Revision tags: release/14.0.0 |
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95ee2897 |
| 16-Aug-2023 |
Warner Losh <imp@FreeBSD.org> |
sys: Remove $FreeBSD$: two-line .h pattern
Remove /^\s*\*\n \*\s+\$FreeBSD\$$\n/
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Revision tags: release/13.2.0, release/12.4.0, release/13.1.0, release/12.3.0, release/13.0.0, release/12.2.0, release/11.4.0, release/12.1.0, release/11.3.0 |
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e532a999 |
| 20-Jun-2019 |
Alan Somers <asomers@FreeBSD.org> |
MFHead @349234
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
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179f6280 |
| 17-Jun-2019 |
Conrad Meyer <cem@FreeBSD.org> |
random(4): Fortuna: allow increased concurrency
Add experimental feature to increase concurrency in Fortuna. As this diverges slightly from canonical Fortuna, and due to the security sensitivity of
random(4): Fortuna: allow increased concurrency
Add experimental feature to increase concurrency in Fortuna. As this diverges slightly from canonical Fortuna, and due to the security sensitivity of random(4), it is off by default. To enable it, set the tunable kern.random.fortuna.concurrent_read="1". The rest of this commit message describes the behavior when enabled.
Readers continue to update shared Fortuna state under global mutex, as they do in the status quo implementation of the algorithm, but shift the actual PRF generation out from under the global lock. This massively reduces the CPU time readers spend holding the global lock, allowing for increased concurrency on SMP systems and less bullying of the harvestq kthread.
It is somewhat of a deviation from FS&K. I think the primary difference is that the specific sequence of AES keys will differ if READ_RANDOM_UIO is accessed concurrently (as the 2nd thread to take the mutex will no longer receive a key derived from rekeying the first thread). However, I believe the goals of rekeying AES are maintained: trivially, we continue to rekey every 1MB for the statistical property; and each consumer gets a forward-secret, independent AES key for their PRF.
Since Chacha doesn't need to rekey for sequences of any length, this change makes no difference to the sequence of Chacha keys and PRF generated when Chacha is used in place of AES.
On a GENERIC 4-thread VM (so, INVARIANTS/WITNESS, numbers not necessarily representative), 3x concurrent AES performance jumped from ~55 MiB/s per thread to ~197 MB/s per thread. Concurrent Chacha20 at 3 threads went from roughly ~113 MB/s per thread to ~430 MB/s per thread.
Prior to this change, the system was extremely unresponsive with 3-4 concurrent random readers; each thread had high variance in latency and throughput, depending on who got lucky and won the lock. "rand_harvestq" thread CPU use was high (double digits), seemingly due to spinning on the global lock.
After the change, concurrent random readers and the system in general are much more responsive, and rand_harvestq CPU use dropped to basically zero.
Tests are added to the devrandom suite to ensure the uint128_add64 primitive utilized by unlocked read functions to specification.
Reviewed by: markm Approved by: secteam(delphij) Relnotes: yes Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20313
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2aaf9152 |
| 18-Mar-2019 |
Alan Somers <asomers@FreeBSD.org> |
MFHead@r345275
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ff511f1f |
| 11-Mar-2019 |
Enji Cooper <ngie@FreeBSD.org> |
MFhead@r344996
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ab69c485 |
| 08-Mar-2019 |
Conrad Meyer <cem@FreeBSD.org> |
Fortuna: Add Chacha20 as an alternative stream cipher
Chacha20 with a 256 bit key and 128 bit counter size is a good match for an AES256-ICM replacement.
In userspace, Chacha20 is typically margina
Fortuna: Add Chacha20 as an alternative stream cipher
Chacha20 with a 256 bit key and 128 bit counter size is a good match for an AES256-ICM replacement.
In userspace, Chacha20 is typically marginally slower than AES-ICM on machines with AESNI intrinsics, but typically much faster than AES on machines without special intrinsics. ChaCha20 does well on typical modern architectures with SIMD instructions, which includes most types of machines FreeBSD runs on.
In the kernel, we can't (or don't) make use of AESNI intrinsics for random(4) anyway. So even on amd64, using Chacha provides a modest performance improvement in random device throughput today.
This change makes the stream cipher used by random(4) configurable at boot time with the 'kern.random.use_chacha20_cipher' tunable.
Very rough, non-scientific measurements at the /dev/random device, on a GENERIC-NODEBUG amd64 VM with 'pv', show a factor of 2.2x higher throughput for Chacha20 over the existing AES-ICM mode.
Reviewed by: delphij, markm Approved by: secteam (delphij) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19475
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Revision tags: release/12.0.0, release/11.2.0, release/10.4.0, release/11.1.0, release/11.0.1, release/11.0.0, release/10.3.0 |
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b5ff185e |
| 12-Sep-2015 |
Baptiste Daroussin <bapt@FreeBSD.org> |
Merge from head
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ab875b71 |
| 14-Aug-2015 |
Navdeep Parhar <np@FreeBSD.org> |
Catch up with head, primarily for the 1.14.4.0 firmware.
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Revision tags: release/10.2.0 |
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4cd9b24e |
| 04-Jul-2015 |
Dimitry Andric <dim@FreeBSD.org> |
Merge ^/head r284737 through r285152.
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d1b06863 |
| 30-Jun-2015 |
Mark Murray <markm@FreeBSD.org> |
Huge cleanup of random(4) code.
* GENERAL - Update copyright. - Make kernel options for RANDOM_YARROW and RANDOM_DUMMY. Set neither to ON, which means we want Fortuna - If there is no 'device rand
Huge cleanup of random(4) code.
