1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 #include <linux/export.h>
3 #include <linux/bitops.h>
4 #include <linux/dmi.h>
5 #include <linux/elf.h>
6 #include <linux/mm.h>
7 #include <linux/kvm_types.h>
8 #include <linux/io.h>
9 #include <linux/sched.h>
10 #include <linux/sched/clock.h>
11 #include <linux/random.h>
12 #include <linux/topology.h>
13 #include <linux/platform_data/x86/amd-fch.h>
14 #include <asm/processor.h>
15 #include <asm/apic.h>
16 #include <asm/cacheinfo.h>
17 #include <asm/cpu.h>
18 #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
19 #include <asm/cpuid/api.h>
20 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
21 #include <asm/smp.h>
22 #include <asm/numa.h>
23 #include <asm/pci-direct.h>
24 #include <asm/delay.h>
25 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
26 #include <asm/resctrl.h>
27 #include <asm/msr.h>
28 #include <asm/sev.h>
29
30 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
31 # include <asm/mmconfig.h>
32 #endif
33
34 #include "cpu.h"
35
36 u16 invlpgb_count_max __ro_after_init = 1;
37
rdmsrq_amd_safe(unsigned msr,u64 * p)38 static inline int rdmsrq_amd_safe(unsigned msr, u64 *p)
39 {
40 u32 gprs[8] = { 0 };
41 int err;
42
43 WARN_ONCE((boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0xf),
44 "%s should only be used on K8!\n", __func__);
45
46 gprs[1] = msr;
47 gprs[7] = 0x9c5a203a;
48
49 err = rdmsr_safe_regs(gprs);
50
51 *p = gprs[0] | ((u64)gprs[2] << 32);
52
53 return err;
54 }
55
wrmsrq_amd_safe(unsigned msr,u64 val)56 static inline int wrmsrq_amd_safe(unsigned msr, u64 val)
57 {
58 u32 gprs[8] = { 0 };
59
60 WARN_ONCE((boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0xf),
61 "%s should only be used on K8!\n", __func__);
62
63 gprs[0] = (u32)val;
64 gprs[1] = msr;
65 gprs[2] = val >> 32;
66 gprs[7] = 0x9c5a203a;
67
68 return wrmsr_safe_regs(gprs);
69 }
70
71 /*
72 * B step AMD K6 before B 9730xxxx have hardware bugs that can cause
73 * misexecution of code under Linux. Owners of such processors should
74 * contact AMD for precise details and a CPU swap.
75 *
76 * See http://www.multimania.com/poulot/k6bug.html
77 * and section 2.6.2 of "AMD-K6 Processor Revision Guide - Model 6"
78 * (Publication # 21266 Issue Date: August 1998)
79 *
80 * The following test is erm.. interesting. AMD neglected to up
81 * the chip setting when fixing the bug but they also tweaked some
82 * performance at the same time..
83 */
84
85 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
86 extern __visible void vide(void);
87 __asm__(".text\n"
88 ".globl vide\n"
89 ".type vide, @function\n"
90 ".align 4\n"
91 "vide: ret\n");
92 #endif
93
init_amd_k5(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)94 static void init_amd_k5(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
95 {
96 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
97 /*
98 * General Systems BIOSen alias the cpu frequency registers
99 * of the Elan at 0x000df000. Unfortunately, one of the Linux
100 * drivers subsequently pokes it, and changes the CPU speed.
101 * Workaround : Remove the unneeded alias.
102 */
103 #define CBAR (0xfffc) /* Configuration Base Address (32-bit) */
104 #define CBAR_ENB (0x80000000)
105 #define CBAR_KEY (0X000000CB)
106 if (c->x86_model == 9 || c->x86_model == 10) {
107 if (inl(CBAR) & CBAR_ENB)
108 outl(0 | CBAR_KEY, CBAR);
109 }
110 #endif
111 }
112
init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)113 static void init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
114 {
115 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
116 struct msr val;
117 int mbytes = get_num_physpages() >> (20-PAGE_SHIFT);
118
119 if (c->x86_model < 6) {
120 /* Based on AMD doc 20734R - June 2000 */
121 if (c->x86_model == 0) {
122 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_APIC);
123 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PGE);
124 }
125 return;
126 }
127
128 if (c->x86_model == 6 && c->x86_stepping == 1) {
129 const int K6_BUG_LOOP = 1000000;
130 int n;
131 void (*f_vide)(void);
132 u64 d, d2;
133
134 pr_info("AMD K6 stepping B detected - ");
135
136 /*
137 * It looks like AMD fixed the 2.6.2 bug and improved indirect
138 * calls at the same time.
139 */
140
141 n = K6_BUG_LOOP;
142 f_vide = vide;
143 OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(f_vide);
144 d = rdtsc();
145 while (n--)
146 f_vide();
147 d2 = rdtsc();
148 d = d2-d;
149
150 if (d > 20*K6_BUG_LOOP)
151 pr_cont("system stability may be impaired when more than 32 MB are used.\n");
152 else
153 pr_cont("probably OK (after B9730xxxx).\n");
154 }
155
156 /* K6 with old style WHCR */
157 if (c->x86_model < 8 ||
158 (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping < 8)) {
159 /* We can only write allocate on the low 508Mb */
160 if (mbytes > 508)
161 mbytes = 508;
162
163 rdmsrq(MSR_K6_WHCR, val.q);
164 if ((val.l & 0x0000FFFF) == 0) {
165 unsigned long flags;
166 val.l = (1 << 0) | ((mbytes / 4) << 1);
167 local_irq_save(flags);
168 wbinvd();
169 wrmsrq(MSR_K6_WHCR, val.q);
170 local_irq_restore(flags);
171 pr_info("Enabling old style K6 write allocation for %d Mb\n",
172 mbytes);
173 }
174 return;
175 }
176
177 if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping > 7) ||
178 c->x86_model == 9 || c->x86_model == 13) {
179 /* The more serious chips .. */
180
181 if (mbytes > 4092)
182 mbytes = 4092;
183
184 rdmsrq(MSR_K6_WHCR, val.q);
185 if ((val.l & 0xFFFF0000) == 0) {
186 unsigned long flags;
187 val.l = ((mbytes >> 2) << 22) | (1 << 16);
188 local_irq_save(flags);
189 wbinvd();
190 wrmsrq(MSR_K6_WHCR, val.q);
191 local_irq_restore(flags);
192 pr_info("Enabling new style K6 write allocation for %d Mb\n",
193 mbytes);
194 }
195
196 return;
197 }
198
199 if (c->x86_model == 10) {
200 /* AMD Geode LX is model 10 */
201 /* placeholder for any needed mods */
202 return;
203 }
204 #endif
205 }
206
init_amd_k7(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)207 static void init_amd_k7(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
208 {
209 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
210 struct msr val;
211
212 /*
213 * Bit 15 of Athlon specific MSR 15, needs to be 0
214 * to enable SSE on Palomino/Morgan/Barton CPU's.
