#
60e9eabf |
| 29-Jun-2020 |
Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> |
Backmerge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-next' into drm-misc-next
Some conflicts with ttm_bo->offset removal, but drm-misc-next needs updating to v5.8.
Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.la
Backmerge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-next' into drm-misc-next
Some conflicts with ttm_bo->offset removal, but drm-misc-next needs updating to v5.8.
Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
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Revision tags: v5.8-rc3 |
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#
0f69403d |
| 25-Jun-2020 |
Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> |
Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next-queued
Catch up with upstream, in particular to get c1e8d7c6a7a6 ("mmap locking API: convert mmap_sem comments").
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@inte
Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next-queued
Catch up with upstream, in particular to get c1e8d7c6a7a6 ("mmap locking API: convert mmap_sem comments").
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
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Revision tags: v5.8-rc2 |
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#
6870112c |
| 17-Jun-2020 |
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> |
Merge tag 'v5.8-rc1' into regulator-5.8
Linux 5.8-rc1
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#
07c7b547 |
| 16-Jun-2020 |
Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> |
Merge tag 'v5.8-rc1' into fixes
Linux 5.8-rc1
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#
4b3c1f1b |
| 16-Jun-2020 |
Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> |
Merge v5.8-rc1 into drm-misc-fixes
Beginning a new release cycles for what will become v5.8. Updating drm-misc-fixes accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
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Revision tags: v5.8-rc1 |
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#
8440d4a7 |
| 12-Jun-2020 |
Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> |
Merge branch 'dt/schema-cleanups' into dt/linus
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#
f77d26a9 |
| 11-Jun-2020 |
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
Merge branch 'x86/entry' into ras/core
to fixup conflicts in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c so MCE specific follow up patches can be applied without creating a horrible merge conflict afterwards.
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#
9ff72585 |
| 04-Jun-2020 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
Merge branch 'proc-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull proc updates from Eric Biederman: "This has four sets of changes:
- modernize proc to sup
Merge branch 'proc-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull proc updates from Eric Biederman: "This has four sets of changes:
- modernize proc to support multiple private instances
- ensure we see the exit of each process tid exactly
- remove has_group_leader_pid
- use pids not tasks in posix-cpu-timers lookup
Alexey updated proc so each mount of proc uses a new superblock. This allows people to actually use mount options with proc with no fear of messing up another mount of proc. Given the kernel's internal mounts of proc for things like uml this was a real problem, and resulted in Android's hidepid mount options being ignored and introducing security issues.
The rest of the changes are small cleanups and fixes that came out of my work to allow this change to proc. In essence it is swapping the pids in de_thread during exec which removes a special case the code had to handle. Then updating the code to stop handling that special case"
* 'proc-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument remove the no longer needed pid_alive() check in __task_pid_nr_ns() posix-cpu-timers: Replace __get_task_for_clock with pid_for_clock posix-cpu-timers: Replace cpu_timer_pid_type with clock_pid_type posix-cpu-timers: Extend rcu_read_lock removing task_struct references signal: Remove has_group_leader_pid exec: Remove BUG_ON(has_group_leader_pid) posix-cpu-timer: Unify the now redundant code in lookup_task posix-cpu-timer: Tidy up group_leader logic in lookup_task proc: Ensure we see the exit of each process tid exactly once rculist: Add hlists_swap_heads_rcu proc: Use PIDTYPE_TGID in next_tgid Use proc_pid_ns() to get pid_namespace from the proc superblock proc: use named enums for better readability proc: use human-readable values for hidepid docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options and new mount behavior proc: add option to mount only a pids subset proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts
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#
16ba7e31 |
| 03-Jun-2020 |
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> |
Merge branches 'for-5.7/upstream-fixes', 'for-5.8/apple', 'for-5.8/asus', 'for-5.8/core', 'for-5.8/intel-ish', 'for-5.8/logitech', 'for-5.8/mcp2221' and 'for-5.8/multitouch' into for-linus
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#
d053cf0d |
| 01-Jun-2020 |
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> |
Merge branch 'for-5.8' into for-linus
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Revision tags: v5.7, v5.7-rc7 |
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#
1f422417 |
| 23-May-2020 |
Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org> |
Merge branch 'timers/drivers/timer-ti' into timers/drivers/next
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Revision tags: v5.7-rc6 |
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#
4aef2ec9 |
| 13-May-2020 |
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> |
Merge branch 'kvm-amd-fixes' into HEAD
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#
68f0f269 |
| 11-May-2020 |
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
Merge branch 'for-mingo' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-rcu into core/rcu
Pull RCU updates from Paul McKenney:
