sys: Remove $FreeBSD$: one-line .c pattern

Remove /^[\s*]*__FBSDID\("\$FreeBSD\$"\);?\s*\n/

Merge head

IFC @264767

Merge head up to r262222 (last merge was incomplete).

MFC @ r259205 in preparation for some SVM updates. (for real this time)

- For kernel compiled only with KDTRACE_HOOKS and not any lock debugging
option, unbreak the lock tracing release semantic by embedding
calls to LOCKSTAT_PROFILE_RELEASE_LOCK() direclty in the in

- For kernel compiled only with KDTRACE_HOOKS and not any lock debugging
option, unbreak the lock tracing release semantic by embedding
calls to LOCKSTAT_PROFILE_RELEASE_LOCK() direclty in the inlined
version of the releasing functions for mutex, rwlock and sxlock.
Failing to do so skips the lockstat_probe_func invokation for
unlocking.
- As part of the LOCKSTAT support is inlined in mutex operation, for
kernel compiled without lock debugging options, potentially every
consumer must be compiled including opt_kdtrace.h.
Fix this by moving KDTRACE_HOOKS into opt_global.h and remove the
dependency by opt_kdtrace.h for all files, as now only KDTRACE_FRAMES
is linked there and it is only used as a compile-time stub [0].

[0] immediately shows some new bug as DTRACE-derived support for debug
in sfxge is broken and it was never really tested. As it was not
including correctly opt_kdtrace.h before it was never enabled so it
was kept broken for a while. Fix this by using a protection stub,
leaving sfxge driver authors the responsibility for fixing it
appropriately [1].

Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon storage division
Discussed with: rstone
[0] Reported by: rstone
[1] Discussed with: philip

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IFC @ r225592

sys/dev/bvm/bvm_console.c - move up to the new alt-break order.

Integrate from head at r225316.

Add the fo_chown and fo_chmod methods to struct fileops and use them
to implement fchown(2) and fchmod(2) support for several file types
that previously lacked it. Add MAC entries for chown/chmod don

Add the fo_chown and fo_chmod methods to struct fileops and use them
to implement fchown(2) and fchmod(2) support for several file types
that previously lacked it. Add MAC entries for chown/chmod done on
posix shared memory and (old) in-kernel posix semaphores.

Based on the submission by: glebius
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: re (bz)

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Merge from head

Merge from HEAD

Rename MAC Framework-internal macros used to invoke policy entry points:

MAC_BOOLEAN -> MAC_POLICY_BOOLEAN
MAC_BOOLEAN_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_BOOLEANN_NOSLEEP
MAC_CHECK

Rename MAC Framework-internal macros used to invoke policy entry points:

MAC_BOOLEAN -> MAC_POLICY_BOOLEAN
MAC_BOOLEAN_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_BOOLEANN_NOSLEEP
MAC_CHECK -> MAC_POLICY_CHECK
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP
MAC_EXTERNALIZE -> MAC_POLICY_EXTERNALIZE
MAC_GRANT -> MAC_POLICY_GRANT
MAC_GRANT_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_GRANT_NOSLEEP
MAC_INTERNALIZE -> MAC_POLICY_INTERNALIZE
MAC_PERFORM -> MAC_POLICY_PERFORM_CHECK
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_PERFORM_NOSLEEP

This frees up those macro names for use in wrapping calls into the MAC
Framework from the remainder of the kernel.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

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- Merge from HEAD

Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to
improve performance:

- Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor
threads entering the framework, as th

Rework MAC Framework synchronization in a number of ways in order to
improve performance:

- Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor
threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead
and behaved badly in the face of contention.

- Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock,
which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework
depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep
or not.

- Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive
access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks,
which occurs only when policies are attached or detached.

- Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring
any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are
loaded; this a race we can afford to lose.

- For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is
permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition
macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some
cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the
MAC Framework entry point.

As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness
warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all
acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions
for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire
other locks.

Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)

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Update the projects tree to a newer FreeBSD current.

Add static DTrace probes for MAC Framework access control checks and
privilege grants so that dtrace can be more easily used to monitor
the security decisions being generated by the MAC Framework fol

Add static DTrace probes for MAC Framework access control checks and
privilege grants so that dtrace can be more easily used to monitor
the security decisions being generated by the MAC Framework following
policy invocation.

Successful access control checks will be reported by:

mac_framework:kernel:<entrypoint>:mac_check_ok

Failed access control checks will be reported by:

mac_framework:kernel:<entrypoint>:mac_check_err

Successful privilege grants will be reported by:

mac_framework:kernel:priv_grant:mac_grant_ok

Failed privilege grants will be reported by:

mac_framework:kernel:priv_grant:mac_grant_err

In all cases, the return value (always 0 for _ok, otherwise an errno
for _err) will be reported via arg0 on the probe, and subsequent
arguments will hold entrypoint-specific data, in a style similar to
privilege tracing.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.