* GENERAL - Update copyright. - Make kernel options for RANDOM_YARROW and RANDOM_DUMMY. Set neither to ON, which means we want Fortuna - If there is no 'device random' in the kernel, there will be NO random(4) device in the kernel, and the KERN_ARND sysctl will return nothing. With RANDOM_DUMMY there will be a random(4) that always blocks. - Repair kern.arandom (KERN_ARND sysctl). The old version went through arc4random(9) and was a bit weird. - Adjust arc4random stirring a bit - the existing code looks a little suspect. - Fix the nasty pre- and post-read overloading by providing explictit functions to do these tasks. - Redo read_random(9) so as to duplicate random(4)'s read internals. This makes it a first-class citizen rather than a hack. - Move stuff out of locked regions when it does not need to be there. - Trim RANDOM_DEBUG printfs. Some are excess to requirement, some behind boot verbose. - Use SYSINIT to sequence the startup. - Fix init/deinit sysctl stuff. - Make relevant sysctls also tunables. - Add different harvesting "styles" to allow for different requirements (direct, queue, fast). - Add harvesting of FFS atime events. This needs to be checked for weighing down the FS code. - Add harvesting of slab allocator events. This needs to be checked for weighing down the allocator code. - Fix the random(9) manpage. - Loadable modules are not present for now. These will be re-engineered when the dust settles. - Use macros for locks. - Fix comments.
* src/share/man/... - Update the man pages.
* src/etc/... - The startup/shutdown work is done in D2924.
* src/UPDATING - Add UPDATING announcement.
* src/sys/dev/random/build.sh - Add copyright. - Add libz for unit tests.
* src/sys/dev/random/dummy.c - Remove; no longer needed. Functionality incorporated into randomdev.*.
* live_entropy_sources.c live_entropy_sources.h - Remove; content moved. - move content to randomdev.[ch] and optimise.
* src/sys/dev/random/random_adaptors.c src/sys/dev/random/random_adaptors.h - Remove; plugability is no longer used. Compile-time algorithm selection is the way to go.
* src/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.c src/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.h - Add early (re)boot-time randomness caching.
* src/sys/dev/random/randomdev_soft.c src/sys/dev/random/randomdev_soft.h - Remove; no longer needed.
* src/sys/dev/random/uint128.h - Provide a fake uint128_t; if a real one ever arrived, we can use that instead. All that is needed here is N=0, N++, N==0, and some localised trickery is used to manufacture a 128-bit 0ULLL.
* src/sys/dev/random/unit_test.c src/sys/dev/random/unit_test.h - Improve unit tests; previously the testing human needed clairvoyance; now the test will do a basic check of compressibility. Clairvoyant talent is still a good idea. - This is still a long way off a proper unit test.
* src/sys/dev/random/fortuna.c src/sys/dev/random/fortuna.h - Improve messy union to just uint128_t. - Remove unneeded 'static struct fortuna_start_cache'. - Tighten up up arithmetic. - Provide a method to allow eternal junk to be introduced; harden it against blatant by compress/hashing. - Assert that locks are held correctly. - Fix the nasty pre- and post-read overloading by providing explictit functions to do these tasks. - Turn into self-sufficient module (no longer requires randomdev_soft.[ch])
* src/sys/dev/random/yarrow.c src/sys/dev/random/yarrow.h - Improve messy union to just uint128_t. - Remove unneeded 'staic struct start_cache'. - Tighten up up arithmetic. - Provide a method to allow eternal junk to be introduced; harden it against blatant by compress/hashing. - Assert that locks are held correctly. - Fix the nasty pre- and post-read overloading by providing explictit functions to do these tasks. - Turn into self-sufficient module (no longer requires randomdev_soft.[ch]) - Fix some magic numbers elsewhere used as FAST and SLOW.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2025 Reviewed by: vsevolod,delphij,rwatson,trasz,jmg Approved by: so (delphij)
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8f0ea33f |
| 13-Jan-2015 |
Glen Barber <gjb@FreeBSD.org> |
Reintegrate head revisions r273096-r277147
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
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9268022b |
| 19-Nov-2014 |
Simon J. Gerraty <sjg@FreeBSD.org> |
Merge from head@274682
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Revision tags: release/10.1.0 |
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5c9ef378 |
| 04-Nov-2014 |
Alexander V. Chernikov <melifaro@FreeBSD.org> |
Sync to HEAD@r274095.
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10cb2424 |
| 30-Oct-2014 |
Mark Murray <markm@FreeBSD.org> |
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random.
This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other p
This is the much-discussed major upgrade to the random(4) device, known to you all as /dev/random.
This code has had an extensive rewrite and a good series of reviews, both by the author and other parties. This means a lot of code has been simplified. Pluggable structures for high-rate entropy generators are available, and it is most definitely not the case that /dev/random can be driven by only a hardware souce any more. This has been designed out of the device. Hardware sources are stirred into the CSPRNG (Yarrow, Fortuna) like any other entropy source. Pluggable modules may be written by third parties for additional sources.
The harvesting structures and consequently the locking have been simplified. Entropy harvesting is done in a more general way (the documentation for this will follow). There is some GREAT entropy to be had in the UMA allocator, but it is disabled for now as messing with that is likely to annoy many people.
The venerable (but effective) Yarrow algorithm, which is no longer supported by its authors now has an alternative, Fortuna. For now, Yarrow is retained as the default algorithm, but this may be changed using a kernel option. It is intended to make Fortuna the default algorithm for 11.0. Interested parties are encouraged to read ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" By Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno for Fortuna's gory details. Heck, read it anyway.
Many thanks to Arthur Mesh who did early grunt work, and who got caught in the crossfire rather more than he deserved to.
My thanks also to folks who helped me thresh this out on whiteboards and in the odd "Hallway track", or otherwise.
My Nomex pants are on. Let the feedback commence!
Reviewed by: trasz,des(partial),imp(partial?),rwatson(partial?) Approved by: so(des)
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