1. Miscellaneous fixes. 2. kfree_rcu() updates.
Merge branch 'for-mingo' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-rcu into core/rcu
Pull RCU updates from Paul McKenney:
1. Miscellaneous fixes. 2. kfree_rcu() updates. 3. Remove scheduler locking restriction 4. RCU-tasks update, including addition of RCU Tasks Trace for BPF use and RCU Tasks Rude. (This branch is on top of #3 due to overlap of changed code.) 5. RCU CPU stall warning updates. 6. Torture-test updates.
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Revision tags: v5.7-rc5, v5.7-rc4, v5.7-rc3 |
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#
4353dd3b |
| 25-Apr-2020 |
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
Merge tag 'efi-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core
Pull EFI changes for v5.8 from Ard Biesheuvel:
"- preliminary changes for RISC-V - add support for setti
Merge tag 'efi-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core
Pull EFI changes for v5.8 from Ard Biesheuvel:
"- preliminary changes for RISC-V - add support for setting the resolution on the EFI framebuffer - simplify kernel image loading for arm64 - Move .bss into .data via the linker script instead of relying on symbol annotations. - Get rid of __pure getters to access global variables - Clean up the config table matching arrays"
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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#
0fb5ce62 |
| 24-Apr-2020 |
Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
proc: modernize proc to support multiple private instances
Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> writes: Procfs modernization: --------------------- Historically procfs was always tied to pid
proc: modernize proc to support multiple private instances
Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> writes: Procfs modernization: --------------------- Historically procfs was always tied to pid namespaces, during pid namespace creation we internally create a procfs mount for it. However, this has the effect that all new procfs mounts are just a mirror of the internal one, any change, any mount option update, any new future introduction will propagate to all other procfs mounts that are in the same pid namespace.
This may have solved several use cases in that time. However today we face new requirements, and making procfs able to support new private instances inside same pid namespace seems a major point. If we want to to introduce new features and security mechanisms we have to make sure first that we do not break existing usecases. Supporting private procfs instances will allow to support new features and behaviour without propagating it to all other procfs mounts.
Today procfs is more of a burden especially to some Embedded, IoT, sandbox, container use cases. In user space we are over-mounting null or inaccessible files on top to hide files and information. If we want to hide pids we have to create PID namespaces otherwise mount options propagate to all other proc mounts, changing a mount option value in one mount will propagate to all other proc mounts. If we want to introduce new features, then they will propagate to all other mounts too, resulting either maybe new useful functionality or maybe breaking stuff. We have also to note that userspace should not workaround procfs, the kernel should just provide a sane simple interface.
In this regard several developers and maintainers pointed out that there are problems with procfs and it has to be modernized:
"Here's another one: split up and modernize /proc." by Andy Lutomirski [1]
Discussion about kernel pointer leaks:
"And yes, as Kees and Daniel mentioned, it's definitely not just dmesg. In fact, the primary things tend to be /proc and /sys, not dmesg itself." By Linus Torvalds [2]
Lot of other areas in the kernel and filesystems have been updated to be able to support private instances, devpts is one major example [3].
Which will be used for:
1) Embedded systems and IoT: usually we have one supervisor for apps, we have some lightweight sandbox support, however if we create pid namespaces we have to manage all the processes inside too, where our goal is to be able to run a bunch of apps each one inside its own mount namespace, maybe use network namespaces for vlans setups, but right now we only want mount namespaces, without all the other complexity. We want procfs to behave more like a real file system, and block access to inodes that belong to other users. The 'hidepid=' will not work since it is a shared mount option.