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Introduce two related changes to the TrustedBSD MAC Framework:

(1) Abstract interpreter vnode labeling in execve(2) and mac_execve(2)
so that the general exec code isn't aware of the details of

Introduce two related changes to the TrustedBSD MAC Framework:

(1) Abstract interpreter vnode labeling in execve(2) and mac_execve(2)
so that the general exec code isn't aware of the details of
allocating, copying, and freeing labels, rather, simply passes in
a void pointer to start and stop functions that will be used by
the framework. This change will be MFC'd.

(2) Introduce a new flags field to the MAC_POLICY_SET(9) interface
allowing policies to declare which types of objects require label
allocation, initialization, and destruction, and define a set of
flags covering various supported object types (MPC_OBJECT_PROC,
MPC_OBJECT_VNODE, MPC_OBJECT_INPCB, ...). This change reduces the
overhead of compiling the MAC Framework into the kernel if policies
aren't loaded, or if policies require labels on only a small number
or even no object types. Each time a policy is loaded or unloaded,
we recalculate a mask of labeled object types across all policies
present in the system. Eliminate MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF option as it
is no longer required.

MFC after: 1 week ((1) only)
Reviewed by: csjp
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.

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Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX
semaphores. Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file
descriptor type that is set to close on exec. This removes

Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX
semaphores. Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file
descriptor type that is set to close on exec. This removes the need for
all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit
event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of
that for us nicely. It is also suggested as one possible implementation
in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach.

Some bugs that were fixed as a result include:
- References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after
the sem_unlink() operation. Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name
was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from
sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc. This fixes that.
- Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a
process exited or exec'd. They were only cleaned up if the process
did an explicit sem_destroy(). This could result in a leak of semaphore
objects that could never be cleaned up.
- On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to
'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had
write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other
process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(),
sem_wait(), etc.
- As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces
creating the semaphore was not honored. Thus if your umask denied group
read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed
it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the
same group, for example. This includes access via the previous bug.
- If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores,
then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system
calls before it noticed that there was a problem. I'm not sure if
this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the
kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked. One can
make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event
handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during
unload after any checks). This also fixes a race where even if the
sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the
syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when
they are unloaded.

XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking
to drain any threads from the calls.
- Some minor fixes to errno values on error. For example, sem_init()
isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores
the way that sem_open() can. Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that
case.

Other changes:
- Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of
named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory
object file descriptors. Kernel semaphores can now also have names
longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories
in their pathname.
- The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now
done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks.
- Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various
MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an
active credential. There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it
is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor.
- A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present
in src/tools/regression/posixsem.

Reported by: kris (1)
Tested by: kris
Reviewed by: rwatson (lightly)
MFC after: 1 month

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Remove the posixsem_check_destroy() MAC check. It is semantically identical
to doing a MAC check for close(), but no other types of close() (including
close(2) and ksem_close(2)) have MAC checks.

D

Remove the posixsem_check_destroy() MAC check. It is semantically identical
to doing a MAC check for close(), but no other types of close() (including
close(2) and ksem_close(2)) have MAC checks.

Discussed with: rwatson

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Fix a MAC label leak for POSIX semaphores, in which per-policy labels
would be properly disposed of, but the global label structure for the
semaphore wouldn't be freed.

MFC after: 3 days
Reported by

Fix a MAC label leak for POSIX semaphores, in which per-policy labels
would be properly disposed of, but the global label structure for the
semaphore wouldn't be freed.

MFC after: 3 days
Reported by: tanyong <tanyong at ercist dot iscas dot ac dot cn>,
zhouzhouyi

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Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes
from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to
the following general forms:

mac_<object>_<method/action>
mac_<objec

Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes
from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to
the following general forms:

mac_<object>_<method/action>
mac_<object>_check_<method/action>

The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly
reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more
consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain
multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical
parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for
certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly,
some entry point names.

All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules
not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to
conform to the new KPI.

Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer

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Canonicalize naming of local variables for struct ksem and associated
labels to 'ks' and 'kslabel' to reflect the convention in posix_sem.c.

MFC after: 3 days
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

Continue 7-CURRENT MAC Framework rearrangement and cleanup:

Don't perform a nested include of _label.h in mac.h, as mac.h now
describes only the user API to MAC, and _label.h defines the in-kernel

Continue 7-CURRENT MAC Framework rearrangement and cleanup:

Don't perform a nested include of _label.h in mac.h, as mac.h now
describes only the user API to MAC, and _label.h defines the in-kernel
representation of MAC labels.

Remove mac.h includes from policies and MAC framework components that do
not use userspace MAC API definitions.

Add _KERNEL inclusion checks to mac_internal.h and mac_policy.h, as these
are kernel-only include files

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

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Move src/sys/sys/mac_policy.h, the kernel interface between the MAC
Framework and security modules, to src/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h,
completing the removal of kernel-only MAC Framework include f

Move src/sys/sys/mac_policy.h, the kernel interface between the MAC
Framework and security modules, to src/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h,
completing the removal of kernel-only MAC Framework include files from
src/sys/sys. Update the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules. Delete
the old mac_policy.h.

Third party policy modules will need similar updating.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

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Minor style fixes.