 }
17867
17868 /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */
17869 err = check_reg_arg(env, ctx_reg, SRC_OP);
17870 if (err)
17871 return err;
17872
17873 /* Disallow usage of BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] with reference tracking, as
17874 * gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to
17875 * reference leak.
17876 */
17877 err = check_resource_leak(env, false, true, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND]");
17878 if (err)
17879 return err;
17880
17881 if (regs[ctx_reg].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
17882 verbose(env,
17883 "at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
17884 return -EINVAL;
17885 }
17886
17887 if (mode == BPF_IND) {
17888 /* check explicit source operand */
17889 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
17890 if (err)
17891 return err;
17892 }
17893
17894 err = check_ptr_off_reg(env, ®s[ctx_reg], ctx_reg);
17895 if (err < 0)
17896 return err;
17897
17898 /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
17899 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
17900 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
17901 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
17902 }
17903
17904 /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains
17905 * the value fetched from the packet.
17906 * Already marked as written above.
17907 */
17908 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
17909 /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */
17910 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
17911 return 0;
17912 }
17913
check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,const char * reg_name)17914 static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, const char *reg_name)
17915 {
17916 const char *exit_ctx = "At program exit";
17917 struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown;
17918 const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
17919 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
17920 struct bpf_retval_range range = retval_range(0, 1);
17921 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
17922 int err;
17923 struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0];
17924 const bool is_subprog = frame->subprogno;
17925 bool return_32bit = false;
17926 const struct btf_type *reg_type, *ret_type = NULL;
17927
17928 /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */
17929 if (!is_subprog || frame->in_exception_callback_fn) {
17930 switch (prog_type) {
17931 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
17932 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP)
17933 /* See below, can be 0 or 0-1 depending on hook. */
17934 break;
17935 if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
17936 return 0;
17937 break;
17938 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
17939 if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
17940 return 0;
17941
17942 if (frame->in_exception_callback_fn)
17943 break;
17944
17945 /* Allow a struct_ops program to return a referenced kptr if it
17946 * matches the operator's return type and is in its unmodified
17947 * form. A scalar zero (i.e., a null pointer) is also allowed.
17948 */
17949 reg_type = reg->btf ? btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id) : NULL;
17950 ret_type = btf_type_resolve_ptr(prog->aux->attach_btf,
17951 prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type,
17952 NULL);
17953 if (ret_type && ret_type == reg_type && reg->ref_obj_id)
17954 return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false);
17955 break;
17956 default:
17957 break;
17958 }
17959 }
17960
17961 /* eBPF calling convention is such that R0 is used
17962 * to return the value from eBPF program.
17963 * Make sure that it's readable at this time
17964 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
17965 * something into it earlier
17966 */
17967 err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP);
17968 if (err)
17969 return err;
17970
17971 if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
17972 verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr as return value\n", regno);
17973 return -EACCES;
17974 }
17975
17976 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn) {
17977 exit_ctx = "At async callback return";
17978 range = frame->callback_ret_range;
17979 goto enforce_retval;
17980 }
17981
17982 if (is_subprog && !frame->in_exception_callback_fn) {
17983 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
17984 verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R%d is not a scalar value (%s)\n",
17985 regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
17986 return -EINVAL;
17987 }
17988 return 0;
17989 }
17990
17991 switch (prog_type) {
17992 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR:
17993 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG ||
17994 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG ||
17995 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_RECVMSG ||
17996 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME ||
17997 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME ||
17998 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME ||
17999 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME ||
18000 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME ||
18001 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME)
18002 range = retval_range(1, 1);
18003 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND ||
18004 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND)
18005 range = retval_range(0, 3);
18006 break;
18007 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
18008 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS) {
18009 range = retval_range(0, 3);
18010 enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_range(2, 3);
18011 }
18012 break;
18013 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK:
18014 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS:
18015 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE:
18016 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL:
18017 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT:
18018 break;
18019 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT:
18020 if (!env->prog->aux->attach_btf_id)
18021 return 0;
18022 range = retval_range(0, 0);
18023 break;
18024 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
18025 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) {
18026 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY:
18027 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT:
18028 case BPF_TRACE_FSESSION:
18029 range = retval_range(0, 0);
18030 break;
18031 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
18032 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
18033 return 0;
18034 case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
18035 break;
18036 default:
18037 return -ENOTSUPP;
18038 }
18039 break;
18040 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE:
18041 switch (env->prog->expected_attach_type) {
18042 case BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_SESSION:
18043 case BPF_TRACE_UPROBE_SESSION:
18044 range = retval_range(0, 1);
18045 break;
18046 default:
18047 return 0;
18048 }
18049 break;
18050 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP:
18051 range = retval_range(SK_DROP, SK_PASS);
18052 break;
18053
18054 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
18055 if (env->prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_CGROUP) {
18056 /* no range found, any return value is allowed */
18057 if (!get_func_retval_range(env->prog, &range))
18058 return 0;
18059 /* no restricted range, any return value is allowed */
18060 if (range.minval == S32_MIN && range.maxval == S32_MAX)
18061 return 0;
18062 return_32bit = true;
18063 } else if (!env->prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) {
18064 /* Make sure programs that attach to void
18065 * hooks don't try to modify return value.
18066 */
18067 range = retval_range(1, 1);
18068 }
18069 break;
18070
18071 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_NETFILTER:
18072 range = retval_range(NF_DROP, NF_ACCEPT);
18073 break;
18074 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
18075 if (!ret_type)
18076 return 0;
18077 range = retval_range(0, 0);
18078 break;
18079 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT:
18080 /* freplace program can return anything as its return value
18081 * depends on the to-be-replaced kernel func or bpf program.
18082 */
18083 default:
18084 return 0;
18085 }
18086
18087 enforce_retval:
18088 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
18089 verbose(env, "%s the register R%d is not a known value (%s)\n",
18090 exit_ctx, regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
18091 return -EINVAL;
18092 }
18093
18094 err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno);
18095 if (err)
18096 return err;
18097
18098 if (!retval_range_within(range, reg, return_32bit)) {
18099 verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, range, exit_ctx, reg_name);
18100 if (!is_subprog &&
18101 prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP &&
18102 prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM &&
18103 !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
18104 verbose(env, "Note, BPF_LSM_CGROUP that attach to void LSM hooks can't modify return value!\n");
18105 return -EINVAL;
18106 }
18107
18108 if (!tnum_is_unknown(enforce_attach_type_range) &&
18109 tnum_in(enforce_attach_type_range, reg->var_off))
18110 env->prog->enforce_expected_attach_type = 1;
18111 return 0;
18112 }
18113
mark_subprog_changes_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int off)18114 static void mark_subprog_changes_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
18115 {
18116 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog;
18117
18118 subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, off);
18119 subprog->changes_pkt_data = true;
18120 }
18121
mark_subprog_might_sleep(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int off)18122 static void mark_subprog_might_sleep(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
18123 {
18124 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog;
18125
18126 subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, off);
18127 subprog->might_sleep = true;
18128 }
18129
18130 /* 't' is an index of a call-site.
18131 * 'w' is a callee entry point.
18132 * Eventually this function would be called when env->cfg.insn_state[w] == EXPLORED.
18133 * Rely on DFS traversal order and absence of recursive calls to guarantee that
18134 * callee's change_pkt_data marks would be correct at that moment.
18135 */
merge_callee_effects(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int t,int w)18136 static void merge_callee_effects(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int t, int w)
18137 {
18138 struct bpf_subprog_info *caller, *callee;
18139
18140 caller = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, t);
18141 callee = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, w);
18142 caller->changes_pkt_data |= callee->changes_pkt_data;
18143 caller->might_sleep |= callee->might_sleep;
18144 }
18145
18146 /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code
18147 * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v):
18148 * 2 label v as discovered
18149 * 3 let S be a stack
18150 * 4 S.push(v)
18151 * 5 while S is not empty
18152 * 6 t <- S.peek()
18153 * 7 if t is what we're looking for:
18154 * 8 return t
18155 * 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do
18156 * 10 if edge e is already labelled
18157 * 11 continue with the next edge
18158 * 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e)
18159 * 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored
18160 * 14 label e as tree-edge
18161 * 15 label w as discovered
18162 * 16 S.push(w)
18163 * 17 continue at 5
18164 * 18 else if vertex w is discovered
18165 * 19 label e as back-edge
18166 * 20 else
18167 * 21 // vertex w is explored
18168 * 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge
18169 * 23 label t as explored
18170 * 24 S.pop()
18171 *
18172 * convention:
18173 * 0x10 - discovered
18174 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled
18175 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled
18176 * 0x20 - explored
18177 */
18178
18179 enum {
18180 DISCOVERED = 0x10,
18181 EXPLORED = 0x20,
18182 FALLTHROUGH = 1,
18183 BRANCH = 2,
18184 };
18185
mark_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int idx)18186 static void mark_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
18187 {
18188 env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true;
18189 }
18190
is_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx)18191 static bool is_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
18192 {
18193 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point;
18194 }
18195
mark_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int idx)18196 static void mark_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
18197 {
18198 env->insn_aux_data[idx].force_checkpoint = true;
18199 }
18200
is_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx)18201 static bool is_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
18202 {
18203 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].force_checkpoint;
18204 }
18205
mark_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int idx)18206 static void mark_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
18207 {
18208 env->insn_aux_data[idx].calls_callback = true;
18209 }
18210
bpf_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx)18211 bool bpf_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
18212 {
18213 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].calls_callback;
18214 }
18215
18216 enum {
18217 DONE_EXPLORING = 0,
18218 KEEP_EXPLORING = 1,
18219 };
18220
18221 /* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above:
18222 * t - index of current instruction
18223 * w - next instruction
18224 * e - edge
18225 */
push_insn(int t,int w,int e,struct bpf_verifier_env * env)18226 static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18227 {
18228 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack;
18229 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state;
18230
18231 if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH))
18232 return DONE_EXPLORING;
18233
18234 if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH))
18235 return DONE_EXPLORING;
18236
18237 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
18238 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t);
18239 verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
18240 return -EINVAL;
18241 }
18242
18243 if (e == BRANCH) {
18244 /* mark branch target for state pruning */
18245 mark_prune_point(env, w);
18246 mark_jmp_point(env, w);
18247 }
18248
18249 if (insn_state[w] == 0) {
18250 /* tree-edge */
18251 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
18252 insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED;
18253 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
18254 return -E2BIG;
18255 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w;
18256 return KEEP_EXPLORING;
18257 } else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
18258 if (env->bpf_capable)
18259 return DONE_EXPLORING;
18260 verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t);
18261 verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w);
18262 verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
18263 return -EINVAL;
18264 } else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
18265 /* forward- or cross-edge */
18266 insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
18267 } else {
18268 verifier_bug(env, "insn state internal bug");
18269 return -EFAULT;
18270 }
18271 return DONE_EXPLORING;
18272 }
18273
visit_func_call_insn(int t,struct bpf_insn * insns,struct bpf_verifier_env * env,bool visit_callee)18274 static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, struct bpf_insn *insns,
18275 struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
18276 bool visit_callee)
18277 {
18278 int ret, insn_sz;
18279 int w;
18280
18281 insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[t]) ? 2 : 1;
18282 ret = push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env);
18283 if (ret)
18284 return ret;
18285
18286 mark_prune_point(env, t + insn_sz);
18287 /* when we exit from subprog, we need to record non-linear history */
18288 mark_jmp_point(env, t + insn_sz);
18289
18290 if (visit_callee) {
18291 w = t + insns[t].imm + 1;
18292 mark_prune_point(env, t);
18293 merge_callee_effects(env, t, w);
18294 ret = push_insn(t, w, BRANCH, env);
18295 }
18296 return ret;
18297 }
18298
18299 /* Bitmask with 1s for all caller saved registers */
18300 #define ALL_CALLER_SAVED_REGS ((1u << CALLER_SAVED_REGS) - 1)
18301
18302 /* True if do_misc_fixups() replaces calls to helper number 'imm',
18303 * replacement patch is presumed to follow bpf_fastcall contract
18304 * (see mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call() below).
18305 */
verifier_inlines_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,s32 imm)18306 static bool verifier_inlines_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, s32 imm)
18307 {
18308 switch (imm) {
18309 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
18310 case BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id:
18311 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
18312 case BPF_FUNC_get_current_task_btf:
18313 case BPF_FUNC_get_current_task:
18314 #endif
18315 return env->prog->jit_requested && bpf_jit_supports_percpu_insn();
18316 #endif
18317 default:
18318 return false;
18319 }
18320 }
18321
18322 struct call_summary {
18323 u8 num_params;
18324 bool is_void;
18325 bool fastcall;
18326 };
18327
18328 /* If @call is a kfunc or helper call, fills @cs and returns true,
18329 * otherwise returns false.
18330 */
get_call_summary(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * call,struct call_summary * cs)18331 static bool get_call_summary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *call,
18332 struct call_summary *cs)
18333 {
18334 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta;
18335 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
18336 int i;
18337
18338 if (bpf_helper_call(call)) {
18339
18340 if (get_helper_proto(env, call->imm, &fn) < 0)
18341 /* error would be reported later */
18342 return false;
18343 cs->fastcall = fn->allow_fastcall &&
18344 (verifier_inlines_helper_call(env, call->imm) ||
18345 bpf_jit_inlines_helper_call(call->imm));
18346 cs->is_void = fn->ret_type == RET_VOID;
18347 cs->num_params = 0;
18348 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fn->arg_type); ++i) {
18349 if (fn->arg_type[i] == ARG_DONTCARE)
18350 break;
18351 cs->num_params++;
18352 }
18353 return true;
18354 }
18355
18356 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(call)) {
18357 int err;
18358
18359 err = fetch_kfunc_arg_meta(env, call->imm, call->off, &meta);
18360 if (err < 0)
18361 /* error would be reported later */
18362 return false;
18363 cs->num_params = btf_type_vlen(meta.func_proto);
18364 cs->fastcall = meta.kfunc_flags & KF_FASTCALL;
18365 cs->is_void = btf_type_is_void(btf_type_by_id(meta.btf, meta.func_proto->type));
18366 return true;
18367 }
18368
18369 return false;
18370 }
18371
18372 /* LLVM define a bpf_fastcall function attribute.
18373 * This attribute means that function scratches only some of
18374 * the caller saved registers defined by ABI.
18375 * For BPF the set of such registers could be defined as follows:
18376 * - R0 is scratched only if function is non-void;
18377 * - R1-R5 are scratched only if corresponding parameter type is defined
18378 * in the function prototype.
18379 *
18380 * The contract between kernel and clang allows to simultaneously use
18381 * such functions and maintain backwards compatibility with old
18382 * kernels that don't understand bpf_fastcall calls:
18383 *
18384 * - for bpf_fastcall calls clang allocates registers as-if relevant r0-r5
18385 * registers are not scratched by the call;
18386 *
18387 * - as a post-processing step, clang visits each bpf_fastcall call and adds
18388 * spill/fill for every live r0-r5;
18389 *
18390 * - stack offsets used for the spill/fill are allocated as lowest
18391 * stack offsets in whole function and are not used for any other
18392 * purposes;
18393 *
18394 * - when kernel loads a program, it looks for such patterns
18395 * (bpf_fastcall function surrounded by spills/fills) and checks if
18396 * spill/fill stack offsets are used exclusively in fastcall patterns;
18397 *
18398 * - if so, and if verifier or current JIT inlines the call to the
18399 * bpf_fastcall function (e.g. a helper call), kernel removes unnecessary
18400 * spill/fill pairs;
18401 *
18402 * - when old kernel loads a program, presence of spill/fill pairs
18403 * keeps BPF program valid, albeit slightly less efficient.
18404 *
18405 * For example:
18406 *
18407 * r1 = 1;
18408 * r2 = 2;
18409 * *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1; r1 = 1;
18410 * *(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r2; r2 = 2;
18411 * call %[to_be_inlined] --> call %[to_be_inlined]
18412 * r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 16); r0 = r1;
18413 * r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 += r2;
18414 * r0 = r1; exit;
18415 * r0 += r2;
18416 * exit;
18417 *
18418 * The purpose of mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call is to:
18419 * - look for such patterns;
18420 * - mark spill and fill instructions in env->insn_aux_data[*].fastcall_pattern;
18421 * - mark set env->insn_aux_data[*].fastcall_spills_num for call instruction;
18422 * - update env->subprog_info[*]->fastcall_stack_off to find an offset
18423 * at which bpf_fastcall spill/fill stack slots start;
18424 * - update env->subprog_info[*]->keep_fastcall_stack.
18425 *
18426 * The .fastcall_pattern and .fastcall_stack_off are used by
18427 * check_fastcall_stack_contract() to check if every stack access to
18428 * fastcall spill/fill stack slot originates from spill/fill
18429 * instructions, members of fastcall patterns.
18430 *
18431 * If such condition holds true for a subprogram, fastcall patterns could
18432 * be rewritten by remove_fastcall_spills_fills().
18433 * Otherwise bpf_fastcall patterns are not changed in the subprogram
18434 * (code, presumably, generated by an older clang version).
18435 *
18436 * For example, it is *not* safe to remove spill/fill below:
18437 *
18438 * r1 = 1;
18439 * *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1; r1 = 1;
18440 * call %[to_be_inlined] --> call %[to_be_inlined]
18441 * r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); <---- wrong !!!
18442 * r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 += r1;
18443 * r0 += r1; exit;
18444 * exit;
18445 */
mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_subprog_info * subprog,int insn_idx,s16 lowest_off)18446 static void mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
18447 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog,
18448 int insn_idx, s16 lowest_off)
18449 {
18450 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi, *stx, *ldx;
18451 struct bpf_insn *call = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
18452 u32 clobbered_regs_mask;
18453 struct call_summary cs;
18454 u32 expected_regs_mask;
18455 s16 off;
18456 int i;
18457
18458 if (!get_call_summary(env, call, &cs))
18459 return;
18460
18461 /* A bitmask specifying which caller saved registers are clobbered
18462 * by a call to a helper/kfunc *as if* this helper/kfunc follows
18463 * bpf_fastcall contract:
18464 * - includes R0 if function is non-void;
18465 * - includes R1-R5 if corresponding parameter has is described
18466 * in the function prototype.
18467 */
18468 clobbered_regs_mask = GENMASK(cs.num_params, cs.is_void ? 1 : 0);
18469 /* e.g. if helper call clobbers r{0,1}, expect r{2,3,4,5} in the pattern */
18470 expected_regs_mask = ~clobbered_regs_mask & ALL_CALLER_SAVED_REGS;
18471
18472 /* match pairs of form:
18473 *
18474 * *(u64 *)(r10 - Y) = rX (where Y % 8 == 0)
18475 * ...
18476 * call %[to_be_inlined]
18477 * ...
18478 * rX = *(u64 *)(r10 - Y)
18479 */
18480 for (i = 1, off = lowest_off; i <= ARRAY_SIZE(caller_saved); ++i, off += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
18481 if (insn_idx - i < 0 || insn_idx + i >= env->prog->len)
18482 break;
18483 stx = &insns[insn_idx - i];
18484 ldx = &insns[insn_idx + i];
18485 /* must be a stack spill/fill pair */
18486 if (stx->code != (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) ||
18487 ldx->code != (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) ||
18488 stx->dst_reg != BPF_REG_10 ||
18489 ldx->src_reg != BPF_REG_10)
18490 break;
18491 /* must be a spill/fill for the same reg */
18492 if (stx->src_reg != ldx->dst_reg)
18493 break;
18494 /* must be one of the previously unseen registers */
18495 if ((BIT(stx->src_reg) & expected_regs_mask) == 0)
18496 break;
18497 /* must be a spill/fill for the same expected offset,
18498 * no need to check offset alignment, BPF_DW stack access
18499 * is always 8-byte aligned.
18500 */
18501 if (stx->off != off || ldx->off != off)
18502 break;
18503 expected_regs_mask &= ~BIT(stx->src_reg);
18504 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx - i].fastcall_pattern = 1;
18505 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx + i].fastcall_pattern = 1;
18506 }
18507 if (i == 1)
18508 return;
18509
18510 /* Conditionally set 'fastcall_spills_num' to allow forward
18511 * compatibility when more helper functions are marked as
18512 * bpf_fastcall at compile time than current kernel supports, e.g:
18513 *
18514 * 1: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1
18515 * 2: call A ;; assume A is bpf_fastcall for current kernel
18516 * 3: r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8)
18517 * 4: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1
18518 * 5: call B ;; assume B is not bpf_fastcall for current kernel
18519 * 6: r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8)
18520 *
18521 * There is no need to block bpf_fastcall rewrite for such program.
18522 * Set 'fastcall_pattern' for both calls to keep check_fastcall_stack_contract() happy,
18523 * don't set 'fastcall_spills_num' for call B so that remove_fastcall_spills_fills()
18524 * does not remove spill/fill pair {4,6}.
18525 */
18526 if (cs.fastcall)
18527 env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].fastcall_spills_num = i - 1;
18528 else
18529 subprog->keep_fastcall_stack = 1;
18530 subprog->fastcall_stack_off = min(subprog->fastcall_stack_off, off);
18531 }
18532
mark_fastcall_patterns(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)18533 static int mark_fastcall_patterns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18534 {
18535 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
18536 struct bpf_insn *insn;
18537 s16 lowest_off;
18538 int s, i;
18539
18540 for (s = 0; s < env->subprog_cnt; ++s, ++subprog) {
18541 /* find lowest stack spill offset used in this subprog */
18542 lowest_off = 0;
18543 for (i = subprog->start; i < (subprog + 1)->start; ++i) {
18544 insn = env->prog->insnsi + i;
18545 if (insn->code != (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) ||
18546 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_10)
18547 continue;
18548 lowest_off = min(lowest_off, insn->off);
18549 }
18550 /* use this offset to find fastcall patterns */
18551 for (i = subprog->start; i < (subprog + 1)->start; ++i) {
18552 insn = env->prog->insnsi + i;
18553 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
18554 continue;
18555 mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call(env, subprog, i, lowest_off);
18556 }
18557 }
18558 return 0;
18559 }
18560
iarray_realloc(struct bpf_iarray * old,size_t n_elem)18561 static struct bpf_iarray *iarray_realloc(struct bpf_iarray *old, size_t n_elem)
18562 {
18563 size_t new_size = sizeof(struct bpf_iarray) + n_elem * sizeof(old->items[0]);
18564 struct bpf_iarray *new;
18565
18566 new = kvrealloc(old, new_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
18567 if (!new) {
18568 /* this is what callers always want, so simplify the call site */
18569 kvfree(old);
18570 return NULL;
18571 }
18572
18573 new->cnt = n_elem;
18574 return new;
18575 }
18576
copy_insn_array(struct bpf_map * map,u32 start,u32 end,u32 * items)18577 static int copy_insn_array(struct bpf_map *map, u32 start, u32 end, u32 *items)
18578 {
18579 struct bpf_insn_array_value *value;
18580 u32 i;
18581
18582 for (i = start; i <= end; i++) {
18583 value = map->ops->map_lookup_elem(map, &i);
18584 /*
18585 * map_lookup_elem of an array map will never return an error,
18586 * but not checking it makes some static analysers to worry
18587 */
18588 if (IS_ERR(value))
18589 return PTR_ERR(value);
18590 else if (!value)
18591 return -EINVAL;
18592 items[i - start] = value->xlated_off;
18593 }
18594 return 0;
18595 }
18596
cmp_ptr_to_u32(const void * a,const void * b)18597 static int cmp_ptr_to_u32(const void *a, const void *b)
18598 {
18599 return *(u32 *)a - *(u32 *)b;
18600 }
18601
sort_insn_array_uniq(u32 * items,int cnt)18602 static int sort_insn_array_uniq(u32 *items, int cnt)
18603 {
18604 int unique = 1;
18605 int i;
18606
18607 sort(items, cnt, sizeof(items[0]), cmp_ptr_to_u32, NULL);
18608
18609 for (i = 1; i < cnt; i++)
18610 if (items[i] != items[unique - 1])
18611 items[unique++] = items[i];
18612
18613 return unique;
18614 }
18615
18616 /*
18617 * sort_unique({map[start], ..., map[end]}) into off
18618 */
copy_insn_array_uniq(struct bpf_map * map,u32 start,u32 end,u32 * off)18619 static int copy_insn_array_uniq(struct bpf_map *map, u32 start, u32 end, u32 *off)
18620 {
18621 u32 n = end - start + 1;
18622 int err;
18623
18624 err = copy_insn_array(map, start, end, off);
18625 if (err)
18626 return err;
18627
18628 return sort_insn_array_uniq(off, n);
18629 }
18630
18631 /*
18632 * Copy all unique offsets from the map
18633 */
jt_from_map(struct bpf_map * map)18634 static struct bpf_iarray *jt_from_map(struct bpf_map *map)
18635 {
18636 struct bpf_iarray *jt;
18637 int err;
18638 int n;
18639
18640 jt = iarray_realloc(NULL, map->max_entries);
18641 if (!jt)
18642 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
18643
18644 n = copy_insn_array_uniq(map, 0, map->max_entries - 1, jt->items);
18645 if (n < 0) {
18646 err = n;
18647 goto err_free;
18648 }
18649 if (n == 0) {
18650 err = -EINVAL;
18651 goto err_free;
18652 }
18653 jt->cnt = n;
18654 return jt;
18655
18656 err_free:
18657 kvfree(jt);
18658 return ERR_PTR(err);
18659 }
18660
18661 /*
18662 * Find and collect all maps which fit in the subprog. Return the result as one
18663 * combined jump table in jt->items (allocated with kvcalloc)
18664 */
jt_from_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int subprog_start,int subprog_end)18665 static struct bpf_iarray *jt_from_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
18666 int subprog_start, int subprog_end)
18667 {
18668 struct bpf_iarray *jt = NULL;
18669 struct bpf_map *map;
18670 struct bpf_iarray *jt_cur;
18671 int i;
18672
18673 for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++) {
18674 /*
18675 * TODO (when needed): collect only jump tables, not static keys
18676 * or maps for indirect calls
18677 */
18678 map = env->insn_array_maps[i];
18679
18680 jt_cur = jt_from_map(map);
18681 if (IS_ERR(jt_cur)) {
18682 kvfree(jt);
18683 return jt_cur;
18684 }
18685
18686 /*
18687 * This is enough to check one element. The full table is
18688 * checked to fit inside the subprog later in create_jt()
18689 */
18690 if (jt_cur->items[0] >= subprog_start && jt_cur->items[0] < subprog_end) {
18691 u32 old_cnt = jt ? jt->cnt : 0;
18692 jt = iarray_realloc(jt, old_cnt + jt_cur->cnt);
18693 if (!jt) {
18694 kvfree(jt_cur);
18695 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
18696 }
18697 memcpy(jt->items + old_cnt, jt_cur->items, jt_cur->cnt << 2);
18698 }
18699
18700 kvfree(jt_cur);
18701 }
18702
18703 if (!jt) {
18704 verbose(env, "no jump tables found for subprog starting at %u\n", subprog_start);
18705 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
18706 }
18707
18708 jt->cnt = sort_insn_array_uniq(jt->items, jt->cnt);
18709 return jt;
18710 }
18711
18712 static struct bpf_iarray *
create_jt(int t,struct bpf_verifier_env * env)18713 create_jt(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18714 {
18715 static struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog;
18716 int subprog_start, subprog_end;
18717 struct bpf_iarray *jt;
18718 int i;
18719
18720 subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, t);
18721 subprog_start = subprog->start;
18722 subprog_end = (subprog + 1)->start;
18723 jt = jt_from_subprog(env, subprog_start, subprog_end);
18724 if (IS_ERR(jt))
18725 return jt;
18726
18727 /* Check that the every element of the jump table fits within the given subprogram */
18728 for (i = 0; i < jt->cnt; i++) {
18729 if (jt->items[i] < subprog_start || jt->items[i] >= subprog_end) {
18730 verbose(env, "jump table for insn %d points outside of the subprog [%u,%u]\n",
18731 t, subprog_start, subprog_end);
18732 kvfree(jt);
18733 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
18734 }
18735 }
18736
18737 return jt;
18738 }
18739
18740 /* "conditional jump with N edges" */
visit_gotox_insn(int t,struct bpf_verifier_env * env)18741 static int visit_gotox_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18742 {
18743 int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack;
18744 int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state;
18745 bool keep_exploring = false;
18746 struct bpf_iarray *jt;
18747 int i, w;
18748
18749 jt = env->insn_aux_data[t].jt;
18750 if (!jt) {
18751 jt = create_jt(t, env);
18752 if (IS_ERR(jt))
18753 return PTR_ERR(jt);
18754
18755 env->insn_aux_data[t].jt = jt;
18756 }
18757
18758 mark_prune_point(env, t);
18759 for (i = 0; i < jt->cnt; i++) {
18760 w = jt->items[i];
18761 if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
18762 verbose(env, "indirect jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
18763 return -EINVAL;
18764 }
18765
18766 mark_jmp_point(env, w);
18767
18768 /* EXPLORED || DISCOVERED */
18769 if (insn_state[w])
18770 continue;
18771
18772 if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
18773 return -E2BIG;
18774
18775 insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w;
18776 insn_state[w] |= DISCOVERED;
18777 keep_exploring = true;
18778 }
18779
18780 return keep_exploring ? KEEP_EXPLORING : DONE_EXPLORING;
18781 }
18782
visit_tailcall_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int t)18783 static int visit_tailcall_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int t)
18784 {
18785 static struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog;
18786 struct bpf_iarray *jt;
18787
18788 if (env->insn_aux_data[t].jt)
18789 return 0;
18790
18791 jt = iarray_realloc(NULL, 2);
18792 if (!jt)
18793 return -ENOMEM;
18794
18795 subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, t);
18796 jt->items[0] = t + 1;
18797 jt->items[1] = subprog->exit_idx;
18798 env->insn_aux_data[t].jt = jt;
18799 return 0;
18800 }
18801
18802 /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following:
18803 * < 0 - an error occurred
18804 * DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored
18805 * KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored
18806 */
visit_insn(int t,struct bpf_verifier_env * env)18807 static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18808 {
18809 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi, *insn = &insns[t];
18810 int ret, off, insn_sz;
18811
18812 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn))
18813 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, true);
18814
18815 /* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */
18816 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP &&
18817 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP32) {
18818 insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(insn) ? 2 : 1;
18819 return push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env);
18820 }
18821
18822 switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) {
18823 case BPF_EXIT:
18824 return DONE_EXPLORING;
18825
18826 case BPF_CALL:
18827 if (is_async_callback_calling_insn(insn))
18828 /* Mark this call insn as a prune point to trigger
18829 * is_state_visited() check before call itself is
18830 * processed by __check_func_call(). Otherwise new
18831 * async state will be pushed for further exploration.
18832 */
18833 mark_prune_point(env, t);
18834 /* For functions that invoke callbacks it is not known how many times
18835 * callback would be called. Verifier models callback calling functions
18836 * by repeatedly visiting callback bodies and returning to origin call
18837 * instruction.
18838 * In order to stop such iteration verifier needs to identify when a
18839 * state identical some state from a previous iteration is reached.
18840 * Check below forces creation of checkpoint before callback calling
18841 * instruction to allow search for such identical states.
18842 */
18843 if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn)) {
18844 mark_calls_callback(env, t);
18845 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t);
18846 mark_prune_point(env, t);
18847 mark_jmp_point(env, t);
18848 }
18849 if (bpf_helper_call(insn)) {
18850 const struct bpf_func_proto *fp;
18851
18852 ret = get_helper_proto(env, insn->imm, &fp);
18853 /* If called in a non-sleepable context program will be
18854 * rejected anyway, so we should end up with precise
18855 * sleepable marks on subprogs, except for dead code
18856 * elimination.