215 * If the BIOS didn't enable it already, enable it here.
216 */
217 if (c->x86_model >= 6 && c->x86_model <= 10) {
218 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM)) {
219 pr_info("Enabling disabled K7/SSE Support.\n");
220 msr_clear_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, 15);
221 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM);
222 }
223 }
224
225 /*
226 * It's been determined by AMD that Athlons since model 8 stepping 1
227 * are more robust with CLK_CTL set to 200xxxxx instead of 600xxxxx
228 * As per AMD technical note 27212 0.2
229 */
230 if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping >= 1) || (c->x86_model > 8)) {
231 rdmsrq(MSR_K7_CLK_CTL, val.q);
232 if ((val.l & 0xfff00000) != 0x20000000) {
233 pr_info("CPU: CLK_CTL MSR was %x. Reprogramming to %x\n",
234 val.l, ((val.l & 0x000fffff) | 0x20000000));
235 val.l = (val.l & 0x000fffff) | 0x20000000;
236 wrmsrq(MSR_K7_CLK_CTL, val.q);
237 }
238 }
239
240 /* calling is from identify_secondary_cpu() ? */
241 if (!c->cpu_index)
242 return;
243
244 /*
245 * Certain Athlons might work (for various values of 'work') in SMP
246 * but they are not certified as MP capable.
247 */
248 /* Athlon 660/661 is valid. */
249 if ((c->x86_model == 6) && ((c->x86_stepping == 0) ||
250 (c->x86_stepping == 1)))
251 return;
252
253 /* Duron 670 is valid */
254 if ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_stepping == 0))
255 return;
256
257 /*
258 * Athlon 662, Duron 671, and Athlon >model 7 have capability
259 * bit. It's worth noting that the A5 stepping (662) of some
260 * Athlon XP's have the MP bit set.
261 * See http://www.heise.de/newsticker/data/jow-18.10.01-000 for
262 * more.
263 */
264 if (((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_stepping >= 2)) ||
265 ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_stepping >= 1)) ||
266 (c->x86_model > 7))
267 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MP))
268 return;
269
270 /* If we get here, not a certified SMP capable AMD system. */
271
272 /*
273 * Don't taint if we are running SMP kernel on a single non-MP
274 * approved Athlon
275 */
276 WARN_ONCE(1, "WARNING: This combination of AMD"
277 " processors is not suitable for SMP.\n");
278 add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
279 #endif
280 }
281
282 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
283 /*
284 * To workaround broken NUMA config. Read the comment in
285 * srat_detect_node().
286 */
nearby_node(int apicid)287 static int nearby_node(int apicid)
288 {
289 int i, node;
290
291 for (i = apicid - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
292 node = __apicid_to_node[i];
293 if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE && node_online(node))
294 return node;
295 }
296 for (i = apicid + 1; i < MAX_LOCAL_APIC; i++) {
297 node = __apicid_to_node[i];
298 if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE && node_online(node))
299 return node;
300 }
301 return first_node(node_online_map); /* Shouldn't happen */
302 }
303 #endif
304
srat_detect_node(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)305 static void srat_detect_node(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
306 {
307 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
308 int cpu = smp_processor_id();
309 int node;
310 unsigned apicid = c->topo.apicid;
311
312 node = numa_cpu_node(cpu);
313 if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE)
314 node = per_cpu_llc_id(cpu);
315
316 /*
317 * On multi-fabric platform (e.g. Numascale NumaChip) a
318 * platform-specific handler needs to be called to fixup some
319 * IDs of the CPU.
320 */
321 if (x86_cpuinit.fixup_cpu_id)
322 x86_cpuinit.fixup_cpu_id(c, node);
323
324 if (!node_online(node)) {
325 /*
326 * Two possibilities here:
327 *
328 * - The CPU is missing memory and no node was created. In
329 * that case try picking one from a nearby CPU.
330 *
331 * - The APIC IDs differ from the HyperTransport node IDs
332 * which the K8 northbridge parsing fills in. Assume
333 * they are all increased by a constant offset, but in
334 * the same order as the HT nodeids. If that doesn't
335 * result in a usable node fall back to the path for the
336 * previous case.
337 *
338 * This workaround operates directly on the mapping between
339 * APIC ID and NUMA node, assuming certain relationship
340 * between APIC ID, HT node ID and NUMA topology. As going
341 * through CPU mapping may alter the outcome, directly
342 * access __apicid_to_node[].
343 */
344 int ht_nodeid = c->topo.initial_apicid;
345
346 if (__apicid_to_node[ht_nodeid] != NUMA_NO_NODE)
347 node = __apicid_to_node[ht_nodeid];
348 /* Pick a nearby node */
349 if (!node_online(node))
350 node = nearby_node(apicid);
351 }
352 numa_set_node(cpu, node);
353 #endif
354 }
355
bsp_determine_snp(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)356 static void bsp_determine_snp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
357 {
358 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
359 cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD;
360
361 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) {
362 /*
363 * RMP table entry format is not architectural and is defined by the
364 * per-processor PPR. Restrict SNP support on the known CPU models
365 * for which the RMP table entry format is currently defined or for
366 * processors which support the architecturally defined RMPREAD
367 * instruction.