2) Containers, sandboxes and Private instances of file systems - devpts case Historically, lot of file systems inside Linux kernel view when instantiated were just a mirror of an already created and mounted filesystem. This was the case of devpts filesystem, it seems at that time the requirements were to optimize things and reuse the same memory, etc. This design used to work but not anymore with today's containers, IoT, hostile environments and all the privacy challenges that Linux faces.
In that regards, devpts was updated so that each new mounts is a total independent file system by the following patches:
"devpts: Make each mount of devpts an independent filesystem" by Eric W. Biederman [3] [4]
3) Linux Security Modules have multiple ptrace paths inside some subsystems, however inside procfs, the implementation does not guarantee that the ptrace() check which triggers the security_ptrace_check() hook will always run. We have the 'hidepid' mount option that can be used to force the ptrace_may_access() check inside has_pid_permissions() to run. The problem is that 'hidepid' is per pid namespace and not attached to the mount point, any remount or modification of 'hidepid' will propagate to all other procfs mounts.
This also does not allow to support Yama LSM easily in desktop and user sessions. Yama ptrace scope which restricts ptrace and some other syscalls to be allowed only on inferiors, can be updated to have a per-task context, where the context will be inherited during fork(), clone() and preserved across execve(). If we support multiple private procfs instances, then we may force the ptrace_may_access() on /proc/<pids>/ to always run inside that new procfs instances. This will allow to specifiy on user sessions if we should populate procfs with pids that the user can ptrace or not.
By using Yama ptrace scope, some restricted users will only be able to see inferiors inside /proc, they won't even be able to see their other processes. Some software like Chromium, Firefox's crash handler, Wine and others are already using Yama to restrict which processes can be ptracable. With this change this will give the possibility to restrict /proc/<pids>/ but more importantly this will give desktop users a generic and usuable way to specifiy which users should see all processes and which user can not.
Side notes:
* This covers the lack of seccomp where it is not able to parse arguments, it is easy to install a seccomp filter on direct syscalls that operate on pids, however /proc/<pid>/ is a Linux ABI using filesystem syscalls. With this change all LSMs should be able to analyze open/read/write/close... on /proc/<pid>/
4) This will allow to implement new features either in kernel or userspace without having to worry about procfs. In containers, sandboxes, etc we have workarounds to hide some /proc inodes, this should be supported natively without doing extra complex work, the kernel should be able to support sane options that work with today and future Linux use cases.
5) Creation of new superblock with all procfs options for each procfs mount will fix the ignoring of mount options. The problem is that the second mount of procfs in the same pid namespace ignores the mount options. The mount options are ignored without error until procfs is remounted.
Before:
proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=2 0 0
mount("proc", "/tmp/proc", "proc", 0, "hidepid=1") = 0 +++ exited with 0 +++
proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=2 0 0 proc /tmp/proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=2 0 0
proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=1 0 0 proc /tmp/proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=1 0 0
After:
proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=ptraceable 0 0
proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=ptraceable 0 0 proc /tmp/proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=invisible 0 0
Introduced changes: ------------------- Each mount of procfs creates a separate procfs instance with its own mount options.
This series adds few new mount options:
* New 'hidepid=ptraceable' or 'hidepid=4' mount option to show only ptraceable processes in the procfs. This allows to support lightweight sandboxes in Embedded Linux, also solves the case for LSM where now with this mount option, we make sure that they have a ptrace path in procfs.
* 'subset=pid' that allows to hide non-pid inodes from procfs. It can be used in containers and sandboxes, as these are already trying to hide and block access to procfs inodes anyway.
ChangeLog: ---------- * Rebase on top of v5.7-rc1. * Fix a resource leak if proc is not mounted or if proc is simply reconfigured. * Add few selftests.