18857 */
18858 if (ret == 0 && fp->might_sleep)
18859 mark_subprog_might_sleep(env, t);
18860 if (bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(insn->imm))
18861 mark_subprog_changes_pkt_data(env, t);
18862 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
18863 visit_tailcall_insn(env, t);
18864 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) {
18865 struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta;
18866
18867 ret = fetch_kfunc_arg_meta(env, insn->imm, insn->off, &meta);
18868 if (ret == 0 && is_iter_next_kfunc(&meta)) {
18869 mark_prune_point(env, t);
18870 /* Checking and saving state checkpoints at iter_next() call
18871 * is crucial for fast convergence of open-coded iterator loop
18872 * logic, so we need to force it. If we don't do that,
18873 * is_state_visited() might skip saving a checkpoint, causing
18874 * unnecessarily long sequence of not checkpointed
18875 * instructions and jumps, leading to exhaustion of jump
18876 * history buffer, and potentially other undesired outcomes.
18877 * It is expected that with correct open-coded iterators
18878 * convergence will happen quickly, so we don't run a risk of
18879 * exhausting memory.
18880 */
18881 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t);
18882 }
18883 /* Same as helpers, if called in a non-sleepable context
18884 * program will be rejected anyway, so we should end up
18885 * with precise sleepable marks on subprogs, except for
18886 * dead code elimination.
18887 */
18888 if (ret == 0 && is_kfunc_sleepable(&meta))
18889 mark_subprog_might_sleep(env, t);
18890 if (ret == 0 && is_kfunc_pkt_changing(&meta))
18891 mark_subprog_changes_pkt_data(env, t);
18892 }
18893 return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL);
18894
18895 case BPF_JA:
18896 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
18897 return visit_gotox_insn(t, env);
18898
18899 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP)
18900 off = insn->off;
18901 else
18902 off = insn->imm;
18903
18904 /* unconditional jump with single edge */
18905 ret = push_insn(t, t + off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
18906 if (ret)
18907 return ret;
18908
18909 mark_prune_point(env, t + off + 1);
18910 mark_jmp_point(env, t + off + 1);
18911
18912 return ret;
18913
18914 default:
18915 /* conditional jump with two edges */
18916 mark_prune_point(env, t);
18917 if (is_may_goto_insn(insn))
18918 mark_force_checkpoint(env, t);
18919
18920 ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
18921 if (ret)
18922 return ret;
18923
18924 return push_insn(t, t + insn->off + 1, BRANCH, env);
18925 }
18926 }
18927
18928 /* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program
18929 * loop == back-edge in directed graph
18930 */
check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)18931 static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
18932 {
18933 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
18934 int *insn_stack, *insn_state;
18935 int ex_insn_beg, i, ret = 0;
18936
18937 insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvzalloc_objs(int, insn_cnt,
18938 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
18939 if (!insn_state)
18940 return -ENOMEM;
18941
18942 insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvzalloc_objs(int, insn_cnt,
18943 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
18944 if (!insn_stack) {
18945 kvfree(insn_state);
18946 return -ENOMEM;
18947 }
18948
18949 ex_insn_beg = env->exception_callback_subprog
18950 ? env->subprog_info[env->exception_callback_subprog].start
18951 : 0;
18952
18953 insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
18954 insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
18955 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1;
18956
18957 walk_cfg:
18958 while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) {
18959 int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1];
18960
18961 ret = visit_insn(t, env);
18962 switch (ret) {
18963 case DONE_EXPLORING:
18964 insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
18965 env->cfg.cur_stack--;
18966 break;
18967 case KEEP_EXPLORING:
18968 break;
18969 default:
18970 if (ret > 0) {
18971 verifier_bug(env, "visit_insn internal bug");
18972 ret = -EFAULT;
18973 }
18974 goto err_free;
18975 }
18976 }
18977
18978 if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) {
18979 verifier_bug(env, "pop stack internal bug");
18980 ret = -EFAULT;
18981 goto err_free;
18982 }
18983
18984 if (ex_insn_beg && insn_state[ex_insn_beg] != EXPLORED) {
18985 insn_state[ex_insn_beg] = DISCOVERED;
18986 insn_stack[0] = ex_insn_beg;
18987 env->cfg.cur_stack = 1;
18988 goto walk_cfg;
18989 }
18990
18991 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
18992 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[i];
18993
18994 if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
18995 verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i);
18996 ret = -EINVAL;
18997 goto err_free;
18998 }
18999 if (bpf_is_ldimm64(insn)) {
19000 if (insn_state[i + 1] != 0) {
19001 verbose(env, "jump into the middle of ldimm64 insn %d\n", i);
19002 ret = -EINVAL;
19003 goto err_free;
19004 }
19005 i++; /* skip second half of ldimm64 */
19006 }
19007 }
19008 ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
19009 env->prog->aux->changes_pkt_data = env->subprog_info[0].changes_pkt_data;
19010 env->prog->aux->might_sleep = env->subprog_info[0].might_sleep;
19011
19012 err_free:
19013 kvfree(insn_state);
19014 kvfree(insn_stack);
19015 env->cfg.insn_state = env->cfg.insn_stack = NULL;
19016 return ret;
19017 }
19018
19019 /*
19020 * For each subprogram 'i' fill array env->cfg.insn_subprogram sub-range
19021 * [env->subprog_info[i].postorder_start, env->subprog_info[i+1].postorder_start)
19022 * with indices of 'i' instructions in postorder.
19023 */
compute_postorder(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)19024 static int compute_postorder(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
19025 {
19026 u32 cur_postorder, i, top, stack_sz, s;
19027 int *stack = NULL, *postorder = NULL, *state = NULL;
19028 struct bpf_iarray *succ;
19029
19030 postorder = kvzalloc_objs(int, env->prog->len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
19031 state = kvzalloc_objs(int, env->prog->len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
19032 stack = kvzalloc_objs(int, env->prog->len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
19033 if (!postorder || !state || !stack) {
19034 kvfree(postorder);
19035 kvfree(state);
19036 kvfree(stack);
19037 return -ENOMEM;
19038 }
19039 cur_postorder = 0;
19040 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
19041 env->subprog_info[i].postorder_start = cur_postorder;
19042 stack[0] = env->subprog_info[i].start;
19043 stack_sz = 1;
19044 do {
19045 top = stack[stack_sz - 1];
19046 state[top] |= DISCOVERED;
19047 if (state[top] & EXPLORED) {
19048 postorder[cur_postorder++] = top;
19049 stack_sz--;
19050 continue;
19051 }
19052 succ = bpf_insn_successors(env, top);
19053 for (s = 0; s < succ->cnt; ++s) {
19054 if (!state[succ->items[s]]) {
19055 stack[stack_sz++] = succ->items[s];
19056 state[succ->items[s]] |= DISCOVERED;
19057 }
19058 }
19059 state[top] |= EXPLORED;
19060 } while (stack_sz);
19061 }
19062 env->subprog_info[i].postorder_start = cur_postorder;
19063 env->cfg.insn_postorder = postorder;
19064 env->cfg.cur_postorder = cur_postorder;
19065 kvfree(stack);
19066 kvfree(state);
19067 return 0;
19068 }
19069
check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)19070 static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
19071 {
19072 int i;
19073
19074 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
19075 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) {
19076 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n");
19077 return -EINVAL;
19078 }
19079 if (env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) {
19080 verbose(env, "tail_call is not allowed in subprogs without BTF\n");
19081 return -EINVAL;
19082 }
19083 }
19084 return 0;
19085 }
19086
19087 /* The minimum supported BTF func info size */
19088 #define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8
19089 #define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252
19090
check_btf_func_early(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const union bpf_attr * attr,bpfptr_t uattr)19091 static int check_btf_func_early(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
19092 const union bpf_attr *attr,
19093 bpfptr_t uattr)
19094 {
19095 u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info);
19096 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto;
19097 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size;
19098 struct bpf_func_info *krecord;
19099 struct bpf_prog *prog;
19100 const struct btf *btf;
19101 u32 prev_offset = 0;
19102 bpfptr_t urecord;
19103 int ret = -ENOMEM;
19104
19105 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt;
19106 if (!nfuncs) {
19107 if (check_abnormal_return(env))
19108 return -EINVAL;
19109 return 0;
19110 }
19111
19112 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size;
19113 if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE ||
19114 urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE ||
19115 urec_size % sizeof(u32)) {
19116 verbose(env, "invalid func info rec size %u\n", urec_size);
19117 return -EINVAL;
19118 }
19119
19120 prog = env->prog;
19121 btf = prog->aux->btf;
19122
19123 urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel);
19124 min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size);
19125
19126 krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN);
19127 if (!krecord)
19128 return -ENOMEM;
19129
19130 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) {
19131 ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size);
19132 if (ret) {
19133 if (ret == -E2BIG) {
19134 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in func info");
19135 /* set the size kernel expects so loader can zero
19136 * out the rest of the record.
19137 */
19138 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr,
19139 offsetof(union bpf_attr, func_info_rec_size),
19140 &min_size, sizeof(min_size)))
19141 ret = -EFAULT;
19142 }
19143 goto err_free;
19144 }
19145
19146 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&krecord[i], urecord, min_size)) {
19147 ret = -EFAULT;
19148 goto err_free;
19149 }
19150
19151 /* check insn_off */
19152 ret = -EINVAL;
19153 if (i == 0) {
19154 if (krecord[i].insn_off) {
19155 verbose(env,
19156 "nonzero insn_off %u for the first func info record",
19157 krecord[i].insn_off);
19158 goto err_free;
19159 }
19160 } else if (krecord[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) {
19161 verbose(env,
19162 "same or smaller insn offset (%u) than previous func info record (%u)",
19163 krecord[i].insn_off, prev_offset);
19164 goto err_free;
19165 }
19166
19167 /* check type_id */
19168 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id);
19169 if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) {
19170 verbose(env, "invalid type id %d in func info",
19171 krecord[i].type_id);
19172 goto err_free;
19173 }
19174
19175 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type);
19176 if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)))
19177 /* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */
19178 goto err_free;
19179
19180 prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off;
19181 bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size);
19182 }
19183
19184 prog->aux->func_info = krecord;
19185 prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs;
19186 return 0;
19187
19188 err_free:
19189 kvfree(krecord);
19190 return ret;
19191 }
19192
check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const union bpf_attr * attr,bpfptr_t uattr)19193 static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
19194 const union bpf_attr *attr,
19195 bpfptr_t uattr)
19196 {
19197 const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type;
19198 u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size;
19199 struct bpf_func_info *krecord;
19200 struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL;
19201 struct bpf_prog *prog;
19202 const struct btf *btf;
19203 bpfptr_t urecord;
19204 bool scalar_return;
19205 int ret = -ENOMEM;
19206
19207 nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt;
19208 if (!nfuncs) {
19209 if (check_abnormal_return(env))
19210 return -EINVAL;
19211 return 0;
19212 }
19213 if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) {
19214 verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n");
19215 return -EINVAL;
19216 }
19217
19218 urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size;
19219
19220 prog = env->prog;
19221 btf = prog->aux->btf;
19222
19223 urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel);
19224
19225 krecord = prog->aux->func_info;
19226 info_aux = kzalloc_objs(*info_aux, nfuncs,
19227 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN);
19228 if (!info_aux)
19229 return -ENOMEM;
19230
19231 for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) {
19232 /* check insn_off */
19233 ret = -EINVAL;
19234
19235 if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) {
19236 verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n");
19237 goto err_free;
19238 }
19239
19240 /* Already checked type_id */
19241 type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id);
19242 info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info);
19243 /* Already checked func_proto */
19244 func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type);
19245
19246 ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL);
19247 scalar_return =
19248 btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_is_any_enum(ret_type);
19249 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_ld_abs) {
19250 verbose(env, "LD_ABS is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n");
19251 goto err_free;
19252 }
19253 if (i && !scalar_return && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) {
19254 verbose(env, "tail_call is only allowed in functions that return 'int'.\n");
19255 goto err_free;
19256 }
19257
19258 bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size);
19259 }
19260
19261 prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux;
19262 return 0;
19263
19264 err_free:
19265 kfree(info_aux);
19266 return ret;
19267 }
19268
adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)19269 static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
19270 {
19271 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
19272 int i;
19273
19274 if (!aux->func_info)
19275 return;
19276
19277 /* func_info is not available for hidden subprogs */
19278 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt - env->hidden_subprog_cnt; i++)
19279 aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start;
19280 }
19281
19282 #define MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE offsetofend(struct bpf_line_info, line_col)
19283 #define MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE
19284
check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const union bpf_attr * attr,bpfptr_t uattr)19285 static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
19286 const union bpf_attr *attr,
19287 bpfptr_t uattr)
19288 {
19289 u32 i, s, nr_linfo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size, prev_offset = 0;
19290 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub;
19291 struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
19292 struct bpf_prog *prog;
19293 const struct btf *btf;
19294 bpfptr_t ulinfo;
19295 int err;
19296
19297 nr_linfo = attr->line_info_cnt;
19298 if (!nr_linfo)
19299 return 0;
19300 if (nr_linfo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_line_info))
19301 return -EINVAL;
19302
19303 rec_size = attr->line_info_rec_size;
19304 if (rec_size < MIN_BPF_LINEINFO_SIZE ||
19305 rec_size > MAX_LINEINFO_REC_SIZE ||
19306 rec_size & (sizeof(u32) - 1))
19307 return -EINVAL;
19308
19309 /* Need to zero it in case the userspace may
19310 * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object.
19311 */
19312 linfo = kvzalloc_objs(struct bpf_line_info, nr_linfo,
19313 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN);
19314 if (!linfo)
19315 return -ENOMEM;
19316
19317 prog = env->prog;
19318 btf = prog->aux->btf;
19319
19320 s = 0;
19321 sub = env->subprog_info;
19322 ulinfo = make_bpfptr(attr->line_info, uattr.is_kernel);
19323 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_line_info);
19324 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size);
19325 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++) {
19326 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, expected_size, rec_size);
19327 if (err) {
19328 if (err == -E2BIG) {
19329 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in line_info");
19330 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr,
19331 offsetof(union bpf_attr, line_info_rec_size),
19332 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size)))
19333 err = -EFAULT;
19334 }
19335 goto err_free;
19336 }
19337
19338 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&linfo[i], ulinfo, ncopy)) {
19339 err = -EFAULT;
19340 goto err_free;
19341 }
19342
19343 /*
19344 * Check insn_off to ensure
19345 * 1) strictly increasing AND
19346 * 2) bounded by prog->len
19347 *
19348 * The linfo[0].insn_off == 0 check logically falls into
19349 * the later "missing bpf_line_info for func..." case
19350 * because the first linfo[0].insn_off must be the
19351 * first sub also and the first sub must have
19352 * subprog_info[0].start == 0.
19353 */
19354 if ((i && linfo[i].insn_off <= prev_offset) ||
19355 linfo[i].insn_off >= prog->len) {
19356 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].insn_off:%u (prev_offset:%u prog->len:%u)\n",
19357 i, linfo[i].insn_off, prev_offset,
19358 prog->len);
19359 err = -EINVAL;
19360 goto err_free;
19361 }
19362
19363 if (!prog->insnsi[linfo[i].insn_off].code) {
19364 verbose(env,
19365 "Invalid insn code at line_info[%u].insn_off\n",
19366 i);
19367 err = -EINVAL;
19368 goto err_free;
19369 }
19370
19371 if (!btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].line_off) ||
19372 !btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[i].file_name_off)) {
19373 verbose(env, "Invalid line_info[%u].line_off or .file_name_off\n", i);
19374 err = -EINVAL;
19375 goto err_free;
19376 }
19377
19378 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) {
19379 if (linfo[i].insn_off == sub[s].start) {
19380 sub[s].linfo_idx = i;
19381 s++;
19382 } else if (sub[s].start < linfo[i].insn_off) {
19383 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for func#%u\n", s);
19384 err = -EINVAL;
19385 goto err_free;
19386 }
19387 }
19388
19389 prev_offset = linfo[i].insn_off;
19390 bpfptr_add(&ulinfo, rec_size);
19391 }
19392
19393 if (s != env->subprog_cnt) {
19394 verbose(env, "missing bpf_line_info for %u funcs starting from func#%u\n",
19395 env->subprog_cnt - s, s);
19396 err = -EINVAL;
19397 goto err_free;
19398 }
19399
19400 prog->aux->linfo = linfo;
19401 prog->aux->nr_linfo = nr_linfo;
19402
19403 return 0;
19404
19405 err_free:
19406 kvfree(linfo);
19407 return err;
19408 }
19409
19410 #define MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo)
19411 #define MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE
19412
check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const union bpf_attr * attr,bpfptr_t uattr)19413 static int check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
19414 const union bpf_attr *attr,
19415 bpfptr_t uattr)
19416 {
19417 u32 i, nr_core_relo, ncopy, expected_size, rec_size;
19418 struct bpf_core_relo core_relo = {};
19419 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
19420 const struct btf *btf = prog->aux->btf;
19421 struct bpf_core_ctx ctx = {
19422 .log = &env->log,
19423 .btf = btf,
19424 };
19425 bpfptr_t u_core_relo;
19426 int err;
19427
19428 nr_core_relo = attr->core_relo_cnt;
19429 if (!nr_core_relo)
19430 return 0;
19431 if (nr_core_relo > INT_MAX / sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo))
19432 return -EINVAL;
19433
19434 rec_size = attr->core_relo_rec_size;
19435 if (rec_size < MIN_CORE_RELO_SIZE ||
19436 rec_size > MAX_CORE_RELO_SIZE ||
19437 rec_size % sizeof(u32))
19438 return -EINVAL;
19439
19440 u_core_relo = make_bpfptr(attr->core_relos, uattr.is_kernel);
19441 expected_size = sizeof(struct bpf_core_relo);
19442 ncopy = min_t(u32, expected_size, rec_size);
19443
19444 /* Unlike func_info and line_info, copy and apply each CO-RE
19445 * relocation record one at a time.
19446 */
19447 for (i = 0; i < nr_core_relo; i++) {
19448 /* future proofing when sizeof(bpf_core_relo) changes */
19449 err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(u_core_relo, expected_size, rec_size);
19450 if (err) {
19451 if (err == -E2BIG) {
19452 verbose(env, "nonzero tailing record in core_relo");
19453 if (copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr,
19454 offsetof(union bpf_attr, core_relo_rec_size),
19455 &expected_size, sizeof(expected_size)))
19456 err = -EFAULT;
19457 }
19458 break;
19459 }
19460
19461 if (copy_from_bpfptr(&core_relo, u_core_relo, ncopy)) {
19462 err = -EFAULT;
19463 break;
19464 }
19465
19466 if (core_relo.insn_off % 8 || core_relo.insn_off / 8 >= prog->len) {
19467 verbose(env, "Invalid core_relo[%u].insn_off:%u prog->len:%u\n",
19468 i, core_relo.insn_off, prog->len);
19469 err = -EINVAL;
19470 break;
19471 }
19472
19473 err = bpf_core_apply(&ctx, &core_relo, i,
19474 &prog->insnsi[core_relo.insn_off / 8]);
19475 if (err)
19476 break;
19477 bpfptr_add(&u_core_relo, rec_size);
19478 }
19479 return err;
19480 }
19481
check_btf_info_early(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const union bpf_attr * attr,bpfptr_t uattr)19482 static int check_btf_info_early(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
19483 const union bpf_attr *attr,
19484 bpfptr_t uattr)
19485 {
19486 struct btf *btf;
19487 int err;
19488
19489 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) {
19490 if (check_abnormal_return(env))
19491 return -EINVAL;
19492 return 0;
19493 }
19494
19495 btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd);
19496 if (IS_ERR(btf))
19497 return PTR_ERR(btf);
19498 if (btf_is_kernel(btf)) {
19499 btf_put(btf);
19500 return -EACCES;
19501 }
19502 env->prog->aux->btf = btf;
19503
19504 err = check_btf_func_early(env, attr, uattr);
19505 if (err)
19506 return err;
19507 return 0;
19508 }
19509
check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const union bpf_attr * attr,bpfptr_t uattr)19510 static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
19511 const union bpf_attr *attr,
19512 bpfptr_t uattr)
19513 {
19514 int err;
19515
19516 if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) {
19517 if (check_abnormal_return(env))
19518 return -EINVAL;
19519 return 0;
19520 }
19521
19522 err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr);
19523 if (err)
19524 return err;
19525
19526 err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr);
19527 if (err)
19528 return err;
19529
19530 err = check_core_relo(env, attr, uattr);
19531 if (err)
19532 return err;
19533
19534 return 0;
19535 }
19536
19537 /* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */
range_within(const struct bpf_reg_state * old,const struct bpf_reg_state * cur)19538 static bool range_within(const struct bpf_reg_state *old,
19539 const struct bpf_reg_state *cur)
19540 {
19541 return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value &&
19542 old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value &&
19543 old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value &&
19544 old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value &&
19545 old->u32_min_value <= cur->u32_min_value &&
19546 old->u32_max_value >= cur->u32_max_value &&
19547 old->s32_min_value <= cur->s32_min_value &&
19548 old->s32_max_value >= cur->s32_max_value;
19549 }
19550
19551 /* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have
19552 * the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from
19553 * the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids.
19554 * Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent
19555 * regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But
19556 * regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about
19557 * that.
19558 * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If
19559 * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map.
19560 */
check_ids(u32 old_id,u32 cur_id,struct bpf_idmap * idmap)19561 static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
19562 {
19563 struct bpf_id_pair *map = idmap->map;
19564 unsigned int i;
19565
19566 /* either both IDs should be set or both should be zero */
19567 if (!!old_id != !!cur_id)
19568 return false;
19569
19570 if (old_id == 0) /* cur_id == 0 as well */
19571 return true;
19572
19573 for (i = 0; i < idmap->cnt; i++) {
19574 if (map[i].old == old_id)
19575 return map[i].cur == cur_id;
19576 if (map[i].cur == cur_id)
19577 return false;
19578 }
19579
19580 /* Reached the end of known mappings; haven't seen this id before */
19581 if (idmap->cnt < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE) {
19582 map[idmap->cnt].old = old_id;
19583 map[idmap->cnt].cur = cur_id;
19584 idmap->cnt++;
19585 return true;
19586 }
19587
19588 /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */
19589 WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
19590 return false;
19591 }
19592
19593 /*
19594 * Compare scalar register IDs for state equivalence.
19595 *
19596 * When old_id == 0, the old register is independent - not linked to any
19597 * other register. Any linking in the current state only adds constraints,
19598 * making it more restrictive. Since the old state didn't rely on any ID
19599 * relationships for this register, it's always safe to accept cur regardless
19600 * of its ID. Hence, return true immediately.
19601 *
19602 * When old_id != 0 but cur_id == 0, we need to ensure that different
19603 * independent registers in cur don't incorrectly satisfy the ID matching
19604 * requirements of linked registers in old.
19605 *
19606 * Example: if old has r6.id=X and r7.id=X (linked), but cur has r6.id=0
19607 * and r7.id=0 (both independent), without temp IDs both would map old_id=X
19608 * to cur_id=0 and pass. With temp IDs: r6 maps X->temp1, r7 tries to map
19609 * X->temp2, but X is already mapped to temp1, so the check fails correctly.
19610 */
check_scalar_ids(u32 old_id,u32 cur_id,struct bpf_idmap * idmap)19611 static bool check_scalar_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
19612 {
19613 if (!old_id)
19614 return true;
19615
19616 cur_id = cur_id ? cur_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen;
19617
19618 return check_ids(old_id, cur_id, idmap);
19619 }
19620
clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * st,u32 ip)19621 static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
19622 struct bpf_func_state *st,
19623 u32 ip)
19624 {
19625 u16 live_regs = env->insn_aux_data[ip].live_regs_before;
19626 int i, j;
19627
19628 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
19629 /* liveness must not touch this register anymore */
19630 if (!(live_regs & BIT(i)))
19631 /* since the register is unused, clear its state
19632 * to make further comparison simpler
19633 */
19634 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]);
19635 }
19636
19637 for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
19638 if (!bpf_stack_slot_alive(env, st->frameno, i)) {
19639 __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr);
19640 for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
19641 st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID;
19642 }
19643 }
19644 }
19645
clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * st)19646 static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
19647 struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
19648 {
19649 int i, ip;
19650
19651 bpf_live_stack_query_init(env, st);
19652 st->cleaned = true;
19653 for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) {
19654 ip = frame_insn_idx(st, i);
19655 clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i], ip);
19656 }
19657 }
19658
19659 /* the parentage chains form a tree.
19660 * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and
19661 * pushed into state stack for future exploration.
19662 * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifier states
19663 * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already,
19664 * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when
19665 * the verifier explores other branches.
19666 * Example:
19667 * 1: *(u64)(r10 - 8) = 1
19668 * 2: if r1 == 100 goto pc+1
19669 * 3: *(u64)(r10 - 8) = 2
19670 * 4: r0 = *(u64)(r10 - 8)
19671 * 5: exit
19672 * when the verifier reaches exit insn the stack slot -8 in the state list of
19673 * insn 2 is not yet marked alive. Then the verifier pops the other_branch
19674 * of insn 2 and goes exploring further. After the insn 4 read, liveness
19675 * analysis would propagate read mark for -8 at insn 2.
19676 *
19677 * Since the verifier pushes the branch states as it sees them while exploring
19678 * the program the condition of walking the branch instruction for the second
19679 * time means that all states below this branch were already explored and
19680 * their final liveness marks are already propagated.
19681 * Hence when the verifier completes the search of state list in is_state_visited()
19682 * we can call this clean_live_states() function to clear dead the registers and stack
19683 * slots to simplify state merging.
19684 *
19685 * Important note here that walking the same branch instruction in the callee
19686 * doesn't meant that the states are DONE. The verifier has to compare
19687 * the callsites
19688 */
19689
19690 /* Find id in idset and increment its count, or add new entry */
idset_cnt_inc(struct bpf_idset * idset,u32 id)19691 static void idset_cnt_inc(struct bpf_idset *idset, u32 id)
19692 {
19693 u32 i;
19694
19695 for (i = 0; i < idset->num_ids; i++) {
19696 if (idset->entries[i].id == id) {
19697 idset->entries[i].cnt++;
19698 return;
19699 }
19700 }
19701 /* New id */
19702 if (idset->num_ids < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE) {
19703 idset->entries[idset->num_ids].id = id;
19704 idset->entries[idset->num_ids].cnt = 1;
19705 idset->num_ids++;
19706 }
19707 }
19708
19709 /* Find id in idset and return its count, or 0 if not found */
idset_cnt_get(struct bpf_idset * idset,u32 id)19710 static u32 idset_cnt_get(struct bpf_idset *idset, u32 id)
19711 {
19712 u32 i;
19713
19714 for (i = 0; i < idset->num_ids; i++) {
19715 if (idset->entries[i].id == id)
19716 return idset->entries[i].cnt;
19717 }
19718 return 0;
19719 }
19720
19721 /*
19722 * Clear singular scalar ids in a state.
19723 * A register with a non-zero id is called singular if no other register shares
19724 * the same base id. Such registers can be treated as independent (id=0).
19725 */
clear_singular_ids(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * st)19726 static void clear_singular_ids(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
19727 struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
19728 {
19729 struct bpf_idset *idset = &env->idset_scratch;
19730 struct bpf_func_state *func;
19731 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
19732
19733 idset->num_ids = 0;
19734
19735 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(st, func, reg, ({
19736 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
19737 continue;
19738 if (!reg->id)
19739 continue;
19740 idset_cnt_inc(idset, reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST);
19741 }));
19742
19743 bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(st, func, reg, ({
19744 if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
19745 continue;
19746 if (!reg->id)
19747 continue;
19748 if (idset_cnt_get(idset, reg->id & ~BPF_ADD_CONST) == 1) {
19749 reg->id = 0;
19750 reg->off = 0;
19751 }
19752 }));
19753 }
19754
clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn,struct bpf_verifier_state * cur)19755 static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn,
19756 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
19757 {
19758 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
19759 struct list_head *pos, *head;
19760
19761 head = explored_state(env, insn);
19762 list_for_each(pos, head) {
19763 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node);
19764 if (sl->state.branches)
19765 continue;
19766 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn ||
19767 !same_callsites(&sl->state, cur))
19768 continue;
19769 if (sl->state.cleaned)
19770 /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */
19771 continue;
19772 if (incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state))
19773 continue;
19774 clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state);
19775 }
19776 }
19777
regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state * rold,const struct bpf_reg_state * rcur,struct bpf_idmap * idmap)19778 static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
19779 const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
19780 struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
19781 {
19782 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
19783 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) &&
19784 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap);
19785 }
19786
19787 enum exact_level {
19788 NOT_EXACT,
19789 EXACT,
19790 RANGE_WITHIN
19791 };
19792
19793 /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */
regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_reg_state * rold,struct bpf_reg_state * rcur,struct bpf_idmap * idmap,enum exact_level exact)19794 static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
19795 struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap,
19796 enum exact_level exact)
19797 {
19798 if (exact == EXACT)
19799 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap);
19800
19801 if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
19802 /* explored state can't have used this */
19803 return true;
19804
19805 /* Enforce that register types have to match exactly, including their
19806 * modifiers (like PTR_MAYBE_NULL, MEM_RDONLY, etc), as a general
19807 * rule.
19808 *
19809 * One can make a point that using a pointer register as unbounded
19810 * SCALAR would be technically acceptable, but this could lead to
19811 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak while pointers
19812 * are not. We could make this safe in special cases if root is
19813 * calling us, but it's probably not worth the hassle.
19814 *
19815 * Also, register types that are *not* MAYBE_NULL could technically be
19816 * safe to use as their MAYBE_NULL variants (e.g., PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE
19817 * is safe to be used as PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, provided both point
19818 * to the same map).
19819 * However, if the old MAYBE_NULL register then got NULL checked,
19820 * doing so could have affected others with the same id, and we can't
19821 * check for that because we lost the id when we converted to
19822 * a non-MAYBE_NULL variant.
19823 * So, as a general rule we don't allow mixing MAYBE_NULL and
19824 * non-MAYBE_NULL registers as well.
19825 */
19826 if (rold->type != rcur->type)
19827 return false;
19828
19829 switch (base_type(rold->type)) {
19830 case SCALAR_VALUE:
19831 if (env->explore_alu_limits) {
19832 /* explore_alu_limits disables tnum_in() and range_within()
19833 * logic and requires everything to be strict
19834 */
19835 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
19836 check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap);
19837 }
19838 if (!rold->precise && exact == NOT_EXACT)
19839 return true;
19840 /*
19841 * Linked register tracking uses rold->id to detect relationships.
19842 * When rold->id == 0, the register is independent and any linking
19843 * in rcur only adds constraints. When rold->id != 0, we must verify
19844 * id mapping and (for BPF_ADD_CONST) offset consistency.
19845 *
19846 * +------------------+-----------+------------------+---------------+
19847 * | | rold->id | rold + ADD_CONST | rold->id == 0 |
19848 * |------------------+-----------+------------------+---------------|
19849 * | rcur->id | range,ids | false | range |
19850 * | rcur + ADD_CONST | false | range,ids,off | range |
19851 * | rcur->id == 0 | range,ids | false | range |
19852 * +------------------+-----------+------------------+---------------+
19853 *
19854 * Why check_ids() for scalar registers?
19855 *
19856 * Consider the following BPF code:
19857 * 1: r6 = ... unbound scalar, ID=a ...
19858 * 2: r7 = ... unbound scalar, ID=b ...
19859 * 3: if (r6 > r7) goto +1
19860 * 4: r6 = r7
19861 * 5: if (r6 > X) goto ...
19862 * 6: ... memory operation using r7 ...
19863 *
19864 * First verification path is [1-6]:
19865 * - at (4) same bpf_reg_state::id (b) would be assigned to r6 and r7;
19866 * - at (5) r6 would be marked <= X, sync_linked_regs() would also mark
19867 * r7 <= X, because r6 and r7 share same id.
19868 * Next verification path is [1-4, 6].
19869 *
19870 * Instruction (6) would be reached in two states:
19871 * I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6;
19872 * II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6.
19873 *
19874 * Use check_ids() to distinguish these states.
19875 * ---
19876 * Also verify that new value satisfies old value range knowledge.
19877 */
19878
19879 /*
19880 * ADD_CONST flags must match exactly: BPF_ADD_CONST32 and
19881 * BPF_ADD_CONST64 have different linking semantics in
19882 * sync_linked_regs() (alu32 zero-extends, alu64 does not),
19883 * so pruning across different flag types is unsafe.