368 */
369 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) &&
370 (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ZEN3) ||
371 cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ZEN4) ||
372 cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RMPREAD)) &&
373 snp_probe_rmptable_info()) {
374 cc_platform_set(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
375 } else {
376 setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
377 cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
378 }
379 }
380 #endif
381 }
382
383 #define ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(fam, model, step, ucode) \
384 X86_MATCH_VFM_STEPS(VFM_MAKE(X86_VENDOR_AMD, fam, model), \
385 step, step, ucode)
386
387 static const struct x86_cpu_id amd_tsa_microcode[] = {
388 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x01, 0x1, 0x0a0011d7),
389 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x01, 0x2, 0x0a00123b),
390 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x08, 0x2, 0x0a00820d),
391 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x11, 0x1, 0x0a10114c),
392 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x11, 0x2, 0x0a10124c),
393 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x18, 0x1, 0x0a108109),
394 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x21, 0x0, 0x0a20102e),
395 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x21, 0x2, 0x0a201211),
396 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x44, 0x1, 0x0a404108),
397 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x50, 0x0, 0x0a500012),
398 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x61, 0x2, 0x0a60120a),
399 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x74, 0x1, 0x0a704108),
400 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x75, 0x2, 0x0a705208),
401 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x78, 0x0, 0x0a708008),
402 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x7c, 0x0, 0x0a70c008),
403 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0xa0, 0x2, 0x0aa00216),
404 {},
405 };
406
tsa_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)407 static void tsa_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
408 {
409 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
410 return;
411
412 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN3) ||
413 cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN4)) {
414 if (x86_match_min_microcode_rev(amd_tsa_microcode))
415 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_VERW_CLEAR);
416 else
417 pr_debug("%s: current revision: 0x%x\n", __func__, c->microcode);
418 } else {
419 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO);
420 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO);
421 }
422 }
423
bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)424 static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
425 {
426 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) {
427
428 if (c->x86 > 0x10 ||
429 (c->x86 == 0x10 && c->x86_model >= 0x2)) {
430 u64 val;
431
432 rdmsrq(MSR_K7_HWCR, val);
433 if (!(val & BIT(24)))
434 pr_warn(FW_BUG "TSC doesn't count with P0 frequency!\n");
435 }
436 }
437
438 if (c->x86 == 0x15) {
439 unsigned long upperbit;
440 u32 cpuid, assoc;
441
442 cpuid = cpuid_edx(0x80000005);
443 assoc = cpuid >> 16 & 0xff;
444 upperbit = ((cpuid >> 24) << 10) / assoc;
445
446 va_align.mask = (upperbit - 1) & PAGE_MASK;
447 va_align.flags = ALIGN_VA_32 | ALIGN_VA_64;
448
449 /* A random value per boot for bit slice [12:upper_bit) */
450 va_align.bits = get_random_u32() & va_align.mask;
451 }
452
453 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MWAITX))
454 use_mwaitx_delay();
455
456 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD) &&
457 !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD) &&
458 c->x86 >= 0x15 && c->x86 <= 0x17) {
459 unsigned int bit;
460
461 switch (c->x86) {
462 case 0x15: bit = 54; break;
463 case 0x16: bit = 33; break;
464 case 0x17: bit = 10; break;
465 default: return;
466 }
467 /*
468 * Try to cache the base value so further operations can
469 * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable SSBD.
470 */
471 if (!rdmsrq_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
472 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD);
473 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
474 x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask = 1ULL << bit;
475 }
476 }
477
478 resctrl_cpu_detect(c);
479
480 /* Figure out Zen generations: */
481 switch (c->x86) {
482 case 0x17:
483 switch (c->x86_model) {
484 case 0x00 ... 0x2f:
485 case 0x50 ... 0x5f:
486 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN1);
487 break;
488 case 0x30 ... 0x4f:
489 case 0x60 ... 0x7f:
490 case 0x90 ... 0x91:
491 case 0xa0 ... 0xaf:
492 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN2);
493 break;
494 default:
495 goto warn;
496 }
497 break;
498
499 case 0x19:
500 switch (c->x86_model) {
501 case 0x00 ... 0x0f:
502 case 0x20 ... 0x5f:
503 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN3);
504 break;
505 case 0x10 ... 0x1f:
506 case 0x60 ... 0xaf:
507 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN4);
508 break;
509 default:
510 goto warn;
511 }
512 break;
513
514 case 0x1a:
515 switch (c->x86_model) {
516 case 0x00 ... 0x2f:
517 case 0x40 ... 0x4f:
518 case 0x60 ... 0x7f:
519 case 0xd0 ... 0xd7:
520 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN5);
521 break;
522 case 0x50 ... 0x5f:
523 case 0x80 ... 0xaf:
524 case 0xc0 ... 0xcf:
525 case 0xd8 ... 0xef:
526 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN6);
527 break;
528 default:
529 goto warn;
530 }
531 break;
532
533 default:
534 break;
535 }
536
537 bsp_determine_snp(c);
538 tsa_init(c);
539
540 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_GP_ON_USER_CPUID))
541 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT);
542
543 return;
544
545 warn:
546 WARN_ONCE(1, "Family 0x%x, model: 0x%x??\n", c->x86, c->x86_model);
547 }
548
early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)549 static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
550 {
551 u64 msr;
552
553 /*
554 * Mark using WBINVD is needed during kexec on processors that
555 * support SME. This provides support for performing a successful
556 * kexec when going from SME inactive to SME active (or vice-versa).
