Fix typo in VERIEXEC_VERIFIED_FILE

Reviewed by: stevek

sys: Remove $FreeBSD$: one-line .h pattern

Remove /^\s*\*+\s*\$FreeBSD\$.*$\n/

veriexec: Rename old VERIEXEC_SIGNED_LOAD as VERIEXEC_SIGNED_LOAD32

We need to handle old ioctl from old binary.

Add some missing ioctls.

Obtained from: Juniper Networks, Inc.

veriexec: Additional functionality for MAC/veriexec

Ensure veriexec opens the file before doing any read operations.

When the MAC_VERIEXEC_CHECK_PATH_SYSCALL syscall is requested, veriexec
needs to

veriexec: Additional functionality for MAC/veriexec

Ensure veriexec opens the file before doing any read operations.

When the MAC_VERIEXEC_CHECK_PATH_SYSCALL syscall is requested, veriexec
needs to open the file before calling mac_veriexec_check_vp. This is to
ensure any set up is done by the file system. Most file systems do not
explicitly need an open, but some (e.g. virtfs) require initialization
of access tokens (file identifiers, etc.) before doing any read or write
operations.

The evaluate_fingerprint() function needs to ensure it has an open file
for reading in order to evaluate the fingerprint. The ideal solution is
to have a hook after the VOP_OPEN call in vn_open. For now, we open the
file for reading, envaluate the fingerprint, and close the file. While
this leaves a potential hole that could possibly be taken advantage of
by a dedicated aversary, this code path is not typically visited often
in our use cases, as we primarily encounter verified mounts and not
individual files. This should be considered a temporary workaround until
discussions about the post-open hook have concluded and the hook becomes
available.

Add MAC_VERIEXEC_GET_PARAMS_PATH_SYSCALL and
MAC_VERIEXEC_GET_PARAMS_PID_SYSCALL to mac_veriexec_syscall so we can
fetch and check label contents in an unconstrained manner.

Add a check for PRIV_VERIEXEC_CONTROL to do ioctl on /dev/veriexec

Make it clear that trusted process cannot be debugged. Attempts to debug
a trusted process already fail, but the failure path is very obscure.
Add an explicit check for VERIEXEC_TRUSTED in
mac_veriexec_proc_check_debug.

We need mac_veriexec_priv_check to not block PRIV_KMEM_WRITE if
mac_priv_gant() says it is ok.

Reviewed by: sjg
Obtained from: Juniper Networks, Inc.

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MFHead @348740

Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation

Add a new ioctl for the larger params struct that includes the label.

We need to make the find_veriexec_file() function available publicly, so
rename it to mac_veriexec_metadata_find_file_info() and

Add a new ioctl for the larger params struct that includes the label.

We need to make the find_veriexec_file() function available publicly, so
rename it to mac_veriexec_metadata_find_file_info() and make it non-static.

Bump the version of the veriexec device interface so user space will know
the labelized version of fingerprint loading is available.

Approved by: sjg
Obtained from: Juniper Networks, Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20295

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Add command to get version of the ioctl interface for the veriexec device.

Obtained from: Juniper Networks, Inc.
MFC after: 1 week

Device for user space to interface with MAC/veriexec.

The veriexec device features the following ioctl commands:

VERIEXEC_ACTIVE
Activate veriexec functionality
VERIEXEC_DEBUG_ON
Enable debuggi

Device for user space to interface with MAC/veriexec.

The veriexec device features the following ioctl commands:

VERIEXEC_ACTIVE
Activate veriexec functionality
VERIEXEC_DEBUG_ON
Enable debugging mode and increment or set the debug level
VERIEXEC_DEBUG_OFF
Disable debugging mode
VERIEXEC_ENFORCE
Enforce veriexec fingerprinting (and acitvate if not already)
VERIEXEC_GETSTATE
Get current veriexec state
VERIEXEC_LOCK
Lock changes to veriexec meta-data store
VERIEXEC_LOAD
Load veriexec fingerprint if secure level is not raised (and passes the
checks for VERIEXEC_SIGNED_LOAD)
VERIEXEC_SIGNED_LOAD
Load veriexec fingerprints from loader that supports signed manifest
(and thus we can be more lenient about secure level being raised.)
Fingerprints can be loaded if the meta-data store is not locked. Also
securelevel must not have been raised or some fingerprints must have
already been loaded, otherwise it would be dangerous to allow loading.
(Note: this assumes that the fingerprints in the meta-data store at
least cover the fingerprint loader.)

Reviewed by: jtl
Obtained from: Juniper Networks, Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8561

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