19884 */
19885 if (rold->id &&
19886 (rold->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) != (rcur->id & BPF_ADD_CONST))
19887 return false;
19888
19889 /* Both have offset linkage: offsets must match */
19890 if ((rold->id & BPF_ADD_CONST) && rold->off != rcur->off)
19891 return false;
19892
19893 if (!check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
19894 return false;
19895
19896 return range_within(rold, rcur) && tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
19897 case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
19898 case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
19899 case PTR_TO_MEM:
19900 case PTR_TO_BUF:
19901 case PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER:
19902 /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and
19903 * everything else matches, we are OK.
19904 */
19905 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 &&
19906 range_within(rold, rcur) &&
19907 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) &&
19908 check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) &&
19909 check_ids(rold->ref_obj_id, rcur->ref_obj_id, idmap);
19910 case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
19911 case PTR_TO_PACKET:
19912 /* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr
19913 * did, so that any accesses which were safe before are
19914 * still safe. This is true even if old range < old off,
19915 * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or
19916 * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access.
19917 */
19918 if (rold->range > rcur->range)
19919 return false;
19920 /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment;
19921 * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range.
19922 */
19923 if (rold->off != rcur->off)
19924 return false;
19925 /* id relations must be preserved */
19926 if (!check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
19927 return false;
19928 /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
19929 return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
19930 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
19931 case PTR_TO_STACK:
19932 /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to
19933 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar
19934 */
19935 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap) && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno;
19936 case PTR_TO_ARENA:
19937 return true;
19938 case PTR_TO_INSN:
19939 return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, var_off)) == 0 &&
19940 rold->off == rcur->off && range_within(rold, rcur) &&
19941 tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
19942 default:
19943 return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap);
19944 }
19945 }
19946
19947 static struct bpf_reg_state unbound_reg;
19948
unbound_reg_init(void)19949 static __init int unbound_reg_init(void)
19950 {
19951 __mark_reg_unknown_imprecise(&unbound_reg);
19952 return 0;
19953 }
19954 late_initcall(unbound_reg_init);
19955
is_stack_all_misc(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_stack_state * stack)19956 static bool is_stack_all_misc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
19957 struct bpf_stack_state *stack)
19958 {
19959 u32 i;
19960
19961 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(stack->slot_type); ++i) {
19962 if ((stack->slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC) ||
19963 (stack->slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack))
19964 continue;
19965 return false;
19966 }
19967
19968 return true;
19969 }
19970
scalar_reg_for_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_stack_state * stack)19971 static struct bpf_reg_state *scalar_reg_for_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
19972 struct bpf_stack_state *stack)
19973 {
19974 if (is_spilled_scalar_reg64(stack))
19975 return &stack->spilled_ptr;
19976
19977 if (is_stack_all_misc(env, stack))
19978 return &unbound_reg;
19979
19980 return NULL;
19981 }
19982
stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * old,struct bpf_func_state * cur,struct bpf_idmap * idmap,enum exact_level exact)19983 static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
19984 struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap,
19985 enum exact_level exact)
19986 {
19987 int i, spi;
19988
19989 /* walk slots of the explored stack and ignore any additional
19990 * slots in the current stack, since explored(safe) state
19991 * didn't use them
19992 */
19993 for (i = 0; i < old->allocated_stack; i++) {
19994 struct bpf_reg_state *old_reg, *cur_reg;
19995
19996 spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE;
19997
19998 if (exact == EXACT &&
19999 (i >= cur->allocated_stack ||
20000 old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
20001 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]))
20002 return false;
20003
20004 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID)
20005 continue;
20006
20007 if (env->allow_uninit_stack &&
20008 old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC)
20009 continue;
20010
20011 /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack
20012 * and these slots were used
20013 */
20014 if (i >= cur->allocated_stack)
20015 return false;
20016
20017 /* 64-bit scalar spill vs all slots MISC and vice versa.
20018 * Load from all slots MISC produces unbound scalar.
20019 * Construct a fake register for such stack and call
20020 * regsafe() to ensure scalar ids are compared.
20021 */
20022 old_reg = scalar_reg_for_stack(env, &old->stack[spi]);
20023 cur_reg = scalar_reg_for_stack(env, &cur->stack[spi]);
20024 if (old_reg && cur_reg) {
20025 if (!regsafe(env, old_reg, cur_reg, idmap, exact))
20026 return false;
20027 i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1;
20028 continue;
20029 }
20030
20031 /* if old state was safe with misc data in the stack
20032 * it will be safe with zero-initialized stack.
20033 * The opposite is not true
20034 */
20035 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC &&
20036 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_ZERO)
20037 continue;
20038 if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
20039 cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])
20040 /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
20041 * this stack slot, but current has STACK_MISC ->
20042 * this verifier states are not equivalent,
20043 * return false to continue verification of this path
20044 */
20045 return false;
20046 if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE != BPF_REG_SIZE - 1)
20047 continue;
20048 /* Both old and cur are having same slot_type */
20049 switch (old->stack[spi].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) {
20050 case STACK_SPILL:
20051 /* when explored and current stack slot are both storing
20052 * spilled registers, check that stored pointers types
20053 * are the same as well.
20054 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored
20055 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8}
20056 * but current path has stored:
20057 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16}
20058 * such verifier states are not equivalent.
20059 * return false to continue verification of this path
20060 */
20061 if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
20062 &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap, exact))
20063 return false;
20064 break;
20065 case STACK_DYNPTR:
20066 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
20067 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
20068 if (old_reg->dynptr.type != cur_reg->dynptr.type ||
20069 old_reg->dynptr.first_slot != cur_reg->dynptr.first_slot ||
20070 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap))
20071 return false;
20072 break;
20073 case STACK_ITER:
20074 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
20075 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
20076 /* iter.depth is not compared between states as it
20077 * doesn't matter for correctness and would otherwise
20078 * prevent convergence; we maintain it only to prevent
20079 * infinite loop check triggering, see
20080 * iter_active_depths_differ()
20081 */
20082 if (old_reg->iter.btf != cur_reg->iter.btf ||
20083 old_reg->iter.btf_id != cur_reg->iter.btf_id ||
20084 old_reg->iter.state != cur_reg->iter.state ||
20085 /* ignore {old_reg,cur_reg}->iter.depth, see above */
20086 !check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap))
20087 return false;
20088 break;
20089 case STACK_IRQ_FLAG:
20090 old_reg = &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
20091 cur_reg = &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
20092 if (!check_ids(old_reg->ref_obj_id, cur_reg->ref_obj_id, idmap) ||
20093 old_reg->irq.kfunc_class != cur_reg->irq.kfunc_class)
20094 return false;
20095 break;
20096 case STACK_MISC:
20097 case STACK_ZERO:
20098 case STACK_INVALID:
20099 continue;
20100 /* Ensure that new unhandled slot types return false by default */
20101 default:
20102 return false;
20103 }
20104 }
20105 return true;
20106 }
20107
refsafe(struct bpf_verifier_state * old,struct bpf_verifier_state * cur,struct bpf_idmap * idmap)20108 static bool refsafe(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,
20109 struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
20110 {
20111 int i;
20112
20113 if (old->acquired_refs != cur->acquired_refs)
20114 return false;
20115
20116 if (old->active_locks != cur->active_locks)
20117 return false;
20118
20119 if (old->active_preempt_locks != cur->active_preempt_locks)
20120 return false;
20121
20122 if (old->active_rcu_locks != cur->active_rcu_locks)
20123 return false;
20124
20125 if (!check_ids(old->active_irq_id, cur->active_irq_id, idmap))
20126 return false;
20127
20128 if (!check_ids(old->active_lock_id, cur->active_lock_id, idmap) ||
20129 old->active_lock_ptr != cur->active_lock_ptr)
20130 return false;
20131
20132 for (i = 0; i < old->acquired_refs; i++) {
20133 if (!check_ids(old->refs[i].id, cur->refs[i].id, idmap) ||
20134 old->refs[i].type != cur->refs[i].type)
20135 return false;
20136 switch (old->refs[i].type) {
20137 case REF_TYPE_PTR:
20138 case REF_TYPE_IRQ:
20139 break;
20140 case REF_TYPE_LOCK:
20141 case REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK:
20142 case REF_TYPE_RES_LOCK_IRQ:
20143 if (old->refs[i].ptr != cur->refs[i].ptr)
20144 return false;
20145 break;
20146 default:
20147 WARN_ONCE(1, "Unhandled enum type for reference state: %d\n", old->refs[i].type);
20148 return false;
20149 }
20150 }
20151
20152 return true;
20153 }
20154
20155 /* compare two verifier states
20156 *
20157 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since
20158 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them
20159 *
20160 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of
20161 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has
20162 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution
20163 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already
20164 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish.
20165 *
20166 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative
20167 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one.
20168 * Example:
20169 * explored current
20170 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC)
20171 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC)
20172 *
20173 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more
20174 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means
20175 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too
20176 *
20177 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid
20178 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that
20179 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely
20180 */
func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_func_state * old,struct bpf_func_state * cur,u32 insn_idx,enum exact_level exact)20181 static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
20182 struct bpf_func_state *cur, u32 insn_idx, enum exact_level exact)
20183 {
20184 u16 live_regs = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].live_regs_before;
20185 u16 i;
20186
20187 if (old->callback_depth > cur->callback_depth)
20188 return false;
20189
20190 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
20191 if (((1 << i) & live_regs) &&
20192 !regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i],
20193 &env->idmap_scratch, exact))
20194 return false;
20195
20196 if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch, exact))
20197 return false;
20198
20199 return true;
20200 }
20201
reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)20202 static void reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
20203 {
20204 struct bpf_idmap *idmap = &env->idmap_scratch;
20205
20206 idmap->tmp_id_gen = env->id_gen;
20207 idmap->cnt = 0;
20208 }
20209
states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_verifier_state * old,struct bpf_verifier_state * cur,enum exact_level exact)20210 static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
20211 struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
20212 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,
20213 enum exact_level exact)
20214 {
20215 u32 insn_idx;
20216 int i;
20217
20218 if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
20219 return false;
20220
20221 reset_idmap_scratch(env);
20222
20223 /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation
20224 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one.
20225 */
20226 if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative)
20227 return false;
20228
20229 if (old->in_sleepable != cur->in_sleepable)
20230 return false;
20231
20232 if (!refsafe(old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch))
20233 return false;
20234
20235 /* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same
20236 * and all frame states need to be equivalent
20237 */
20238 for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) {
20239 insn_idx = frame_insn_idx(old, i);
20240 if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
20241 return false;
20242 if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i], insn_idx, exact))
20243 return false;
20244 }
20245 return true;
20246 }
20247
20248 /* find precise scalars in the previous equivalent state and
20249 * propagate them into the current state
20250 */
propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const struct bpf_verifier_state * old,struct bpf_verifier_state * cur,bool * changed)20251 static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
20252 const struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
20253 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,
20254 bool *changed)
20255 {
20256 struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg;
20257 struct bpf_func_state *state;
20258 int i, err = 0, fr;
20259 bool first;
20260
20261 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) {
20262 state = old->frame[fr];
20263 state_reg = state->regs;
20264 first = true;
20265 for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++, state_reg++) {
20266 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE ||
20267 !state_reg->precise)
20268 continue;
20269 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
20270 if (first)
20271 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating r%d", fr, i);
20272 else
20273 verbose(env, ",r%d", i);
20274 }
20275 bt_set_frame_reg(&env->bt, fr, i);
20276 first = false;
20277 }
20278
20279 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
20280 if (!is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[i]))
20281 continue;
20282 state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
20283 if (state_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE ||
20284 !state_reg->precise)
20285 continue;
20286 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
20287 if (first)
20288 verbose(env, "frame %d: propagating fp%d",
20289 fr, (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
20290 else
20291 verbose(env, ",fp%d", (-i - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
20292 }
20293 bt_set_frame_slot(&env->bt, fr, i);
20294 first = false;
20295 }
20296 if (!first && (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2))
20297 verbose(env, "\n");
20298 }
20299
20300 err = __mark_chain_precision(env, cur, -1, changed);
20301 if (err < 0)
20302 return err;
20303
20304 return 0;
20305 }
20306
20307 #define MAX_BACKEDGE_ITERS 64
20308
20309 /* Propagate read and precision marks from visit->backedges[*].state->equal_state
20310 * to corresponding parent states of visit->backedges[*].state until fixed point is reached,
20311 * then free visit->backedges.
20312 * After execution of this function incomplete_read_marks() will return false
20313 * for all states corresponding to @visit->callchain.
20314 */
propagate_backedges(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_scc_visit * visit)20315 static int propagate_backedges(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_scc_visit *visit)
20316 {
20317 struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge;
20318 struct bpf_verifier_state *st;
20319 bool changed;
20320 int i, err;
20321
20322 i = 0;
20323 do {
20324 if (i++ > MAX_BACKEDGE_ITERS) {
20325 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
20326 verbose(env, "%s: too many iterations\n", __func__);
20327 for (backedge = visit->backedges; backedge; backedge = backedge->next)
20328 mark_all_scalars_precise(env, &backedge->state);
20329 break;
20330 }
20331 changed = false;
20332 for (backedge = visit->backedges; backedge; backedge = backedge->next) {
20333 st = &backedge->state;
20334 err = propagate_precision(env, st->equal_state, st, &changed);
20335 if (err)
20336 return err;
20337 }
20338 } while (changed);
20339
20340 free_backedges(visit);
20341 return 0;
20342 }
20343
states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state * old,struct bpf_verifier_state * cur)20344 static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
20345 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
20346 {
20347 struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur;
20348 int i, fr = cur->curframe;
20349
20350 if (old->curframe != fr)
20351 return false;
20352
20353 fold = old->frame[fr];
20354 fcur = cur->frame[fr];
20355 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
20356 if (memcmp(&fold->regs[i], &fcur->regs[i],
20357 offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, frameno)))
20358 return false;
20359 return true;
20360 }
20361
is_iter_next_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx)20362 static bool is_iter_next_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
20363 {
20364 return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].is_iter_next;
20365 }
20366
20367 /* is_state_visited() handles iter_next() (see process_iter_next_call() for
20368 * terminology) calls specially: as opposed to bounded BPF loops, it *expects*
20369 * states to match, which otherwise would look like an infinite loop. So while
20370 * iter_next() calls are taken care of, we still need to be careful and
20371 * prevent erroneous and too eager declaration of "infinite loop", when
20372 * iterators are involved.
20373 *
20374 * Here's a situation in pseudo-BPF assembly form:
20375 *
20376 * 0: again: ; set up iter_next() call args
20377 * 1: r1 = &it ; <CHECKPOINT HERE>
20378 * 2: call bpf_iter_num_next ; this is iter_next() call
20379 * 3: if r0 == 0 goto done
20380 * 4: ... something useful here ...
20381 * 5: goto again ; another iteration
20382 * 6: done:
20383 * 7: r1 = &it
20384 * 8: call bpf_iter_num_destroy ; clean up iter state
20385 * 9: exit
20386 *
20387 * This is a typical loop. Let's assume that we have a prune point at 1:,
20388 * before we get to `call bpf_iter_num_next` (e.g., because of that `goto
20389 * again`, assuming other heuristics don't get in a way).
20390 *
20391 * When we first time come to 1:, let's say we have some state X. We proceed
20392 * to 2:, fork states, enqueue ACTIVE, validate NULL case successfully, exit.
20393 * Now we come back to validate that forked ACTIVE state. We proceed through
20394 * 3-5, come to goto, jump to 1:. Let's assume our state didn't change, so we
20395 * are converging. But the problem is that we don't know that yet, as this
20396 * convergence has to happen at iter_next() call site only. So if nothing is
20397 * done, at 1: verifier will use bounded loop logic and declare infinite
20398 * looping (and would be *technically* correct, if not for iterator's
20399 * "eventual sticky NULL" contract, see process_iter_next_call()). But we
20400 * don't want that. So what we do in process_iter_next_call() when we go on
20401 * another ACTIVE iteration, we bump slot->iter.depth, to mark that it's
20402 * a different iteration. So when we suspect an infinite loop, we additionally
20403 * check if any of the *ACTIVE* iterator states depths differ. If yes, we
20404 * pretend we are not looping and wait for next iter_next() call.
20405 *
20406 * This only applies to ACTIVE state. In DRAINED state we don't expect to
20407 * loop, because that would actually mean infinite loop, as DRAINED state is
20408 * "sticky", and so we'll keep returning into the same instruction with the
20409 * same state (at least in one of possible code paths).
20410 *
20411 * This approach allows to keep infinite loop heuristic even in the face of
20412 * active iterator. E.g., C snippet below is and will be detected as
20413 * infinitely looping:
20414 *
20415 * struct bpf_iter_num it;
20416 * int *p, x;
20417 *
20418 * bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10);
20419 * while ((p = bpf_iter_num_next(&t))) {
20420 * x = p;
20421 * while (x--) {} // <<-- infinite loop here
20422 * }
20423 *
20424 */
iter_active_depths_differ(struct bpf_verifier_state * old,struct bpf_verifier_state * cur)20425 static bool iter_active_depths_differ(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
20426 {
20427 struct bpf_reg_state *slot, *cur_slot;
20428 struct bpf_func_state *state;
20429 int i, fr;
20430
20431 for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) {
20432 state = old->frame[fr];
20433 for (i = 0; i < state->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
20434 if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_ITER)
20435 continue;
20436
20437 slot = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
20438 if (slot->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE)
20439 continue;
20440
20441 cur_slot = &cur->frame[fr]->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
20442 if (cur_slot->iter.depth != slot->iter.depth)
20443 return true;
20444 }
20445 }
20446 return false;
20447 }
20448
is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int insn_idx)20449 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
20450 {
20451 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
20452 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
20453 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new;
20454 bool force_new_state, add_new_state, loop;
20455 int n, err, states_cnt = 0;
20456 struct list_head *pos, *tmp, *head;
20457
20458 force_new_state = env->test_state_freq || is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx) ||
20459 /* Avoid accumulating infinitely long jmp history */
20460 cur->jmp_history_cnt > 40;
20461
20462 /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions
20463 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1
20464 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen
20465 * at least 2 jumps and at least 8 instructions.
20466 * This heuristics helps decrease 'total_states' and 'peak_states' metric.
20467 * In tests that amounts to up to 50% reduction into total verifier
20468 * memory consumption and 20% verifier time speedup.
20469 */
20470 add_new_state = force_new_state;
20471 if (env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed >= 2 &&
20472 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed >= 8)
20473 add_new_state = true;
20474
20475 clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur);
20476
20477 loop = false;
20478 head = explored_state(env, insn_idx);
20479 list_for_each_safe(pos, tmp, head) {
20480 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node);
20481 states_cnt++;
20482 if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn_idx)
20483 continue;
20484
20485 if (sl->state.branches) {
20486 struct bpf_func_state *frame = sl->state.frame[sl->state.curframe];
20487
20488 if (frame->in_async_callback_fn &&
20489 frame->async_entry_cnt != cur->frame[cur->curframe]->async_entry_cnt) {
20490 /* Different async_entry_cnt means that the verifier is
20491 * processing another entry into async callback.
20492 * Seeing the same state is not an indication of infinite
20493 * loop or infinite recursion.
20494 * But finding the same state doesn't mean that it's safe
20495 * to stop processing the current state. The previous state
20496 * hasn't yet reached bpf_exit, since state.branches > 0.
20497 * Checking in_async_callback_fn alone is not enough either.
20498 * Since the verifier still needs to catch infinite loops
20499 * inside async callbacks.
20500 */
20501 goto skip_inf_loop_check;
20502 }
20503 /* BPF open-coded iterators loop detection is special.
20504 * states_maybe_looping() logic is too simplistic in detecting
20505 * states that *might* be equivalent, because it doesn't know
20506 * about ID remapping, so don't even perform it.
20507 * See process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ()
20508 * for overview of the logic. When current and one of parent
20509 * states are detected as equivalent, it's a good thing: we prove
20510 * convergence and can stop simulating further iterations.
20511 * It's safe to assume that iterator loop will finish, taking into
20512 * account iter_next() contract of eventually returning
20513 * sticky NULL result.
20514 *
20515 * Note, that states have to be compared exactly in this case because
20516 * read and precision marks might not be finalized inside the loop.
20517 * E.g. as in the program below:
20518 *
20519 * 1. r7 = -16
20520 * 2. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32()
20521 * 3. while (bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8])) {
20522 * 4. if (r6 != 42) {
20523 * 5. r7 = -32
20524 * 6. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32()
20525 * 7. continue
20526 * 8. }
20527 * 9. r0 = r10
20528 * 10. r0 += r7
20529 * 11. r8 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0)
20530 * 12. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32()
20531 * 13. }
20532 *
20533 * Here verifier would first visit path 1-3, create a checkpoint at 3
20534 * with r7=-16, continue to 4-7,3. Existing checkpoint at 3 does
20535 * not have read or precision mark for r7 yet, thus inexact states
20536 * comparison would discard current state with r7=-32
20537 * => unsafe memory access at 11 would not be caught.
20538 */
20539 if (is_iter_next_insn(env, insn_idx)) {
20540 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN)) {
20541 struct bpf_func_state *cur_frame;
20542 struct bpf_reg_state *iter_state, *iter_reg;
20543 int spi;
20544
20545 cur_frame = cur->frame[cur->curframe];
20546 /* btf_check_iter_kfuncs() enforces that
20547 * iter state pointer is always the first arg
20548 */
20549 iter_reg = &cur_frame->regs[BPF_REG_1];
20550 /* current state is valid due to states_equal(),
20551 * so we can assume valid iter and reg state,
20552 * no need for extra (re-)validations
20553 */
20554 spi = __get_spi(iter_reg->off + iter_reg->var_off.value);
20555 iter_state = &func(env, iter_reg)->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
20556 if (iter_state->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
20557 loop = true;
20558 goto hit;
20559 }
20560 }
20561 goto skip_inf_loop_check;
20562 }
20563 if (is_may_goto_insn_at(env, insn_idx)) {
20564 if (sl->state.may_goto_depth != cur->may_goto_depth &&
20565 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN)) {
20566 loop = true;
20567 goto hit;
20568 }
20569 }
20570 if (bpf_calls_callback(env, insn_idx)) {
20571 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN)) {
20572 loop = true;
20573 goto hit;
20574 }
20575 goto skip_inf_loop_check;
20576 }
20577 /* attempt to detect infinite loop to avoid unnecessary doomed work */
20578 if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) &&
20579 states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, EXACT) &&
20580 !iter_active_depths_differ(&sl->state, cur) &&
20581 sl->state.may_goto_depth == cur->may_goto_depth &&
20582 sl->state.callback_unroll_depth == cur->callback_unroll_depth) {
20583 verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
20584 verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx);
20585 verbose(env, "cur state:");
20586 print_verifier_state(env, cur, cur->curframe, true);
20587 verbose(env, "old state:");
20588 print_verifier_state(env, &sl->state, cur->curframe, true);
20589 return -EINVAL;
20590 }
20591 /* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state
20592 * too often, since different loop iterations have distinct
20593 * states and may not help future pruning.
20594 * This threshold shouldn't be too low to make sure that
20595 * a loop with large bound will be rejected quickly.
20596 * The most abusive loop will be:
20597 * r1 += 1
20598 * if r1 < 1000000 goto pc-2
20599 * 1M insn_procssed limit / 100 == 10k peak states.
20600 * This threshold shouldn't be too high either, since states
20601 * at the end of the loop are likely to be useful in pruning.
20602 */
20603 skip_inf_loop_check:
20604 if (!force_new_state &&
20605 env->jmps_processed - env->prev_jmps_processed < 20 &&
20606 env->insn_processed - env->prev_insn_processed < 100)
20607 add_new_state = false;
20608 goto miss;
20609 }
20610 /* See comments for mark_all_regs_read_and_precise() */
20611 loop = incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state);
20612 if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, loop ? RANGE_WITHIN : NOT_EXACT)) {
20613 hit:
20614 sl->hit_cnt++;
20615
20616 /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and
20617 * current state is equivalent to it (except precision marks)
20618 * the precision needs to be propagated back in
20619 * the current state.
20620 */
20621 err = 0;
20622 if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx))
20623 err = push_jmp_history(env, cur, 0, 0);
20624 err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state, cur, NULL);
20625 if (err)
20626 return err;
20627 /* When processing iterator based loops above propagate_liveness and
20628 * propagate_precision calls are not sufficient to transfer all relevant
20629 * read and precision marks. E.g. consider the following case:
20630 *
20631 * .-> A --. Assume the states are visited in the order A, B, C.
20632 * | | | Assume that state B reaches a state equivalent to state A.
20633 * | v v At this point, state C is not processed yet, so state A
20634 * '-- B C has not received any read or precision marks from C.
20635 * Thus, marks propagated from A to B are incomplete.
20636 *
20637 * The verifier mitigates this by performing the following steps:
20638 *
20639 * - Prior to the main verification pass, strongly connected components
20640 * (SCCs) are computed over the program's control flow graph,
20641 * intraprocedurally.
20642 *
20643 * - During the main verification pass, `maybe_enter_scc()` checks
20644 * whether the current verifier state is entering an SCC. If so, an
20645 * instance of a `bpf_scc_visit` object is created, and the state
20646 * entering the SCC is recorded as the entry state.
20647 *
20648 * - This instance is associated not with the SCC itself, but with a
20649 * `bpf_scc_callchain`: a tuple consisting of the call sites leading to
20650 * the SCC and the SCC id. See `compute_scc_callchain()`.
20651 *
20652 * - When a verification path encounters a `states_equal(...,
20653 * RANGE_WITHIN)` condition, there exists a call chain describing the
20654 * current state and a corresponding `bpf_scc_visit` instance. A copy
20655 * of the current state is created and added to
20656 * `bpf_scc_visit->backedges`.
20657 *
20658 * - When a verification path terminates, `maybe_exit_scc()` is called
20659 * from `update_branch_counts()`. For states with `branches == 0`, it
20660 * checks whether the state is the entry state of any `bpf_scc_visit`
20661 * instance. If it is, this indicates that all paths originating from
20662 * this SCC visit have been explored. `propagate_backedges()` is then
20663 * called, which propagates read and precision marks through the
20664 * backedges until a fixed point is reached.
20665 * (In the earlier example, this would propagate marks from A to B,
20666 * from C to A, and then again from A to B.)
20667 *
20668 * A note on callchains
20669 * --------------------
20670 *
20671 * Consider the following example:
20672 *
20673 * void foo() { loop { ... SCC#1 ... } }
20674 * void main() {
20675 * A: foo();
20676 * B: ...
20677 * C: foo();
20678 * }
20679 *
20680 * Here, there are two distinct callchains leading to SCC#1:
20681 * - (A, SCC#1)
20682 * - (C, SCC#1)
20683 *
20684 * Each callchain identifies a separate `bpf_scc_visit` instance that
20685 * accumulates backedge states. The `propagate_{liveness,precision}()`
20686 * functions traverse the parent state of each backedge state, which
20687 * means these parent states must remain valid (i.e., not freed) while
20688 * the corresponding `bpf_scc_visit` instance exists.
20689 *
20690 * Associating `bpf_scc_visit` instances directly with SCCs instead of
20691 * callchains would break this invariant:
20692 * - States explored during `C: foo()` would contribute backedges to
20693 * SCC#1, but SCC#1 would only be exited once the exploration of
20694 * `A: foo()` completes.
20695 * - By that time, the states explored between `A: foo()` and `C: foo()`
20696 * (i.e., `B: ...`) may have already been freed, causing the parent
20697 * links for states from `C: foo()` to become invalid.
20698 */
20699 if (loop) {
20700 struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge;
20701
20702 backedge = kzalloc_obj(*backedge,
20703 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
20704 if (!backedge)
20705 return -ENOMEM;
20706 err = copy_verifier_state(&backedge->state, cur);
20707 backedge->state.equal_state = &sl->state;
20708 backedge->state.insn_idx = insn_idx;
20709 err = err ?: add_scc_backedge(env, &sl->state, backedge);
20710 if (err) {
20711 free_verifier_state(&backedge->state, false);
20712 kfree(backedge);
20713 return err;
20714 }
20715 }
20716 return 1;
20717 }
20718 miss:
20719 /* when new state is not going to be added do not increase miss count.
20720 * Otherwise several loop iterations will remove the state
20721 * recorded earlier. The goal of these heuristics is to have
20722 * states from some iterations of the loop (some in the beginning
20723 * and some at the end) to help pruning.
20724 */
20725 if (add_new_state)
20726 sl->miss_cnt++;
20727 /* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial
20728 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view.
20729 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time,
20730 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed.
20731 * 'n' controls how many times state could miss before eviction.
20732 * Use bigger 'n' for checkpoints because evicting checkpoint states
20733 * too early would hinder iterator convergence.
20734 */
20735 n = is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx) && sl->state.branches > 0 ? 64 : 3;
20736 if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * n + n) {
20737 /* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to
20738 * speed up verification
20739 */
20740 sl->in_free_list = true;
20741 list_del(&sl->node);
20742 list_add(&sl->node, &env->free_list);
20743 env->free_list_size++;
20744 env->explored_states_size--;
20745 maybe_free_verifier_state(env, sl);
20746 }
20747 }
20748
20749 if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt)
20750 env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt;
20751
20752 if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES)
20753 return 0;
20754
20755 if (!add_new_state)
20756 return 0;
20757
20758 /* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one.
20759 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
20760 * but it will either reach outer most bpf_exit (which means it's safe)
20761 * or it will be rejected. When there are no loops the verifier won't be
20762 * seeing this tuple (frame[0].callsite, frame[1].callsite, .. insn_idx)
20763 * again on the way to bpf_exit.
20764 * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state
20765 * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0.
20766 */
20767 new_sl = kzalloc_obj(struct bpf_verifier_state_list, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
20768 if (!new_sl)
20769 return -ENOMEM;
20770 env->total_states++;
20771 env->explored_states_size++;
20772 update_peak_states(env);
20773 env->prev_jmps_processed = env->jmps_processed;
20774 env->prev_insn_processed = env->insn_processed;
20775
20776 /* forget precise markings we inherited, see __mark_chain_precision */
20777 if (env->bpf_capable)
20778 mark_all_scalars_imprecise(env, cur);
20779
20780 clear_singular_ids(env, cur);
20781
20782 /* add new state to the head of linked list */
20783 new = &new_sl->state;
20784 err = copy_verifier_state(new, cur);
20785 if (err) {
20786 free_verifier_state(new, false);
20787 kfree(new_sl);
20788 return err;
20789 }
20790 new->insn_idx = insn_idx;
20791 verifier_bug_if(new->branches != 1, env,
20792 "%s:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d",
20793 __func__, new->branches, insn_idx);
20794 err = maybe_enter_scc(env, new);
20795 if (err) {
20796 free_verifier_state(new, false);
20797 kfree(new_sl);
20798 return err;
20799 }
20800
20801 cur->parent = new;
20802 cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx;
20803 cur->dfs_depth = new->dfs_depth + 1;
20804 clear_jmp_history(cur);
20805 list_add(&new_sl->node, head);
20806 return 0;
20807 }
20808
20809 /* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */
reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type)20810 static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type)
20811 {
20812 switch (base_type(type)) {
20813 case PTR_TO_CTX:
20814 case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
20815 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
20816 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
20817 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
20818 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
20819 case PTR_TO_ARENA:
20820 return false;
20821 default:
20822 return true;
20823 }
20824 }
20825
20826 /* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we
20827 * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok
20828 * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch:
20829 *
20830 * R1 = sock_ptr
20831 * goto X;
20832 * ...
20833 * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr;
20834 * goto X;
20835 * ...