557 *
558 * The cache must be cleared so that if there are entries with the
559 * same physical address, both with and without the encryption bit,
560 * they don't race each other when flushed and potentially end up
561 * with the wrong entry being committed to memory.
562 *
563 * Test the CPUID bit directly because with mem_encrypt=off the
564 * BSP will clear the X86_FEATURE_SME bit and the APs will not
565 * see it set after that.
566 */
567 if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax(0x8000001f) & BIT(0)))
568 __this_cpu_write(cache_state_incoherent, true);
569
570 /*
571 * BIOS support is required for SME and SEV.
572 * For SME: If BIOS has enabled SME then adjust x86_phys_bits by
573 * the SME physical address space reduction value.
574 * If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
575 * SME feature (set in scattered.c).
576 * If the kernel has not enabled SME via any means then
577 * don't advertise the SME feature.
578 * For SEV: If BIOS has not enabled SEV then don't advertise SEV and
579 * any additional functionality based on it.
580 *
581 * In all cases, since support for SME and SEV requires long mode,
582 * don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
583 */
584 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
585 /* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
586 rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, msr);
587 if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
588 goto clear_all;
589
590 /*
591 * Always adjust physical address bits. Even though this
592 * will be a value above 32-bits this is still done for
593 * CONFIG_X86_32 so that accurate values are reported.
594 */
595 c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
596
597 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
598 goto clear_all;
599
600 if (!sme_me_mask)
601 setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME);
602
603 rdmsrq(MSR_K7_HWCR, msr);
604 if (!(msr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
605 goto clear_sev;
606
607 return;
608
609 clear_all:
610 setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME);
611 clear_sev:
612 setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
613 setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
614 setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
615 }
616 }
617
early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)618 static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
619 {
620 u64 val;
621
622 if (c->x86 >= 0xf)
623 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K8);
624
625 rdmsrq_safe(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, &val);
626 c->microcode = (u32)val;
627
628 /*
629 * c->x86_power is 8000_0007 edx. Bit 8 is TSC runs at constant rate
630 * with P/T states and does not stop in deep C-states
631 */
632 if (c->x86_power & (1 << 8)) {
633 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
634 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC);
635 }
636
637 /* Bit 12 of 8000_0007 edx is accumulated power mechanism. */
638 if (c->x86_power & BIT(12))
639 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER);
640
641 /* Bit 14 indicates the Runtime Average Power Limit interface. */
642 if (c->x86_power & BIT(14))
643 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RAPL);
644
645 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
646 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32);
647 #else
648 /* Set MTRR capability flag if appropriate */
649 if (c->x86 == 5)
650 if (c->x86_model == 13 || c->x86_model == 9 ||
651 (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping >= 8))
652 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR);
653 #endif
654 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) && defined(CONFIG_PCI)
655 /*
656 * ApicID can always be treated as an 8-bit value for AMD APIC versions
657 * >= 0x10, but even old K8s came out of reset with version 0x10. So, we
658 * can safely set X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID unconditionally for families
659 * after 16h.
660 */
661 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APIC)) {
662 if (c->x86 > 0x16)
663 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID);
664 else if (c->x86 >= 0xf) {
665 /* check CPU config space for extended APIC ID */
666 unsigned int val;
667
668 val = read_pci_config(0, 24, 0, 0x68);
669 if ((val >> 17 & 0x3) == 0x3)
670 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID);
671 }
672 }
673 #endif
674
675 /*
676 * This is only needed to tell the kernel whether to use VMCALL
677 * and VMMCALL. VMMCALL is never executed except under virt, so
678 * we can set it unconditionally.
679 */
680 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL);
681
682 /* F16h erratum 793, CVE-2013-6885 */
683 if (c->x86 == 0x16 && c->x86_model <= 0xf)
684 msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, 15);
685
686 early_detect_mem_encrypt(c);
687
688 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE)) {
689 if (c->x86 == 0x17 && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
690 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
691 else if (c->x86 >= 0x19 && !wrmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB)) {
692 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
693 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB);
694 }
695 }
696 }
697
init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)698 static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
699 {
700 u32 level;
701 u64 value;
702
703 /* On C+ stepping K8 rep microcode works well for copy/memset */
704 level = cpuid_eax(1);
705 if ((level >= 0x0f48 && level < 0x0f50) || level >= 0x0f58)
706 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD);
707
708 /*
709 * Some BIOSes incorrectly force this feature, but only K8 revision D
710 * (model = 0x14) and later actually support it.
711 * (AMD Erratum #110, docId: 25759).
712 */
713 if (c->x86_model < 0x14 && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
714 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM);
715 if (!rdmsrq_amd_safe(0xc001100d, &value)) {
716 value &= ~BIT_64(32);
717 wrmsrq_amd_safe(0xc001100d, value);
718 }
719 }
720
721 if (!c->x86_model_id[0])
722 strscpy(c->x86_model_id, "Hammer");
723
724 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
725 /*
726 * Disable TLB flush filter by setting HWCR.FFDIS on K8
727 * bit 6 of msr C001_0015
728 *
729 * Errata 63 for SH-B3 steppings
730 * Errata 122 for all steppings (F+ have it disabled by default)
731 */
732 msr_set_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, 6);
733 #endif
734 set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE);
735
736 /*
737 * Check models and steppings affected by erratum 400. This is
738 * used to select the proper idle routine and to enable the
739 * check whether the machine is affected in arch_post_acpi_subsys_init()
740 * which sets the X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E bug depending on the MSR check.
741 */
742 if (c->x86_model > 0x41 ||
743 (c->x86_model == 0x41 && c->x86_stepping >= 0x2))
744 setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_AMD_E400);
745 }
746
init_amd_gh(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)747 static void init_amd_gh(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
748 {
749 #ifdef CONFIG_MMCONF_FAM10H
750 /* do this for boot cpu */
751 if (c == &boot_cpu_data)
752 check_enable_amd_mmconf_dmi();
753
754 fam10h_check_enable_mmcfg();
755 #endif
756
757 /*
758 * Disable GART TLB Walk Errors on Fam10h. We do this here because this
759 * is always needed when GART is enabled, even in a kernel which has no
760 * MCE support built in. BIOS should disable GartTlbWlk Errors already.