* After a discussion with Eric W. Biederman, the numerical values for hidepid parameter have been removed from uapi. * Remove proc_self and proc_thread_self from the pid_namespace struct. * I took into account the comment of Kees Cook. * Update Reviewed-by tags.
* 'subset=pidfs' renamed to 'subset=pid' as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. * Include Reviewed-by tags.
* Rebase on top of Eric W. Biederman's procfs changes. * Add human readable values of 'hidepid' as suggested by Andy Lutomirski.
* Started using RCU lock to clean dcache entries as suggested by Linus Torvalds.
* 'pidonly=1' renamed to 'subset=pidfs' as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. * HIDEPID_* moved to uapi/ as they are user interface to mount(). Suggested-by Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
* 'hidepid=' and 'gid=' mount options are moved from pid namespace to superblock. * 'newinstance' mount option removed as suggested by Eric W. Biederman. Mount of procfs always creates a new instance. * 'limit_pids' renamed to 'hidepid=3'. * I took into account the comment of Linus Torvalds [7]. * Documentation added.
* Fixed a bug that caused a problem with the Fedora boot. * The 'pidonly' option is visible among the mount options.
* Renamed mount options to 'newinstance' and 'pids=' Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> * Fixed order of commit, Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> * Many bug fixes.
* Removed 'unshared' mount option and replaced it with 'limit_pids' which is attached to the current procfs mount. Suggested-by Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> * Do not fill dcache with pid entries that we can not ptrace. * Many bug fixes.
References: ----------- [1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/ksummit-discuss/2017-January/004215.html [2] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/05/5 [3] https://lwn.net/Articles/689539/ [4] http://lxr.free-electrons.com/source/Documentation/filesystems/devpts.txt?v=3.14 [5] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/5/2/407 [6] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/5/3/357 [7] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/5/11/505
Alexey Gladkov (7): proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option proc: add option to mount only a pids subset docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options and new mount behavior proc: use human-readable values for hidepid proc: use named enums for better readability
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 92 +++++++++--- fs/proc/base.c | 48 +++++-- fs/proc/generic.c | 9 ++ fs/proc/inode.c | 30 +++- fs/proc/root.c | 131 +++++++++++++----- fs/proc/self.c | 6 +- fs/proc/thread_self.c | 6 +- fs/proc_namespace.c | 14 +- include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 12 -- include/linux/proc_fs.h | 30 +++- tools/testing/selftests/proc/.gitignore | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/proc/Makefile | 2 + .../selftests/proc/proc-fsconfig-hidepid.c | 50 +++++++ .../selftests/proc/proc-multiple-procfs.c | 48 +++++++ 14 files changed, 384 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-fsconfig-hidepid.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-multiple-procfs.c
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200419141057.621356-1-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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#
36dbae99 |
| 24-Apr-2020 |
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> |
Merge branch 'topic/nhlt' into for-next
Merge NHLT init cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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Revision tags: v5.7-rc2 |
|
#
1c6c4d11 |
| 19-Apr-2020 |
Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> |
proc: use human-readable values for hidepid
The hidepid parameter values are becoming more and more and it becomes difficult to remember what each new magic number means.
Backward compatibility is
proc: use human-readable values for hidepid
The hidepid parameter values are becoming more and more and it becomes difficult to remember what each new magic number means.
Backward compatibility is preserved since it is possible to specify numerical value for the hidepid parameter. This does not break the fsconfig since it is not possible to specify a numerical value through it. All numeric values are converted to a string. The type FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY cannot be used to indicate a numerical value.
Selftest has been added to verify this behavior.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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#
fa10fed3 |
| 19-Apr-2020 |
Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> |
proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace
This patch allows to have multiple procfs instances inside the same pid namespace. The aim here is lightweight sandboxes, and to allo
proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace
This patch allows to have multiple procfs instances inside the same pid namespace. The aim here is lightweight sandboxes, and to allow that we have to modernize procfs internals.
1) The main aim of this work is to have on embedded systems one supervisor for apps. Right now we have some lightweight sandbox support, however if we create pid namespacess we have to manages all the processes inside too, where our goal is to be able to run a bunch of apps each one inside its own mount namespace without being able to notice each other. We only want to use mount namespaces, and we want procfs to behave more like a real mount point.