20836 * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0);
20837 */
reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src,enum bpf_reg_type prev)20838 static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev)
20839 {
20840 return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) ||
20841 !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev));
20842 }
20843
is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(enum bpf_reg_type type)20844 static bool is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(enum bpf_reg_type type)
20845 {
20846 switch (base_type(type)) {
20847 case PTR_TO_MEM:
20848 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
20849 return true;
20850 default:
20851 return false;
20852 }
20853 }
20854
is_ptr_to_mem(enum bpf_reg_type type)20855 static bool is_ptr_to_mem(enum bpf_reg_type type)
20856 {
20857 return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_MEM;
20858 }
20859
save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,enum bpf_reg_type type,bool allow_trust_mismatch)20860 static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type,
20861 bool allow_trust_mismatch)
20862 {
20863 enum bpf_reg_type *prev_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type;
20864 enum bpf_reg_type merged_type;
20865
20866 if (*prev_type == NOT_INIT) {
20867 /* Saw a valid insn
20868 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
20869 * save type to validate intersecting paths
20870 */
20871 *prev_type = type;
20872 } else if (reg_type_mismatch(type, *prev_type)) {
20873 /* Abuser program is trying to use the same insn
20874 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
20875 * with different pointer types:
20876 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and
20877 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
20878 * Reject it.
20879 */
20880 if (allow_trust_mismatch &&
20881 is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(type) &&
20882 is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(*prev_type)) {
20883 /*
20884 * Have to support a use case when one path through
20885 * the program yields TRUSTED pointer while another
20886 * is UNTRUSTED. Fallback to UNTRUSTED to generate
20887 * BPF_PROBE_MEM/BPF_PROBE_MEMSX.
20888 * Same behavior of MEM_RDONLY flag.
20889 */
20890 if (is_ptr_to_mem(type) || is_ptr_to_mem(*prev_type))
20891 merged_type = PTR_TO_MEM;
20892 else
20893 merged_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
20894 if ((type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) || (*prev_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED))
20895 merged_type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
20896 if ((type & MEM_RDONLY) || (*prev_type & MEM_RDONLY))
20897 merged_type |= MEM_RDONLY;
20898 *prev_type = merged_type;
20899 } else {
20900 verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
20901 return -EINVAL;
20902 }
20903 }
20904
20905 return 0;
20906 }
20907
20908 enum {
20909 PROCESS_BPF_EXIT = 1
20910 };
20911
process_bpf_exit_full(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,bool * do_print_state,bool exception_exit)20912 static int process_bpf_exit_full(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
20913 bool *do_print_state,
20914 bool exception_exit)
20915 {
20916 /* We must do check_reference_leak here before
20917 * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when
20918 * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback function,
20919 * for which reference_state must match caller reference
20920 * state when it exits.
20921 */
20922 int err = check_resource_leak(env, exception_exit,
20923 exception_exit || !env->cur_state->curframe,
20924 exception_exit ? "bpf_throw" :
20925 "BPF_EXIT instruction in main prog");
20926 if (err)
20927 return err;
20928
20929 /* The side effect of the prepare_func_exit which is
20930 * being skipped is that it frees bpf_func_state.
20931 * Typically, process_bpf_exit will only be hit with
20932 * outermost exit. copy_verifier_state in pop_stack will
20933 * handle freeing of any extra bpf_func_state left over
20934 * from not processing all nested function exits. We
20935 * also skip return code checks as they are not needed
20936 * for exceptional exits.
20937 */
20938 if (exception_exit)
20939 return PROCESS_BPF_EXIT;
20940
20941 if (env->cur_state->curframe) {
20942 /* exit from nested function */
20943 err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx);
20944 if (err)
20945 return err;
20946 *do_print_state = true;
20947 return 0;
20948 }
20949
20950 err = check_return_code(env, BPF_REG_0, "R0");
20951 if (err)
20952 return err;
20953 return PROCESS_BPF_EXIT;
20954 }
20955
indirect_jump_min_max_index(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int regno,struct bpf_map * map,u32 * pmin_index,u32 * pmax_index)20956 static int indirect_jump_min_max_index(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
20957 int regno,
20958 struct bpf_map *map,
20959 u32 *pmin_index, u32 *pmax_index)
20960 {
20961 struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
20962 u64 min_index, max_index;
20963 const u32 size = 8;
20964
20965 if (check_add_overflow(reg->umin_value, reg->off, &min_index) ||
20966 (min_index > (u64) U32_MAX * size)) {
20967 verbose(env, "the sum of R%u umin_value %llu and off %u is too big\n",
20968 regno, reg->umin_value, reg->off);
20969 return -ERANGE;
20970 }
20971 if (check_add_overflow(reg->umax_value, reg->off, &max_index) ||
20972 (max_index > (u64) U32_MAX * size)) {
20973 verbose(env, "the sum of R%u umax_value %llu and off %u is too big\n",
20974 regno, reg->umax_value, reg->off);
20975 return -ERANGE;
20976 }
20977
20978 min_index /= size;
20979 max_index /= size;
20980
20981 if (max_index >= map->max_entries) {
20982 verbose(env, "R%u points to outside of jump table: [%llu,%llu] max_entries %u\n",
20983 regno, min_index, max_index, map->max_entries);
20984 return -EINVAL;
20985 }
20986
20987 *pmin_index = min_index;
20988 *pmax_index = max_index;
20989 return 0;
20990 }
20991
20992 /* gotox *dst_reg */
check_indirect_jump(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn)20993 static int check_indirect_jump(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
20994 {
20995 struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch;
20996 struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg;
20997 struct bpf_map *map;
20998 u32 min_index, max_index;
20999 int err = 0;
21000 int n;
21001 int i;
21002
21003 dst_reg = reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg);
21004 if (dst_reg->type != PTR_TO_INSN) {
21005 verbose(env, "R%d has type %s, expected PTR_TO_INSN\n",
21006 insn->dst_reg, reg_type_str(env, dst_reg->type));
21007 return -EINVAL;
21008 }
21009
21010 map = dst_reg->map_ptr;
21011 if (verifier_bug_if(!map, env, "R%d has an empty map pointer", insn->dst_reg))
21012 return -EFAULT;
21013
21014 if (verifier_bug_if(map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY, env,
21015 "R%d has incorrect map type %d", insn->dst_reg, map->map_type))
21016 return -EFAULT;
21017
21018 err = indirect_jump_min_max_index(env, insn->dst_reg, map, &min_index, &max_index);
21019 if (err)
21020 return err;
21021
21022 /* Ensure that the buffer is large enough */
21023 if (!env->gotox_tmp_buf || env->gotox_tmp_buf->cnt < max_index - min_index + 1) {
21024 env->gotox_tmp_buf = iarray_realloc(env->gotox_tmp_buf,
21025 max_index - min_index + 1);
21026 if (!env->gotox_tmp_buf)
21027 return -ENOMEM;
21028 }
21029
21030 n = copy_insn_array_uniq(map, min_index, max_index, env->gotox_tmp_buf->items);
21031 if (n < 0)
21032 return n;
21033 if (n == 0) {
21034 verbose(env, "register R%d doesn't point to any offset in map id=%d\n",
21035 insn->dst_reg, map->id);
21036 return -EINVAL;
21037 }
21038
21039 for (i = 0; i < n - 1; i++) {
21040 other_branch = push_stack(env, env->gotox_tmp_buf->items[i],
21041 env->insn_idx, env->cur_state->speculative);
21042 if (IS_ERR(other_branch))
21043 return PTR_ERR(other_branch);
21044 }
21045 env->insn_idx = env->gotox_tmp_buf->items[n-1];
21046 return 0;
21047 }
21048
do_check_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,bool * do_print_state)21049 static int do_check_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool *do_print_state)
21050 {
21051 int err;
21052 struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[env->insn_idx];
21053 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
21054
21055 if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
21056 err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
21057 if (err)
21058 return err;
21059
21060 } else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
21061 bool is_ldsx = BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX;
21062
21063 /* Check for reserved fields is already done in
21064 * resolve_pseudo_ldimm64().
21065 */
21066 err = check_load_mem(env, insn, false, is_ldsx, true, "ldx");
21067 if (err)
21068 return err;
21069 } else if (class == BPF_STX) {
21070 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) {
21071 err = check_atomic(env, insn);
21072 if (err)
21073 return err;
21074 env->insn_idx++;
21075 return 0;
21076 }
21077
21078 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) {
21079 verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
21080 return -EINVAL;
21081 }
21082
21083 err = check_store_reg(env, insn, false);
21084 if (err)
21085 return err;
21086 } else if (class == BPF_ST) {
21087 enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type;
21088
21089 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM ||
21090 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
21091 verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
21092 return -EINVAL;
21093 }
21094 /* check src operand */
21095 err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
21096 if (err)
21097 return err;
21098
21099 dst_reg_type = cur_regs(env)[insn->dst_reg].type;
21100
21101 /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
21102 err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
21103 insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
21104 BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false);
21105 if (err)
21106 return err;
21107
21108 err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false);
21109 if (err)
21110 return err;
21111 } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) {
21112 u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
21113
21114 env->jmps_processed++;
21115 if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
21116 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
21117 (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL &&
21118 insn->off != 0) ||
21119 (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 &&
21120 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL &&
21121 insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) ||
21122 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || class == BPF_JMP32) {
21123 verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
21124 return -EINVAL;
21125 }
21126
21127 if (env->cur_state->active_locks) {
21128 if ((insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 &&
21129 insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) ||
21130 (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL &&
21131 (insn->off != 0 || !kfunc_spin_allowed(insn->imm)))) {
21132 verbose(env,
21133 "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n");
21134 return -EINVAL;
21135 }
21136 }
21137 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) {
21138 err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
21139 } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) {
21140 err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
21141 if (!err && is_bpf_throw_kfunc(insn))
21142 return process_bpf_exit_full(env, do_print_state, true);
21143 } else {
21144 err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
21145 }
21146 if (err)
21147 return err;
21148
21149 mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0);
21150 } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
21151 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
21152 if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
21153 insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
21154 verbose(env, "BPF_JA|BPF_X uses reserved fields\n");
21155 return -EINVAL;
21156 }
21157 return check_indirect_jump(env, insn);
21158 }
21159
21160 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
21161 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
21162 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
21163 (class == BPF_JMP && insn->imm != 0) ||
21164 (class == BPF_JMP32 && insn->off != 0)) {
21165 verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
21166 return -EINVAL;
21167 }
21168
21169 if (class == BPF_JMP)
21170 env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
21171 else
21172 env->insn_idx += insn->imm + 1;
21173 return 0;
21174 } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
21175 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
21176 insn->imm != 0 ||
21177 insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
21178 insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
21179 class == BPF_JMP32) {
21180 verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
21181 return -EINVAL;
21182 }
21183 return process_bpf_exit_full(env, do_print_state, false);
21184 } else {
21185 err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
21186 if (err)
21187 return err;
21188 }
21189 } else if (class == BPF_LD) {
21190 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
21191
21192 if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) {
21193 err = check_ld_abs(env, insn);
21194 if (err)
21195 return err;
21196
21197 } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) {
21198 err = check_ld_imm(env, insn);
21199 if (err)
21200 return err;
21201
21202 env->insn_idx++;
21203 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
21204 } else {
21205 verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
21206 return -EINVAL;
21207 }
21208 } else {
21209 verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class);
21210 return -EINVAL;
21211 }
21212
21213 env->insn_idx++;
21214 return 0;
21215 }
21216
do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)21217 static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
21218 {
21219 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2);
21220 struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
21221 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
21222 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
21223 bool do_print_state = false;
21224 int prev_insn_idx = -1;
21225
21226 for (;;) {
21227 struct bpf_insn *insn;
21228 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;
21229 int err, marks_err;
21230
21231 /* reset current history entry on each new instruction */
21232 env->cur_hist_ent = NULL;
21233
21234 env->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
21235 if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
21236 verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
21237 env->insn_idx, insn_cnt);
21238 return -EFAULT;
21239 }
21240
21241 insn = &insns[env->insn_idx];
21242 insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
21243
21244 if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
21245 verbose(env,
21246 "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
21247 env->insn_processed);
21248 return -E2BIG;
21249 }
21250
21251 state->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx;
21252 state->insn_idx = env->insn_idx;
21253
21254 if (is_prune_point(env, env->insn_idx)) {
21255 err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx);
21256 if (err < 0)
21257 return err;
21258 if (err == 1) {
21259 /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
21260 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
21261 if (do_print_state)
21262 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n",
21263 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
21264 env->cur_state->speculative ?
21265 " (speculative execution)" : "");
21266 else
21267 verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx);
21268 }
21269 goto process_bpf_exit;
21270 }
21271 }
21272
21273 if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) {
21274 err = push_jmp_history(env, state, 0, 0);
21275 if (err)
21276 return err;
21277 }
21278
21279 if (signal_pending(current))
21280 return -EAGAIN;
21281
21282 if (need_resched())
21283 cond_resched();
21284
21285 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 && do_print_state) {
21286 verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:",
21287 env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
21288 env->cur_state->speculative ?
21289 " (speculative execution)" : "");
21290 print_verifier_state(env, state, state->curframe, true);
21291 do_print_state = false;
21292 }
21293
21294 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
21295 if (verifier_state_scratched(env))
21296 print_insn_state(env, state, state->curframe);
21297
21298 verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
21299 env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos;
21300 verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx);
21301 verbose_insn(env, insn);
21302 env->prev_insn_print_pos = env->log.end_pos - env->prev_log_pos;
21303 env->prev_log_pos = env->log.end_pos;
21304 }
21305
21306 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
21307 err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx,
21308 env->prev_insn_idx);
21309 if (err)
21310 return err;
21311 }
21312
21313 sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
21314 prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx;
21315
21316 /* Reduce verification complexity by stopping speculative path
21317 * verification when a nospec is encountered.
21318 */
21319 if (state->speculative && insn_aux->nospec)
21320 goto process_bpf_exit;
21321
21322 err = bpf_reset_stack_write_marks(env, env->insn_idx);
21323 if (err)
21324 return err;
21325 err = do_check_insn(env, &do_print_state);
21326 if (err >= 0 || error_recoverable_with_nospec(err)) {
21327 marks_err = bpf_commit_stack_write_marks(env);
21328 if (marks_err)
21329 return marks_err;
21330 }
21331 if (error_recoverable_with_nospec(err) && state->speculative) {
21332 /* Prevent this speculative path from ever reaching the
21333 * insn that would have been unsafe to execute.
21334 */
21335 insn_aux->nospec = true;
21336 /* If it was an ADD/SUB insn, potentially remove any
21337 * markings for alu sanitization.
21338 */
21339 insn_aux->alu_state = 0;
21340 goto process_bpf_exit;
21341 } else if (err < 0) {
21342 return err;
21343 } else if (err == PROCESS_BPF_EXIT) {
21344 goto process_bpf_exit;
21345 }
21346 WARN_ON_ONCE(err);
21347
21348 if (state->speculative && insn_aux->nospec_result) {
21349 /* If we are on a path that performed a jump-op, this
21350 * may skip a nospec patched-in after the jump. This can
21351 * currently never happen because nospec_result is only
21352 * used for the write-ops
21353 * `*(size*)(dst_reg+off)=src_reg|imm32` and helper
21354 * calls. These must never skip the following insn
21355 * (i.e., bpf_insn_successors()'s opcode_info.can_jump
21356 * is false). Still, add a warning to document this in
21357 * case nospec_result is used elsewhere in the future.
21358 *
21359 * All non-branch instructions have a single
21360 * fall-through edge. For these, nospec_result should
21361 * already work.
21362 */
21363 if (verifier_bug_if((BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP ||
21364 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32) &&
21365 BPF_OP(insn->code) != BPF_CALL, env,
21366 "speculation barrier after jump instruction may not have the desired effect"))
21367 return -EFAULT;
21368 process_bpf_exit:
21369 mark_verifier_state_scratched(env);
21370 err = update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state);
21371 if (err)
21372 return err;
21373 err = bpf_update_live_stack(env);
21374 if (err)
21375 return err;
21376 err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, &env->insn_idx,
21377 pop_log);
21378 if (err < 0) {
21379 if (err != -ENOENT)
21380 return err;
21381 break;
21382 } else {
21383 do_print_state = true;
21384 continue;
21385 }
21386 }
21387 }
21388
21389 return 0;
21390 }
21391
find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf * btf)21392 static int find_btf_percpu_datasec(struct btf *btf)
21393 {
21394 const struct btf_type *t;
21395 const char *tname;
21396 int i, n;
21397
21398 /*
21399 * Both vmlinux and module each have their own ".data..percpu"
21400 * DATASECs in BTF. So for module's case, we need to skip vmlinux BTF
21401 * types to look at only module's own BTF types.
21402 */
21403 n = btf_nr_types(btf);
21404 for (i = btf_named_start_id(btf, true); i < n; i++) {
21405 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, i);
21406 if (BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info) != BTF_KIND_DATASEC)
21407 continue;
21408
21409 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
21410 if (!strcmp(tname, ".data..percpu"))
21411 return i;
21412 }
21413
21414 return -ENOENT;
21415 }
21416
21417 /*
21418 * Add btf to the env->used_btfs array. If needed, refcount the
21419 * corresponding kernel module. To simplify caller's logic
21420 * in case of error or if btf was added before the function
21421 * decreases the btf refcount.
21422 */
__add_used_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct btf * btf)21423 static int __add_used_btf(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct btf *btf)
21424 {
21425 struct btf_mod_pair *btf_mod;
21426 int ret = 0;
21427 int i;
21428
21429 /* check whether we recorded this BTF (and maybe module) already */
21430 for (i = 0; i < env->used_btf_cnt; i++)
21431 if (env->used_btfs[i].btf == btf)
21432 goto ret_put;
21433
21434 if (env->used_btf_cnt >= MAX_USED_BTFS) {
21435 verbose(env, "The total number of btfs per program has reached the limit of %u\n",
21436 MAX_USED_BTFS);
21437 ret = -E2BIG;
21438 goto ret_put;
21439 }
21440
21441 btf_mod = &env->used_btfs[env->used_btf_cnt];
21442 btf_mod->btf = btf;
21443 btf_mod->module = NULL;
21444
21445 /* if we reference variables from kernel module, bump its refcount */
21446 if (btf_is_module(btf)) {
21447 btf_mod->module = btf_try_get_module(btf);
21448 if (!btf_mod->module) {
21449 ret = -ENXIO;
21450 goto ret_put;
21451 }
21452 }
21453
21454 env->used_btf_cnt++;
21455 return 0;
21456
21457 ret_put:
21458 /* Either error or this BTF was already added */
21459 btf_put(btf);
21460 return ret;
21461 }
21462
21463 /* replace pseudo btf_id with kernel symbol address */
__check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,struct bpf_insn_aux_data * aux,struct btf * btf)21464 static int __check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
21465 struct bpf_insn *insn,
21466 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
21467 struct btf *btf)
21468 {
21469 const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi;
21470 const struct btf_type *datasec;
21471 const struct btf_type *t;
21472 const char *sym_name;
21473 bool percpu = false;
21474 u32 type, id = insn->imm;
21475 s32 datasec_id;
21476 u64 addr;
21477 int i;
21478
21479 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id);
21480 if (!t) {
21481 verbose(env, "ldimm64 insn specifies invalid btf_id %d.\n", id);
21482 return -ENOENT;
21483 }
21484
21485 if (!btf_type_is_var(t) && !btf_type_is_func(t)) {
21486 verbose(env, "pseudo btf_id %d in ldimm64 isn't KIND_VAR or KIND_FUNC\n", id);
21487 return -EINVAL;
21488 }
21489
21490 sym_name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
21491 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(sym_name);
21492 if (!addr) {
21493 verbose(env, "ldimm64 failed to find the address for kernel symbol '%s'.\n",
21494 sym_name);
21495 return -ENOENT;
21496 }
21497 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr;
21498 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32;
21499
21500 if (btf_type_is_func(t)) {
21501 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY;
21502 aux->btf_var.mem_size = 0;
21503 return 0;
21504 }
21505
21506 datasec_id = find_btf_percpu_datasec(btf);
21507 if (datasec_id > 0) {
21508 datasec = btf_type_by_id(btf, datasec_id);
21509 for_each_vsi(i, datasec, vsi) {
21510 if (vsi->type == id) {
21511 percpu = true;
21512 break;
21513 }
21514 }
21515 }
21516
21517 type = t->type;
21518 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, type, NULL);
21519 if (percpu) {
21520 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU;
21521 aux->btf_var.btf = btf;
21522 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type;
21523 } else if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) {
21524 const struct btf_type *ret;
21525 const char *tname;
21526 u32 tsize;
21527
21528 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */
21529 ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, t, &tsize);
21530 if (IS_ERR(ret)) {
21531 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
21532 verbose(env, "ldimm64 unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n",
21533 tname, PTR_ERR(ret));
21534 return -EINVAL;
21535 }
21536 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY;
21537 aux->btf_var.mem_size = tsize;
21538 } else {
21539 aux->btf_var.reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
21540 aux->btf_var.btf = btf;
21541 aux->btf_var.btf_id = type;
21542 }
21543
21544 return 0;
21545 }
21546
check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,struct bpf_insn_aux_data * aux)21547 static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
21548 struct bpf_insn *insn,
21549 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
21550 {
21551 struct btf *btf;
21552 int btf_fd;
21553 int err;
21554
21555 btf_fd = insn[1].imm;
21556 if (btf_fd) {
21557 btf = btf_get_by_fd(btf_fd);
21558 if (IS_ERR(btf)) {
21559 verbose(env, "invalid module BTF object FD specified.\n");
21560 return -EINVAL;
21561 }
21562 } else {
21563 if (!btf_vmlinux) {
21564 verbose(env, "kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\n");
21565 return -EINVAL;
21566 }
21567 btf_get(btf_vmlinux);
21568 btf = btf_vmlinux;
21569 }
21570
21571 err = __check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux, btf);
21572 if (err) {
21573 btf_put(btf);
21574 return err;
21575 }
21576
21577 return __add_used_btf(env, btf);
21578 }
21579
is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type)21580 static bool is_tracing_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type)
21581 {
21582 switch (type) {
21583 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE:
21584 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT:
21585 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT:
21586 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT:
21587 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE:
21588 return true;
21589 default:
21590 return false;
21591 }
21592 }
21593
bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map * map)21594 static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map)
21595 {
21596 return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE ||
21597 map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE);
21598 }
21599
check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_map * map,struct bpf_prog * prog)21600 static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
21601 struct bpf_map *map,
21602 struct bpf_prog *prog)
21603
21604 {
21605 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog);
21606
21607 if (map->excl_prog_sha &&
21608 memcmp(map->excl_prog_sha, prog->digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
21609 verbose(env, "program's hash doesn't match map's excl_prog_hash\n");
21610 return -EACCES;
21611 }
21612
21613 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_LIST_HEAD) ||
21614 btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_RB_ROOT)) {
21615 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) {
21616 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_{list_head,rb_root} yet\n");
21617 return -EINVAL;
21618 }
21619 }
21620
21621 if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK | BPF_RES_SPIN_LOCK)) {
21622 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) {
21623 verbose(env, "socket filter progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
21624 return -EINVAL;
21625 }
21626
21627 if (is_tracing_prog_type(prog_type)) {
21628 verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
21629 return -EINVAL;
21630 }
21631 }
21632
21633 if ((bpf_prog_is_offloaded(prog->aux) || bpf_map_is_offloaded(map)) &&
21634 !bpf_offload_prog_map_match(prog, map)) {
21635 verbose(env, "offload device mismatch between prog and map\n");
21636 return -EINVAL;
21637 }
21638
21639 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) {
21640 verbose(env, "bpf_struct_ops map cannot be used in prog\n");
21641 return -EINVAL;
21642 }
21643
21644 if (prog->sleepable)
21645 switch (map->map_type) {
21646 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH:
21647 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH:
21648 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY:
21649 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH:
21650 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY:
21651 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH:
21652 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
21653 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
21654 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF:
21655 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF:
21656 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE:
21657 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE:
21658 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE:
21659 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE:
21660 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE:
21661 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK:
21662 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA:
21663 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY:
21664 case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
21665 break;
21666 default:
21667 verbose(env,
21668 "Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, ringbuf and local storage maps\n");
21669 return -EINVAL;
21670 }
21671
21672 if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) &&
21673 bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog->aux, map)) {
21674 verbose(env, "only one cgroup storage of each type is allowed\n");
21675 return -EBUSY;
21676 }
21677
21678 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA) {
21679 if (env->prog->aux->arena) {
21680 verbose(env, "Only one arena per program\n");
21681 return -EBUSY;
21682 }
21683 if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks || !env->bpf_capable) {
21684 verbose(env, "CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON are required to use arena\n");
21685 return -EPERM;
21686 }
21687 if (!env->prog->jit_requested) {
21688 verbose(env, "JIT is required to use arena\n");
21689 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
21690 }
21691 if (!bpf_jit_supports_arena()) {
21692 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support arena\n");
21693 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
21694 }
21695 env->prog->aux->arena = (void *)map;
21696 if (!bpf_arena_get_user_vm_start(env->prog->aux->arena)) {
21697 verbose(env, "arena's user address must be set via map_extra or mmap()\n");
21698 return -EINVAL;
21699 }
21700 }
21701
21702 return 0;
21703 }
21704
__add_used_map(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_map * map)21705 static int __add_used_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_map *map)
21706 {
21707 int i, err;
21708
21709 /* check whether we recorded this map already */
21710 for (i = 0; i < env->used_map_cnt; i++)
21711 if (env->used_maps[i] == map)
21712 return i;
21713
21714 if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
21715 verbose(env, "The total number of maps per program has reached the limit of %u\n",
21716 MAX_USED_MAPS);
21717 return -E2BIG;
21718 }
21719
21720 err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog);
21721 if (err)
21722 return err;
21723
21724 if (env->prog->sleepable)
21725 atomic64_inc(&map->sleepable_refcnt);
21726
21727 /* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
21728 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it
21729 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
21730 * and all maps are released in bpf_free_used_maps()
21731 */
21732 bpf_map_inc(map);
21733
21734 env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
21735
21736 if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) {
21737 err = bpf_insn_array_init(map, env->prog);
21738 if (err) {
21739 verbose(env, "Failed to properly initialize insn array\n");
21740 return err;
21741 }
21742 env->insn_array_maps[env->insn_array_map_cnt++] = map;
21743 }
21744
21745 return env->used_map_cnt - 1;
21746 }
21747
21748 /* Add map behind fd to used maps list, if it's not already there, and return
21749 * its index.
21750 * Returns <0 on error, or >= 0 index, on success.
21751 */
add_used_map(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int fd)21752 static int add_used_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int fd)
21753 {
21754 struct bpf_map *map;
21755 CLASS(fd, f)(fd);
21756
21757 map = __bpf_map_get(f);
21758 if (IS_ERR(map)) {
21759 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n", fd);
21760 return PTR_ERR(map);
21761 }
21762
21763 return __add_used_map(env, map);
21764 }
21765
21766 /* find and rewrite pseudo imm in ld_imm64 instructions:
21767 *
21768 * 1. if it accesses map FD, replace it with actual map pointer.
21769 * 2. if it accesses btf_id of a VAR, replace it with pointer to the var.
21770 *
21771 * NOTE: btf_vmlinux is required for converting pseudo btf_id.
21772 */
resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)21773 static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
21774 {
21775 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
21776 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
21777 int i, err;
21778
21779 err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog);
21780 if (err)
21781 return err;
21782
21783 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
21784 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
21785 ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM && BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEMSX) ||
21786 insn->imm != 0)) {
21787 verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
21788 return -EINVAL;
21789 }
21790
21791 if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
21792 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux;
21793 struct bpf_map *map;
21794 int map_idx;
21795 u64 addr;
21796 u32 fd;
21797
21798 if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
21799 insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
21800 insn[1].off != 0) {
21801 verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
21802 return -EINVAL;
21803 }
21804
21805 if (insn[0].src_reg == 0)
21806 /* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
21807 goto next_insn;
21808
21809 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID) {
21810 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
21811 err = check_pseudo_btf_id(env, insn, aux);
21812 if (err)
21813 return err;
21814 goto next_insn;
21815 }
21816
21817 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC) {
21818 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
21819 aux->ptr_type = PTR_TO_FUNC;
21820 goto next_insn;
21821 }
21822
21823 /* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is
21824 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn.
21825 */
21826 switch (insn[0].src_reg) {
21827 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE:
21828 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE:
21829 break;
21830 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD:
21831 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX:
21832 if (insn[1].imm == 0)
21833 break;
21834 fallthrough;
21835 default:
21836 verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
21837 return -EINVAL;
21838 }
21839
21840 switch (insn[0].src_reg) {
21841 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE:
21842 case BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX:
21843 if (bpfptr_is_null(env->fd_array)) {
21844 verbose(env, "fd_idx without fd_array is invalid\n");
21845 return -EPROTO;
21846 }
21847 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array,
21848 insn[0].imm * sizeof(fd),
21849 sizeof(fd)))
21850 return -EFAULT;
21851 break;
21852 default:
21853 fd = insn[0].imm;
21854 break;
21855 }
21856
21857 map_idx = add_used_map(env, fd);
21858 if (map_idx < 0)
21859 return map_idx;
21860 map = env->used_maps[map_idx];
21861
21862 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
21863 aux->map_index = map_idx;
21864
21865 if (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD ||
21866 insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) {
21867 addr = (unsigned long)map;
21868 } else {
21869 u32 off = insn[1].imm;
21870
21871 if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
21872 verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n");
21873 return -EINVAL;
21874 }
21875
21876 err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off);
21877 if (err) {
21878 verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n",
21879 map->value_size, off);
21880 return err;
21881 }
21882
21883 aux->map_off = off;
21884 addr += off;
21885 }
21886
21887 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr;
21888 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32;
21889
21890 next_insn:
21891 insn++;
21892 i++;
21893 continue;
21894 }
21895
21896 /* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */
21897 if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) {
21898 verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code);
21899 return -EINVAL;
21900 }
21901 }
21902
21903 /* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
21904 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
21905 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
21906 */
21907 return 0;
21908 }
21909
21910 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)21911 static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
21912 {
21913 __bpf_free_used_maps(env->prog->aux, env->used_maps,
21914 env->used_map_cnt);
21915 }
21916
21917 /* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)21918 static void release_btfs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
21919 {
21920 __bpf_free_used_btfs(env->used_btfs, env->used_btf_cnt);
21921 }
21922
21923 /* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */
convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)21924 static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
21925 {
21926 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
21927 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
21928 int i;
21929
21930 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
21931 if (insn->code != (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW))
21932 continue;
21933 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC)
21934 continue;
21935 insn->src_reg = 0;
21936 }
21937 }
21938
21939 /* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range
21940 * insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying
21941 * [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero
21942 */
adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_prog * new_prog,u32 off,u32 cnt)21943 static void adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
21944 struct bpf_prog *new_prog, u32 off, u32 cnt)
21945 {
21946 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *data = env->insn_aux_data;
21947 struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi;
21948 u32 old_seen = data[off].seen;
21949 u32 prog_len;
21950 int i;
21951
21952 /* aux info at OFF always needs adjustment, no matter fast path
21953 * (cnt == 1) is taken or not. There is no guarantee INSN at OFF is the
21954 * original insn at old prog.