761 * If it doesn't, we do it here as suggested by the BKDG.
762 *
763 * Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33012
764 */
765 msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_MCx_MASK(4), 10);
766
767 /*
768 * On family 10h BIOS may not have properly enabled WC+ support, causing
769 * it to be converted to CD memtype. This may result in performance
770 * degradation for certain nested-paging guests. Prevent this conversion
771 * by clearing bit 24 in MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2.
772 *
773 * NOTE: we want to use the _safe accessors so as not to #GP kvm
774 * guests on older kvm hosts.
775 */
776 msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2, 24);
777
778 set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH);
779
780 /*
781 * Check models and steppings affected by erratum 400. This is
782 * used to select the proper idle routine and to enable the
783 * check whether the machine is affected in arch_post_acpi_subsys_init()
784 * which sets the X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E bug depending on the MSR check.
785 */
786 if (c->x86_model > 0x2 ||
787 (c->x86_model == 0x2 && c->x86_stepping >= 0x1))
788 setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_AMD_E400);
789 }
790
init_amd_ln(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)791 static void init_amd_ln(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
792 {
793 /*
794 * Apply erratum 665 fix unconditionally so machines without a BIOS
795 * fix work.
796 */
797 msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, 31);
798 }
799
800 static bool rdrand_force;
801
rdrand_cmdline(char * str)802 static int __init rdrand_cmdline(char *str)
803 {
804 if (!str)
805 return -EINVAL;
806
807 if (!strcmp(str, "force"))
808 rdrand_force = true;
809 else
810 return -EINVAL;
811
812 return 0;
813 }
814 early_param("rdrand", rdrand_cmdline);
815
clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)816 static void clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
817 {
818 /*
819 * Saving of the MSR used to hide the RDRAND support during
820 * suspend/resume is done by arch/x86/power/cpu.c, which is
821 * dependent on CONFIG_PM_SLEEP.
822 */
823 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PM_SLEEP))
824 return;
825
826 /*
827 * The self-test can clear X86_FEATURE_RDRAND, so check for
828 * RDRAND support using the CPUID function directly.
829 */
830 if (!(cpuid_ecx(1) & BIT(30)) || rdrand_force)
831 return;
832
833 msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_CPUID_FN_1, 62);
834
835 /*
836 * Verify that the CPUID change has occurred in case the kernel is
837 * running virtualized and the hypervisor doesn't support the MSR.
838 */
839 if (cpuid_ecx(1) & BIT(30)) {
840 pr_info_once("BIOS may not properly restore RDRAND after suspend, but hypervisor does not support hiding RDRAND via CPUID.\n");
841 return;
842 }
843
844 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
845 pr_info_once("BIOS may not properly restore RDRAND after suspend, hiding RDRAND via CPUID. Use rdrand=force to reenable.\n");
846 }
847
init_amd_jg(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)848 static void init_amd_jg(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
849 {
850 /*
851 * Some BIOS implementations do not restore proper RDRAND support
852 * across suspend and resume. Check on whether to hide the RDRAND
853 * instruction support via CPUID.
854 */
855 clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c);
856 }
857
init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)858 static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
859 {
860 u64 value;
861
862 /*
863 * The way access filter has a performance penalty on some workloads.
864 * Disable it on the affected CPUs.
865 */
866 if ((c->x86_model >= 0x02) && (c->x86_model < 0x20)) {
867 if (!rdmsrq_safe(MSR_F15H_IC_CFG, &value) && !(value & 0x1E)) {
868 value |= 0x1E;
869 wrmsrq_safe(MSR_F15H_IC_CFG, value);
870 }
871 }
872
873 /*
874 * Some BIOS implementations do not restore proper RDRAND support
875 * across suspend and resume. Check on whether to hide the RDRAND
876 * instruction support via CPUID.
877 */
878 clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c);
879 }
880
881 static const struct x86_cpu_id erratum_1386_microcode[] = {
882 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x17, 0x01, 0x2, 0x0800126e),
883 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x17, 0x31, 0x0, 0x08301052),
884 {}
885 };
886
fix_erratum_1386(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)887 static void fix_erratum_1386(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
888 {
889 /*
890 * Work around Erratum 1386. The XSAVES instruction malfunctions in
891 * certain circumstances on Zen1/2 uarch, and not all parts have had
892 * updated microcode at the time of writing (March 2023).
893 *
894 * Affected parts all have no supervisor XSAVE states, meaning that
895 * the XSAVEC instruction (which works fine) is equivalent.
896 *
897 * Clear the feature flag only on microcode revisions which
898 * don't have the fix.
899 */
900 if (x86_match_min_microcode_rev(erratum_1386_microcode))
901 return;
902
903 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
904 }
905
init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)906 void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
907 {
908 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
909 /*
910 * On Zen2 we offer this chicken (bit) on the altar of Speculation.
911 *
912 * This suppresses speculation from the middle of a basic block, i.e. it
913 * suppresses non-branch predictions.
914 */
915 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
916 msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT);
917 #endif
918 }
919
init_amd_zen_common(void)920 static void init_amd_zen_common(void)
921 {
922 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN);
923 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
924 node_reclaim_distance = 32;
925 #endif
926 }
927
init_amd_zen1(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)928 static void init_amd_zen1(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
929 {
930 fix_erratum_1386(c);
931
932 /* Fix up CPUID bits, but only if not virtualised. */
933 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
934
935 /* Erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. */
936 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB))
937 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
938 }
939
940 pr_notice_once("AMD Zen1 DIV0 bug detected. Disable SMT for full protection.\n");
941 setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_DIV0);
942
943 /*
944 * Turn off the Instructions Retired free counter on machines that are
945 * susceptible to erratum #1054 "Instructions Retired Performance
946 * Counter May Be Inaccurate".