2) Linux Security Modules have multiple ptrace paths inside some subsystems, however inside procfs, the implementation does not guarantee that the ptrace() check which triggers the security_ptrace_check() hook will always run. We have the 'hidepid' mount option that can be used to force the ptrace_may_access() check inside has_pid_permissions() to run. The problem is that 'hidepid' is per pid namespace and not attached to the mount point, any remount or modification of 'hidepid' will propagate to all other procfs mounts.
This also does not allow to support Yama LSM easily in desktop and user sessions. Yama ptrace scope which restricts ptrace and some other syscalls to be allowed only on inferiors, can be updated to have a per-task context, where the context will be inherited during fork(), clone() and preserved across execve(). If we support multiple private procfs instances, then we may force the ptrace_may_access() on /proc/<pids>/ to always run inside that new procfs instances. This will allow to specifiy on user sessions if we should populate procfs with pids that the user can ptrace or not.
By using Yama ptrace scope, some restricted users will only be able to see inferiors inside /proc, they won't even be able to see their other processes. Some software like Chromium, Firefox's crash handler, Wine and others are already using Yama to restrict which processes can be ptracable. With this change this will give the possibility to restrict /proc/<pids>/ but more importantly this will give desktop users a generic and usuable way to specifiy which users should see all processes and which users can not.
Side notes: * This covers the lack of seccomp where it is not able to parse arguments, it is easy to install a seccomp filter on direct syscalls that operate on pids, however /proc/<pid>/ is a Linux ABI using filesystem syscalls. With this change LSMs should be able to analyze open/read/write/close...
In the new patch set version I removed the 'newinstance' option as suggested by Eric W. Biederman.
Selftest has been added to verify new behavior.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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#
41d91ec3 |
| 22-Apr-2020 |
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> |
Merge tag 'tegra-for-5.7-asoc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tegra/linux into asoc-5.7
ASoC: tegra: Fixes for v5.7-rc3
This contains a couple of fixes that are needed to properly
Merge tag 'tegra-for-5.7-asoc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tegra/linux into asoc-5.7
ASoC: tegra: Fixes for v5.7-rc3
This contains a couple of fixes that are needed to properly reconfigure the audio clocks on older Tegra devices.
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#
175ae3ad |
| 21-Apr-2020 |
Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> |
Merge branch 'fixes-v5.7' into fixes
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#
3bda0386 |
| 21-Apr-2020 |
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> |
Merge tag 'kvm-s390-master-5.7-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into kvm-master
KVM: s390: Fix for 5.7 and maintainer update
- Silence false positive lockdep warnin
Merge tag 'kvm-s390-master-5.7-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into kvm-master
KVM: s390: Fix for 5.7 and maintainer update
- Silence false positive lockdep warning - add Claudio as reviewer
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#
08d99b2c |
| 17-Apr-2020 |
Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> |
Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next
Backmerging required to pull topic/phy-compliance.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
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#
2b703bbd |
| 16-Apr-2020 |
Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> |
Merge drm/drm-next into drm-intel-next-queued
Backmerging in order to pull "topic/phy-compliance".
Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
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#
a4721ced |
| 14-Apr-2020 |
Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech> |
Merge v5.7-rc1 into drm-misc-fixes
Start the new drm-misc-fixes cycle.
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
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#
3b02a051 |
| 13-Apr-2020 |
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
Merge tag 'v5.7-rc1' into locking/kcsan, to resolve conflicts and refresh
Resolve these conflicts:
arch/x86/Kconfig arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
Do a minor "evil merge" to move the KCSAN entry up a
Merge tag 'v5.7-rc1' into locking/kcsan, to resolve conflicts and refresh
Resolve these conflicts:
arch/x86/Kconfig arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
Do a minor "evil merge" to move the KCSAN entry up a bit by a few lines in the Kconfig to reduce the probability of future conflicts.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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