21955 */
21956 data[off].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(insn + off + cnt - 1);
21957
21958 if (cnt == 1)
21959 return;
21960 prog_len = new_prog->len;
21961
21962 memmove(data + off + cnt - 1, data + off,
21963 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
21964 memset(data + off, 0, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (cnt - 1));
21965 for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) {
21966 /* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */
21967 data[i].seen = old_seen;
21968 data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(insn + i);
21969 }
21970 }
21971
adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 off,u32 len)21972 static void adjust_subprog_starts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len)
21973 {
21974 int i;
21975
21976 if (len == 1)
21977 return;
21978 /* NOTE: fake 'exit' subprog should be updated as well. */
21979 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
21980 if (env->subprog_info[i].start <= off)
21981 continue;
21982 env->subprog_info[i].start += len - 1;
21983 }
21984 }
21985
release_insn_arrays(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)21986 static void release_insn_arrays(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
21987 {
21988 int i;
21989
21990 for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++)
21991 bpf_insn_array_release(env->insn_array_maps[i]);
21992 }
21993
adjust_insn_arrays(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 off,u32 len)21994 static void adjust_insn_arrays(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len)
21995 {
21996 int i;
21997
21998 if (len == 1)
21999 return;
22000
22001 for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++)
22002 bpf_insn_array_adjust(env->insn_array_maps[i], off, len);
22003 }
22004
adjust_insn_arrays_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 off,u32 len)22005 static void adjust_insn_arrays_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 len)
22006 {
22007 int i;
22008
22009 for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++)
22010 bpf_insn_array_adjust_after_remove(env->insn_array_maps[i], off, len);
22011 }
22012
adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog * prog,u32 off,u32 len)22013 static void adjust_poke_descs(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 len)
22014 {
22015 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *tab = prog->aux->poke_tab;
22016 int i, sz = prog->aux->size_poke_tab;
22017 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *desc;
22018
22019 for (i = 0; i < sz; i++) {
22020 desc = &tab[i];
22021 if (desc->insn_idx <= off)
22022 continue;
22023 desc->insn_idx += len - 1;
22024 }
22025 }
22026
bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 off,const struct bpf_insn * patch,u32 len)22027 static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
22028 const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
22029 {
22030 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
22031 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data = NULL;
22032
22033 if (len > 1) {
22034 new_data = vrealloc(env->insn_aux_data,
22035 array_size(env->prog->len + len - 1,
22036 sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data)),
22037 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
22038 if (!new_data)
22039 return NULL;
22040
22041 env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
22042 }
22043
22044 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
22045 if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) {
22046 if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE)
22047 verbose(env,
22048 "insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n",
22049 env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx);
22050 return NULL;
22051 }
22052 adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog, off, len);
22053 adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len);
22054 adjust_insn_arrays(env, off, len);
22055 adjust_poke_descs(new_prog, off, len);
22056 return new_prog;
22057 }
22058
22059 /*
22060 * For all jmp insns in a given 'prog' that point to 'tgt_idx' insn adjust the
22061 * jump offset by 'delta'.
22062 */
adjust_jmp_off(struct bpf_prog * prog,u32 tgt_idx,u32 delta)22063 static int adjust_jmp_off(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 tgt_idx, u32 delta)
22064 {
22065 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
22066 u32 insn_cnt = prog->len, i;
22067 s32 imm;
22068 s16 off;
22069
22070 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
22071 u8 code = insn->code;
22072
22073 if (tgt_idx <= i && i < tgt_idx + delta)
22074 continue;
22075
22076 if ((BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32) ||
22077 BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT)
22078 continue;
22079
22080 if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA)) {
22081 if (i + 1 + insn->imm != tgt_idx)
22082 continue;
22083 if (check_add_overflow(insn->imm, delta, &imm))
22084 return -ERANGE;
22085 insn->imm = imm;
22086 } else {
22087 if (i + 1 + insn->off != tgt_idx)
22088 continue;
22089 if (check_add_overflow(insn->off, delta, &off))
22090 return -ERANGE;
22091 insn->off = off;
22092 }
22093 }
22094 return 0;
22095 }
22096
adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 off,u32 cnt)22097 static int adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
22098 u32 off, u32 cnt)
22099 {
22100 int i, j;
22101
22102 /* find first prog starting at or after off (first to remove) */
22103 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
22104 if (env->subprog_info[i].start >= off)
22105 break;
22106 /* find first prog starting at or after off + cnt (first to stay) */
22107 for (j = i; j < env->subprog_cnt; j++)
22108 if (env->subprog_info[j].start >= off + cnt)
22109 break;
22110 /* if j doesn't start exactly at off + cnt, we are just removing
22111 * the front of previous prog
22112 */
22113 if (env->subprog_info[j].start != off + cnt)
22114 j--;
22115
22116 if (j > i) {
22117 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
22118 int move;
22119
22120 /* move fake 'exit' subprog as well */
22121 move = env->subprog_cnt + 1 - j;
22122
22123 memmove(env->subprog_info + i,
22124 env->subprog_info + j,
22125 sizeof(*env->subprog_info) * move);
22126 env->subprog_cnt -= j - i;
22127
22128 /* remove func_info */
22129 if (aux->func_info) {
22130 move = aux->func_info_cnt - j;
22131
22132 memmove(aux->func_info + i,
22133 aux->func_info + j,
22134 sizeof(*aux->func_info) * move);
22135 aux->func_info_cnt -= j - i;
22136 /* func_info->insn_off is set after all code rewrites,
22137 * in adjust_btf_func() - no need to adjust
22138 */
22139 }
22140 } else {
22141 /* convert i from "first prog to remove" to "first to adjust" */
22142 if (env->subprog_info[i].start == off)
22143 i++;
22144 }
22145
22146 /* update fake 'exit' subprog as well */
22147 for (; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++)
22148 env->subprog_info[i].start -= cnt;
22149
22150 return 0;
22151 }
22152
bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 off,u32 cnt)22153 static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
22154 u32 cnt)
22155 {
22156 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
22157 u32 i, l_off, l_cnt, nr_linfo;
22158 struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
22159
22160 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
22161 if (!nr_linfo)
22162 return 0;
22163
22164 linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
22165
22166 /* find first line info to remove, count lines to be removed */
22167 for (i = 0; i < nr_linfo; i++)
22168 if (linfo[i].insn_off >= off)
22169 break;
22170
22171 l_off = i;
22172 l_cnt = 0;
22173 for (; i < nr_linfo; i++)
22174 if (linfo[i].insn_off < off + cnt)
22175 l_cnt++;
22176 else
22177 break;
22178
22179 /* First live insn doesn't match first live linfo, it needs to "inherit"
22180 * last removed linfo. prog is already modified, so prog->len == off
22181 * means no live instructions after (tail of the program was removed).
22182 */
22183 if (prog->len != off && l_cnt &&
22184 (i == nr_linfo || linfo[i].insn_off != off + cnt)) {
22185 l_cnt--;
22186 linfo[--i].insn_off = off + cnt;
22187 }
22188
22189 /* remove the line info which refer to the removed instructions */
22190 if (l_cnt) {
22191 memmove(linfo + l_off, linfo + i,
22192 sizeof(*linfo) * (nr_linfo - i));
22193
22194 prog->aux->nr_linfo -= l_cnt;
22195 nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
22196 }
22197
22198 /* pull all linfo[i].insn_off >= off + cnt in by cnt */
22199 for (i = l_off; i < nr_linfo; i++)
22200 linfo[i].insn_off -= cnt;
22201
22202 /* fix up all subprogs (incl. 'exit') which start >= off */
22203 for (i = 0; i <= env->subprog_cnt; i++)
22204 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx > l_off) {
22205 /* program may have started in the removed region but
22206 * may not be fully removed
22207 */
22208 if (env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx >= l_off + l_cnt)
22209 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx -= l_cnt;
22210 else
22211 env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx = l_off;
22212 }
22213
22214 return 0;
22215 }
22216
22217 /*
22218 * Clean up dynamically allocated fields of aux data for instructions [start, ...]
22219 */
clear_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int start,int len)22220 static void clear_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int start, int len)
22221 {
22222 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
22223 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
22224 int end = start + len;
22225 int i;
22226
22227 for (i = start; i < end; i++) {
22228 if (aux_data[i].jt) {
22229 kvfree(aux_data[i].jt);
22230 aux_data[i].jt = NULL;
22231 }
22232
22233 if (bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[i]))
22234 i++;
22235 }
22236 }
22237
verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,u32 off,u32 cnt)22238 static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt)
22239 {
22240 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
22241 unsigned int orig_prog_len = env->prog->len;
22242 int err;
22243
22244 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux))
22245 bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(env, off, cnt);
22246
22247 /* Should be called before bpf_remove_insns, as it uses prog->insnsi */
22248 clear_insn_aux_data(env, off, cnt);
22249
22250 err = bpf_remove_insns(env->prog, off, cnt);
22251 if (err)
22252 return err;
22253
22254 err = adjust_subprog_starts_after_remove(env, off, cnt);
22255 if (err)
22256 return err;
22257
22258 err = bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(env, off, cnt);
22259 if (err)
22260 return err;
22261
22262 adjust_insn_arrays_after_remove(env, off, cnt);
22263
22264 memmove(aux_data + off, aux_data + off + cnt,
22265 sizeof(*aux_data) * (orig_prog_len - off - cnt));
22266
22267 return 0;
22268 }
22269
22270 /* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not
22271 * explore branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can
22272 * have dead code too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code
22273 * with 'ja -1'.
22274 *
22275 * Just nops are not optimal, e.g. if they would sit at the end of the
22276 * program and through another bug we would manage to jump there, then
22277 * we'd execute beyond program memory otherwise. Returning exception
22278 * code also wouldn't work since we can have subprogs where the dead
22279 * code could be located.
22280 */
sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)22281 static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
22282 {
22283 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
22284 struct bpf_insn trap = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, -1);
22285 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
22286 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
22287 int i;
22288
22289 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
22290 if (aux_data[i].seen)
22291 continue;
22292 memcpy(insn + i, &trap, sizeof(trap));
22293 aux_data[i].zext_dst = false;
22294 }
22295 }
22296
insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code)22297 static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code)
22298 {
22299 u8 op;
22300
22301 op = BPF_OP(code);
22302 if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32)
22303 return op != BPF_JA;
22304
22305 if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP)
22306 return false;
22307
22308 return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL;
22309 }
22310
opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)22311 static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
22312 {
22313 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
22314 struct bpf_insn ja = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0);
22315 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
22316 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
22317 int i;
22318
22319 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
22320 if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code))
22321 continue;
22322
22323 if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen)
22324 ja.off = insn->off;
22325 else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen)
22326 ja.off = 0;
22327 else
22328 continue;
22329
22330 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux))
22331 bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(env, i, &ja);
22332
22333 memcpy(insn, &ja, sizeof(ja));
22334 }
22335 }
22336
opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)22337 static int opt_remove_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
22338 {
22339 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;
22340 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
22341 int i, err;
22342
22343 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
22344 int j;
22345
22346 j = 0;
22347 while (i + j < insn_cnt && !aux_data[i + j].seen)
22348 j++;
22349 if (!j)
22350 continue;
22351
22352 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, j);
22353 if (err)
22354 return err;
22355 insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
22356 }
22357
22358 return 0;
22359 }
22360
22361 static const struct bpf_insn NOP = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0);
22362 static const struct bpf_insn MAY_GOTO_0 = BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND, 0, 0, 0, 0);
22363
opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)22364 static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
22365 {
22366 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
22367 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
22368 bool is_may_goto_0, is_ja;
22369 int i, err;
22370
22371 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
22372 is_may_goto_0 = !memcmp(&insn[i], &MAY_GOTO_0, sizeof(MAY_GOTO_0));
22373 is_ja = !memcmp(&insn[i], &NOP, sizeof(NOP));
22374
22375 if (!is_may_goto_0 && !is_ja)
22376 continue;
22377
22378 err = verifier_remove_insns(env, i, 1);
22379 if (err)
22380 return err;
22381 insn_cnt--;
22382 /* Go back one insn to catch may_goto +1; may_goto +0 sequence */
22383 i -= (is_may_goto_0 && i > 0) ? 2 : 1;
22384 }
22385
22386 return 0;
22387 }
22388
opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,const union bpf_attr * attr)22389 static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
22390 const union bpf_attr *attr)
22391 {
22392 struct bpf_insn *patch;
22393 /* use env->insn_buf as two independent buffers */
22394 struct bpf_insn *zext_patch = env->insn_buf;
22395 struct bpf_insn *rnd_hi32_patch = &env->insn_buf[2];
22396 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data;
22397 int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len;
22398 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
22399 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
22400 bool rnd_hi32;
22401
22402 rnd_hi32 = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32;
22403 zext_patch[1] = BPF_ZEXT_REG(0);
22404 rnd_hi32_patch[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
22405 rnd_hi32_patch[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32);
22406 rnd_hi32_patch[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, 0, BPF_REG_AX);
22407 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
22408 int adj_idx = i + delta;
22409 struct bpf_insn insn;
22410 int load_reg;
22411
22412 insn = insns[adj_idx];
22413 load_reg = insn_def_regno(&insn);
22414 if (!aux[adj_idx].zext_dst) {
22415 u8 code, class;
22416 u32 imm_rnd;
22417
22418 if (!rnd_hi32)
22419 continue;
22420
22421 code = insn.code;
22422 class = BPF_CLASS(code);
22423 if (load_reg == -1)
22424 continue;
22425
22426 /* NOTE: arg "reg" (the fourth one) is only used for
22427 * BPF_STX + SRC_OP, so it is safe to pass NULL
22428 * here.
22429 */
22430 if (is_reg64(&insn, load_reg, NULL, DST_OP)) {
22431 if (class == BPF_LD &&
22432 BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_IMM)
22433 i++;
22434 continue;
22435 }
22436
22437 /* ctx load could be transformed into wider load. */
22438 if (class == BPF_LDX &&
22439 aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX)
22440 continue;
22441
22442 imm_rnd = get_random_u32();
22443 rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn;
22444 rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd;
22445 rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg;
22446 patch = rnd_hi32_patch;
22447 patch_len = 4;
22448 goto apply_patch_buffer;
22449 }
22450
22451 /* Add in an zero-extend instruction if a) the JIT has requested
22452 * it or b) it's a CMPXCHG.
22453 *
22454 * The latter is because: BPF_CMPXCHG always loads a value into
22455 * R0, therefore always zero-extends. However some archs'
22456 * equivalent instruction only does this load when the
22457 * comparison is successful. This detail of CMPXCHG is
22458 * orthogonal to the general zero-extension behaviour of the
22459 * CPU, so it's treated independently of bpf_jit_needs_zext.
22460 */
22461 if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn))
22462 continue;
22463
22464 /* Zero-extension is done by the caller. */
22465 if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(&insn))
22466 continue;
22467
22468 if (verifier_bug_if(load_reg == -1, env,
22469 "zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined"))
22470 return -EFAULT;
22471
22472 zext_patch[0] = insn;
22473 zext_patch[1].dst_reg = load_reg;
22474 zext_patch[1].src_reg = load_reg;
22475 patch = zext_patch;
22476 patch_len = 2;
22477 apply_patch_buffer:
22478 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, adj_idx, patch, patch_len);
22479 if (!new_prog)
22480 return -ENOMEM;
22481 env->prog = new_prog;
22482 insns = new_prog->insnsi;
22483 aux = env->insn_aux_data;
22484 delta += patch_len - 1;
22485 }
22486
22487 return 0;
22488 }
22489
22490 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a
22491 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure:
22492 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff
22493 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock
22494 */
convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)22495 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
22496 {
22497 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info;
22498 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops;
22499 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, ret, delta = 0, epilogue_cnt = 0;
22500 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
22501 struct bpf_insn *epilogue_buf = env->epilogue_buf;
22502 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf = env->insn_buf;
22503 struct bpf_insn *insn;
22504 u32 target_size, size_default, off;
22505 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
22506 enum bpf_access_type type;
22507 bool is_narrower_load;
22508 int epilogue_idx = 0;
22509
22510 if (ops->gen_epilogue) {
22511 epilogue_cnt = ops->gen_epilogue(epilogue_buf, env->prog,
22512 -(subprogs[0].stack_depth + 8));
22513 if (epilogue_cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) {
22514 verifier_bug(env, "epilogue is too long");
22515 return -EFAULT;
22516 } else if (epilogue_cnt) {
22517 /* Save the ARG_PTR_TO_CTX for the epilogue to use */
22518 cnt = 0;
22519 subprogs[0].stack_depth += 8;
22520 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_1,
22521 -subprogs[0].stack_depth);
22522 insn_buf[cnt++] = env->prog->insnsi[0];
22523 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
22524 if (!new_prog)
22525 return -ENOMEM;
22526 env->prog = new_prog;
22527 delta += cnt - 1;
22528
22529 ret = add_kfunc_in_insns(env, epilogue_buf, epilogue_cnt - 1);
22530 if (ret < 0)
22531 return ret;
22532 }
22533 }
22534
22535 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) {
22536 if (!ops->gen_prologue) {
22537 verifier_bug(env, "gen_prologue is null");
22538 return -EFAULT;
22539 }
22540 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
22541 env->prog);
22542 if (cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) {
22543 verifier_bug(env, "prologue is too long");
22544 return -EFAULT;
22545 } else if (cnt) {
22546 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
22547 if (!new_prog)
22548 return -ENOMEM;
22549
22550 env->prog = new_prog;
22551 delta += cnt - 1;
22552
22553 ret = add_kfunc_in_insns(env, insn_buf, cnt - 1);
22554 if (ret < 0)
22555 return ret;
22556 }
22557 }
22558
22559 if (delta)
22560 WARN_ON(adjust_jmp_off(env->prog, 0, delta));
22561
22562 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux))
22563 return 0;
22564
22565 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
22566
22567 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
22568 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access;
22569 u8 mode;
22570
22571 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].nospec) {
22572 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].alu_state);
22573 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf;
22574
22575 *patch++ = BPF_ST_NOSPEC();
22576 *patch++ = *insn;
22577 cnt = patch - insn_buf;
22578 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
22579 if (!new_prog)
22580 return -ENOMEM;
22581
22582 delta += cnt - 1;
22583 env->prog = new_prog;
22584 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
22585 /* This can not be easily merged with the
22586 * nospec_result-case, because an insn may require a
22587 * nospec before and after itself. Therefore also do not
22588 * 'continue' here but potentially apply further
22589 * patching to insn. *insn should equal patch[1] now.
22590 */
22591 }
22592
22593 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
22594 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
22595 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
22596 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) ||
22597 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_B) ||
22598 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_H) ||
22599 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_W)) {
22600 type = BPF_READ;
22601 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
22602 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
22603 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
22604 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) ||
22605 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
22606 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
22607 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
22608 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) {
22609 type = BPF_WRITE;
22610 } else if ((insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_B) ||
22611 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_H) ||
22612 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_W) ||
22613 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_DW)) &&
22614 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type == PTR_TO_ARENA) {
22615 insn->code = BPF_STX | BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC | BPF_SIZE(insn->code);
22616 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
22617 continue;
22618 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) &&
22619 epilogue_cnt &&
22620 i + delta < subprogs[1].start) {
22621 /* Generate epilogue for the main prog */
22622 if (epilogue_idx) {
22623 /* jump back to the earlier generated epilogue */
22624 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP32_A(epilogue_idx - i - delta - 1);
22625 cnt = 1;
22626 } else {
22627 memcpy(insn_buf, epilogue_buf,
22628 epilogue_cnt * sizeof(*epilogue_buf));
22629 cnt = epilogue_cnt;
22630 /* epilogue_idx cannot be 0. It must have at
22631 * least one ctx ptr saving insn before the
22632 * epilogue.
22633 */
22634 epilogue_idx = i + delta;
22635 }
22636 goto patch_insn_buf;
22637 } else {
22638 continue;
22639 }
22640
22641 if (type == BPF_WRITE &&
22642 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].nospec_result) {
22643 /* nospec_result is only used to mitigate Spectre v4 and
22644 * to limit verification-time for Spectre v1.
22645 */
22646 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf;
22647
22648 *patch++ = *insn;
22649 *patch++ = BPF_ST_NOSPEC();
22650 cnt = patch - insn_buf;
22651 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
22652 if (!new_prog)
22653 return -ENOMEM;
22654
22655 delta += cnt - 1;
22656 env->prog = new_prog;
22657 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
22658 continue;
22659 }
22660
22661 switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) {
22662 case PTR_TO_CTX:
22663 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
22664 continue;
22665 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access;
22666 break;
22667 case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
22668 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
22669 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access;
22670 break;
22671 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
22672 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
22673 break;
22674 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
22675 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
22676 break;
22677 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
22678 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
22679 /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike
22680 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot
22681 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle
22682 * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed
22683 * for this case.
22684 */
22685 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
22686 case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
22687 if (type == BPF_READ) {
22688 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
22689 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
22690 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
22691 else
22692 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEMSX |
22693 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
22694 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
22695 }
22696 continue;
22697 case PTR_TO_ARENA:
22698 if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX) {
22699 if (!bpf_jit_supports_insn(insn, true)) {
22700 verbose(env, "sign extending loads from arena are not supported yet\n");
22701 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
22702 }
22703 insn->code = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) | BPF_PROBE_MEM32SX | BPF_SIZE(insn->code);
22704 } else {
22705 insn->code = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) | BPF_PROBE_MEM32 | BPF_SIZE(insn->code);
22706 }
22707 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
22708 continue;
22709 default:
22710 continue;
22711 }
22712
22713 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size;
22714 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn);
22715 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
22716
22717 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field,
22718 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific
22719 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful,
22720 * we will apply proper mask to the result.
22721 */
22722 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size;
22723 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size);
22724 off = insn->off;
22725 if (is_narrower_load) {
22726 u8 size_code;
22727
22728 if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
22729 verifier_bug(env, "narrow ctx access misconfigured");
22730 return -EFAULT;
22731 }
22732
22733 size_code = BPF_H;
22734 if (ctx_field_size == 4)
22735 size_code = BPF_W;
22736 else if (ctx_field_size == 8)
22737 size_code = BPF_DW;
22738
22739 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1);
22740 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code;
22741 }
22742
22743 target_size = 0;
22744 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog,
22745 &target_size);
22746 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE ||
22747 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
22748 verifier_bug(env, "error during ctx access conversion (%d)", cnt);
22749 return -EFAULT;
22750 }
22751
22752 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
22753 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset(
22754 off, size, size_default) * 8;
22755 if (shift && cnt + 1 >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) {
22756 verifier_bug(env, "narrow ctx load misconfigured");
22757 return -EFAULT;
22758 }
22759 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) {
22760 if (shift)
22761 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH,
22762 insn->dst_reg,
22763 shift);
22764 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
22765 (1 << size * 8) - 1);
22766 } else {
22767 if (shift)
22768 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH,
22769 insn->dst_reg,
22770 shift);
22771 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
22772 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1);
22773 }
22774 }
22775 if (mode == BPF_MEMSX)
22776 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X,
22777 insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg,
22778 size * 8, 0);
22779
22780 patch_insn_buf:
22781 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
22782 if (!new_prog)
22783 return -ENOMEM;
22784
22785 delta += cnt - 1;
22786
22787 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
22788 env->prog = new_prog;
22789 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
22790 }
22791
22792 return 0;
22793 }
22794
jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)22795 static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
22796 {
22797 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp;
22798 int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog;
22799 struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
22800 struct bpf_insn *insn;
22801 void *old_bpf_func;
22802 int err, num_exentries;
22803 int old_len, subprog_start_adjustment = 0;
22804
22805 if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1)
22806 return 0;
22807
22808 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
22809 if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
22810 continue;
22811
22812 /* Upon error here we cannot fall back to interpreter but
22813 * need a hard reject of the program. Thus -EFAULT is
22814 * propagated in any case.
22815 */
22816 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
22817 if (verifier_bug_if(subprog < 0, env, "No program to jit at insn %d",
22818 i + insn->imm + 1))
22819 return -EFAULT;
22820 /* temporarily remember subprog id inside insn instead of
22821 * aux_data, since next loop will split up all insns into funcs
22822 */
22823 insn->off = subprog;
22824 /* remember original imm in case JIT fails and fallback
22825 * to interpreter will be needed
22826 */
22827 env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm = insn->imm;
22828 /* point imm to __bpf_call_base+1 from JITs point of view */
22829 insn->imm = 1;
22830 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
22831 #if defined(MODULES_VADDR)
22832 u64 addr = MODULES_VADDR;
22833 #else
22834 u64 addr = VMALLOC_START;
22835 #endif
22836 /* jit (e.g. x86_64) may emit fewer instructions
22837 * if it learns a u32 imm is the same as a u64 imm.
22838 * Set close enough to possible prog address.
22839 */
22840 insn[0].imm = (u32)addr;
22841 insn[1].imm = addr >> 32;
22842 }
22843 }
22844
22845 err = bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(prog);
22846 if (err)
22847 goto out_undo_insn;
22848
22849 err = -ENOMEM;
22850 func = kzalloc_objs(prog, env->subprog_cnt);
22851 if (!func)
22852 goto out_undo_insn;
22853
22854 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
22855 subprog_start = subprog_end;
22856 subprog_end = env->subprog_info[i + 1].start;
22857
22858 len = subprog_end - subprog_start;
22859 /* bpf_prog_run() doesn't call subprogs directly,
22860 * hence main prog stats include the runtime of subprogs.
22861 * subprogs don't have IDs and not reachable via prog_get_next_id
22862 * func[i]->stats will never be accessed and stays NULL
22863 */
22864 func[i] = bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(bpf_prog_size(len), GFP_USER);
22865 if (!func[i])
22866 goto out_free;
22867 memcpy(func[i]->insnsi, &prog->insnsi[subprog_start],
22868 len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn));
22869 func[i]->type = prog->type;
22870 func[i]->len = len;
22871 if (bpf_prog_calc_tag(func[i]))
22872 goto out_free;
22873 func[i]->is_func = 1;
22874 func[i]->sleepable = prog->sleepable;
22875 func[i]->aux->func_idx = i;
22876 /* Below members will be freed only at prog->aux */
22877 func[i]->aux->btf = prog->aux->btf;
22878 func[i]->aux->subprog_start = subprog_start + subprog_start_adjustment;
22879 func[i]->aux->func_info = prog->aux->func_info;
22880 func[i]->aux->func_info_cnt = prog->aux->func_info_cnt;
22881 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = prog->aux->poke_tab;
22882 func[i]->aux->size_poke_tab = prog->aux->size_poke_tab;
22883 func[i]->aux->main_prog_aux = prog->aux;
22884
22885 for (j = 0; j < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; j++) {
22886 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke;
22887
22888 poke = &prog->aux->poke_tab[j];
22889 if (poke->insn_idx < subprog_end &&
22890 poke->insn_idx >= subprog_start)
22891 poke->aux = func[i]->aux;
22892 }
22893
22894 func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F';
22895 func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
22896 if (env->subprog_info[i].priv_stack_mode == PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE)
22897 func[i]->aux->jits_use_priv_stack = true;
22898
22899 func[i]->jit_requested = 1;
22900 func[i]->blinding_requested = prog->blinding_requested;
22901 func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
22902 func[i]->aux->kfunc_btf_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_btf_tab;
22903 func[i]->aux->linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
22904 func[i]->aux->nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
22905 func[i]->aux->jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo;
22906 func[i]->aux->linfo_idx = env->subprog_info[i].linfo_idx;
22907 func[i]->aux->arena = prog->aux->arena;
22908 func[i]->aux->used_maps = env->used_maps;
22909 func[i]->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt;
22910 num_exentries = 0;
22911 insn = func[i]->insnsi;
22912 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
22913 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
22914 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM ||
22915 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM32 ||
22916 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM32SX ||
22917 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX))
22918 num_exentries++;
22919 if ((BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX ||
22920 BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ST) &&
22921 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM32)
22922 num_exentries++;
22923 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
22924 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC)
22925 num_exentries++;
22926 }
22927 func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries;
22928 func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable;
22929 func[i]->aux->exception_cb = env->subprog_info[i].is_exception_cb;
22930 func[i]->aux->changes_pkt_data = env->subprog_info[i].changes_pkt_data;
22931 func[i]->aux->might_sleep = env->subprog_info[i].might_sleep;
22932 if (!i)
22933 func[i]->aux->exception_boundary = env->seen_exception;
22934
22935 /*
22936 * To properly pass the absolute subprog start to jit
22937 * all instruction adjustments should be accumulated
22938 */
22939 old_len = func[i]->len;
22940 func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
22941 subprog_start_adjustment += func[i]->len - old_len;
22942
22943 if (!func[i]->jited) {
22944 err = -ENOTSUPP;
22945 goto out_free;
22946 }
22947 cond_resched();
22948 }
22949
22950 /* at this point all bpf functions were successfully JITed
22951 * now populate all bpf_calls with correct addresses and
22952 * run last pass of JIT
22953 */
22954 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
22955 insn = func[i]->insnsi;
22956 for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
22957 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
22958 subprog = insn->off;
22959 insn[0].imm = (u32)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func;
22960 insn[1].imm = ((u64)(long)func[subprog]->bpf_func) >> 32;
22961 continue;
22962 }
22963 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
22964 continue;
22965 subprog = insn->off;
22966 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(func[subprog]->bpf_func);
22967 }
22968
22969 /* we use the aux data to keep a list of the start addresses
22970 * of the JITed images for each function in the program
22971 *
22972 * for some architectures, such as powerpc64, the imm field
22973 * might not be large enough to hold the offset of the start
22974 * address of the callee's JITed image from __bpf_call_base
22975 *
22976 * in such cases, we can lookup the start address of a callee
22977 * by using its subprog id, available from the off field of
22978 * the call instruction, as an index for this list
22979 */
22980 func[i]->aux->func = func;
22981 func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt - env->hidden_subprog_cnt;
22982 func[i]->aux->real_func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
22983 }
22984 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
22985 old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func;
22986 tmp = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
22987 if (tmp != func[i] || func[i]->bpf_func != old_bpf_func) {
22988 verbose(env, "JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
22989 err = -ENOTSUPP;
22990 goto out_free;
22991 }
22992 cond_resched();
22993 }
22994
22995 /*
22996 * Cleanup func[i]->aux fields which aren't required
22997 * or can become invalid in future
22998 */
22999 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
23000 func[i]->aux->used_maps = NULL;
23001 func[i]->aux->used_map_cnt = 0;
23002 }
23003
23004 /* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and
23005 * populate kallsysm. Begin at the first subprogram, since
23006 * bpf_prog_load will add the kallsyms for the main program.
23007 */
23008 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
23009 err = bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]);
23010 if (err)
23011 goto out_free;
23012 }
23013
23014 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
23015 bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]);
23016
23017 /* Last step: make now unused interpreter insns from main
23018 * prog consistent for later dump requests, so they can
23019 * later look the same as if they were interpreted only.
23020 */
23021 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
23022 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
23023 insn[0].imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
23024 insn[1].imm = insn->off;
23025 insn->off = 0;
23026 continue;
23027 }
23028 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
23029 continue;
23030 insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
23031 subprog = find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1);
23032 insn->imm = subprog;
23033 }
23034
23035 prog->jited = 1;
23036 prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func;
23037 prog->jited_len = func[0]->jited_len;
23038 prog->aux->extable = func[0]->aux->extable;
23039 prog->aux->num_exentries = func[0]->aux->num_exentries;
23040 prog->aux->func = func;
23041 prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt - env->hidden_subprog_cnt;
23042 prog->aux->real_func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
23043 prog->aux->bpf_exception_cb = (void *)func[env->exception_callback_subprog]->bpf_func;
23044 prog->aux->exception_boundary = func[0]->aux->exception_boundary;
23045 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog);
23046 return 0;
23047 out_free:
23048 /* We failed JIT'ing, so at this point we need to unregister poke
23049 * descriptors from subprogs, so that kernel is not attempting to
23050 * patch it anymore as we're freeing the subprog JIT memory.
23051 */
23052 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) {
23053 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map;
23054 map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack(map_ptr, prog->aux);
23055 }
23056 /* At this point we're guaranteed that poke descriptors are not
23057 * live anymore. We can just unlink its descriptor table as it's
23058 * released with the main prog.