947 */
948 if (c->x86_model < 0x30) {
949 msr_clear_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT);
950 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IRPERF);
951 }
952
953 pr_notice_once("AMD Zen1 FPDSS bug detected, enabling mitigation.\n");
954 msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG, MSR_AMD64_FP_CFG_ZEN1_DENORM_FIX_BIT);
955 }
956
957 static const struct x86_cpu_id amd_zenbleed_microcode[] = {
958 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x17, 0x31, 0x0, 0x0830107b),
959 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x17, 0x60, 0x1, 0x0860010c),
960 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x17, 0x68, 0x1, 0x08608107),
961 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x17, 0x71, 0x0, 0x08701033),
962 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x17, 0xa0, 0x0, 0x08a00009),
963 {}
964 };
965
zen2_zenbleed_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)966 static void zen2_zenbleed_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
967 {
968 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
969 return;
970
971 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AVX))
972 return;
973
974 if (!x86_match_min_microcode_rev(amd_zenbleed_microcode)) {
975 pr_notice_once("Zenbleed: please update your microcode for the most optimal fix\n");
976 msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT);
977 } else {
978 msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT);
979 }
980 }
981
init_amd_zen2(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)982 static void init_amd_zen2(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
983 {
984 init_spectral_chicken(c);
985 fix_erratum_1386(c);
986 zen2_zenbleed_check(c);
987
988 /* Disable RDSEED on AMD Cyan Skillfish because of an error. */
989 if (c->x86_model == 0x47 && c->x86_stepping == 0x0) {
990 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED);
991 msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_CPUID_FN_7, 18);
992 pr_emerg("RDSEED is not reliable on this platform; disabling.\n");
993 }
994
995 /* Correct misconfigured CPUID on some clients. */
996 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB);
997
998 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
999 msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN2_BP_CFG_BUG_FIX_BIT);
1000 }
1001
init_amd_zen3(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)1002 static void init_amd_zen3(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
1003 {
1004 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
1005 /*
1006 * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to
1007 * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the
1008 * BTC_NO bit.
1009 */
1010 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))
1011 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO);
1012 }
1013 }
1014
init_amd_zen4(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)1015 static void init_amd_zen4(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
1016 {
1017 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
1018 msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT);
1019
1020 /*
1021 * These Zen4 SoCs advertise support for virtualized VMLOAD/VMSAVE
1022 * in some BIOS versions but they can lead to random host reboots.
1023 */
1024 switch (c->x86_model) {
1025 case 0x18 ... 0x1f:
1026 case 0x60 ... 0x7f:
1027 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
1028 break;
1029 }
1030 }
1031
1032 static const struct x86_cpu_id zen5_rdseed_microcode[] = {
1033 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x02, 0x1, 0x0b00215a),
1034 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x08, 0x1, 0x0b008121),
1035 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x11, 0x0, 0x0b101054),
1036 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x24, 0x0, 0x0b204037),
1037 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x44, 0x0, 0x0b404035),
1038 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x44, 0x1, 0x0b404108),
1039 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x60, 0x0, 0x0b600037),
1040 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x68, 0x0, 0x0b608038),
1041 ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x70, 0x0, 0x0b700037),
1042 {},
1043 };
1044
init_amd_zen5(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)1045 static void init_amd_zen5(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
1046 {
1047 if (!x86_match_min_microcode_rev(zen5_rdseed_microcode)) {
1048 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED);
1049 msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_CPUID_FN_7, 18);
1050 pr_emerg_once("RDSEED32 is broken. Disabling the corresponding CPUID bit.\n");
1051 }
1052 }
1053
init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)1054 static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
1055 {
1056 u64 vm_cr;
1057
1058 early_init_amd(c);
1059
1060 if (c->x86 >= 0x10)
1061 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD);
1062
1063 /* AMD FSRM also implies FSRS */
1064 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSRM))
1065 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FSRS);
1066
1067 /* K6s reports MCEs but don't actually have all the MSRs */
1068 if (c->x86 < 6)
1069 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MCE);
1070
1071 switch (c->x86) {
1072 case 4: init_amd_k5(c); break;
1073 case 5: init_amd_k6(c); break;
1074 case 6: init_amd_k7(c); break;
1075 case 0xf: init_amd_k8(c); break;
1076 case 0x10: init_amd_gh(c); break;
1077 case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break;
1078 case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break;
1079 case 0x16: init_amd_jg(c); break;
1080 }
1081
1082 /*
1083 * Save up on some future enablement work and do common Zen
1084 * settings.
1085 */
1086 if (c->x86 >= 0x17)
1087 init_amd_zen_common();
1088
1089 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN1))
1090 init_amd_zen1(c);
1091 else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN2))
1092 init_amd_zen2(c);
1093 else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN3))
1094 init_amd_zen3(c);
1095 else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN4))
1096 init_amd_zen4(c);
1097 else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN5))
1098 init_amd_zen5(c);
1099
1100 /*
1101 * Enable workaround for FXSAVE leak on CPUs
1102 * without a XSaveErPtr feature
1103 */
1104 if ((c->x86 >= 6) && (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XSAVEERPTR)))
1105 set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK);
1106
1107 cpu_detect_cache_sizes(c);
1108
1109 srat_detect_node(c);
1110
1111 init_amd_cacheinfo(c);
1112
1113 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SVM)) {
1114 rdmsrq(MSR_VM_CR, vm_cr);
1115 if (vm_cr & SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK) {
1116 pr_notice_once("SVM disabled (by BIOS) in MSR_VM_CR\n");
1117 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SVM);
1118 }
1119 }
1120
1121 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) {
1122 /*
1123 * Use LFENCE for execution serialization. On families which
1124 * don't have that MSR, LFENCE is already serializing.