23059 */
23060 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
23061 if (!func[i])
23062 continue;
23063 func[i]->aux->poke_tab = NULL;
23064 bpf_jit_free(func[i]);
23065 }
23066 kfree(func);
23067 out_undo_insn:
23068 /* cleanup main prog to be interpreted */
23069 prog->jit_requested = 0;
23070 prog->blinding_requested = 0;
23071 for (i = 0, insn = prog->insnsi; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
23072 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
23073 continue;
23074 insn->off = 0;
23075 insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
23076 }
23077 bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog);
23078 return err;
23079 }
23080
fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)23081 static int fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
23082 {
23083 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
23084 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
23085 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
23086 bool has_kfunc_call = bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call(prog);
23087 int i, depth;
23088 #endif
23089 int err = 0;
23090
23091 if (env->prog->jit_requested &&
23092 !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
23093 err = jit_subprogs(env);
23094 if (err == 0)
23095 return 0;
23096 if (err == -EFAULT)
23097 return err;
23098 }
23099 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
23100 if (has_kfunc_call) {
23101 verbose(env, "calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
23102 return -EINVAL;
23103 }
23104 if (env->subprog_cnt > 1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) {
23105 /* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls
23106 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
23107 */
23108 verbose(env, "tail_calls are not allowed in non-JITed programs with bpf-to-bpf calls\n");
23109 return -EINVAL;
23110 }
23111 for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++, insn++) {
23112 if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn)) {
23113 /* When JIT fails the progs with callback calls
23114 * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
23115 */
23116 verbose(env, "callbacks are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n");
23117 return -EINVAL;
23118 }
23119
23120 if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
23121 continue;
23122 depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i);
23123 if (depth < 0)
23124 return depth;
23125 bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth);
23126 }
23127 err = 0;
23128 #endif
23129 return err;
23130 }
23131
23132 /* replace a generic kfunc with a specialized version if necessary */
specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_kfunc_desc * desc,int insn_idx)23133 static int specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc, int insn_idx)
23134 {
23135 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
23136 bool seen_direct_write;
23137 void *xdp_kfunc;
23138 bool is_rdonly;
23139 u32 func_id = desc->func_id;
23140 u16 offset = desc->offset;
23141 unsigned long addr = desc->addr;
23142
23143 if (offset) /* return if module BTF is used */
23144 return 0;
23145
23146 if (bpf_dev_bound_kfunc_id(func_id)) {
23147 xdp_kfunc = bpf_dev_bound_resolve_kfunc(prog, func_id);
23148 if (xdp_kfunc)
23149 addr = (unsigned long)xdp_kfunc;
23150 /* fallback to default kfunc when not supported by netdev */
23151 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) {
23152 seen_direct_write = env->seen_direct_write;
23153 is_rdonly = !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE);
23154
23155 if (is_rdonly)
23156 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly;
23157
23158 /* restore env->seen_direct_write to its original value, since
23159 * may_access_direct_pkt_data mutates it
23160 */
23161 env->seen_direct_write = seen_direct_write;
23162 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_set_dentry_xattr]) {
23163 if (bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked(prog))
23164 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked;
23165 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_remove_dentry_xattr]) {
23166 if (bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked(prog))
23167 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked;
23168 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_file]) {
23169 if (!env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].non_sleepable)
23170 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_dynptr_from_file_sleepable;
23171 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_arena_alloc_pages]) {
23172 if (env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].non_sleepable)
23173 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_arena_alloc_pages_non_sleepable;
23174 } else if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_arena_free_pages]) {
23175 if (env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].non_sleepable)
23176 addr = (unsigned long)bpf_arena_free_pages_non_sleepable;
23177 }
23178 desc->addr = addr;
23179 return 0;
23180 }
23181
__fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(struct bpf_insn_aux_data * insn_aux,u16 struct_meta_reg,u16 node_offset_reg,struct bpf_insn * insn,struct bpf_insn * insn_buf,int * cnt)23182 static void __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux,
23183 u16 struct_meta_reg,
23184 u16 node_offset_reg,
23185 struct bpf_insn *insn,
23186 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf,
23187 int *cnt)
23188 {
23189 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta;
23190 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(struct_meta_reg, (long)kptr_struct_meta) };
23191
23192 insn_buf[0] = addr[0];
23193 insn_buf[1] = addr[1];
23194 insn_buf[2] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(node_offset_reg, insn_aux->insert_off);
23195 insn_buf[3] = *insn;
23196 *cnt = 4;
23197 }
23198
fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,struct bpf_insn * insn_buf,int insn_idx,int * cnt)23199 static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
23200 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf, int insn_idx, int *cnt)
23201 {
23202 struct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc;
23203 int err;
23204
23205 if (!insn->imm) {
23206 verbose(env, "invalid kernel function call not eliminated in verifier pass\n");
23207 return -EINVAL;
23208 }
23209
23210 *cnt = 0;
23211
23212 /* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with an offset relative to
23213 * __bpf_call_base, unless the JIT needs to call functions that are
23214 * further than 32 bits away (bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call()).
23215 */
23216 desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off);
23217 if (!desc) {
23218 verifier_bug(env, "kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u",
23219 insn->imm);
23220 return -EFAULT;
23221 }
23222
23223 err = specialize_kfunc(env, desc, insn_idx);
23224 if (err)
23225 return err;
23226
23227 if (!bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call())
23228 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr);
23229
23230 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] ||
23231 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) {
23232 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta;
23233 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) };
23234 u64 obj_new_size = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size;
23235
23236 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl] && kptr_struct_meta) {
23237 verifier_bug(env, "NULL kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d",
23238 insn_idx);
23239 return -EFAULT;
23240 }
23241
23242 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, obj_new_size);
23243 insn_buf[1] = addr[0];
23244 insn_buf[2] = addr[1];
23245 insn_buf[3] = *insn;
23246 *cnt = 4;
23247 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl] ||
23248 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl] ||
23249 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) {
23250 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta;
23251 struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) };
23252
23253 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl] && kptr_struct_meta) {
23254 verifier_bug(env, "NULL kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d",
23255 insn_idx);
23256 return -EFAULT;
23257 }
23258
23259 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] &&
23260 !kptr_struct_meta) {
23261 verifier_bug(env, "kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d",
23262 insn_idx);
23263 return -EFAULT;
23264 }
23265
23266 insn_buf[0] = addr[0];
23267 insn_buf[1] = addr[1];
23268 insn_buf[2] = *insn;
23269 *cnt = 3;
23270 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] ||
23271 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] ||
23272 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) {
23273 struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta;
23274 int struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_3;
23275 int node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_4;
23276
23277 /* rbtree_add has extra 'less' arg, so args-to-fixup are in diff regs */
23278 if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) {
23279 struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_4;
23280 node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_5;
23281 }
23282
23283 if (!kptr_struct_meta) {
23284 verifier_bug(env, "kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d",
23285 insn_idx);
23286 return -EFAULT;
23287 }
23288
23289 __fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(&env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx], struct_meta_reg,
23290 node_offset_reg, insn, insn_buf, cnt);
23291 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] ||
23292 desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) {
23293 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1);
23294 *cnt = 1;
23295 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_session_is_return] &&
23296 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FSESSION) {
23297 /*
23298 * inline the bpf_session_is_return() for fsession:
23299 * bool bpf_session_is_return(void *ctx)
23300 * {
23301 * return (((u64 *)ctx)[-1] >> BPF_TRAMP_IS_RETURN_SHIFT) & 1;
23302 * }
23303 */
23304 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8);
23305 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_0, BPF_TRAMP_IS_RETURN_SHIFT);
23306 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_0, 1);
23307 *cnt = 3;
23308 } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_session_cookie] &&
23309 env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FSESSION) {
23310 /*
23311 * inline bpf_session_cookie() for fsession:
23312 * __u64 *bpf_session_cookie(void *ctx)
23313 * {
23314 * u64 off = (((u64 *)ctx)[-1] >> BPF_TRAMP_COOKIE_INDEX_SHIFT) & 0xFF;
23315 * return &((u64 *)ctx)[-off];
23316 * }
23317 */
23318 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8);
23319 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_0, BPF_TRAMP_COOKIE_INDEX_SHIFT);
23320 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_0, 0xFF);
23321 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_0, 3);
23322 insn_buf[4] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1);
23323 insn_buf[5] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_0, 0);
23324 *cnt = 6;
23325 }
23326
23327 if (env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].arg_prog) {
23328 u32 regno = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].arg_prog;
23329 struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(regno, (long)env->prog->aux) };
23330 int idx = *cnt;
23331
23332 insn_buf[idx++] = ld_addrs[0];
23333 insn_buf[idx++] = ld_addrs[1];
23334 insn_buf[idx++] = *insn;
23335 *cnt = idx;
23336 }
23337 return 0;
23338 }
23339
23340 /* The function requires that first instruction in 'patch' is insnsi[prog->len - 1] */
add_hidden_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * patch,int len)23341 static int add_hidden_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *patch, int len)
23342 {
23343 struct bpf_subprog_info *info = env->subprog_info;
23344 int cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
23345 struct bpf_prog *prog;
23346
23347 /* We only reserve one slot for hidden subprogs in subprog_info. */
23348 if (env->hidden_subprog_cnt) {
23349 verifier_bug(env, "only one hidden subprog supported");
23350 return -EFAULT;
23351 }
23352 /* We're not patching any existing instruction, just appending the new
23353 * ones for the hidden subprog. Hence all of the adjustment operations
23354 * in bpf_patch_insn_data are no-ops.
23355 */
23356 prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, env->prog->len - 1, patch, len);
23357 if (!prog)
23358 return -ENOMEM;
23359 env->prog = prog;
23360 info[cnt + 1].start = info[cnt].start;
23361 info[cnt].start = prog->len - len + 1;
23362 env->subprog_cnt++;
23363 env->hidden_subprog_cnt++;
23364 return 0;
23365 }
23366
23367 /* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass.
23368 * These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations.
23369 */
do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)23370 static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
23371 {
23372 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
23373 enum bpf_attach_type eatype = prog->expected_attach_type;
23374 enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(prog);
23375 struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
23376 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
23377 const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
23378 const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
23379 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux;
23380 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf = env->insn_buf;
23381 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
23382 struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
23383 int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0, cur_subprog = 0;
23384 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info;
23385 u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth;
23386 u16 stack_depth_extra = 0;
23387
23388 if (env->seen_exception && !env->exception_callback_subprog) {
23389 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf;
23390
23391 *patch++ = env->prog->insnsi[insn_cnt - 1];
23392 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1);
23393 *patch++ = BPF_EXIT_INSN();
23394 ret = add_hidden_subprog(env, insn_buf, patch - insn_buf);
23395 if (ret < 0)
23396 return ret;
23397 prog = env->prog;
23398 insn = prog->insnsi;
23399
23400 env->exception_callback_subprog = env->subprog_cnt - 1;
23401 /* Don't update insn_cnt, as add_hidden_subprog always appends insns */
23402 mark_subprog_exc_cb(env, env->exception_callback_subprog);
23403 }
23404
23405 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt;) {
23406 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X) && insn->imm) {
23407 if ((insn->off == BPF_ADDR_SPACE_CAST && insn->imm == 1) ||
23408 (((struct bpf_map *)env->prog->aux->arena)->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_USER_CONV)) {
23409 /* convert to 32-bit mov that clears upper 32-bit */
23410 insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_X;
23411 /* clear off and imm, so it's a normal 'wX = wY' from JIT pov */
23412 insn->off = 0;
23413 insn->imm = 0;
23414 } /* cast from as(0) to as(1) should be handled by JIT */
23415 goto next_insn;
23416 }
23417
23418 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].needs_zext)
23419 /* Convert BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 to 32-bit ALU */
23420 insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_OP(insn->code) | BPF_SRC(insn->code);
23421
23422 /* Make sdiv/smod divide-by-minus-one exceptions impossible. */
23423 if ((insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K) ||
23424 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K) ||
23425 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_K) ||
23426 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_K)) &&
23427 insn->off == 1 && insn->imm == -1) {
23428 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64;
23429 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV;
23430 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf;
23431
23432 if (isdiv)
23433 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) |
23434 BPF_NEG | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg,
23435 0, 0, 0);
23436 else
23437 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0);
23438
23439 cnt = patch - insn_buf;
23440
23441 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
23442 if (!new_prog)
23443 return -ENOMEM;
23444
23445 delta += cnt - 1;
23446 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23447 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23448 goto next_insn;
23449 }
23450
23451 /* Make divide-by-zero and divide-by-minus-one exceptions impossible. */
23452 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
23453 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) ||
23454 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
23455 insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) {
23456 bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64;
23457 bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV;
23458 bool is_sdiv = isdiv && insn->off == 1;
23459 bool is_smod = !isdiv && insn->off == 1;
23460 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf;
23461
23462 if (is_sdiv) {
23463 /* [R,W]x sdiv 0 -> 0
23464 * LLONG_MIN sdiv -1 -> LLONG_MIN
23465 * INT_MIN sdiv -1 -> INT_MIN
23466 */
23467 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg);
23468 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) |
23469 BPF_ADD | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX,
23470 0, 0, 1);
23471 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
23472 BPF_JGT | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX,
23473 0, 4, 1);
23474 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
23475 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX,
23476 0, 1, 0);
23477 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) |
23478 BPF_MOV | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg,
23479 0, 0, 0);
23480 /* BPF_NEG(LLONG_MIN) == -LLONG_MIN == LLONG_MIN */
23481 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) |
23482 BPF_NEG | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg,
23483 0, 0, 0);
23484 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1);
23485 *patch++ = *insn;
23486 cnt = patch - insn_buf;
23487 } else if (is_smod) {
23488 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */
23489 /* [R,W]x mod -1 -> 0 */
23490 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg);
23491 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) |
23492 BPF_ADD | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX,
23493 0, 0, 1);
23494 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
23495 BPF_JGT | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX,
23496 0, 3, 1);
23497 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
23498 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX,
23499 0, 3 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 1);
23500 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0);
23501 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1);
23502 *patch++ = *insn;
23503
23504 if (!is64) {
23505 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1);
23506 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg);
23507 }
23508 cnt = patch - insn_buf;
23509 } else if (isdiv) {
23510 /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */
23511 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
23512 BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg,
23513 0, 2, 0);
23514 *patch++ = BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg);
23515 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1);
23516 *patch++ = *insn;
23517 cnt = patch - insn_buf;
23518 } else {
23519 /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */
23520 *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) |
23521 BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg,
23522 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0);
23523 *patch++ = *insn;
23524
23525 if (!is64) {
23526 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1);
23527 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg);
23528 }
23529 cnt = patch - insn_buf;
23530 }
23531
23532 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
23533 if (!new_prog)
23534 return -ENOMEM;
23535
23536 delta += cnt - 1;
23537 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23538 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23539 goto next_insn;
23540 }
23541
23542 /* Make it impossible to de-reference a userspace address */
23543 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
23544 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM ||
23545 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) {
23546 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf;
23547 u64 uaddress_limit = bpf_arch_uaddress_limit();
23548
23549 if (!uaddress_limit)
23550 goto next_insn;
23551
23552 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg);
23553 if (insn->off)
23554 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_AX, insn->off);
23555 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32);
23556 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_AX, uaddress_limit >> 32, 2);
23557 *patch++ = *insn;
23558 *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1);
23559 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0);
23560
23561 cnt = patch - insn_buf;
23562 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
23563 if (!new_prog)
23564 return -ENOMEM;
23565
23566 delta += cnt - 1;
23567 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23568 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23569 goto next_insn;
23570 }
23571
23572 /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */
23573 if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD &&
23574 (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS ||
23575 BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) {
23576 cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf);
23577 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) {
23578 verifier_bug(env, "%d insns generated for ld_abs", cnt);
23579 return -EFAULT;
23580 }
23581
23582 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
23583 if (!new_prog)
23584 return -ENOMEM;
23585
23586 delta += cnt - 1;
23587 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23588 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23589 goto next_insn;
23590 }
23591
23592 /* Rewrite pointer arithmetic to mitigate speculation attacks. */
23593 if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) ||
23594 insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) {
23595 const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X;
23596 const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X;
23597 struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf;
23598 bool issrc, isneg, isimm;
23599 u32 off_reg;
23600
23601 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
23602 if (!aux->alu_state ||
23603 aux->alu_state == BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER)
23604 goto next_insn;
23605
23606 isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE;
23607 issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) ==
23608 BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC;
23609 isimm = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE;
23610
23611 off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg;
23612 if (isimm) {
23613 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit);
23614 } else {
23615 if (isneg)
23616 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
23617 *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit);
23618 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
23619 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
23620 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
23621 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63);
23622 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
23623 }
23624 if (!issrc)
23625 *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg);
23626 insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX;
23627 if (isneg)
23628 insn->code = insn->code == code_add ?
23629 code_sub : code_add;
23630 *patch++ = *insn;
23631 if (issrc && isneg && !isimm)
23632 *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
23633 cnt = patch - insn_buf;
23634
23635 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
23636 if (!new_prog)
23637 return -ENOMEM;
23638
23639 delta += cnt - 1;
23640 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23641 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23642 goto next_insn;
23643 }
23644
23645 if (is_may_goto_insn(insn) && bpf_jit_supports_timed_may_goto()) {
23646 int stack_off_cnt = -stack_depth - 16;
23647
23648 /*
23649 * Two 8 byte slots, depth-16 stores the count, and
23650 * depth-8 stores the start timestamp of the loop.
23651 *
23652 * The starting value of count is BPF_MAX_TIMED_LOOPS
23653 * (0xffff). Every iteration loads it and subs it by 1,
23654 * until the value becomes 0 in AX (thus, 1 in stack),
23655 * after which we call arch_bpf_timed_may_goto, which
23656 * either sets AX to 0xffff to keep looping, or to 0
23657 * upon timeout. AX is then stored into the stack. In
23658 * the next iteration, we either see 0 and break out, or
23659 * continue iterating until the next time value is 0
23660 * after subtraction, rinse and repeat.
23661 */
23662 stack_depth_extra = 16;
23663 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_AX, BPF_REG_10, stack_off_cnt);
23664 if (insn->off >= 0)
23665 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off + 5);
23666 else
23667 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off - 1);
23668 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, 1);
23669 insn_buf[3] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_AX, 0, 2);
23670 /*
23671 * AX is used as an argument to pass in stack_off_cnt
23672 * (to add to r10/fp), and also as the return value of
23673 * the call to arch_bpf_timed_may_goto.
23674 */
23675 insn_buf[4] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, stack_off_cnt);
23676 insn_buf[5] = BPF_EMIT_CALL(arch_bpf_timed_may_goto);
23677 insn_buf[6] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_AX, stack_off_cnt);
23678 cnt = 7;
23679
23680 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
23681 if (!new_prog)
23682 return -ENOMEM;
23683
23684 delta += cnt - 1;
23685 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23686 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23687 goto next_insn;
23688 } else if (is_may_goto_insn(insn)) {
23689 int stack_off = -stack_depth - 8;
23690
23691 stack_depth_extra = 8;
23692 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_AX, BPF_REG_10, stack_off);
23693 if (insn->off >= 0)
23694 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off + 2);
23695 else
23696 insn_buf[1] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_AX, 0, insn->off - 1);
23697 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, 1);
23698 insn_buf[3] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_AX, stack_off);
23699 cnt = 4;
23700
23701 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
23702 if (!new_prog)
23703 return -ENOMEM;
23704
23705 delta += cnt - 1;
23706 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23707 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23708 goto next_insn;
23709 }
23710
23711 if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
23712 goto next_insn;
23713 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
23714 goto next_insn;
23715 if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) {
23716 ret = fixup_kfunc_call(env, insn, insn_buf, i + delta, &cnt);
23717 if (ret)
23718 return ret;
23719 if (cnt == 0)
23720 goto next_insn;
23721
23722 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
23723 if (!new_prog)
23724 return -ENOMEM;
23725
23726 delta += cnt - 1;
23727 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23728 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23729 goto next_insn;
23730 }
23731
23732 /* Skip inlining the helper call if the JIT does it. */
23733 if (bpf_jit_inlines_helper_call(insn->imm))
23734 goto next_insn;
23735
23736 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
23737 prog->dst_needed = 1;
23738 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
23739 bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
23740 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_override_return)
23741 prog->kprobe_override = 1;
23742 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
23743 /* If we tail call into other programs, we
23744 * cannot make any assumptions since they can
23745 * be replaced dynamically during runtime in
23746 * the program array.
23747 */
23748 prog->cb_access = 1;
23749 if (!allow_tail_call_in_subprogs(env))
23750 prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK;
23751 prog->aux->max_pkt_offset = MAX_PACKET_OFF;
23752
23753 /* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
23754 * conditional branch in the interpreter for every normal
23755 * call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
23756 * that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
23757 */
23758 insn->imm = 0;
23759 insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL;
23760
23761 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
23762 if (env->bpf_capable && !prog->blinding_requested &&
23763 prog->jit_requested &&
23764 !bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) &&
23765 !bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux) &&
23766 !bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux)) {
23767 struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor desc = {
23768 .reason = BPF_POKE_REASON_TAIL_CALL,
23769 .tail_call.map = aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr,
23770 .tail_call.key = bpf_map_key_immediate(aux),
23771 .insn_idx = i + delta,
23772 };
23773
23774 ret = bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(prog, &desc);
23775 if (ret < 0) {
23776 verbose(env, "adding tail call poke descriptor failed\n");
23777 return ret;
23778 }
23779
23780 insn->imm = ret + 1;
23781 goto next_insn;
23782 }
23783
23784 if (!bpf_map_ptr_unpriv(aux))
23785 goto next_insn;
23786
23787 /* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call
23788 * emit two extra insns:
23789 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out;
23790 * index &= array->index_mask;
23791 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation
23792 */
23793 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux)) {
23794 verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n");
23795 return -EINVAL;
23796 }
23797
23798 map_ptr = aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr;
23799 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3,
23800 map_ptr->max_entries, 2);
23801 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3,
23802 container_of(map_ptr,
23803 struct bpf_array,
23804 map)->index_mask);
23805 insn_buf[2] = *insn;
23806 cnt = 3;
23807 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
23808 if (!new_prog)
23809 return -ENOMEM;
23810
23811 delta += cnt - 1;
23812 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23813 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23814 goto next_insn;
23815 }
23816
23817 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback) {
23818 /* The verifier will process callback_fn as many times as necessary
23819 * with different maps and the register states prepared by
23820 * set_timer_callback_state will be accurate.
23821 *
23822 * The following use case is valid:
23823 * map1 is shared by prog1, prog2, prog3.
23824 * prog1 calls bpf_timer_init for some map1 elements
23825 * prog2 calls bpf_timer_set_callback for some map1 elements.
23826 * Those that were not bpf_timer_init-ed will return -EINVAL.
23827 * prog3 calls bpf_timer_start for some map1 elements.
23828 * Those that were not both bpf_timer_init-ed and
23829 * bpf_timer_set_callback-ed will return -EINVAL.
23830 */
23831 struct bpf_insn ld_addrs[2] = {
23832 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_3, (long)prog->aux),
23833 };
23834
23835 insn_buf[0] = ld_addrs[0];
23836 insn_buf[1] = ld_addrs[1];
23837 insn_buf[2] = *insn;
23838 cnt = 3;
23839
23840 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
23841 if (!new_prog)
23842 return -ENOMEM;
23843
23844 delta += cnt - 1;
23845 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23846 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23847 goto patch_call_imm;
23848 }
23849
23850 if (is_storage_get_function(insn->imm)) {
23851 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].non_sleepable)
23852 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_ATOMIC);
23853 else
23854 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, (__force __s32)GFP_KERNEL);
23855 insn_buf[1] = *insn;
23856 cnt = 2;
23857
23858 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
23859 if (!new_prog)
23860 return -ENOMEM;
23861
23862 delta += cnt - 1;
23863 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23864 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23865 goto patch_call_imm;
23866 }
23867
23868 /* bpf_per_cpu_ptr() and bpf_this_cpu_ptr() */
23869 if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].call_with_percpu_alloc_ptr) {
23870 /* patch with 'r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0)' since for percpu data,
23871 * bpf_mem_alloc() returns a ptr to the percpu data ptr.
23872 */
23873 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, 0);
23874 insn_buf[1] = *insn;
23875 cnt = 2;
23876
23877 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
23878 if (!new_prog)
23879 return -ENOMEM;
23880
23881 delta += cnt - 1;
23882 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23883 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23884 goto patch_call_imm;
23885 }
23886
23887 /* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup
23888 * and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit
23889 * only.
23890 */
23891 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
23892 (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem ||
23893 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem ||
23894 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem ||
23895 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem ||
23896 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem ||
23897 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem ||
23898 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map ||
23899 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem ||
23900 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem)) {
23901 aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
23902 if (bpf_map_ptr_poisoned(aux))
23903 goto patch_call_imm;
23904
23905 map_ptr = aux->map_ptr_state.map_ptr;
23906 ops = map_ptr->ops;
23907 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
23908 ops->map_gen_lookup) {
23909 cnt = ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf);
23910 if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP)
23911 goto patch_map_ops_generic;
23912 if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) {
23913 verifier_bug(env, "%d insns generated for map lookup", cnt);
23914 return -EFAULT;
23915 }
23916
23917 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta,
23918 insn_buf, cnt);
23919 if (!new_prog)
23920 return -ENOMEM;
23921
23922 delta += cnt - 1;
23923 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
23924 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
23925 goto next_insn;
23926 }
23927
23928 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_elem,
23929 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL));
23930 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_delete_elem,
23931 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key))NULL));
23932 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_update_elem,
23933 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
23934 u64 flags))NULL));
23935 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_push_elem,
23936 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value,
23937 u64 flags))NULL));
23938 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_pop_elem,
23939 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL));
23940 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_peek_elem,
23941 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *value))NULL));
23942 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_redirect,
23943 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map, u64 index, u64 flags))NULL));
23944 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_for_each_callback,
23945 (long (*)(struct bpf_map *map,
23946 bpf_callback_t callback_fn,
23947 void *callback_ctx,
23948 u64 flags))NULL));
23949 BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem,
23950 (void *(*)(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 cpu))NULL));
23951
23952 patch_map_ops_generic:
23953 switch (insn->imm) {
23954 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem:
23955 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_elem);
23956 goto next_insn;
23957 case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem:
23958 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_update_elem);
23959 goto next_insn;
23960 case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem:
23961 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_delete_elem);
23962 goto next_insn;
23963 case BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem:
23964 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_push_elem);
23965 goto next_insn;
23966 case BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem:
23967 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_pop_elem);
23968 goto next_insn;
23969 case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem:
23970 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_peek_elem);
23971 goto next_insn;
23972 case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
23973 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_redirect);
23974 goto next_insn;
23975 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem:
23976 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_for_each_callback);
23977 goto next_insn;
23978 case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_percpu_elem:
23979 insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(ops->map_lookup_percpu_elem);
23980 goto next_insn;
23981 }
23982
23983 goto patch_call_imm;
23984 }
23985
23986 /* Implement bpf_jiffies64 inline. */
23987 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
23988 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_jiffies64) {
23989 struct bpf_insn ld_jiffies_addr[2] = {
23990 BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_0,
23991 (unsigned long)&jiffies),
23992 };
23993
23994 insn_buf[0] = ld_jiffies_addr[0];
23995 insn_buf[1] = ld_jiffies_addr[1];
23996 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0,
23997 BPF_REG_0, 0);
23998 cnt = 3;
23999
24000 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf,
24001 cnt);
24002 if (!new_prog)
24003 return -ENOMEM;
24004
24005 delta += cnt - 1;
24006 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
24007 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
24008 goto next_insn;
24009 }
24010
24011 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && !defined(CONFIG_UML)
24012 /* Implement bpf_get_smp_processor_id() inline. */
24013 if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id &&
24014 verifier_inlines_helper_call(env, insn->imm)) {
24015 /* BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id inlining is an
24016 * optimization, so if cpu_number is ever
24017 * changed in some incompatible and hard to support
24018 * way, it's fine to back out this inlining logic
24019 */
24020 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
24021 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, (u32)(unsigned long)&cpu_number);
24022 insn_buf[1] = BPF_MOV64_PERCPU_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0);
24023 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0);
24024 cnt = 3;
24025 #else
24026 insn_buf[0] = BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0);
24027 cnt = 1;
24028 #endif
24029 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
24030 if (!new_prog)
24031 return -ENOMEM;
24032
24033 delta += cnt - 1;
24034 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
24035 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
24036 goto next_insn;
24037 }
24038
24039 /* Implement bpf_get_current_task() and bpf_get_current_task_btf() inline. */
24040 if ((insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_current_task || insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_current_task_btf) &&
24041 verifier_inlines_helper_call(env, insn->imm)) {
24042 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, (u32)(unsigned long)¤t_task);
24043 insn_buf[1] = BPF_MOV64_PERCPU_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0);
24044 insn_buf[2] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0);
24045 cnt = 3;
24046
24047 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
24048 if (!new_prog)
24049 return -ENOMEM;
24050
24051 delta += cnt - 1;
24052 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
24053 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
24054 goto next_insn;
24055 }
24056 #endif
24057 /* Implement bpf_get_func_arg inline. */
24058 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
24059 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg) {
24060 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) {
24061 int nr_args = btf_type_vlen(prog->aux->attach_func_proto);
24062
24063 /* skip 'void *__data' in btf_trace_##name() and save to reg0 */
24064 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, nr_args - 1);
24065 cnt = 1;
24066 } else {
24067 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */
24068 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8);
24069 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_0, 0xFF);
24070 cnt = 2;
24071 }
24072 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP32_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, 6);
24073 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_2, 3);
24074 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1);
24075 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0);
24076 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0);
24077 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0);
24078 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_A(1);
24079 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL);
24080
24081 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
24082 if (!new_prog)
24083 return -ENOMEM;
24084
24085 delta += cnt - 1;
24086 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
24087 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
24088 goto next_insn;
24089 }
24090
24091 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ret inline. */
24092 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
24093 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ret) {
24094 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT ||
24095 eatype == BPF_TRACE_FSESSION ||
24096 eatype == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) {
24097 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */
24098 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8);
24099 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_0, 0xFF);
24100 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_0, 3);
24101 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1);
24102 insn_buf[4] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0);
24103 insn_buf[5] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, 0);
24104 insn_buf[6] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0);
24105 cnt = 7;
24106 } else {
24107 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EOPNOTSUPP);
24108 cnt = 1;
24109 }
24110
24111 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
24112 if (!new_prog)
24113 return -ENOMEM;
24114
24115 delta += cnt - 1;
24116 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
24117 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
24118 goto next_insn;
24119 }
24120
24121 /* Implement get_func_arg_cnt inline. */
24122 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
24123 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_arg_cnt) {
24124 if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) {
24125 int nr_args = btf_type_vlen(prog->aux->attach_func_proto);
24126
24127 /* skip 'void *__data' in btf_trace_##name() and save to reg0 */
24128 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, nr_args - 1);
24129 cnt = 1;
24130 } else {
24131 /* Load nr_args from ctx - 8 */
24132 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -8);
24133 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_0, 0xFF);
24134 cnt = 2;
24135 }
24136
24137 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
24138 if (!new_prog)
24139 return -ENOMEM;
24140
24141 delta += cnt - 1;
24142 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
24143 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
24144 goto next_insn;
24145 }
24146
24147 /* Implement bpf_get_func_ip inline. */
24148 if (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
24149 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip) {
24150 /* Load IP address from ctx - 16 */
24151 insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, -16);
24152
24153 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, 1);
24154 if (!new_prog)
24155 return -ENOMEM;
24156
24157 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
24158 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
24159 goto next_insn;
24160 }
24161
24162 /* Implement bpf_get_branch_snapshot inline. */
24163 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) &&
24164 prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
24165 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_branch_snapshot) {
24166 /* We are dealing with the following func protos:
24167 * u64 bpf_get_branch_snapshot(void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags);
24168 * int perf_snapshot_branch_stack(struct perf_branch_entry *entries, u32 cnt);
24169 */
24170 const u32 br_entry_size = sizeof(struct perf_branch_entry);
24171
24172 /* struct perf_branch_entry is part of UAPI and is
24173 * used as an array element, so extremely unlikely to
24174 * ever grow or shrink
24175 */
24176 BUILD_BUG_ON(br_entry_size != 24);
24177
24178 /* if (unlikely(flags)) return -EINVAL */
24179 insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_3, 0, 7);
24180
24181 /* Transform size (bytes) into number of entries (cnt = size / 24).
24182 * But to avoid expensive division instruction, we implement
24183 * divide-by-3 through multiplication, followed by further
24184 * division by 8 through 3-bit right shift.
24185 * Refer to book "Hacker's Delight, 2nd ed." by Henry S. Warren, Jr.,
24186 * p. 227, chapter "Unsigned Division by 3" for details and proofs.
24187 *
24188 * N / 3 <=> M * N / 2^33, where M = (2^33 + 1) / 3 = 0xaaaaaaab.
24189 */
24190 insn_buf[1] = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0xaaaaaaab);
24191 insn_buf[2] = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MUL, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0);
24192 insn_buf[3] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_2, 36);
24193
24194 /* call perf_snapshot_branch_stack implementation */
24195 insn_buf[4] = BPF_EMIT_CALL(static_call_query(perf_snapshot_branch_stack));
24196 /* if (entry_cnt == 0) return -ENOENT */
24197 insn_buf[5] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 4);
24198 /* return entry_cnt * sizeof(struct perf_branch_entry) */
24199 insn_buf[6] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MUL, BPF_REG_0, br_entry_size);
24200 insn_buf[7] = BPF_JMP_A(3);
24201 /* return -EINVAL; */
24202 insn_buf[8] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -EINVAL);
24203 insn_buf[9] = BPF_JMP_A(1);
24204 /* return -ENOENT; */
24205 insn_buf[10] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -ENOENT);
24206 cnt = 11;
24207
24208 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
24209 if (!new_prog)
24210 return -ENOMEM;
24211
24212 delta += cnt - 1;
24213 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
24214 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
24215 goto next_insn;
24216 }
24217
24218 /* Implement bpf_kptr_xchg inline */
24219 if (prog->jit_requested && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
24220 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg &&
24221 bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg()) {
24222 insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2);
24223 insn_buf[1] = BPF_ATOMIC_OP(BPF_DW, BPF_XCHG, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0);
24224 cnt = 2;
24225
24226 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
24227 if (!new_prog)
24228 return -ENOMEM;
24229
24230 delta += cnt - 1;
24231 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
24232 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
24233 goto next_insn;
24234 }
24235 patch_call_imm:
24236 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, env->prog);
24237 /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
24238 * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
24239 */
24240 if (!fn->func) {
24241 verifier_bug(env,
24242 "not inlined functions %s#%d is missing func",
24243 func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
24244 return -EFAULT;
24245 }
24246 insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
24247 next_insn:
24248 if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) {
24249 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra;
24250 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_extra = stack_depth_extra;
24251
24252 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth;
24253 if (stack_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK && !prog->jit_requested) {
24254 verbose(env, "stack size %d(extra %d) is too large\n",
24255 stack_depth, stack_depth_extra);
24256 return -EINVAL;
24257 }
24258 cur_subprog++;
24259 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth;
24260 stack_depth_extra = 0;
24261 }
24262 i++;
24263 insn++;
24264 }
24265
24266 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = subprogs[0].stack_depth;
24267 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
24268 int delta = bpf_jit_supports_timed_may_goto() ? 2 : 1;
24269 int subprog_start = subprogs[i].start;
24270 int stack_slots = subprogs[i].stack_extra / 8;
24271 int slots = delta, cnt = 0;
24272
24273 if (!stack_slots)
24274 continue;
24275 /* We need two slots in case timed may_goto is supported. */
24276 if (stack_slots > slots) {
24277 verifier_bug(env, "stack_slots supports may_goto only");
24278 return -EFAULT;
24279 }
24280
24281 stack_depth = subprogs[i].stack_depth;
24282 if (bpf_jit_supports_timed_may_goto()) {
24283 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, -stack_depth,
24284 BPF_MAX_TIMED_LOOPS);
24285 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, -stack_depth + 8, 0);
24286 } else {
24287 /* Add ST insn to subprog prologue to init extra stack */
24288 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, -stack_depth,
24289 BPF_MAX_LOOPS);
24290 }
24291 /* Copy first actual insn to preserve it */
24292 insn_buf[cnt++] = env->prog->insnsi[subprog_start];
24293
24294 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, subprog_start, insn_buf, cnt);
24295 if (!new_prog)
24296 return -ENOMEM;
24297 env->prog = prog = new_prog;
24298 /*
24299 * If may_goto is a first insn of a prog there could be a jmp
24300 * insn that points to it, hence adjust all such jmps to point
24301 * to insn after BPF_ST that inits may_goto count.
24302 * Adjustment will succeed because bpf_patch_insn_data() didn't fail.
24303 */
24304 WARN_ON(adjust_jmp_off(env->prog, subprog_start, delta));
24305 }
24306
24307 /* Since poke tab is now finalized, publish aux to tracker. */
24308 for (i = 0; i < prog->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) {
24309 map_ptr = prog->aux->poke_tab[i].tail_call.map;
24310 if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track ||
24311 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack ||
24312 !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) {
24313 verifier_bug(env, "poke tab is misconfigured");
24314 return -EFAULT;
24315 }
24316
24317 ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux);
24318 if (ret < 0) {
24319 verbose(env, "tracking tail call prog failed\n");
24320 return ret;
24321 }
24322 }
24323
24324 ret = sort_kfunc_descs_by_imm_off(env);
24325 if (ret)
24326 return ret;
24327
24328 return 0;
24329 }
24330
inline_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int position,s32 stack_base,u32 callback_subprogno,u32 * total_cnt)24331 static struct bpf_prog *inline_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
24332 int position,
24333 s32 stack_base,
24334 u32 callback_subprogno,
24335 u32 *total_cnt)
24336 {
24337 s32 r6_offset = stack_base + 0 * BPF_REG_SIZE;
24338 s32 r7_offset = stack_base + 1 * BPF_REG_SIZE;
24339 s32 r8_offset = stack_base + 2 * BPF_REG_SIZE;
24340 int reg_loop_max = BPF_REG_6;
24341 int reg_loop_cnt = BPF_REG_7;
24342 int reg_loop_ctx = BPF_REG_8;
24343
24344 struct bpf_insn *insn_buf = env->insn_buf;
24345 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
24346 u32 callback_start;
24347 u32 call_insn_offset;
24348 s32 callback_offset;
24349 u32 cnt = 0;
24350
24351 /* This represents an inlined version of bpf_iter.c:bpf_loop,
24352 * be careful to modify this code in sync.
24353 */
24354
24355 /* Return error and jump to the end of the patch if
24356 * expected number of iterations is too big.
24357 */
24358 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_1, BPF_MAX_LOOPS, 2);
24359 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, -E2BIG);
24360 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 16);
24361 /* spill R6, R7, R8 to use these as loop vars */
24362 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, r6_offset);
24363 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, r7_offset);
24364 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_8, r8_offset);
24365 /* initialize loop vars */
24366 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_max, BPF_REG_1);
24367 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV32_IMM(reg_loop_cnt, 0);
24368 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(reg_loop_ctx, BPF_REG_3);
24369 /* loop header,
24370 * if reg_loop_cnt >= reg_loop_max skip the loop body
24371 */
24372 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, reg_loop_cnt, reg_loop_max, 5);
24373 /* callback call,
24374 * correct callback offset would be set after patching
24375 */
24376 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, reg_loop_cnt);
24377 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, reg_loop_ctx);
24378 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_CALL_REL(0);
24379 /* increment loop counter */
24380 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, reg_loop_cnt, 1);
24381 /* jump to loop header if callback returned 0 */
24382 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, -6);
24383 /* return value of bpf_loop,
24384 * set R0 to the number of iterations
24385 */
24386 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, reg_loop_cnt);
24387 /* restore original values of R6, R7, R8 */
24388 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, r6_offset);
24389 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, r7_offset);
24390 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, r8_offset);
24391
24392 *total_cnt = cnt;
24393 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, position, insn_buf, cnt);
24394 if (!new_prog)
24395 return new_prog;
24396
24397 /* callback start is known only after patching */
24398 callback_start = env->subprog_info[callback_subprogno].start;
24399 /* Note: insn_buf[12] is an offset of BPF_CALL_REL instruction */
24400 call_insn_offset = position + 12;
24401 callback_offset = callback_start - call_insn_offset - 1;
24402 new_prog->insnsi[call_insn_offset].imm = callback_offset;
24403
24404 return new_prog;
24405 }
24406
is_bpf_loop_call(struct bpf_insn * insn)24407 static bool is_bpf_loop_call(struct bpf_insn *insn)
24408 {
24409 return insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
24410 insn->src_reg == 0 &&
24411 insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_loop;
24412 }
24413
24414 /* For all sub-programs in the program (including main) check
24415 * insn_aux_data to see if there are bpf_loop calls that require
24416 * inlining. If such calls are found the calls are replaced with a
24417 * sequence of instructions produced by `inline_bpf_loop` function and
24418 * subprog stack_depth is increased by the size of 3 registers.
24419 * This stack space is used to spill values of the R6, R7, R8. These
24420 * registers are used to store the loop bound, counter and context
24421 * variables.
24422 */
optimize_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)24423 static int optimize_bpf_loop(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
24424 {
24425 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprogs = env->subprog_info;
24426 int i, cur_subprog = 0, cnt, delta = 0;
24427 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
24428 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
24429 u16 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth;
24430 u16 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth;
24431 u16 stack_depth_extra = 0;
24432
24433 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
24434 struct bpf_loop_inline_state *inline_state =
24435 &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].loop_inline_state;
24436
24437 if (is_bpf_loop_call(insn) && inline_state->fit_for_inline) {
24438 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
24439
24440 stack_depth_extra = BPF_REG_SIZE * 3 + stack_depth_roundup;
24441 new_prog = inline_bpf_loop(env,
24442 i + delta,
24443 -(stack_depth + stack_depth_extra),
24444 inline_state->callback_subprogno,
24445 &cnt);
24446 if (!new_prog)
24447 return -ENOMEM;
24448
24449 delta += cnt - 1;
24450 env->prog = new_prog;
24451 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
24452 }
24453
24454 if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) {
24455 subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra;
24456 cur_subprog++;
24457 stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth;
24458 stack_depth_roundup = round_up(stack_depth, 8) - stack_depth;
24459 stack_depth_extra = 0;
24460 }
24461 }
24462
24463 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth;
24464
24465 return 0;
24466 }
24467
24468 /* Remove unnecessary spill/fill pairs, members of fastcall pattern,
24469 * adjust subprograms stack depth when possible.
24470 */
remove_fastcall_spills_fills(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)24471 static int remove_fastcall_spills_fills(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
24472 {
24473 struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
24474 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data;
24475 struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
24476 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
24477 u32 spills_num;
24478 bool modified = false;
24479 int i, j;
24480
24481 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
24482 if (aux[i].fastcall_spills_num > 0) {
24483 spills_num = aux[i].fastcall_spills_num;
24484 /* NOPs would be removed by opt_remove_nops() */
24485 for (j = 1; j <= spills_num; ++j) {
24486 *(insn - j) = NOP;
24487 *(insn + j) = NOP;
24488 }
24489 modified = true;
24490 }
24491 if ((subprog + 1)->start == i + 1) {
24492 if (modified && !subprog->keep_fastcall_stack)
24493 subprog->stack_depth = -subprog->fastcall_stack_off;
24494 subprog++;
24495 modified = false;
24496 }
24497 }
24498
24499 return 0;
24500 }
24501
free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)24502 static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
24503 {
24504 struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
24505 struct list_head *head, *pos, *tmp;
24506 struct bpf_scc_info *info;
24507 int i, j;
24508
24509 free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);
24510 env->cur_state = NULL;
24511 while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false));
24512
24513 list_for_each_safe(pos, tmp, &env->free_list) {
24514 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node);
24515 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
24516 kfree(sl);
24517 }
24518 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->free_list);
24519
24520 for (i = 0; i < env->scc_cnt; ++i) {
24521 info = env->scc_info[i];
24522 if (!info)
24523 continue;
24524 for (j = 0; j < info->num_visits; j++)
24525 free_backedges(&info->visits[j]);
24526 kvfree(info);
24527 env->scc_info[i] = NULL;
24528 }
24529
24530 if (!env->explored_states)
24531 return;
24532
24533 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++) {
24534 head = &env->explored_states[i];
24535
24536 list_for_each_safe(pos, tmp, head) {
24537 sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node);
24538 free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
24539 kfree(sl);
24540 }
24541 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->explored_states[i]);
24542 }
24543 }
24544
do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int subprog)24545 static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
24546 {
24547 bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2);
24548 struct bpf_subprog_info *sub = subprog_info(env, subprog);
24549 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
24550 struct bpf_verifier_state *state;
24551 struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
24552 int ret, i;
24553
24554 env->prev_linfo = NULL;
24555 env->pass_cnt++;
24556
24557 state = kzalloc_obj(struct bpf_verifier_state, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
24558 if (!state)
24559 return -ENOMEM;
24560 state->curframe = 0;
24561 state->speculative = false;
24562 state->branches = 1;
24563 state->in_sleepable = env->prog->sleepable;
24564 state->frame[0] = kzalloc_obj(struct bpf_func_state, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
24565 if (!state->frame[0]) {
24566 kfree(state);
24567 return -ENOMEM;
24568 }
24569 env->cur_state = state;
24570 init_func_state(env, state->frame[0],
24571 BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */,
24572 0 /* frameno */,
24573 subprog);
24574 state->first_insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start;
24575 state->last_insn_idx = -1;
24576
24577 regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs;
24578 if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) {
24579 const char *sub_name = subprog_name(env, subprog);
24580 struct bpf_subprog_arg_info *arg;
24581 struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
24582
24583 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
24584 verbose(env, "Validating %s() func#%d...\n", sub_name, subprog);
24585 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog);
24586 if (ret)
24587 goto out;
24588
24589 if (subprog_is_exc_cb(env, subprog)) {
24590 state->frame[0]->in_exception_callback_fn = true;
24591 /* We have already ensured that the callback returns an integer, just
24592 * like all global subprogs. We need to determine it only has a single
24593 * scalar argument.
24594 */
24595 if (sub->arg_cnt != 1 || sub->args[0].arg_type != ARG_ANYTHING) {
24596 verbose(env, "exception cb only supports single integer argument\n");
24597 ret = -EINVAL;
24598 goto out;
24599 }
24600 }
24601 for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= sub->arg_cnt; i++) {
24602 arg = &sub->args[i - BPF_REG_1];
24603 reg = ®s[i];
24604
24605 if (arg->arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
24606 reg->type = PTR_TO_CTX;
24607 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i);
24608 } else if (arg->arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
24609 reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
24610 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
24611 } else if (arg->arg_type == (ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY)) {
24612 /* assume unspecial LOCAL dynptr type */
24613 __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL, true, ++env->id_gen);
24614 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) {
24615 reg->type = PTR_TO_MEM;
24616 reg->type |= arg->arg_type &
24617 (PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED | MEM_RDONLY);
24618 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i);
24619 reg->mem_size = arg->mem_size;
24620 if (arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL)
24621 reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
24622 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
24623 reg->type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
24624 if (arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL)
24625 reg->type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
24626 if (arg->arg_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)
24627 reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
24628 if (arg->arg_type & PTR_TRUSTED)
24629 reg->type |= PTR_TRUSTED;
24630 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i);
24631 reg->btf = bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); /* can't fail at this point */
24632 reg->btf_id = arg->btf_id;
24633 reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
24634 } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_ARENA) {
24635 /* caller can pass either PTR_TO_ARENA or SCALAR */
24636 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
24637 } else {
24638 verifier_bug(env, "unhandled arg#%d type %d",
24639 i - BPF_REG_1, arg->arg_type);
24640 ret = -EFAULT;
24641 goto out;
24642 }
24643 }
24644 } else {
24645 /* if main BPF program has associated BTF info, validate that
24646 * it's matching expected signature, and otherwise mark BTF
24647 * info for main program as unreliable
24648 */
24649 if (env->prog->aux->func_info_aux) {
24650 ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, 0);
24651 if (ret || sub->arg_cnt != 1 || sub->args[0].arg_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX)
24652 env->prog->aux->func_info_aux[0].unreliable = true;
24653 }
24654
24655 /* 1st arg to a function */
24656 regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
24657 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1);
24658 }
24659
24660 /* Acquire references for struct_ops program arguments tagged with "__ref" */
24661 if (!subprog && env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) {
24662 for (i = 0; i < aux->ctx_arg_info_size; i++)
24663 aux->ctx_arg_info[i].ref_obj_id = aux->ctx_arg_info[i].refcounted ?
24664 acquire_reference(env, 0) : 0;
24665 }
24666
24667 ret = do_check(env);
24668 out:
24669 if (!ret && pop_log)
24670 bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0);
24671 free_states(env);
24672 return ret;
24673 }
24674
24675 /* Lazily verify all global functions based on their BTF, if they are called
24676 * from main BPF program or any of subprograms transitively.
24677 * BPF global subprogs called from dead code are not validated.
24678 * All callable global functions must pass verification.
24679 * Otherwise the whole program is rejected.
24680 * Consider:
24681 * int bar(int);
24682 * int foo(int f)
24683 * {
24684 * return bar(f);
24685 * }
24686 * int bar(int b)
24687 * {
24688 * ...
24689 * }
24690 * foo() will be verified first for R1=any_scalar_value. During verification it
24691 * will be assumed that bar() already verified successfully and call to bar()
24692 * from foo() will be checked for type match only. Later bar() will be verified
24693 * independently to check that it's safe for R1=any_scalar_value.
24694 */
do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)24695 static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
24696 {
24697 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
24698 struct bpf_func_info_aux *sub_aux;
24699 int i, ret, new_cnt;
24700
24701 if (!aux->func_info)
24702 return 0;
24703
24704 /* exception callback is presumed to be always called */
24705 if (env->exception_callback_subprog)
24706 subprog_aux(env, env->exception_callback_subprog)->called = true;
24707
24708 again:
24709 new_cnt = 0;
24710 for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
24711 if (!subprog_is_global(env, i))
24712 continue;
24713
24714 sub_aux = subprog_aux(env, i);
24715 if (!sub_aux->called || sub_aux->verified)
24716 continue;
24717
24718 env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start;
24719 WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0);
24720 ret = do_check_common(env, i);
24721 if (ret) {
24722 return ret;
24723 } else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
24724 verbose(env, "Func#%d ('%s') is safe for any args that match its prototype\n",
24725 i, subprog_name(env, i));
24726 }
24727
24728 /* We verified new global subprog, it might have called some
24729 * more global subprogs that we haven't verified yet, so we
24730 * need to do another pass over subprogs to verify those.
24731 */
24732 sub_aux->verified = true;
24733 new_cnt++;
24734 }
24735
24736 /* We can't loop forever as we verify at least one global subprog on
24737 * each pass.
24738 */
24739 if (new_cnt)
24740 goto again;
24741
24742 return 0;
24743 }
24744
do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)24745 static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
24746 {
24747 int ret;
24748
24749 env->insn_idx = 0;
24750 ret = do_check_common(env, 0);
24751 if (!ret)
24752 env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth;
24753 return ret;
24754 }
24755
24756
print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)24757 static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
24758 {
24759 int i;
24760
24761 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) {
24762 verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n",
24763 div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000));
24764 verbose(env, "stack depth ");
24765 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
24766 u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
24767
24768 verbose(env, "%d", depth);
24769 if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt)
24770 verbose(env, "+");
24771 }
24772 verbose(env, "\n");
24773 }
24774 verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d "
24775 "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n",
24776 env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS,
24777 env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states,
24778 env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk);
24779 }
24780
bpf_prog_ctx_arg_info_init(struct bpf_prog * prog,const struct bpf_ctx_arg_aux * info,u32 cnt)24781 int bpf_prog_ctx_arg_info_init(struct bpf_prog *prog,
24782 const struct bpf_ctx_arg_aux *info, u32 cnt)
24783 {
24784 prog->aux->ctx_arg_info = kmemdup_array(info, cnt, sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
24785 prog->aux->ctx_arg_info_size = cnt;
24786
24787 return prog->aux->ctx_arg_info ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
24788 }
24789
check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)24790 static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
24791 {
24792 const struct btf_type *t, *func_proto;
24793 const struct bpf_struct_ops_desc *st_ops_desc;
24794 const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops;
24795 const struct btf_member *member;
24796 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
24797 bool has_refcounted_arg = false;
24798 u32 btf_id, member_idx, member_off;
24799 struct btf *btf;
24800 const char *mname;
24801 int i, err;
24802
24803 if (!prog->gpl_compatible) {
24804 verbose(env, "struct ops programs must have a GPL compatible license\n");
24805 return -EINVAL;
24806 }
24807
24808 if (!prog->aux->attach_btf_id)
24809 return -ENOTSUPP;
24810
24811 btf = prog->aux->attach_btf;
24812 if (btf_is_module(btf)) {
24813 /* Make sure st_ops is valid through the lifetime of env */
24814 env->attach_btf_mod = btf_try_get_module(btf);
24815 if (!env->attach_btf_mod) {
24816 verbose(env, "struct_ops module %s is not found\n",
24817 btf_get_name(btf));
24818 return -ENOTSUPP;
24819 }
24820 }
24821
24822 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id;
24823 st_ops_desc = bpf_struct_ops_find(btf, btf_id);
24824 if (!st_ops_desc) {
24825 verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a supported struct\n",
24826 btf_id);
24827 return -ENOTSUPP;
24828 }
24829 st_ops = st_ops_desc->st_ops;
24830
24831 t = st_ops_desc->type;
24832 member_idx = prog->expected_attach_type;
24833 if (member_idx >= btf_type_vlen(t)) {
24834 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member idx %u of struct %s\n",
24835 member_idx, st_ops->name);
24836 return -EINVAL;
24837 }
24838
24839 member = &btf_type_member(t)[member_idx];
24840 mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, member->name_off);
24841 func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf, member->type,
24842 NULL);
24843 if (!func_proto) {
24844 verbose(env, "attach to invalid member %s(@idx %u) of struct %s\n",
24845 mname, member_idx, st_ops->name);
24846 return -EINVAL;
24847 }
24848
24849 member_off = __btf_member_bit_offset(t, member) / 8;
24850 err = bpf_struct_ops_supported(st_ops, member_off);
24851 if (err) {
24852 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n",
24853 mname, st_ops->name);
24854 return err;
24855 }
24856
24857 if (st_ops->check_member) {
24858 err = st_ops->check_member(t, member, prog);
24859
24860 if (err) {
24861 verbose(env, "attach to unsupported member %s of struct %s\n",
24862 mname, st_ops->name);
24863 return err;
24864 }
24865 }
24866
24867 if (prog->aux->priv_stack_requested && !bpf_jit_supports_private_stack()) {
24868 verbose(env, "Private stack not supported by jit\n");
24869 return -EACCES;
24870 }
24871
24872 for (i = 0; i < st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].cnt; i++) {
24873 if (st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].info->refcounted) {
24874 has_refcounted_arg = true;
24875 break;
24876 }
24877 }
24878
24879 /* Tail call is not allowed for programs with refcounted arguments since we
24880 * cannot guarantee that valid refcounted kptrs will be passed to the callee.
24881 */
24882 for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
24883 if (has_refcounted_arg && env->subprog_info[i].has_tail_call) {
24884 verbose(env, "program with __ref argument cannot tail call\n");
24885 return -EINVAL;
24886 }
24887 }
24888
24889 prog->aux->st_ops = st_ops;
24890 prog->aux->attach_st_ops_member_off = member_off;
24891
24892 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = func_proto;
24893 prog->aux->attach_func_name = mname;
24894 env->ops = st_ops->verifier_ops;
24895
24896 return bpf_prog_ctx_arg_info_init(prog, st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].info,
24897 st_ops_desc->arg_info[member_idx].cnt);
24898 }
24899 #define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_"
24900
check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr,const char * func_name)24901 static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)
24902 {
24903 if (within_error_injection_list(addr) ||
24904 !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, func_name, sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
24905 return 0;
24906
24907 return -EINVAL;
24908 }
24909
24910 /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on
24911 * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list
24912 */
24913 BTF_SET_START(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject)
24914 /* Three functions below can be called from sleepable and non-sleepable context.
24915 * Assume non-sleepable from bpf safety point of view.
24916 */
BTF_ID(func,__filemap_add_folio)24917 BTF_ID(func, __filemap_add_folio)
24918 #ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_PAGE_ALLOC
24919 BTF_ID(func, should_fail_alloc_page)
24920 #endif
24921 #ifdef CONFIG_FAILSLAB
24922 BTF_ID(func, should_failslab)
24923 #endif
24924 BTF_SET_END(btf_non_sleepable_error_inject)
24925
24926 static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id)
24927 {
24928 return btf_id_set_contains(&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id);
24929 }
24930
bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log * log,const struct bpf_prog * prog,const struct bpf_prog * tgt_prog,u32 btf_id,struct bpf_attach_target_info * tgt_info)24931 int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
24932 const struct bpf_prog *prog,
24933 const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog,
24934 u32 btf_id,
24935 struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info)
24936 {
24937 bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT;
24938 bool prog_tracing = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING;
24939 char trace_symbol[KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN];
24940 const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_";
24941 struct bpf_raw_event_map *btp;
24942 int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i;
24943 const struct btf_type *t;
24944 bool conservative = true;
24945 const char *tname, *fname;
24946 struct btf *btf;
24947 long addr = 0;
24948 struct module *mod = NULL;
24949
24950 if (!btf_id) {
24951 bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n");
24952 return -EINVAL;
24953 }
24954 btf = tgt_prog ? tgt_prog->aux->btf : prog->aux->attach_btf;
24955 if (!btf) {
24956 bpf_log(log,
24957 "FENTRY/FEXIT program can only be attached to another program annotated with BTF\n");
24958 return -EINVAL;
24959 }
24960 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id);
24961 if (!t) {
24962 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is invalid\n", btf_id);
24963 return -EINVAL;
24964 }
24965 tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
24966 if (!tname) {
24967 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u doesn't have a name\n", btf_id);
24968 return -EINVAL;
24969 }
24970 if (tgt_prog) {
24971 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = tgt_prog->aux;
24972 bool tgt_changes_pkt_data;
24973 bool tgt_might_sleep;
24974
24975 if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux) &&
24976 !bpf_prog_dev_bound_match(prog, tgt_prog)) {
24977 bpf_log(log, "Target program bound device mismatch");
24978 return -EINVAL;
24979 }
24980
24981 for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++)
24982 if (aux->func_info[i].type_id == btf_id) {
24983 subprog = i;
24984 break;
24985 }
24986 if (subprog == -1) {
24987 bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname);
24988 return -EINVAL;
24989 }
24990 if (aux->func && aux->func[subprog]->aux->exception_cb) {
24991 bpf_log(log,
24992 "%s programs cannot attach to exception callback\n",
24993 prog_extension ? "Extension" : "FENTRY/FEXIT");
24994 return -EINVAL;
24995 }
24996 conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable;
24997 if (prog_extension) {
24998 if (conservative) {
24999 bpf_log(log,
25000 "Cannot replace static functions\n");
25001 return -EINVAL;
25002 }
25003 if (!prog->jit_requested) {
25004 bpf_log(log,
25005 "Extension programs should be JITed\n");
25006 return -EINVAL;
25007 }
25008 tgt_changes_pkt_data = aux->func
25009 ? aux->func[subprog]->aux->changes_pkt_data
25010 : aux->changes_pkt_data;
25011 if (prog->aux->changes_pkt_data && !tgt_changes_pkt_data) {
25012 bpf_log(log,
25013 "Extension program changes packet data, while original does not\n");
25014 return -EINVAL;
25015 }
25016
25017 tgt_might_sleep = aux->func
25018 ? aux->func[subprog]->aux->might_sleep
25019 : aux->might_sleep;
25020 if (prog->aux->might_sleep && !tgt_might_sleep) {
25021 bpf_log(log,
25022 "Extension program may sleep, while original does not\n");
25023 return -EINVAL;
25024 }
25025 }
25026 if (!tgt_prog->jited) {
25027 bpf_log(log, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n");
25028 return -EINVAL;
25029 }
25030 if (prog_tracing) {
25031 if (aux->attach_tracing_prog) {
25032 /*
25033 * Target program is an fentry/fexit which is already attached
25034 * to another tracing program. More levels of nesting
25035 * attachment are not allowed.
25036 */
25037 bpf_log(log, "Cannot nest tracing program attach more than once\n");
25038 return -EINVAL;
25039 }
25040 } else if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) {
25041 /*
25042 * To avoid potential call chain cycles, prevent attaching of a
25043 * program extension to another extension. It's ok to attach
25044 * fentry/fexit to extension program.
25045 */
25046 bpf_log(log, "Cannot recursively attach\n");
25047 return -EINVAL;
25048 }
25049 if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
25050 prog_extension &&
25051 (tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FENTRY ||
25052 tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT ||
25053 tgt_prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FSESSION)) {
25054 /* Program extensions can extend all program types
25055 * except fentry/fexit. The reason is the following.
25056 * The fentry/fexit programs are used for performance
25057 * analysis, stats and can be attached to any program
25058 * type. When extension program is replacing XDP function
25059 * it is necessary to allow performance analysis of all
25060 * functions. Both original XDP program and its program
25061 * extension. Hence attaching fentry/fexit to
25062 * BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT is allowed. If extending of
25063 * fentry/fexit was allowed it would be possible to create
25064 * long call chain fentry->extension->fentry->extension
25065 * beyond reasonable stack size. Hence extending fentry
25066 * is not allowed.
25067 */
25068 bpf_log(log, "Cannot extend fentry/fexit/fsession\n");
25069 return -EINVAL;
25070 }
25071 } else {
25072 if (prog_extension) {
25073 bpf_log(log, "Cannot replace kernel functions\n");
25074 return -EINVAL;
25075 }
25076 }
25077
25078 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) {
25079 case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP:
25080 if (tgt_prog) {
25081 bpf_log(log,
25082 "Only FENTRY/FEXIT progs are attachable to another BPF prog\n");
25083 return -EINVAL;
25084 }
25085 if (!btf_type_is_typedef(t)) {
25086 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a typedef\n",
25087 btf_id);
25088 return -EINVAL;
25089 }
25090 if (strncmp(prefix, tname, sizeof(prefix) - 1)) {
25091 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n",
25092 btf_id, tname);
25093 return -EINVAL;
25094 }
25095 tname += sizeof(prefix) - 1;
25096
25097 /* The func_proto of "btf_trace_##tname" is generated from typedef without argument
25098 * names. Thus using bpf_raw_event_map to get argument names.
25099 */
25100 btp = bpf_get_raw_tracepoint(tname);
25101 if (!btp)
25102 return -EINVAL;
25103 fname = kallsyms_lookup((unsigned long)btp->bpf_func, NULL, NULL, NULL,
25104 trace_symbol);
25105 bpf_put_raw_tracepoint(btp);
25106
25107 if (fname)
25108 ret = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, fname, BTF_KIND_FUNC);
25109
25110 if (!fname || ret < 0) {
25111 bpf_log(log, "Cannot find btf of tracepoint template, fall back to %s%s.\n",
25112 prefix, tname);
25113 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
25114 if (!btf_type_is_ptr(t))
25115 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */
25116 return -EINVAL;
25117 } else {
25118 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, ret);
25119 if (!btf_type_is_func(t))
25120 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */
25121 return -EINVAL;
25122 }
25123
25124 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
25125 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
25126 /* should never happen in valid vmlinux build */
25127 return -EINVAL;
25128
25129 break;
25130 case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
25131 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) {
25132 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n",
25133 btf_id);
25134 return -EINVAL;
25135 }
25136 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
25137 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
25138 return -EINVAL;
25139 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel);
25140 if (ret)
25141 return ret;
25142 break;
25143 default:
25144 if (!prog_extension)
25145 return -EINVAL;
25146 fallthrough;
25147 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
25148 case BPF_LSM_MAC:
25149 case BPF_LSM_CGROUP:
25150 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY:
25151 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT:
25152 case BPF_TRACE_FSESSION:
25153 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FSESSION &&
25154 !bpf_jit_supports_fsession()) {
25155 bpf_log(log, "JIT does not support fsession\n");
25156 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
25157 }
25158 if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) {
25159 bpf_log(log, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n",
25160 btf_id);
25161 return -EINVAL;
25162 }
25163 if (prog_extension &&
25164 btf_check_type_match(log, prog, btf, t))
25165 return -EINVAL;
25166 t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type);
25167 if (!btf_type_is_func_proto(t))
25168 return -EINVAL;
25169
25170 if ((prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type || prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type) &&
25171 (!tgt_prog || prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type != tgt_prog->type ||
25172 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type != tgt_prog->expected_attach_type))
25173 return -EINVAL;
25174
25175 if (tgt_prog && conservative)
25176 t = NULL;
25177
25178 ret = btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, t, tname, &tgt_info->fmodel);
25179 if (ret < 0)
25180 return ret;
25181
25182 if (tgt_prog) {
25183 if (subprog == 0)
25184 addr = (long) tgt_prog->bpf_func;
25185 else
25186 addr = (long) tgt_prog->aux->func[subprog]->bpf_func;
25187 } else {
25188 if (btf_is_module(btf)) {
25189 mod = btf_try_get_module(btf);
25190 if (mod)
25191 addr = find_kallsyms_symbol_value(mod, tname);
25192 else
25193 addr = 0;
25194 } else {
25195 addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname);
25196 }
25197 if (!addr) {
25198 module_put(mod);
25199 bpf_log(log,
25200 "The address of function %s cannot be found\n",
25201 tname);
25202 return -ENOENT;
25203 }
25204 }
25205
25206 if (prog->sleepable) {
25207 ret = -EINVAL;
25208 switch (prog->type) {
25209 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
25210
25211 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are
25212 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist.