1125 * msr_set_bit() uses the safe accessors, too, even if the MSR
1126 * is not present.
1127 */
1128 msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG,
1129 MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT);
1130
1131 /* A serializing LFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
1132 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
1133 }
1134
1135 /*
1136 * Family 0x12 and above processors have APIC timer
1137 * running in deep C states.
1138 */
1139 if (c->x86 > 0x11)
1140 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARAT);
1141
1142 /* 3DNow or LM implies PREFETCHW */
1143 if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH))
1144 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOW) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_LM))
1145 set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH);
1146
1147 /* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
1148 if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
1149 set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
1150
1151 /* Enable the Instructions Retired free counter */
1152 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IRPERF))
1153 msr_set_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT);
1154
1155 check_null_seg_clears_base(c);
1156
1157 /*
1158 * Make sure EFER[AIBRSE - Automatic IBRS Enable] is set. The APs are brought up
1159 * using the trampoline code and as part of it, MSR_EFER gets prepared there in
1160 * order to be replicated onto them. Regardless, set it here again, if not set,
1161 * to protect against any future refactoring/code reorganization which might
1162 * miss setting this important bit.
1163 */
1164 if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) &&
1165 cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
1166 WARN_ON_ONCE(msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS) < 0);
1167
1168 /* AMD CPUs don't need fencing after x2APIC/TSC_DEADLINE MSR writes. */
1169 clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_APIC_MSRS_FENCE);
1170
1171 /* Enable Translation Cache Extension */
1172 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TCE))
1173 msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_TCE);
1174 }
1175
1176 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
amd_size_cache(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c,unsigned int size)1177 static unsigned int amd_size_cache(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int size)
1178 {
1179 /* AMD errata T13 (order #21922) */
1180 if (c->x86 == 6) {
1181 /* Duron Rev A0 */
1182 if (c->x86_model == 3 && c->x86_stepping == 0)
1183 size = 64;
1184 /* Tbird rev A1/A2 */
1185 if (c->x86_model == 4 &&
1186 (c->x86_stepping == 0 || c->x86_stepping == 1))
1187 size = 256;
1188 }
1189 return size;
1190 }
1191 #endif
1192
cpu_detect_tlb_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)1193 static void cpu_detect_tlb_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
1194 {
1195 u32 ebx, eax, ecx, edx;
1196 u16 mask = 0xfff;
1197
1198 if (c->x86 < 0xf)
1199 return;
1200
1201 if (c->extended_cpuid_level < 0x80000006)
1202 return;
1203
1204 cpuid(0x80000006, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
1205
1206 tlb_lld_4k = (ebx >> 16) & mask;
1207 tlb_lli_4k = ebx & mask;
1208
1209 /*
1210 * K8 doesn't have 2M/4M entries in the L2 TLB so read out the L1 TLB
1211 * characteristics from the CPUID function 0x80000005 instead.
1212 */
1213 if (c->x86 == 0xf) {
1214 cpuid(0x80000005, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
1215 mask = 0xff;
1216 }
1217
1218 /* Handle DTLB 2M and 4M sizes, fall back to L1 if L2 is disabled */
1219 if (!((eax >> 16) & mask))
1220 tlb_lld_2m = (cpuid_eax(0x80000005) >> 16) & 0xff;
1221 else
1222 tlb_lld_2m = (eax >> 16) & mask;
1223
1224 /* a 4M entry uses two 2M entries */
1225 tlb_lld_4m = tlb_lld_2m >> 1;
1226
1227 /* Handle ITLB 2M and 4M sizes, fall back to L1 if L2 is disabled */
1228 if (!(eax & mask)) {
1229 /* Erratum 658 */
1230 if (c->x86 == 0x15 && c->x86_model <= 0x1f) {
1231 tlb_lli_2m = 1024;
1232 } else {
1233 cpuid(0x80000005, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
1234 tlb_lli_2m = eax & 0xff;
1235 }
1236 } else
1237 tlb_lli_2m = eax & mask;
1238
1239 tlb_lli_4m = tlb_lli_2m >> 1;
1240
1241 /* Max number of pages INVLPGB can invalidate in one shot */
1242 if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB))
1243 invlpgb_count_max = (cpuid_edx(0x80000008) & 0xffff) + 1;
1244 }
1245
1246 static const struct cpu_dev amd_cpu_dev = {
1247 .c_vendor = "AMD",
1248 .c_ident = { "AuthenticAMD" },
1249 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
1250 .legacy_models = {
1251 { .family = 4, .model_names =
1252 {
1253 [3] = "486 DX/2",
1254 [7] = "486 DX/2-WB",
1255 [8] = "486 DX/4",
1256 [9] = "486 DX/4-WB",
1257 [14] = "Am5x86-WT",
1258 [15] = "Am5x86-WB"
1259 }
1260 },
1261 },
1262 .legacy_cache_size = amd_size_cache,
1263 #endif
1264 .c_early_init = early_init_amd,
1265 .c_detect_tlb = cpu_detect_tlb_amd,
1266 .c_bsp_init = bsp_init_amd,
1267 .c_init = init_amd,
1268 .c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_AMD,
1269 };
1270
1271 cpu_dev_register(amd_cpu_dev);
1272
1273 static DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(unsigned long[4], amd_dr_addr_mask);
1274
1275 static unsigned int amd_msr_dr_addr_masks[] = {
1276 MSR_F16H_DR0_ADDR_MASK,