25213 */
25214 if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) &&
25215 within_error_injection_list(addr))
25216 ret = 0;
25217 /* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can also be sleepable if they are
25218 * in the fmodret id set with the KF_SLEEPABLE flag.
25219 */
25220 else {
25221 u32 *flags = btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id,
25222 prog);
25223
25224 if (flags && (*flags & KF_SLEEPABLE))
25225 ret = 0;
25226 }
25227 break;
25228 case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
25229 /* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs.
25230 * Only some of them are sleepable.
25231 */
25232 if (bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(btf_id))
25233 ret = 0;
25234 break;
25235 default:
25236 break;
25237 }
25238 if (ret) {
25239 module_put(mod);
25240 bpf_log(log, "%s is not sleepable\n", tname);
25241 return ret;
25242 }
25243 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) {
25244 if (tgt_prog) {
25245 module_put(mod);
25246 bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n");
25247 return -EINVAL;
25248 }
25249 ret = -EINVAL;
25250 if (btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id, prog) ||
25251 !check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname))
25252 ret = 0;
25253 if (ret) {
25254 module_put(mod);
25255 bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname);
25256 return ret;
25257 }
25258 }
25259
25260 break;
25261 }
25262 tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr;
25263 tgt_info->tgt_name = tname;
25264 tgt_info->tgt_type = t;
25265 tgt_info->tgt_mod = mod;
25266 return 0;
25267 }
25268
BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny)25269 BTF_SET_START(btf_id_deny)
25270 BTF_ID_UNUSED
25271 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
25272 BTF_ID(func, ___migrate_enable)
25273 BTF_ID(func, migrate_disable)
25274 BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable)
25275 #endif
25276 #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU
25277 BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict)
25278 #endif
25279 #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) || defined(CONFIG_TRACE_PREEMPT_TOGGLE)
25280 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_add)
25281 BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_sub)
25282 #endif
25283 #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU
25284 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_lock)
25285 BTF_ID(func, __rcu_read_unlock)
25286 #endif
25287 BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny)
25288
25289 /* fexit and fmod_ret can't be used to attach to __noreturn functions.
25290 * Currently, we must manually list all __noreturn functions here. Once a more
25291 * robust solution is implemented, this workaround can be removed.
25292 */
25293 BTF_SET_START(noreturn_deny)
25294 #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
25295 BTF_ID(func, __ia32_sys_exit)
25296 BTF_ID(func, __ia32_sys_exit_group)
25297 #endif
25298 #ifdef CONFIG_KUNIT
25299 BTF_ID(func, __kunit_abort)
25300 BTF_ID(func, kunit_try_catch_throw)
25301 #endif
25302 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
25303 BTF_ID(func, __module_put_and_kthread_exit)
25304 #endif
25305 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
25306 BTF_ID(func, __x64_sys_exit)
25307 BTF_ID(func, __x64_sys_exit_group)
25308 #endif
25309 BTF_ID(func, do_exit)
25310 BTF_ID(func, do_group_exit)
25311 BTF_ID(func, kthread_complete_and_exit)
25312 BTF_ID(func, make_task_dead)
25313 BTF_SET_END(noreturn_deny)
25314
25315 static bool can_be_sleepable(struct bpf_prog *prog)
25316 {
25317 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING) {
25318 switch (prog->expected_attach_type) {
25319 case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY:
25320 case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT:
25321 case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN:
25322 case BPF_TRACE_ITER:
25323 case BPF_TRACE_FSESSION:
25324 return true;
25325 default:
25326 return false;
25327 }
25328 }
25329 return prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM ||
25330 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE /* only for uprobes */ ||
25331 prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS;
25332 }
25333
check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)25334 static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
25335 {
25336 struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
25337 struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = prog->aux->dst_prog;
25338 struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {};
25339 u32 btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id;
25340 struct bpf_trampoline *tr;
25341 int ret;
25342 u64 key;
25343
25344 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL) {
25345 if (prog->sleepable)
25346 /* attach_btf_id checked to be zero already */
25347 return 0;
25348 verbose(env, "Syscall programs can only be sleepable\n");
25349 return -EINVAL;
25350 }
25351
25352 if (prog->sleepable && !can_be_sleepable(prog)) {
25353 verbose(env, "Only fentry/fexit/fmod_ret, lsm, iter, uprobe, and struct_ops programs can be sleepable\n");
25354 return -EINVAL;
25355 }
25356
25357 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS)
25358 return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env);
25359
25360 if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
25361 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM &&
25362 prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT)
25363 return 0;
25364
25365 ret = bpf_check_attach_target(&env->log, prog, tgt_prog, btf_id, &tgt_info);
25366 if (ret)
25367 return ret;
25368
25369 if (tgt_prog && prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) {
25370 /* to make freplace equivalent to their targets, they need to
25371 * inherit env->ops and expected_attach_type for the rest of the
25372 * verification
25373 */
25374 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type];
25375 prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type;
25376 }
25377
25378 /* store info about the attachment target that will be used later */
25379 prog->aux->attach_func_proto = tgt_info.tgt_type;
25380 prog->aux->attach_func_name = tgt_info.tgt_name;
25381 prog->aux->mod = tgt_info.tgt_mod;
25382
25383 if (tgt_prog) {
25384 prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type = tgt_prog->type;
25385 prog->aux->saved_dst_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type;
25386 }
25387
25388 if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) {
25389 prog->aux->attach_btf_trace = true;
25390 return 0;
25391 } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) {
25392 return bpf_iter_prog_supported(prog);
25393 }
25394
25395 if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) {
25396 ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog);
25397 if (ret < 0)
25398 return ret;
25399 } else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING &&
25400 btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) {
25401 verbose(env, "Attaching tracing programs to function '%s' is rejected.\n",
25402 tgt_info.tgt_name);
25403 return -EINVAL;
25404 } else if ((prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT ||
25405 prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FSESSION ||
25406 prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) &&
25407 btf_id_set_contains(&noreturn_deny, btf_id)) {
25408 verbose(env, "Attaching fexit/fsession/fmod_ret to __noreturn function '%s' is rejected.\n",
25409 tgt_info.tgt_name);
25410 return -EINVAL;
25411 }
25412
25413 key = bpf_trampoline_compute_key(tgt_prog, prog->aux->attach_btf, btf_id);
25414 tr = bpf_trampoline_get(key, &tgt_info);
25415 if (!tr)
25416 return -ENOMEM;
25417
25418 if (tgt_prog && tgt_prog->aux->tail_call_reachable)
25419 tr->flags = BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX;
25420
25421 prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr;
25422 return 0;
25423 }
25424
bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void)25425 struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void)
25426 {
25427 if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) {
25428 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
25429 if (!btf_vmlinux)
25430 btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux();
25431 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
25432 }
25433 return btf_vmlinux;
25434 }
25435
25436 /*
25437 * The add_fd_from_fd_array() is executed only if fd_array_cnt is non-zero. In
25438 * this case expect that every file descriptor in the array is either a map or
25439 * a BTF. Everything else is considered to be trash.
25440 */
add_fd_from_fd_array(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,int fd)25441 static int add_fd_from_fd_array(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int fd)
25442 {
25443 struct bpf_map *map;
25444 struct btf *btf;
25445 CLASS(fd, f)(fd);
25446 int err;
25447
25448 map = __bpf_map_get(f);
25449 if (!IS_ERR(map)) {
25450 err = __add_used_map(env, map);
25451 if (err < 0)
25452 return err;
25453 return 0;
25454 }
25455
25456 btf = __btf_get_by_fd(f);
25457 if (!IS_ERR(btf)) {
25458 btf_get(btf);
25459 return __add_used_btf(env, btf);
25460 }
25461
25462 verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map or btf\n", fd);
25463 return PTR_ERR(map);
25464 }
25465
process_fd_array(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,union bpf_attr * attr,bpfptr_t uattr)25466 static int process_fd_array(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr)
25467 {
25468 size_t size = sizeof(int);
25469 int ret;
25470 int fd;
25471 u32 i;
25472
25473 env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel);
25474
25475 /*
25476 * The only difference between old (no fd_array_cnt is given) and new
25477 * APIs is that in the latter case the fd_array is expected to be
25478 * continuous and is scanned for map fds right away
25479 */
25480 if (!attr->fd_array_cnt)
25481 return 0;
25482
25483 /* Check for integer overflow */
25484 if (attr->fd_array_cnt >= (U32_MAX / size)) {
25485 verbose(env, "fd_array_cnt is too big (%u)\n", attr->fd_array_cnt);
25486 return -EINVAL;
25487 }
25488
25489 for (i = 0; i < attr->fd_array_cnt; i++) {
25490 if (copy_from_bpfptr_offset(&fd, env->fd_array, i * size, size))
25491 return -EFAULT;
25492
25493 ret = add_fd_from_fd_array(env, fd);
25494 if (ret)
25495 return ret;
25496 }
25497
25498 return 0;
25499 }
25500
25501 /* Each field is a register bitmask */
25502 struct insn_live_regs {
25503 u16 use; /* registers read by instruction */
25504 u16 def; /* registers written by instruction */
25505 u16 in; /* registers that may be alive before instruction */
25506 u16 out; /* registers that may be alive after instruction */
25507 };
25508
25509 /* Bitmask with 1s for all caller saved registers */
25510 #define ALL_CALLER_SAVED_REGS ((1u << CALLER_SAVED_REGS) - 1)
25511
25512 /* Compute info->{use,def} fields for the instruction */
compute_insn_live_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env * env,struct bpf_insn * insn,struct insn_live_regs * info)25513 static void compute_insn_live_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
25514 struct bpf_insn *insn,
25515 struct insn_live_regs *info)
25516 {
25517 struct call_summary cs;
25518 u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
25519 u8 code = BPF_OP(insn->code);
25520 u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
25521 u16 src = BIT(insn->src_reg);
25522 u16 dst = BIT(insn->dst_reg);
25523 u16 r0 = BIT(0);
25524 u16 def = 0;
25525 u16 use = 0xffff;
25526
25527 switch (class) {
25528 case BPF_LD:
25529 switch (mode) {
25530 case BPF_IMM:
25531 if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) {
25532 def = dst;
25533 use = 0;
25534 }
25535 break;
25536 case BPF_LD | BPF_ABS:
25537 case BPF_LD | BPF_IND:
25538 /* stick with defaults */
25539 break;
25540 }
25541 break;
25542 case BPF_LDX:
25543 switch (mode) {
25544 case BPF_MEM:
25545 case BPF_MEMSX:
25546 def = dst;
25547 use = src;
25548 break;
25549 }
25550 break;
25551 case BPF_ST:
25552 switch (mode) {
25553 case BPF_MEM:
25554 def = 0;
25555 use = dst;
25556 break;
25557 }
25558 break;
25559 case BPF_STX:
25560 switch (mode) {
25561 case BPF_MEM:
25562 def = 0;
25563 use = dst | src;
25564 break;
25565 case BPF_ATOMIC:
25566 switch (insn->imm) {
25567 case BPF_CMPXCHG:
25568 use = r0 | dst | src;
25569 def = r0;
25570 break;
25571 case BPF_LOAD_ACQ:
25572 def = dst;
25573 use = src;
25574 break;
25575 case BPF_STORE_REL:
25576 def = 0;
25577 use = dst | src;
25578 break;
25579 default:
25580 use = dst | src;
25581 if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)
25582 def = src;
25583 else
25584 def = 0;
25585 }
25586 break;
25587 }
25588 break;
25589 case BPF_ALU:
25590 case BPF_ALU64:
25591 switch (code) {
25592 case BPF_END:
25593 use = dst;
25594 def = dst;
25595 break;
25596 case BPF_MOV:
25597 def = dst;
25598 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
25599 use = 0;
25600 else
25601 use = src;
25602 break;
25603 default:
25604 def = dst;
25605 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
25606 use = dst;
25607 else
25608 use = dst | src;
25609 }
25610 break;
25611 case BPF_JMP:
25612 case BPF_JMP32:
25613 switch (code) {
25614 case BPF_JA:
25615 def = 0;
25616 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
25617 use = dst;
25618 else
25619 use = 0;
25620 break;
25621 case BPF_JCOND:
25622 def = 0;
25623 use = 0;
25624 break;
25625 case BPF_EXIT:
25626 def = 0;
25627 use = r0;
25628 break;
25629 case BPF_CALL:
25630 def = ALL_CALLER_SAVED_REGS;
25631 use = def & ~BIT(BPF_REG_0);
25632 if (get_call_summary(env, insn, &cs))
25633 use = GENMASK(cs.num_params, 1);
25634 break;
25635 default:
25636 def = 0;
25637 if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
25638 use = dst;
25639 else
25640 use = dst | src;
25641 }
25642 break;
25643 }
25644
25645 info->def = def;
25646 info->use = use;
25647 }
25648
25649 /* Compute may-live registers after each instruction in the program.
25650 * The register is live after the instruction I if it is read by some
25651 * instruction S following I during program execution and is not
25652 * overwritten between I and S.
25653 *
25654 * Store result in env->insn_aux_data[i].live_regs.
25655 */
compute_live_registers(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)25656 static int compute_live_registers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
25657 {
25658 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux = env->insn_aux_data;
25659 struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
25660 struct insn_live_regs *state;
25661 int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
25662 int err = 0, i, j;
25663 bool changed;
25664
25665 /* Use the following algorithm:
25666 * - define the following:
25667 * - I.use : a set of all registers read by instruction I;
25668 * - I.def : a set of all registers written by instruction I;
25669 * - I.in : a set of all registers that may be alive before I execution;
25670 * - I.out : a set of all registers that may be alive after I execution;
25671 * - insn_successors(I): a set of instructions S that might immediately
25672 * follow I for some program execution;
25673 * - associate separate empty sets 'I.in' and 'I.out' with each instruction;
25674 * - visit each instruction in a postorder and update
25675 * state[i].in, state[i].out as follows:
25676 *
25677 * state[i].out = U [state[s].in for S in insn_successors(i)]
25678 * state[i].in = (state[i].out / state[i].def) U state[i].use
25679 *
25680 * (where U stands for set union, / stands for set difference)
25681 * - repeat the computation while {in,out} fields changes for
25682 * any instruction.
25683 */
25684 state = kvzalloc_objs(*state, insn_cnt, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
25685 if (!state) {
25686 err = -ENOMEM;
25687 goto out;
25688 }
25689
25690 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; ++i)
25691 compute_insn_live_regs(env, &insns[i], &state[i]);
25692
25693 changed = true;
25694 while (changed) {
25695 changed = false;
25696 for (i = 0; i < env->cfg.cur_postorder; ++i) {
25697 int insn_idx = env->cfg.insn_postorder[i];
25698 struct insn_live_regs *live = &state[insn_idx];
25699 struct bpf_iarray *succ;
25700 u16 new_out = 0;
25701 u16 new_in = 0;
25702
25703 succ = bpf_insn_successors(env, insn_idx);
25704 for (int s = 0; s < succ->cnt; ++s)
25705 new_out |= state[succ->items[s]].in;
25706 new_in = (new_out & ~live->def) | live->use;
25707 if (new_out != live->out || new_in != live->in) {
25708 live->in = new_in;
25709 live->out = new_out;
25710 changed = true;
25711 }
25712 }
25713 }
25714
25715 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; ++i)
25716 insn_aux[i].live_regs_before = state[i].in;
25717
25718 if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) {
25719 verbose(env, "Live regs before insn:\n");
25720 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; ++i) {
25721 if (env->insn_aux_data[i].scc)
25722 verbose(env, "%3d ", env->insn_aux_data[i].scc);
25723 else
25724 verbose(env, " ");
25725 verbose(env, "%3d: ", i);
25726 for (j = BPF_REG_0; j < BPF_REG_10; ++j)
25727 if (insn_aux[i].live_regs_before & BIT(j))
25728 verbose(env, "%d", j);
25729 else
25730 verbose(env, ".");
25731 verbose(env, " ");
25732 verbose_insn(env, &insns[i]);
25733 if (bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[i]))
25734 i++;
25735 }
25736 }
25737
25738 out:
25739 kvfree(state);
25740 return err;
25741 }
25742
25743 /*
25744 * Compute strongly connected components (SCCs) on the CFG.
25745 * Assign an SCC number to each instruction, recorded in env->insn_aux[*].scc.
25746 * If instruction is a sole member of its SCC and there are no self edges,
25747 * assign it SCC number of zero.
25748 * Uses a non-recursive adaptation of Tarjan's algorithm for SCC computation.
25749 */
compute_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env * env)25750 static int compute_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
25751 {
25752 const u32 NOT_ON_STACK = U32_MAX;
25753
25754 struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data;
25755 const u32 insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
25756 int stack_sz, dfs_sz, err = 0;
25757 u32 *stack, *pre, *low, *dfs;
25758 u32 i, j, t, w;
25759 u32 next_preorder_num;
25760 u32 next_scc_id;
25761 bool assign_scc;
25762 struct bpf_iarray *succ;
25763
25764 next_preorder_num = 1;
25765 next_scc_id = 1;
25766 /*
25767 * - 'stack' accumulates vertices in DFS order, see invariant comment below;
25768 * - 'pre[t] == p' => preorder number of vertex 't' is 'p';
25769 * - 'low[t] == n' => smallest preorder number of the vertex reachable from 't' is 'n';
25770 * - 'dfs' DFS traversal stack, used to emulate explicit recursion.
25771 */
25772 stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
25773 pre = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
25774 low = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
25775 dfs = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(*dfs), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
25776 if (!stack || !pre || !low || !dfs) {
25777 err = -ENOMEM;
25778 goto exit;
25779 }
25780 /*
25781 * References:
25782 * [1] R. Tarjan "Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms"
25783 * [2] D. J. Pearce "A Space-Efficient Algorithm for Finding Strongly Connected Components"
25784 *
25785 * The algorithm maintains the following invariant:
25786 * - suppose there is a path 'u' ~> 'v', such that 'pre[v] < pre[u]';
25787 * - then, vertex 'u' remains on stack while vertex 'v' is on stack.
25788 *
25789 * Consequently:
25790 * - If 'low[v] < pre[v]', there is a path from 'v' to some vertex 'u',
25791 * such that 'pre[u] == low[v]'; vertex 'u' is currently on the stack,
25792 * and thus there is an SCC (loop) containing both 'u' and 'v'.
25793 * - If 'low[v] == pre[v]', loops containing 'v' have been explored,
25794 * and 'v' can be considered the root of some SCC.
25795 *
25796 * Here is a pseudo-code for an explicitly recursive version of the algorithm:
25797 *
25798 * NOT_ON_STACK = insn_cnt + 1
25799 * pre = [0] * insn_cnt
25800 * low = [0] * insn_cnt
25801 * scc = [0] * insn_cnt
25802 * stack = []
25803 *
25804 * next_preorder_num = 1
25805 * next_scc_id = 1
25806 *
25807 * def recur(w):
25808 * nonlocal next_preorder_num
25809 * nonlocal next_scc_id
25810 *
25811 * pre[w] = next_preorder_num
25812 * low[w] = next_preorder_num
25813 * next_preorder_num += 1
25814 * stack.append(w)
25815 * for s in successors(w):
25816 * # Note: for classic algorithm the block below should look as:
25817 * #
25818 * # if pre[s] == 0:
25819 * # recur(s)
25820 * # low[w] = min(low[w], low[s])
25821 * # elif low[s] != NOT_ON_STACK:
25822 * # low[w] = min(low[w], pre[s])
25823 * #
25824 * # But replacing both 'min' instructions with 'low[w] = min(low[w], low[s])'
25825 * # does not break the invariant and makes itartive version of the algorithm
25826 * # simpler. See 'Algorithm #3' from [2].
25827 *
25828 * # 's' not yet visited
25829 * if pre[s] == 0:
25830 * recur(s)
25831 * # if 's' is on stack, pick lowest reachable preorder number from it;
25832 * # if 's' is not on stack 'low[s] == NOT_ON_STACK > low[w]',
25833 * # so 'min' would be a noop.
25834 * low[w] = min(low[w], low[s])
25835 *
25836 * if low[w] == pre[w]:
25837 * # 'w' is the root of an SCC, pop all vertices
25838 * # below 'w' on stack and assign same SCC to them.
25839 * while True:
25840 * t = stack.pop()
25841 * low[t] = NOT_ON_STACK
25842 * scc[t] = next_scc_id
25843 * if t == w:
25844 * break
25845 * next_scc_id += 1
25846 *
25847 * for i in range(0, insn_cnt):
25848 * if pre[i] == 0:
25849 * recur(i)
25850 *
25851 * Below implementation replaces explicit recursion with array 'dfs'.
25852 */
25853 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
25854 if (pre[i])
25855 continue;
25856 stack_sz = 0;
25857 dfs_sz = 1;
25858 dfs[0] = i;
25859 dfs_continue:
25860 while (dfs_sz) {
25861 w = dfs[dfs_sz - 1];
25862 if (pre[w] == 0) {
25863 low[w] = next_preorder_num;
25864 pre[w] = next_preorder_num;
25865 next_preorder_num++;
25866 stack[stack_sz++] = w;
25867 }
25868 /* Visit 'w' successors */
25869 succ = bpf_insn_successors(env, w);
25870 for (j = 0; j < succ->cnt; ++j) {
25871 if (pre[succ->items[j]]) {
25872 low[w] = min(low[w], low[succ->items[j]]);
25873 } else {
25874 dfs[dfs_sz++] = succ->items[j];
25875 goto dfs_continue;
25876 }
25877 }
25878 /*
25879 * Preserve the invariant: if some vertex above in the stack
25880 * is reachable from 'w', keep 'w' on the stack.
25881 */
25882 if (low[w] < pre[w]) {
25883 dfs_sz--;
25884 goto dfs_continue;
25885 }
25886 /*
25887 * Assign SCC number only if component has two or more elements,
25888 * or if component has a self reference, or if instruction is a
25889 * callback calling function (implicit loop).
25890 */
25891 assign_scc = stack[stack_sz - 1] != w; /* two or more elements? */
25892 for (j = 0; j < succ->cnt; ++j) { /* self reference? */
25893 if (succ->items[j] == w) {
25894 assign_scc = true;
25895 break;
25896 }
25897 }
25898 if (bpf_calls_callback(env, w)) /* implicit loop? */
25899 assign_scc = true;
25900 /* Pop component elements from stack */
25901 do {
25902 t = stack[--stack_sz];
25903 low[t] = NOT_ON_STACK;
25904 if (assign_scc)
25905 aux[t].scc = next_scc_id;
25906 } while (t != w);
25907 if (assign_scc)
25908 next_scc_id++;
25909 dfs_sz--;
25910 }
25911 }
25912 env->scc_info = kvzalloc_objs(*env->scc_info, next_scc_id,
25913 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
25914 if (!env->scc_info) {
25915 err = -ENOMEM;
25916 goto exit;
25917 }
25918 env->scc_cnt = next_scc_id;
25919 exit:
25920 kvfree(stack);
25921 kvfree(pre);
25922 kvfree(low);
25923 kvfree(dfs);
25924 return err;
25925 }
25926
bpf_check(struct bpf_prog ** prog,union bpf_attr * attr,bpfptr_t uattr,__u32 uattr_size)25927 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u32 uattr_size)
25928 {
25929 u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns();
25930 struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
25931 int i, len, ret = -EINVAL, err;
25932 u32 log_true_size;
25933 bool is_priv;
25934
25935 BTF_TYPE_EMIT(enum bpf_features);
25936
25937 /* no program is valid */
25938 if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0)
25939 return -EINVAL;
25940
25941 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
25942 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
25943 */
25944 env = kvzalloc_obj(struct bpf_verifier_env, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
25945 if (!env)
25946 return -ENOMEM;
25947
25948 env->bt.env = env;
25949
25950 len = (*prog)->len;
25951 env->insn_aux_data =
25952 vzalloc(array_size(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data), len));
25953 ret = -ENOMEM;
25954 if (!env->insn_aux_data)
25955 goto err_free_env;
25956 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
25957 env->insn_aux_data[i].orig_idx = i;
25958 env->succ = iarray_realloc(NULL, 2);
25959 if (!env->succ)
25960 goto err_free_env;
25961 env->prog = *prog;
25962 env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type];
25963
25964 env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(env->prog->aux->token);
25965 env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(env->prog->aux->token);
25966 env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(env->prog->aux->token);
25967 env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(env->prog->aux->token);
25968 env->bpf_capable = is_priv = bpf_token_capable(env->prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF);
25969
25970 bpf_get_btf_vmlinux();
25971
25972 /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
25973 if (!is_priv)
25974 mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
25975
25976 /* user could have requested verbose verifier output
25977 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
25978 */
25979 ret = bpf_vlog_init(&env->log, attr->log_level,
25980 (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf,
25981 attr->log_size);
25982 if (ret)
25983 goto err_unlock;
25984
25985 ret = process_fd_array(env, attr, uattr);
25986 if (ret)
25987 goto skip_full_check;
25988
25989 mark_verifier_state_clean(env);
25990
25991 if (IS_ERR(btf_vmlinux)) {
25992 /* Either gcc or pahole or kernel are broken. */
25993 verbose(env, "in-kernel BTF is malformed\n");
25994 ret = PTR_ERR(btf_vmlinux);
25995 goto skip_full_check;
25996 }
25997
25998 env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT);
25999 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
26000 env->strict_alignment = true;
26001 if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
26002 env->strict_alignment = false;
26003
26004 if (is_priv)
26005 env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ;
26006 env->test_reg_invariants = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS;
26007
26008 env->explored_states = kvzalloc_objs(struct list_head,
26009 state_htab_size(env),
26010 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
26011 ret = -ENOMEM;
26012 if (!env->explored_states)
26013 goto skip_full_check;
26014
26015 for (i = 0; i < state_htab_size(env); i++)
26016 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->explored_states[i]);
26017 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->free_list);
26018
26019 ret = check_btf_info_early(env, attr, uattr);
26020 if (ret < 0)
26021 goto skip_full_check;
26022
26023 ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env);
26024 if (ret < 0)
26025 goto skip_full_check;
26026
26027 ret = check_subprogs(env);
26028 if (ret < 0)
26029 goto skip_full_check;
26030
26031 ret = check_btf_info(env, attr, uattr);
26032 if (ret < 0)
26033 goto skip_full_check;
26034
26035 ret = resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(env);
26036 if (ret < 0)
26037 goto skip_full_check;
26038
26039 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
26040 ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog);
26041 if (ret)
26042 goto skip_full_check;
26043 }
26044
26045 ret = check_cfg(env);
26046 if (ret < 0)
26047 goto skip_full_check;
26048
26049 ret = compute_postorder(env);
26050 if (ret < 0)
26051 goto skip_full_check;
26052
26053 ret = bpf_stack_liveness_init(env);
26054 if (ret)
26055 goto skip_full_check;
26056
26057 ret = check_attach_btf_id(env);
26058 if (ret)
26059 goto skip_full_check;
26060
26061 ret = compute_scc(env);
26062 if (ret < 0)
26063 goto skip_full_check;
26064
26065 ret = compute_live_registers(env);
26066 if (ret < 0)
26067 goto skip_full_check;
26068
26069 ret = mark_fastcall_patterns(env);
26070 if (ret < 0)
26071 goto skip_full_check;
26072
26073 ret = do_check_main(env);
26074 ret = ret ?: do_check_subprogs(env);
26075
26076 if (ret == 0 && bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux))
26077 ret = bpf_prog_offload_finalize(env);
26078
26079 skip_full_check:
26080 kvfree(env->explored_states);
26081
26082 /* might decrease stack depth, keep it before passes that
26083 * allocate additional slots.
26084 */
26085 if (ret == 0)
26086 ret = remove_fastcall_spills_fills(env);
26087
26088 if (ret == 0)
26089 ret = check_max_stack_depth(env);
26090
26091 /* instruction rewrites happen after this point */
26092 if (ret == 0)
26093 ret = optimize_bpf_loop(env);
26094
26095 if (is_priv) {
26096 if (ret == 0)
26097 opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(env);
26098 if (ret == 0)
26099 ret = opt_remove_dead_code(env);
26100 if (ret == 0)
26101 ret = opt_remove_nops(env);
26102 } else {
26103 if (ret == 0)
26104 sanitize_dead_code(env);
26105 }
26106
26107 if (ret == 0)
26108 /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
26109 ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
26110
26111 if (ret == 0)
26112 ret = do_misc_fixups(env);
26113
26114 /* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched
26115 * insns could be handled correctly.
26116 */
26117 if (ret == 0 && !bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux)) {
26118 ret = opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(env, attr);
26119 env->prog->aux->verifier_zext = bpf_jit_needs_zext() ? !ret
26120 : false;
26121 }
26122
26123 if (ret == 0)
26124 ret = fixup_call_args(env);
26125
26126 env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time;
26127 print_verification_stats(env);
26128 env->prog->aux->verified_insns = env->insn_processed;
26129
26130 /* preserve original error even if log finalization is successful */
26131 err = bpf_vlog_finalize(&env->log, &log_true_size);
26132 if (err)
26133 ret = err;
26134
26135 if (uattr_size >= offsetofend(union bpf_attr, log_true_size) &&
26136 copy_to_bpfptr_offset(uattr, offsetof(union bpf_attr, log_true_size),
26137 &log_true_size, sizeof(log_true_size))) {
26138 ret = -EFAULT;
26139 goto err_release_maps;
26140 }
26141
26142 if (ret)
26143 goto err_release_maps;
26144
26145 if (env->used_map_cnt) {
26146 /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */
26147 env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_objs(env->used_maps[0],
26148 env->used_map_cnt,
26149 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
26150
26151 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) {
26152 ret = -ENOMEM;
26153 goto err_release_maps;
26154 }
26155
26156 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps,
26157 sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt);
26158 env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt;
26159 }
26160 if (env->used_btf_cnt) {
26161 /* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */
26162 env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_objs(env->used_btfs[0],
26163 env->used_btf_cnt,
26164 GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
26165 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) {
26166 ret = -ENOMEM;
26167 goto err_release_maps;
26168 }
26169
26170 memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_btfs, env->used_btfs,
26171 sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]) * env->used_btf_cnt);
26172 env->prog->aux->used_btf_cnt = env->used_btf_cnt;
26173 }
26174 if (env->used_map_cnt || env->used_btf_cnt) {
26175 /* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic
26176 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions
26177 */
26178 convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env);
26179 }
26180
26181 adjust_btf_func(env);
26182
26183 err_release_maps:
26184 if (ret)
26185 release_insn_arrays(env);
26186 if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
26187 /* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
26188 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them.
26189 */
26190 release_maps(env);
26191 if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs)
26192 release_btfs(env);
26193
26194 /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets
26195 for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning
26196 */
26197 if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT)
26198 env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0;
26199
26200 *prog = env->prog;
26201
26202 module_put(env->attach_btf_mod);
26203 err_unlock:
26204 if (!is_priv)
26205 mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
26206 clear_insn_aux_data(env, 0, env->prog->len);
26207 vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
26208 err_free_env:
26209 bpf_stack_liveness_free(env);
26210 kvfree(env->cfg.insn_postorder);
26211 kvfree(env->scc_info);
26212 kvfree(env->succ);
26213 kvfree(env->gotox_tmp_buf);
26214 kvfree(env);
26215 return ret;
26216 }
26217