1277 MSR_F16H_DR1_ADDR_MASK,
1278 MSR_F16H_DR1_ADDR_MASK + 1,
1279 MSR_F16H_DR1_ADDR_MASK + 2
1280 };
1281
amd_set_dr_addr_mask(unsigned long mask,unsigned int dr)1282 void amd_set_dr_addr_mask(unsigned long mask, unsigned int dr)
1283 {
1284 int cpu = smp_processor_id();
1285
1286 if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_BPEXT))
1287 return;
1288
1289 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dr >= ARRAY_SIZE(amd_msr_dr_addr_masks)))
1290 return;
1291
1292 if (per_cpu(amd_dr_addr_mask, cpu)[dr] == mask)
1293 return;
1294
1295 wrmsrq(amd_msr_dr_addr_masks[dr], mask);
1296 per_cpu(amd_dr_addr_mask, cpu)[dr] = mask;
1297 }
1298
amd_get_dr_addr_mask(unsigned int dr)1299 unsigned long amd_get_dr_addr_mask(unsigned int dr)
1300 {
1301 if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_BPEXT))
1302 return 0;
1303
1304 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dr >= ARRAY_SIZE(amd_msr_dr_addr_masks)))
1305 return 0;
1306
1307 return per_cpu(amd_dr_addr_mask[dr], smp_processor_id());
1308 }
1309 EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(amd_get_dr_addr_mask);
1310
zenbleed_check_cpu(void * unused)1311 static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused)
1312 {
1313 struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(smp_processor_id());
1314
1315 zen2_zenbleed_check(c);
1316 }
1317
amd_check_microcode(void)1318 void amd_check_microcode(void)
1319 {
1320 if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
1321 return;
1322
1323 if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ZEN2))
1324 on_each_cpu(zenbleed_check_cpu, NULL, 1);
1325 }
1326
1327 static const char * const s5_reset_reason_txt[] = {
1328 [0] = "thermal pin BP_THERMTRIP_L was tripped",
1329 [1] = "power button was pressed for 4 seconds",
1330 [2] = "shutdown pin was tripped",
1331 [4] = "remote ASF power off command was received",
1332 [9] = "internal CPU thermal limit was tripped",
1333 [16] = "system reset pin BP_SYS_RST_L was tripped",
1334 [17] = "software issued PCI reset",
1335 [18] = "software wrote 0x4 to reset control register 0xCF9",
1336 [19] = "software wrote 0x6 to reset control register 0xCF9",
1337 [20] = "software wrote 0xE to reset control register 0xCF9",
1338 [21] = "ACPI power state transition occurred",
1339 [22] = "keyboard reset pin KB_RST_L was tripped",
1340 [23] = "internal CPU shutdown event occurred",
1341 [24] = "system failed to boot before failed boot timer expired",
1342 [25] = "hardware watchdog timer expired",
1343 [26] = "remote ASF reset command was received",
1344 [27] = "an uncorrected error caused a data fabric sync flood event",
1345 [29] = "FCH and MP1 failed warm reset handshake",
1346 [30] = "a parity error occurred",
1347 [31] = "a software sync flood event occurred",
1348 };
1349
print_s5_reset_status_mmio(void)1350 static __init int print_s5_reset_status_mmio(void)
1351 {
1352 void __iomem *addr;
1353 u32 value;
1354 int i;
1355
1356 if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ZEN))
1357 return 0;
1358
1359 addr = ioremap(FCH_PM_BASE + FCH_PM_S5_RESET_STATUS, sizeof(value));
1360 if (!addr)
1361 return 0;
1362
1363 value = ioread32(addr);
1364
1365 /* Value with "all bits set" is an error response and should be ignored. */
1366 if (value == U32_MAX) {
1367 iounmap(addr);
1368 return 0;
1369 }
1370
1371 /*
1372 * Clear all reason bits so they won't be retained if the next reset
1373 * does not update the register. Besides, some bits are never cleared by
1374 * hardware so it's software's responsibility to clear them.
1375 *
1376 * Writing the value back effectively clears all reason bits as they are
1377 * write-1-to-clear.
1378 */
1379 iowrite32(value, addr);
1380 iounmap(addr);
1381
1382 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s5_reset_reason_txt); i++) {
1383 if (!(value & BIT(i)))
1384 continue;
1385
1386 if (s5_reset_reason_txt[i]) {
1387 pr_info("x86/amd: Previous system reset reason [0x%08x]: %s\n",
1388 value, s5_reset_reason_txt[i]);
1389 }
1390 }
1391
1392 return 0;
1393 }
1394 late_initcall(print_s5_reset_status_mmio);
1395
dmi_scan_additional(const struct dmi_header * d,void * p)1396 static void __init dmi_scan_additional(const struct dmi_header *d, void *p)
1397 {
1398 struct dmi_a_info *info = (struct dmi_a_info *)d;
1399 void *next, *end;
1400
1401 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DMI))
1402 return;
1403
1404 if (info->header.type != DMI_ENTRY_ADDITIONAL ||
1405 info->header.length < DMI_A_INFO_MIN_SIZE ||
1406 info->count < 1)
1407 return;
1408
1409 next = (void *)(info + 1);
1410 end = (void *)info + info->header.length;
1411
1412 do {
1413 struct dmi_a_info_entry *entry;
1414 const char *string_ptr;
1415
1416 entry = (struct dmi_a_info_entry *)next;
1417
1418 /*
1419 * Not much can be done to validate data. At least the entry
1420 * length shouldn't be 0.
1421 */
1422 if (!entry->length)
1423 return;
1424
1425 string_ptr = dmi_string_nosave(&info->header, entry->str_num);
1426
1427 /* Sample string: AGESA!V9 StrixKrackanPI-FP8 1.1.0.0c */
1428 if (!strncmp(string_ptr, "AGESA", 5)) {
1429 pr_info("AGESA: %s\n", string_ptr);
1430 break;
1431 }
1432
1433 next += entry->length;
1434 } while (end - next >= DMI_A_INFO_ENT_MIN_SIZE);
1435 }
1436
print_dmi_agesa(void)1437 static __init int print_dmi_agesa(void)
1438 {
1439 dmi_walk(dmi_scan_additional, NULL);
1440 return 0;
1441 }
1442 late_initcall(print_dmi_agesa);
1443